Assessing the Theory of Demographics as Destiny & Patterns of Bloc Voting in the United States

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Assessing The Theory of Demographics As Destiny & Patterns of Bloc Voting in The United States

Senior Project submitted to
the Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

By
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Table of Contents

I. Introduction, Part One: The Browning (and Greying) of America................................................3

II. Introduction, Part Two: The “Four Basic Assumptions” of the “Demographics as Destiny” Theory........................................................................................................................................7

III. Defining Demographics.................................................................................................................17

IV. Minority Turnout Strategy: Democrats vs. Republicans..............................................................42

V. Minority Turnout and the 2016 General Election........................................................................60

VI. Voter Fraud and Gerrymandering...............................................................................................69

VII. Conclusion..................................................................................................................................88
I. Introduction, Part One: The Browning (and Greying) of America

The demographics of the United States of America are changing. As it is now, Black Americans comprise 13.6% of the total U.S. population\(^1\), while Hispanic or Latino Americans are reported to be 16.3% of the population according to the 2010 Census\(^2\). This is up from around 12 percentage points, respectively, for each these groups in the 2000 census. Minorities are participating in the electoral process in increasing numbers: In 2012, 17,813,000 blacks turned out to vote (a net increase of 1.68 million voters over 2008) while 11,188,000 Latinos cast ballots (a net increase of 1.44 million over 2008), according to a U.S. Census report\(^3\). That same report notes that for the first time, the percentage of age-eligible blacks who cast votes, 66.2%, was higher than that of white americans, 64.1%.

It should be noted that these figures refer to turn-out in a presidential election—with a Black candidate, the first minority candidate to be nominated by a major political party, and the first such candidate to win a presidential election— but it is also true that the rate of black voter turnout has been increasing steadily over the past 20 years. It would be understandable to regard these results as somewhat exceptional, but what cannot be disputed is that America is becoming an


older, darker nation. In fact, the United States is projected to become a majority-minority country by 2050\textsuperscript{4}. This means that there will be more black and brown people in the U.S. than there will be whites. A U.S. News and World Report article states that of the 20 Million children in 2014 who were under five years old, 50.2\% of them were nonwhites. Of these 20 million children, 22\% are black, and 15\% are Latino, with the rest being Asians or other nonwhite groups. More than half of all kids under the age of 18 are projected to be nonwhite by 2020\textsuperscript{5}. America is a much more diverse country than it once was. With a record 14.6\% percent of all new marriages in 2012 being inter-race, attitudes regarding miscegenation have also significantly shifted.

Even in lily-white Iowa, with its 91\% Caucasian population\textsuperscript{6}, demographics are changing. Children of a race other than white and/or who are Hispanic represent 21.1\% percent of Iowa’s 0-5 population and 17.2\% percent of the 6-17 population, but only 2.9\% percent of the 65-plus population. Over the last two decades, the Hispanic young-child population in Iowa has more than doubled, and, in fact, people of Hispanic descent are now the largest minority group in the state. Growth has not been limited merely to Hispanics, since all other races, including those who


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.

identify as multiple races, have seen population growth. Iowa’s population is projected to continue becoming more diverse over the next decade, although at a slower rate than during the beginning of the century. The growth of minority communities is a key component of overall population growth in the state. Without growth among children of color and/or of Hispanic descent, Iowa’s young child population would have declined statewide and in 70 of 99 counties.

An equally compelling trend-line to study is the change in demographics in terms of age, which can affect the strength of the narrative of change in party alignment along racial lines in ways that may not always be linear. According to Pew Research Center, American fertility is at an all-time low, with 62.5 births per 1,000 women of childbearing age. A University of Nebraska-Omaha study based on recently released data from births in 2013 has recently challenged conventional wisdom by suggesting that fertility rates amongst different ethnic groups in America are now much more similar than in the recent past, with Hispanic birth rates declining every year between 2007 and 2013 to 83 births per thousand women ages 13-44, while black non-Hispanics give birth at a rate of 65 births per one thousand women in the same age group. Prior to the recession, the black fertility rate was nearly 30 points below the Hispanic rate. The U.S. white non-Hispanic fertility rate has held stable since 1990, with 60 births per 1,000 women. Thanks to advances in medical technology, one in seven Americans was over the age of 65 in 2014, and in 15

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7 It should be noted that the Census’s identification of people of two or more races is a fairly recent development, so it is difficult to determine objectively what percentage increases mean in this case. The possible consequences of this development are at this moment too speculative to be included in this assessment of the debate regarding the significance of demographics in determining general election outcomes.
years, that will change to one in five Americans\(^8\). The age of America’s population has increased at an unabated pace, with a median age over 40 years old in many states, and America’s population also grew at a faster rate in the older ages than in the younger ages from 2000-2010. According to the U.S. Census,

“Between 2000 and 2010, the population under the age of 18 grew at a rate of 2.6 percent. The growth rate was even slower for those aged 18 to 44 (0.6 percent). This contrasts with the substantially faster growth rates seen at older ages. The population aged 45 to 64 grew at a rate of 31.5 percent. The large growth in this age group is primarily due to the aging of the Baby Boom population. Finally, the population aged 65 and over also grew at a faster rate (15.1 percent) than the population under age 45.”\(^9\)

The graying of America, coupled with the inherent differences between how young and old people vote, both within and across racial lines, will strongly affect the 2016 general election and all elections hereafter.

II. Introduction, Part Two: The “Four Basic Assumptions” of the “Demographics as Destiny” Theory

After the election of president Barack Obama in 2008, many professional prognosticators predicted a bleak future for the Republican party. The exit poll showed that President Obama strengthened the party’s hold on blacks and Hispanics, as well as young voters, constituent groups that pundits claimed were to become the Democratic Party’s core electorate. He carried Hispanics

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67 to 31 percent, despite Republican opponent John McCain's support of comprehensive immigration legislation (in 2012, he carried Hispanics 71-27%)\textsuperscript{10}. This is a marked increase over the 2004 general election, in which John Kerry claimed 53% of the Latino vote to Bush’s 44%\textsuperscript{11}, and over Gore’s 62% of the Hispanic vote in 2000\textsuperscript{12}, when Latinos were only 7% of the electorate(they comprised 8.4% of the electorate in 2012). Obama carried voters under 30 – the so-called Millennial Generation – by 66 to 32 percent, and, according to marketing researchers Experian, 45% of Millennials are people of color. If these trends in voter allegiance across racial lines were to continue along with the projected majority-minority demographic shift by 2050, it would be reasonable to predict either the demise of the Republican party, or a radical shift in the party’s ideology to accommodate minority voters. This argument was widely deemed the “Demographics as Destiny” theory\textsuperscript{13}.

As Obama began to get into the actual business of governing, and his symbolic political victory gave way to the pragmatic challenge of governing amongst the most politically divided Congress of the 20th or 21st centuries, the opinion of minority groups has soured slightly with regards to his job performance. In Gallup polls, Obama's job approval among Hispanics declined from 75 percent in 2012 to 52 in 2013 and among Millennials from 61 percent in 2012 to 46

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Rodriguez, Cindy Y. "Latino Vote Key To Obama's Re-election." CNN. Cable News Network, 9 Nov. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Barone, Michael. "Demographics May Be Destiny -- But Not One Political Direction | RealClearPolitics." RealClearPolitics, 13 May 2014. Web.
\end{enumerate}
percent in 2013\textsuperscript{14}. This did not stop Barack Obama, however, from improving on his 2008 performance amongst minority groups, as the above paragraph has indicated.

As the 2012 and 2014 elections rolled around, below the presidential level, Democrats slid into arguably their weakest condition since the 1920s. Despite the increases in Black and Hispanic population across the United States and the record turnouts for President Obama in 2008, this failed to create Democratic victories at the state and congressional levels. This points to a problem with the “Demographics as Destiny” argument. Whites now, and for the foreseeable future, will cast an overwhelming majority of the nation’s ballots in both midterms (75\% of the vote, according to 2014 exit polls) and presidential elections (72\% in 2012), and in 2010, 2012 and 2014, they favored the Republicans by a whopping 20 percentage points or more\textsuperscript{15}. More white people voted for Mitt Romney in 2012 than voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980. Barack Obama lost white voters by 20 points — the widest margin since 1984\textsuperscript{16}.

On the other hand, the “demographic change” argument is based on four basic assumptions that may not ever come to fruition. First, that the minority population (especially Hispanics) will continue to grow by leaps and bounds. Though U.S. births have been the main driving force behind the increase of Hispanics in America, accounting for 78\% of the population growth amongst this population, they are no longer the fastest-growing population in the country,


ranking 2nd behind Asian-Americans in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, the most recent year for which data was available\textsuperscript{17}. The number of Latino immigrants in the United States stalled in 2010 at around 18.8 million, and the foreign-born share of Latinos is now in decline\textsuperscript{18}. A second important assumption is that minorities will soon register to vote and cast ballots in proportion to their share of the population. Thirdly, that minorities will continue indefinitely to be a reliable part of the Democratic coalition is not guaranteed. Fourthly, nor is it certain that minority allegiance to the Democratic party will necessarily offset shifts along different variables (age being the most important “other variable”). For Demographics to be Destiny, all four of these conditions must be met.

The evidence in support of the first assumption remains to be seen and will not be clear for years. The second has not happened as yet, and it is not clear when it will happen. Hispanics, for example, comprise 16% of the nation’s population, according to the 2010 Census, but cast only 10% of the ballots in 2012 and 8% in 2014, according to national exit polls. This is despite the fact that the share of all legal foreign-born residents who have become naturalized U.S. citizens rose to 56% in 2011, the highest rate in over three decades and an 18% leap over the year 1990\textsuperscript{19}. As of 2011, 9.7 million immigrants to the United States had not yet naturalized, with more than a third (3.5 million) of these people being Mexicans. The Mexican naturalization rate has flattened, and

\textsuperscript{17}“U.S. Hispanic and Asian populations growing, but for different reasons”. Brown, Anna. Pew Research Center. 26 June 2014. Web.


the country has the lowest rate of naturalized American citizens compared with other immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean (61% in 2011). This could be because 29% percent of Mexican immigrants are unaware that Mexico allows them to hold dual citizenship with both America and Mexico, though it should be taken into account that even though non-Mexican Latino immigrants are even less clear on the subject, with 38% responding that they are unaware of their country’s dual citizenship laws, their rate of naturalization is nearly double that of Mexican immigrants. Another reason for the lack of naturalization amongst Mexican immigrants is Mexicans’ significant feelings of belonging with their home country and families in Mexico, and a reluctance to embrace an identity as an American citizen, and ergo, a reluctance to have a voice in American politics.

The third assumption, that minorities will remain solidly Democratic is open to debate. The Republican share of the Hispanic vote in national exit polls increased from 27% in 2012 to about 35% in 2014— though it should be noted that presidential and midterm elections function differently, the increase in such a short time is still significant. Exit-poll data from 2016 will be necessarily in order to draw a full conclusion from this observation. Additionally, though they are not yet a statistically large-enough voting bloc to significantly swing elections at this moment in time (Asians cast 3% of the vote in both 2008 and 2012 elections), the GOP share of the Asian vote nearly doubled, from 26% in 2012 to about 50% this time.

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At the state level, things are looking positively dismal for Democrats, despite the population advantages they should be reaping. Final statewide results certified by California Secretary of State Debra Bowen showed the November 4, 2014, General Election brought a record low turnout for a regularly scheduled general election: 42.2 percent of registered voters. By contrast, the last gubernatorial general election in November 2010 drew nearly 60 percent of registered voters. Also, in 2014 Californians created another record, although not one they should necessarily be proud of: a record for their lowest statewide primary election turnout ever, just 25.2 percent in June 2014. Just one-quarter of California voters selected the candidates for the other 75%.

The fourth assumption, that advantageous racial demographics for Democrats could offset advantageous age demographics for Republicans, is exceptional among our assumptions in that it may have already been proven untrue. White Californians vote in significantly larger numbers than their minority counterparts. Although Whites now make up only 38.8% of the state's population, 57 percent of voters who cast ballots in the 2014 midterm were Caucasian. This is extraordinary considering that Latinos are, as of March 2014, the largest ethnic group in the state of California, making up 39% of the state’s population. The Latino population of California is relatively young, with a median age of about 29, while the greying white population has a median age of 45, so this

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may help provide an understanding of what happened in the 2014 midterm—people between the age of 45 and 64 make up the largest share of voters nationwide, and only 8.2 percent of Californians age 18-24 cast a ballot in 2014. Therefore, favorable racial demographics for Democrats did not offset favorable age demographics for Republicans in California’s 2014 General Election, and there is reason to believe this may be the case elsewhere as well.

Once populated overwhelmingly by a demographic generally considered favorable to Republicans, no other plausibly competitive state has seen a more favorable shift for Democrats in the racial composition of eligible voters over the last decade than the state of Georgia. According to data from the Georgia secretary of state, the 2010 electorate in the Peach State was 66.3 percent white and 28.2 percent black. Since then, the white share of registered voters has fallen, to 58 percent from 62.6 percent. The pace of demographic change is so fast that Michelle Nunn, a Democrat, was, in 2014, locked in a tight race against the Republican David Perdue for an open Senate seat—even with an off-year electorate that was favorable for the G.O.P.24 However, Perdue eventually won by 7.9% of the vote, and with less than 10% of the minority vote. Despite favorable demographic advantages, Democrats were unable to flip the Senate seat to blue, or even significantly hurt Perdue, who maintained a larger margin-of-victory in the general election than his forebear Saxby Chambliss, whose margin in the 2008 general was three percentage points25, though a runoff excluding the libertarian candidate in December of 2008 found Chambliss’s


margin of victory extending to 12 percentage points (the libertarian candidate, Allen Buckley, received 3.4% in 2008, improving on his 2004 run by 1.3%)\textsuperscript{26}.

Though Georgia’s Secretary of State did not tabulate results from this race, in nearby North Carolina, which is demographically quite similar and also had an open Senate seat Democrats were hoping to claim, 70 percent of the voters in that election were 40 years old or older\textsuperscript{27}. Likewise, Democrats did not pick up the North Carolina seat. California, North Carolina, and perhaps Georgia all show how increases in minority population and even turnout are not enough to offset white middle-aged and senior voters’ preference towards Republican candidates.

In Texas the situation may appear to be better on the surface for Democrats when it is actually even worse. Rather than the black-white shift of a state like Georgia, Latinos are projected to become the majority demographic group by 2040. Latino-Americans do not have the same historical ties to the civil rights movement as black americans, ergo they are not as loyal to the Democratic party. For the past 20 years, Texas has consistently voted Republican across the board. Over this period, Texas’ Latino population increased rapidly and Latinos continue to vote in low, although increasing, rates. In 2000, Latinos represented 18.5% of registered voters in Texas, however, only 29.5% of registered Latino voters actually voted that year. In recent elections, this pattern has begun to change as Latinos have grown closer to representing 50 percent of Texas’ population and more are beginning to realize the power of their vote. In 2012, Latinos comprised


\textsuperscript{27} "North Carolina, Georgia Go Red at Midterm despite Demographic Changes." PBS. PBS, 5 November 2014. Web.
25% of registered voters in Texas and close to 40% voted, while Republicans running in Texas draw 40 percent of the Latino vote on average—meaning that Texan Latinos are not a Democratic bloc-vote. In 2014, the Latino vote was split, and they were not moved to the polls in greater numbers. Latinos made up 17% of the voter turnout in 2014, the same as in 2010, with 48% of Latinos voting for Republican U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, besting his Democratic opponent, David Alameel, who got 47 percent, according to exit polls. Additional exit polls also showed GOP governor-elect Greg Abbott winning 44 percent of the Latino vote, a higher percentage than the 38 percent Republican Gov. Rick Perry won in 2010, though Democrat Wendy Davis won the Latino vote by 55%. According to, Janet Murguía, president and CEO of the National Council of La Raza, the 2014 election in Texas was “a lost opportunity for Democrats.” Though 25 million Latinos were eligible to vote, only about 2,261,000 did. Those that did show up to the polls tended to vote Republican more than one might assume.

Texas already has one of the lowest turnouts in the country, with 33.6% of all eligible voters voting in 2014, and the state’s new voter ID law has been estimated by one federal judge could have kept away over 600,000 registered voters, many of them Hispanics and other


31 Ibid.
minorities\textsuperscript{32}. Even if the 600,000 additional voters were all Democrats, it would not be enough to offset Cornyn’s tremendous statewide win (with a victory margin of 1.3 million votes), nor Abbott’s (900,000 votes.)\textsuperscript{33}

What is the G.O.P. doing to a) bring minority voters into their party and b) maintain their grip on working-class whites and older voters? Conversely, how are Democrats attempting to reach out to minority voters and increase registration, and how effective have their tactics been? How are they battling against efforts to subdue the black vote through the stripping of the Voting Rights Act, and suppressive measures such as gerrymandering and Voter ID? Can Democrats count on the black and hispanic vote forever, and will demographics truly be destiny?

From the evidence available, it appears that the Demographics as Destiny argument is flawed. Though the browning of America will have an effect on elections, it is just one of several trends in American politics which interact and affect turnout, including the “graying” of America, the slow collapse of religious authority embodied by the encroachment of atheism, and the declining levels of union membership and power of labor as a political force. These demographic groups are not exclusive— one can be a young black youth and a union member, or none of the above. In fact, many individuals can be assigned to any number of demographic cohorts—color, race, wealth, employed or unemployed, years of education, native born or immigrant, rural or urban, et cetera. Often times, competing cohort interests overlap, and individuals must prioritize

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\textsuperscript{33} “Turnout and Voter Registration Figures (1970-current)”. Texas Secretary of State. Web.
\end{quote}
the interests of one facet of their demography over another. This is why one cannot simply say, “all Latino people vote or will vote this way” and why Texan Latinos vote differently than Californian Latinos.

Though whites may indeed become the minority, and non-whites have supported Democratic candidates by 2/3rds or greater margins for the past several presidential elections, the Democrats still have not solved the problem of how to turn out voters in situations with favorable demographics in such a manner as to turn historically red seats blue, which will be detailed in this paper’s case studies. This is an attempt to offer a less sexy and more sophisticated understanding of the categorical claims made regarding minority voters. An understanding of how membership in certain voter cohorts can affect turnout over time is essential for understanding the measures that parties might take to make sure that demography is or is not destiny.

III. Defining Demographics

Before we begin to discuss the Demographics as Destiny theory, it’s origins, and it’s implications, we must first discuss demographics in general. What makes a group of people a demographic? Webster’s Dictionary defines “demographic” as “relating to the dynamic balance of a population especially with regard to density and capacity for expansion or decline.”34 This refers to

a technical definition of the word which is used primarily in sociology, but firstly by advertising and other sales professions and was later adopted by political analysts. The application of the word to a grouping with specified common characteristics has been applied to elections, where the demographics in question are often age-related—as in tailoring a TV show for a 18-25 demographic. Populations can be divided in ways which may or may not influence voter turnout, such as race, class, urban/rural, religious affinity, national origin, Strauss-Howe generational cohort, type of work (are they a member of the “creative class”? ) sports team affinity, and any other grouping that one may have an inkling could prove helpful in subdividing a population by. The use of the word in advertising, commerce, and political journalism/management uses it to refer to one or another of the groupings that are relevant to the process of interest, and is mostly a question of selling something or getting a product accepted by a certain demographic. So which demographic cohorts create the strongest affinity ties, and why do certain demographics forge allegiances with particular opinions and the parties these opinions are represented by?

There are several sub-groups of varyingly liberal and conservative flavors making up the core constituencies of the Democratic and Republican parties. Across a range of economic issues (which, across all demographics, are considered the most important issues when it comes to determining which party or candidate one will vote for), the most liberal views tend to be held by lower-income minorities, while the most conservative views are held by high-income whites. The more religious people are typically in the conservative constituency (including religious non-whites), while those who attend church less typically agree with liberal policy points (correlation does not imply causation). The Republican coalition has a stable core of socially conservative,
heterosexual whites, mostly rich and pious, though some of whom go to church less than others and some of whom are less wealthy. The Democratic coalition does not have a demographic base of whites or rich people or religious people to provide the party an overall structure, but is instead constituted of the plurality of minority stakeholders such as blacks, Latinos, Jews35 and LGBT people, with strong support coming from urban American coastal enclaves. Democratic party members are united in their disagreements with Republican ideology, though the disagreements may differ depending on what demographic group a Democratic party member may belong to. In the Democratic party, issues such as support for environmentalism and overall policies of redistributive economics and government-mandated equal treatment regardless of sex, gender, or creed tend to be the issues on which the majority of its base can agree on.

Political scientists have long noticed a lack of liberal-conservative coherence amongst people with less human capital (which can alternatively be called class privilege)36; that is, amongst these populations there is less consistency in relation to standard schemes of contrasting ideologies. Their views are less likely to belong in a rigid liberal or conservative “system”. African-Americans, who are on average more religious, poorer, and less educated than whites, favor Democrats by a ratio of more than ten-to-one. The typical black person goes to church two or three

35 It should be noted that synagogue attendance does not correspond with conservatism in the same way that church attendance does. The values of the Jewish people inscribed in the Torah can be described as community-oriented and favoring collectivism and charity (which they call mitzvahs). Thus, historically, Jews have aligned themselves with liberal politicians and parties, including in America, where many early Socialists and Communists were Jewish immigrants. Jews have leaned Democratic in every election since Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, who was the first president to prioritize the needs of the Jewish people and provide aid to then newly-formed Israel.

36 Eg. Converse 1964; Ellis & Stimson 2012; Claassen, Tucker & Smith 2013.
times a month— most whites go two or three times a year. though around a third of whites have college degrees, only 15% of blacks do. Households headed by African-Americans typically earn $20-40,000 a year less than those of white families. African-Americans who fall into this socio-economic archetype typically make up around half of the Democratic party’s constituency— the other half is far wealthier, more educated, is whiter and has less faith. The Democratic party is a diverse tent under which both the poorest and most pious black Americans and wealthier, less pious caucasians come together to make policy. This diversity is present mainly amongst supporters, though it is found in the Democratic leadership as well. According to Jason Weeden and Roger Kurtzbahn, authors of The Hidden Agenda of the Political Mind: How Self-Interest Shapes Our Opinions and Why We Won’t Admit It, On many issues Democratic party members may disagree— eight in ten richer, white Democratic party members do not mind premarital or homosexual intercourse, and would legalize pot. Less than a third of church-going African-Americans support either of these positions. Almost nine-in-ten richer, whiter Democratic party members approve of the banning of prayer in schools, while less than two-in-ten black churchgoing Americans agree. On racial issues, white Democrats are typically more middle of the road or approaching conservative values, whereas churchgoing blacks, who may appear starkly conservative judging from their above positions, are incredibly liberal in their support of race-based affirmative action and an end to race-biased policing practices. 50% of


churchgoing blacks thing a police officer should never strike a citizen, less than one-in-ten of Democrats with the most human capital agree.

Other minorities tend to favor the Democratic party, too. Latinos are a big part of the Democratic constituency, and Asians and other ethnic groups lean Democratic to a slightly lesser degree. In terms of lifestyle and religious issues they hold middle-of-the-road positions, whereas on economic issues they are liberal. The key difference between Latinos, Asians, other minorities and the rest of the Democratic constituency is on the question of immigration. The 1990s and 2000s saw an unprecedented rise in Latino and Asian immigration that only began to flatten around the Great Recession. Over half of Latino/Asian/other adults in the United States are immigrants, and tend to favor a more liberal immigration policy. Because many of these immigrants are not yet citizens, or are so new to their country that they do not feel “American” yet, a large proportion do not vote.

Where do these groups agree, then? On economic items relating to redistribution, health care, and education— and their general hatred of Republicans. Both groups believe the government should have a role in reducing income differences and subsidizing health care and education in about equal proportions. It should be noted that black Americans who do not go to church tend to have very similar views on economics, race, and criminal justice as that of more pious blacks, but differ sharply on lifestyle issues like the ability to have sex outside of marriage or legalize drugs. 

The Republican party, on the other hand, consists, demographically, mostly of socially conservative, heterosexual whites who are rich and pious. This demographic is part of the Republican party both in the sense that they regularly vote for Republicans and that they are 

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“members” in the sense of partisan activity and group-memberships. The National Rifle Association, for example, whose members are overwhelmingly Republican, has created the most effective mobilization of second amendment-minded working-class white Americans in the history of the United States, organizing gun shows alongside pro-2nd amendment rallies, cultivating a significant mailing list, and sending “report cards” to members on their Senator’s gun control records. Combined with the high rate of church attendance amongst this demographic, which in and of itself is the locus point of activity and socialization in many communities, it can be said that Republicanism is a lived-through group experience in a way that Liberalism often finds trouble matching— a group of Republicans would be easier to talk into spending an afternoon shooting or spending Sunday morning at church than Democrats could be talked into protesting the availability of firearms or attending a meeting of secular humanists.

All of this leads us to the question of how we arrived at these coalitions in the first place. There is a distinct and linear path from the era of the Great Depression (1929-1940), out of which the modern Democratic and Republican parties began to take shape, to their forms in the present era. In the Reconstructionist era (around 1870), the Democratic party was a largely southern party, while Republicans represented northerners. In addition to this distinct regional identity, most Democrats were poorer, non-protestant Christians, Catholics, and Jews, while Republicans were moneymed Protestant types. In the 1930s and 1940s, Roosevelt began to assemble his “New Deal coalition” of farmers, laborers, Catholics, union members, and African Americans. Importantly, these coalitions were inclusive and multiracial— if you were a member of one or many minorities, you could find a place in the New Deal Coalition. Republicans were a smaller coalition of eastern
and midwestern members of the Old Money elite. It makes sense why the young, moneyed
Methodist known as Hillary Clinton was a “Goldwater Girl” in the 1960s— the scion of successful
Chicagoans, it was the Republican party which represented the interests of her parents and their
social circle, and whose values she was taught to support at a young age, the values of moneyed
midwestern Protestants⁴⁰.

In the 1970s, however, Clinton switched to the Democratic party, along with a large swath
of other Americans. Why did this happen? The genesis of her move towards the Democratic party
might have been because of an arranged meeting with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1962, where
Clinton listened to Dr. King deliver a sermon accusing people who ignored the changing political
climate of the 1960s as “sleeping through a revolution.” Clinton was introduced to Dr. King and
shook his hand; six years later, she burst into tears upon learning of his assassination according to
her college roommate at Wellesley⁴¹. Clinton’s move towards the Democratic party was a result of
the party’s growing affiliation with Dr. King’s civil rights cause and the growing liberal mobilization
within her generation. The Democratic party firmly established it’s black coalition because of
Lyndon Johnson and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the legislation which proved most vital in
actualizing the African-American alignment with the Democratic party by making it possible for
black people to go beyond the tacit support for the party they had expressed since the New Deal
and actually vote for Democrats themselves. Conversely, black Republican mobilization in the
south ended with the advent of the “Southern Strategy”, pioneered by Goldwater in 1964 and
mastered by Nixon. Johnson’s advocacy on behalf of African-Americans built upon the work of

⁴⁰ Kurtzbahn, Roger & Weeden, Jason. “The Hidden Agenda of the Political Mind: How Self-
Franklin D. Roosevelt and led to a decades-long affinity between black people, the civil rights movement, and the Democratic party that continues to this day.

As a Senator representing Texas, Johnson was initially chosen by Kennedy to help the first Catholic president win the southern segregationist vote. He had opposed every major piece of civil rights legislation that had come across his desk in the 1940s and 1950s, and seemed like an unlikely person to put pressure on Congress to pass a law guaranteeing Black Americans the right to vote. Yet forty-eight hours after what had been called the “Bloody Sunday” massacre of civil rights marchers in Selma, Alabama by state police, Johnson gave a speech in which he insisted, “what happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches into every section and State in America. It is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just Negroes, but all of us who must overcome this crippling legacy of American injustice. And we shall overcome.” This is the speech that Martin Luther King Jr.’s confidantes say caused MLK to cry in front of them for the first time. King later called it “the most moving, eloquent, unequivocal and passionate plea for human rights ever made by any President.”

Four months later, the Voting Rights Act passed the House 333-85, after it passed the Senate by a similarly overwhelming majority two months earlier. Johnson signed the VRA on August 6th, 1965, a bill that notably not only gave black Americans the right to vote, but protected them against the nefarious “poll taxes”, grandfather clauses and literacy tests that had for so long prevented them from having the ballot. On the first day the VRA

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43 Berman, “Give Us The Ballot,” p. 29.
was in effect, Alabama examiners registered 1,114 black voters in nine counties, a number that had increased to 7,000 by that Friday.

In response, the Republican party, sensing an opportunity, developed something called the Southern Strategy. The logic behind the Strategy can best be summarized by its architect, Barry Goldwater, who told a gathering of Republican party state chairmen in Atlanta in 1961 that “we’re not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are.” Former Democratic party power player Strom Thurmond notably crossed the aisle to endorse Goldwater for the presidency, claiming, “The [Democratic] party of our fathers is dead.” Thurmond had long been leading southern opposition to civil rights and campaigned aggressively on behalf of Barry Goldwater in 1964. GOP opposition to the VRA, alongside school integration and integrated busing, attracted southern whites and delivered the Deep South to Barry Goldwater, and then Richard Nixon (who had begun denouncing civil rights efforts he previously supported in a "reverse Johnson") for the first time in history.

Nixon utilized a language of “states’ rights”, which builds on the constitutional provision that all rights not given to the people explicitly in the constitution are left to the states, to oppose the National Voting Rights Act on constitutional grounds and guard against explicit charges of racism in their opposition to such important legislation for one single group. This “dog-whistle politics” allowed Nixon to avoid running explicitly “as a racist candidate” as he thought Goldwater did, campaigning on racial issues without ever mentioning race. There were almost no images of

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blacks in his ads, except to show them rioting. He premised his campaign almost entirely, according to writer Ari Berman, on the white backlash vote. Nixon's strategy proved successful and he was elected to the presidency in November of 1968.

Party alignments shifted again in the 1980s as the “culture wars” opened up over the sexual and drug revolutions. Evangelicals organized under the Republican banner to support politicians in favor of abortion bans and school prayer, and opposition to gay rights. This influx of white religious conservatives into the Republican tent drove many secular Americans towards the Democratic party. In the years since, church attendance has become a major “tell” regarding party affiliation amongst whites— the more attendance, the more conservative the person is. Please note that this metric of church attendance also refers to “a demographic” in the sense of that term in these discussions.

In the 1990s, the Democrats began to increase the members of the educated elite amidst their ranks, who were liberal on social issues but rather centrist on economics. This coalition of “New Democrats” is best exemplified by Bill Clinton, who hid from the term “liberal”, stripped the welfare rolls, and supported conservative, authoritarian policies on criminal justice. In response to an America that had shifted more towards the right throughout the 80s, the Democrats became a centrist party as the Republicans slid further and further right. Left-leaning voices in the party

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were often marginalized by the press and party establishment, such as Jesse Jackson, who was a failed candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in both 1984 and 1988 despite his calls for a Roosevelt-style “Rainbow” Coalition of people of every skin color and class level. A 1987 article in the New York Times claimed, "Most political analysts give him little chance of being nominated – partly because he is black, partly because of his unretrenched liberalism," signaling Jackson’s difficulty in having his message embraced by what was purportedly America’s liberal party. The Democratic party lost the elections of 1980 (in which progressive incumbent Jimmy Carter was defeated by conservative Ronald Reagan), 1984, and 1988 by running candidates which were criticized as being “too liberal”— Michael Dukakis famously ran away from the phrase “liberal” during the 1988 debates versus George H.W. Bush, and his reluctance to characterize himself as such was a defining narrative of the 1988 campaign. It was only upon embracing the “Third Way” of Clinton and the neoliberal democrats could the Democratic party win again at the presidential level.

Though the priorities of Democrats and Republicans have shifted since the Great Depression, they always staked consistent positions on the issue of economics. Democrats favor redistributive policies and welfare, while Republicans oppose taxation, regulation, and infringement on the rights of the people to do as they please with their money. As a result, wealthier individuals have always tended to favor Republicans, while working class laborers have usually voted Democratic. The enormous diversity of the united states have led to a continued


high-stakes contest between those who seek to protect people with high class privilege and those who wish to advance an economic agenda “correcting” group-based advantages.

III. Case Study: South Carolina

A key battleground state across federal, local, and state-level electoral politics in the next few decades will be South Carolina. The 4th nominating state in the primary process, The Palmetto State has seen rapid socioeconomic shifting since the year 2000. Over a ten-year period, the amount of Latino Americans in South Carolina rose at a rate faster than any other state in the union, 147.9%, to 200,000 latinos. Non-white citizens make up more than one-third of the state’s population, indicating a minority population that is the 12th largest in America (America as a whole has a 77.7% white-only population)\textsuperscript{50}. Recently, the Michelin tire corporation and the automaker BMW have built and opened factories in the Greenburg-Spartanville area at South Carolina’s northwest border, luring an influx of economic migrants to the state. In Spartanburg, the city has seen an 11.05% decline in people identifying as “white alone” from 2000-2010, to 218,000 from 243,000. The percentage of people identifying as two or more races increased by 71.65% in that same time frame to 82,152 people, while the amount of people identifying as of Latino origin increased by 78.28% to 260,954 people\textsuperscript{51}. The percentage of people identifying as black or African-American alone, while decreasing at 7.10% to ~34,000 people, has not decreased as steeply as the rate of purely caucasian people living in Spartanburg. In Greenburg-Spartanville,

\textsuperscript{50} “The United States of education: The changing demographics of the United States and their schools” Center for Public Education. 15 November 2007. Web.

unemployment was as low as 7.4% in 2012, whereas in interior counties such as Marion, the unemployment rate was as much as ten percentage points higher. However, while the overall population of South Carolina is 28.3% black, they comprise only 14.1% of net interstate migration and white migrants make up nearly 80% of net migration and 67% of the state population. The breakdown of migrants by race from 2005-2008 saw a net increase of 115,800 white people, 20,800 who identify as black, and 8,800 who identify as Other.

Retirees have also been attracted by the low cost-of-living and picturesque views found in South Carolina’s coastal cities—leading what was once one of the most rural states in the country to now house nearly 70% of its population in urban centers. According to Karen Kedrowski, who chairs the political science department at Winthrop College in Rock Hill, says, “There’s a saying that every time a moving van pulls up in South Carolina, it unloads two things: retirees and Republicans.” According to the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce, the state received a net migration of 34,000 college-educated workers between 2005-2008, ranking the state 7th nationwide in attractiveness to those with degrees. Perhaps this is due to a paucity of South Carolinians with specialized post-secondary training: only 7.6% of South Carolina’s residents have Bachelor's degrees, or 368,807. Still, the amount of migrants with high school degrees or their equivalent is higher than those with bachelor's degrees, and the population of South Carolinians


54 Ibid.
who don't have a post-secondary degree is nearly double that of the Bachelor’s degree holders, at about 661,791.

In 2000, approximately 12% (489,000) of the South Carolina population was 65 or older. This represented an approximate 16% (+97,000) increase from 1990. The fastest growing segment of the elderly population was the “very old” or 85 and over group. Between 1990 and 2000, this group saw a 63% (+20,000) increase. The 75 to 84 population group saw a 38% (+45,000) and the 65 to 74 population saw a 10% (+24,000) increase. Looking at a comparison between four southeastern states in this figure from researcher Mark Bondo, it becomes clear that South Carolina has had larger retiree growth than states of comparable size in the south:

Through the period 2010 to 2013, across South Carolina nearly two-thirds of the population gains involved the 65-plus group. By the end of that year, there were an estimated 78,726 people at least
85 years old residing in South Carolina, which is 7,274 more than there were three years earlier. During that same time, the number of residents under age 17 increased by just 3,799\textsuperscript{55}.

How has this movement in the population of seniors affected voting in South Carolina? Utilizing data from SCVotes.org, the trend-lines for voting amongst various age groups in South Carolina can be visualized\textsuperscript{56}.

From 1992 to 2012, there was a 201.07% increase in South Carolinian voters who actually went to the polls on election day in the 65+ demographic (from 230,242 to 462,970), a 227.24% increase in voters aged 45-64 (from 399,860 to 772,327), an 88.84% increase in people who voted aged 24-45 (from 553,640 to 623,158), and a 68.56% increase in the amount of voters aged 18-24 (from 53,725 to 78,359). It would seem that the more significant increase in voter numbers is not the


\textsuperscript{56} Voter Data from the South Carolina State Election Committee. Accessed via Web.
retirees, but rather the amount of middle-aged people participating in the electoral process in the state of South Carolina. However, it can be concluded that older South Carolinians have significantly more of a voice in the state’s political leanings— the amount of people aged 45-64 who voted in South Carolina in 2012 is higher than the 18-24 and 24-45 demographic groups combined. 23.9% of voters in South Carolina in 2012 were 65+, while 39.9% of South Carolinian voters were between 45 and 64. While the impact of voters over the retirement age has perhaps been slightly overstated, it cannot be denied that older voters provide a significant counterweight against any substantial increase in minority or youth turnout.

Though this paper will discuss Voter ID laws and their affect on voter turnout in more detail later, it should be noted that an Associated Press analysis suggests that the Palmetto State’s voter ID laws could impact the 217,000 active voters in the state who do not have a driver's license or state ID card, Of which almost a third are 65 or older. In South Carolina’s Beaufort County, it is estimated that nearly 1,600 seniors live in precincts in the Sun City retirement community or affluent neighborhoods nearby who do not have a driver’s license or state ID card. When one considers that precinct 3A (where the median income is $80,613) has 1,481 voters, of which only 17 are not white, it could be deduced that Voter ID laws harm, rather than help, Republican turnout in these neighborhoods.

In terms of racial diversity, the senior population of South Carolina is primarily white. In 2000, approximately three quarters of the population was white, while the remaining

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was black\textsuperscript{58}.

Between 1995 and 2000, South Carolina had approximately 16,000 net migrants at or over the age of 65, for a net migration rate of 34\%, ranking South Carolina 4th nationally. Another study by Longino and Bradley (2003) showed South Carolina receiving a net of approximately 18,236 of in migrants at or over the age of 60 from 1985 to 1990, ranking South Carolina 6th nationally. From 1995-2000, the same study by Longino showed that South Carolina received a net of approximately 28,000 in migrants at or over the age of 60, ranking South Carolina 5th nationally\textsuperscript{59}.

By studying the 2006 South Carolina Mature Adults Count, we can gain some insight into where these retirees disperse themselves. Using first time driver's license data, the report found that from 2002-2005 21,654 persons over the age of 65 were issued South Carolina driver’s licenses for the first time. The counties receiving in-migrants, based on driver’s license data were Horry (3,668), Beaufort (3,271), Greenville (1,585), Charleston (1,348), York (1,160), and Aiken (1,131). The South Carolina counties with the fast growing senior population are mostly considered to be urban in nature.


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
In addition to retiree growth, there is a large swath of South Carolinians who are younger yet similarly affluent. Those people “vote their pocketbooks,” Prof. Kedrowski said, noting that the GOP’s center of gravity was gradually shifting to those economic conservatives and away from the rural, evangelical conservatives, that, to be sure, still represent a significant share of the party.

It would be worthwhile to chart the amount of minorities versus caucasians who have historically voted in South Carolina in much the same way that age demographics are charted above. Though South Carolina does not keep track of which specific racial groups are voting, it does keep track of “nonwhite” and “white” voters. The results from 1992 onwards are tabulated below:

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60 Data is not available for the exact income level per capita of this demographic, nor is income data available for all retirees moving to South Carolina.
From 1992 to 2012, the number of white voters in South Carolina increased by 139.75%, from 950,556 voters in 1992 to 1,328,492 in 2012 (an increase of 377,936 voters), while the number of nonwhite voters increased by 212.02%, from 286,911 in 1992 to 608,323 in 2012 (an increase of 321,412 voters). Though the rate of nonwhite voters is growing faster than white voters, the overall increase of white voters over this 20-year span is around 50,000 greater than the increase in nonwhite voters. It would be incorrect to assume that all non-white voters were voting Democrat in this span of time—indeed, some of the most prominent new faces in South Carolina’s Republican leadership are non-white.

Along with South Carolina’s demographics, the face of its leadership is also changing. The Indian-American Nikki Haley, who was born Nimrata Nikki Randhawa, is the state’s Republican Governor. The Palmetto State’s first female or minority leader and the youngest governor in America at age 41, she has quickly become a rising star within the GOP establishment and a much-ballyhooed potential running mate for a GOP presidential candidate in 2016.\(^6\)

Haley’s rise began in her early 20s, when she rose to an executive position at her mother’s boutique clothing company Exotica International, and in 1998 was named to the Board of Directors of the Orangeburg County Chamber of Commerce. In the 2000s Haley aggressively began to consolidate her influence throughout South Carolina by gaining a Board of Directors seat on the Lexington Chamber of Commerce in 2003 and serving on the Lexington Medical Foundation, Lexington County Sheriff’s Foundation, and West Metro Republican Women’s

boards. She was elected to be the Treasurer of Lexington County’s Chamber of Commerce in 2003 and was it’s president in 2004. 2004 was also the year she challenged incumbent state Senator Larry Koon in the Republican primary— and won on an anti-tax policy platform with an emphasis on education. In the primary election, she forced a runoff as Koon won just 42% of the vote. She placed second with 40% of the vote. In the runoff, she defeated him 55%–45%. Chairing the Freshman Caucus of the South Carolina Senate, Haley quickly became known as an effective legislator, winning the 2005 “Friend of the Taxpayer” Award from the South Carolina Association of Taxpayers and a “Legislator of the Year” award that same year. Haley also received the Palmetto Leadership Award from the S.C. Policy Council and the Strom Thurmond Excellence in Public Serv. and Govt. Award from the S.C. Fed. of Rep. Women in 2006; Haley became majority whip that year as well. She was re-elected after running un-opposed in 2006, and she beat Democrat Edgar Gomez by 83-17% margins in 2008 for a third term. She was elected Governor in 2010 after announcing her candidacy a year earlier at the encouragement of then-incumbent Governor Mark Sanford. Endorsed by Mitt Romney and Sarah Palin, Haley received 49% of the vote, necessitating a runoff, which she won over Democratic Candidate Vincent Sheheen. Haley’s win challenged the “good ol’ boy network of the state” after defeating a sitting attorney general, a sitting congressman, and the state’s lieutenant governor for the GOP gubernatorial nomination.


In June of 2015, after white supremacist Dylann Roof shot and killed nine African-Americans at Emanuel A.M.E. Church in Charleston, Haley was widely praised for her deft speech ordering the Confederate battle flag to be removed from the state Capitol grounds. The International Business Times reported that “Rumors were flying this week that the GOP could be eyeing South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley to be its vice presidential candidate after her handling of the June 17 Charleston shooting and its aftermath.” The Wall Street Journal praised Haley in a piece entitled “Let Her Lead”, for declaring, alongside presidential candidate Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC), that “The hate-filled murderer who massacred our brothers and sisters in Charleston has a sick and twisted view of the flag. In no way does he reflect the people of our state who respect, and in many ways, revere it.” ABC Analyst Rick Klein said of Haley, “Yes, this raises her veepstakes stock. But that's almost secondary to the example she set....this is politics at its best – not as pejorative but as a force for the positive.” After her speech, Rience Priebus, head of the Republican National Committee, commended Haley, saying “it’s time to do what’s right,” according to a Forbes magazine article praising Haley as a “Smart Leader” who made a decision that “boosts her profile and makes her more appealing as a vice presidential pick.”

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Not just pundits supported Haley—in a letter to local Pennsylvania paper the Lehigh Valley Times, Bethlehem Township resident Gregory LaBelle praised Haley as “A classy lady who clearly has the hearts and minds and souls of the people of South Carolina in her heart first. She used the opportunity to open a discussion and not for personal cheap political gain….I wish she would run for president.”

However, liberal media outlets such as Salon refused to give Haley undue praise for what they described as doing “the right thing”.

Haley’s rising-star status was cemented when she was asked to give the official GOP rebuttal to Barack Obama’s 2016 State Of The Union address, during which she acknowledged the first black president “broke historic barriers” and “inspired millions of Americans” with his election, and spoke at-length about being the “proud daughter of Indian-American immigrants”:

“Growing up in the rural south, my family didn’t look like our neighbors, and we didn’t have much. There were times that were tough, but we had each other, and we had the opportunity to do anything, to be anything, as long as we were willing to work for it.”

“My story is really not much different from millions of other Americans. Immigrants have been coming to our shores for generations to live the dream that is America. They wanted better for their children than for themselves. That remains the dream of all of us, and in this country we have seen time and again that that dream is achievable.”

“Today, we live in a time of threats like few others in recent memory. During anxious times, it can be tempting to follow the siren call of the angriest voices. We must resist that temptation.”

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Haley stated that though America was going through “anxious times”, Americans must resist the “angriest voices” and seek moderation and temperance in government and rhetoric. Though seen by some pundits as a rebuke against the far-right rhetoric of Republican candidate Donald Trump, while speaking of the Charleston Shooting perpetuated by Dylann Roof, her message of moderation was echoed:

“That night, someone new joined [the Mother Emanuel church]. He didn’t look like them, didn’t act like them, didn’t sound like them. They didn’t throw him out. They didn’t call the police. Instead, they pulled up a chair and prayed with him. For an hour.”

“What happened after the tragedy is worth pausing to think about. Our state was struck with shock, pain, and fear. But our people would not allow hate to win. We didn’t have violence, we had vigils. We didn’t have riots, we had hugs. We didn’t turn against each other’s race or religion. We turned toward God, and to the values that have long made our country the freest and greatest in the world. We removed a symbol that was being used to divide us, and we found a strength that united us against a domestic terrorist and the hate that filled him.”

“There’s an important lesson in this. In many parts of society today, whether in popular culture, academia, the media, or politics, there’s a tendency to falsely equate noise with results. Some people think that you have to be the loudest voice in the room to make a difference. That is just not true. Often, the best thing we can do is turn down the volume. When the sound is quieter, you can actually hear what someone else is saying. And that can make a world of difference.”

Roof’s racially-motivated killing was an effort to reclaim the state’s segregationist roots, and a sign of growing anxiety over the state’s changing racial identity among the state’s white Christian base. In a manifesto later discovered to have been written by Roof on a website entitled “The Last Rhodesian” (referring to the white minority of what is now Zimbabwe, where whites fought blacks for 15 years and enlisted white supremacists as mercenaries), the shooter described his motivation for slaying nine African-Americans at a church:

“I have no choice. I am not in the position to, alone, go into the ghetto and fight. I chose Charleston because it is most historic city in my state, and at one time had the highest ratio of blacks to Whites in the country. We have no skinheads, no real KKK, no one doing anything but talking on the internet. Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.”

Slave ownership, which was widespread throughout much of the state’s early history, shaped not only race relations in South Carolina, but its distrust of the outside world. To historian W. Scott Poole, South Carolina is one of the most “stately” states, in that it has it’s own unique culture which separates it from the rest of the Union— in fact, it was the first state to secede during the Civil War. Notably, it was a slave society from it’s very founding, unlike colonial societies like Virginia. In 1850, while a quarter of white families held slaves in the South, in South Carolina nearly half of all white families owned slaves. “It was really during the Civil Rights Movement that many whites in South Carolina developed this sense that [they] are the real Americans,” says Poole. “The courts don’t represent America, the federal government doesn’t represent America, and maybe the Constitution doesn’t represent America: there is this authentic America that’s under threat.”

Indeed, while Haley and other minority leaders— such as freshman GOP Senator Tim Scott, the first African American senator from South Carolina since 1897, who has spent much

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of his career reaching out to minority communities in South Carolina— have broken new ground in South Carolina, they have done so representing a conservative ideology that is rooted in a vision of America that has not changed much since the 1950s: Scott has voted against reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act and against federal funding for abortion or groups like Planned Parenthood, opposes same sex marriage, and supports Voter ID laws, while Haley is pro-life, believes marriage is between one man and one woman, has dismissively referred to minority and women’s rights groups as “special interest groups”, rejected Syrian refugees from coming to South Carolina, and also supports photo ID at all election sites.

Nor should the cases of Haley and Scott necessarily point to an authentic groundswell of conservatism amongst the state’s minorities, as the new minority faces in GOP leadership have done little to inspire minority voter turnout locally. In the 2014 midterm, South Carolina boasted an abysmal 43.6% turnout amongst registered voters, the lowest since the 1970s. In this midterm, when Haley was up for reelection, 365,106 nonwhite voters turned out to vote, while 872,479 white voters were counted—a decrease of 243,217 nonwhites (-60%) and 456,013 white voters (-65.67%). In South Carolina, when the parties don’t do a good job turning out voters, then turnout ends up defaulting to a very Republican-friendly demographic. Republicans swept

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80 Voter Data from the South Carolina State Election Committee. Accessed via Web.
statewide races against their Democratic opponents in 2014 by margins ranging from 14.5 percentage points in the governor’s race to 24 percentage points in Tim Scott’s historic U.S. Senate race.

In Haley’s 2014 race, which she won by 12 percentage points, she placed an emphasis on job creation and economic reform in her campaign speeches, but there was certainly nothing special about the small-government ideology she was selling— it was the same formula Republicans have been promoting for decades. So how did she deliver such a decisive victory and earn her mandate? Bruce Ransom, a Clemson University political science professor, claims the margin was due in part to the lack of any damage done by her opponents, including Greenville former judge and Democratic party candidate Tom Ervin, despite problems at some of her cabinet agencies, including the state Department of Revenue and the state Department of Social Services. Danielle Vinson, a Furman University political scientist, said Haley was helped by a lack of a smart campaign by Democrats. Vinson believes Democrats were worried about turning off moderate voters so they avoided doing things that could have energized their base, particularly African-American voters. She said in an interview with Greenville Online, for instance, that she was puzzled about the lack of air play by the Democratic campaign on black radio stations. "That's a no-brainer," she said. "From that perspective, it just wasn't a smart campaign."

IV. Minority Turnout Strategy: Democrats vs. Republicans

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If Tom Ervin couldn’t run a “smart campaign” and energize local Democrats at the state level, could it be possible that Democrats are having trouble energizing minority voters in the post-Obama era in other locales? The answer is yes. Though the Democratic Party’s public policy has significantly advanced the interests of minority voters over the years, and has adjusted meaningfully to the tenor of the times, Democrats and progressives have failed to fully realize the opportunity to bring black and latino voters into their coalition and secure a multiracial political majority. The Obama coalition has not been strengthened or solidified; rather, it has lost strength and enthusiasm—according to a January 2016 Gallup poll, Democratic party identification fell below 30% for the first time ever. This can be blamed on people with positions of power in the Democratic Party’s inability to see minority voters as a significant force to expand debate and advance a Democratic agenda. Instead, the concerns of black, latino, arab, desi and asian-american voters often take a backseat to the hand-wringing of white swing voters, who are perceived as the crucial bloc needed for the Democratic party to secure seats at the state, local, and national level.

There are clear examples of the prioritization of white voters over minorities in the Democratic party, one of which occurred from 2009 to 2010, when the leaders of the Democratic party defunded and dismantled the constituency desks targeting voters of color because they preferred a “color-blind” approach to increasing voter roles. Also in 2010, a former organizer for the Obama campaign made a strong push to cancel a large march for jobs planned by a coalition of...

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civil rights and labor groups “for fear that it would alienate White swing voters.” Democratic leadership largely takes it’s advice from white opinion-makers: According to an internal spending report, over the 2010 and 2012 campaign cycles, Democrats awarded $514 million dollars in contracts to political consultants, 97% of which went to White consultants and businesses (and 83% to white men). The report was updated to include 2014 spending, and the results were virtually the same. Of the $193 Million spent by the Democratic party in the 2014 cycle on consulting firms, 97.9% of all contract money went to white consultants. At the upper echelons of the Democratic establishment, the vast majority of all spending, strategizing, organizing, and message creation is driven and executed by white men. The lack of a role for people of color in these processes is alarming considering the extent to which the Democratic party depends on black and latino voters, who comprise 28% of all voters.

The success of the Obama campaign in creating voter turnout cannot be separated from the color of his skin. It should be noted, however, that the Obama campaign’s success was not merely a result of his appeal to African-American voters, and this appeal was not instantaneous— in fact, in December 2007, Clinton still led Obama by 20 points nationally. Black voters did not

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87 The party committee expenditures went to 108 consulting firms, 15 of which were minority-owned or whose senior leadership was minority. Minority-owned consulting firms earned 2.1 percent of party committees’ expenditures cot consulting firms and 0.9 percent of total expenditures made. The analysis of 2014 spending was conducted by PowerPAC+, but the results have not been made available to a general audience.

switch over to Obama until he won the Iowa caucus. At the general level, once the nomination was secured, Obama practiced a 50-state strategy to create voter turnout. The importance of this 50-state strategy cannot be underestimated in the success of his campaign, as Obama made significant successful incursions into the areas that Democrats had previously conceded to Republicans, including Virginia and North Carolina, former slave states in which Democrats had scant success at the national level.

This was a key difference between Obama’s campaign and John Kerry’s 2004 campaign. In that cycle, Kerry followed the then-conventional wisdom of Democratic politics by asserting that the Bible belt was already and irreversibly GOP territory, so the southern region of America could be ignored altogether— in fact, Kerry believed he could win the White House without winning a single southern state, pointing out in an interview that Al Gore would have won in 2000 had New Hampshire voted Democratic. Kerry’s hubristic pursuit of this strategy cost him his election— Texas, for example has more than 2 million progressive whites whose votes Kerry could have won had he decided to campaign there, and North Carolina had 1.6 million— which Obama managed to bring over. It appears as if Democratic power players are reverting to Kerry-style thinking when it comes to campaigning in 2016, prioritizing white swing-voters over minorities, despite the fact that had Kerry increased his share of the black vote in Ohio by just eight percent (from 84 to 96%) he would have won the presidency.


89 Ibid.

91 Phillips, “Brown is the New White” p. 100.
The idea that White votes matter most has been largely an unspoken tenet of the United States for the past 400 years, but even in recent history this idea continues to dominate the minds of Very Serious People. An appeal towards the political middle was the key to victory for Bill Clinton and the Third Way Democrats, whose campaign manager James Carville said, “the highest-premium voter in ’92 was a voter who would vote for one party some and for another party some.”92 In the 80s, these swing voters were called Reagan Democrats. In 2015, The Clinton campaign began referring to this bloc as “everyday Americans”, a term later scrapped for sounding too nebulous. Whatever terminology is used to describe these voters, the idea has always been amongst the Democratic elite and the media that this is the essential bloc that liberals must chase in order to elect their party candidates. While the failure of blacks to vote means a loss, the likelihood of white working-class voters actively supporting the opposition makes them twice as valuable a win. According to Steve Phillips, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, “White swing voters were the only group that the White House asked [opinion research firms] to poll on a regular basis.93”

From Steve Phillips’ “Brown Is The New White” comes this illuminating look into Democratic party strategy at a state level:


93 Phillips, “Brown is the New White” p. 69.
In 2014, the representatives of several progressive billionaires held a conference call to discuss how to help Democrats win in Georgia. At the time, Georgia house minority leader Stacey Abrams had organized a very promising program that needed $6 Million to register and turn out 200,000 voters. Most of the donors were not interested in investing in a voter of color registration and mobilization program. Their preferred form of engagement was to fund television ads targeting the largely White pool of “likely voters.”

Republican David Perdue’s margin-of-victory over Democrat Michelle Nunn in the 2014 Georgia Senate election was 198,000 votes\(^{94}\). Had the Democrats’ donor base embraced the Abrams plan, Michelle Nunn could have become a sitting U.S. Senator. There are over one million people of color in Georgia who are eligible to vote but have not yet participated in elections. Simple math shows that these voters could have shifted the outcome in Nunn’s favor if they were registered and mobilized. Registering just 30 percent of unregistered eligible black voters in Georgia would have yielded an estimated 146,000 new votes, and if you add in 30 percent of Hispanic and Asian-American voters, Nunn could have had 185,000 new voters to court. Registering 60% of unregistered eligible blacks would yield 292,000, and if the other minority populations were factored in, that number would increase to 369,000 new voters. Even if the Democrats could not register 30% of these eligible unregistered populations, the amount of new voters would be enough to influence the policy positions of any candidate on either side of the

\(^{94}\) Data from the George State Elections Board. Retrieved via Web.
aisle. Though black voters in these states don’t uniformly vote Democratic, they overwhelmingly do so. Conversely, white voters are far more likely to support a GOP ticket.\textsuperscript{95}

North Carolina Democrat Kay Hagan failed on similar grounds. The progressive incumbent and favorite to win the election, she lost her seat in 2014 because she did not take advantage of minority voters who would be inclined to support her. In her initial 2008 victory, she captured 46 percent of the minority vote. But in her reelection bid, of the $40 million spent by Hagan and groups supporting her, $18.8 million was spent on negative television advertisements besmirching the character of Hagan’s opponent, Thom Tillis. That same $18.8 Million could have paid for 400 full-time staff members going door-to-door on Hagan’s behalf for an entire year, talking to and mobilizing the voters who had turned out for her in 2008. If each of those 400 staff members, working full-time for a year, making calls and knocking on doors, managed to get just three additional votes for Hagan every week, while taking two weeks off for vacation, Hagan could have secured an additional 59,000 votes and won the election.\textsuperscript{96} Yet the money was spent on TV ads, which have proven to be 1/10th as effective in generating voter turn-out than face-to-face conversations, based on two decades of rigorous experimentation by political scientists from Yale (Donald Green and Alan Gerber) to the University of California Berkeley (Lisa Garcia) to University of Maryland (Janelle Wong) and many more studies by countless researchers. Canvassing door-to-door is not easy, but it is highly effective, especially for reaching poorer and younger voters who don’t necessarily own television sets. Yet despite so many studies suggesting


\textsuperscript{96} Phillips, Steve. “Brown Is The New White”, p. 103
canvassing is more effective than attack ads, in 2012 and 2014, 82 percent of outside spending on Senate races went to television ads, while more than $11 million was spent on internet-based voter outreach. The graph below, from the New York Times, offers a frankly disturbing illustration of the allocation of outside campaign spending:

![More Outside Spending in Senate Races Goes to Digital](image)

Spending on field operations amounted to 4 percent of all outside money in the 2012 and 2014 elections— an increase from 2010, when that figure was 3 percent. In 2010, nearly five times as much money was spent on stuffing voters’ mailboxes with junk than was spent showing up at their doorstep and making the case for the candidates supported by these outside interests. In past elections, organized labor would have done much of the job of mobilizing volunteers to go door-to-door making the case for their candidates, but unions have shrunk in America to a shadow of their former size. That is why the drastic decline of organized labor was such a serious loss.

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In a 2014 study by Ben Jealous, former head of the NAACP and now at the Center for American Progress, Jealous commissioned a statistical analysis of what would happen if a massive wave of voter registration occurred among the estimated 3.7 million black and 3.2 million hispanic voters currently living in the “Black Belt”, an informal name for the states and counties that stretch across the former Confederate states, east to west from Delaware to East Texas, and north to south from the southern tip of Tennessee to the northern counties of Florida where slavery was in effect. What the CAP found was that registering just 30 percent of unregistered black voters would yield enough new voters to upset the balance of power (defined as the net average margin of victory for a certain political party over the previous three gubernatorial elections) in North Carolina and Virginia in either an off-year midterm or general election year. An increase of 60 percent would tip the scales for the democrats in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. There is no reasonable explanation for Democrats not to attempt to register more minority voters.

What is happening in the Democratic party, vis-a-vis their attempts to create a permanent progressive majority, is the waste of hundreds of millions of dollars each election, spent not on trying to bring new constituents into their party and into the political process, but on TV ads and other investments that are not paying dividends. They are failing to apply the best practices learned from the large scale success of the Obama campaign by neglecting to invest in the emerging market of minority voters, a large market in a fast-growing sector. There are 23 million latinos eligible to

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vote, but 12 million of them did not cast ballots in the 2012 election, more than twice the size of Obama’s margin of victory.

Why is this the case? Democrats should be investigating. 800,000 American latinos will turn eighteen every year between now and 2028— if this population of Latinos that became eligible to vote every year was a state, it would be greater than the population of Wyoming, Alaska, and both North and South Dakota. Yet Democrats seem to be trying their hardest to actively repel minority voters. Leading Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton called in 2015 to deport all Central American migrant children, and in 2013 and early 2014, President Obama increased the amount of deportations he signed off on by such a degree that latino activists began calling him the “deporter-in-chief”. In an election year, Democrats could have mobilized latinos by providing policy support for a path to citizenship for undocumented migrants and provide protection and relief to the families of undocumented and low-income latinos. But the Democratic senators up for re-election were afraid of the wrath of White Swing Voters. Because they have failed and continue to fail to take advantage of this new population of minority voters, the drop-off from the 2008 election to the 2010 election was almost twice as bad as usual, and the Republican turnout was almost twice as good as usual. In 2014, Democratic turnout in Senate races plummeted 42 percent, or 14 million votes from the record numbers of 2008, the last year those Senators were up for election (which also happened to be a presidential election year).

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Earlier in this paper, the presidential campaign of John Kerry, running against George W. Bush, was discussed. While Kerry actively resisted the idea of expanding his party’s base by courting southern and minority voters, George W. Bush was tirelessly paving inroads with latino voters, even going against the grain of his own party in his pursuit of bringing minorities into his party. Following Ronald Reagan’s maxim that latinos “were Republicans, they just don’t know it yet”, Bush had begun building up his credibility in the Mexican-American community as governor of Texas in 1999 by joining with then-President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo to build a bridge joining Eagle Pass, Texas with the town of Piedras Negras, Mexico. Standing at a lectern emblazoned with Mexico’s state seal, Bush said, ‘Bridges, not walls, are the finest monuments any public official can leave.’

In his 2000 presidential campaign, Bush took a different tone from his Republican primary opponents, espousing a “compassionate conservatism” in which he said he would not ‘use our children, the children of immigrants, as a political issue in America.’” When Bush was re-elected in 2004, he claimed for himself 44 percent of the latino vote to Kerry’s 56%, the largest margin of latinos ever earned by a Republican candidate. Bush’s margin-of-victory also owed something to his use of advanced constituent-collection technology. By matching consumer data to voter files, and cross-referencing church memberships with lists of those belonging to gun-rights group, Bush was effectively able to micro-target voters in a technique that is now called “modeling.” In retrospect, Latino attraction to Bush was an anomaly rather than the sign of a shift rightward in Latino voters,

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but it is useful to think about why this anomaly occurred. All signs point toward Bush’s embrace of
gentler rhetoric around immigration, as well as his innovative voter modeling program, in
attracting latino voters to the Republican party who had previously been outside of their coalition.

Then-Governor Bush was not the only man to recognize the importance of communities of
color to the Republican Party. Since 2011, Charles and Edward Koch, the billionaire investor
brothers, have put $10 Million into their organization Libre Initiative, a latino-focused 501(c)4
advocacy organization that describes itself as a “non-partisan, nonprofit grassroots organization that
advances the principles and values of economic freedom to the U.S. Hispanic community”, which
are “constitutionally limited government, property rights, rule of law, sound money supply, and
free enterprise.”

The group has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in 2014 attacking
incumbent Democratic congress-members and helped three out of the four Democrats they put in
their crosshairs lose their seats. Libre is heavily active in Texas, as well as Florida, which is the
home to Jeb Bush’s Hispanic Leadership Network, an organization characterizing itself as giving
the Hispanic community more of a voice in the Republican party. Its initial conference, which it
holds annually, attracted 600 conservative Latino leaders and activists, and describes itself as “The
largest network of Hispanic advocates in the country.”

In the 2012 election cycle, the Republican
State Leadership Committee put up $3 million to “identify and support new GOP latino
candidates and women for state office.” They identified about 125 new Republican Latino
candidates, 84 of whom were elected. The RSLC then led an effort to grow each state-level

101 https://www.thelibreinitiative.com/
102 http://hispanicleadershipnetwork.org/
Hispanic caucus, as well as to create a Future Majority caucus led by New Mexico governor Susana Martinez and Nevada governor Brian Sandoval along with a board of “ten rising stars” from state legislatures across the country. The group’s plans for 2016 were described as “aiming to recruit 250 new candidates to run for state-level office, get 50 of them elected or appointed, and see 10 minority elected officials enter leadership in states around the country, on a $7 Million budget, including women.”

Congressman Rand Paul has been somewhat bold compared to his Republican colleagues in engaging in action designed to curry favor with minorities. At the flashpoint of the Ferguson, Missouri conflict in which an unarmed black teenager was killed by a police officer, Congressman Paul, who represented Kentucky and was considering a run for president at the time, travelled to Ferguson to meet with Black community leaders. Paul’s rhetoric surrounding his visit was remarkably fierce coming from a Republican candidate for president: “Anyone who thinks that race does not still, even if inadvertently, skew the application of criminal justice in this country is just not paying close enough attention,” he said in a Time op-ed. Paul, whose views skew libertarian, was, during his run, one of the only Republican candidates calling for a decreased rather than increased community policing presence, as well as the demilitarization of the police, (i.e. taking away the military-style assault weapons, tanks, and body armor given to neighborhood

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police departments). It is notable that Paul’s op-ed was published August 14th, 2014, as Michael Brown, the unarmed black teenager at the center of the conflict, was killed only five days prior.

Paul’s impassioned plea for a more compassionate police presence, his acknowledgment of his own racial privilege, and his indictment of a “systemic problem with today’s law enforcement” at which “big government” is to blame came five days before Democratic Candidate Bernie Sanders’ condemnation of the Ferguson violence and calls for police reform, and a full month before Hillary Clinton’s prepared remarks on the incident. Nia-Malika Henderson of the Washington Post noted that Paul “went further in [his statement] than Sen. Elizabeth Warren or President Barack Obama, who in his third statement on Ferguson, touched on black crime rates, and only allowed that there might be sentencing disparities and differential treatment for blacks in the criminal justice system.” 105 Paul’s actions on racial justice issues, while bold, seem to have fallen on deaf ears during the Republican primary. Never achieving more than 4% of the popular vote, Paul’s candidacy was out-of-step with a Republican electorate that prioritized border security and “ending PC culture”, but his words and actions are a real example of some Republicans coming closer to the left on minority issues.

Where the Democrats and the Republicans principally differ in their approach to the Black Belt is their attitude. The mentality of the Democratic party leadership seems to be stuck in the 1970s, envisioning the South as a “shut door” artificially constrained by the lingering legacy or racism. The demographic and other trends discussed in this report show that there is an

opportunity to bring Democratic control over the Black Belt states that Democrats are not realizing or attempting to realize because they lack cultural competence. Since Barack Obama’s election, Democrats have only elected four more candidates of color to statewide offices—Sen. Corey Booker of New Jersey, New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas, former Delaware treasurer Chip Flowers, and Rhode Island secretary of state Nellie Gorbea. The Republicans have elected Tim Scott and Nikki Haley (who were discussed previously) as well as Florida’s Sen. Marco Rubio, Texas’ Ted Cruz, New Mexico’s Gov. Susana Martinez, Nevada Gov. Brian Sandoval, Maryland Lieutenant Gov. Boyd Rutherford, Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal, and two black Republicans in the Senate, Mia Love in Utah and Will Hurd in Texas—ten elected officials of color. The disparity is telling. It should be noted that there are still more total Democratic elected officials of color than there are Republicans; in the House of Representatives there are 46 African-Americans, all Democrats; in the Senate, there are one black Democrat and Republican each. In the H/R there are 30 Hispanic Americans, 26 Democrats, 4 Republicans; in the Senate, there are two Hispanic Republicans, and two Hispanic Democrats. Still, it is clear that Republicans have made strides in electing conservative officials from minority constituencies.

The Democratic side of the aisle isn’t all incompetency when it comes to electing legislators of color—The Democrats actually managed to accomplish a historical first when they managed to put into office Rep. Keith Ellison, the first Muslim-American ever to hold a congressional post. Though he was an incumbent, having won his first congressional race with 56% of the general vote and 44% of support in the primary, Congressman Ellison’s electoral victory offers a case study to Democrats on how to get progressive people of color elected to local offices intelligently and
effectively in the 21st century. In 2014, Ellison managed to increase turnout in his district by 5 percent despite statewide turnout decreasing by 3%, and they did it by doing a detailed, data-rich analysis of their electorate and identifying their most likely supporters. They then crafted tailored messages to reach micro-constituencies within their target demographics, often tailoring their messages down to the needs of occupants of single apartment buildings. The Ellison team realized their core supporters usually rented their homes and moved fairly frequently, so they canvassed 525 apartment complexes in their district, each with at least 51 units inside, and the 90,000 voters who lived there. Dozens of volunteers knocked on 50,000 doors, registering people to vote, identifying supporters, and getting people to commit to Ellison.

Noticing the large Somali population of Ellison’s district, Ellison worked to figure out the specific needs of Minnesota’s Somali-American community and developed a specific canvassing operation targeting these immigrants as well as Latinos. Black voters were reached with a program jokingly named “Souls to the Polls”, in which community outreach was conducted amidst 124 area church congregations. Ellison staff visited the churches to speak at Sunday services, encouraging early or absentee voting if necessary and driving the conversation around Ellison’s campaign by taking it directly to the community106.

Through this sort of Moneyball-style politics— creating a data-driven thesis and applying it to a campaign with a high degree of cultural fluency— Ellison defied the national trends of decreased turnout in a midterm election year and also helped bring voters to the polls to elect

Minnesota a democratic Secretary of State. Every Democratic campaign strategist, advisor and consultant should study the strategies employed by the Ellison campaign in 2014 if they want to turn, and keep, states blue in 2016 and beyond.

In 2013, Republicans issued a report on their “Growth and Opportunity Project”, a hundred-page “autopsy” of the GOP’s electoral failures released in wake of the 2012 election. The report was meant to provide a path out of the hole the GOP had dug for itself with voters of color. “Many minorities wrongly think Republicans do not like them or want them in the country,” the report says. “If we want ethnic minority voters to support Republicans, we have to engage them and show our sincerity...Our Party has an incredibly opportunity on our hands, and we must seize it enthusiastically.”

In order to make inroads with voters of color, the Republican party’s report recommends the following:

- Formation of a new Growth and Opportunity Inclusion Council “to expand and diversify the state of the party”
- “Engaging people of color throughout the year, not just every four years”
- More POC field staff, communications directors, political directors, and committee members
- “at the staff level, the personnel [of color] should be visible and involved in senior political and budget decisions and not be limited to demographic outreach,”
- Developing best practices of candidates successful with voters of color.
- Building ongoing relationships with ethnic media.
- Designing a surrogate program to prepare and train ethnic conservatives to talk in national and local media
- Establishing a training program available to all Republican candidates that would educate them on the particular culture, aspirations, positions on issues, contributions to the country, etc., of various racial and ethnic communities

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• Hiring a faith-based outreach director to focus on engaging faith-based organizations and communities.\(^{109}\)

The report also offered several specific suggestions for each minority group that went beyond mere broad-brush suggestions:

For Latinos:
“We must embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform. If we do not, our Party’s appeal will continue to shrink to its core constituencies only.”
Develop an extensive network of Hispanic and other demographic groups’ political operatives that can help provide continuity for Republican political candidates around the country.

For Latinos and Asian Americans:
Introducing new citizens to the Republican party after naturalization ceremonies

For African Americans:
Establish a presence in Black communities and with groups like the NAACP, engage with historically Black colleges and universities, and develop a national database of Black leaders.\(^{110}\)

It is clear from this report that the Republican party is aware of its problems with minority voters, and is taking steps to address their concerns. The actions of the party, many of which have been detailed in this paper, are proving the recommendations which have been provided in the report are being followed, and often successfully. A meaningful segment of the conservative movement is very soberly attempting to win over voters of color. The Democratic party conducted its own report along similar lines, but whereas the GOP’s report was 100 pages long, the Democrats’ report was only nine pages, and described by the Washington Post as empty “political pablum.”\(^{111}\) It took eleven committee members to produce nine pages of largely content-free


\(^{110}\) Ibid.

political rhetoric. Buried inside the committee’s political doublespeak and catch-phrases, however, was this significant passage:

The current GOP stranglehold on state houses, governorships and congressional seats is a by-product of more than 30 years of organizing, fostering talent and significant financial investments at the state and local level. The DNC must develop – and accelerate – programs at the state and local level to ensure that the next redistricting and reapportionment projects encourage Democratic growth.112

The Task Force recommends that the DNC – along with the Democratic family of organizations, state parties and allied organizations – create and resource a three-cycle plan that targets and wins back legislative chambers in order to prepare for redistricting efforts. This long-term effort must be aggressive and focused on winning elections at the state and local level. It must also support efforts to take back the House of Representatives.

The Democrats are aware that the GOP has achieved and progressed where they have settled and stalled. The question remains what Debbie Wasserman-Schultz and the Democratic National Committee are planning to do about it. Perhaps they could follow some of the suggestions outlined in the Growth and Opportunity Project report— it is frankly not bad advice.

V. Minority Turnout and the 2016 General Election

There has been some talk that Donald Trump, the current GOP front-runner, cannot bring Latinos into the party with his anti-immigrant rhetoric. “Trump represents everything the Republican Party does not want to be.” said Artemio Muñiz, chair of the Texas Federation of

Hispanic Republicans. “The Republican brand is toxic right now with the Hispanic community and we need to repair it. If Trump is the nominee, I don’t see how we’re going to be able to go into the Hispanic community and win the hearts and minds of Latino voters.”\textsuperscript{113} Yet amongst Latinos present at the 2016 Nevada caucus, Trump placed in first amongst Republicans with 44% of the Latino vote\textsuperscript{114}, and Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric may be winning him points with African-American voters, whose wages have historically been depressed in correlation with increasing immigration.\textsuperscript{115}

Republicans have not competed seriously for African-American votes at the general level since Richard Nixon won 30 percent of the black vote in 1960, but Trump could be the candidate to change that. A Washington Post-ABC News survey shows that 1 in 5 black and latino voters approves of Trump\textsuperscript{116}— if Trump could capture 20% of the black vote, it could be a historic margin in a general election that allows the Republicans to hold on to both the House and Senate. In fact, in general election matchup polling, Trump has already achieved 20% of the black vote in some polls\textsuperscript{117}. Trump has proved to be the exception to the general rules of politics thus far in the 2016 election, and he has the potential to use his immigration position to make a play for black votes.


\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.


Whereas the Democrats benefit when Latinos, African-Americans, Asians, Arab-Americans and Desi-Americans unite with college-educated whites and the LGBT community to create a coalition, the Republicans can win by dividing cohort groups against each other to protect their interests. It is interesting that when a Republican candidate such as Ben Carson runs on a Democratic-style message of coming together, with his slogan of “Heal. Inspire. Revive.” that candidate can do so poorly. The Obama-style racial narrative, in which the party needs a great minority leader to unify it through gentle and gifted hands, does not appeal to Republicans.

Similarly, Carson’s belief that racism and poverty can be eradicated through individual acts and not structural change resonates with white conservatives, but is loathed by black Americans. The Daily Beast columnist Barrett Holmes Pitner suggests that Trump’s style “can attract black supporters because his dehumanizing language is not directed toward them, and is masked by the false promise of economic opportunity and national unity.”\(^{118}\) Indeed, Trump’s critique of the “rigged system” at the heart of the American economy and the belief in individual liberty and freedom as a universally uplifting force resonates with Republican voters, and his supporters have a community identity that appeals to black voters, who resonate with collective, community-based initiatives.\(^{119}\) According to frequent on-air polling strategist Frank Luntz, if Trump were “the Republican nominee, he would get the highest percentage of black votes since Ronald Reagan in


\(^{119}\) Ibid.
1980….In all the groups I have done, I have found Obama voters, they could’ve voted for Obama twice, but if they’re African-American they would consider Trump.”\(^{120}\)

Though Bernie Sanders, the anti-establishment Democratic candidate, has done well with white voters, he has consistently failed to out-gain his primary opponent Hillary Clinton in support amongst minorities. In the South Carolina Primary, Clinton beat Sanders 73-26%, and captured black voters by an astonishing 86-14 margin\(^{121}\), despite Sanders having a significantly stronger ground game in the weeks leading up to the primary with nearly five times as many campaign offices and volunteers. Clinton is doing well with black voters now, but if she wins the general election, Trump may attack her on her role in doubling the rate of mass incarceration in America during the Clinton administration, and bring to light some questionable comments regarding African American youths, during which she remarked certain black gang members were “what are being called super-predators, no conscience, no empathy...we must bring them to heel.” Her campaign suffered an initial rash of bad press after Black Lives Matter activist Ashley Williams interrupted Clinton at a campaign event to demand an apology for her racially-charged language, and the hashtag #WhichHillary emerged after a video of Williams’ confrontation went viral, receiving more than 350,000 tweets surrounding the incident. In the words of MSNBC’s Chuck Todd, “The more voters see Hillary Clinton, the less they like her.”\(^{122}\) The more black voters are


exposed to Clinton’s racial history, the more they could potentially switch to Trump in the general election. This, of course, is all purely speculative at this point.

Bernie Sanders’ position on immigration reform, politically, is a winning strategy for his campaign and for Democrats because it is one of the issues that affect people so deep and emotionally that families who benefit from laws allowing undocumented migrants to receive support and a path towards citizenship in the United States would likely stay loyal to the Democratic party for decades to come, akin to how African-Americans became such an integral Democratic voting bloc during the Civil Rights era. By supporting comprehensive immigration reform, Democrats can capture some of the 800,000 hispanic teens that become eligible to vote each year, and enfranchise their family members. Indeed, by making immigration reform a centerpiece of his political campaign, Sanders was able to take a solid lead amongst latino voters by April 2016, with polls putting him anywhere from 4 to 15 points ahead of Clinton.

There exists a question whether thinking about and conducting electoral campaigns in terms of "demographics" of the usual census types does harm to the rationale for a democratic election process, presumably because campaigns so designed encourage people to think about their choices not in terms of their individual [rational] [moral] [civic] preferences, but in terms of group loyalties and/or "mass" marketing motivations. This gives rise to a chicken or an egg-style conundrum— which came first, the group loyalties and mass-marketable cohorts known as

“demographics”, or the individuals, which then coalesced through the development of shared interests and identities to constitute a demographic?

The simple fact, however, is that certain demographic groups do overwhelmingly prefer certain policies or candidates, and it is important to view American domestic politics through the lens of demographics and appeal to minority cohorts if one hopes to win elections in the 21st century. Does one honestly believe, for example, that Bernie Sanders can win a Democratic primary without winning a majority of black voters? Could Donald Trump win a general election by continuing to appeal to African-American voters, espousing a message of economic opportunity while simultaneously toeing the line with Black Lives Matter voters (who represent a much smaller part of the black voting populace than the media would lead one to believe)? And is it necessarily wrong for individuals to prioritize collective interests over individual ones, as many white progressives often do when they vote to raise their own taxes to fund welfare programs?

Thinking about oneself as a member of a demographic, and as other voters as representatives of demographics, can be helpful in identifying key constituencies and their issues, but the specific demographic variables that are examined in political science—race variables, age variables, class variables—interact in ways that are often difficult to predict. Encouraging Americans to think of themselves as a collective underclass of the “99%”, for example, has helped push issues of income inequality to the forefront of the 2016 campaign season. This is one example of how a demographic (The 99%) is created. Once it is named and branded, people find themselves identifying with this cohort and interested in advancing it’s interests. A weakness of
Occupy Wall Street was a failure of OWS to produce a cohesive list of demands to impose upon the next generation of politicians, but politicians like Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, Alan Grayson, and Tim Canova area leading a new “Warren Wing” of the Democratic Party which depends upon the support of those who identify as part of the “progressive” or “99%” demographics. Historically, large disparities in turnout have benefitted the wealthy, as white Americans, particularly affluent white Americans, have out-participated people of color, low-income Americans, and young people by significantly large margins. According to a 2015 DEMOS paper, “In 2012, 26 million eligible voters of color did not vote, and, among eligible voters earning less than $50,000, 47 million did not vote. In 2014, 44 million eligible voters of color did not vote, and 66 million eligible voters earning less than $50,000 did not vote”. The disparity in voting between class brackets is striking when visualized in graphic form:

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As we can see, voters in the top tax bracket participate in the electoral process at nearly twice the rate of groups below the poverty line. As such, the disparities in turnout benefit the donor class or “1%”. Groups that historically undervote tend to be substantially more in favor of progressive economic policies favored by “Warren Wing” democrats compared to more wealthy voters, particularly wealthy white voters. This has been visualized in the following charts:

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In Sean McElwee’s paper “Why Voting Matters: Large Disparities In Turnout Benefit The Donor Class”, McElwee found that on every issue for which he was able to obtain data, non-registered voters were more willing to support redistributive policies and laws which helped lower-income Americans with less opportunity and those that have been affected by structural racism:
In the charts above and on the preceding pages, a positive number signals support of a policy, while negative numbers signal opposition (those who were “not sure” were excluded). It can be seen that these gaps are dramatic enough that should unregistered voters decide to vote, they could shift the tides of policy in a more redistributive direction. This is seen most strikingly in support for free community college, which has a net support of 46 points among non-registered individuals (63 percent in favor, 17 percent opposed), but only 7 points among registered individuals (43 percent in favor and 36 percent opposed). Because these lower-voting populations don’t vote, their voices are almost entirely ignored in policymaking. Perhaps these populations do not vote because they do not find politicians who are willing to represent their voice—then again, this is a catch-22 as if they voted, politicians would almost certainly begin to account for their blocs. Nevertheless, it seems logical and likely that voter turnout differences are a significant part of the problem of white-affluent bias in public policy. Boosting turnout tends to have the effect of reducing the class bias of the electorate, since most new voters are less wealthy than the median voter. However this does not mean that all policies to boost turnout reduce the class bias of the electorate. Policies that target registration have the strongest effect of boosting turnout among low-income groups and may reduce class bias.

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There is potential for the “Warren Wing” to coalesce into a real movement if it can encourage Democrats to go beyond traditional understandings of demographics and form a new demography, in which lines are not drawn racially but economically. The “Warren Wing” could further strengthen its coalition if it brings non-voting Americans into the political process, both by supporting policies that non-voters support and increasing voter rolls through same-day registration. Same-day registration has been shown to increase turnout by 11 points over districts without same-day registration, provided for equally high levels of campaign spending and party GOTV operations. Still, attention must be paid to the interests of existing demographic cohorts—African-Americans, Latinos, LGBT activists—as these groups often have large NGOs with millions of dollars that they can spend resourcing campaigns.

VI. Voter Fraud and Gerrymandering

While Republicans are waging a long-term battle to bring souls to the polls and chicanos to the caucuses, the party is presently following a seemingly conflicting and counterintuitive strategy used to counter the (expected) rise of unfavorable demographics. Since the founding of the country, when the black people of America were only seen as 3/5ths of a citizen and the right to vote was reserved to white male property owners, up through the “grandfather clauses” of the Reconstructionist era, there has been an effort to suppress voices of color, the poor, and the working-class from voting, each in different ways. Since the passage of the voting rights act in 1964,

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there has existed a 50-year campaign to undo its progress. Gerrymandering-style redistricting has been pushed hard by opponents of the enfranchisement of people of color, as well as voter ID laws, which ostensibly exist to protect against fraud but which have a uncomfortable relationship which correlates to the level of minority cohort voter activity in a given state. In 2013, the VRA was gutted so historically that fears of a “New Jim Crow” era sparked. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had used obsolete information in continuing to require nine states, mainly Black Belt states like South Carolina, to obtain federal approval for voting rule changes affecting minority voters. The Voting Rights Act was challenged by Shelby County, Alabama, which argued the preclearance requirement has outlived its usefulness. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote for the majority, claiming, "Our country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions." Within 24 hours of the Supreme Court’s decision, five states had already moved ahead with getting restrictive voting rights laws passed.

Since 2012, 41 states have introduced some form of restrictive voting legislation, and of those 18 passed laws. Most of these laws, considered the strictest, require that a form of valid photo ID is presented before casting one’s ballot, such as a Driver’s License or State ID. Proponents of those laws suggest they are designed to prevent voting fraud, the accidental counting of unregistered, ineligible, duplicate, or dead, voters. Voting rights advocates argue that these laws disproportionately target lower-income families and voters of color who may not have cars, and thus


may not have drivers’ licenses. A 2011 study by the Brennan Center for Law and Justice found that 21 million American adult citizens do not possess a valid photo ID—11% of the American population\textsuperscript{131}. The evidence suggest that there is a negligible amount of voter fraud which actually occurs. A comprehensive investigation of “voter impersonation” found only 31 credible incidents of fake ballots cast out of one billion\textsuperscript{132}. So why do these laws continue to exist? There does not seem to be a legitimate reason, though a conservative legislator suggested in a 2012 Fox News interview that the Pennsylvania Voter ID law was “gonna allow Governor Romney to win Pennsylvania.”\textsuperscript{133} Texas (who demand “proof of citizenship” shown to voting clerks), North Carolina, and Mississippi also have put Voter ID laws into place, though interestingly in Mississippi, 1,000 people who lacked an acceptable form of photo ID received a free one from local election clerks\textsuperscript{134}.

Laws that have previously made it easier to vote have also been under attack from conservative forces, who have eliminated “Souls to the Polls” programs and laws permitting counties to allow voting on Sundays in Ohio, and the Shelby vs. Holder decision in Alabama eliminated provisions that forced the Alabama government to run changes in their voting procedures through the Justice department. Since 2011, restrictions on early or absentee voting


\textsuperscript{133} Aaron Blake, “Everything you need to Know About the Pennsylvania Voter ID Fight,” Washington Post. 2 October 2012. Web.

have passed in Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Ohio, while in Iowa, executive action by Governor Terry Branstead has made it harder for Iowans to restore voting rights. At least thirteen states have introduced bills to end highly popular Election Day and same-day voter registration, and reduce opportunities to bring new voters into the political process.135

The question exists as to how harmful these voter ID laws and other suppressive efforts have been on minority turnout, and the answer is that it has been rather effective, though not necessarily effective enough to decide a race. A 2014 study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that voter ID laws were responsible for a 2-3 percent drop in voter turnout in elections from 2008 to 2012, more than enough to decide a close race. In fact, Obama’s margin of victory in Florida, Virginia, and Ohio in 2012 was 3 percent of less in each of those states. With Virginia’s 13 delegates, Florida’s 29 and Ohio’s 18, Obama would have lost 53 delegates had Romney won those states, and Romney would have gained their delegates— changing Obama’s margin-of-victory to 20 electoral votes, where it had previously been nearly 130. Losing these states would have given Obama less of a mandate to govern, but it would not have swung the contest in Romney’s favor— the White House would remain under Democratic control.

Voter ID laws and the increasing legal hurdles voters of color must overcome in order to make their voice heard in the political process are certainly an issue that must be addressed, but even if all voter ID laws were eliminated, it would still not address the central problem at the heart of the Demographics is Destiny question, which is voter turnout. In the case of fighting these laws,

perhaps the more effective strategy is not to spend lots of money on legal defense teams challenging
the laws in court, but on more door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, and organizing to bring
people of color to the polls. That is not to say that we shouldn’t attempt to maintain the
democratic character of the electoral process because it isn’t pragmatic; by all means, the integrity
brought into American politics by the VRA must be preserved. Yet bringing new voters into the
electoral process is often easier, faster, and more cost-effective than overturning voter ID laws.

An example of what the previous paragraph is proposing can be found in Ashindi Maxton’s
fight against proposed Voter ID laws in Pennsylvania. After spending six weeks coordinating data
collection and locating witnesses for the lawsuits that successfully challenged the law in the courts,
Maxton concluded that it may be more cost-effective and impactful to run programs to help people
get IDs than to engage in protracted and expensive fights to overturn the laws themselves. Such
tactics could be duplicated in other markets.

Another way to increase turnout and “get around” Voter ID laws that has already been
implemented is automatically registering all eligible state residents who are eighteen years of age or
older to vote, which became law in Oregon in 2015. The only way to not have your vote count in
Oregon is to affirmatively opt-out of being registered on the voter rolls.

At the federal level, efforts led by Representatives John Lewis, Steny Hoyer, James Clyburn,
John Conyers, Robert Brady and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand have introduced legislation which
includes key provisions such as Electronic voter registration for all consenting adults when they
interact with a wide variety of government agencies (registration at the DMV, for example) Making registration permanent even if a voter moves to another state, fail-safes against the input of faulty data that would invalidate a ballot, and offering states federal funding to make necessary technological upgrades to improve voting systems.\footnote{136}

This bill, H.R. 12, branded as the Voter Empowerment Act, was a significant and promising piece of legislation that could have had positive implications were it signed into law. With the support of Clyburn and Lewis, some of the most prominent members of the black Democratic establishment, and Kristen Gillibrand, a leading congresswoman in the Women’s Caucus, it is surprising that after being introduced on March 15, 2015, the bill was referred to six different committees, and then three different subcommittees, before finally dying in the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training. No action has been taken on the bill since April 29th, 2015.\footnote{137} It should be noted that the ability of Democrats to pass legislation of this nature when the Republicans control the House and the Senate is limited at best. Still, one would at least expect the bill to have been debated on the floor. We should expect to see more legislation of this nature circulating through the great bill-digestion system of Congress if Democrats can regain House control in 2017.


It should be noted that Republicans are not the only party to use suppressive tactics to prevent minorities from voting. Democrats in Arizona, a state which has a non-Hispanic white population of 56.2% and a latino population of 30.5%\textsuperscript{138}, are calling for the Justice Department to investigate the long lines faced by voters on March 24th, 2016 in the state’s presidential primary. Some voters had to wait up to five hours in line to vote, and even after doing so, were told they could not cast ballots afterwards. In Maricopa County, which had 200 polling stations in 2012, only 60 polling stations were available, a measure that was intended to cut costs. “Let’s be clear—voter suppression happened,” said U.S. Rep. Ruben Gallego, the Democrat who represents Arizona’s 7th congressional district in Congress\textsuperscript{139}. Maricopa County Recorder Helen Purcell took responsibility for the lines and delays, claiming that she erroneously estimated the number of needed polling stations because of the large number of independents that changed their status to “Democrat” in order to vote, relatively poor voter turn-out in the past, and an overestimation of the number voters that mailed in their ballots. They assumed 95 percent of voters would use the mail, while only 86 percent did. In the 2008 Democratic primary, Election Day turnout in Maricopa County was 113,807; in 2016 it was only 32,949. In other words: tens of thousands of voters were likely prevented from voting\textsuperscript{140}. Purcell refused, however to label the events that

\textsuperscript{138} Arizona State Census for 2010.


transpired as “suppression”, claiming, “When you see people who are still willing to cast that vote and wait in line until well after the polls close, I don’t think that’s voter suppression.”

This is another effect of the Shelby vs. Holder decision of 2013, first mentioned at the top of this section, in which the U.S. Supreme court eliminated requirements for Arizona and other states with histories of voter suppression to have federal authorities pre-approve changes to election rules and regulations before elections, which was formerly protected under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Arizona has faced accusations of voter suppression in the past. In 2004, controversy was stirred up when it became the first state to require voters to show proof that they were naturalized American citizens before they could vote at polling stations. That requirement was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2013, according to ABC News, and, while Arizona still requires voter ID of some sort, it can be identification of a non-photographic nature (such as a credit card).

The Arizona Democratic primary was won by Hillary Clinton, 57.6% to 39.9%. Her opponent, Bernie Sanders, responded to the question of suppression in a CNN interview:

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"In the United States of America, democracy is the foundation of our way of life. And what happened in Arizona is a disgrace. I hope that every state in this country learns from that and learns how to put together a proper election where people can come in and vote in a timely manner and go back to work."\(^{143}\)

His primary opponent issued a response through her campaign counsel to furious Sanders supporters on Reddit, a popular social media platform whose “/r/SandersForPresident” sub-forum attracts roughly 150,000 “Sandernistas”. According to Hillary spokesperson Marc Elias:

“The way Arizona administered its elections last night is absolutely, unequivocally unacceptable. It’s the result of a larger Republican effort to make it harder for people to vote – especially those who are less likely to support their policies. From attacks on the Voting Rights Act to harsh voter ID laws to cutbacks on early voting to limits on voter registration, these restrictions disproportionately target low-income voters, young voters, and people of color, especially African Americans*.

[...]

Helen Purcell, the County’s Election Recorder (a Republican) took responsibility for what happened. That’s good; she should. But at the end of the day, an apology isn’t enough here. If Arizona so badly messed up the administration of this election– disenfranchising any number of Sanders and Clinton supporters– it’s really bad news for the general election.

I have spent years fighting voter suppression and am currently suing North Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin and Ohio to protect voting rights. On Monday, I was arguing for protecting minority voting rights in front of the Supreme Court of the United States. Last night, we saw first hand why that fight is so important. We need you to stand up and say enough is enough.”\(^{144}\)

If both Clinton and Sanders campaigns have acknowledged problems with the primary process in Arizona, the results should be voided and a new primary should be held. As the numbers show, the low turnout on Election Day was good news for Clinton because most of her supporters had already voted by mail: Voters under 30, the most favorable Demographic for Sanders, accounted for only 7 percent of Democratic early voters, compared to 41 percent for the

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over 65 crowd, a demographic which strongly favors Clinton\textsuperscript{145}. This allowed Clinton to create, and maintain, an early lead amongst Arizona’s Democratic voters.

Aside from the long lines, misfiled voter registrations prevented many in Arizona from voting. Leaders from the Arizona branch of the Democratic Party have confirmed that its lawyers are officially making an inquiry after multiple Democratic voters showed up to the polls to find that their party status had been changed or even completely eliminated. To add insult to injury, the polling locations have been so poorly planned that many voters had to wait in line up to four hours before finding out that their information had been improperly filed. “Computer glitches” were the reasons cited by the Arizona Democratic Party for the error, but according to the Huffington Post, a citizen of Arizona captured evidence of outright voter suppression on video. In a clip posted to the Viva Bernie 2016 Facebook group, an angry voter describes the incident she captured on-camera:

\begin{quote}
I went to the Pima County Recorders office and video taped the whole thing. Here’s what they are doing. They are copying voter registration cards changing the date and the party preference. They can’t change the original because that goes out to the party. At first she tried to say I sent in a second voter registration card (of course I didn’t not) then she changes her story to its a computer glitch then states it’s an error.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

The Illinois Democratic Primary, held on March 15th, faced a similar controversy: In six counties across Illinois – Adams, Champaign, Effingham, Madison, Sangamon, and St. Clair – polling places ran out of ballots amid higher-than-expected voter turnout, meaning thousands of

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} https://www.facebook.com/groups/1649941911932852/permalink/1655874224672954/
voters were sent home after waiting in-line for hours\textsuperscript{147}. Adams County state attorney Jon Barnard went before Adams County circuit judge Chet Vahle on March 17th to request an injunction that would grant those voters the ability to vote late due to insufficient ballot allotment.

The next day, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, an ardent Hillary Clinton supporter who has introduced her at campaign rallies, filed an appeal in Illinois 4th District Appellate Court to prevent late voting. Like in Arizona, Clinton also defeated Sanders in the Illinois primary, but her margin-of-victory was much smaller: 50.5% to 48.7%, a slim margin of 35,000 votes or 1.8% of the Illinois electorate. On March 23, the appellate court issued a stay on Judge Vahle’s injunction, meaning those voters won’t get a chance to cast ballots in this primary.

According to The Guardian, Bernie Sanders won in four of the six Illinois counties that had election shortages\textsuperscript{148}. In Champaign County, home to the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Sanders beat Clinton 20,581-10,542 — almost a two-to-one margin. Bernie Sanders beat Clinton in rural Effingham County 1,247-867. Sanders won by 3,391 votes in Madison County, a Democratic Party stronghold, and he also won 10,365 votes to Clinton’s 9,255 votes in Sangamon County.

In an April 5th, 2016 audit of 5% of primary votes by the Chicago Board of Elections mandated by the Illinois State BOE, it was discovered that in one precinct, 21 Bernie votes were


erased and 49 Hillary votes were added to the audit tally in order to match the machine count. In this one precinct, this change from the actual results accounted for nearly 20% of overall votes cast. The actual tally was 56.7% in Senator Sanders’ favor. After count was manipulated by machine, Sanders lost with 47.5% of vote— an 18.4% swing. Yet Chicago BOE officials refuse to acknowledge any discrepancy between the ballots hand-counted by auditors and the machine ballots— even after auditors quintuple-checked the discrepancy to make sure it existed.

In a phone interview with US Uncut, state attorney Barnard said that had there been enough ballots available in those counties, the end result may have been a Sanders win, rather than a Clinton victory. He added that the responsibility for having enough available ballots ultimately falls on the shoulders of elected county clerks, who failed in their duty to provide voters with a fair election and the opportunity to have their voice heard.

“What occurred here is that the county clerk failed to print sufficient ballots to meet the demands of voters,” Barnard said. “How ironic is it that the entity who appears to be the guardian of the right to vote is the entity that deprived people of that right?”

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Barnard is correct in that it is bizarre that the party that has historically fought voter suppression has seemingly engaged in voter suppression— and in two states with large minority populations that would seem to be favorable to Democrats. Because the Adams County Clerk must certify primary election results by March 29, Barnard said there isn’t enough time to appeal the case to the Illinois Supreme Court, effectively disenfranchising thousands of voters.

Allegations of voter suppression have dogged the 2016 Democratic primary since the Iowa Caucuses, during which Hillary Clinton was declared a winner by two-tenths of one percent. Describing the caucuses as a “debacle”, the Des Moines Register’s editorial board wrote that “[the Iowa Democratic Party’s] refusal to undergo scrutiny or allow for an appeal reeks of autocracy”:

“[T]he results were too close not to do a complete audit of results...too many questions have been raised. Too many accounts have arisen of inconsistent counts, untrained and overwhelmed volunteers, confused voters, cramped precinct locations, a lack of voter registration forms and other problems. Too many of us, including members of the Register editorial board who were observing caucuses, saw opportunities for error amid Monday night’s chaos.”

In 90 of Iowa’s precincts, final vote tallies were reported “missing”, effectively disenfranchising thousands of Iowans. When the Sanders campaign asked for a review of the results, the Iowa Democratic Party refused. According to the Des Moines Register:

Dr. Andy McGuire, chairwoman of the Iowa Democratic Party, dug in her heels and said no. She said the three campaigns had representatives in a room in the hours after the caucuses and went over the discrepancies.

McGuire knows what’s at stake. Her actions only confirm the suspicions, wild as they might be, of Sanders supporters. Their candidate, after all, is opposed by the party establishment — and wasn’t even a Democrat a few months ago.

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Massachusetts’ primary results have also been called into question, where Hillary Clinton won by less than 2%. According to the Huffington Post:

On the day of the primary, Bill Clinton was accused of unethical (and very likely illegal) electioneering in the Boston area. According to reports, Bill “blocked off several polling entrances, preventing people from voting. In New Bedford, a Reddit user posted a video depicting the former president speaking from a megaphone. Voters were roped off and could not enter their polling places.”

It’s against Massachusetts state law to campaign within 150 feet of a polling station. Massachusetts Secretary of State William F. Galvin “notified” the Clinton campaign of the rule after this activity was reported.

Additionally, New York’s primary has come under scrutiny from both right and left sides of the political spectrum for their draconian voter restrictions. In New York, which has a closed primary, the deadline to register as a Democrat or Republican was the first week of October 2015, before a single televised debate had taken place. This means that many people who had come into their political consciousness sometime during or after the fall of last year were unable to vote for the candidate of their choosing in the primary. Famously, Presidential candidate Donald Trump’s children were upset to discover in March of 2016 that though they were registered to vote, since they had not been registered as Republicans prior to October 2015, they could not vote for their father in the primary. “it’s a rigged system, it’s a crooked system, it’s 100% crooked,” Trump said of the New York primary process. Conversely, Erica Garner, daughter of Eric Garner, who was choked

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to death by NYPD Officers in 2015, could not vote for the same reason—she had not registered as a Democrat prior to the deadline\textsuperscript{155}.

New York’s voter restrictions are unlike any other state in the nation. In 11 states—Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Wyoming and Washington D.C.—voters are allowed to register for a political party on the day of the primary. Twenty other states—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia—have open primaries, meaning one can vote in them regardless of one’s party affiliation or disaffiliation. So why is New York’s primary written in this way?

In the lead-up to the New York primary, countless voter registration problems were reported as longstanding members of the Democratic party claimed someone had switched their affiliation to independent without notice, or that the Board of Elections had neglected to change their party affiliation before the deadline\textsuperscript{156}. Mayor Bill De Blasio of New York City demanded an explanation from city officials as to why more than 126,000 registered Democrats were dropped from the voting rolls since Fall 2015. The request came the day an analysis by WNYC revealed the largest decline in active registered Democrats statewide was in Brooklyn.\textsuperscript{157} On April 16th, 2016,

\textsuperscript{155} “Erica Garner Can’t Vote In NY”. Politico Pro. 16 April 2016. Web.


\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
representatives with Election Justice USA filed an emergency injunction on behalf of the people whose registrations were changed without their knowledge or consent. Four days later, the NY Attorney General opened an investigation into what it called “voting irregularities” and “alleged improprieties” after receiving over 1,000 complaints to the office’s voter hotline on election day, an unusually high number by the Attorney General’s own admission. On April 21st, 2016, the NYC BOE suspended Republican clerk Diane Haslett-Rudiano without pay from her $125,000-a-year position. Haslett-Rudiano was thought to have skipped a step in a regular protocol of updating the voter list with deaths and changes of address. Haslett-Rudiano’s suspension raised eyebrows on both sides of New York’s political establishment—though the problems occurred mainly with Democratic party rolls, Haslett-Rudiano, only oversees voter rolls for the Republican party, while Democrat Betty Ann Canizio, the BOE Deputy Clerk for Brooklyn, is the official primarily responsible for overseeing the borough’s Democratic voting rolls. According to the New York Post:

Canizio is an ally of Brooklyn Democratic Chairman Frank Seddio. She has a long history as a borough district leader of rubber-stamping his candidate nominations and political appointments. Seddio used his political muscle to help Canizio, 68, secure her $120,000-a-year post, sources said.

BOE sources say she’s routinely absent or works half days. She failed to show up for work Thursday and wasn’t at her Bay Ridge home when visited by a Post reporter.

Canizio was also at the center of a illegal parking placard scandal that rocked her office—yet somehow avoided punishment. Two Brooklyn elected officials told The Post Canizio bragged at a Democratic committee meeting in 2014 that she illegally gave away her city-issued parking placard to her husband so he could avoid tickets. She then recruited David Annarummo, a BOE administrative associate, to drive her to and from work as part of his duties.

Annarummo was one of the five staffers busted using fake, photocopied parking placards and slapped with fines of up to $500 by the city's Conflicts of Interest Board.

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According to an elected Brooklyn official who is a democrat, speaking to the New York Daily News, “It sounds like they cut a deal to make the Republican the scapegoat and protect Betty Ann”.\textsuperscript{160} Though Haslett-Rudiano has not officially been dismissed from her position, it is remarkable that she has been the sole figure implicated in the removal of entire city blocks and housing complexes from voter registration databases that she was not even in charge of overseeing.

To many observers, the October 9th, 2015 deadline to change party affiliation has been seen as an attempt to disenfranchise Independent/Unaffiliated voters, now the largest group of voters in the United States. According to a January 2016 Gallup poll, 26\% of Americans identify as Republicans, while 29\% identify as Democrats, an all-time low for both groups. According to the same poll, 42\% of Americans identify as Unaffiliated\textsuperscript{161}. The Unaffiliated coalition comprises a wide variety of ideological beliefs, but are united by the fact that they simply do not identify with political parties or want to participate in traditional party politics—yet another reason to hold off the “Demographics are Destiny” celebration. Many of these independent voters turn out to vote, cycle after cycle, often for one of the two mainstream parties’ candidates—so why not allow them to vote in the primary? Especially in an election dominated by nontraditional candidates such as Sanders and Trump, who did not rise up through the party ranks but are instead using the apparatus of the party as an instrument through which to reach and find their coalition?

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.

At very least, New York State, infamously known for “machine politics” and political corruption (whose most recent scandal, for which Mayor DeBlasio was implicated in “willful violation of campaign finance laws” came to light a mere four days after the April 19th primary) is signaling to unaffiliated voters that the two mainstream parties find their involvement in their process distasteful. At most, it is disenfranchising everyday people in the name of protecting the powerful in either party’s establishment. Whereas a state with voter ID laws can expect to see a 2% drop in voter turnout as a share of the registered population, 25% of New York’s voters were left unable to vote in the 2016 primary.

To suggest that independents, many of whom belong to demographic populations that have been let down by the two-party system, should not be able to vote in a primary due to their lack of party affiliation is similar to suggesting that voters who were not able to pay a poll tax should not

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be able to vote, or those that didn’t get voter IDs made a choice not to. According to DEMOS’s Matt Breunig, what is upsetting about the “that isn’t voter suppression, this is” line of thinking is that its proponents fixate on trying to define whether voter suppression is or is not happening, when disenfranchisement is not binary, but rather occurs on a sliding scale of increasingly odious voter restrictions:

“Requiring no registration (or having automatic registration) will lead to more participation than requiring same-day registration, which will lead to more participation than requiring registration two weeks before, which will lead to more participation than requiring registration 6 months before, which will lead to more participation than requiring registration only in the month of February in odd-numbered years.”

“The tricky thing about it is that for any procedural rule that drags on voter participation, there is always some kind of plausible explanation for it. Party registration is plausibly important in order to prevent would-be saboteurs (though there is not much evidence of bad-faith sabotage and committed saboteurs could still sabotage). Voter ID is plausibly important in order to prevent fraud and in fact most countries have voter ID as it is (though there is not much evidence of voter fraud and committed fraudsters could probably create fake IDs to defraud). Early voting is costly and how much early voting you allow is always arbitrary (why 10 days and not 11?). The same is true of how long polls stay open and how many polling stations you use: there are associated costs to using more and cut offs are always somewhat arbitrary.”

In short: there is an element of confirmation bias at play, in that one may find a procedural rule harmful which hurts his or her coalition while finding no trouble with a rule that negatively affects the turnout of his or her opponent’s coalition. Should even half of the 3.6 million registered NY independents have joined the 1.6 million New Yorkers who cast ballots on April 19th, 2016, the result would likely be enormously different than the Clinton and Trump landslides that transpired. For long, the narrative has been that the Republicans like to suppress the vote, and Democrats don’t. In reality, we see both parties endorsing measures that reduce the turnout of

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voters they don’t want inside their process, provided those measures have at least some kind of ostensibly plausible justification.

VII. Conclusion

Earlier, this paper established that for Demographics to be Destiny, four basic conditions must be met: 1) that the population of minority communities will continue to grow by leaps and bounds 2) that minorities will soon register to vote and cast ballots in proportion to their share of the population 3) that minorities will continue indefinitely to be a reliable part of the Democratic coalition 4) minority allegiance to the Democratic party will offset shifts along different variables, such as age. After further investigation, this paper does not find any conclusive evidence of any of the four conditions being fulfilled. The growth of minority communities is slowing, while the nation as a whole is experiencing a decline in birthrates as well as immigration. In states with large minority populations, such as South Carolina, voters of color, especially young voters of color, are not registering at a fast-enough pace to offset similar increases in registration amongst older, white voters, who have more conservative policy beliefs than minority constituents. Party identification amongst American citizens is at an all-time low, with more and more Americans choosing to belong to no party at all and vote Unaffiliated. Lastly, voters over 45 continue to out-power voters of color and religious minorities in terms of influence at the voting booths.

The Democratic Party cannot take the votes of black, hispanic, asian, Arab and Desi-Americans for granted as the Republican party continues to make up for its historical disparity in electing officials of color and religious minorities to senior leadership positions and is executing
several strategies at the state and national level to bring minorities into the party. Though having Donald Trump at the top of the presidential ticket could dissuade Latinos and other communities turned off by his rhetoric (which some have perceived as racially-charged and insensitive) from voting for him, it should be noted that Trump’s candidacy and newfound influence within the party is unlikely to have a negative down-ballot affect on Republicans. Though the state parties and the national-level parties of the United States often work in coercion, most noticeably during the general election years, state parties often have a great deal of autonomy to pursue their own strategies on how to bring out the electorate in their own states, setting primary rules, appointing clerks, and nominating their own candidates. It is likely that Republicans will continue to build in states where they have already had some success in recruiting minorities, such as Texas and South Carolina, and that minority constituents there will vote for Republicans at a local level with a more moderate tone on racial issues.

Additionally, since the Republican party has such a strong pull with voters over 45, who out-vote younger voters, Democrats must make a concerted effort to GOTV amongst younger voters— as well as communities of color. Strong GOTV efforts coupled with same-day registration, especially in communities with younger constituents, will have a positive effect on Democratic turnout. Local parties must work in a tripartite fashion to increase turnout: 1) encourage the reinstatement of provisions originally demanded by the VRA 2) use district “modeling” to microtarget undervoting constituencies for GOTV efforts 3) make registration and voting as easy as possible by encouraging SDR, increasing polling places, and printing a surplus of ballots. Both parties must also craft policy that appeals to the needs of minority communities. They must also
not neglect the voices of Unaffiliated voters, as denying them a say in their primary process would do nothing to abnegate their influence in a general election. Since primaries are about selecting the most appealing candidates to face off in the general, and the independent voters can often “swing” an election in one party or another’s favor, it would make sense for parties to select candidates which possess crossover appeal beyond their traditional constituencies.