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Knowledge and Power in Occupied Japan: U.S. Censorship of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

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Knowledge and Power in Occupied Japan: U.S. Censorship of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
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Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

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Glossary

ABCC:	Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
CCD:	Civil Censorship Detachment
CI&E:	Civil Information and Education Section
CIS:	Civil Intelligence Section
ESS:	Economic and Scientific Section
G-2:	Military intelligence staff in the U.S Army (G-1 personnel, G-3 operations)
PH&W:	Public Health and Welfare
PPB:	Press, Pictorial and Broadcast
SCAP:	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. This was the position General MacArthur was given but it came to stand for both General Macarthur and the staff operating under him (also known as GHQ)

Introduction

On August 6th, 1945 at 8:16 a.m. the United States dropped the atomic bomb dubbed ‘Little Boy’ over Hiroshima. On August 9th at 11:02 a.m. the second bomb ‘Fat Man’ was dropped on Nagasaki. The United States had become the first and only country to use nuclear weapons against another country, and the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the first citizens to experience firsthand the full effects of these bombs. The survivors of the two bombings became known as *Hibakusha*, which is usually translated as ‘bomb affected people’ or ‘explosion affected people’. On August 15th, Emperor Hirohito spoke on the radio for the first time to announce Japan’s surrender. It took the Allied occupation forces two weeks to reach Japan, and on September 2nd the official documents of surrender were signed.¹

¹ Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan: from Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

General Douglas MacArthur, was given the position of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Under the command of General MacArthur, the occupation of Japan began. SCAP came to stand for both General MacArthur and the occupation bureaucracy that would operate in Japan under his command.² While General MacArthur was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, having ‘Allied Powers’ in the title could be misleading, as he had predominantly American staff, and took direct orders from the U.S. government. The central goals of SCAP were to demilitarize Japan and to turn the country into a democracy. Japan was also a key strategic location for U.S. forces as Cold War tensions ramped up, and the U.S. became involved in the Korea War. In establishing the U.S. occupation of Japan, SCAP found it necessary to set up a system of censorship in order to advance American interests and keep the peace.³

The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) was established in order to carry out the censorship of books, newspapers, radio, film, plays, magazines, and personal letters and phone calls. An extensive list of censored subjects was created. This list included topics like, the criticism of SCAP, Nationalistic Propaganda, and the mention of censorship itself.⁴ Under this level of nationwide censorship, news about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bombings, and the stories of its inhabitants, were also suppressed. The censorship of the bombings was not one of the initial topics for censorship, but became perceived as a taboo topic. Hibakusha were prevented from speaking about their situations. Those who survived their injuries and radiation poisoning in the months after the bombings would go on to deal with future medical issues due to injuries and radiation exposure. SCAP censorship under the CCD only exacerbated the suffering Hibakusha faced, as

² General Head Quarters (GHQ) was also used interchangeably to refer to SCAP.

³ Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan: from Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

⁴ Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999, 406-411.

medical information was not allowed to be published and lack of information around what had happened to them contributed to the spread of misinformation, like the common belief that their conditions were communicable. The resulting societal discrimination meant that Hibakusha were further injured by financial and emotional hardship caused by societal isolation.

The three texts that have informed my research on this topic are John W. Dower's *Embracing Defeat*, Susan Southard's *Nagasaki Life after Nuclear War*, and Monica Braw's *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed*. In Dower's work he provides a chapter on censorship under SCAP, outlining the types of information that was censored, and specific works that were censored. He touches briefly on the censorship of information around Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and concludes the chapter by concluding that censorship had a lasting effect through the "continued socialization in the acceptance of authority," and that this undermined the project of democracy the U.S. was establishing in Japan.⁵

In Susan Southard's book, *Nagasaki*, she follows the stories of five Hibakusha in Nagasaki, who were all children and young adults at the time of the bombing. She interweaves the stories of their experiences with the political events occurring at the same time, discussing the censorship of texts, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, the evolving relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and the place of Hibakusha in society. This book begins on the day of the bombing in 1945 and continues until present day, showing the whole lives of these five individuals and the changes in the debates around nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and how the bombings are remembered.

Monica Braw provides an in-depth study on U.S. Censorship in Japan. Her research centers around the set up and process of censorship within Japan, with the latter half addressing censorship

⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 439.

of the atomic bombs, proposing reasons for it due to the risk of the Soviets and other world powers gaining information. As well as raising the issues of censoring a country while setting up a democracy, and the U.S. supporting the necessity of dropping the bombs on Japan. In her work she focuses more on censorship practices than addressing hibakusha's experiences. Aware of this she remarks in her introduction that "it may seem that I have forgotten the hibakusha and their own evidence of what it was like to live under the occupation..." but that through her project she was hoping to spread awareness about the censorship of the horrors they experienced.⁶

In my analysis of this topic I have drawn on these three texts for background on the topic, but I make more direct links between censorship and the experience of people within Japan. Braw and Dower focus on the set up of censorship, the specific works that were censored, and larger political concerns at the time. And Southard focuses on the life of five hibakusha and the historical and political events they lived through. In my work I focused on the censorship of the narratives on the Atomic Bombing, and the personal medical information of Hibakusha. In looking more closely at one type of censorship you can see the direct impact it had on Hibakusha within Japan.

In this project I will also explore the reasons behind the U.S. censorship of the Atomic bombings. CCD policy did not establish a specific category of censorship for the Atomic bombings, but censored it for multiple reasons due to U.S. interest. I will look both into the official reasons for censorship, and the other motives behind the U.S.'s choice to censor this topic. I propose that the censorship of medical and personal information around the bombings are due to issues tied up in war guilt, the U.S.'s desire for the monopoly of scientific information pertaining to Atomic weapons, and promoting U.S. interest in the newly forming nation of Japan.

⁶ Braw, Monica. *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991, 9.

Chapter One: Censorship Under SCAP

To understand the effects of SCAP censorship and how it worked in practice, it is first essential to outline how the process began, and the specific transitions it went through. In this section I will provide background information necessary to the understanding of the Censorship process in Japan. I will first outline how censorship was carried out in the United States and Japan during war time, and then in comparison will present the censorship process in occupied Japan. Then I will address the transition from pre-censorship to post-censorship, and the establishment of specific censorship policies.


Wartime Censorship in the U.S.

In the United States the U.S. Government reports having established a civil censorship system of “voluntary self-censorship” where no edits were made prior to publication, and there was no official power to punish violators beyond publishing the names of individuals who had shared too much. However, the Justice Department could try people under the 1918 Espionage Act.⁷ While the Civil Censorship system was reported to only provide guidelines for self-censorship, in practice individuals who did not follow the guidelines faced consequences.

When Stanley Johnston and another journalist ignored the ‘guidelines’, they were “immediately summoned to Washington and interrogated by Navy Department officials and were nearly indicted by a special federal grand jury for violating the Espionage Act,” permanently

⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. ““Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and The American Press and Radio in World War II.”” Central Intelligence Agency. Last modified June 27, 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article10.html>.

damaging their reputations as reporters.⁸ Therefore, this 'voluntary' system was in practice a mandate. In the photo below, we see outlined the different branches of the U.S. censorship system, with field stations of the postal and cable division being located in major cities across the country. If this system was not meant to correct people beforehand or penalize them afterwards it seems unlikely that such a wide network of censorship would have been necessary. So the modest official stance on censorship and the more rigorous practice of how it was carried out were inconsistent with each other.



DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AWP 8-2-2002

⁸ Aswell, Paul. "Wartime Press Censorship by the U.S. Armed Forces A Historical Perspective." <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a227383.pdf>. 71-75.

Fig 1. U.S. Censorship organization (It is important to note the different divisions that censorship in the U.S. operated under. Under the office of the Director is the Press division, Cable Division, Postal Division, Technical Operations Division, and the Broadcast Division. When SCAP began setting up censorship divisions in Japan we will see a similar format.)⁹

Wartime Censorship in Japan

The system of censorship that was in place during the war was a legacy of Meiji era policy, that expanded in response to the crisis. A key apparatus of enforcing censorship during the war was the thought police. The various cabinets and boards who organized and wrote censorship practices into law relied on the police to carry out the collection of information of censored materials and to put pressure on publishers. The Book Section of the Police Bureau was responsible for the censorship and licensing of publications from 1893-1940, but the Special Higher Section became the official group that supervised this censorship. The Special Higher Police or ‘thought police’ were established in 1911 in response to discovering a plot to assassinate Emperor Meiji.¹⁰ Originally, they had the job of monitoring social movements and preventing the spread of ‘dangerous foreign ideologies’, these dangerous ideologies were most often far-left or anarchist groups that were deemed a threat to the nation. When the Japanese Communist Party won eight seats in the election of 1928, the Home Minister Suzuki Kisaburo ordered a further crack down on communist and socialist ideologies’.

⁹ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Civil Intelligence Section. Civil Censorship Detachment. Records Section. 1945-11/1949. "000.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947." Chart. 486850. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

¹⁰ Mitchell, Richard H. *Censorship in Imperial Japan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1983. 146.

As a result of this crackdown in 1929 the Special Higher Police were expanded and began following orders to prosecute anyone guilty of a ‘thought crime’. This term was vaguely defined and gave the Special Higher Police the ability to arrest, according to one secret directive, “anyone who appears as if they *might want* to change the absolutism of the emperor”.¹¹ In 1932 with the ongoing war the thought police were again expanded and an independent Censorship Section was created. The Book Section at this time was also divided into First Section responsible for newspapers, and public peace violations and the Second section, looking for public moral violation.¹²

While in 1940 an attempt was made at organizing censorship efforts under one group, the Cabinet Information Bureau, censorship in Japan remained complex with different departments all trying to retain their influence. The police groups tasked with censorship maintained a more hands-on approach, surveilling places of publication, interrogating readers of texts that were disapproved of, and arresting those guilty of ‘though crime’. Information collected in police stations was given to prefectural governments. As the government set strict standards for censorship, any document that was a public peace violation or public moral violation could be censored.¹³ Like in the U.S., writers and journalists in Japan had to “accept the rule of onerous censorship system or withdraw from professional life”.¹⁴ They had to follow specific press codes and if not, their material would be seized and they could face punishment. Many editors ended up having ‘friendly discussions’ with censorship authorities about what they published. If a journalist or author was disapproved of it would be ‘suggested’ their work not be published, which had the effect of blacklisting them. To

¹¹ Mitchell, *Censorship*, 203.

¹² *Ibid.*, 261.

¹³ This was under Article 23 of the Press Law; “when published literature and pictures are regarded as disturbing to public peace and order or injurious to morals, the home minister has the authority to forbid their sale and distribution and confiscate the plates and the printed matter” Mitchell, *Censorship*, 150.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 336

get editors to cooperate with these ‘suggestions’, compliance was linked to their ability to sell and issue, and the amount of paper they were given during the paper shortages.¹⁵

Establishing Censorship Under SCAP; the CIS, CCD, and CI&E

As the war drew to a close and the U.S. began to plan the future of Japan after surrender. Directives to establish freedom of speech, and freedom of the press were passed concurrently with plans to establish an elaborate system of censorship in Japan. Plans for civil censorship in Japan had been in works for over a year prior to the bombing of Hiroshima. On May 19, 1944 the first directive on civil censorship was established for occupied areas. By August 15th, 1945 the Emperor had surrendered and concrete plans were put in place for the structure of the occupation of Japan. The August 29th, 1945 Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, established that under occupation forces “the Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and press”.¹⁶ The establishment of free speech was one of the points of the Potsdam Declaration that Japan had signed when agreeing to surrender, and this Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive was established consistent with points it set out. However, the Basic Plan for Civilian Censorship was already underway at this time, with the first draft created April 20th, 1945, and the third and final version was approved September 30th, 1945.

It is important to note that both free speech and press practices and censorship regimes for Japan were being written and established at the same time. In creating Japan as a new nation and a future ally for the U.S., it was important to establish a democratic country, but SCAP also wanted to shape the country in they saw fit, which would necessitate more control. By September 3, 1945

¹⁵ Mitchell, *Censorship*, 326-327

¹⁶ Braw, *Atomic Bomb Suppressed*, 27.

the Civil Censorship Department was operational, setting up the censorship regime that would operate under SCAP for the years to come.¹⁷ In October of that year a Civil Liberties directive stripped the Japanese Board of Information of the ability to censor materials in the country, and by December 31, 1945 the Japanese Board of Information was dissolved all together.¹⁸ Here we see the transfer of censorship duties from one nation to the next. And while freedoms of speech and press were being drafted in the new constitution the censorship mechanism within Japan was growing.¹⁹

There were multiple bodies established under SCAP that were responsible for censorship and information control. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) was a branch of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), which operated under the command of General Charles A. Willoughby.²⁰ The CCD focused on “suppressing the circulation of any material deemed inimical to the aims of Occupation.” As well as collecting information from personal letters, calls, and other transmission on the views held by Japanese citizens.²¹ The CCD was further divided up into different divisions according to what sort of material they would be censoring, as the U.S. had done in North America during the war. Though, in the U.S. there were five distinct divisions of censorship, in Japan, SCAP established the Press, Pictorial and Broadcast division as one group.

Another department that was responsible for censorship was the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E). This section was separate from the CIS and unlike the CCD was

¹⁷ Okamoto, Shiro. “The Man Who Saved Kabuki.” *Google Books*, books.google.com/books?id=mZB_r3y-utwC&pg=PA90&lpg=PA90&dq=ci%26e%2Band%2Bccd&source=bl&ots=FjIuorXeVQ&sig=BzzHbNZRezZZKqFtZhlDTf1uB_s&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjj5pbUvKDaAhWinOAKHQ9zDMwQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=ci%26e%20and%20ccd&f.p.90.

¹⁸ Braw, Monica. 29.

¹⁹ By 1946 the CCD had 8734 members, the new constitution that upheld freedom of speech in the country went into operation May 3, 1947

²⁰ Braw, *Atomic Bomb Suppressed*, 34.

²¹ Okamoto, *Kabuki*, 90.

“designed to perform the positive function of revealing American practices to the Japanese in the field of communication and thereby inculcating in them a first-hand knowledge of the workings of democracy”.²² It would have conducted censorship of a different type. Focusing on what sort of messages were making their way to the public, preventing old narratives that were disapproved, and providing ‘educational guidance’ to inform Japanese citizens about American ideal and the importance of democracy.

Censorship Practice: 1945-1947

From late 1945 to early 1947, SCAP censorship was at its peak. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) grew rapidly in size during this time as the occupation bureaucracy took shape. In 1945 the CCD based their operations out of Tokyo, which was convenient as the major newspapers were based there. Under the Wartime government newspapers also saw censors. The organization of Japanese censorship set up during the war was useful to the U.S.. Having a more centralized system that was set up under Japanese wartime censorship, it made the process more efficient for SCAP, and it provided a number of Japanese staff that were needed to help in censorship or translation, as at the time of occupation only a small number of the forces could read Japanese. The reach of the CCD quickly expanded, so by 1946 the CCD was made up of several geographic districts, the Tokyo district, the Osaka district with a Nagoya sub-station, and a Fukuoka district.²³ While the focus of my analysis is on Occupied Japan I would be remiss in not mentioning Korea, as it was a colonial territory of Japan, and the American censorship expanded

²² Okamoto, *Kabuki*, 90.

²³ Memorandum, "000.73: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1948," Diet National Archive, <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3540590>.P. 29.

to cover this territory. Therefore, by 1946 the CCD also had two districts located in Seoul and Pusan (modern day Busan).²⁴

During this time the majority of materials were subjected to a pre-censor. The CCD made it a requirement that “all Japanese new agency copy, large daily newspapers, selected magazine copy, and all books are censored prior to dissemination in Japan. All other publications are censored within a reasonable length of time after publication”.²⁵ In addition, movies, radio, textbooks, plays, and even personal letters and phone calls began to be monitored and censored. The use of pre-censorship versus post-censorship has different implication for the effects of the censorship. As the type of censorship used by the CCD changed over time we see how it affected access to information.

In 1945, the practice of pre-censoring as opposed to post-censoring meant that in the final product there was no trace that information was being suppressed. With post-censorship one would have black bars or x's over the material which indicated to the reader that something was omitted²⁶. Post-censor, then, would have left people with the understanding that the material was censored. With pre-censorship the published product bears no trace of omissions. In addition to this, censorship and the acknowledgement of the CCD were censored topics.²⁷ To ensure this process was seamless, no mention could be made of the censorship practice and no traces of censorship would be left in the final product. At this time, the CCD operated as a silent organization shaping what information the public had access to, without the general public being aware of what was being withheld. As a result, gaps in knowledge existed about events occurring inside Japan, and

²⁴ Memorandum, "000.73: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1948,". 29.

²⁵ Memorandum, "000.73: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1946," n.d. <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3540478>.

²⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 408.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 408.

stories about those affected by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were prime examples of such gaps.

In Dower's book *Embracing Defeat*, he states the public lacked all information about the establishment and dissolution of the CCD censor.²⁸ However, this seems unlikely as those in the publishing business were numerous and they faced the censor daily. Many others were censored due to their writing about censorship, which indicates individuals were aware about the censorship occurred. According to SCAP records, over 3,000 foreign and Japanese nationals worked for the CCD by May 1946, a number which eventually grew to 8084.²⁹ This group of Japanese nationals were necessary for the CCD as very few of the CCD's U.S. citizens knew Japanese, which was essential for the translation, reading and censoring of documents, films, and radio.³⁰ Besides the Japanese citizens the CCD employed a number of Koreans living within Japan. This increasingly large number of individuals involved in the censorship efforts also make it seem improbable that members of the public would not be aware of the CCD. The U.S. kept censorship of large group projects a secret before but only under extreme circumstances. The Manhattan project had upwards of 125,000 employees and it maintained secrecy, but those employees lived in restricted areas, and the U.S. worked to censor the public's knowledge of the project by containing information leaks. Given how widespread the CCD was throughout Japan, both area wise, and in reach of its censor (especially with private letters and phone calls) it is highly unlikely that its existence was completely secret. It could be conceived that some of the general public was aware of this mass

²⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 407-408.

²⁹ Memorandum, "000.73: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1946," 9.

³⁰ Braw, *Atomic Bomb Suppressed*.

ensorship effort, but since any writing about the existence of censorship was itself censored one cannot definitively say what the general population knew about the CCD.

Censorship Practice: 1947-1948

In 1947-1948 the CCD slowly transitioned most media from being pre-censored to post-censored. As on September 29th 1947 a policy was approved that had the effect of “placing on post-censorship, at the discretion of the Civil Censorship Officer, all press, pictorial and broadcast agencies except those which had failed to conform with the Press Code for Japan”.³¹ Seventeen publishers saw pre-censorship after this time. In the 147 books submitted between October 15th, 1947 and July 23, 1948, thirty-three of those books saw deletions under the censor³². Out of the twelve publishing companies that were under a partial pre-censor at that time, only 4 books were evaluated for pre-censor from September 15, 1947 to August 20th, 1948, and out of those four books only two books saw any sort of censorship.³³ Due to these figures it was recommended that 27 of the publishers that saw some sort of pre-censor be moved to post-censorship.³⁴ And by the end of July 1948 all major newspapers and publishers were shifted to post-censorship.³⁵

With the case of post-censorship, one would think having the public be able to see that work was being censored was less nefarious than the silent pre-censor. However, to have a work be published, and then censored was extremely costly to all involved. Post-censorship could be devastating to a company who had invested in creating a product that could not be sold. When the film, *Tragedy of Japan*, was prevented from being released by the CCD the company that financed

³¹ Memorandum, "000.73: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1948. 4.

³² Ibid. 7-8.

³³ Ibid. 9.

³⁴ Ibid. 5.

³⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*. 432.

it, Nichiei, almost went bankrupt.³⁶ Censored works like this set an example for the industry, which led to an increase of self-censorship, and the unwillingness for publishers to invest money in products with certain topics due to the risks. Still it is during this time of the shift from pre-censor to post-censor that we begin to see some of the first major works around Hiroshima and Nagasaki begin to be published, so the process of shifting from pre- to post-censorship had some effect in loosening restrictions.

CCD Censorship Policy

The CCD censored materials that it felt would be detrimental to the occupation efforts in Japan. The main reasoning behind censorship was outlined in the memorandum approved by Brigadier General K. R. Thorpe, on November 13th 1945, which states:

4. Only Statements which:

- a. Are obviously untrue
- b. Would seriously disturb public tranquility
- c. Would seriously endanger the occupation or its objectives
- d. Would reflect seriously upon the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers would be suppressed.³⁷

Consistent with these motives, in June of 1946, some thirty broad topics were designated censored topics by the CCD including any mention of the CCD or Censorship.³⁸ In Dower's book, *Embracing Defeat*, he outlines the various censored topics as follows:

Criticism of SCAP

Criticism of SCAP Writing the Constitution

Criticism of Military Tribunal

References to Censorship

³⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat* 429.

³⁷ Memorandum, " GHQ, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, APO 500, 16 September 1946," n.d. 486850. 00.73: *Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947*. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, Declassified Number 775820.

³⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*. 410-411.

Criticisms of the United States	Glorification of Feudal Ideals
Criticism of Russia	Greater East Asia Propaganda
Criticism of Great Britain	General (Japanese) Propaganda
Criticism of Koreans	Justification or Defense of War Criminals
Criticism of China	Fraternization (referring in particular to fraternization of Allied personnel with Japanese women)
Criticism of other Allies	Black Market Activities
Criticism of Japanese Treatment in Manchuria (referring to treatment of Japanese POWs or civilians by Russians and Chinese after Japan's capitulation)	Criticism of Occupation Forces
Criticism of Allies' Pre-War Policies	Overplaying Starvation
Third World War Comments	Incitement to Violence or Unrest (on actual censored material this often was phrased as "Disturbs public tranquility")
Defense of War Propaganda	Untrue statements
Divine Descent National Propaganda	Inappropriate References to SCAP
Militaristic Propaganda	Premature Disclosure
Nationalistic Propaganda	

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While the Atomic bomb was not a censored topic specifically outlined by the CCD guidelines, early works about the bombings were censored and it quickly became an off-limits topic that people either self-censored, or that was censored by the CCD. This was true in regard to both witness accounts and medical research. While there were local publications that made it through the censor in Hiroshima, this was due to the CCD not having full control or necessary staff at the time of publication. At the end of the war the bombing itself had been downplayed by the Japanese

³⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 411.

government, and now it was being suppressed by the Americans.⁴⁰ Therefore, the nation as a whole lacked awareness of the challenges faced by Hibakusha.⁴¹

Since Atomic Bomb was not one of the thirty plus topics outlined in June of 1946, many secondary sources state that a specific rule for its censorship did not exist. In Dower's book, *Embracing Defeat*, he states that "writing about the atomic-bomb experience was not explicitly proscribed (for censor)" and quoting Susan Southard's book "No specific censorship rules related directly to the Nagasaki and Hiroshima atomic bombings".⁴² However, in the SCAP GHQ document on the "News Articles Concerning Results of Atomic Bombing" a policy was proposed and the Public Health and Welfare (PH&W) and Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) concurred. The document established the policy that:

- a. Articles containing material which threatens the sovereignty of the United States will not be released. References to bomb performance or characteristics, critical mass, official reports of scientific investigations of results of the bombing, purported details of manufacture of the bomb or its contents, etc are examples of information considered threatening the security of the United States.
- b. The limited number of facts upon which long range predictions of atomic bomb effects can be based, leads to controversy among competent scientists concerning the accuracy of such predictions. Because of the danger that controversial predictions may unnecessarily alarm the Japanese, articles containing long range predictions of affects of atom bombings should not be released.

⁴⁰ Braw, *Atomic Bomb Suppressed*.

⁴¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*. 414.

⁴² Southard, Susan. *Nagasaki: Life after Nuclear War*. New York, NY: Viking, 2015. 146

- c. Articles of a general nature and not containing information included in paragraphs 1a. and 1b. above may be released without reference to ESS (Economic and Scientific Section)
- d. Clearance of an article does not constitute verification of validity of scientific statements made therein, but is security clearance only.⁴³

According to this document it appears that the CCD did in fact have a policy outlined around the censorship of the Atomic bombings. Section A. does not fall directly under one of the censorship categories outlined by the CCD in 1946, the memorandum approved by Brigadier General K. R. Thorpe, on November 13th 1945, or the Press Code for Japan, as it speaks directly of protecting U.S. sovereignty and security instead of SCAP or occupation objectives. Section B. aligns more with the November 13th 1945 memorandum referencing the danger of untrue statements, and disturbing public tranquility. This document would allow the CCD to censor most material around the bombings, especially medical information. The presence of an 'et cetera' in paragraph 1a. also attests to the fact that the category of what and what couldn't be said about the bombings were broadly defined casting a wide umbrella of censorship around the topic.

Conclusion

In this section I provided an overview of the system of censorship set up under SCAP from 1945- 1948. The shift from pre-censorship to post-censorship that occurred, was continued after 1948, as slowly all media was transferred to post-censorship. While post-censorship led to a rise in self-censorship would have continued effects, the transition to post-censorship still marked a

⁴³ Memorandum, "News Articles Concerning Results of Atomic Bombing," n.d. 486850. 00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD."

decrease in control of SCAP. Through 1949 to 1951 the censorship process was further weakened until SCAP's departure in 1952. Now we understand how the SCAP apparatus was set up, how did it play out in relation to the control of information in post-war japan? In the next chapter I will look at this in more depth, looking at examples of documents that were censored from 1945-1948, and the unintended effects of that censorship.

Chapter Two: Censored Texts

In this chapter we will look at how the censorship process worked for written narratives around the bombings. In most examples sensitive subjects were censored without regard for the context or greater meaning of the text as a whole. The CCD was particularly careful in their censorship of the Atomic Bombings, as to not incite unrest, give Japanese citizens the ability to claim victim status, or implicate the U.S. in wartime atrocities. This chapter will also look at the censorship of medical information collected about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Medical censorship was two-fold, as the U.S. both sought to control already existing medical information through censorship, as well as establish an information collection system that would then be suppressed.

To set a standard for what would and would not be censored, SCAP established different sets of rules for publications, motion pictures, telecommunication, radio broadcasts, and personal mail. The Press Code for Japan were applied to all publications within the country,

CODE FOR JAPANESE PRESS

In accordance with the Supreme Allied Commander's objective of establishing freedom of the press in Japan, a Press Code for Japan has been issued. This PRESS CODE, rather than being one of restrictions of the press, is one which is designed to educate the press of the Japanese in the responsibilities and meaning of a free press. Emphasis is placed on the truth of news and the elimination of propaganda. This Press Code will cover, in addition, all publications printed in Japan.

This is Press Code for Japan:

1. News must adhere strictly to the truth.
2. Nothing should be printed which might, directly or by indirectly, disturb the public tranquility.
3. There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers.
4. There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied Occupation and nothing which might invite mistrust or resentment of those troops.
5. There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troops movements unless such movements

have been officially released.

6. News stories must be factually written and completely devoid of editorial opinion.
7. News stories shall not be colored to conform with any propaganda line.
8. Minor details of a news story must not be over-emphasized to stress or develop any propaganda line.
9. No news story shall be distorted by the omission of pertinent facts or details.
10. In the make-up of the newspaper no news story shall be given undue prominence for the purpose of establishing or developing any propaganda line.⁴⁴

While most points of the code address the spread of propaganda, and critique of the Allies, other points of the code were more open to interpretation. Specifically, Section 2. “Nothing should be printed which might, directly or by indirectly, disturb the public tranquility,” relies upon the interpretation of the censor to decide what would and would not be censored under this standard.

⁴⁵ Functionally this left the press code open enough that it gave the CCD carte blanche to censor works as desired.

In addition to section two, the Press Code sections most often cited when censoring Atomic Bomb related information, were sections three and four, on criticism of the Allies. When the ‘criticism of allies’ sections of the press code were used to censor texts, it was often due to explicit criticism by Japanese citizens of actions of the U.S. and SCAP in both wartime and in occupation. However, it was also used more subtly to prevent mention of damage done to the country by U.S. bombings, including both the firebombings which devastated 67 major cities in Japan, and the Atomic bombs. A text which mentioned the bombings, without referencing any allied power directly would also be censored due to the concern that it could lead to the criticism of the occupying power’s actions during the war.

⁴⁴ Civil Censorship Detachment. "Press Code for Japan." September 21, 1945.
<https://www.lib.umd.edu/prange/about-us/civil-censorship-detachment>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Meanwhile reasons for citing public tranquility as a basis for censorship were even more vague, since there were no documents that outlined what threatened public tranquility and what did not. As an occupying power SCAP was interested in maintaining their control over the country and shaping it into a new nation according to their design. Maintaining order was critical, but in practice a wide variety of works could be suppressed in the name of protecting public tranquility. In censorship related to the Atomic bombs, we see the U.S. both justifying their usage of the Atomic bombs, and preventing Japanese citizens from talking about their experiences as victims of the bombs. As a result, this limited people's abilities to publicly process their wartime experiences, and for Hibakusha it limited their ability to organization and get help for the issues they faced due to the bombing.

The CCD's press and pictorial division did not look into the nuances of texts when censoring. Instead the censorship tended to block any mention of certain topics, no matter the context they were written in. For example, "a story that used seeds sprouting in Nagasaki as a metaphor for young people throwing their energies into constructing a new Japan out of the ruins" was censored under SCAP.⁴⁶ Here we see one of many examples of censorship could be counterproductive to SCAP's goals. Censorship often prevented narratives of change and growth being published if those works also included mentions of 'forbidden topics'. Though with the sheer volume of materials being reviewed by the CCD each month, perhaps heavy-handed editing was due to work load preventing in-depth reading of texts. As the vast number of texts would contribute to readers scanning for forbidden words, rather than analyzing the significance and greater meaning of texts.

⁴⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 418.

Consequences of Censorship

This blanket censorship often contributed to some poor choices, that had unintended consequences. In Dower's book, *Embracing Defeat*, he discusses how under SCAP, the name that was used in Japan for the war in Asia was changed from the Great East Asia War, to the "Pacific War". This had the unintended effect of focusing more on Japan's role in conflicts between the U.S. than Japan and the war in China and Southeast Asia. This choice;

reflected the reflexive ethnocentrism of the conquerors, who essentially had excluded Japan's Asian antagonists from any meaningful role... quite the opposite of reminding the Japanese of their war guilt, such a maladroit rectification of names facilitated the process of forgetting what they had done to their Asian neighbors⁴⁷

The practice of censoring communication to and from these areas only added to the further separation of Japan from their war guilt for actions taken against China, Korea and the Philippines. As Korea and China became major points of contention for the U.S. during the Cold War, with the Communist Party of China becoming the single ruling party in 1949, and the Korean War beginning in 1950, both while Japan was still being occupied. Japan was an essential strategic location for the U.S. at this time, so fraternization with or sympathy for communist countries was heavily frowned upon. Further distancing Japan from the countries it had occupied, and the acts Japan had committed in those countries during the war.

Censorship reflected U.S. international policy at the time. In addition to limiting connection to China, Korea and the Philippines, due to cold war tensions. SCAP also permitted criticism of the Soviet Union to appear openly in the press. It was official policy to "eliminate flagrant criticism


⁴⁷ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 418.

of all Allied Powers, except the Soviet Union, unless emanating from persons prominent in public or private life".⁴⁸ This policy was critiqued by the Russians, both in letters received from Russian Lt. General Kusma N. Derevyanico, and in *Pravda* a Russian newspaper. Despite criticism, the policy was not changed, especially as Cold War tensions increased and the U.S. increasingly leaned to the right politically, even carrying out their own Red Purge in Japan.

Cold War tensions also contributed to the censor of information. With the Soviet Union becoming a greater threat the U.S. took protecting information on atomic bomb technology seriously. The importance to the U.S. of maintaining their monopoly on specific scientific knowledge around the atomic bombs also contributed to why SCAP was so strict with the censorship of information on the atomic bombs.

⁴⁸ Memorandum, "News Articles Concerning Results of Atomic Bombing," n.d. 486850. 00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD."

Censorship Scope, Process, and Archive Examples



(Map of the Newspapers in Japan, all of which were censored under SCAP)⁴⁹

Looking at the monthly responsibilities of different CCD divisions we get a sense of the sheer scope of the censorship efforts undertaken. In December of 1946, District I (of the three mainland districts) read 2,259 magazines⁵⁰, the postal division examined 1,863,278 pieces of mail,

⁴⁹ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Civil Intelligence Section. Civil Censorship Detachment. Records Section. 1945-11/1949. "000.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947." Map. 486850. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

⁵⁰ Memorandum, "Magazine Censorship Procedure," n.d. 486850. 00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD."

and 151,869 calls were handled by the telecommunication division.⁵¹ The 70 newspapers shown on the map above were all under censor. Books in District required 464 deletions from October 6th- November 5th 1946, including edits to textbooks, novels, fairy tales, and memoirs.⁵² Of course, the deletions were only a small portion of the pages read and does not fully describe the magnitude of the reading required. An invoice for censorship tape needed monthly by the CCD, estimated 5 million letters sealed per month, requiring 7,716 rolls of each month.⁵³ At this time the CCD had only about 3,980 staff members employed to carry out these tasks.

The way the censorship was carried out depended on whether it was pre- or post- censored. The time at which different sections of the CCD swapped from pre- to post censor varies, and there was also variation from publisher to publisher as past experience with each publisher would influence how subsequent materials were reviewed. In the time of pre-censorship, when an article was delivered to the local censorship district it would be “divided into four categories: objectionable, questionable or possibly objectionable, sensitive, and unobjectionable” these categories were distinguished usually by how many articles of the press code they violated. Unobjectionable documents went through an average of eight steps before being published, but sensitive document took up to thirty-one steps prior to publication.⁵⁴ Questionable and sensitive material were often sent to higher ranked staff at the district PPB office or the central division of the PPB.

⁵¹ Memorandum, "461: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1946," December 31, 1945. <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3540522>. 141, 148.


⁵² Memorandum, "Censorship Books 1946," n.d. 486850.
00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.”

⁵³ Memorandum, "000.73: General Headquarters G-2, Far East Command, Jan - Dec 1948," Diet National Archive, <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3540590>. 26.

⁵⁴ Braw, *Atomic bomb Suppressed*, 55.

As described later, written works on Hiroshima and Nagasaki required approval by multiple other agencies. This typically included the Civil Information and Education Section, Economic and Scientific Section, and Public Health and Welfare. This was made necessary due to the policy discussed in Chapter One where the document “News Articles Concerning Results of Atomic Bombing” cited the need for accuracy of information, and suppression details that could lead to another country learning how to construct a bomb, as well as preventing ‘unnecessary alarm’ of the bombs effects. Once a document went through all of these channels if a final decision was still not made, as in the case of *the Bells of Nagasaki*, additional dialogue would occur between heads of different branches of SCAP and the CCD.

What happened to work that was found to be sensitive or objectionable? In some cases, it was suppressed completely, in other cases partial deletions occurred, and some works were put on hold and brought up again later for consideration. In cases like the text below, *Kuroi Tamago*, multiple poems were in the original copy marked in red for deletion, and after the offending pages were deleted the work was able to be published. In other cases, it may be just one line or multiple pages that were found objectionable. When this happened, the publisher was notified and documentation was sent along with the document detailing what had been found



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Below is an English version of the document sent to the Author of *Kuroi Tamago*. A handwritten Japanese translation was also provided for this book, which demonstrates how language was another barrier SCAP censors faced, that would further increase the time it took to process texts. While 3,400 members of the CCD were Japanese or Foreign nationals that were hired due to their ability to read and write Japanese, texts that needed additional assessment, which could include things like radio broadcasts required additional translation. Generally, works were translated into English, reviewed by the necessary section of the CCD, had judgement passed on which parts needed to be suppressed, and then the result of their decisions would be written in English. This would then need additional Japanese translations so that all parties involved could understand censorship requirement, and what actions were being taken.

⁵⁵ Kurihara, Sadako. *Kuroi tamago*. Gordon W. Prange Collection. Hornbake Library North, University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT CENSOR
 Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division
 APO 929, Fukuoka, Kyushu

24 July 1946

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM:

TO : KUROI TAMAGO, Publisher, Mr. Tadaichi Kurihara
 c/o Chugoku Banku Hakkojo, Nagaki Gion-Machi, Asa-Gun
 SUBJECT : Publication censorship Hiroshima Ken


1. The book, KUROI TAMAGO, has passed pre-censorship and may now be printed and distributed. However, certain deletions have been marked on the copy. These deletions must be made before publication. No indication of censorship will appear in the finished product.
2. We are returning your copy on which are marked all required changes and which bears the stamp of our censor giving you authority for publication after such deletions have been made.
3. One copy of the completed edition must be submitted to this office for check purposes.
4. A copy of the Press Code for Japan is enclosed.

FOR THE DISTRICT CENSOR:

FRANK L. FAIRBOND
 1st. Lt., Inf.
 Chief P.P.B.

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⁵⁶ Kurihara, Sadako. *Kuroi tamago*. Gordon W. Prange Collection. Hornbake Library North, University of Maryland, College Park, MD.



(National Archives, Press and Publication Subject)⁵⁷

In a document from the national archive we see how a line in a book was censored due to the mention of someone's parents being victims of the atomic bomb. "you must study earnestly and become a great scientist, since your parents were made victims of the atomic bomb." This underlined portion was to be deleted, citing disapproval due to it causing resentment of the Allied Powers. With this text it seems that the book only needed line deletion, as it did not provide many other details on the bombings besides mention it in name. Therefore, it's unlikely this text would go through the CI&E, PH&W, and ESS. However, there would be little possibility for negotiation on the inclusion of reference to the atomic bomb. Any text that alludes to details of Hiroshima

⁵⁷ Memo, "Press and Publication Subject," n.d. 486850. 00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD."

and Nagasaki or paints Japanese citizens as victims would be unlikely to pass the censor untouched. In most cases it seems officially to be under the concern that it would cause resentment of the occupiers or cause possible unrest.

Bells of Nagasaki

The Bells of Nagasaki by Nagai Takeshi, was one of the first major works on the bombings that made its past the censor and was read widely by Japanese society. However, it underwent a long process of negotiation before its eventual release in 1949. Its release only being allowed after the American's demands to include an appendix outlining the actions by Japanese forces in "The Sack of Manila" were met.⁵⁸ This was meant to be a move by the U.S. to make sure the book about Nagasaki did not lessen the public's perceptions of Japanese war guilt *or* give Japanese citizens the idea they could claim victim status as a result of what the U.S. had done.

In SCAP documents from January 13, 1947 to March 31st, 1948, we see the developing discussion behind the censorship of *The Bells of Nagasaki*, with this correspondence ultimately ending in the book once again being kept from publication. The chain of documents span the time when the censorship office was increasingly shifting from a pre-censorship to a post-censorship process. *The Bells of Nagasaki* itself was first written and submitted when its publisher, Showa Shubo, was subject to pre-censorship, at which time General Willoughby suspended it for six months. However, by January of 1948 the publisher was moved to a post-censorship process and since the book was put on hold the publisher asked if it could be considered once again for publication.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat*, 415.

⁵⁹ Memo, "Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki," n.d. 486850. 00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. January 6, 1948. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

Document I January 6th: Report by Bratton to Willoughby

In the January 6th memo sent from Colonel Bratton to General Willoughby, we see the standpoints of different sections of SCAP on *The Bells of Nagasaki*. First, Public Health and Welfare (PH&W) had “no objection to the publication of the information... regarding the physical effects on humans of the atomic bomb explosion at Nagasaki”. The Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) also did not object to the “physical and chemical information disclosed”. However, Lieutenant Colonel Nugent of the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), was opposed to its publication on the grounds that it “not only would possibly disturb public tranquility immediately but would serve as a constant reminder to the Japanese public of what they had suffered at the hands of the Allies prior to the surrender”. Due to this threat to ‘public tranquility’ the Press Code for Japan established by SCAP supported Nugent’s stance.⁶⁰

Document II January 10th: Willoughby’s Position

It was at this time that General Willoughby, who previously had put *The Bells of Nagasaki* on hold, raised the idea of publishing it under SCAP when they would have the most control over the situation. In the January 10th memo he stated that;

We can always quote CI&E and “hide behind them”. On the other hand, the atomic bombing of Nagasaki is a fact of history, that no amount of censorship suppression will ever eliminate. The question in my mind, is whether it is advantageous to keep it out of print now while we still have the troops and police power to counteract it or let it be printed after we have left (and it surely will be printed then) with undesirable reactions (excepted by CI&E) taking place when our influence has been completely removed.

⁶⁰ Memo, "Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki"

Willoughby is critical of Colonel Bratton's citation of Lieutenant Colonel Nugent of the CI&E. With the ESS and PH&W departments judging the book okay to publish. As a result, the CI&E is the only agency left supporting the standards set by the Press Code for Japan. While General Willoughby understands that the book could cause inflammatory reactions, he stresses the idea that while Japan is under SCAP's control, they would be in the best position to prevent any possible side effects of its publication.⁶¹

Document II January 12th-13th: Theater's response and Bratton's rebuttal

On January 12th and 13th we get two responses to Willoughby's statement, one from Theater Intel which agrees with Willoughby's sentiments, that the book will eventually be published so it's best if the occupying forces take the initiative to release it on their own terms. Bratton, however, is still resistant. Even though the Economic and Scientific Section had already deemed the "physical and chemical information disclosed" safe for publication Bratton raises concerns that pages 66-73 "contain speculation as to the structure and composition of this bomb which may be too close to the mark to justify publication at this time". Colonel Bratton was Chief of the Far Eastern section of the Intelligence Branch, so his words must have carried weight. An attached note questions whether "G-2 will interpret Col Bratton's comment No. 4 as representing CCD's reply on this matter?" or "whether or not a reply from CCD will be necessary".⁶²

In looking at the archival sources related to atomic bomb censorship, it is important to understand the role individuals played in the process. Do we understand the discussion above to be the opinions of people or the stances of the organizations they represent? First let's look at

⁶¹ Memo, "Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki," n.d. 486850. 00.73: Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press for 1947. January, 10-13, 1948. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD."

⁶² Memo, "Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki,". January, 10-13, 1948.

Lieutenant Colonel Nugent, head of the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E). In the January 6th document he states “after scrutinizing a few pages” it would “possibly disturb public tranquility” and he “definitely concurred in CCD’s desire to keep (bells of Nagasaki) out of print”.⁶³ At that time, the CI&E was primarily focused on censorship which provided ‘educational guidance’ that the occupying powers wished to make public. Having read the first few pages of the book Nugent would have found graphic descriptions of the bombing and the effects both the radiation and explosion had on the human body. As a result, he suggests censoring the book in accordance with the Press Code for Japan, as it is against the interest of the occupying forces for the Japanese public to be reminded of “what they suffered at the hands of the Allies”.⁶⁴

What of Willoughby? Major General Willoughby who was called “my pet fascist” by MacArthur, supported keeping “the emperor as an anchor to keep Japan socially conservative and cohesive”, and was chief of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS).⁶⁵ The CCD, it’s important to remember, was one of the departments under the CIS. Willoughby, being the strongest advocate for the book’s publication, under specific conditions. He knew it would be published one day, so while SCAP was still in control they could shape how the book was perceived. This is an interesting move by Willoughby, especially given his harsh stance on other topics during the time, such as during the trial of war criminals.

What is Colonel Bratton’s position in this situation? Colonel Bratton was a subordinate of Major General Willoughby. And he presents document I to Major General Willoughby, citing PH&W and ESS having no objection, but emphasizing the negative stance of Nugent of the

⁶³ Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki, Jan. 6.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan*, 237.

CI&E and following the Press Code for Japan. When Willoughby responds describing the need for publication now under specific circumstances, Bratton disagrees. Since he feels strongly that description of the bomb is too accurate (despite PH&W and ESS finding its descriptions acceptable). The correspondence sparks a question, Bratton is taking a stance on the topic and is seen as someone who could possibly speak for the CCD. Is his view shared by the CCD or not? We see in a hand-written note that “CCD says no action until G-2 or DA informs us further”. Bratton does not have the last word on the topic, and additional people need to be consulted.⁶⁶

Document III Conditions for Publication

Sometime between January 13th and March 21st the decision to publish the book with the *Sack of Manila* included was made, and on March 21st General Willoughby calls for further action to be taken on the book to see if the editor or publisher will agree to the addition of *The Sack of Manila*. At this point, the addition of the appendix describing Japanese war crimes becomes a SCAP publication requirement as a way to justify the U.S. choice to drop atomic bombs on civilians. For Willoughby it seemed necessary to assure the book would not provide the Japanese people with the ability to claim victim status in regards to the bombings, so by including the account of the war crimes committed by Japan in the Philippines it would to show to the Japanese public why the U.S.’s actions were justified.⁶⁷

Document IV Publishers Response

However, the publisher Dr. Ryusaburo Shikiba was against the publication of these two texts together, stating that “the purpose of the two publications are entirely different.” And that the book “asserts that the dropping of the atomic bomb signifies the beginning of peace for mankind.”

⁶⁶ Memo, "Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki,". January, 10-13, 1948.

⁶⁷ “Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki”, March 21, 1948

In response, General Willoughby makes it clear that in order for *The Bells of Nagasaki* to be published, the appendix on Japanese war crimes in the Philippines must be included.⁶⁸

Document V and Willoughby's decision

Willoughby touts the familiar SCAP points on the portrayal of the bombing, that it would have “an adverse effect on the Japanese mind, lead to possibly inflammatory reactions and, in any event, suggest by inference that the American was inhumane in using this weapon to expedite the termination of the war”.⁶⁹ We see how the portrayal of the bombing in any way that depicts Japanese suffering, could be seen as a threat to American interest in Japan, and that it would fall under categories in the censorship codes and the press code for Japan, that would prevent it from being published.

General Willoughby goes from defending the book against Bratton's proposal to censor it immediately due to its threat to ‘public tranquility’ to citing the very same aspects of the books threats. While ironic, his stance is slightly different than Bratton, Willoughby's goal was the controlled publication of *The Bells of Nagasaki* under SCAP. Ultimately the publication of this book seems to have come down to General Willoughby's stance that Japanese war crimes also be present in the publication.

3. When you publish the description of an act, it is essential to also cover the reasons for it, the condition that led to it; we used the bombs to terminate a war which we did not start. We used it to retaliate also against acts of barbarism by the Japanese war machine. Contrary to the views of the author, as far as we are concerned, if and when American military acts

⁶⁸ “Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki”, *Letter from the Editor*.

⁶⁹ Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki”, March 21, 1948

are described (as the bombing), then Jap military acts, that were provocation or motive will have to be shown.

4. Unless the “other side of the story” is covered, we will continue to suppress the book.

Willoughby’s dilemma illustrates a fundamental challenge in establishing censorship during a short-term occupation. SCAP will one day be gone and when they left this text would be published. If he could have it published under SCAP control he could see that “provocation or motive” for the U. S.’s decision to drop the bombs was included. In his eyes by including the appendix on Japanese war crimes it would provide this justification. By doing this however, he falls into saying ‘you sacked Manila so we bombed Nagasaki’. Which sets up some troubling justifications for U.S. retaliation.

In reading the Bells of Nagasaki, the author certainly describes the physical effects of the bombing from a highly medical standpoint as a doctor. But he also says things like this:

Nagasaki, the only holy place in all Japan- was it not chosen as a victim, a pure lamb, to be slaughtered and burned on the altar of sacrifice to expiate the sins committed by humanity in the Second World War

He concludes in a funeral address to the dead that the second atomic bomb dropping on Nagasaki was divine providence. And that the people there were a sacrifice for that peace. Taking the event out of the political critiques often made of the U.S., and setting it up as this event of martyrdom of those in a holy place, for the sake of world peace. While this may seem to be a farfetched

conclusion, it was his sincere response to the event. To then attach an appendix on war crimes does seem like a drastic change of pace and could lead to some unintended effects.⁷⁰

The *Bells of Nagasaki* was release in 1949, with the appendix “the Sack of Manilla” included. This was done to make sure that “when American military acts are described (as the bombing), then Jap military acts, that were provocation or motive will have to be shown”.⁷¹ The appendix then would be seen by SCAP as the proper precaution needed in order to educate Japanese citizens as to why the atomic bombs were necessary, and motivated attacks. Taking the victim status away from Japan by showing it as an aggressor, with the bomb as a response to that. In actuality it seems to have ended up being a ‘strategy of false moral equivalences’. By having in one book a story about the effects of the Atomic bomb being dropped on Japan, and then a story about Japan’s war crimes a parallel could been drawn between the two events.

We do see this technique of comparing them as moral equivalents present in Japan today. In a 2005 text book a section outlines the International Laws of War and War Crimes

there is no nation that has not tortured and killed unarmed civilians in wartime. Japanese soldiers also tortured and killed prisoners of war and civilians in regions they invaded... the U.S. launched indiscriminate bombing raids on dozens of Japanese cities, including Tokyo, and then dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki... Soviet troops invaded Manchuria, where they robbed, raped and killed countless Japanese civilians...⁷²

Here we see how Japanese, US, and Soviet war crimes are all lumped together in one section. With all nations being equally guilty. When grouped together like this with a preface stating ‘every

⁷⁰ “Censorship on Book on Bombing of Nagasaki”, Mar 26, 1948.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. *New History Textbook*. 2005. 60.

nation has done this' it makes the acts seem like routine, unavoidable effects of war. The description also fails to mention any specific Japanese war crime, like the Nanking and Manilla Massacres. Instead of addressing these issues in more depth they are all compared and seemingly dismissed in one brief section.

Case Study Two: Medical Documents

Under SCAP the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) began gathering medical information on Hibakusha in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the ABCC was not officially part of the occupation, it was functionally an information gathering apparatus of the United States. Japanese and U.S. doctors both worked on this project, but in the end “the United States took full possession of all of the ABCC’s research data, study outcomes, and specimens, in part to prevent other nations from gleaning technological information about the bombs...”.⁷³ Japanese doctors were astounded by this as they had assumed the information would be public and be used to help the hibakusha. However, the information gathered by ABCC was kept classified by the U.S. government for some time. Still to this day, in order to access the information that the U.S. holds one has to go to the national archives in D.C. as none of the reports are digitized. On the National Diet Archive of Japan however, one can find years’ worth of SCAP documents from this time. This includes detailed reports about the conditions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, medical reports of the observed effects, and autopsies of those who died either directly after the blasts or in the coming weeks due to radiation sickness and other complications.

⁷³ Southard, Susan, *Nagasaki*. 182.

The ABCC conducted examinations on hibakusha, studying how radiation effected their health, without providing any sort of medical care to the victims. This was due to the ABCC's stance that providing "medical care to atomic bomb survivors would oblige the United States to deliver care to every Japanese citizen injured during the war".⁷⁴ Providing medical care to Hibakusha quickly became tied to the idea of war guilt. If the U.S. gave medical treatment to Hibakusha that could be seen as either apologizing or not holding Japan accountable for their war crimes. This became the public reasoning behind why medical care was withheld from the hibakusha that the ABCC examined. However, it does not seem to be the only reason.

The U.S. during this time allowed and even encouraged Japanese doctors and scientists to study hibakusha but then did not allow for the information to be published or shared within Japan. As conducting highly complicated medical studies with patients in Japanese would have been difficult for the American forces, it makes sense that they allowed Japanese doctors to continue their work. But by collecting the end product for U.S. usage it prevented the spread of information about the atomic bomb victims. In addition, Autopsies were performed on hibakusha by the U.S. occurred directly after death, in ways that were often jarring to the families of the deceased. The second generation hibakusha, who were in utero during the bombing were also visited soon after birth, and then at regular intervals as they became an additional source of information on how radiation would affect the next generation. Most shockingly, specimens of human remains, clinical records, and slide specimen, taken at this time were kept in the U.S. until May, 1973, when they were finally returned to Japan.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 184.

⁷⁵ Selden, Kyoko Iriye, and Mark Selden, editors. *The Atomic Bomb Voices from Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. M.E. Sharpe, 1989. 114-118.

Maintaining a monopoly on information on the true effect of the Atomic Bomb was a central motive for U.S. actions. As well as wanting to prevent other nations from gaining an understanding of nuclear weapons. The ABCC and USSBS learned how people were affected by the blasts to protect U.S. interests and not to treat Japanese victims. One gets the impression from these documents that this was a clinical study, with Hiroshima, Nagasaki and its inhabitants as tests subjects of this new weapon. In addition, when reading reports about the bombings there are mention on how this information could be used to help protect the U.S. in the future in case of nuclear attack. Further showing how U.S. motives around the censorship and collection of data around the Atomic Bomb was part of a U.S. protectionist military strategy, which came at the expense of the Hibakusha.

Medical treatment and Censorship:

After the bombings many Japanese doctors and scientist entered Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the risk of their own health and safety to see what they could do to help and to collected information on the bombing. One Japanese doctor describes his experience.

Today we have some members of the Occupation forces here with us, and I wish to say that the aim of our research absolutely does not lie in the scheming of warped ambitions... but our aim is to analyze the results of the atomic bomb as much as possible with the scientific knowledge of our country and contribute our efforts to the civilization of mankind to some extent by submitting the results of our research. I wish that the members of the Occupation Forces would also understand this point⁷⁶

⁷⁶GHQ/SCAP Records, Top Secret Records of Various. "319.1." March 1946.
<http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/9898235.60>.

This quote was found translated in a SCAP document that was kept secret during occupation. The Japanese doctors and scientists involved in the study seemed committed to gathering and sharing all results found. SCAP from the beginning is suspicious of their motives. That if they can observe the physical effects there is the possibility that they could seek to recreate the bomb. And September 15th, 1954 a memo from the U.S. War Department “requested all reports about the atomic bombs- particularly reports that included scientific or technical details- be approved by the War Department prior to publication in order to protect the military secrecy of the bomb... most reports about the human impact of the bombs were effectively suspended in both Japan and the United States”.⁷⁷ The Japanese doctor quoted above as well as countless others were present in Hiroshima and Nagasaki around the days of the bombings, gathering information and providing care. Thousands of records of patient data, health effect reports, and possible treatments were produced by Japanese doctors. These were then collected by the U.S and the majority of reports were not allowed to be published due to the risk to military secrecy around the bombings. Even today in the U.S., most primary documents like from this period are available only in the National Archive in Maryland. However, on the Japanese Diet Archive, medical documents like this are all available online.

The report by the Japanese committee also give detailed descriptions of the varying stages of the human effects of the bomb. Stage one “injuries caused by concussion, external injuries, burns caused by heat... so violent is the effect that the death rate is about 80 percent in places about one kilometer away from the point” and “the various symptoms of radiation injury begin to appear... mucous hemorrhage, together with uneasiness, pain fever, and vomiting, also hemorrhage in the respiratory and digestive systems”, Stage two, “the period of about a month

⁷⁷ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 113.

and a half after the bombing lasting from the third to the eighth week... symptoms such as falling of the hair or hemorrhage in a different form, such as a light hemorrhage of the skin..." By the third period, survivors began to recover in the third or fourth months after the bombing, varying according to numbers of white blood cells present. The fourth stage presented is the future; scientists, had noticed differences in reproductive capabilities, but recommended further study.⁷⁸ This excerpt describes what would come to be known as acute radiation syndrome (ARS). Reports coming from Japan would shape what we know about the effects of radiation to this day, as what we know about higher level exposure to radiation is largely based off the information collected in the wake of the atomic bombs. The hibakusha served as the perfect test subjects for the ABCC, with a large enough sample size to draw conclusive data. In a medical report titled *Long-term Radiation Related Health Effects in a Unique population: Lessons Learned from the Atomic Bomb Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, published in 2011, the authors conclude that the "ABCC/RERF would become one of the world's longest continuing binational research projects producing the world's best risk estimations derived in a human population for health effects after an acute exposure to ionizing radiation".⁷⁹ To this day the data from the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been used to shape exposure and medical treatment guidelines throughout the world. Yet in the months after the bombings Japanese scientists struggled get information published, and observations were made by the ABCC without providing care.

ABCC Medical Exams:

⁷⁸ GHQ/SCAP Records, Top Secret Records of Various. "319.1." 93.

⁷⁹ Douple, Evan. "Long-term Radiation-Related Health Effects in a Unique Human Population: Lessons Learned from the Atomic Bomb Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3907953/>.

In treating the survivors of the atomic bombings, the U.S. took a purely observational role. With the ABCC setting up medical studies in which they observed hibakusha, “they underwent physical examinations and were asked a series of question about their location at the time of the bombing, distance from the hypocenter, direction they were facing, and physical symptoms they had experiences since then”.⁸⁰ In order to carry out these examinations the ABCC was given millions of dollars to fund their observations, which others felt could otherwise have gone to providing care to hibakusha. Seventy percent of the ABCC doctors were Japanese doctors who that could otherwise have been providing medical treatment, however, they were paid to survey of the hibakusha, information that would in the end be entirely claimed by the U.S.. Providing "medical care to atomic bomb survivors would oblige the United States to deliver care to every Japanese citizen injured during the war,” so no medical treatment was to be given during these checkups.⁸¹ Investing millions to collect data was acceptable, but giving care would be seen as claiming responsibility for U.S. actions in Japan. However, if one looks at the data collection purely as a science experiment, having a control population without any care given, allows researchers to see the full effects play out. While there is no direct evidence that U.S. motives were this sinister, the infamous U.S. Public Health Service Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment on African-American men in Alabama was conducted between 1932 and 1972, overlapping with the radiation studies in Japan. In the Tuskegee study, black men with syphilis were neither informed of their disease, nor treated with available antibiotics. Rather, their symptoms were studied as the disease played out. American medical researchers had already shown themselves willing to conduct an observational study on people of color without disclosing useful information to those involved.

⁸⁰ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 182-183.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

In addition, “the imbalance of power at the ABCC was made worse by wage inequalities between U.S. and Japanese physicians working there. The agency’s longtime policy to designate only U.S. physicians and scientists as directors of each city’s operation resulted in the majority of the ABCC’s staff.... Having to work under U.S. authority”.⁸² Japanese doctors were paid less despite taking on the burden of the majority of the work. This was disturbing for the Japanese doctors and their patients. The fact that the Japanese citizens would not benefit from the research just added insult to injury. However, some of the Japanese doctors who worked for the ABCC went against their orders provided what care they could in their short visits with victims.

In order to study radiation in any capacity Japanese’s doctors had to obtain specific permission from SCAP to begin conducting studies. And then after completing the studies the research was translated into English and submitted for censor, as was decreed by the U.S. War department. Under SCAP, as well the press code for Japan’s rule to maintain ‘public tranquility’, it was extremely rare for any to be given permission to publish.⁸³ This censorship was so extreme that

“the number of published atomic bomb-related scientific reports diminished to three each year in 1948 and 1949. Japanese scientists and physicians eager to support *Hibakusha* health and recovery were further impeded by the United States’ 1945 confiscation of early Japanese research teams’ blood samples, specimens, photographs, questionnaires, and clinical records from victim autopsies and survivor examinations.”⁸⁴

⁸² Southard, *Nagasaki*, 182.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 147.

⁸⁴ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 148.

The SCAP censorship operated under two mechanisms, seizing existing medical documents and samples and studies immediately following the bombing, and instating a system of information collection in Japan the results of which were reserved solely for use by the United States.

Medical report of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima. Source: Army Medical College, First Tokyo Army hospital via joint medical commission for investigation of effects of atomic bombs (30 November 1945). Report No. 3c(25)

It is impossible to convey the full scope of medical and scientific documents and studies collected and censored by ABCC and SCAP. Years of personal data on patients, and human specimens were collected during this time, and scientists who carried out studies during this time were unable to publish their studies. With only three studies being published in both 1948 and 1949. Looking at this document one can begin to get a sense of what sort of information was collected and kept secret during this time.

The Medical report of the Atomic bombing in Hiroshima, carried out by the Army Medical College and 1st Tokyo Army Hospital was one of the earliest investigations into the effect. The report was the third report made by November 30th, 1945, three months after the bombing. The Army Medical College and 1st Tokyo Army Hospital sent their first First Aid Squad to Hiroshima two days after the bombing. They stayed in the area from August 8th to November 21st, where they provided care and conducted their own investigations. As the army was demobilized they had to cease their aid to the region. This third report is their last report of their findings during their time there. This report was designated as confidential information, and it was one of many of its kind during the time. Other examples include the “former Tokyo Imperial Universities’ extensive early

post bomb studies and Dr. Shirabe's meticulous 1945 study of the medical condition of eight thousand Nagasaki Hibakusha".⁸⁵

The report by the Army Medical College and 1st Tokyo Army Hospital outlined a wide variety of information, from the observed effects on different parts of the body, patients treated, and the radiation levels in different parts of the city. One example of the information collected is figure 10-4 below. It shows the medical data of a soldier K. Sato who was outside during the bombing and thrown into the river by the blast. It details his symptoms that manifested around the 20th of August, until his death on August 30th. He suffered what we now know to be the expected symptoms of acute radiation poisoning. Especially noticeable in this report is the white blood cell count (WBC).⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 148.

⁸⁶ Army Medical College. "Medical report of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima. Source: Army Medical College, First Tokyo Army hospital via joint medical commission for investigation of effects of atomic bombs (30 November 1945). Report No. 3c(25), USSBS Index Section 2." <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8318508>.

Fig. 10--4

No. 4. K.Satoi soldier 22 y. Akatsuki 16170 Garrison (Ujina Hospital)

Location: Kakomachi (near Prefecture building) 0.8 Km southwest from the center. He was on the bank of River Temma & thrown into the river by blast.

Burn & injury: Contusion on head & small of back which healt not later than 20/VIII. Afterwards he worked usually.

Course of symptom:

He noted depilation of scalp hair between 20/VIII--25/VIII. On 25/VIII rose the body temperature, and petechia manifested. On 26/VIII he was admitted to the Ujina Hospital. At that time conjunctiva & other visible mucous membranes were anemic, and hemorrhagic stomatitis, gingivitis & tonsillitis were notable. Scalp hair was totally and beard partially depilated but eyebrows remained intact. Petechias was on the whole body especially much quantity on scalp skin. On 24/VIII petechia increased and visual disturbance appeared. On 30/VIII disturbance of consciousness. On 31/VIII 2 a.m. he died.

Laboratory dates

Date	r.b.c.	Hb (%)	w.b.c.	Bleeding time	blood pressure
28/VIII	2.11	45	333	28"	96----56
31/VIII	2.30		45		

31/VIII 2.30

Date	23/78	24	25	26
70				
60				
50				
40				
30				
Stool	8	10	13	
	watery		bloody	
Laboratory data	w.b.c. 333 r. - 2.11 hb 45% Clotting Time 28" B. press 96-56			w.b.c. 45 r. 2.3 B. press 96-56



Petechia (29/VIII)

The average healthy individual has between 4,500-11,000 WBC's per microliter. Satoi's WBC count was 333 four days before his death and 45 on the day of his death. White blood cell count is a good measure of the damage radiation has done to the body. While they did not know it at the time. Strontium-90 a radioactive particle is similar enough to calcium that the body can't tell the

difference and it will be used by the body replacing calcium in bones, which can result in lower white blood cell counts.⁸⁷

Fig. 10--9

No. 9. H. Yoshida officer 35 y. 2nd Army Hospital (2nd Army Hospital)

Location: 2nd Army Hospital 1.0 Km north from the center
Indoor of wooden building

Burn & injury: no

Course of symptoms:

Vomiting appeared after the bombing on 6/VIII. Anorexia continued from 6/VIII until 13/VIII.

He noted petechia and gingivobleeding on 26/VIII.

On 5/IX began bloody stool. He noted two big petechias on the abdomen and also yellow color of the skin which vanished after three days. Before 15/IX all petechias vanished.

Laboratory data

	26/VIII	4/IX	11/IX	22/IX	11/X
w.b.c.	1800	1800	1000	3600	6800

The report by the Army Medical College and 1st Tokyo Army Hospital contains many more instances of personal information like the one above. In many cases, like officer H. Yoshida, the patient survived. In addition, the report provides speculation on the damage radiation has done to different parts of the human body. Many doctors became frustrated when the data they collected was seized by the U.S. in early 1945. With no data, no conclusions could be reached making publication impossible, even if censorship was not a factor. When specimens were taken the "United States claimed sole use of these body parts- taken without consent- for military studies to help defend U.S. citizens against nuclear attack".⁸⁸ While taking the physical specimens of the deceased was problematic it is also important to consider the effect on surviving Hibakusha when

⁸⁷ Army Medical College. "Medical report of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima.

⁸⁸ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 148.

their own medical data was seized. With the deceased it was a violation of family wishes, but with surviving hibakusha it was their own medical history that would be important to obtaining medical care for the rest of their lives.

Conclusion

In this chapter looking at specific examples of censored materials revealed several things about the SCAP censorship. The United States engaged in different forms of information management to support their own national interests. While the official goal of occupation was to reshape Japan into a modern democratic nation, that would be an ally of the U.S., actual motives behind censorship varied. The censorship of information on the atomic bombs was not just to prevent Japanese citizens from getting upset and threatening 'public tranquility'. The U.S. had to assure their actions were justified, and that war guilt fell on Japan for their actions. We see this in the case of *The Bells of Nagasaki*. They also had to maintain a monopoly on scientific information around the bombs, to prevent the Soviets or any other country from gaining the level of information the U.S. knew about its manufacture and its effects. They did this through medical censorship and the ABCC. SCAP was responsible for preventing medical information about the effects of the bomb from reaching the public. And the ABCC used Japanese doctors to collect information on the effect on Hibakusha, then the U.S. seized the knowledge that was gained from this to be used for their own protection and benefit.

This system of censorship had many unintended consequences. SCAP had carried out censorship for their own reasons, with a certain disregard for Hibakusha. They did not purposely place Hibakusha in a position that would lead to them being discriminated against in Japanese

society, but that is where hibakusha ended up. In the next chapter I will explore this further by looking at how SCAP censorship directly impacted hibakusha.

Chapter Three: Effects of Censorship

Hibakusha after the bombings often found themselves without family, or resources to continue. And for years lacked any sort of help. They faced discrimination in the workplace and in marriage. In regards to their injuries they could be debilitating and there was a stigma of them as a disease that was contagious. In regards to work, employees did not want to have workers who would often be sick, and discriminated against those who were disfigured. For marriage, the after effects of radiation was unknown, hibakusha may have deformed children it was thought, and women were especially discriminated against for this⁸⁹. It was common practice to keep one's hibakusha status secret, only revealing it after marriage or even on their death beds. By preventing the stories and medical information of Hibakusha to be published, Hibakusha were largely misunderstood, with people even thinking their condition was contagious. Due to discrimination many hibakusha were forced or chose to stay silent, and those around them did not truly understand the nature of their conditions.

In setting up censorship around the Atomic Bomb SCAP created a gap of information around the experiences and hardships of a group of people. U.S. motives were tied to keeping a monopoly on information, and enforcing the idea of Japanese war guilt, without realizing it would result in discrimination towards hibakusha. In regards to who provided medical care or the long-term funding for it, Hibakusha became tied to the political positions of the U.S. and Japan in relation to war guilt. Both countries became reluctant to offer help to this group. As outlined in case study two, the ABBC conducted studies without providing care as to them somehow "medical care to atomic bomb survivors would oblige the United States to deliver care to every

⁸⁹ Dower, John W. *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq*. W.W. Norton, 2011.

Japanese citizen injured during the war".⁹⁰ But the Japanese Government also remained reluctant to provide care to Hibakusha. In this chapter I will mainly focus on how the collection of information by the ABCC and censorship by SCAP effected hibakusha. In addition, I will look at the legacy of these censorship practices, and what that means for Japan and the world today.

Information Collection on Hibakusha

The medical censorship conducted under SCAP took two different forms, each having its own effect on Hibakusha. While groups the CCD, CI&E, and PH&W would prevent the publication of medical studies and other physical descriptions of the bombing the ABCC carried out a system of information collection, that was ultimately confiscated by the U.S.. For Japanese scientists this was incredibly frustrating as projects they had worked on for years was not able to be shared, and “extreme insult arose when the United States took full possession of all of the ABCC’s research data, study outcomes, and specimens in part to prevent other nations from gleaning technical information about the bombs...”.⁹¹ Most Japanese scientists involved had assumed the information they were collecting would be used to benefit the public, and could have never imagined all of their documents would have been taken from them. However, providing care for effected citizens was not the goal of the ABCC.

The ABCC studied the effect of the atomic bomb on hibakusha for U.S. interests. When creating the project, it was designed to provide the U.S. with a “greater understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons currently in development, support for civil defense planning for potential nuclear attacks on U.S. cities, and data for the reevaluation of international radiation dose limits for physicians, scientists, radiation workers, and patients”.⁹² The ABCC was officially a

⁹⁰ Southard, Susan. *Nagasaki: Life After Nuclear War*. 184.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 182.

⁹² Southard, *Nagasaki*, 181.

collaboration between the national health organizations of Japan and the U.S.. Yet Japanese citizens did not benefit from the information collected until many years later, when for some of them, it would be too late. The ABCC remained in operation from 1946-1975, in 1975 the Radiation Effects Research Foundation took over in its place, which was equally funded and carried out by the U.S. and Japan. In 1951-52 as the occupation forces began their departure censorship was lifted and “for the first time, Japanese scientific and medical communities gained access to the detailed 1945 surveys, studies and analyses... for hibakusha, however, any potential help these long-awaited reports may have provided had long expired”.⁹³ Yes, doctors could not publish their studies and see the full effects of the atomic bombs, but for the hibakusha it felt like too little too late. It would be hard to undo five years of censorship and silence.

The lifting of censorship helped alleviate the restriction on the publication of information on the Atomic bomb, but it did not mean all of the information collected and censored by the ABCC was available to Hibakusha. When Hibakusha were granted medical care under the Japanese government after 1953 they had to provide documentation. One survivor Taniguchi Sumiteru was required to present his documentation to gain medical benefits from his employers, from Omura National Hospital in Nagasaki. This was a hospital that within the first two weeks of the bombing treated over eight hundred patients. When Taniguchi arrived however his “was the only hibakusha medical record there. Rumors had circulated that other hibakusha records had been burned or relocated somewhere in Japan... Tanaguchi is convinced that the U.S. government took them either to the ABCC or back to the United State”, as he remained in the hospital due to his injuries until 1949, which he believes was after the other medical documents

⁹³ Ibid. 195.

of Hibakusha were taken.⁹⁴ This does not seem to be a far fetch claim when you consider that the U.S. held onto over 23,000 items, “including clinical records, slide specimens, and human remains” until May of 1973.⁹⁵ Many other Hibakusha would struggle to find necessary documentation, or any sort of medical record from the time.

Effect of Information Collection

For many Hibakusha their treatment by the ABCC was jarring. Do-oh was fifteen years old when the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, she spent the next five years shut inside due to her health and her lasting mental effects of the bombing. When she was twenty the ABCC showed up at her door and gave her the hope of being healed, her drive to the medical building was the first time she saw the city after the bombing.⁹⁶ However, after the appointment, she “went home hugely disappointed... as a young girl, I had been seen naked from the waist up and had taken the black cloth off my head in front of men. I felt something like rage”.⁹⁷ She had assumed she would receive treatment by the ABCC, or at least basic pain management or emotional support. She had instead received humiliation at having to strip in front of strange men and show her balding head for the first time. She had refused to leave her house in part due to the embarrassment of her condition and was now being scrutinized in a medical office. After this visit she refused to return even when they continued sending letters and calling her for over 20 years. The incident left a mark on her “ I felt like I was an object kept alive for research”.⁹⁸ This was a similar sentiment reflected by many Hibakusha as these ABCC visits had many unintended effects.

⁹⁴ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 227

⁹⁵ Selden, *The Atomic Bomb*, 114-118

⁹⁶ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 180-181

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 183.

⁹⁸ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 193.

The experience of Mrs. Makiko Tada reflects larger issues with the tests, as well as a common attitude hibakusha had toward the ABCC. Left as a single mother with three children she struggled to support her and her family with the limited work she was able to do with her injuries. She recounts her experience:

the ABCC on Mount Hiji comes by car to pick us up, strip our clothes so they can examine us as much as they like, and draw out blood, yet they don't even give us a day's pay or nutrition in return for the drawn blood. All they give us are two cookies for the children. I'll never ever go again... I chased them away when they came to pick us up the next time.... They came directly to school by car and took Mutsuzumi back and examined him⁹⁹

She like Do-oh never want to return after her experiences, invasive examination, and no care. But in addition, Makiko and other Hibakusha would be missing work opportunities by going to the ABCC. The examinations all took place during the day, so patients would lose a day's wages to be seen, in addition other little offenses piled up, like having only English magazines in the waiting room.¹⁰⁰ Makiko couldn't feed her children, and was already missing work regularly due to illness, so even the smallest amount of compensation or food could have made a difference to her. In addition, they take her son without her permission from his school, in direct disregard to her wishes. She ends her account, "If we become mere objects of examination it wastes out blood. I wish they tried to take care of our health. I wish they did their research for the sake for peace that will never be disturbed by war again".¹⁰¹ Makiko is not aware of the exact ways the U.S. will exploit this data for their own research and safety, but she knows that their motives are not to help. Hibakusha like

⁹⁹ Selden, *The Atomic Bomb* 181.

¹⁰⁰ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 183.

¹⁰¹ Selden, *The Atomic Bomb* 181.

herself are ‘objects of examination’, objects an Atomic bomb was tested on, and here is the ABCC taking a survey of the results.

ABCC: Midwives and Autopsies

The ABCC in addition to routine examinations also set up systems of monitoring births and autopsies of hibakusha. Under the ABCC “an estimated five hundred autopsies were conducted each year... the tissues, slides, and body parts of older children and adults were extracted, examined and quickly dispatched to the United States”.¹⁰² These autopsies, conducted on hibakusha who took part in studies, further made the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki feel like lab rats. They had a condition inflicted upon them, they were observed and examined, and then once they died they were dissected. In regards to the children who died the ABCC set up a system in 1949 where a “midwife with a relationship with the family helped negotiate this difficult conversation”, to take the infant or young child and perform autopsies on them, only the infants remains would not be taken back to the United States.¹⁰³

The next part of the ABCC’s study was observing the pregnancies, births, and newborns of hibakusha. The children of mother who were pregnant at the timing of the bombing were particularly susceptible to radiation. Most women miscarried after the bombing, but the children who had survived by 1949 were observed to have “microcephaly, cardiac disease, incontinence, and severe mental and developmental disabilities...”.¹⁰⁴ This was in result to the radiation exposure in utero, but mothers were told it was due to stress and malnutrition, “when they realized that radiation from the bomb may have caused their children conditions, they demanded to know

¹⁰² Southard, *Nagasaki* 186

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* 189

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 190

why they hadn't been told earlier".¹⁰⁵ The mothers felt guilt over the conditions they raised their children in that led to their medical problems, when in reality it was the radiation they had experienced that had done the damage.

In order to study the children born to hibakusha mothers in the years after the bombings the ABCC conducted examinations on mothers and newborns without revealing results. To find these women "the ABCC had linked its study to Japan's postwar food-rationing system," this meant that pregnant women who had access to additional rations in the middle of their second trimester had to report to the ABCC in order to claim their benefits.¹⁰⁶ This resulted in over 90% of pregnant hibakusha being seen by the ABCC. They gathered information about the woman and her partners locations at the time of the bombing, and illnesses they suffered from it. Then once the child was born a physical exam would be conducted by a pediatrician and a nurse, then after that 20% would be followed up with for additional observations. To carry this out effectively the ABCC developed relationships with midwives and would pay them to inform them of births so that doctors could be sent out.¹⁰⁷ For the hibakusha involved "how this information would be used- including the fact that the families' data would go to the United States for military evaluation- was not revealed".¹⁰⁸ They were told they were making an important contribution by allowing these exams, and that data would in fact inform what we know about the effect of radiation on the next generation. However, this data would not be available to the participants in the studies for many years.

¹⁰⁵ Southard, *Nagasaki*, 190

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 191

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 191

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 191

Knowledge in Society

In 1951 SCAP eased off on censorship restrictions and with the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco on April 28th, 1952 occupation was officially over. The materials that had been censored for the past seven years could now be freely published. With the publication of personal accounts and medical records the general public learned, some for the first time, about what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hibakusha had faced years of hardship in silence, and the ability to talk now could not change that. And Japan the only nation who had felt the impact of the Atomic bombs was the last country that could talk about it. John Dower, in *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering* remarks that:

It is at the local level that U.S. censorship was most inhumane... survivors of the bombs could not grieve publicly, could not share their experiences through the written word, could not be offered public counsel and support. Psychological traumas we now associate with the bomb experience... could not be address in open media forums¹⁰⁹

Hibakusha were separated from each other, both physically and through censorship. After the bombing, those with family elsewhere scattered across the country, others were separated to far flung hospitals for treatment. It took years for Hibakusha like Do-oh to leave her house, and for Taniguchi to stand up from his hospital bed. All through this time they were unable to get their stories out further than those they knew. Most had no way to process what they went through, and their circumstances necessitated them returning to work the best they could to make a life out of the ashes. In Susan J. Brison's writing, "trauma narrative and the remaking of the self she remarks on the importance of communicating "by transforming traumatic memory into a

¹⁰⁹ Dower, John, W. *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World*. New York, NY: New Press, 2014. 147.

collective narrative that can then be integrated into the survivor's sense of self and view of the world, but also by reintegrating the survivor into a community, reestablishing connections essential to selfhood".¹¹⁰ The Hibakusha had an important mechanism of processing what they went through denied to them.

U.S. censorship of medical information also had another unintended effect. The symptoms of radiation sickness that hibakusha suffered through were never able to be reported to the larger public, so the misconception that it was contagious spread. The "American isolation of the hibakusha was compounded by ostracism within Japanese society itself, for the bomb, of course, stigmatized its victims... they were deformed reminders of a miserable past. Given the unknown generic consequences of irradiation, they were shunned as marriage prospects".¹¹¹ Japan was forming itself as a new nation, 63 of its major cities had been firebombed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki also being razed to the ground. Everyone had enough hardships to be getting along with just to survive that more than just hibakusha were discriminated against for being different, amputees and war orphans also faced hardship reintegrating. Hibakusha themselves were focused on trying to make new lives for themselves, but their poor health and physical signs of damage left them at a disadvantage.

In marriage and business, it was often necessary to lie about ones hibakusha status, but those with severe injuries could not pass as unaffected. Twelve years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan passed the Atomic Bomb Victims Medical Care Law, finally providing them with medical exams and specific illnesses that were linked to radiation, like

¹¹⁰ Brison, Susan J., "Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self," in *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present*, ed. Mieke Bal et al, Hanover and London: The University Press of New England, 1998. p. 40.

¹¹¹ Dower, John, W. *Ways of Forgetting*, 148.

thyroid cancer and leukemia¹¹². Survivors were given an A-Bomb Victims Health Book to identify themselves as eligible for benefits. The reason getting government support was so difficult was due to the fear “of huge expenditure to cover hibakusha medical care and potential implications of Japan’s war responsibility”.¹¹³ Like under SCAP, the medical care for hibakusha remained linked to war responsibility.

Life for Hibakusha

The government of Japan began to provide medical care to hibakusha under the Atomic Bomb Victims Medical Care Law in 1957. But it was extremely difficult to prove one was a hibakusha. As they needed either "a certified statement by a public official or a photograph proving their specific location at the time of the bombing" a "written certification from two different people 'excluding blood relatives to the third degree' swearing to their location at the time of the bomb" or "under oath, to submit written statements of their location at the time of the bombing" but this still needed someone who saw them around the time of the bombing to serve as witness.¹¹⁴ Which when there was death on such scale was hard to find. And many residents relocated leaving little or no trace as to where they went. Korean hibakusha found it especially difficult, as the majority lived in one neighborhood that was hard hit, and after the war ended, the majority returned to Korea, where doctors had no experience in treating them, and such a small population of effected people there was not the same motivation for gaining knowledge about the effects as in Japan. Still within the first year of the program 200,984 people stepped forward to claim Hibakusha status.¹¹⁵ This was clearly a double-edged sword. On one hand some amount of

¹¹² Southard, Susan. *Nagasaki: Life After Nuclear War*. 221

¹¹³ *Ibid.* 222

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* 221

¹¹⁵ Southard, Susan. *Nagasaki: Life After Nuclear War*. 221

medical care would be covered but openly identifying as a Hibakusha could lead to increased workplace or marriage discrimination.

In 1975 when the ABCC became a non-profit called Radiation Effects Research Foundation, the first Chairman elected was a Japanese doctor. With this shift Japan finally gained control over what research was being done, this also had the effect of changing how the organization was perceived by survivors. While things had improved in the 1970's many hibakusha were still living in poverty, and their unemployment rate was 70% higher than non-hibakusha.¹¹⁶ More vocal Hibakusha joined anti-nuclear protests and organizations, or became public speakers about their experiences, while other hibakusha remained silent. Do-oh, the hibakusha who as a girl refused to leave her house for five years, was inspired by Mayor Motoshima for refusing to escort a ship captain that may have been carrying a nuclear weapon, and the protestors that responded to the event. In 1989 she finally "felt free to disclose her hibakusha identity... enrolled in a five-week community class at Nagasaki Univeristy called "The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and its Influences" where she "finally learned about the immense power and the human effects of the atomic bomb".¹¹⁷ While she had lived the effects first hand, she had never had the chance to learn about them. Most of her life she had avoided the label oh Hibakusha, and kept that part of her a secret, working through her pain. With the increase of Hibakusha voicing their stories in public she finally felt like she could embrace her past, and she began speaking on her life, on Japan's atrocities in China, and the Atomic bomb. She passed away during her second fight against cancer in 2007.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 245

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 259

The Legacy of Censorship; Nagasaki, Minamata, and Fukushima

The wartime and occupation period censorship practices left a legacy of which has affected Japan to this day. During the occupation Japan had transitioned from the defeated Empire to a new nation, from an authoritarian state to a democracy. Yet the system of censorship that operated in wartime Japan was replaced and expanded under a new form on U.S. censorship. The post-censorship practices of wartime Japan changed to a pre-censorship system under the CCD. The mechanisms of censorship went from being the thought police roaming the street, to an organization that could not have its existence acknowledged in public. When the CCD eventually changed over to post-censorship the practice of self-censorship increased. And then the U.S. left Japan, with a constitution in place that swore the nation to respecting the rights of free speech and freedom of the press.

In the city of Nagasaki, in 1988, Mayor Motoshima Hitoshi broke the Chrysanthemum Taboo. The Chrysanthemum taboo is a social taboo against criticizing the Emperor, that during WWII would have been punishable by law. Mayor Motoshima sparked a national controversy by saying, while the Emperor was on his deathbed “I think that the emperor does bear responsibility for the war. However, by the will of the great majority as well as of the Allied powers, he was released from having to take responsibility”.¹¹⁸ Motoshima publicly held the Emperor accountable for his role in the war, as well as mentioned how the Allied powers let him off criticized the Emperor. In response to this many conservative organizations demanded that he step down from his position, and he began to receive death threats. He was placed under twenty-four-hour police protection due to the threats against him.

¹¹⁸ Field, Norma. *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1991. 178

One month later Emperor Hirohito passed away and the newspapers reported on blamelessness, and his love of peace. Mayor Motoshima was called on to publicly apologize or step down, however when he spoke in a press conference he said “Freedom of speech cannot be restricted to certain times and places... he still bears responsibility for the war”.¹¹⁹ He stands firm that under the constitution he has the right to say what he wishes about the Emperors responsibility for the war. He had broken a taboo not a law, however these is a social, cultural and political cost to it. Public discourse on the Emperors flaws was suppressed and limited, not through government censorship, but due to self-censorship and the social cost of breaking the taboo. Sixty-two right-wing groups occupied the city in response to Mayor Motoshima’s words, he received bullets in the mail, and his wife was hospitalized due to stress. Motoshima remained outspoken, also talking about Japanese injustices in Asia during the war, and refusing to see a U.S. ship captain who had brought a ship into the harbor that potentially carried nuclear weapons. In 1990, a member of a right-wing group attempted to assassinate him, shooting him in the back but Motoshima survived.¹²⁰ So, while free speech is still upheld by rule of law, the social and political costs to taking a stance often lead individuals to self-censor themselves. The cost of speaking out on certain topics remains, and we have seen it come into effect in protests in Japan today.

Minamata disease was the result of severe mercury poisoning. When the Chisso Corporation located in Minamata, Japan released methylmercury into the local water system, this toxic chemical bioaccumulated in the fish and other life in Minamata Bay. When the fish, oysters, and other products from the bay were consumed by the population of Minamata it

¹¹⁹ Field, Norma. *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1991. 184

¹²⁰ Southard, Susan. *Nagasaki: Life After Nuclear War*. 258

resulted in mystery symptoms. These included fever, convulsions, coma and eventually death, as of the 2,267 infected, over 900 of them ended up dying. However, when this tragedy first began the government was slow to react. The Chisso Corporation achieved “remarkable success at covering up its responsibility” and the “reluctance of the government to jeopardize the industrial growth” only contributed to the tragedy.¹²¹ The first recorded case of Minamata was April 1956, in November of 1959 researchers had reported it was due to mercury found in fish and shellfish from the bay. This was discredited by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the results were suppressed. Not knowing what cause the disease, victims of the disaster were avoided within the town as people believed it could be contagious, and people continued to get sick.

In 1968 the nature of the disease came to light, twelve years after the cause had been discovered. The government finally announced their findings on the incident in September of 1968, up until then “the company continued to deny responsibility and promote other explanations”.¹²² For twelve years the information behind the cause had been suppressed and Chisso continued to release pollution into the bay. Now that the cause of the disease was out in the open the victims began to speak out about it and gained national attention. With protests and growing support, the victims were able to negotiate for a better agreement from Chisso about compensation for their suffering, winning their case and ¥937 in court.

With the case of Minamata we see a similar circumstance to the situation the Hibakusha faced in regards to recognition and support for their hardships. Details on Minamata were suppressed by government forces. And victims of the disease faced discrimination as nothing

¹²¹George, Timothy S. *Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. 45

¹²² Ibid. 46

was known about their conditions. It took years for the story to break, and once it did they gained support in the local community and were able to get support. While SCAP had suppressed information on the atomic bombs to retain a monopoly on information, the government was reluctant to go up against large businesses. Was this reaction due to censorship practices that were established under SCAP? Minamata is certainly a possible parallel to U.S. censorship of medical information in Japan. By establishing a norm of censorship while setting up a democratic government, SCAP contradicted their own messages, it is unsurprising that suppression and violations of free speech arose from this situation. In Japan today there are other cases, like Fukushima where we have also seen the suppression of information and the social backlash or blacklisting of protesters, as the legacy of censorship remains.

Conclusion

Under SCAP censorship was a policy written into practice and documented by those who carried it out, it is easy to point to specific choices that were made, and rational behind actions. In modern day Japan there is no such system, but people still see limits to how they can express themselves. The effects of self-censorship still remain, as societal pressures hold people back. In 2006 the book *Princess Masako: Prisoner of the Chrysanthemum Throne* was denied publication by Kodansha as they believed it would upset the Japanese public, due to its critique of the Emperor. The Imperial Household Agency went as far as demanding an apology for the writing as it was disrespectful.¹²³ The limit was not specifically placed by the government but there was enough pressure that Kodansha chose not to publish it.

¹²³ The Age, *Japanese Princess Biography Canned - National*, www.theage.com.au/news/national/japanese-princess-biography-canned/2007/02/17/1171405493771.html.

In regards to Fukushima people have also found it difficult to come forward. After the disaster there were protests against nuclear power, and how the government handled the situation. While protests are allowed they can reflect unfavorably on the participants if they are documented being there. The nuclear industry and its connections to other major corporations have made it is hard to protest against. The government is pro-nuclear, and major entertainment companies are connected to the nuclear industry. So famous musicians often find their hands tied by their record companies, as if they speak out on the topic they could be essentially blacklisted.¹²⁴

More direct action has been taken by the Japanese government to limit people's ability to organize. In June of 2017 changes were made to an anti-terror conspiracy law. The changes make it criminal for any group (of two or more people) to plan to commit a crime, even if they do not carry out the plan. If a group is organizing to do something that would violate a law they could be charged. This had the possibility for abuse in the future, as it allows for the punishing of people before they even commit a crime. In the case of some protests, if they were to violate noise regulation laws, those involved could possibly be prosecuted under this anti-terror conspiracy law¹²⁵.

Japan is not alone in these issues, as there are inherent tensions that often arise between civil liberties of free speech and free press, and political order and civil protection. To what extent can information be revealed without threatening the safety of a nation, and revealing state secrets? How do we reconcile people's rights to privacy in times of conflict? Every government

¹²⁴ Manabe, Noriko. *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Protest Music after Fukushima*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹²⁵ Japan Passes Controversial Anti-Terror Conspiracy Law." *BBC News*, BBC, 15 June 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40283730.

has struggled with these questions. In post 9/11 America we have seen how privacy has been compromised as collection of information for national security has overstepped its boundaries. In this age of technology, we are still figuring to what extent we have control over our personal information. In 1940's Japan personal information was both collected and prevented from being published by the United States, in a way that left traces, hundreds of documents left in archives. In this digital age it may be harder to control what is known, but it is even harder to protect against information being gathered about you, and dilemma over personal information management and control will only become a bigger issue in the days to come.

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