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Code-name Friends Next Door: The Securitization of Communism through United States Clandestine Operations in Latin America

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Code-name Friends Next Door: The Securitization of Communism through United States
Clandestine Operations in Latin America

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by

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
May 2023

Dedication

Dad, I never thought I would be completing this project without your help to talk through ideas.

You were my better half, and I wish you were here with me. You have always taught me to always be thankful and be the best at what I do. I hope I have made you proud through this project. I love you so much and am very thankful for all you have done for me. With much love and a fist pump, your son.

Rest in Peace.



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To GOD: Thank you for taking me this far. There were times when I cried and prayed, not knowing how or why to keep going. I kept my faith in you and you guided me through. For that and all the grace you show me, thank you. Philippians 4:13 says, “I can do ALL things through Christ who strengthens me.” I recently learned that means you can both fall and rise through Christ. Amen.

To my Mom: Thank you for all the sacrifices you made for me. Thank you for being hard on me and showing me tough love at times. Thank you for always saying, “all is well”, and for being my number 1 supporter. You have been a major part of who I am today, and I wouldn’t have gotten this far without you. I love you so much.

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To everyone with whom I’ve had a conversation, and to myself, thank you. I was asked a few times before the completion of this project if I would do college differently if I had a second chance. To that, I say no. My experiences are a part of who I am. Thank you to all for the journey.

Abstract

In this senior project, I will explore the beginning of U.S. covert operations in Latin America, and how the line drawn between security and development affected the region during The Cold War. This period of time followed a global recognition of alliances, territorial conflicts, and foreign trade partnerships. While Latin America was considered a developing region with much economic potential, its physical location was also a security concern for the United States, which was and is right next door. Were U.S. clandestine operations in Latin America necessary for the progression? Did the security strategy against communism outweigh the reality of its perceived threat?

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Introduction

In security studies, the term “referent object” describes an object being securitized in response to a threat. Underdevelopment, malnutrition, and inequitable education access are all historical examples of objects securitized in response to some form of threat. Simultaneously, western capitalism has played a large role in the growing economic and political influence of the United States, especially as it relates to confronting the potential rise and spread of communism in Latin America.

This was an overwhelming fear for presidential U.S. administrations during the Cold War, especially concerning President Truman’s administration when the international conflict began in 1947. U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, implemented through the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, and the Alliance for Progress, demonstrated its concern for the region. Some would argue the United States’ concern was more aligned with its economic interests in the region. What is not explicitly stated, however, is the nation’s concern for the securitization of Latin America and the potential impact on its own international standing.

The United States’ position after World War II was more relevant than before concerning regions like Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. For a long time, presidential and congressional elections have also shaped the United States’ position and response concerning national and international affairs. The Civil Rights Act, for example, was passed in 1964 after a 72-day filibuster, prohibiting the discrimination of race, color, sex, religion, and other protected classes. Why would a country finally introduce legislation to protect the rights of minority groups while simultaneously limiting social mobility by supporting covert, militarized coups in another?

The question I would like to pose is not whether U.S. clandestine intervention was positive or effective during the Cold War, but rather its role in the developed dynamic between the U.S. and Latin America as a recognized Third World region. Were militarized and clandestine operations in Latin America necessary for the region's economic and political stability?

Over time, economic and political intervention in Latin America allowed the U.S. to have a contingency plan for growing powers in Europe. One current example of its security efforts is its partnership with and majority stake in the North American Treaty Organization (NATO), founded in 1949. One of this organization's core objectives is to maintain a shared military partnership among member countries with aligned democratic values. If security concerns are prioritized while responding to issues concerning the social well-being of an affected population, the question has to be asked if intervention in Latin American countries was necessary.

The U.S. Agency for International Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank are among several United States-based multilateral organizations granting much-needed assistance to the region. How does the current reliance on foreign aid speak to the region's dynamic with the United States? Could these prior instances of intervention have made the current demand for foreign aid worse? At what point does the intervention become problematic?

In this project, I will focus on two Latin American countries: Guatemala and Brazil. In the case of Guatemala in 1954, the expropriation of over 150,000 acres owned by the United Fruit Company followed a military coup with the support of several U.S. agencies. In the case of Brazil in 1964, several issues, including a lack of national support for the Alliance for Progress

and local military opposition against Brazilian President João Goulart. led to a coup and the successful removal of their president.

In these two cases, there is a pattern of a supposed economic threat toward the United States and a response of militarized and clandestine operations that leave long-lasting effects for both sides. Are these efforts of securitization necessary at the expense of disrupted Latin American governments and societies? Was the United States aiming to keep communism in Latin America under control or to be in control of Latin America? Did U.S. foreign policy programs like the Alliance for Progress and the Truman Doctrine aim to truly provide further economic and political sovereignty for Latin American countries? To what extent did this benefit the U.S. long-term?

Instances of militarized interventions and covert operations can have long-lasting effects on the political states of affected countries. To date, Latin American countries like Guatemala and Brazil are dispersed regarding their economic standing. That is not to say the coups undergone are wholly responsible for the current political and economic state in these countries, however, they do play a part and can have domino effects. Considering the GDP of several Latin American countries has grown since 1960, it is evident there are benefits from U.S. economic partnerships.

However, while some countries in the region may have experienced positive economic returns, the current social and political state of the country sheds light on what is not made clear

by the numbers. What happened after each respective coup, and why did one country's case turn out better than others?

Chapter 1 - Foreign Policy Framework

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was closely tied to the Cold War and Latin America. Established in 1947 as part of the National Security Act, the organization had the goal of gathering intelligence and conducting covert operations to protect U.S. national security interests. As noted by Vincent Bevins in *The Jakarta Method*, “As the United States woke up to its position of unprecedented global power, there were a few ways its government could interact with the rest of the world. The president was in charge of the Department of Defense and State Department, but there was no permanent institution engaged in gathering information abroad and licensed to carry out secret operations” (Bevins 24). During the Cold War, the agency played a crucial role in gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as in supporting anti-communist regimes and movements around the world.

The Alliance for Progress

The Alliance for Progress was a United States foreign aid program aimed at promoting economic and social development in Latin America during the Cold War. The program was launched in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy and was intended to provide economic assistance to Latin American countries in exchange for their commitment to democratic reform and social progress. The program was seen as a response to the spread of communism in the region and was designed to provide a defense to the threat against capitalism (Smetherman and Smetherman 79). This foreign policy, however, had had a lasting impact on the region, as it helped to establish a

framework for U.S. engagement with Latin America that emphasized economic development and political reform.

The Need for Balance Between Security and Development

When discussing the goals of development and security, one has to consider primary stakeholders and those who are on the receiving end of their efforts. In the case of post-cold-war reconstruction, the west played a large role in seeking solutions for various issues in civil societies across the globe. Namely, the U.S. government aimed to serve nations facing human rights issues including political conflict, immigration, voting rights, education, and other areas of society at threat to its progression. Third-world countries in many parts of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East were also compelled to work with western foreign aid programs to resolve societal issues, especially if they were receptive to democratic ideals. This unbalanced relationship caused these very regions to be dependent on received resources, and ultimately, propelled them to accept the reconstruction efforts placed on them. Nation-states and multilateral organizations with substantial economic capital view their work as non-political and essential to the improvement of underdeveloped cities and countries.

While the discourse around development is often “depoliticized”, the resulting actions are politically driven. The mid-1900s and after experiencing decades of contradicting ideologies regarding the organization and distribution of wealth in the international system. International socialism and Third Worldism offered solutions to these problems, however, only Third Worldism, viewing development and underdevelopment as an organic reflection of each other, led to the re-problematization of underdevelopment as dangerous.

On the other hand, many would argue the issue of underdevelopment is indeed a security threat that requires a forced or militarized response. For example, the refugee crisis experienced by numerous countries, many of which are due to political conflict and instability, has compelled neighboring nations to reach out with possible solutions and methods of intervention. In addition to refugee flow, the costs of civil war and other humanitarian issues have warranted the need for international organizations to intervene. From that perspective, if there isn't an apparent need from a respective country, then there is no need to intervene. Lasting outcomes affecting economic development, health, food security, voting rights, and the ability to maintain a strong government are namely a few areas where security and development organizations have expanded their reach in the cold-war era. It would be dangerous to a country's advancement and future if any of these focus areas have been weakened, and many of the countries in need of response already have thousands of marginalized people, like any nation, in need of great assistance and resources.

Chapter 2 - Guatemala Case Study

Introduction

Guatemala is one of seven countries in Central America, and the closest of all to the U.S. border. As history shows, such physical proximity could be the first step to a partnership while also creating a power dynamic between nation-states. For Central America and the rest of Latin America as a whole, the call for partnership became urgent amidst the rise of communism within the Soviet Union.

The context of Guatemala's case is critical for two reasons. First, it demonstrates a sensitive relationship concerning both security and the economy, one that is shared between almost every Latin American country and the United States. Secondly, Guatemala's case marked the first time covert intelligence operations were executed on behalf of the United States in Latin America. It also served as a roadmap for U.S. security policy concerning interventions, which had both adverse and positive effects for both countries involved. Considering this region was largely considered "Third World" and in need of development, a major part of their partnership with the U.S. became most visible via economic development.

Chiquita Brands, once known as The United Fruit Company, held a significant economic relationship between Guatemala and several other Latin and Caribbean countries. Many scholars have presented clear arguments for the association between the U.S.-based company and the Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S.-Guatemala economic partnership concerning the production, importation, and exportation of goods, however, paints a clearer picture. At the time, for example, 77% of Guatemalan exports went to the United States, and 65% of imports to

Guatemala came from there (La Feber 1). This reveals the economic dependency for both countries, but to what length would either go to maintain that partnership?

The United Fruit Company

The United Fruit Company (UFC) was formed in 1899 after a merger between the Boston Fruit Company and Minor C. Keith. Keith owned three banana companies with holdings in Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia, therefore, he had already built significant relationships with the governments in those countries (Guevara). The main goods produced by the company were bananas, and as that empire grew and ultimately monopolized the good, it ultimately grew across all of Central America, including El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala. The UFC understood the value of bananas and had special processes in place to maintain that value. Stacy May and Galo Plaza elaborate, stating, “Thus the creation of temperate zone markets for this tropically grown fruit has increased the retail value of the entire commercial crop by two to three times, since a banana to consumers in the United States, England, or Germany is worth about six times what it brings when sold to consumers in Guatemala, Panama, or Ecuador” (May and Plaza 221). After the UFC understood what processes worked best and were most profitable for the company, the value of the banana became evident in North American and European revenue sales.

It is important to note that not only did the United Fruit Company have strong ties with the countries in which they produced bananas, but with the United States government as well. In fact, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a law firm in New York called Sullivan and Cromwell that represented the company. His brother, Allen Dulles, served as Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency and on the board of trustees for the United Fruit Company, meaning he also owned a percentage of shares (La Feber). Just as economic stability was a major concern for the administration during this time, the Dulles brothers were in tandem as they held a personal stake in the company's success.

Immerman further elaborates "Converging with his religious faith was Dulles' sincere faith in the capitalist system. Long one of the highest-paid lawyers on Wall Street, he fervently believed in free enterprise and the expansion of corporate investments abroad. He assumed that these investments were threatened by the Soviet Union...[and] since a basic tenet of the Eisenhower administration was that security was inextricably linked to economic well-being, Dulles, like others around the White House, viewed the fiscal health of the United States as a crucial component of its defense posture. (Immerman).

The United Fruit Company was further connected to the Eisenhower administration as the company's top public relations officer, Ed Whitman, was the husband of Eisenhower's personal secretary, Ann Whitman (La Feber 1). When it came to running stories via U.S.-based media publications like the New York Times or lobbying against Guatemalan policies under President Arbenz, the United Fruit Company always had the upper hand.

What Caused the Covert Intervention?

The 1954 coup in Guatemala took place during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and President Harry S. Truman. As mentioned before, the major concern for the United States during the Cold War period was the growth of communism. How to prevent the threat of this economic and political principle was an issue both administrations were tasked with. There had already been several economic partnerships established between North and Latin America, one of them largely concerning fruit and the United Fruit Company. As noted by Richard H. Immerman in his text, "The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention,"

the biggest threat Latin America posed to the U.S. was the possibility of it being at the disposal of the Soviet Union. Immerman writes, “Latin American policy reflected the overarching objective of containing Communism. Since most Latin American countries, especially the dictatorships, posed no threat to United States policy, the region generally received less attention and fewer resources than such areas as Europe and the Far East, which appeared more vulnerable to Communist expansion” (Immerman 9). This vulnerability caused the United States to make a strategic power move. In response, the United States made an effort to stop the Soviet Union from establishing international alliances that would pose a real and financial threat to the United States.

President Arbenz, however, did not see economic growth as a priority for the country. In fact, he was more concerned about the severe misdistribution of land and the disproportionate effects this had on the Guatemalan population. 72% of arable land was controlled by 2% of the population, driving issues concerning health, poverty, and malnutrition to be exacerbated. In addition, only 12% of privately owned land was actively being used for agricultural development (Handy). In a speech he gave in 1951, President Arbenz reinforced the need for a national focus on equitable land distribution shortly after taking office:

“All the riches of Guatemala are not as important as the life, the freedom, the dignity, the health, and the happiness of the most humble of its people. How wrong we would be if—mistaking the means for the end—we were to set financial stability and economic growth as the supreme goals of our policy, sacrificing to them the well-being of our masses...” (Gleijeses).

The following year, on June 17, 1952, the Congress of Guatemala ratified Decree 900, an Agrarian Reform Law drafted by President Arbenz. Ultimately, this law redistributed over 150,000 acres of land to approximately 100,000 Guatemalan families. Some arguments have been made over the effectiveness of the law, as more than half of it was given to the Ladino population. Ladino, meaning “everyone who is not indigenous,” consisted of descendants from Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Nevertheless, the expropriation and redistribution of this unused land was a threat to the United Fruit Company and the economy of the United States.

Operation PBSuccess

Upon its authorization by the National Security Act (NSA) in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency has risen to be a key aid for the United States’ work related to covert intervention abroad. Consequently, the presence of communism in Soviet Russia and the potential threat to the United States' economic development were the driving motivations that caused such an intervention. This threat was commonly found among developing countries recognized as “Third World,” with social goals that focused on progress for the community rather than the individual. Unfortunately, U.S. goals of security and development did not align with the sentiments of communal progression, where economic growth was placed in the background. This structure limited economic cooperation from the U.S. perspective and, in turn, centralized government regulations for Central and Latin America.

One could have anticipated that President Eisenhower would ask Congress for more military funding after World War II ended. However, considering his military background and

understanding of the impact mass military spending has on society and the economy, he chose not to (Le Feber).

President Truman was not on the same page prior to his administration. Instead, he regarded military aid as essential against the threat of communism, hence the passing of the NSA. Covert intervention, however, was something both presidents supported. As Richard Immerman states, “Dwight Eisenhower believed covert operations were a crucial component of realizing United States foreign policy objectives, but they were effective only if they were used correctly and judiciously” (Immerman 17). Covert intervention would also prove to be much less expensive than the disposal of any U.S. military branch, establishing why Guatemala’s case served as a blueprint for future interventions, even though they were not always successful.

Operation PBSUCCESS, funded by a \$2.7 million budget, was considered an inexpensive alternative to a fully-funded military operation. Under President Eisenhower, the operation was intended primarily for “psychological warfare, political action, subversion, and other components of a small paramilitary war” (Kane). With coordination from the Department of State, the CIA was successfully able to carry out their operation after President Arbenz resigned from office and sought asylum in Mexico. While assassination by the CIA was discussed, it was never executed. The Guatemalan military general Castillo Armas assumed the presidency on June 27, 1954, one week after his CIA-backed forces were dispatched to complete the uprising (Kane). The CIA additionally provided an aircraft as a demonstration of aerial assault in Guatemala at various locations. The public became disoriented in response, achieving the psychological disorientation that the Eisenhower administration originally hoped to achieve. Due

to the already-established economic partnership between the United States and Guatemala, one must ask: was covert intervention necessary to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship?

Benefits and Drawbacks

The influence of U.S. foreign policy initiatives like the Truman Doctrine and the Alliance for Progress demonstrated the beginning of a positive and public relationship between the United States and Latin America. In other ways, it has played a major role in the dependent dynamic between the U.S. and developing countries in Latin America. These policies, in addition to Guatemala being the first intervened country in the region by the U.S., served as structural breaks to the political, social, and economic states of the mentioned countries. All of these actions led to an exponential increase in foreign aid from U.S.-based organizations and multinational corporations like the United Fruit Company.

Richard Immerman emphasized this point, stating “While Latin America’s strategic importance in the immediate postwar years is well known, its economic value is not. There have been numerous accounts of activities by such economic giants as the United Fruit Company, and, along with other underdeveloped regions, Latin America has figured prominently in the myriad dependency models...Private, long-term investment throughout the region surpassed the amount invested in any other part of the world except Canada. By the end of 1950, this investment had already reached about \$6 billion, compared with direct private investments outside the western hemisphere of only \$4.6 billion. In terms of the export market, Latin America in 1950 purchased about \$2.7 billion worth of the United States goods, which amounted to about 50% of its total imports from all sources” (Immerman).

It is clear that both Latin America and the United States benefited economically from their partnership. For the U.S., it was clear that capitalism and democracy were the key tools that would guarantee economic security and political prosperity. The Eisenhower administration was especially fervent about the connection between security and economic well-being (Immerman

17). To date, Guatemala's GDP and GDP per capita have significantly risen since the 1960s (Macrotrends), however, does that necessarily mean they have benefited across the board from U.S. economic partnership?

As of 2021, the World Bank notes Guatemala has received a net total of over \$500 million, while Latin America as a whole has received an estimated \$11.85 billion (World Bank Data). While much of this foreign aid has covered necessary expenses related to health, environmental relief, and education, it has also led to the region's dependency on more aid. Could the administration at the time have attempted to make the region more self-sufficient while maintaining a stable partnership?

Conclusion

The United Fruit Company's economic influence and its will to maintain that influence played a significant role in the overthrow and removal of Guatemalan President Arbenz. The United States government saw communism as a threat, and Latin America was seen as a vulnerable region that needed to be contained. The United Fruit Company was closely tied to the United States, with members of the Dulles family holding influential positions on both sides. Through covert intelligence operations, the United States was able to intervene in Guatemalan politics and maintain its economic partnership with the country. The legacy of this intervention continues to have significant impacts on both countries to this day, but how did this instance lead to the case of Brazil's intervention 10 years later?

Chapter 3 - Brazil Case Study

Introduction

Brazil is the largest country in South America and, as of 2021, has a population of over 214 million people (World Bank). It also shares a border with nearly every country on the continent, except for Guyana, Ecuador, and Chile. Holding a rich value in both agricultural and non-agricultural goods, it is evident Brazil's import and export policies have always been critical to the economic, political, and social progress of the nation. The several port cities have also aided them, and would surely benefit any country conducting business with them. Ironically, the country was also facing a severe amount of debt totaling more than \$900 million during the 1965-1966 fiscal year (New York Times).

Despite the evident support of Brazil through development aid, and economic partnership with multinational corporations, the United States wanted to be wary of potential threats to their progress as a nation. Communist expansion in Brazil was one of those threats. This meant not displaying open support for socialist and communist initiatives held by Brazilian leadership, especially the president. "The US role in the coup was not the result of ineluctable economic or strategic forces. U.S. officials might have accepted President Goulart seeing out his term if, for example, he had complied with their demands to remove leftists from his government and adjust his economic policies in favor of US economic interests" (Pereira 16). In Brazil's political history throughout the Cold War, there have been several presidents that valued the sentiments of those economic ideas, like Juscelino Kubitschek, Jânio Quadros, and João Goulart. They saw this

threat in Goulart's administration and requested that he remove anti-US and leftist politicians from his cabinet, which he never did.

Brazil's Political State

Although presidents and vice presidents were elected via majority elections in Brazil, lower chamber members of Congress were elected proportionally. This ultimately determined the agenda that Brazilian presidents could realistically pursue, as a considerable number of congressional members did not align with the progressive objectives shared by leaders like Goulart and Quadros (Spektor 2). "The new president, who had never been a long-term member of any political party, found it difficult to navigate the multi-party Brazilian system. In the realm of foreign policy, Quadros decided to adopt a 'neutral' policy, visiting Cuba and resuming relations with the Soviet Union". (Brown University). Given his strategic goal for what he considered the best plan for Brazil, he wanted to reconnect with global partners like China, the Soviet Union, and German as he didn't see political or economic reasoning for a total dissolution of partnership. Going further, he met with Ernest "Che" Guevara and gave him an award recognizing him for his work. This demonstrated to the United States that Quadros and his administration could be a potential threat. Similar to 10 years prior, they were concerned about partnerships between Guatemala and Eastern Europe, except now there was proof.

"In a system prone to clashes between a majority-vote executive and a proportional-representation legislature, no democratically elected president could remain in office without their support. Securing that support was not an easy operation for any president, however, because the military did not act in unison. Hence, military commanders intervened in politics regularly..." (Spektor 3)

The Brazilian military saw their role as a balance and intermediary between civilian concerns and political consensus. In addition, members of Brazil's Congress were known to request incentives in order for presidential reform to receive support. This creates a set of three potential oppositions to the presidential leadership if their objectives don't align with the needs of the population, Congress, and military. "At the time Goulart came to office, the majority of the Brazilian Congress was in the hands of conservative parties who dismissed progressive change in the country's laws as a prelude to social upheaval and instability" (Spektor 3). Although Goulart shared similar values with Quadros, it was not convenient for him to continue pushing the goal of "sweeping away" corruption. A lot of their work was viewed as over-progressive and aligned with socialism, which ultimately led to Quadros' resignation from office.

What Caused The Intervention?

In May 1962, there was a legislative revision to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 titled the "Hickenlooper Amendment," named after U.S. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper. The bill was introduced to Congress on the Senate Floor and was intended to "threaten to suspend foreign aid to countries that expropriate American property without just compensation as a sound and effective method of protecting private foreign investment" (Lillich 1). This amendment was in response to Brazilian Governor Brizola's order to expropriate a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T) in February of the same year, which was an American-based telephone company.

In later months, other governors in Brazil threatened to expropriate the energy provider American and Foreign Power (AMFORP) (Spektor 6). The reimbursement to the multinational company was only up to 10% of what the subsidiary was worth. This did not go well with the Department of State or U.S. Executive Office, which yielded intenser revisions to the Hickenlooper Amendment. The White House, in turn, later applied more pressure for negotiations on compensation for the expropriation of IT&T and AMFORP.

The Alliance for Progress loans were no longer being sent to the central government of Brazil, as many U.S. officials highly advised against granting the country further aid, especially Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to Brazil. Not only was U.S. development policy beginning to challenge the state of Brazil, but security policy as well. “In October 1962, the CIA began giving financial support to politicians opposing Goulart, ranging from \$5 million to \$20 million (Spektor 7).

In response, President Goulart gathered further opposition within Brazil, and plans to overthrow him became much more visible. Top industry leaders in business, right-wing civilians, and high-ranking military officers recognized Goulart’s attempt to implement progressive economic reform. Ultimately conflicting with their personal interests, the demand for a new president would soon become a reality for the country. On March 13, 1964, President Goulart gave a speech to 150,000 people who appeared to be supporters of communism. Promises such as increasing the minimum wage, denouncing Congress as “archaic”, and implementing plebiscites (which would expand voting power in legislation to all members of the country),

received immediate backlash. Six days later, a rally of over 300,000 civilians gathered in São Paulo to voice their concerns and present a united front in opposition to his reforms (Spektor 10).

Operation Brother Sam - 1964 Coup

Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson's transition into office created space for stricter policy in U.S. foreign affairs. Concerning the securitization of communism, the 1947 National Security Act further supported this position. The rally on March 19th pushed President Johnson to authorize a naval task force of 7 to 8 vessels and oil tankers to be sent to the coast of Brazil (Spektor 10).

On March 30, 1964, a now declassified document from the CIA presented detailed information about the anticipated coup. Created with the subject line "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerais," the document acknowledges the U.S. government was aware of the coup developments, specifically where Brazilian troops were meeting and the order to attack military bases that were certain to be loyal to President Goulart.

Part E of the document stated, "The revolution will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody. Fighting in the north might continue for a long time. The position of the navy is uncertain and could add to the difficulties of the anti-Goulart forces. The Air Force is so divided that it will not be a problem in the early stages. Eventually, it should come to the aid of the anti-Goulart forces" (CIA).

This classified message was sent to the State Department, Army, Air Force, Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command (CINCSO), and Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic (CINCLANT). CINCSO is one of the highest levels of

joint-military commands in the Department of Defense, and a critical position in order for the United States to adequately provide on-the-ground support in South America and specifically Brazil at the time. Although the navy's location was uncertain, CINCLANT provided support to anti-Goulart forces via ships. The CIA, nevertheless, was well aware of both coup details and designated military support, which was clearly communicated to departments concerning United States security.

Once Johnson gave orders for Operation Brother Sam to commence, arms, ammunition, and fuel were also sent to support local anti-Goulart personnel in the military. In the end, the U.S. saw success in the overthrow of President Goulart. "The heads of the three military forces established a "Supreme Command of the Revolution," and Brazil embarked upon a path of authoritarian rule for the next two decades. At midday on April 2, Operation Brother Sam was deactivated, and the US government rushed to recognize the new dictatorial government of Brazil" (Spektor 11).

Benefits and Drawbacks

The economic state of Brazil was dependent on its relationship with the United States and foreign aid organizations associated with the nation. As observed in Guatemala's case, the economic prosperity of Latin America was beneficial to the United States, therefore prompting the securitization of communism in Brazil through Operation Brother Sam.

The economic need of Brazil, however, was also clear to the Kennedy administration, hence why they were the largest beneficiary of the Alliance for Progress. From 1961-1968, Brazil received a total of \$1.9 billion which made up 10% of the AFP budget (Smetherman and Smetherman 80). Another reason for the large foreign aid package was in response to organizing communities in Northeast Brazil that demanded political and civil rights while facing land eviction (Spektor 4). Although the U.S. saw a need to help maintain Brazil's government and economy, U.S. presidents simultaneously saw the danger of supporting anti-capitalist leaders in Latin America, knowing they would receive ridicule and decrease their chances of being re-elected into office.

In 1960, Brazil's GDP was \$17 billion, and as of 2021, \$1.6 trillion. In 2019, Brazil was noted as the United States' 8th largest supplier of agricultural goods, including tobacco, red meats, and roasted coffee (holding the highest value of an imported agricultural good). Non-agricultural goods imported by the U.S. to Brazil totaled over \$16 billion, in contrast to agricultural goods totaling \$3.3 billion. (Office of the United States Trade Representative). The export of coffee was critical for Brazil even before the 1964 intervention.

Concerning the Brazilian population following the intervention, the Brazilian population faced a military regime for two decades. Consequently, almost 500 people were disappeared, detained, tortured, or killed in an effort to dismantle the left-wing consensus and uphold a conservative system in all aspects of the country (Uchoa). Several changes were made to the government through amendments like Institutional Act 5, which disbanded Congress, further censored civilians through education, and disbanded "habeas corpus", a process which

determines if the imprisonment of someone is lawful or not based on the crimes being charged (Cornell Law). With severe changes like these being made to the government, there was no oversight to the damage being done. At the expense of the population, many of whom were marginalized, the United States and conservative leaders in Brazil benefited from the forced removal of President Goulart from office. Was U.S. support for the coup necessary to achieve their goal of economic growth? How might this have determined the relationship between two countries today? Could either have been better off with the intervention?

Conclusion

Goulart's fall was not solely due to U.S. influence as the military during the time had a majority interest in removing him from power as president. The U.S. was helpful in Goulart's removal by supporting the local military, applying economic and diplomatic pressure to the country, and encouraging authoritarian rule following his leave (Spektor 1). In 1960, Janio Quadros ran on a presidential platform seeking to restore diplomatic relationships with China, The Soviet Union, and East Germany while simultaneously advocating against imperialist foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, in 2009 the global economic and security partnership "BRICS" was founded between five world-leading market economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. What could this mean for the future of the United States and its trade value?

Conclusion

In conclusion, this project has explored the relationship between U.S. securitization and development in Brazil and Guatemala in regard to covert interventions. Through the analysis of the Cold War period, it is clear U.S. intervention in these countries has had an impact on each respective country's development, often prioritizing security and capitalism over the concern of the local population. In addition, countries like Chile, Indonesia, and Cuba have experience similar instances of U.S. cover intervention.

One limitation of this project could be a perceived generalization for all Latin American countries, which could possibly conflict with the assessments made of Guatemala and Brazil. It is important to acknowledge these differences and consider the unique historical and political contexts of each country when analyzing U.S. intervention.

Overall, I have raised the question of whether U.S. clandestine operations in Latin America were necessary for U.S. prosperity. In today's atmosphere, can wellbeing and safety be achieved without securitization? While there may be situations where security measures are necessary, it is important to consider the long-term consequences of prioritizing securitization at another country's or community's expense. In order to truly develop a country to its full potential, it is crucial to take into consideration the perspective of those affected by U.S. foreign policy.

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