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Political Modernization in Atatürk’s Turkey and The Shah’s Iran and the Struggle For Meaning

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Political Modernization in Atatürk’s Turkey and The Shah’s Iran
and the Struggle For Meaning

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
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Thank you Walter Mead, who taught me how to be self-critical without demoralizing myself, provided reading suggestions and guidance that helped shape this project, and had patience with my thoughts and progress.
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Seeking Meaning, Recognition, and Modernity

Introduction: Iran and Turkey

During the twentieth century, leaders in the Middle East faced a thorny dilemma. Adopt modern ideologies and technologies in order to remain globally competitive, or maintain traditional values that weakened their defenses against foreign influence, while keeping standards of living low relative to the West.

Leaders Mustapha Kemal Atatürk and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi thought the answer was obvious. Successfully modernizing would place their countries on a globally competitive level, deter exploitation of their resources and strategic geographical positions by foreign powers, and satiate their personal ambitions for glory and posterity.

Turkey, home to Atatürk, and Iran, where the shah reigned, both had the resources available to develop their respective countries. Most importantly, the foci from which all lines of power emanated were from the presidency of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk and the monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

The reforms heralding modernity for each ruler were similar. Secularization of the government, social reform, and state control of the economy were heavily promoted in both countries. Their militaries grew, and more young people went to school. Their main differences lay in the countryside: Land reform was the flagship of the shah’s program, something which Atatürk did not do.

Although Atatürk and the shah had mostly similar reforms and nearly absolute authority, Iranians unexpectedly forced the latter out of the country and eliminated the monarchical institution. The shah’s subjects rallied against him, with more and more social groups walking
out onto the streets of Tehran to challenge his rule. He fled to Egypt, dying in exile a year later. The shah left in his wake revolutionaries who would found the Islamic Republic.

Atatürk successfully presided over Turkey until his death in 1938. His closest associate, Ismet Inonu, continued the Father Turk’s style of rule, but after WWII acquiesced to a two-party system. The new Democratic Party swept the once-dominant Republican People’s Party from power in 1950, with the help of politically mobilized ruralites. Although the Democratic Party rolled back reforms, the political institution built by Kemal, and the modernity it heralded, proved far more stable compared to the Iranian throne thirty years later after Atatürk’s death. His legacy is undoubtedly held in higher esteem amongst Turks compared to that of the shah in Iran.

The time period studied for the shah ranges from the late 1950s to his exile in 1979, since before then he did not have the political capital to instigate reform or consolidate his power. The shah, unlike his father Reza Shah, witnessed the undoing of the Iranian monarchy. Reza Shah built the groundwork for a new dynasty, but his sudden removal from power at the hands of foreign governments underscores any valuable insights into the tenacity of his rule, since it cannot be determined whether or not Iranians would have revolted against him. Had he reigned until his death or had Iranians dethroned him, then Reza Shah’s reign would present another compelling reformer worthy of study, since he too attempted to modernize Iran. Atatürk’s rule is studied from 1919, when he chaired the Sivas congress, until his death in 1939.

How did Atatürk hold on to power? He was not unanimously supported. While the shah took care of political opponents with his secret police, SAVAK, Atatürk used Independent Tribunals to occasionally jail and execute opponents in a fashion that resembled repression more than due process. Iranian elections held little pretenses about their fraudulence, while the Turks could only vote for a single party or at times a sterile opposition. While students would protest
on the streets of Tehran, Kurds rebelled in the rural areas of eastern Turkey. Something must have happened in Iran that filled people with a revolutionary passion that led them out into the streets *en masse*, shouting and later shooting at soldiers who watched them with loaded guns. Some Turks were kindled by the same revolutionary flame, but no critical mass appeared to tip the scales away from Atatürk.

The answer for why Iranians expelled the shah, and why Turks were content to work within its preexisting institutions, should be explained by examining the effects of reforms in each country, namely the effects they had on the way Turks and Iranians found meaning in life. This is because the changes these countries experienced directly tested their people's ability to change their identities and value life in ways they had not before. Both Kemal and the shah were testing the ability of their nations to change their perceptions of reality through government policy.

**Finding Meaning In Life**

An individual finds meaning in life by acting in ways that give them a sense of pride and purpose. The individual in society belongs to a social group, a large number of people with similar contexts, such as the same occupation, religion, or education. They adopt similar ideas and values that determine what actions will give them pride and purpose, be it working to provide for their families, praying and obeying scripture, or studying to increase their knowledge. Values often overlap, causing alliances between social groups, while opposing values can create enemies. By studying the actions that different social groups collectively consider righteous, just, and prideful, their meanings in life are observed. Francis Fukuyama, in *The End of History*, examines meanings and values, providing useful terms and the framework for this analysis. His inferences from Aristotle’s tripartite division of the soul, and Hegel’s
concept of recognition and history, effectively map out the individual’s needs, how they strategically achieve those needs, and what methods of achievement are right or wrong, just or unjust, self-respecting or self-deprecating.

**The Thymos**

Fukuyama writes, “Socrates notes that the human soul has a desiring part which is made up of many different desires, the most vivid of which are hunger and thirst. These desires all take a similar form of impelling man toward something--food or drink--outside of himself. But Socrates notes, there are times when a man refrains from drinking even when he is thirsty… there is a separate part of the soul, the reasoning or calculating part, that may induce a human being to act contrarily to desire--for example, when the thirsty man fails to drink because he knows the water is contaminated” (Fukuyama 163-4). The combination of desire and reason is considered the entirety of the human soul according to enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John-Jacques Rousseau. Methods of pursuing sufficient wealth to survive comfortably will motivate peasants to ransack grainstores or compel slum dwellers to loot the baker’s shop for bread.

However, according to Fukuyama, the way in which a person strategizes for obtaining desires does not describe them adequately. Take, for example, a student taking a test. They do not know the answer to a question worth a large percentage of the test, but have in plain sight the correct answer of the student next to them. The student decides to look over, and receives the credit for the problem, but feels shame for having done so. If the student’s desire is to get a good grade in the class, then their best strategy in that situation is to cheat. But the emotion felt from cheating does not line up with the emotion expected with completing a goal, pride. What aspect of the student’s mind causes them to feel shame? It is the thymos, a concept which gives the
student, and all humans, meaning. “Thymos [is] somehow related to the value one sets on oneself, what we today might call ‘self-esteem’… Thymos is something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that they have a certain worth” (Fukuyama 164). If desire motivates humans to survive, and reason helps them survive strategically, thymos provides their decisions, actions, and themselves, meaning. A meaningful life consists of actions which are considered not just strategically right, but also thymotically right by the people making them. When they are making right decisions they feel emotions such as pride and self-respect. Wrong decisions evoke shame or regret.

The thymos creates desires which are more profound than simple desires such as food, water, shelter, or sex. These desires consist of concepts such as freedom, purpose, or belonging, which are not required for survival but make survival and death satisfying, and prideful. Students protesting government policies, or people detonating explosive vests they wore into a crowded marketplace, commit actions which they believe are desirous, strategic, right, and therefore meaningful.

**The “Struggle For Recognition”**

These thymotic desires are better described as the “struggle for recognition,” and are innately political. The “struggle for recognition” is an aspect of human nature described by Hegel. He uses the “first man,” a heuristic device, to describe the struggle. This man is analogous to the humans who have the misfortune of dwelling in Hobbesian and Lockean states of nature, with one critical distinction. The “first man,” like the inhabitants of the state of nature, desires to preserve his life. He will sleep, eat, and drink to satiate this desire. But, “Above all, [the first man] desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be recognized. Indeed, for Hegel, an individual could not become self-conscious, that is, become aware of himself as a
separate human being, without being recognized by other human beings. Man, in other words, was from the start a *social* being: his own sense of self-worth and identity is intimately connected with the value that other people place on him” (Fukuyama 146). *Thymos* is born out of sociability, and thus intimately related with the desire for recognition. Having *thymos* is only necessary for the “first man” when he desires to impress upon himself and other people that he acts rightfully. The *asocial* “first man,” with no one to present a meaningful life to, can freely pursue strategic choice, since the thymotic part of the soul, without human contact to shape its growth, becomes identical to the rational part. *Thymos* limits our strategic choices because humans *are* social. They need to filter out amoral strategic choices in order to be recognized as human. Social groups, like those responsible for political unrest, share a collective feeling of right and wrong because of its members’ needs to feel recognized. The members belong to a social group because they seek recognition from each other through similar actions, and thus share a similar sense of *thymos*.

Hegel’s conception of the “first man” pertains more accurately to the discussion of meanings, as compared to Hobbes or Locke, because Hegel incorporates values into his rudimentary human. The state of nature for both Hobbes and Locke assumes that men come together in groups for the sole sake of survival. The “first man” groups with other “first” humans not only for survival, but also for *finding meaning in life, which is a fundamental facet of human nature*. Therefore, politics, the organization of humanity, not only has a purely allocative function for resources and services, but also represents how humanity seeks recognition, or how they impress upon others that their lives have meaning.

Acting to feel recognized by other humans involves risking one’s life or wellbeing. Fukuyama writes, “Hegel’s ‘first man’… wants not only to be recognized by other men, but to be
recognized as a man. And what constitutes man’s identity as man, the most fundamental and uniquely human characteristic, is man’s ability to risk his own life. Thus the ‘first man’s’ encounter with other men leads to a violent struggle in which each contestant seeks to make the other “recognize” him by risking his own life” (Fukuyama 146). The “first man,” according to Hegel, flaunts his thymos as the most human thymos. His system of right and wrong, compared to others, is the most human, and therefore should be recognized as such. The “first man” propounds his thymos through violent struggle, his victory giving him prestige.

Risking one’s life for prestige is the only option for the “first man” to demonstrate the supremacy of his thymos because, according to Hegel, it demonstrates his ability to act freely from animal instincts. “For by risking his life, man proves that he can act contrary to his most powerful and basic instinct, the instinct for self-preservation… [M]an’s human desire must win out over his animal desire for self preservation” (Fukuyama 150). Humans, then, demonstrate their authentic nature by risking their lives, not for strategic gains, but for demonstrating the supremacy of their thymos.

The resulting battle for prestige leads to a victor, or master, and vanquished, or slave, who submits himself to the master for fear of his life. Thus humans, according to Hegel, first organized themselves based on a hierarchy with powerful warriors at the top, and weak dependents at the bottom. This alignment would perpetuate, morphing most notably into wealthy elites and needy peasants. “The warrior ethos--the sense of innate superiority based on the willingness to risk death--remained the essential core of the culture of aristocratic societies the world over, long after years of peace and leisure allowed these same aristocrats to degenerate into pampered and effeminate courtiers” (Fukuyama 148). Political history has fit this narrative for thousands of years, its hierarchical governments have masters at the top, whose wealth
ensures their survival, but must maintain their status as recognized elites by waging wars in the name of a royal family, or country, or ideology. These choices, thymotically correct for their instigators, are usually also strategic. Napoleon, for instance, led armies in the name of France (and himself), not just to flaunt his prestige, but also to maintain the political system that kept him in power. There could have been strategic choices that helped him maintain power not involving his doomed military exploits, like ruling France within its pre-expansion borders, but they would have been shameful for him, and his recognized status as a conquering emperor would be tarnished. What was expansion for Napoleon was modernization for Atatürk and the shah. They were masters battling for prestige, both literally risking their lives. Their modernizing efforts were not always undertaken on the battlefield, but they nevertheless had inherited the ancient drive for recognition from the “first man.”

Hegelian history describes not only the motivations of masters, like Atatürk and the shah, but also that of slaves: The people of Turkey and Iran. Modernizing would motivate more and more slavish social groups into seeking recognition from each other by risking their livelihoods to act against the government. Atatürk and the shah tread dangerously close to a major turning point in Hegelian history. Masters and slaves had long dominated the political and social scene, but, this dichotomy would eventually give way to a more equitable distribution of recognition amongst peoples. The tipping point would occur when the slaves, in unison, sought recognition from each other through destroying the master-slave relationship. The structures of Turkey and Iran’s governments during modernizing reveals their leaders’ efforts to simultaneously consolidate power and achieve their aims, without opposition.

**What Is Modernization?**
Samuel Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies* has a collection of trends, definitions, measurements, and prescriptions meant to analyze the methods undertaken by leaders modernizing their governments and societies, and how these changes affected political institutions and participation. He defines modernization by making intellectual, demographic, familial, hierarchical, and economic distinctions upon which modernizing has an effect. Within these distinctions is the diffusion of knowledge, the creation of newly politicized groups that are socially mobile, reorganization of the family into a small unit that identifies with a large national group, a power structure based on plural, “dispersed inequalities,” and a complexification, de-agriculturalization, and industrialization of the economy. Huntington writes,

“Those aspects of modernization most relevant to politics can be broadly grouped into two categories. First, social mobilization… is the process by which ‘major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.’ It means a change in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world. It is a consequence of literacy, education, increased communications, mass media exposure, and urbanization. Secondly, economic development refers to the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society. It may be measured by per capita gross national product, level of industrialization, and level of individual welfare gauged by such indices as life expectancy, caloric intake, supply of hospitals and doctors. Social mobilization involves changes in the aspirations of individuals, groups, and societies, economic development involves changes in their capabilities. Modernization requires both.” (Huntington 33-4)

The movement of peasants to factories, the mandatory schooling of children, entertaining news on national and global issues, movie theaters, cars, roads, and more, radically affects the *thymos* of social groups exposed to them. A peasant unable to provide for the family moves to the city and takes a job at a factory. The best strategy for providing for the family, which this individual takes pride in, has changed. The *thymotic* impulse at first remains the same, but changes when the peasant, or perhaps his educated and literate progeny, start to read newspapers that list the poor working conditions and pay of the factory compared to those in the Soviet Union, and that the workers not only have the right, but are obligated to form unions and press for better living
conditions. Providing for the family is still a source of pride, but now the peasant’s worker offspring feel shame at providing their masters labor that is undervalued. They feel pride at the idea of striking, a choice that risks losing their jobs, or getting arrested and serving jail time. This choice is not strategic, their desire for food and shelter is provided for at their current wages. But, the workers’ thymotic impulse has changed such that striking is the best strategic option, because it provides the best chance of concurrently fulfilling their simple desires and their thymotic desires. Atatürk and the shah saw it in their interests to have factory workers, and lots of them. They also worked to suppress nascent socialist tendencies. Industrial workers, and other groups, would soon perceive their conditions as shameful. For this reason they had the task of either channeling the thymos of workers away from dangerous ideals, or suppressing them. Huntington usefully determines whether scenarios, in which strategies meant to mitigate or eliminate government opposition are successful or not. Fukuyama’s explanation of the thymos provides a compelling explanation as to why the opposition groups would take advantage of these scenarios, successfully or not.

**Modernization and Liberal Democracy**

According to Fukuyama, the effect of modernization on politics as told by Huntington, should, eventually, result in liberal democracy. The tenets of modernity lead to slaves realizing they are capable of mastery through work. Fukuyama writes, “Modern natural science is not the invention of idle masters, who have everything they want, but of slaves who are forced to work and who do not like their present condition. Through science and technology, the slave discovers that he can change nature, not only the physical environment into which he is born, but his own nature as well… Work itself represented freedom because it demonstrated man’s ability to overcome natural determination, to create through his labor” (Fukuyama 194). A major aspect of
modernization is the implementation of modern natural science on a society lacking it. From factory workers to the educated middle class, the utilization of modern science provides practice in freedom, not demonstrated through bloody battles, but through work. In doing so, the desire to be recognized as human, and superiorly so, is channeled through mastery not over other people, but through nature. The *thymos* of the slave thus defines prideful actions as those that conquer nature, be it through mixing chemicals to create fertilizer or by bending and cutting metals into tools and machinery. These strategic choices, which run through a thymotic filter, result in increased caloric intake, a decrease in the mortality rates of mothers and infants, and increased leisure time. The amalgamation of these choices fall under a liberal *thymos*, since liberal slaves could demonstrate their freedom by mastering nature.

Science only provides slaves with a liberal *thymos*. To fully realize liberal democracy, slaves needed to believe in equality between themselves and their masters. According to Hegel, universal religion gives birth to this belief. He uses Christianity as his example, and Fukuyama points out that Western Christian nations have adopted liberal democracy. Muslims share with Christians the belief that all humans are initially equal in the eyes of God, and can only distinguish themselves by acting morally in line with scripture. Although differences exist, the basic tenets which make Islam universal, such as the ability to convert, and its panethnic and proselytizing nature, make it similar enough to apply to Hegel’s conception of universal religion (and Nietzsche's conception of a slave religion). [Islam] “articulated for the slave a vision of what human freedom should be. Even though it did not provide him with a practical way out of his slavery, it permitted him to see more clearly his objective: the free and autonomous individual who is recognized for his freedom and autonomy, recognized universally and reciprocally by all men… [Therefore,] completion of the historical process required only a
sectarianization of [Islam]” (Fukuyama 198). Democratization appears when it is created by former “slaves” who aspire to be recognized and have rights. They achieve this by secularizing universal religion such that an amorphous deity no longer justifies the equality of individuals. A democracy fulfills the slaves’ desire for recognition by endowing them with rights, and in turn the slaves follow its laws (Fukuyama 203). The dialog between a democratic state and its people through representation and voting ensures that the rights of citizens satisfies their need for recognition, and that the prideful actions determined by their liberal thymos have legality.

Three main aspects of modernized politics, rationalization of authority, differentiated and specialized institutions, and increased political participation, all have liberal democratic implications. Huntington calls the rationalization of authority “the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority. This change implies that government is the product of man, not of nature nor of God, and that a well-ordered society must have a determinate human source of final authority, obedience to whose positive law takes precedence over other obligations” (Huntington 34). A liberal democratic state would most likely have a rationalization of government because its individuals believe in rights bestowed upon themselves. Slaves learned of the need for rational government through their belief in equality before God, but a government could easily base their legitimacy on divine sanction and thus maintain the mastery of its officials. A stabile modern state most likely bases its legitimacy off of the elimination of the master-slave relationship, and thus promotes equality for the sake of preventing the dichotomy from arising.

A second criteria for modern government is “the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform these functions. Areas of particular competence--legal, military, administrative, scientific--become separated from the political
realm, and anonymous, specialized, but subordinated organs arise to discharge those tasks. Administrative hierarchies become more elaborate, more complex, more disciplined. Office and power are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription” (Huntington 34).

Modernization produces organizational and political issues, solved only by restructuring government. Combating urban poverty, regulating new types of industry, and subordinating the armed forces to civilian leadership helps maintain an equitable and efficacious modern society. The liberal *thymos* of a modern state leads to governmental positions staffed by exceptional individuals, who voters recognize as acting righteously. Politicians must demonstrate their achievements, completed through hard work rather than ascription, and must demonstrate leadership skills solely devoted to the common good.

The third aspect of a modern government “involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society” (Huntington 34). Huntington points out that totalitarian states benefit from increased participation when their leaders need the participation of peoples on a massive scale to maintain power. This occurs in fascist states, when all classes of society participate in the politics of the country, although this often comes at the cost of excluding minority ethnic and racial groups in their entirety. But, liberal democracy evidently requires increased political participation as well. Without it, certain social groups can have more representation in government, slowly reshaping society to recognize their thymotic desires, and marginalizing others. A proportionally accurate representation of different social groups and classes in democratic government ensures the best (albeit still very small) chance of recognizing the rights of every citizen.

**Turkey and Iran: Prevention of Liberal Democracy**
Iran and Turkey, could they have satisfied these criteria, more likely than not might have progressed towards liberal democracy under the watchful eyes of Atatürk and the shah. However, while the methods in which Turkey and Iran modernized may have brought them closer to liberalism, they moved *farther away* from democracy. The shah and Atatürk both distorted Fukuyama’s path to a liberal democratic government. Fukuyama holds that democracy is engendered by the struggle for the “slaves” to acquire equal rights based on their conception of freedom first before God, then before each other. They respect the *thymos* of others, and expect the same treatment for their own (Fukuyama 204). Through this process each and every person might pursue their desires using an optimal strategy that they consider just, so long as it falls within reasonable guidelines (no murderers, rapists, arsonists, etc.). However, the modernization and secularization of Iran and Turkey *was instituted through their leaders*, Atatürk and the shah. Modernizing society from above deviates from the ideal structure of history Fukuyama lays out. These leaders began to create the prerequisites that stir the slaves to demand their recognition before man and not God, all the while trying to maintain their centralized power. The “positive laws” of rationalized authority suddenly become ironic considering that the Turks and Iranians obeyed positive laws enforced by secret police and extralegal courts. Huntington points out that the realities of modernization are often unstable, and are not a peaceful path to modern politics. His analysis exposes the crooked path of historical progress (Huntington 37). Fukuyama provides a backdrop for history which can accurately explain how the quest for meaning in life instigates political change, while Huntington provides the gritty details of how changing values in modernizing countries more likely creates instability than liberal democracy. The struggle for the right of recognition, and the struggle for modernity imply similar results but the process is unpredictable. However, examining the struggle for modernity *within* the context of the struggle
for, and against, universal recognition, explains why two countries undergoing the same process produced different results, and why one leader achieved his ambition, and the other was shamed.

**Megalothymia**

The shah, and Atatürk during his life, both had no intentions of transferring their semi-democratic institutions into democracies. The leaders fit into Fukuyama’s definition of *megalothymia*, or “the desire to be recognized as superior to other people” (Fukuyama 182). The shah’s position as monarch undoubtedly affirmed his position of superiority. Through flowery titles, immense wealth, and political power the shah established himself as a fatherly figure out to give the lowly peasants of his country wealth and a little bit of dignity (in return for grateful loyalty.) The shah’s *megalothymia* gave him political blindness, since he chose to believe that he successfully implemented flailing policies and laws, rather than live with the knowledge that his monarchical status did not elevate his humanness over others, which would have compelled him to witness the reality of his crumbling political support.

*Megalothymia* did not alter Atatürk’s judgement, in the way it affected the shah. While the former also saw himself as the one person capable of running the country, Atatürk never acted for the sake of flaunting his superior humanity. While his reputation as a war hero led people to commission sculptures built in his image, and caused Turkey’s parliament to give him the surname Atatürk, which translates to “Father Turk,” he did not go so far as to force Turks to further subject themselves to his humanity.

The *megalothymia* which both leaders shared led them to force social groups to change their *thymos*, thus implying that their original identities lacked humanness. For instance, in public speeches both the shah and Atatürk derided social groups that found strong meaning in religion, calling them reactionaries and stuck in the past. They were convinced that social groups
unlike their own should have found meaning in life in a way similar to theirs, and made full use of the government to ensure these groups would change.

By sterilizing the opposition and maintaining a constant cadre of loyal and well-paid followers, Atatürk and the shah elevated themselves above others through their ability to exercise power. They satiated their *megalothymia* by planning ambitious reforms that swept through parliament and into law in the blink of an eye. These leaders both believed that they alone could save their countries from poverty and despair, thus satisfying their *megalothymia* while conveniently rationalizing their needs for power. Modernizing was their path to being recognized by their subjects as charismatic, and irreplaceable, leaders. Their ambitions compelled them to bring their countries, and themselves, to new heights on the world stage by rapidly adopting the technologies of the West. Modernizing, their only perceived choice for expanding power, put them at the most risk, by trying to imbue upon their citizens new meanings and values that would bring them to challenge the regimes. The shah and Atatürk’s control of power contributed to the speed at which many of the reforms entered their societies.

A modernizing government must not only adopt new technologies and laws. More importantly, it must convince, or force, its subjects to find meaning in new ways of living, and reject old traditions and patterns. For ambitious modernizing leaders vying to stay in power and even increase it, they must suppress demands for the right of recognition from their people, and the political elite representing the opposition.
Reforms, Revolution, and the Shah of Iran

The Shah and Iran

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr Shahanshah of Iran inherited a regime birthed from a civil war. The historical context for his rule determined many of the challenges the shah faced, and the structure of his government. In 1908, secular intelligentsia, prominent members of the Islamic community known as ulama, and bazaaris, or merchants, battled Muhammad Ali Shah’s forces after they demanded ratification of a constitution limiting the power of the shah. Their inspiration for the constitution, which established a national assembly called the Majlis, came from Belgium. Britain and Russia, the two imperial powers vying for influence in Iran, supported the Constitutionalists and Loyalists, respectfully (Ansari 21). The revolution established the basis for a constitutional monarchy, a government that Mohammed Reza Shah would eventually reign over.

After thirteen years of struggling to run the country and even call the Majlis into session, all it took to topple the constitutional order was three thousand Cossack soldiers. Reza Khan stood at the helm of this coup. Britain needed an excuse to pull troops out of the failed state, and supported Reza Khan because London thought he could rule Iran without heavy foreign
assistance. Russia signed a treaty forgiving all Iranian debts while Iran gave it permission to militarily intervene in the event of foreign invasion (Abrahamian 64).

Reza Khan, free of British or Russian mingling, began to strengthen the Iranian government through modernization and centralization. Military forces lay under his control, and the weakened shah allocated more and more funds to Reza Khan and his army. The Majlis passed reforms in 1924 that mandated military service, birth certificates, taxes for the creation of a railway, and a Persianization of the calendar (Ansari 35).

Two years later, Reza Khan became Reza Shah, deposing Ahmed Shah and taking his place as monarch. His son would inherit a massive bureaucracy and armed forces, the latter of which numbered some 127,000 men in 1941 (Abrahamian 68). Crooked electoral systems turned the Majlis into a rubber stamp (Abrahamian 73). The society Reza Shah built traded in political freedoms for stability and modernity. Reza Shah’s son would try and rule the country like his father, by strengthening the power of the monarchy and marginalizing the Majlis and its supporters.

World War II brought about Reza Shah’s forced abdication. Ironically, the two powers he had compromised with before, Russia and Britain, undid his rule in a matter of three days to consolidate control of Iranian oil and supply routes (Abrahamian 97-98).

Reza Shah’s son, now officially the Shah of Iran at age twenty-one, lacked power or ability to withstand outside influence over oil control, the growing power of the Majlis, and political parties. From 1950-1953, the prime minister effectively controlled the country.

In 1953, a CIA-backed coup ousted the prime minister. The shah finally had an opportunity to consolidate power as Reza Shah had done. The new monarch would further the
modernizing efforts of his father by trying to mobilize the support of peasants, laborers, and women, and by reinvigorating the economy.

The shah failed to hold power because of his unsuccessful strategy for implementing reforms, thus failing to fully politicize the *thymos* of the social groups he sought support from, and in some cases turning them against him. Modernizing Iran proved a task the regime could not fully undertake, causing many of his people to seek recognition—and satisfy their collective *thymos*—through ousting him. They rejected the values their monarch hoped to instill in them.

**The Elections of the Twentieth Majlis**

The election for the twentieth Majlis in August of 1960 provides a moment for the beginnings of reform in Iran. Two parties existed in the Majlis at the time, the Mardom (People’s) party, and the Melliyun (Nationalists) party. The former, chaired by close friend of the shah, Amir Asadollah Alam, officially (but loyally) opposed the office of the monarchy. Manouchehr Eqbal led Melliyun, the majority and pro-monarch party.

Two additional political groups existed that directly threatened the shah’s rule and had politically marginalized him in the past (Afkhami 211). The leftist Tudeh party and the National Front had once bolstered the power of the Majlis with the help of the enigmatic Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. A CIA-backed coup ousted the prime minister and the National Front from politics, while the Tudeh were beaten from the public eye. However, the newly free elections for the Majlis prompted their return into view; the Second National Front formed the day the shah ordered elections (Afkhami 211). Its revival showed how Iranians sought recognition through challenging the regime, risking arrest and imprisonment to demonstrate their resolve to bring political change to parliament.
Fraud ran rampant in the elections for the twentieth Majlis, compelling the shah (whom which the fraudulence favored) to disband it and hold a reelection. The new members of parliament, like those who had just stepped down, would remain loyal to the shah or only tokenly oppose his policies.

The shah’s attempts at maintaining an uncompetitive monarchical two-party system through fake elections revealed the fragility of his position. Later, he and his allies would come to the consensus that only radical reforms would save the power of the upper class. According to Samuel Huntington, an uncompetitive two-party system “may be made to limit the competition between the parties and thereby reduce the capacity of the system to expand its power and assimilate new groups” (Huntington 147). Since the Mardom and Melliyun parties had set roles that stymied any hopes for the Mardom gaining a majority in parliament, the Tudeh and Second National Front gained support from Iranians who felt disenfranchised in the face of an unrepresentative parliament. Fraudulence prevented disloyal candidates from gaining office, but the inevitable uproar forced the shah into dissolving the Majlis and attempting to create a new (and equally loyal) one meant to satisfy voters.

Students of Tehran University saw through this sham, and took to the streets in protest two days after the opening of the Majlis. They burned the car of University Chancellor Eqbal, the former prime minister. Police forced the university to close from late February 1961 until April, but this did not abate the bitterness young people felt towards what they perceived to be an illegitimate parliament (Afkhami 212). Although the protests did little more than publicize the bereavements of students, it was a clear political expression of how they sought recognition. By contacting friends, finding meeting places, and committing emotional and symbolic acts such as burning a prominent elite’s car, students were expressing what they saw to be a perceived
violation of their humanity: The prevention of their political expression through meaningful votes. Their thymos in this situation would dictate that, in order for a student to reassert their life to themselves and anyone else watching, some sort of action must take place that demonstrates a clear counteraction to whatever dehumanized them.

The shah’s megalothymia contributed to a blatant miscalculation in crafting fraudulent elections. Had his poorly contrived plan succeeded, then a loyal Majlis would pass his laws, the people would consider his reign legitimate, and the foundations of Iranian freedom would perceptively emanate from the throne. Thymotic actions for the shah meant acting to make himself appear more human than others, and allowing free elections which meant little under his control would craft the image of a benevolent monarch loved by the people. His thymos in this case departed from rational thought however, because the consequences of allowing so-called free elections that had only one possible outcome seriously overlooked a large swath of Iranians who were in on the scheme. The shah had sought to be recognized as a master while at the same time preventing the recognition of those who sought to have their vote count, to guarantee his power.

The White Revolution

The shah could no longer limit political participation through impropriety and control over political candidates. With internal stability in limbo following the clear evidence that bringing Iran closer to democracy meant the ousting of its entrenched elite, the shah and his loyal ministers started crafting plans to bring wealth and modernity to the country and thereby legitimize their status. The resulting reform efforts would come to be known as the White Revolution. Ali Ansari credits Mardom party leader Asadullah Alam as one of the first to call for
radical reforms. A British diplomat recounted a discussion with Alam in the late 1950s, who had said,

“Asadullah explained that to his mind the problem of the survival of the regime was a matter not so much of economics as of psychology and public … [he] concluded that the key to success was popularity based upon a measure of nationalistic fervour, which in turn must be founded in some patriotic aspiration.” (Ansari 149)

The quotation is a symptom described in Huntington’s diagnosis that modernization involves a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations (Huntington 32). Alam hoped that if people sought recognition through a nationalist identity, then they would support the shah, the supposed embodiment of Iranian nationalism.

External pressures also motivated the shah to reform his country. Gholam Reza Afkhami writes in his biography that the shah wished to fight against what he saw as a world order in which developed countries exploited the resources of the underdeveloped, leaving little profit in their wake. In order to fend off the influence of countries vying for Iranian resources, the shah would have to modernize, while promoting nationalism and democracy that “he defined as an interaction of development, rights, and obligations, which in Iran would materialize only through his intervention” (Afkhami 220-1). The result of this definition meant considerable monarchical involvement in Iranian politics, in order to hasten modernization, increase Iranian competitiveness on the world stage, and maintain stability.

Democracy as defined by the shah further emphasized his megalothymia. He wished to label Iranian society democratic, ironically led by a very politically active monarch. This would make him a sort of inherently elected leader for life. By acting to cement his position as a benevolent leader bringing prosperity and democracy to his people, the shah could satisfy his
oversized *thymos*. He belabored the point in 1967 by holding a multi-million dollar coronation, channeling Napoleon by crowning himself and his second wife, Farah Diba. He also bestowed himself the new title Shahanshah, meaning King of Kings, and announced the building of a massive monument in Tehran named the Shahyad, or The King’s monument (Abrahamian 131). Titles, buildings, and policies designed to maintain leadership reveal a monarch acting to seek recognition as superior to other humans, for his own rational gain and to live a meaningful life.

The White Revolution would be a reflection of the shah’s *megalothymia* since its primary goal was to centralize and stabilize power. One of the major fears of the political elite was a “revolution from below,” or a socialist revolution. “Revolution from above” characterized the White Revolution, which would ally the peasantry with the shah. Additionally, the religious and landed elite presented a conservative, status-quo force that the shah wished to disempower, which in turn would give him far greater social influence and political influence in the Majlis. To achieve these aims, the shah would need to influence the *thymos* of certain social groups, such that they recognized him as their sole leader. These groups existed within a larger framework of three social tiers that included eight social groups.

**Social Groups In Iran**

The top social tier included the Pahlavi royal family and their close connections. These included former members of the Qajar dynasty and other notables whose families had a history of service in the upper echelons of the Iranian government. Military officers and court-connected entrepreneurs and industrialists mingled with the notables and royal families; together this class controlled some eighty-five percent of all insurance, banking, manufacturing, and construction firms. Elites mainly belonged to the Shia Islam sect, while others had ties to Bahaism or were
Freemasons (Abrahamian 138). The elite sought recognition through maintaining and elevating their status as nobles.

Two middle tier social groups consisted of bazaaris, and the clergy on one hand, and the intelligentsia on the other. The former group made up some one million—thirteen percent—of Iran’s working population, and the latter’s population was around seven-hundred thousand, or nine percent. Bazaaris were shopkeepers, small business owners, craftsmen, and other types of laborers who sold their wares or services in bazaars, or marketplaces. The constant mingling of bazaaris, as they operated side-by-side, created a tight-knit social group which sought recognition by protecting their family businesses (Abrahamian 138, Parsa 92). Bazaaris made up nearly two-thirds of domestic wholesale trade by the 1970s, and purchased around one-third of Iran’s imported goods (Parsa 92). They also had a strong religious identity, stimulated by their close connections to Iranian religious leaders, or ulama. The ulama mainly stayed out of politics, but a small vocal minority sought recognition through mobilizing political dissent during the shah’s reign. They could take advantage of unmonitored communications between mosques to evade the prying eyes of the regime. Belonging to Shia Islam, the ulama had a strong hierarchical structure in which the religious elite exhibited considerable influence over lower-ranking ulama who answered to them (Abrahamian 138).

Civil-servants, approximately 304,000 of them, 200,000 teachers and administrators, and 60,000 skilled professionals made up the rest of the middle tier. Their children often travelled abroad for education, coming home with western ideas and training. These students, and those attending Tehran University, had outspoken left-leaning political views, and were prone to seeking recognition by acting out against what they saw as an oppressive government. This group supported the National Front and Tudeh Party during their heyday, and formed various
associations and even guerilla warfare organizations that were critical or violent against the monarchy (Abrahamian 138 Parsa 177-181).

The lower tier held laborers and the rural population. 1,300,000 people worked in factories, refineries, fisheries, mines, transportation, and more. Their numbers swelled as people migrated to cities, increasing from 1.5 million to 5.5 million from 1953 to 1979. In the countryside, prosperous farmers, small landholders, and laborers made up the last 40 percent of Iran’s population. Within their ranks, they comprised around 17 percent, 34 percent, and 49 percent of the rural population, respectively. Small landowners usually farmed less land than was considered subsistence-level, while laborers owned no land and often migrated to the cities (Abrahamian 139). As part of the White Revolution, the shah intended change the collective thymos of the lower tier such that they sought recognition through supporting the shah against their common foe, the landed elite and urban intelligentsia.

“Green Uprising”

Huntington writes that one of the first phases of modernization is the overthrow of the traditional landed elite. The shah feared this phase would be in the form of “revolution from below,” or a socialist revolution. He sought to weather the storm by giving land to the peasants and oust the landed elite in one fell swoop, while his family and close allies found new profits in industry and business, especially in oil production and refinement (Milani 239-243).

To maintain political stability and centralize power, the shah would ally himself with the countryside, in what Huntington refers to as a Green Uprising. Iran’s case is unique, because Huntington did not foresee a monarch attempting to mobilize peasants. However, similarities exist between a military leadership’s Green Uprising and that of the shah’s. The examples listed, South Korea and Egypt, both had military governments which sought to gain rural support to
oust “the former ruling oligarchy” and “construct a new political framework.” In Iran the purpose of the Green Uprising was to politically mobilize peasants against the landed elite, which held power in the Majlis, and create a new political order meant “to surround and contain the instability of the city” (Huntington 73-7). Huntington writes that Green Uprisings will either traditionalize the government in the image of the countryside or revolutionize it. The shah would try to find a middle course that maintained his status of monarch while heralding in a new order beneath his leadership.

The attempt to mobilize the countryside would take great effort and potentially reap great rewards for the shah. He toured the country giving speeches about the merits of his program. In a speech the shah said that land reform would bring “a different meaning to Iran, her independence, and her territorial integrity. We mean for Iran to march in step, shoulder to shoulder, with the most progressive countries of the world. For this to happen we must mobilize all of our aptitudes and capabilities in an environment of social justice that is inferior to none” (Afkhami 228). The shah hoped that farmers would accept his programs and internalize a sense of nationalism. If implemented successfully, the White Revolution would cause those working the fields to find their labor meaningful and righteous beyond the bounds of family support, and extend towards a greater national family of Iranians.

The shah’s megalothymia pulsed through his efforts at land reform. In his book The White Revolution of Iran, the shah writes of himself, “As head of state I felt deeply that I was responsible for the fate of this vast mass of deprived people, and that I must save them from their medieval conditions of life” (Pahlavi 35). This passage indicates that the shah sought to satisfy his thymos using his power for meaningful ends, in this case raising the standard of living for a large portion of his country. That he felt solely responsible for the fate of Iran’s farmers and farm
laborers reveals his megalothymia. He denied any credit to his ministers that initially proposed the idea of land reform, and attempted to assert himself as a hero or savior.

The Referendum of 1963

In an effort to evoke nationalist feelings and politicize the peasantry, the shah decided to hold a referendum for the completed land reform bill in 1963. He spoke to some 4,200 representatives of farmers, farm unions, and cooperatives at the National Congress of the Farmers of Iran in Mohammad Reza Shah Sports Stadium. There he announced six major reforms, the first and foremost being land reform (Afkami 230). Three days before the referendum, held on 26 January 1963, the government bussed 3,000 peasants to Tehran to hold a demonstration and shout pro-shah slogans. Paratroopers also marched through the streets. In the city of Qom, a comparable number of demonstrators led by the ulama protested against the referendum. The government counter-moved by ordering 5,000 peasants into the same city, allegedly attacking the mullahs who organized the event (Milani 293).

The Green Uprising had some noticeable benefits for the shah leading up to the referendum. Newly politicized groups in the country entered busses for a long journey to Qom and Tehran. They walked around in large groups and shouted slogans in favor of a person and policy, demonstrating their shift in thymos. This social group sought to have its humanity recognized by being together on the streets, on the turf of the urban dwellers. They risked the health of their fields and of their own bodies by clashing with rival protesters, flaunting their humanity and satisfying their thymos. The combination of peasant supporters and a strong military presence shows the ability to control the opposition in the city during a Green Uprising. Their presence dissuaded or dispersed urban dwellers who may have otherwise protested.
The referendum ended up passing with 99.5 percent voting in favor. Voters had to cast their ballots openly while police and security forces watched over them in every voting place. Several ayatollahs, or high-ranking members of the ulama, called for a boycott. The Tehran bazaar closed in protest. The referendum was designed to pass, but the newly mobilized country-dwellers were crucial for its legitimacy. The shah had succeeded so far in politicizing their thymos in anticipation of a new way of life. On their farms, the peasants would satisfy their collective thymos by acting to support the country and their king (Afkami 231, Milani 294).

**Ayatollah Khomeini and Counter-thymos**

Opposition groups had not yet finished their attack on the White Revolution. One of the twelve ayatollahs, Ayatollah Khomeini, set out to counter the shah’s influence with a network of his own. Khomeini had become more outspoken following the death of the moderate and powerful Ayatollah Boroujerdi, going so far as to support Navvab Safavi, leader of Feda’yan-e Islam (Martyrs of Islam), a terrorist organization. The government executed Safavi in 1955, but did not fully extinguish the Feda’yan-e (Milani 296).

Khomeini set about mobilizing a network to engender a counter-thymos aimed at social groups within the cities. While the shah’s Green Uprising aimed at mobilizing the countryside, Khomeini would attempt to solidify opposition in the cities. Most social groups in the cities opposed the shah, but whether or not they demanded recognition from their government by protesting downrange from soldiers loyal to the regime, was not yet a certainty. The thymotic impulse, especially when there is job to go to during the day and a family to return to at night, rarely includes risking one’s life for a political cause.

Islamic social groups maintained a network which connected Quran classes, religious camps, mourning groups, publishing houses, and more. The politically active ulama also kept in
touch with one another and their supporters—three distinct networks existed, undetected under the shadow of the shah’s regime and his secret police, SAVAK. Khomeini united them under the name Mo’tafe, or the Coalition. A military wing and political wing were created. In 1963 some 250,000 copies of Khomeini’s statements were clandestinely distributed, along with audio tapes of his talks. Assassinations could be carried out if a fatwa, or religious permission, was granted by a cleric. The Coalition brought together a portion of the ulama, and any supporters who attended their mosques, around a unified counter-thymos that revolved around Khomeini’s distributed ideas and their own personal initiative. While the shah politicized peasants with public speeches and licenses to own private land, the Coalition politicized mosque-goers with religious meaning and licenses to kill (Milani 296-7).

Khomeini was quietly arrested on June 5th following speeches against the shah in his home city of Qom. Commandos arrested him there and took him to Tehran, arriving at around 5am. But by then, the Coalition had already heard of his arrest, and mobilized its network to initiate protests. In Tehran, Qom, Shiraz, Mashhad, and elsewhere, thousands of Khomeini supporters took to the streets, attacking government buildings and burning private businesses like banks and cinemas. Alam, at this point Prime Minister of the Majlis, took command of the army and routed the thousands of demonstrators in Tehran, using live ammunition. Casualty estimates varied widely, the opposition claimed thousands had died, the regime claimed 120, and the US embassy 200 (Milani 299, Afkhami 236). The riots proved the success of the ulama at engendering support and influencing the thymos of people in all Iranian cities. They had sought recognition by risking job loss, arrest, imprisonment, and even death to prove their humanity to each other and satisfy their thymos. At this point however, the shah dispelled the opposition with his loyal military, commanded by Alam. Those aligned with the ulama still feared the military
enough for a show of force to send thousands of people back home. Khomeini would be placed in house arrest for six months and then released (Ansari 161).

**Land Reform**

After the shah’s success in riding out the 1963 riots and protests while rallying peasant support for the referendum, he failed to fully deliver on his promises. The White Revolution would go less than halfway towards its goal of eliminating landlords, causing the *thymos* of the country dwellers to become politicized in ways unanticipated by the regime. The first phase of land reform saw “all landholdings of over ‘one village’ transferred to the government for resale to the peasants” (Mahdavy 137). The subjective measurement betrays the inability of the government to properly survey the countryside and determine an objective measurement for redistributing land. The second stage dealt with landholders who owned less than one village. They could retain a certain amount of land depending on their region or if they used farming machinery (Ansari, “Myth of the White Revolution” 159). Land reform partially or completely affected 13,904 villages of 48,592. By the summer of 1964, more than a year after the referendum, the government bought land equivalent to less than 9,000 villages and had sold it to the peasants. Thus the full process of land reform had been carried out in a minute fraction of Iran’s countryside.

Landowners who owned less than one village could choose many alternative options to selling their land to the government, and most chose to rent their land on 30-year leases. Land owned through religious endowments, which helped fund the ulama, was leased out for 99 years. In the end, 60 percent of all villages would be owned by landlords who controlled less than one village. These landlords could be the wife and children of a single family, thus allowing landowning families to maintain large holdings (Mahdavy 137-139). Farmers who did receive
land now had to ask the government for loans and equipment the Ministry of Agriculture could not provide. The Agriculture Corps, meant to educate the peasantry on modern farming techniques, was seen as condescending and useless by farmers already working the land (Ansari, “Myth of the White Revolution” 159). The Literacy Corps, a piece of the 1963 referendum, had sent around 10,000 teachers to rural areas, but needed 40,000 more. Most importantly, the social group of farm laborers and sharecroppers, who owned no land before the White Revolution, received no land after it. Migrating to the cities stood out as the best available option for this large group of people, who searched for work while living in slums in southern Tehran and on the outskirts of other Iranian cities. The ulama could quickly win over their support, causing the slum dwellers’ *thymos* to find meaning in Islam and following the tenets of religious figures like Ayatollah Khomeini.

The White Revolution had combined fierce rhetoric and lofty promises leading up to the referendum. The shah had toured the country speaking of a new Iran and peasants were willing to support the government by marching in the cities. And now, the majority of Iranian peasants eager for one thing, land they could call their own, were not receiving it. Those who did had problems developing their land and receiving loans. The shah had meant to build his regime upon peasants whose *thymos* would revolve around supporting him and his policies. Instead, peasant’s expectations were not fully met or not met at all. It is hard to imagine that villages left wanting for private land would get on busses and ride for hours to a city to shout slogans. The regime’s attempt at garnering peasant support failed since the *thymos* of many individual peasants no longer found meaning in supporting him or the idea of rural Iranian nationalism. They would instead return to finding meaning by providing for their families the best they could, or, as many decided to do, sell their land if they had any and make for the cities to find better
work. This perhaps is the last thing the shah wanted and an utter backfiring of his Green Uprising. Rather than contain the cities with a stable countryside, the countryside was injecting instability into the city by virtue of unemployed, hungry people looking for jobs and ready to riot for the sake of food or material goods. Alam attributed the large numbers of protesters in 1963 to this very group of ex-peasants.

The shah’s megalothymia exacerbated the problem. Surrounded by sycophants, he failed to see the fissures in his reforms and instead satisfied his thymos by creating an alternate reality inside the royal palace, in which ministers constantly reassured him of victories outside the guarded walls. The shah found it easier to act like an exalted king, rather than accept the shortcomings of policies his government failed to properly implement.

**Women In The White Revolution**

Peasants and farm laborers were not the only support base the shah hoped to structure his monarchy around. He sought the support of women, attempting to create a social group that spanned all social groups and tiers. By enacting laws treating women more equitably, a previously oppressed half of society would mobilize to support the shah. They would fight against groups which inherently sought to limit the visibility of women in public life, groups that also opposed the shah. If women sought recognition by taking advantage of and fighting to defend new opportunities given them, then in doing so they would help to maintain the shah’s position as monarch and perceive their actions as righteous.

In the same referendum which passed land reform, women received the right to vote. This point, perhaps even more so than the land reform bill, incensed the ulama. Ayatollah Khomeini said of women’s suffrage, “the Court of the illegitimate Usurper [the shah] has decided to offer men and women equal rights and trample on the edicts of the Qor’an and Sharia and they want to
take eighteen year old girls to serve in the army” (Milani 293). Unfortunately for the shah, feminists allied with the National Front and Tudeh dismissed the reform as superficial, since profounder issues affected Iranian gender equality, and elections were already full of impropriety. Regardless, women were out in the streets before the referendum demanding that they vote for their own suffrage. The shah intended for women to participate, but also had concerns about preventing clashes on the day of the referendum, causing the government to announce that only men could vote.

Two days before voting day, women school teachers and government workers went on strike, and the government finally announced they could participate in the referendum at separate voting booths. They had successfully sought recognition on this issue by risking their jobs and arrest. 16,433 women in Tehran and around 300,000 elsewhere voted, compared to 521,108 and 5,598,711 men, respectively. Their votes would not be counted in the final tally, but women could now meaningfully participate in future elections and hold elected office. The shah said to women present when he announced the referendum victory, “Our revolution, which the world acclaims, would not have been complete if you were denied these elementary human rights” (Afkhami 232-33).

Women’s participation in the referendum and their subsequent suffrage meant little to the altering of their thymos in favor of the shah. While they could now vote, they could just as easily vote to support candidates loyal to him as they could opposition figures. Their recognition as humans equal to men was one important step closer to a reality, but now the shah needed to win them over. While a women might seek recognition from their peers by voting and participating in politics, it would take more for them to seek recognition by supporting the shah.
The next round of elections saw six women elected into the Majlis while two became senators. They hailed from the upper echelons of the intelligentsia and professional class. These women lobbied to help successfully pass the Family Protection Law of 1967, which had taken four years to become a legal document. It mandated that all civil complaints regarding the family go through court. Women could sue for divorce, and men could no longer do so without court permission. Men could not marry a second wife without the first wife’s permission (the author of the law, one of the female senators, had compromised down from banning polygamy outright) (Afkhami 244-7). The bill fell in the center of Iran’s political leanings, and satisfied the shah as well as a portion of the ulama. Khomeini, however, said of the bill, “The law that recently passed the unlawful Majlis under the name of ‘family protection law’ was passed in order to destroy the Muslim family. It is against Islam, and both its legislators and administrators are sinners against the sharia” (Afkhami 247).

Women could now feel more recognized by acting through the courts to demonstrate a higher level of equality to men than they had felt previously. A woman could feel prideful of her status by suing for divorce, or preventing their husband from marrying a second wife. At the same time the Family Protection Law strengthened the resolve of the vocal ulama like Khomeini, who was now exiled due to more anti-shah rhetoric. The question remained of whether or not increased protection by the courts would convince women, especially those in social groups opposed to the shah, to support the government against religious detractors. Vast gender inequalities remained, the original version of the protection law had been rewritten to a shadow of its former self in order to placate the ulama while still pleasing the modernizers in government. Furthermore, family courts would not make a dent in the countryside, where ruralites maintained traditional ways of living.
The shah amended the constitution in 1967 to allow the queen to rule in the event of the king’s death with no male heir of-age. This was a first of its kind for Iran (Afkhami 249).

A more comprehensive track towards gender equality did not come from the shah, but his sister, Princess Ashraf. She formed the Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI) in the late 1960s, by combining several pre-existing women’s groups. Branches of the organization sprouted in the major cities and countryside, with each branch attempting to connect women to education, vocational training, legal counseling, and more. Mahnaz Afkhami, secretary-general of the organization starting in 1971, toured the countryside to speak with Iranian women. She reported back to the organization’s headquarters in Tehran, saying,

“They told me all of this is fair and good; it is great if I am aware of my individual rights and of the law the parliament has passed to preserve those rights. But of what use is the awareness of the law if I do not know how I will provide my child with the needed daily bred, or shelter, or clothing? Well, the studies about women done in the Sixties were more about individual rights… Invariably, women in factories and farms posed the ability to support one’s life financially as the most important issue and knowing a craft that produced the ability as the priority.” (Afkhami 252)

WOI, started by influential women residing in the white-collar and intelligentsia social group, had internalized feminism based on individual freedoms. Country dwellers and industrial laborers however needed a philosophy which promoted their ability to survive and provide equally to men. Eventually the organization tasked itself with “‘defending women’s individual, family, and social rights in order to achieve their complete equality in the society and before the law’” (Afkhami 256) By the mid-70s WOI had made serious gains. The organization contributed to drafting an amendment to the Family Protection Law passed, giving women guardianship over their children following the husband’s death, and made terms for divorce and polygamy stricter in favor of women. When the government began drawing up a development plan for the country, it mandated that at least one WOI representative sit on each committee, and created a minister of women’s affairs office. These reforms further recognized women as equals in the home, and as
professionals in government. The effect of WOI remained greatest on white-collar and intelligentsia social group members, due to the ability of the judiciary and police to enforce laws in well-populated areas (Afkhami 252-262).

Revolution stopped short any long-term goals WOI could have achieved, and proved that the shah had failed to acquire a reliable base of support from women. He unsuccessfully tried to influence the *thymos* of women such that they considered him necessary for their empowerment. WOI, the most successful effort at promoting gender equality in Iran, had been created by the shah’s sister but was ultimately run by a social group of which its members felt more recognized by democratic or socialist institutions that excluded the office of the monarchy. The government, in blocking a law that would have given women easier access to passports, had already disappointed the middle and upper-class women who could have taken advantage of it. The initial author of the Family Protection Law left the senate in protest over the passport law’s failure, attributable to fierce objections by officials allied to the ulama and the reluctance of the shah to challenge them.

Once revolutionary demonstrations began in the late 1970s, the shah asked the secretary general, who had recently returned from business outside the country, “Where are the liberated women we hear so much about? Perhaps now that the leader has returned they will show some gumption.” As the demonstrations began to seriously threaten stability, the shah sent a message, saying, “the Woman’s Organization is worth less than nothing” (Afkhami 262). What the shah failed to see was that the members of the WOI had built their conceptions of recognition and pride around creating an institution, not defending a government from protesters, many of whom belonged to the same social group as women in the organization. They would not defend a single man to feel shame at rallying against their friends and family, a thymotic drive that loyalist zeal
rarely overpowers. Furthermore, the women who internalized the *thymos* of acting as political equals to men now sought recognition by demonstrating *against* the shah. By failing to fully commit to women’s rights as a result of political compromise with his opponents, the shah unwittingly created a social group that had the confidence and means to act but chose to act against him.

**Assassination Attempts**

American influence in the country provided an enemy which Khomeini could use to convince his supporters that they could find pride in toppling the regime. In 1964, a Status of Forces Agreement gave US military advisors in Iran diplomatic immunity and extended a loan worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Khomeini’s virulent criticism of the bill and comparison of Iranian ministers to “American lackeys” resulted in his arrest and exilement. His statements attempted to convince Iranians that having pride in one’s country meant opposing the regime, which did not actually represent the nation (Afkhami 376).

Some Iranian took his words to heart and then some. In January 1964, Prime Minister Ali Mansur was shot three times outside the Majlis, dying from his wounds. In April 1965, a member of the shah’s personal bodyguard tried to kill him outside his palace, but failed to hit his mark (Milani 311). These supporters of Khomeini risked almost certain death or arrest in order to carry out actions they saw as meaningful. They sought recognition through risking their lives for glory.

**Industrial Laborers**

From 1953 to 1975, massive economic growth in the country, helped along with heavy state involvement in the economy, served to bolster Iran’s industry. The number of small factories increased “from 1,500 to 7,000; medium-sized factories from 300 to more than 800; and
large factories—employing more than 500 workers—from fewer than 100 to more than 150. They included textile, machine tool, and car assembly plants in Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Ahwaz, Arak, and Kermanshah. The smaller plants specialized in clothing, food processing, including beverages, cement, bricks, tiles, paper, and home appliances” (Abrahamian 133).

Millions of people worked in factories all over the country, and the shah sought to gain this social group’s support. He called workers “inseparable from the government” (Pahlavi 83). However, as in the case of land reform, the shah’s policies failed to win over workers to his side in the numbers he had hoped. Oil revenues propped up Iran’s growth rate, but other sectors would not have the same success despite rapid development. The shah’s reforms aimed at workers were inconsequential, and attempts at hastening industrialization further marginalized the bazaaris.

As part of the referendum passed in 1963, workers would have a share of up to 20 percent of profits in certain industrial sectors. Alternatively, employers and laborers could collectively agree on bonus distributions based on productivity and elimination of waste. Workers motivated by a stake in the company would in theory increase productivity, and more importantly, recognize that the shah’s policies had given them better wages and an elevated place in Iranian society (Pahlavi 82).

This reform, like land reform, did not implement fully across Iran, and did not affect workers in the ways they had hoped. Most employers preferred to distribute a share of their profits to laborers, the percentage of which was determined by the Ministry of Labor. Its calculations led many workers to receiving an extra month’s wages in their annual pay, a smaller pay increase than expected. The shah wrote in 1967 that some 90,000 workers had benefitted
from collective agreements, a paltry number compared to the growing millions who belonged to
the working class social group (Pahlavi 82).

Workers could not receive higher wages if capital remained in the hands of the elite. The
shah passed revenues generated by oil to his closest allies, a small group of families that had
weathered the storm transitioning from land-based wealth to industrial wealth. These revenues
did not find their way to working class, regardless of profit schemes or collective agreements. In
the years 1973-1974, Iran’s central bank determined that the wealthiest 10 percent of urban
dwellers the country accounted for 35.2 per cent of total household expenditures, more than the
bottom 70 per cent combined (Abrahamian 141).

Furthermore, in the early 70s, the economy was not healthy. Qassam Lajevardi, a senator,
pointed out to his fellow lawmakers that 103 of 104 state-owned companies were losing money,
state oil being the exception. Price controls, enforced with arrests if necessary, angered the
bazaaris and industrialists. He criticized the Ministry of Labor’s role in deciding the share
workers received in their companies profits, because the percentages were arbitrary or politically
motivated (Milani 336-7).

The *thymos* of the workers by no means swayed in favor of the government. Workers
would not be inclined to seek recognition through obedience and work, when they did not
receive benefits the regime had promised them. Instead, they sought merely to sustain
themselves, leaving open an opportunity for the shah’s opponents to convince them to seek
recognition by acting against the shah. Furthermore, the anger of the bazaaris over price controls,
and the lack of any investment in their own businesses, further distanced another social group
historically opposed to the regime. The shah’s mismanagement of the economy served to alienate
those who were not politically connected to him. In the case of workers, this mismanagement
could be the difference between eating and not eating. A politically volatile class had been promised greater wealth but when not receiving it, they could seek recognition by toppling the existing order. Likewise, bazaaris would now be more likely to take action against the shah, and the bazaars across the country had extensive communication networks that made collective action a tangible reality.

**The Iranian Revolution**

The revolution of 1979 came as a result of two failures made by the regime. Huntington claims that revolution “involves the rapid and violent destruction of existing political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, and the creation of new political institutions” (Huntington 266). Social groups that played a part in the revolution mobilized against the shah as a direct result of his policies meant to gain their support. Peasants who had left for the cities, women, and workers all received promises from the regime that their status would improve, and they would feel pride working within Iranian society as it stood, obeying their monarch. These promises were not fulfilled, and those who did benefit from reforms were small in number and unlikely able to control the instability of the cities.

Secondly, the shah enacted reforms in a manner that characterized his *megalothymia* and thus blinded him from more rational actions that could have preserved his power. The White Revolution was called a revolution in part because the shah took what Huntington calls a “‘root’, or blitzkrieg approach” towards reform. He pushed for all of his major reforms at one time, announcing with public fanfare that Iran would undergo profound changes for the better. Through an all but fixed referendum, and lavish government functions, such as the coronation in 1967, and an opulent celebration of 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy in 1971, the shah sought to portray himself as king, fatherly figure, and enlightened democrat all at the same time.
Huntington wrote in 1968 that “revolution from above” was always bound to fail because it created too many opponents, who in the case of Iran forced the initial goals of the White Revolution into compromises or defeats that accomplished little or nothing. The shah’s need to not only maintain power, but to craft a monarchical image and lasting dynasty, caused him to form a faulty plan to satisfy his *megalothymia*.

March 1975 might be considered the beginning of the end for the shah. During this month he dissolved the two parties in the Majlis and created the *Rastakhiz*, or Resurgence, party. The idea for creating the party is not known with certainty, but one likely possibility is that the shah consulted an Iranian think tank made up of Harvard-trained technocrats who had read Huntington’s book. It seems as if they chose to leave out his argument that a “revolution from above” will fail, and instead pointed out other research claiming that countries with one strong party are less susceptible to regime change (Huntington 408).

The Resurgence Party failed in its goal at maintaining stability. Its comprehensive foray into the lives of all social groups, as Huntington had warned, caused many of them to oppose the regime at the same time. It directly contradicted the shah’s earlier statements against one-party systems, prompting SAVAK to remove these statements, written in his book *Mission for My Country*, from all library shelves. During 1975, the party took over the Majlis, the ministries, the press, and more. It heavily interfered in the bazaar. Guilds were dissolved, and in their place party apparatuses led by court-connected businessmen forced bazaaris to register with the party and join state-controlled Chambers of Guilds. One bazaari told an American journalist, “If we let him, the shah will destroy us. The banks are taking over. The big stores are taking away our livelihoods. And the government will flatten our bazaars to make space for state offices” (Abrahamian 151).
Price controls further attacked the bazaaris’ independence and livelihoods. SAVAK handed out over 250,000 fines, 23,000 evictions, and 8,000 prison sentences to business owners who had broken the shah’s economically inept policy (Abrahamian 152). Bazaaris sought recognition through protecting their businesses and the bazaar itself. The government intentionally entered the bazaars and threatened businesses for the sake of promoting court-connected industries. Unsurprisingly, bazaaris would continue to seek recognition through opposing the shah, since they found pride in their way of life and would not willingly accept a new identity controlled by the Resurgence Party.

Forays into the religious sphere at the same time angered the ulama. The party investigated religious endowments, forbid the private publishing of religious books, and arrested hundreds of Khomeini’s followers at the same time, after they had virulently spoken out against the Resurgence Party. Furthermore, the official calendar of Iran changed from a Muslim model to one crafted to present the shah as the herald of a new age (Abrahamian 152-3). Like the bazaaris, the ulama had more than enough reasons to seek recognition by protecting their religious institutions from political interference.

In one fell swoop the shah had angered all the social groups who opposed him at once—the intelligentsia saw a descent into tyranny, the bazaaris an attack on their businesses, and the ulama a heretical takeover of Islam. These groups would seek to reclaim their humanity, as all of them, be it rights, livelihood, or faith, had something marginalized by the Resurgence Party. Their collective *thymos*, and their actions to reclaim recognition, would soon become fiercely anti-shah and thus override any rational argument that livingly obediently under the government would protect their jobs, families, freedom, and pride.
The result of failing to alter the *thymos* of social groups in the shah’s favor would now come to full force. Prime Minister Sharif-Emami attempted a strategy of reconciliation, which led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners, the end of censorship, and the arrest of dozens of government officials. Reconciliation unleashed a torrent of criticism from the intelligentsia, whose political dissidents read poetry and other works critical of the regime to some 10,000 people outside the university of Tehran. Martial law came as the next option, and protesters now risked death, but continued to march out into the streets as every killing increased their resolve (Milani 388). Reconciliation failed because social groups in Tehran did not seek pride from obtaining increased political freedoms, but instead wholly found meaning from forcing into power a new government that represented them, rather than pander to them.

By 1979, the military declared neutrality and citizens had raided armories, while groups like Fadaiyan organized militias to attack Imperial Guards (Abrahamian 162). The shah did try and salvage what he could of his Green Uprising by again bringing country-dwellers into the city. Instead of demonstrating their love of the regime, they attacked protesters, who resorted to forming neighborhood defense committees to defend themselves. These groups later took on some government functions as the regime’s appearance in everyday life faded away. (Parsa 226-227). The country-dwellers still at the shah’s disposal did not find meaning in protecting his rule, but instead had more immediate needs and desires, like looting stores and attacking urbanites with no consequences.

The Islamic Revolution coalesced after three years of massive protests that quickly degraded the credibility of the government. The revolution was possible because the shah had failed to achieve significant peasant support, and could only utilize the more thuggish section of their population to burn shops and raid homes in the cities, only further angering the opposition.
White-collar workers, bazaaris, industrial laborers, and former peasants looking for industrial jobs led the charge against the government. The high numbers of ex-ruralites in the cities would later give the ulama a strong support base to create the Islamic Republic, since both of these social groups found meaning in faith, and vastly outnumbered those seeking a secular government. While each group had different thymotic impulses, they all sought recognition in the same way and thus worked together, organizing strikes in the bureaucracy and the bazaar, and marching on the streets. A cumulative 16 years of incomplete or failed policies withered away support for the regime. The shah had attempted a mass change in his society, and urged large swaths of Iranians to immediately change how they lived their lives and prescribed value to it. He failed to carry out his end of the bargain of radically reforming society.

Revolution occurred in Iran because the shah failed to convince peasants to toil the land in the name of their country and their king, and defend him from the urbanites. Workers remained poor and grew in number, and eventually saw regime change as a path to dignity and meaningful wages. The middle class had their political freedoms marginalized and tampered with, their economic livelihoods damaged such that they acted in unison to demonstrate they had rights, and dignity. Women had no stake in the shah’s reign and could not foresee the future Islamic Republic’s treatment of them. The people all sought recognition through regime change at the same time.
Caution, Opportunity, and Atatürk

The Rise of Atatürk

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk\(^1\) rose his regime from the ashes of the dying Ottoman Empire. The events leading to its demise greatly influenced the future Turkish Republic, as it allowed Atatürk to rise in military rank and become known across Turkey.

In the late 19th Century, a group of military students formed the Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP, which internalized ideals of positivism, or the belief that scientific verification can justify any rational assertion, and liberalism borrowed from the French Revolution, which stressed the importance of individual freedoms. The CUP, or Unionists, belonged to the Young Turks, a coalition of different groups that shared similar views on the need for rationalism and liberal politics to enter the Ottoman government.

After revolutionaries in Macedonia gained British support, which threatened the region’s Muslim majority, the CUP presented themselves as an alternative to the British plan of setting up a provincial governor. Their movement suddenly became popular, and in 1908, Balkan minority groups and Ottoman military officers successfully pressured Sultan Abdul Hamid II into holding parliamentary elections, an event known as the Young Turk Revolution. The emperor had previously evaded, marginalized, and dissolved parliament in the early 19th century, but the Second Constitutional Government, or Second Mesrutiyet, would exist beyond his death (Akşin

\(^1\) Turkish surnames, except for Atatürk’s, are in parentheses, as they were adopted only in the late-1930s. For this reason Mustafa Kemal’s name appears with his first name, or with his first name and nickname, “Kemal,” which translates to “perfection.”
With Unionists in parliament, Mustafa Kemal and other liberal military officers now had the support of the Turkish government and could more openly declare their criticisms of the Sultan.

Traditionalist elements in the army staged a counter-revolution, which Unionists put with an military force raised in the Balkans, where CUP had the strongest support. Mustafa Kemal joined this army as an officer, and played a role in ending the rebellion. The CUP continued to delegate affairs in the country, but did so with martial law in Istanbul and an army they could not challenge.

World War I marked the end of Ottoman rule and the rise of an alternative government with Atatürk at the helm. While the empire had managed to hold on to Western Anatolia, and reclaimed Eastern Anatolia following the Russian Revolution and their withdrawal from the war, all of Arabia fell into British and Arabic hands. Mustafa Kemal became famous at the southern edge of modern-day Turkey for preventing British and Arabian forces from advancing much farther north than Aleppo, now in modern-day Syria. The CUP assumed dictatorial powers during the war and enacted secular reforms, putting the Ministry of Justice in charge of the religious courts amongst other actions meant to bring rationalism into the country (Akşin 110).

Following the end of the war, Mustafa Kemal chaired the Sivas Congress, a meeting of Turkish political figures. The declarations of the congress, most importantly a call for an independent Turkey, resulted in the creation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, or GNA, which formed after the British occupation of Istanbul. It established itself in Ankara, still nominally supporting the Sultanate but declared void any legislation passed by the Ottoman parliament. The members of the new parliament elected Mustafa Kemal as their chairman (Akşin 153 Zurcher 152).
A civil war erupted in 1920 that would decide the fate of the GNA. In the east, south, and west, various rebellions sprouted up. In the east, an Armenian uprising was successfully put down. A treaty between the nationalists, those who supported or belonged to the GNA, and the Soviet Union, allowed for rearmament and redeployment of nationalist troops to the west. There, İsmet (Inönü), held back Greek invading forces at İnönü, whom later broke through the Turkish line. Mustafa Kemal himself took control of the Turkish forces and within a year of fighting successfully routed the Greek army and made it as far as Istanbul and the straits. Britain controlled this area, which they would continue to hold while they brokered a treaty with the victorious nationalists (Akşin 155-156).

The presidency of Mustafa Kemal heralded a new Turkey, based on nationalism and modernity. Mustafa successfully held on to power until his death and republican government exists in Turkey to this day, albeit sometimes on shaky ground. He modernized the country by eroding the power of his opponents and gradually changing the face of the country. Mustafa successfully altered the thymos of the urban landscape with incremental steps. Social groups internalized the effects of new reforms one at a time, easing their transition into a new identity while preventing opposition groups from mobilizing in unison.

Consolidating Power

Mustafa Kemal, now victorious over the Sultan, Greeks, and Armenians, set about consolidating power. On 2 November 1922, the assembly declared that the British occupation of Istanbul in March 1920 marked the end of the Sultanate, and from that point forward the GNA claimed sole legitimacy as Turkey’s government. This ruling however, did not abolish the Caliphate, or the leader of Islam. Mustafa Kemal had decided that such an action would anger the ulama, or high-ranking Muslim clerics. He still needed their support while the infantile
government grew into a more legitimate body. Therefore, following the Sultan’s flight from Turkey, the assembly chose his cousin, Abdülmecid, to become Caliph. Abdülmecid supported the nationalists and by no means represented a political threat, this however did not stop opponents of Mustafa and the assembly from attempting to establish his office as an alternative power base later on (Mango 364-6). The calculation that went into abolishing the Sultanate and not the Caliphate came down to a fear of too radically altering the reality for Turks, and especially Muslims. Many Turks found meaning living under the nominal leader of Islam, and removing the Caliphate might have caused them to seek recognition by forcing the GNA to reinstate the office, thereby reclaiming their Islamic identities. While the Sultanate's removal would cause a stir in Istanbul, its office only represented the political arm of the Ottoman empire. Turks had witnessed its slow decline and subjugation to foreign powers, making them more amenable to its departure, especially since the nationalists had preserved their independence.

Mustafa Kemal, after convincing the assembly to abolish the Sultanate, then went about ensuring it would become a rubber stamp for his initiatives. He created the Halk Fırkası, or People’s Party, from the Defense of Rights Group, a coalition of government officials, religious notables, and other respected figures who had campaigned for independence. The GNA had passed a High Treason Law during the War of Independence which it now amended to make illegal any actions undertaken to restore the Sultanate. In April of 1923, Mustafa dissolved the assembly for new elections. He barred the Second Group, an opposition coalition of political groups, from elections, by personally choosing the parliamentary candidates. On 9 August 1923, the Defense of Rights Group officially became the People’s Party (PP), which already had in place institutions that gave it influence in all corners of the country, due to independence groups
whose assets it assumed (Zürcher 159-160). The GNA elected Mustafa Kemal its president, unopposed, and the PP elected him its chairman (Mango 389).

**Prelude To Modernization**

Mustafa Kemal wanted to modernize the country due to his *megalothymia* and the social group he belonged to. He attended preeminent war colleges, reformed by the Sultan himself. The schools ironically churned out students and educated officers who opposed his rule. Graduating officers associated themselves with the larger Young Turk movement, which included nationalists, clerics, students, and others critical of the Sultan. Students and officers alike valued science and believed in its utmost importance within society. To them, science battled religion in a struggle to finally become the preeminent belief system, and that people would soon turn to textbooks for meaning over scripture. Mustafa read some of the most popular works circulated by the Young Turks espousing science, and would later speak aphorisms such as, “‘The most truthful guide to life is science,’” or, “‘Seeking any guide other than science, is thoughtlessness, prevarication, and ignorance,’” and, “‘nothing which could not be explained by everyday intelligence [is] worth considering’” (Hanoğlu 48-53).

Mustafa Kemal’s *thymos* inspired him to act towards a more scientific, less religious Turkey. At times this would mean importing Western culture, other times it meant constructing a quasi-mythic history of Turkey based on shaky historical precedence. As president of Turkey, Mustafa continually sought recognition amongst his associates through trying to instill values upon the Turkish people which they took so closely to heart. His *megalothymia* brought him to value instilling on others his way of living. It convinced him that he above all others could create a stabile, modern Turkey. Mustafa Kemal always acted to preserve his power and influence to
achieve this end, an end in which Turks saw his way of life as the most human, and sought to emulate it (Konger 25).

**Turkish Social Groups**

Several social groups in Turkey would dictate the course of Mustafa’s reform track. The most powerful tier consisted of military and ex-military officers (which included Mustafa and many of his loyal ministers), and members of the professional class or businessmen with political connections (Szyliowicz 124). These elite intelligentsia had emerged out of the late Ottoman Empire with radical ideological views compared to other groups in Turkey at the time. Once members of the Young Turk movement and the CUP, the elite social group had absorbed European philosophy, especially that of Vulgar Materialism. It upheld the role of science in society and rejected religion’s role within it. Mustafa Kemal’s reforms drew upon Vulgar Materialism, and his associates, especially those who sought recognition via modernizing, would hold on to the highest-ranking positions in government until 1950 (Hanioğlu 55). Economic stagnation and the abdication of the old elite order prevented the entry of a moneyed or royal class into politics. Officers and bureaucrats would maintain control (Kongar 22).

The middle social tier consisted of non-politically connected intelligentsia, and ulama, or notable religious figures. This latter group would begin in the top tier starting around 1920, but with later marginalization of religion in political affairs, the ulama would start to lose political influence. A lack of institutional networks and strict hierarchies prevented them from status and unify. The ulama sought recognition through preserving the traditional role of religion in Turkish society, becoming an occasional threat to the new regime. Jews and Christians made up the lower intelligentsia, which saw their numbers decline heavily during WWI due to emigration and forced relocation. While Muslims made up the elite, religious and ethnic minorities almost
exclusively provided all services related to merchandise, trade, and small-scale manufacturing. (Mango 8, 368). The lower intelligentsia, especially those belonging to religious minorities, sought recognition through excelling in business and protecting their small communities.

Muslins dominated the lower tier in Turkey. Territorial losses in the early 20th century caused a massive influx of Muslim refugees, who settled in the countryside. Before 1913, 25 percent of Ottomans located within modern Turkish boundaries lived in cities, after the War of Independence 18 percent did. 80 percent of the country had been Muslim, after 1921 the ratio rose to 98 percent (Zürcher 164). Muslims constituted the bulk of the peasantry, and had high rates of illiteracy, poverty, and morbidity since modern medicinal knowledge did not disseminate into rural areas (Mango 7, 13). The state barely intruded into their daily lives, except to collect taxes, much to the chagrin of the peasantry. By the time Mustafa Kemal became chairman of the GNA, Turks and Kurds were the two largest ethnic groups practicing Islam (Szyliowicz 129). This lower tier did not seek recognition through a politicized life during Mustafa’s regime. Kurdish rebellions make up the exception, as some members of this ethnic group strove for a nationalist state of their own, and had highly traditional values, like their Turkish Muslim counterparts (Zürcher 170).

Limiting Political Participation

Social groups in the lower tier, with the exception of the Kurds, did not seek recognition through political action during Mustafa’s life. While reforms affected the lives of many peasants, they rarely demonstrated discontent, even when other social groups might have allied with them in opposition. This is because Mustafa Kemal did not seek to mobilize the lower tier social groups onto the political scene, or otherwise prevented it. The military and intelligentsia consistently remained the only two social groups that supported him, and at times they
themselves expressed criticism. However, the lower tier of society rarely had a means of expressing themselves politically and the elite deliberately prevented from having a meaningful say in Turkey’s affairs.

Samuel Huntington presents the dangers of mobilizing new social groups, an inevitable part of modernization, as the “Gap Hypothesis.” When the effects of modernity alter an individual's expectations, and when these expectations are not met by the existing political institutions, instability is created (Huntington 52). In order to survive a political landscape in which new social groups enter politics, a government must successfully integrate them into pre-existing system. Mustafa Kemal’s regime did not institute reforms meant to politicize the lower tiers of society, since he refused to allow anti-modernist influence within the GNA or his cabinet’s ministries. For this reason he kept intact the divide between the military-intelligentsia alliance and the lower tier. Since much of the lower tier expressed pride through religion and traditional culture, bringing them into the political fold would undermine reforms meant to secularize Turkey, likely displacing thousands of peasants economically and socially (Huntington 52, 356-7).

The People’s Party (later called the Republican People’s Party, or RPP) became the device by which the elite and middle tiers excluded the lower social tier from meaningful political participation, after it achieved one-party status in late-1925. Any social groups that wished to participate in the regime had to work through the structures in the party. The RPP’s leadership could control what social groups had influence within the party, and thus influence in the government (Huntington 425). Peasants had no means of entering the political system because the upper tiers overtly prevented them from voting for candidates that represented their issues. They could become politically active so long as they adopted a new thymos that reflected
the values of the nationalist secular elite. So long as they found meaning in religion, farming, and traditional social customs, the government would prevent their political participation.

**Opposition from Istanbul**

Mustafa’s primary opposition from the middle tier after the War of Independence came out of Istanbul. Former capital of the empire, it housed tens of thousands of civil servants and bureaucrats freshly out of work after the abolition of the Sultanate. They had found meaning through their positions in government. Their collective *thymos* was satisfied when they were helping to run an empire and provide for their families. Now with no empire and no work, they would seek recognition by opposing the new regime (Zürcher 167).

In October 1923 Mustafa Kemal was elected president by the GNA, with his loyal follower and friend İsmet İnönü becoming Prime Minister. Several famous officers from the War of Independence, possible opponents of Mustafa’s rule, did not vote because they were not in the capital. The Istanbul press zealously took up anti-Mustafa rhetoric, posting the officer’s editorials and criticizing the growing despotism in Ankara (Zürcher 167). The ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne ended British occupation of the former Ottoman capital, but Mustafa Kemal did not visit the city because of its people’s resentment towards him. The Russian Revolution further exacerbated economic problems because its planned economy discouraged foreign trade that normally would pass through Istanbul (Mango 391). For a long time Mustafa would not visit the city, partly as a symbolic punishment and partly because it could stir up protests. He needed to silence the vocally critical press and demonstrate Ankara’s, and his own, newfound authority over the former capital. This would at the same time satisfy his *megalothymia* and further his modernizing agenda. By choosing to oppress opposition rather concede or compromise with it,
Mustafa attempted to force Istanbulites to recognize him as their leader, and force them to find meaning in supporting the new nationalist government in Ankara.

Responding to the newspapers in Istanbul, the Mustafa supporters in the assembly selected from their ranks an Independence Tribunal, for the purpose of putting prominent members of the press, as well as a member of the Istanbul bar association who had written an open letter in favor of the Caliphate, on trial for treason. The GNA created Independence Tribunals in September of 1920 to put deserters on trial during the War of Independence. Members of the GNA served as judges and defendants could not appeal a verdict (Mango 297). Additionally, the High Treason Law, which read that words and deeds against the new Republic, could lead to death sentences for critics of the regime. The Independence Tribunal sentenced the lawyer put on trial to five years in prison, but later pardoned him. It acquitted editors of the newspapers, but the trials sent a clear message of the risks taken when criticizing the new regime (Zürcher 168). By silencing the press, Mustafa Kemal and his associates attempted to change the representation of Turkey and the GNA by the press to make it only positive.

**Abolition of the Caliphate**

The epitome of Istanbulite opposition lay in the hope that the Caliphate might one day reclaim the power its office had lost. They thought that the Caliph’s continued existence symbolized the potential for a return of Ottoman power.

The GNA split the Sultanate and Caliphate in order to remove the former, while retaining the support of the ulama and lower tier Muslims, who saw the latter as the figurehead of the pan-Islamic identity. However, as long as the Caliphate existed, the ulama would have a vehicle with
which to operate independently from the government, which they had done so mostly
unmolested during Ottoman rule. Furthermore, embittered intelligentsia in Istanbul would likely
support a return of the Caliphate in order to satisfy their *thymos*, which at that time took the form
of finding dignified work (Akşin 192). The time had come to abolish the Caliphate and clear the
way for turing Turkey into a secular state.

Mustafa Kemal successfully prevented outrage over the removal of the most important
Islamic office. He achieved this by only attacking the status of the ulama, which could not rally
support from other social groups to help fight back. They remained either indifferent, or did not
share the *thymos* of the ulama, namely that of shame at seeing their position, and the position of
religion, marginalized in Turkish society.

Mustafa Kemal sought the support of the military elite. From 15-22 February 1924, he
and other members of his cabinet attended military exercises outside of Izmir, a city in eastern
Turkey. Having praised the military officers there, and telling them cryptically that, “we have
taken up positions to remove obstacles which lay in the way of the nation’s safety and
happiness,” Mustafa decided with his cabinet that the corps commanders, who represented the
biggest threat in the event that they sided with the opposition in the east and marched on Ankara,
remained loyal to him and would not raise any objections to the removal of “obstacles.” The
military, which Mustafa and his political associates had all served in some years before, still
shared their *thymos*. They simply did not feel pride acting to preserve Islamic governance in
Turkey and did not feel shame at seeing it go (Akşin 192, Mango 402).

With the consent of the military in hand, Mustafa Kemal decided with his loyal cabinet to
go ahead with abolishing the Caliphate. Two other important reforms would go along with it,
meant to rein in the power of the ulama and place Islam under the watchful eye of the state.
First, the state would create and administer a unified educational system. *Medreses*, or Arabic-language religious schools which trained new ulama in canon law, scriptures, and traditions, would be closed down. The new schools would only teach in Turkish, which would especially affect the *thymos* of the Kurdish population in western Turkey (Mango 403).

Second, a new law would abolish the Ministry of Religious affairs and the Ministry of the General Staff, consolidating the former under a Directorate of Religious Affairs and the latter under the Ministry of Defense. The ulama once had modest governmental autonomy under a ministry which issued *fatwas*, or decisions on canon law, and administered pious foundations. Now, as directorates, they could only implement policy decisions made by their superiors, rather than create their own initiatives. Likewise, the general staff, an independent military office, would be consolidated under the Ministry of Defense, which one of Mustafa Kemal’s loyal men, Kazim (Ozalp), administered (Akşin 193).

On 1 March 1924 Mustafa spoke to the first session of the newly-elected GNA. The People’s Party dominated the seats in the assembly, and the assemblymen belonged to a social group of which the majority supported Mustafa’s reforms. Regardless, in his speech Mustafa did not demand, but asked the GNA to implement education reform, and spoke of the military and Islam’s potential should they cease to be political instruments. He did not mention the Caliphate in the speech (Mango 403-404).

Regardless, the assembly knew what Mustafa Kemal asked of them, since the PP operated by drafting laws behind closed doors before instructing its members on how to vote during parliamentary sessions. Unsurprisingly three laws appeared and passed comfortably: A unified education law, a law abolishing the ministries of Religious Affairs and the General Staff, and a law abolishing the Caliphate and exiling all members of the Ottoman royal family. The
regime barely spoke of the new laws to the press. Mustafa Kemal himself only mentioned the abolition of the Caliphate once to reporters (Mango 404).

Mustafa’s success at secularizing the state in one fell swoop was due largely to the *thymos* of the social groups negatively affected by the reforms. The ulama barely opposed their own marginalization. Many notable religious figures, instead of fighting together to protect the Caliphate, instead fought each other to win over Mustafa’s favor. Seyit Bey, the Minister of Justice and a member of the ulama, spoke in favor of the abolition, and justified it using his clerical education. Mustafa Kemal relieved him of his position three days later.

The *thymos* of the ulama seemed to encourage acting to support the tangible authority figure rather than the one that nominally represented the ruler of all Muslims. Sunni Islam mandates obedience to the ruler. The ulama could not predict the full extent of secularization that would appear over the next fifteen years, as Mustafa Kemal had not revealed to the public his plans for the country. If Mustafa had enacted his reforms all at a single moment, the ulama may have been driven by their collective *thymos* to protect their identities. Therefore, they did not seek recognition from amongst their social group in a unified manner, nor did they attempt to rally the support of the lower tier Muslim peasant social group (Mango 405). Peasants had little ability to fight the ruling anyway, since they lived dispersed in the countryside, and were not able to travel to the cities in protest.

The *thymos* of the military elite had no connections to the Caliphate. The removal of the Ministry of the General Staff yielded no opposition from this social group either. Their *thymos* was tied up with that of Mustafa Kemal and his ex-military and bureaucratic social group: They both sought after a secular, republican vision of Turkey. Officers did not seem to value political lives, and accepted their exclusion from it. Members of the GNA who had once served in the
military similarly distanced themselves from the army, since they had passed a law preventing officers from holding seats in the assembly.

Furthermore, political attacks against Mustafa Kemal could backfire. Many Turks saw him as a war hero, who stood up against the British and Greeks and established an independent state, for which Islam was still the official religion (Hanioğlu 129). Mustafa had risked his life for glory and won it, granting him some level of immunity against those who sought to criticize him. Most importantly, no one yet could see how far he wished to push the country towards secularism. Mustafa seemed to allow an image of megalothymia crafted around him, since many Turkish people chose to see him as superior figure. So long as he played the part of Turkey’s savior and heralder of a new and prosperous country, his mastery over the politically relevant social groups would continue.

The Progressive Republican Party

The establishment of the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) increased the chances of a unified opposition after the abolition of the Caliphate. Led by Huseyin Rauf (Orbay), it splintered from the PP a few months after the Caliph had left the country. In its manifesto it supported the secular nationalist state, and opposed the centralization of power that Mustafa Kemal had achieved in the constitution. Conservative and Kurdish populations in the east, and Istanbulites and refugees in the west favored an opposition party. While those in Istanbul had already criticized the new regime, they did not possess great enough power to fight back against the GNA for abolishing the Caliphate, especially since the military favored Ankara. The PRP could give them a voice in the assembly.

Refugees in the east had reasons to oppose the government but did not have any power. As part of the nationalists’ agreement with Greece, incoming Muslim refugees (evicted from
Greece) would occupy the farmlands previously owned by Greeks who had left or been forced to leave Anatolia. However, before many could arrive, the bureaucratic elite purchased vast estates meant for redistribution amongst refugees. Mustafa Kemal himself bought 3,000 acres. Some towns even gifted him estates once owned by wealthy Greeks (Mango 391). Corruption prevented many families from receiving a fair share of land, but they did not migrate to the cities. The *thymos* of refugees lay in settling down and adapting to a new life. The PRP could represent their issues, but without it, refugees would not have a means to participate in Ankara politics..

In the east, the Kurdish population had a *thymos* markedly different from those in the west. They too had nationalist tendencies, and many found pride in the idea of a religious Kurdish independent state. They did not have the ability to communicate with those who shared similar criticisms of Mustafa since they lived on the other side Turkey, and railways barely linked the Kurdistan region to the rest of the country. Kurdish organizations existed in Istanbul, Ankara, and Sivas, which all sought a unified Kurdish identity, and in some cases, increased autonomy. They were likely allies of the PRP (Zürcher 170).

**The Sheikh Sait Rebellion**

However, this social group had members who sought recognition by waging an armed rebellion for the establishment of a separate nationalist state. Abolishing the Caliphate had cut the common linkage between Turks and Kurds, a pan-Islamic identity. Schools were forbidden from teaching in Kurdish. WWI had left in its wake a hefty supply of arms and ammunition now controlled by Kurds (Mango 421).

Sheikh Sait of Palu, a prominent Kurdish religious figure, led a rebellion that began in February of 1925. He and his associates had been shamed at their loss of influence after the
closing of the medreses, and had ties to the more avowedly separatist Kurdish organizations. Government forces were few and far between, allowing the rebels to take control of the mountains. Sheikh Sait declared himself Commander of Warriors for the Faith, and intended to restore sharia law in areas under his control.

The Sheikh Sait Rebellion did not last long. Kurdish infighting between conservative Sunnis and more secular Alevi took from its strength. The Ottoman Empire had discriminated against Alevi, motivating them to assist the Turkish army assembling in the region. Within two months, Turkish soldiers captured Sheikh Sait and other prominent figures in the rebellion. He had raised some 15,000 fighters, but 25,000 Turkish soldiers outmatched and outgunned by 10 May 1925 (Mango 425, Zürcher 171).

The Kurdish rebels had a religious thymos, since Sheikh Sait proclaimed his intention to establish sharia law. This stance diverged drastically from the PRP’s agenda, which by no means endorsed armed struggle or an Islamic judiciary system. The PRP chairman Kâzım Karabekir, another famous War of Independence military officer, emphatically denounced the rebellion to the GNA (Zürcher 171). Prime Minister Fethi asked him, who in turn was asked by Mustafa Kemal, to dissolve his party when news of the rebellion reached Ankara (Mango 426). Mustafa and the PP, now called the Republican People’s Party (RPP), worried that the PRP could gain influence by citing the rebellion as an example of the current government’s failure to keep order. The time had come to eliminate the opposition, using the Kurdish conflict as precedent. The GNA amended the High Treason Law to include political use of religion as a form of treason. On 4 March 1925, the assembly passed the Maintenance of Order Law, with 122 in favor and 22 against. It gave the assembly, with the president’s approval, to close down organizations or publications considered politically subversive. Then the assembly created two Independence
Tribunals, one sent to the eastern city of Diyarbakir, while the other remained in Ankara. As early as 6 March, the government began closing down newspapers, especially those based in Istanbul (Zürcher 171, Mango 424). By tying the Kurdish rebels to the PRP, the regime had precedence to close down even more newspapers, further silencing intelligentsia opposition. The Kurdish rebels sought recognition by risking their lives to found a separate nation or at least restore sharia law, while the intelligentsia, and especially the press, risked jail in order to criticize the regime, not establish their own state. The *thymos* of the two different social groups, and the long distances between them, meant that Mustafa Kemal had the opportunity to eliminate both sources of opposition without risking a unified movement against him that the army could not suppress.

At an Independence Tribunal hearing in Diyarbakir, a former leader in the Sheikh Sait Rebellion claimed that the rebels had intended to create an independent Kurdistan, and that the Kurds had hoped a PRP majority in the GNA would grant them autonomy. The tribunal handed out fifty-seven death sentences. It ordered the closure of all dervish lodges, Muslim fraternities of which Sheikh Sait was a leading figure (Mango 425-6).

In Ankara, the second Independence Tribunal did its work to silence the PRP. It ordered the search of its Istanbul headquarters, and closed more newspapers there and sent their editors to trial at the tribunal, which handed out exilements. An opposition leader later claimed that only six of the fourteen daily newspapers remained in Istanbul, and that total sales numbered at a meager 49,000 copies. Self-censored publications no longer interested the intelligentsia, but they had lost an important source of communication that gave them a shared *thymos* that valued active opposition to Ankara. Finally, on 3 June 1925, the government closed the PRP (Mango 427).
No notable protests occurred when newspapers closed down and the opposition dissolved. Mustafa Kemal had struck them down at an incredibly opportune moment: None of the thymotic impulses of the opposition groups at the time were similar. The intelligentsia in Istanbul could not ally with members of the ulama since the dissolution of the PRP had no religious significance. The press, the most thymotically active section of the social group, lost the ability to mobilize its readership due to the Maintenance of Order Law. The existence of the Independence Tribunals prevented potential opposition leaders from unifying Istanbulites, since it could arrest, imprison, and execute them nearly at will. Istanbulites did not seek recognition amongst each other by risking their livelihoods against the regime, because the press silence and lack of organization removed the potential for them to meet in large groups. They now could only follow their rational instinct to find jobs, whilst begrudgingly living under a regime they thought denied them democratic freedoms. Additionally, Mustafa Kemal had mollified the anger of the intelligentsia by staggering the abolition of the Caliphate and the establishment of a one-party state. The RPP still represented many of the secular values that the intelligentsia shared, and thus acting against a regime which in some regards protected the secular values of this social group may have brought shame to a sizeable portion of its members.

Refugees and other members of the lower tier social groups had little connections to the press, and even less to the Kurdish nationalist cause. Illiteracy was extremely high amongst farmers. News of the Turkish army marginalizing a separate ethnic group bore no reason for this social group to feel shame for the Kurds, and anger at the regime. Furthermore, the government dissolved the PRP before it could use the Sheikh Sait Rebellion as a means of convincing the refugees and peasants that the government oppressed them, by corruptly taking their lawfully-given land or harming their Muslim identities.
The ulama, with the exception of those of Kurdish origin, similarly had no thymotic impulses to support press freedoms or the existence of PRP. They found pride, according to Sunni tradition, in supporting the apparent leader. Mustafa Kemal still personified their hopes for the continuation of a pan-Islamic state echoing Ottoman times. The separation of the Caliphate from the elimination of opposition in the GNA prevented the chances of the ulama allying with the intelligentsia, and using mosque networks to stir up demonstrations. Their values simply did not have the chance to align against the RPP and Mustafa Kemal.

Closing the PRP meant the establishment of one-party rule in Turkey until 1949. Mustafa Kemal personally chose all candidates running for seats in the GNA during this period, and RPP leaders ordered all assembly members to vote in favor of reforms created by Mustafa and his associates behind closed doors.

Now that only the intelligentsia, military, and bureaucracy loyal to the RPP participated in politics, the future of Turkey lay completely in the hands of Mustafa Kemal and his inner circle. They drafted reforms behind closed doors, and sent them rapidly through the assembly with barely any debate, before any opposing politicians or social groups had time to react.

**Abolition of the Fez**

One of the most hotly-contested reforms during Mustafa’s regime came in the form of dress codes. Since Ottoman times, the Muslim middle class had ubiquitously worn the fez, a brimless hat suitable for prayer, as it allowed the forehead to touch the ground. More importantly, the fez symbolized the difference between Muslims and the Christian culture of the west. While practical for religious matters, soldiers found them quite pointless against the rays of the sun. Since WWI the army had tried to phase in “headgear with sun-shield.” Mustafa Kemal
believed that civilization implied uniform cultural practices, and that the fez symbolized backwardness in his nation (Mango 433).

The fez had to go. Modernizing the country meant adopting cultural practices and changing the *thymos* of Turkish people such that they found pride dressing similarly to western nations, so as to display their aptitude for civilization. Travelling out to Turkish provincial towns, Mustafa appeared holding a western-style hat in his hand, prompting those who came to see him to remove their fezzes and turbans. He spoke to a Turkish nationalist society about the suitableness of western dress for Turks, and his disapproval upon seeing veiled women. In another speech he decried Muslim brotherhoods, saying that they had no place in a country made around the order of civilization. The enthusiasm of the crowds that came to see him most likely convinced Mustafa that he had the support of the middle tier social groups. It was time to move ahead with the reforms (Mango 434-5).

On 2 September 1925, a day after Mustafa Kemal’s return from the provinces, the government closed all dervish lodges, only permitted Islamic officials to wear turbans and robes, and made hat wearing compulsory for all civil servants. On 25 November, after one of the last meaningful debates in the GNA, the hat became “‘the common headgear of the Turkish people, and the government forbids habits to the contrary.’” On 30 November, the GNA closed all Islamic shrines and mausoleums, and on 26 December, adopted the Christian calendar (Mango 436).

Once again, the ulama did not oppose the rulings which struck down many symbolic pieces of Islamic identity. They likely still found meaning in supporting Mustafa Kemal, and could churn out religious justifications for why recent government decisions did not go against Islam. However, provincial *hocas*, or ulama of lower stature, openly protested the outlawing of
the fez. Riots occurred in Erzurum, a city in the Kurdish-majority region of eastern Turkey, and in Rize, near the Soviet border, where its residents considered themselves Islamic frontiersmen close to an atheist border. These cities did not anticipate what the ulama in Ankara and elsewhere probably saw coming if they had opposed the reforms: martial law in Erzurum, and the justice of the Ankara Independence Tribunal. It metered out some 138 death sentences, usually for charges of rebellion, twenty of which likely arose from participation in the so-called “hat riots” (Mango 436). Conservative forces in eastern Turkey clearly saw the wearing of western hats a shameful act which tread upon their Islamic identity. However, Mustafa Kemal had enacted the ruling after determining the support of the intelligentsia. Therefore, the mostly conservative social groups in the Kurdish regions once again had no allies against Ankara, and the fez quickly disappeared from Turkish life after the government’s strict enforcement of the law. With the banning of dervishes and Muslim brotherhoods, Islamic political identity was quickly disappearing from the thymos of Turks.

**Women’s Rights**

Mustafa Kemal next turned to women’s rights. While he supported reforms meant to increase their status in society compared to men, Mustafa did not seek their support as a unified social group, and discouraged feminist movements. The government banned headscarves on official premises, such as government buildings and schools (Mango 435). The adoption of a new civil code, based on Swiss law, ended divorce at the discretion of the husband, and gave women equal inheritance rights to men. However, men retained head of household status and could prevent their wives from travelling abroad or working outside the home. Regardless, women began careers in teaching, law, medicine, and public services during this period (Mango 437-8) They could vote in municipal elections by 1930 and national elections by 1934. The
reforms served a dual purpose to further remove traditional practices influenced by an Islamic identity, and further gain support of the intelligentsia, which found pride living in a society with increased gender equality.

Role models took up the cause to change the thymos of women where laws could not go. They encouraged women to take pride in western dress, enter careers, and generally serve the republic. This ideal “republican woman” in Turkish society had an education, identified as a Turkish citizen rather than a Muslim, and dressed and acted the part of a civilized person. Women role models propagandized by the government through state-run newspapers promoted service to the republic, rather than service to the cause of gender equality. Mustafa Kemal’s adopted children, of which one was a teacher and another the first female fighter pilot in Turkey, played their part in acting like modern women. In 1929, the Miss Turkey pageant began showcasing the ideal Turkish women, in terms of beauty, to the rest of the world. One of its participants, who later won the Miss World contest in 1932, was given the surname “Ece,” or queen, by Mustafa Kemal himself. The government’s support of these role models had some success in changing the identities of the women intelligentsia, who slowly adopted the values of the female Turkish celebrities seen in the media (Hanioğlu 210-213).

While women of the intelligentsia willingly accepted a new sort of thymos, they did not become a unified social group. The Turkish Women’s Union, after hosting the Twelfth Congress of the International Alliance of Women in 1935, closed down when the government expressed discontent over the congress’s feminist overtones. The TWU’s director announced the closure on the pretext that Turkish women had received political and legal equality in Turkey, rendering the union obsolete. This was not the case, most notably because many women still veiled their faces or wore headscarves in public spaces. Mustafa Kemal refused to support abolishing the veil
outright, since it would lead to serious opposition from the lower tier social groups, Turks and Kurds alike (Zürcher 180) Mustafa Kemal and the RPP leadership did not need, nor want, politicized women. The combination of some women’s reforms, and the promotion of the “republican women,” ensured that women still sought recognition as members of their tiered social groups, rather than as a unified social body. Women in the lower tiers still had traditional lives mostly untouched by laws in Ankara that the government could not enforce in the countryside. Like their male counterparts, the regime thought it prudent that they not become politicized (Hanioğlu 213-4). If women felt pride in participating in politics alongside men, then the number of protesters on the streets could easily double, if they saw fit to seek recognition by opposing Mustafa Kemal. By encouraging women to consider themselves as faithful servants rather than independent actors, the regime hoped to maintain their monopoly on political participation while at the same time altering the thymos of women.

Secularization and Westernization

On 9/10 April 1928, the GNA removed all references to Islam in its constitution, and secularized oaths, at Mustafa Kemal’s bequest. It symbolically ended the role of religion in Mustafa’s regime (Mango 463). The process of secularizing the government had been carried out over the course of several years, slowly degrading the influence of the ulama. While the lower tier social groups still devoutly practiced Islam, the government had completely marginalized their participation in politics, and Mustafa Kemal’s staggered reforms prevented the potential for unified opposition. The thymos of the intelligentsia, the most important social group for Mustafa’s support base, excepting the military, now found meaning in secular, republican government. The ulama did not have political influence and faced the wrath of Independence Tribunals and the army if they attempted to revolt, as Sheikh Sait had found out trying to incite a
Kurdish rebellion. Their lack of organization, and Sunni Islam’s stressed importance of obedience to the leader, prevented them from seeking recognition as a unified social group standing up to Mustafa Kemal’s infidelity.

Mustafa Kemal sought not only to secularize Turkey, but to westernize it as well. To civilize the country meant adopting aspects of western culture and life. On 24 May 1928, the assembly adopted the numeral system used by Europe, replacing Arabic numerals. In June 1928, Mustafa Kemal established a committee to adapt Latin letters for the Turkish language. On 1 November 1928, the GNA decided to make 1 January 1929 the day the nation would officially switch to a Latin alphabet. National Schools opened all over the country to ease the transition and introduce newly literate people into Turkish society. They handed out 2,500,000 literacy diplomas and doubled the literacy rate from 10 to 20 percent (Mango 467).

The transition to the Latin alphabet (in some regards still happening to this day) was met with little resistance. While the already literate intelligentsia had some qualms, the already-changing thymos of this social group could find pride in adopting an “international” alphabet, as the GNA called it. Additionally, the new alphabet superiorly represented Turkish language phonetics compared to Arabic script, since every consonant and vowel using Latin script has only one possible sound. The lower tier social groups had incredibly high illiteracy rates, and these would remain high after alphabet reform. Written language had no relevance and no meaning in their lives. While the National Schools doubled the literacy rate, it had only made a small dent on the illiteracy rate. Regardless, the alphabet change brought the thymos of Turkish social groups closer in relation to those of Europe. Turkish people could now learn European languages more easily, already knowing their alphabet. For this reason relations with the west could be significantly expanded, causing people to have new relationships, and new values,
associated with meeting and speaking with Europeans. Conversely, new Turkish generations would not understand Arabic script, distancing their *thymos* from Middle Eastern nations and an Islamic identity. (Hanoğlu hereeee)

**The Free Republican Party**

While Mustafa Kemal’s modernizing reforms entered Turkish society fairly successfully during the 1920s, opposition to the regime still lurked under the monopoly of the RPP. The Great Depression exacerbated it—the price of agricultural commodities dropped dramatically after Wall Street’s crash. Lower tier social groups depended on agricultural sales, and the RPP’s tight grip on the country had led to mismanagement of the economy. Mustafa toured the western coast of the country and discovered for himself the poverty that lurked just outside city boundaries. In the provinces people expected him to solve their economic woes. Furthermore, ruralites expressed their dissatisfaction in religious terms. Impiety led to misery, faith led to prosperity in their eyes (Mango 471).

Mustafa Kemal turned to his close associate and ambassador to Paris, Fethi (Okyar), to create an opposition party. He hoped political competition would bring the RPP out of its sloth and become a more disciplined and hardworking force. The resulting Free Republican Party had a liberal stance designed by both Fethi and Mustafa. The former began setting up a provincial office in Izmir on 4 September 1930. A large crowd appeared to welcome his arrival, and soon began stoning the RPP’s local offices, leading security forces to open fire. A 14-year-old boy was killed, his father laid him down at the feet of Fethi, saying, “Here is a sacrifice for you. We are ready to give others. Only save us.” Three days later, a Free Republican Party meeting drew one hundred thousand supporters. It ended up winning seats in local elections, but fraud and
intimidation tactics limited its influence in the GNA. Only three months after its creation, Fethi dissolved the party, unwilling to pit himself against Mustafa Kemal.

The RPP’s monopoly on power prevented discontented Turks from participating in politics, but the short-lived existence of the Free Republican Party proved that discontent lay just under the surface. A riot and subsequent murder of a lieutenant in a town near Izmir by a refugee belonging to a dervish order further convinced Mustafa, who had ordered martial law in a large area around the town, that the RPP’s dominance had grown superfluous (Mango 471-477).

**The Turkish History and Language Theses**

The Turkish history and language theses became one of Mustafa Kemal’s final attempts at altering the *thymos* of Turks to make them feel pride belonging to a nation, rather than a religion or empire. The Turkish history thesis claimed that ancient peoples living in modern-day Turkish boundaries established the first civilization, which spread to other continents along with the emigration of ancient Turks. High school textbooks used this thesis as early as 1931, and the Turkish Historical Society, a state-funded program, further corroborated the claim. Mustafa Kemal took great interest in this field of study, and directed funding and support to anthropologists and historians who argued in favor of the history thesis, while removing arguments to the contrary from school and university-level education. The *thymos* of students would invariably be affected by history classes stressing the importance of the Turkish people in world history, marginalizing the Ottoman and Islamic identities of the country to only a thin slice of time in the grand scheme of the Turkish nation’s greatness (Hanioğlu 163-166).

Mustafa Kemal also focused on removing Ottoman language from Turkish life. The Turkish language thesis, or the sun-language theory, hypothesized that besides creating civilization, ancient Turks were the first to utter sounds resembling language. This implied that
all languages had their roots in Turkish. Furthermore, during the 1930s the Turkish Language Association broadcast to thousands of people, asking them to submit “pure” Turkic words to replace the influence of foreign languages. Some 125,000 words were collected, and 7,000 foreign words purged from the dictionaries. By 1934, state declarations spoken in the new Turkish were near incomprehensible. Mustafa Kemal had personally created a rift between Ottoman Turkish and modern Turkish. Pocket dictionaries published in 1935 helped ease the transition. The sun-language theory resulted in the inability of Turks to understand Ottoman Turkish in a matter of a few decades. With it, a direct connection to the past, and the ability to find meaning in it without the use of translations, vanished. The recreation of the Turkish language by Mustafa Kemal first linked Turkey closer to Europe and away from the Middle East, and now it broke from its Ottoman heritage completely. Ironically, many of Mustafa Kemal’s speeches must now be translated into modern Turkish (Hanioğlu 171-176).

By introducing reforms incrementally, and implementing them with the utmost speed, Mustafa Kemal changed the identity of Turkey. The high and middle tier social groups had become more European in their language, laws, appearance, and interests. The ulama had let the Islamic identity of the nation slip away from them, and besides some small, manageable rebellions, the lower tier accepted the reforms which the government could enforce. The RPP successfully managed the political participation of the country, preventing social groups and dissident voices from having any influence in government policy. Its success during Mustafa’s presidency, which ended with his death in 1939, would come to an end when the country adopted a multiparty system. The two attempts at an opposition party during the 1920s and 1930 foreshadowed the eventual entrance of the lower tier, the dissident intelligentsia, and the ulama back onto the political scene. In 1950, the newly-created Democratic Party gained a majority in
the GNA, and rolled back some of the reforms the RPP had introduced, at the behest of the religious and conservative population they represented. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal’s imprint has remained on the country’s ethos, its people’s thymos forever changed.
Conclusion

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wanted to create nationalist, secular regimes that would attract modern technologies and ways of living. In order to modernize, the *thymos* of the social groups in Iran and Turkey had to change. From royals to peasants, the people in these countries would have to adopt new identities in order to find meaning under a new way of living.

Understanding how different social groups find meaning in life provides valuable insight into why people act in unexpected or seemingly irrational ways. Misunderstanding human nature can lead to disastrous consequences for leaders who fail to anticipate how reforms affect the *thymos* of their subjects. When given the choice of satisfying their rational needs to acquire food, maintain a shelter, and preserve freedom, individuals might risk all of these if in satisfying them they lose a piece of their identity, perceive their life as meaningless, and feel shame. Whether or not they choose to seek recognition by risking their lives and livelihoods depends upon the character of their *thymos*, and how much they value whatever meaning is threatened. For instance, Iranians in the late 1970s came out to protest in higher numbers when more of their compatriots died in clashes with the military, because the deaths of protesters symbolized a direct attack on their identities. In this scenario, the desire to satisfy the *thymos* is stronger than the rational desire to avoid death or imprisonment. Protesters valued meaningful lives more than staying inside and avoiding the shah’s forces.

Iranians risked death when protesting in Tehran, and left their places of work and their families to do so. They protested nevertheless, because by opposing the shah they demonstrated their humanity in front of others, and satisfied their *thymos*. The massive numbers of Iranians protesting also provided a rational calculus, since the sheer number of people in the streets meant
that overcoming the military and the police was a legitimate possibility. However, the strong desire to seek recognition through revolution gave these numbers the courage to face down the soldiers.

The shah and Atatürk both used government reforms to try and mould social groups so that they would look, act, and find meaning in new, modern ways. Forcing a social group to change its identity typically results in opposition, since its members see their current values, and humanity, threatened. Iran and Turkey underwent different paths to modernity, as their leaders chose different strategies to combat opposition to their policies. The shah failed because of the strategy he chose: announcing all of his planned reforms at once, and motivating many different social groups to defend the ways they found meaning at the same time, giving them strength in numbers. Additionally, by politically mobilizing the peasantry, workers, and women, the shah created social groups that joined in protest against him when he failed to win over their support. Atatürk succeeded in reshaping Turkey by doing the opposite: announcing reforms just before sending them through the compliant GNA. In doing he singled out separate social groups, preventing opposition alliances from forming because their values were never threatened in unison. He never attempted to mobilize the peasantry, workers, or women, and preferred to suppress those trying to muster their support with the military and the Independence Tribunals. Atatürk understood the limited resources his government had to enforce reforms, and in many rural places lower tier social groups barely felt the effects of modernization. The shah had counted on having the state infiltrate every village it could with the land reform program. Its failure to do so, and the shortcomings of the program itself mobilized the lower tier social groups in ways unanticipated by the shah.
Other factors exacerbated the shah’s political weakness compared to Atatürk. Religious institutions in Iran had entrenched communications networks undetected by the secret police, and the hierarchical structure of Shia Islam gave Ayatollah Khomeini autonomy separate from the state over those who followed his religious and political guidance. The ulama in Turkey did not have the same sort of networks, and Sunni Islam does not utilize hierarchy as strictly as Shia Islam, which gave Ayatollah Khomeini influence over a large number of Iranians.

Atatürk gained a reputation as a war hero in WWI and the War of Independence, and with İsmet İnönü’s help secured a treaty establishing Turkey as an independent state in the eyes of Europe. This provided him with a level of credibility as a leader concerned with Turkey’s well being. He had truly risked his life for glory. The shah on the other hand had relied on CIA assistance to reclaim power from the majlis in 1953, and received loans from the US government in exchange for granting it privileges in the region, such as diplomatic immunity for its personnel. While he made every effort to cast himself as a caring and concerned monarch, the intelligentsia and the ulama allied with Khomeini did not believe this facade. The shah lacked credibility, and made the problem worse by working actively to marginalize respected Iranian figures, such as the ulama, through land reform.

Atatürk dealt with problems that did not plague the shah. Armed ethnic rebellions against the state on the scale of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion did not occur in Iran. The thymos of Turkish Kurds had more meaning attached to protecting their identity than the many different nationalities living under Iran at the time. Events in Iran during the shah’s reign dealt mainly with the Persian national majority. Kurdish opposition to Atatürk undermined his political authority in western Turkey, while the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, or other ethnic groups in Iran had little impact on monarchical control. By using brute force, Independence Tribunals, and
totalitarian laws, Atatürk successfully prevented the opposition party in the GNA from using the Sheikh Sait Rebellion to discredit him.

The *megalothymia* of Atatürk and the shah motivated them to centralize power in order to quickly reform Turkey and Iran, and change the identities of their citizens. Atatürk wanted Turks to have a *thmos* like his and that of his social group. The shah similarly wanted to modify the *thmos* of his citizens while at the same time maintaining the supremacy of his existence over them as king.

In 1950, the centralization of power due to Atatürk’s *megalothymia* ended. In that year the Democratic Party gained a majority in the GNA. After that year, Turkey entered a more democratic period, since multiparty politics ended the monopoly on political participation that the RPP had enjoyed. The military has always acted as the protector of Atatürk’s vision of a Republican Turkey, and has staged several coups over the course of its history, returning power back to the government only after ensuring that nationalist secular parties would regain control of the GNA. Conservative populations in Turkey continue to find meaning in an Islamic identity, but the republican structure of government, and its secular character, has endured.

In the 21st century, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has enjoyed a majority in parliament, and it holds the presidential and prime ministerial offices. It has combined modernism and Islamism as its ideology, which has gained the vote of conservative and rural populations. However, the intelligentsia in the cities have protested several times over the AKP’s history over its Islamic character. They find meaning in a secular state, and have felt shame at seeing mosques and malls built in Istanbul and other cities. However, their lack of allies within Turkey, especially because of the military has thus far stayed out of politics, prevents the intelligentsia from successfully bringing change through demonstrations. The country’s
president, Recep Erdoğan, has used a similar strategy to Atatürk’s, making incremental changes, and slowly centralizing his power without angering too many social groups at once. Syrian refugees could change the political landscape of the country in the future, but like Atatürk, Erdoğan is unlikely to seek their political participation, due to what are likely limited Turkish resources to address their issues.

Iranian politics in the 21st century remain eerily similar to the pre-revolution monarchy. The Ayatollahs have near-absolute authority, maintain police forces devoted to handling political dissent, and maintain a fiercely loyal council. The Majlis, as it was during the shah’s reign, at times functions as a rubber stamp, but occasionally has moderate elements critical of the regime, while remaining loyal. Iran, like Turkey, has an intelligentsia that does not feel represented by the regime’s strict Islamist ideology, but conservative and rural populations still support the government. Protests occurred in Tehran in 2008 over possible elections fraud, but counter-protests and arrests stymied any chance of immediate reforms or regime change. The existence of the Revolutionary Guard, a military force which answers directly to the Ayatollah, further prevents the possibility of urbanites successfully seeking recognition through demonstrations.

The way different social groups found meaning in life in Turkey and Iran determined the success of Atatürk’s modernization strategy compared to that of the shah’s. A person belonging to a social group finds meaning by acting in certain ways to satisfy their thymos. Understanding the general thymos of a social group, and anticipating what will cause them to seek recognition through opposition, can give rulers insight on how to introduce reforms into society. Rational choice is driven not only by need, but by meaning. It is hard to anticipate the actions of a social group unless their values are understood: when would they choose hunger over food, death over
life, unemployment or payment. When many social groups suddenly find value in one thing, for instance, the ousting of their king, they can become an incredibly powerful force.

Works Cited


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