OUR FINANCIAL HERITAGE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR '76

Prepared remarks for the

23rd Annual Conference on the Economic Outlook

December 12, 1975

by

Hyman P. Minsky
Professor of Economics
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri
We are now in a recovery which may not make it to reasonably full employment. The forecast is that 1976 will be a year of relative tranquility; a moderate expansion moderating inflation. In the light of both recent experience—the financial instability evident since 1965 and the trials and tribulations of 1974-75—and our national heritage of financial troubles—the forecast of tranquility is suspect. There are financial time-bombs ticking that could make 1976 as hectic as any of the past several years and the process of successfully defusing financial time-bombs can set the stage for subsequent inflationary bursts.

Rather than view the economy as tending towards a growth equilibrium, as forecasting models do, it might be best if we view our economy as a tight rope walker: On one side it can "fall" into accelerating inflation, on the other it can "fall" into a deep depression.

Even if we avoid financial trauma in 1976, the experience and the unfavorable balance sheet relations, that are a heritage of the past several decades, indicate that an era of financial conservatism by corporations and bankers is in the offing. This, by itself, will make the recovery weak. Thus I look for sluggishness through 1976, with the proviso that if some of the financial time-bombs go off we see a resumption of the sharp decline of 1974III and 1975I will emerge.

To appreciate the limitations of the forecasts we need to appreciate the limitations of the economic theory embodied in forecasting models. The economic theory underlying the usual forecasting model is a synthesis of ideas derived from
Keynes and the older classical economics, whose roots go back to Adam Smith. This standard theory is suspect on two grounds. It has serious logical flaws and it is not able to explain the instability that has characterized our history as well as the past decade. In standard theory – and in the usual forecasting models – there is a built-in tendency for the economy to move towards a growth equilibrium. and thus the forecasting models are. In particular standard theory is weak on the interactions of finance with income, employment, and prices. In standard theory and the usual forecasting models encompassed by "money", the supply of which is presumably controlled by the Federal Reserve. In these models money supply affects interest rates which in turn affect investment; housing investment most directly. The influence of finance is more pervasive than this narrow focus admits – and finance introduces disequilibrating forces in our economy so that normal behavior is cyclical rather than steady growth.

The basic monetary and financial relations in our economy center around the acceptable liability structure for the ownership of various types of assets: i.e. how much and what kind of debt is used. Money in our economy is a type of bond, the supply of money emerges out of financing decisions; money is not just some generalized ration point. Acceptable debt structures vary with perceptions of risk; bankers and businessmen usually perceive risk by extrapolating the past. Thus the relative success of the first fifteen or so post-war years led to views that accepted ever greater
private debt, whereas a calamity, such as occurred in 1929-33, breeds
views that abhor debt.

Hedge financing exists when in each period the unit receives
sufficient cash from operations to meet its financial commitments.
Speculative financing exists when in the near term the unit does
not expect to receive sufficient cash to meet its commitments,
although the capitalized value of expected receipts exceeds that of
expected payments: i.e. receipts are longer than payments. Specu-
lative financing units have to borrow to pay debt, hedge units do
not. Thus speculative financing units are, and hedge financing
units are not, vulnerable to high and rising interest rates. The
proportion of speculative to hedge financing increased over the
years since World War II and this made financial markets and financ-
ing interrelations increasingly fragile: i.e. susceptible to fi-
nancial disturbances. When the financial structure is sufficiently
fragile, financial crises and debt deflation processes - such as
occurred in 1929-33 - can and do take place.

The increased fragility of the financial system made the credit
 crunch of 1966, the liquidity squeeze of 1970, and the spate of
Reserve action combined with the financial and income sustaining
effects of big government aborted the threatened financial crisis
and held the line against a possible debt-deflation. However it is
worth noting that after the 1966 crunch and the 1970 squeeze the
pace of inflation accelerated. Inflation is the price paid for
successfully aborting a threatening financial crisis.
Tables I and II tell us how various income and balance sheet relations have changed for non-corporate business and commercial banking since 1951. The trends, especially since the mid-1960's, of the various ratios are evidence that the financial system became increasingly fragile.

The financial difficulties of 1973-75 were more pervasive than those of 1966 and 1970: three banks in the billion dollar class failed, an entire financial industry, the REIT's, is being cut back if not liquidated, giant banks are taking unprecedented loan losses, financial problems of major corporations are a matter of public record, and our largest city is on the verge of bankruptcy. In each case the cash needed to validate debt has not been forthcoming from normal sources. The problems arose because of the volume of short term debt and higher interest rates which raised the cost of prior speculative postures.

Flow of Funds data show what happened in recent years. As is clear in Table III, 1970-73 saw an explosion in the funds raised in financial markets by households and corporate business. The growth rate of new debt for both households and corporate business far exceeded the growth rate of either household disposable income or of corporate internal funds: Thus the ratio of debt to funds available to service debt rose.

Funds raised by households fell sharply in 1974 and no further fall of such funds took place in 1975I-1975III. In 1974 corporations raised more funds than in 1973, however in 1975I-1975III corporate borrowing fell sharply. In part the drop in funds raised by the
corporate sector reflects the liquidation of inventories, but it also reflects a sharp decline in the ratio of fixed investment to internal funds.

The government deficits in the four quarters 1974IV-1975III led to the screeching halt to the decline and the sharp increase in Gross National Product that occurred in 1975I and 1975II. It is evident that a government deficit of $70 billion over a four quarter period will have an enormous expansionary effect.

There are three expansionary effects of a government deficit. One is the direct effect of throwing money at households and flinging orders at business. Second is an indirect effect, secure financial assets in the form of government debt are forced into the portfolios of households, business, banks and other financial institutions. The $69.9 billions raised by the US Government between 1974IV and 1975III had to show up as safe and secure assets in portfolios which cushion the effect of weakened private assets. Third is also an indirect effect: much government deficits will be offset by surplus or a smaller deficit by the household and business sectors. The induced profit flows to corporations during 1975 sustained and increased the ability of corporations to service their debts. The recovery rests on big government. An attempt to reduce government deficits before the private financial system is robust will lead to a resumption of the decline and increase the likelihood that the financial time-bombs will detonate.

As established historical pattern (Table I) is that a rise in the ratio of corporate fixed investment to gross internal funds takes
place in good times, especially over extended good times, and a decline in this ratio, even unto negative values, occurs in recessions and periods of sluggish economic performance. In Table IV the ratio of fixed investment to internal funds in 1975I-III can be compared to 1974I-III. One quarter does not make a trend, but the evidence indicates that when the ratio of fixed investment falls to or below 1, as it did in 1975III, it does not quickly return to the high levels of the early 1970's. We can expect several quarters, and perhaps several years, to pass before we see a resumption of debt financed investment.

Corporate gross internal funds increased sharply as 1975 progressed (Table IV). The virtual balance between fixed investment and gross internal funds resulted from internal funds rising, not from nominal fixed investment falling. This rise in corporate funds is an offset to the exploding government deficit.

As a result of the burdens that debt financing imposed in 1975 and is continuing to impose upon many financial institutions and corporations, we expect lenders to be reluctant to debt-finance fixed investment, even as income recovers. Corporate internal funds will be a closer governor of investment in the next period than was true in the 1970's to date.

As we look towards 1976 we recognize that January 1 will not see the vanishing of the giant banks, REIT's, airlines, oil tankers, and New York City "time-bombs". The recovery is vulnerable to a disturbance from financial markets. A failure of one of the walking bankrupts or public difficulties for a giant bank can induce even
more conservative behavior with respect to debt than was experienced in 1975III.

One vulnerability follows from the exposure of our largest banks to possible flights of their overseas deposits. In the 1970's foreign branching was taken as the "new frontier" for bank profits. This opening was exploited. Some of the largest banks now have a major proportion of their liabilities in overseas deposits. Such overseas deposits can become a 1970's version of hot money - seeking safety by jumping from one set of banks to another. There are indications that American overseas branches experienced run-offs of deposits in November, as New York teetered on the brink of default. In my view Ford backed down from his hard line, in part, because of the dangers to the overseas American banking community of a default by New York.

The tranquility and moderation forecast for 1976 is therefore suspect. The apple cart can be upset by an exposure of financial weaknesses, a spectacular bankruptcy, a premature attempt to bring government expenses in line with revenues, or a rise in interest rates. The odds are good that one or more of these will take place.

In particular given the expected weak performance of business investment relative to internal funds, if the three way prop of government deficits is removed, the decline in income will be resumed. Such a decline, and in particular the decline in corporate internal funds that will ensue will make it more likely that some of the "time-bombs" planted in our debt structure will detonate. We are hooked on big government with very inefficient standing program
To some extent the level of interest rates is determined by Federal Reserve actions. If the Federal Reserve initiates or acquiesces to sharp rises in interest rates, the cost pressures on units engaged in speculative finance can also trigger financial difficulties.

Thus the time-bombs in our financial structure can go off on their own, or they can be triggered by policy errors: '76 can be a year of turmoil rather than of tranquility.