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The Cross-Dressing Terrorist, the Malaccan Mouse-Deer, and Indonesian Prison Surveillance: An Examination of Radical Indonesian Islamist Cells and Their Relationship to Prison Indoctrination, Violent Recidivism, and State Surveillance

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The Cross-Dressing Terrorist, the Malaccan Mouse-Deer, and Indonesian Prison Surveillance:

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Senior Project Submitted to

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by

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Introduction

The Imprisonment, Release, and Execution of Sunakim, a.k.a. Afif, a.k.a. Sunardi

In the photo taken moments before his death, Sunakim is wearing a simple black Nike baseball hat, a tee-shirt, light blue jeans, gloves, and a red backpack.¹ He looks like an average joe, or in Indonesia, an orang biasa. He’s sweating, even in January, as temperatures rise to 90 degrees in the Jakarta morning traffic. Nothing distinguishes him from the dozens of other men in the photo – except for the gun. The men in the background were not rushing to work, but fleeing from the shots that had just rung out. The unseen photographer was not idly taking photos of the city, but trying to record the shooting as it occurred. Minutes after the photo was taken, an off-duty officer gunned Sunakim down after seeing him appear to flip the switch of a hidden explosive.

As Sunakim’s photo was widely shared, he became the face of the 2016 Jakarta Attacks; attacks that included several different explosions and a shootout, killing 8, injuring 24, and whose responsibility was claimed by ISIS within hours.² Sunakim, along with his fellow


conspirators Marwan, alias Muhammad Ali, and Bahrun Naim, aliases Na'im and Abu Rayyan, had been previously incarcerated, released, and then recidivated. These men are far from being the exception. Dozens of arrested offenders have either hidden their radicalization while incarcerated or become radicalized within prison walls, leaving ample opportunity for violence after their release.

Prisons in almost every nation on Earth contain the possibility for indoctrination into a violent group, but Islamic radicalization is unique within Indonesia via:

1. Indonesia’s majority Muslim population tracing back to the 15th century.
2. The radical Islam movement as a major actor in gaining independence.
3. The past history of unjust imprisonments during Indonesia's 20 year dictatorship.
4. The aims of radical Islamists, especially ISIS influenced, to specifically destroy a democratic state and laws, replacing it with Sharia and ISIS inspired governance.

In comparison, the average prison gang recruiting in prisons rarely has the combination of a political agenda, historical legitimacy, and a state historically abusive in prosecution and imprisonment. Though Sunakim was not recruited in prison, he was sentenced for seven years at Cipinang Penitentiary Institution, for participating in a terrorist training camp in Aceh and became something of a personal masseur for fellow inmate Zaman Abdurrahman. Aman was the creator of the relatively new, deadly, and extraordinary secretive Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD),

3 Noor Huda Ismail and Susan Sim, “From prison to carnage in Jakarta: A tale of two terrorist convicts, their mentor behind bars, and the fighter with ISIS (Part 1),” Brookings, January 22, 2016
a organization formed to support ISIS aligned Indonesians in the creation of their own Islamic
*Khilafah*. Of the eight terrorist attacks that have occurred on Indonesian soil since 2018, all but
two are confirmed JAD attacks.

Sunakim’s general experience is frequently encountered in the stories of other imprisoned
radical Islamists. It is vital that the experiences and views of these men are documented and
tracked. The growing trend of inmates forced to participate in the counter-terrorist prison
initiatives who then proceed to commit terrorist categorized crimes after their release is at best
troubling and proves the current state solution is not producing results in a quick enough manner.
Which is to say, a radical Islamist prisoner must be prevented from committing violent acts
within their set prison sentence. The most effective measures a state can take to prevent further
violence and encourage government trust is through surveillance that determines how inclined a
prisoner will be to commit bombings, stabbings, or shootings for a radical Islamic cell after their
release.

The prevention of further violence and encouragement of government trust was certainly
on the mind of police spokesman Colonel Muhammad Iqbal as he gave one of the first public
briefing after the attacks finished. As he emphasized the fact “No one escaped,” visual proof of
Sunakim’s death was raised high in the air for the spectating journalists. The photo signaled that
that the Indonesian government was in complete control of the situation. The police had killed or
captured the terrorists and the general public was once again safe. Of course, the photo does not
detail the government’s failure in preventing Sunakim’s further radicalization while he was in

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4 Jewel Topsfield, Amilia Rosa and Karuni Rompies, “Jakarta police reveal names of those killed in deadly attack,”
*The Sidney Morning Herald*, January 17, 2016
their custody. It only serves to strengthen government trust as the state depicts itself as a successful operator in countering or pursuing terrorists who disrupt societal peace.

Sunakim’s tee-shirt, light blue jeans, skin, and face are covered in dust and debris and the camera angle strangely tilts to show the whole corpse. It is a visceral reminder of the deadly consequences for both victim and perpetrator in suicide bombings. The bodies of successful terrorists are rarely seen by the public because there is usually little body left; Sunakim unsuccessful detonation is an exception rather than norm. Through this failure, the physical remnants of his body force a person into considering the why of this case. Why did Sunakim become a terrorist? Why was radical Islam a more persuasive ideology than the moderate nonviolent doctrine of most Muslim Indonesians? Why was this particular act of violence necessary? I do not proclaim to answer these questions in their entirety, or at all, but this thesis provides a concise sketch of Indonesia’s historic, political, and geographic circumstances leading to the recent increase of terrorist indictments and recidivist violence. No one can interview Sunakim’s corpse to hear his story. We will never know what led him join a radical Islamist training camp in Aceh or why he became infatuated with Aman Abdurrahman and the JAD. However, we can trace similar cases and the origins and propagation of this ideology to better understand the cause of terrorist activity and successful prevention techniques.

This thesis complete this task with three chapters, beginning with a folk tale that describes the event that launched the introduction of Islam in Indonesia. The first chapter then gives a brief overview of Dutch and English colonization, Japanese occupation, and the Independence Movement’s relationship with the radical Islamic group Darul Islam, considered to be the first organization to lay the ground work for modern terrorist cells within Southeast Asia.
The second chapter details life within prisons, such as the issues of overpopulation, escapes, food shortages, riots, and incitements to violence. All of these institutional problems benefit Islamic radicals and display the major flaws within the Indonesian state. Through the evaluation of the flaws within Indonesian prisons, I conclude in the last chapter, that though a functional, state-funded, surveillance system may contain risks towards citizen privacy and rights, it is necessary to implement in detention centers to prevent violence within and out of prisons.
Chapter 1

A Mouse-deer, the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, and Darul Islam: An Abridged History of Radical Islam in Indonesia.

Malacca – the City Responsible for the Introduction of Islam and Colonization in the Archipelago

The mouse-deer is a small creature, less the two feet tall and tinier than a toddler, but legend tells us that this little mammal is responsible for spreading Islam throughout the Indonesian archipelago in the 15th century.

Our story begins with the traitor Sang Ranjuna Tapa. Sang Ranjuna Tapa, treasurer to Singapura’s newly crowned king, was blessed with a daughter whose beautiful enthralled King Parameswara, who took her as a royal concubine. But jealousy soon ensnared her peers. In 1391, she was slandered by other concubines and accused of adultery by the King himself.\(^5\) She was stripped naked in the market-place, impaled, and left exposed to the elements. Sang Ranjuna Tapa, furious at his daughter’s shameful execution, betrayed Parameswara to a rival Javanese

king. The battle which followed was recorded in the *Malay Annals* as a massacre: “blood flowed like a river,” forever staining the laterite soil red.⁶

Parameswara, the last King of Singapura, fled for his life. But the loss of his ancestral home did not deter his ambition. He traveled north, finding no location satisfactory, until he reached the mouth of the Bertam River. It was there where the little mouse-deer would play its vital role.⁷ Parameswara was resting at the base of a Malacca tree, when he noticed his hunting dogs chasing a mouse-deer. But the dogs failed to catch this tasty snack. The mouse-deer fled into the water, outwitted the dogs, and swam away to survive another day. Parameswara looked on in amazement and declared the formidable nature of the mouse-deer was a sign this land would make an excellent kingdom. Hence the formation of the Malacca Sultanate began – the most important entrepôt in the region and key to the spread of Islamic learning and dissemination.

Though this tale is almost a thousand years old and more likely fiction than fact, it reveals key facets of Indonesian culture, religion, and politics. This chapter will illustrate these facets through the story’s metaphoric qualities that represent the religious diversity of different kingdoms, territorial conflicts in the archipelago, and the importance of ports in establishing global trade. We will then progress a 100 years later to Malacca’s fall and provide a much condensed recount of European colonization. Instead of attempting to convey the entire political, social, and cultural history of Indonesia’s colonization, a task no book – not to mention a thesis –

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could achieve, I have chosen several key stories and attributes of the period to help discern its effect on modern Islamic radicalization. This chapter will then conclude by describing the origins of Darul Islam and the organization’s role in the battles against Dutch forces and it’s vain effort to establish an independent Islamic state. Darul Islam’s failure to institute sharia law and a subsequent military defeats by the newly formed government caused the group’s dismantlement, but ultimately led to the creation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), one of Indonesia’s most notorious terrorist organizations.

600 years before Jemaah Islamiyah was formed, the mythology of Malacca's creation was created, a story exhibiting essential features of Indonesian customs, faith, and governance. First, the majority of Indonesian history revolves around a range of Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and Christian kingdoms. Many of these kingdoms and sultanates existed simultaneously in different regions and, at times, in conflict with one another. Although diverse ethnic and religious kingdoms sharing the same terrain is not unique to Indonesia, its archipelago geological structure and strong non-Abrahamic religions may have prevented Islam’s rapid spread. Unlike countries that bordered the Arabian Peninsula, Indonesia was gradually exposed and converted to Islam by Yemeni traders rather then military conquest: “Islamic culture did not replace Javanese culture but became thoroughly synthesized with it. Thus, Indonesian Islam developed autonomously from that in the Middle East and had to coexist with preexisting social structures and authority systems.”

8 The religion did not become a major contender for regional supremacy until 1445 at earliest, when Malacca’s ruling class and their subjects began converting to Islam.

8 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Kumarian Press, 2003, page. 61
The tale of Malacca’s foundation also reveals the importance of ports in the spreading Islam and European colonization. It was only possible for the mouse-dear to escape the hounds by swimming across the Bertam River; the river and surrounding seas played a vital role in forming trade routes connecting the Indonesian archipelago with the Chinese Empire, Ryukyu Islands, and merchants from Persia, Gujarat, and Arabia.⁹

While Malacca’s founding was essential to Islam’s spread in Indonesia, the city’s capture in 1511 by the Portuguese General Afonso de Albuquerque signified the beginning of 434 years of European colonization and Japanese occupation. Malacca faced hostilities from all sides during its occupation by Portuguese Christians. Before European expansion in the region, the pan-Islamic movement created a network of Islamic sultanates whose alliances were bound by blood and marriage: “[this network] extended from the peninsular Malay to the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines.”¹⁰ These numerous Muslim states surrounded the city and the native Malay sultans spent years battling the European settlers to reclaim their land.¹¹ Eventually, through its mishandling of trade, military defeats, and Dutch conquests, the Portuguese presence was soon eliminated.

The Portuguese remained in Indonesia for less than a century; the same can not be said true for the Dutch. The Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC, the Dutch East India Company) began its first expedition to Nusantara in 1595. The expedition was an ill-favored and

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⁹ Sarji, “The Rulers of Malaysia,” P.14

¹⁰ Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, P. 33

bloody affair – only 93 of the original 248 Dutch sailors survived. The native Indonesians did not fare better. Both Dutch and Indonesians were assaulted and took violent retributive measures in turn. But none could justify the massacre of Madura Island. After a surprise attack in Sidayu by Javanese natives, the Dutch sailors were bellicose and on guard. As the Dutch cargo ships approached Madura, a local prince made the deadly mistake of greeting the foreigners with a display of friendship. As the ceremonial boats rowed forward, the Dutch sailors opened fired, killing all in the welcome party and eventually leaving only 20 Madurese alive. One sailor later admitted, “I watched the attack not without pleasure, but also with shame.”

If shame was ever felt by the Dutch colonizers, it certainly did not affect their control of the islands. For where the Portuguese failed to establish permanent trading posts, the VOC succeeded. For 200 years, the VOC expanded its control of the South Asian spice trade. It’s monopoly policy eradicated the previous trading systems of multiple ports, kingdoms, and merchants, leading to several Dutch military campaigns within the Indonesian archipelago. However, the VOC went bankrupt in 1800 and the Dutch state absorbed its possessions. From 1800 to 1942, the Dutch state controlled the numerous different ethnic and religious islands in the region, eventually creating the boundaries of the modern Indonesian state.

Dutch expansion was not met without resistance. The Aceh or Infidel War of 1873-1904 is a prime example of how the boundaries between local Muslims and international actors dissolved into conflict, accelerating the Dutch absorption of Aceh into its colonial state. This


conflict, which continued underground even after the war's conclusion, showed the emergence of the same tactics, such as suicide bombings, and beliefs held by current radical Islamists who now view radical Islam as a tool to combat the West.

For the majority of the 19th century, Aceh was an independent state who was a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1820s, Aceh began supplying half of the world’s pepper, vastly increasing it’s commercial and political authority in the region. The Aceh Sultan, Alauddin Ibrahim Mansur Syah (1838–1870), extended his domain over the east coast, but this territorial acquisition clashed with Dutch colonial ambitions in nearby Sumatra. The war was originally fueled by Dutch objective to eliminate an independent native state player and ward off British and French aspirations in South Asia.

However, the conflict eventually became seen as a “Holy War” by the Acehnese fighters, rather than a territorial dispute. The war became a symbol of Muslim resistance to Western imperialism; this is the origin of the crucial contemporary characterization of radical Islam as an alternative and counter to Western ideology and physical expansion in Indonesia. The Dutch were eventually able to annex the Aceh, but guerrilla warfare and suicide bombings continued up until and even after the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942. Thus emerged native Indonesian terrorist tactics. Tactics which were committed by an ethnic minority against imperial powers to establish a sovereign Islamic state. Both the convictions and strategy originating in the Infidel War are major parts of current terrorist tactics and doctrine.

15 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300, p. 143
16 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. p. 143
40 years after the Infidel War, WWII prevented the Netherlands from establishing the needed access to govern its South Asian colonies. The Japanese quickly began their own occupation, initially receiving a warm welcome as liberators. But such sentiments rapidly changed when millions of Indonesian became forced laborers for economic development and defense projects in Java.\(^{18}\) After the war ended and Japanese occupation ceased, native Indonesians from all territories were no longer content to live under colonial rule. The Independence Movement began. Two days after the Japanese surrender, Indonesia was proclaimed a free state, though that did not stop the attempts of British peacekeeping forces and a Dutch military campaign to regain the country. It is this precise moment of armed conflict between Dutch regiments and Indonesian militant squads from 1945-49 that the origin of modern Islamic terrorist cells in Indonesia was born.

\(^{18}\) Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300*, p. 206
Darul Islam – A Militia Dreaming of an Islamic State, Awakened by Bloody Party Conflict

The origin of Indonesian terrorist cells can be roughly traced back to the militant organization Darul Islam and its founding patriarch, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo. Darul Islam, meaning the House of Islam, was an Islamic militia, which emerged to notoriety in 1948, one of the last years of Indonesia’s War of Independence against the Dutch. Their aim, simply put, was the creation of an Islamic state risen from the cinders of a freshly branded post-colonial nation. In order to best understand Kartosuwiryo’s actions during this period, one must first be cognitive of the fact that during the war, Japan directly supported Indonesian independence efforts, therefore fractional politics and parties had already started to develop within the framework of creating an independent state before 1945. Kartosuwiryo was one of many politicians involved with the formation of the government and held several positions such as the Masyumi Party’s (the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) Executive Committee Secretary in 1945, a party representative at the Central Indonesian National Committee from 1946-47 (a body created to assist the president of the newly formed Republic of Indonesia), and a candidate for the post of Junior Minister of Defense in 1947. However, in May 1947, the Dutch government came to the conclusion that they needed to directly attack the Republic to


obtain high value exports, such as sugar in Java and rubber in Sumatra. Once this invasion began, Kartosuwiryo rejected a role in the ongoing national politics in favor of organizing and leading the defense of West Java: “It was in the midst of this invasion that Kartosuwiryo transformed the West Java branch of Masyumi into the Darul Islam group, setting aside his commitment to the parliamentary struggle.”

But even before Kartosuwiryo left national politics, the majority of Indonesian Muslims and Muslim organizations supported independence, even through violent means. Once the first battle between independent militias and British peacekeeping forces erupted in 1945, the main Muslim organizations issued fatwas declaring that a war to preserve Indonesian independence from the Dutch was “jihad fi sabilillah (jihad in the path of Allah) and was fard al-ain, obligatory for all Muslims.” A number of religious scholars wrote handbooks describing the obligation Indonesian Muslims had to fight. One such text, written by Arsjad Lubis, called Guide

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23 Formichi, Islam and the Making of the Nation : Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia, Page 81

24 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, Page 33

25 “Islam. A formal, authoritative ruling on a point of Islamic law; a scholarly opinion given (typically in writing) by a mufti or other Muslim juridical authority in response to a question posed by an individual or a court of law.” Oxford English Dictionary

26 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, 32
to Holy War (Penuntun Perang Sabil), explained that violent *jihad*, a term much broader than solely violent acts in *fiqh*, was obligatory when an enemy infiltrated Muslim territory. Kartosuwiryo and Darul Islam became committed to driving out the Western forces and creating an Islamic State. Their methods were violent, but determined to be justified under the doctrine of *jihad*. Kartosoewirjo was prepared to use any and all methods of warfare. In 1948, he commanded his troops to “kidnap and murder all traitors against religion, the state and nation.” The word “traitors” is especially vital because Republic of Indonesia government guerrilla forces were attacked by Darul Islam militias as the former fled from the encroaching Dutch troops, which created a triangular war between the secular Republican forces, the Islamist Darul Islam, and the colonial Dutch army. By this period in the conflict, Kartosuwiryo recognized West Java as Islamic Council territory, not Republic territory, therefore felt fully entitled to enact violence against the so called “traitors.” An organization report from 1948 recounted: “Since the issuance of that order, PADI [Darul Islam Heroes] has started to take action against the traitors that have become its prey in all locations throughout Priangan and western Java. After the special forces of PADI targeted these vermin, their bodies in no small numbers were sprawled dead in the middle of the road or floated as corpses down the rivers.” Note how the word “vermin” is an explicit

27 “Muslim jurisprudence,” “i.e., the science of ascertaining the precise terms of the Sharī‘ah, or Islamic law” https://www.britannica.com/topic/fiq


29 Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, 34


example of dehumanizing language combined with a literal description of executions in the official reports of the organization. Darul Islam engaged in murderous violence, not only towards Dutch forces, but native Indonesians. And wrote not only justifications for the executions, but glorified the acts and degraded the victims as “prey.” From 1945 to the organization’s collapse in 1962, terrorism and violence were combined with the goal of establishing an Islamic State throughout Indonesia. The organization eventually proliferated a religious ideology that justified and required the dehumanization of enemy targets. The ideological rationalization of horrific violence was caused by Darul Islam’s complete prioritization of territorial aims and religious fanaticism over all else.

Darul Islam did reach great territorial heights in Indonesia, at one point controlling an estimated one-third of West Java and more than 90% of South Sulawesi and Aceh provinces. According to an Indonesian defense minister in 1958, “One could say that the rebels control every jungle-covered hill visible from Bandung. [Indonesian army] units have tended to operate autonomously without central coordination.” However, this regional domination ended within seven years. Kartosoewirjo was captured, tried, and executed in 1962. Two years later, his successor Kahar Muzakkar was killed in a military ambush that ended Darul Islam’s insurgency against the Indonesian government.

The organization was dismantled, but underground networks of former veterans persisted. The most well known offspring of Darul Islam is Jamaal Islamiyah (JI), which was marked as a terrorist group associated with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban by UN Security Council Resolution

1267 after a 2002 bombing in Bali was carried out by JI members. The JI is a transnational group with cells in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia that aims to overthrow the governments of the aforementioned nations and to create a pan-Islamic state governed by the tenets of Sharia. It was originally formed in 1982 by Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar who were members of Darul Islam in the 80s. Bashir and Sungkar were incarcerated by President and dictator Suharto, who ousted the democratically elected President Sukarno in 1967. After two years of imprisonment, Bashir and Sungkar traveled throughout the islands of Southeast Asia to recruit for their own militant organization, eventually becoming a legitimate terrorist threat in the region.

In the mid-nineties, Sungkar established contact with Al-Qaeda and in 2002 the JI was responsible for a series of bombings throughout Bali. The final death toll, after three different attacks, was 202, mainly comprising young Western tourists and Balinese Indonesians who were working or lived nearby the explosion sites. Because of the significant number of international

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33 “1267 Committee adds name of an entity to its list” UN Security Council Press Release, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/sc7548


citizens who were killed, the bombing led to far more global scrutiny focused upon the regional terrorist activities of the JI.

The Bali Bombing is a key example of the difference between the JI and Darul Islam; the two organizations shared similar aims in creating an Islamic State, but differed in the type of violence they engaged in. The JI was not fighting armed government forces, as it’s predecessor Darul Islam had done for decades. It was violence committed against unharmed Indonesian and Western civilian tourists. The bombings were the first example of Indonesian terrorist activity that directly copied Al-Qaeda’s style of violence that was completely unrelated to a direct territorial defense justified by a specific interpretation of sharia doctrine.

From 1391 to 2002, Indonesians experienced a tremendous amount of foreign influence, governance, and culture. A religion which few once believed in, transformed the state into the largest Muslim majority nation in the world. And when forced to obey a Western power, Islam became a part of society the Dutch had far less influence over. As a religion, it could be practiced in the privacy of one’s home or masjid, locations colonial authorities did not frequent. Even the geographic origin of Islam separates itself from Western ideologies and religions.

Considering the violence enacted toward Indonesians during Dutch and Japanese occupations, it is far from surprising that some citizens supported the combination of guerrilla tactics with Islam to create Darul Islam and inspire radical Islamists to fight. However, the major change between the doctrine of Darul Islam and contemporary terrorists is the justification of violence. Darul Islam justified its violence in a physical manner that relied on geographical boundaries and the arrival of enemies on the ground. First Dutch troopers, then Republic militias,

and finally Republic of Indonesia (the officially independent state) Infantry Battalions known as the Banteng Raiders.40

The justification of violence in the last two decades has taken a different approach. Darul Islam legitimized its violence as a response to physical military incursions in Indonesia by Dutch or Republic forces. This somewhat mirrors global Islamic terrorism developing as a response to the American invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Though separated by at least half-century, the American intervention in the Middle East and Dutch occupation on Indonesia were enacted by geopolitically powerful Western states dispatching soldiers across the globe to insure their own interests. But the states differ in their economic stability. The Netherlands was financially drained from WWII and could not afford the price the Indonesian Independence struggle was costing. On the other hand, all of America’s interventions in the Middle East have occurred during comparatively financially stable times. The various recessions America has experienced will never be equivalent to the financial devastation Europe experienced in the 40s. However, the high cost of American interventions in terms of dollars and lives did not immediately end those military operations. In comparison, once Indonesian Independence was won, Dutch forces were removed from the Islands. The recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by its former colonizer was the direct result of a bloody and expensive war. In the 21 century, similar territorial battles have occurred, but attacking American soldiers on the battleground did little to prevent what radical Islamists saw as an invasion. A different strategy of attacked was formed – terrorist violence is now aimed at citizens, law enforcement, and in Indonesia,

foreigners. Bombings are not apart of territorial military strategies during war, but a mechanism, by randomly attacking civilians, to force the targeted nation to adhere to the demands of the terrorist organization.

What makes Indonesia such an interesting case study, is that Indonesian terrorists perceive their own state as a target to be dismantled rather than a Western nation that has participated in the military occupations of other Muslim countries. Contemporary Indonesian terrorists can not justify their crimes, as Darul Islam did, as a military operation in the midst of a territorial war with their own state. There is no civil war in Indonesia nor is the state committing crimes to undermine Aceh’s semi-autonomous Sharia government. It is the very existence of an democratic and secular Indonesian state that Indonesian terrorists deem intolerable.
Chapter 2 – Prison Gossip, Betrayal, Riots, Escapes, and Radicalization

The Ideological Differences Between ISIS and Jamaal Islamiyah

Now that one has a decent gauge of the Islam’s historical role in Indonesia, the second chapter of this thesis will examine the differences between currently active terrorist cells, the conditions of Indonesian prisons, and the differences between inmate action depending on the terrorist organization they are affiliated with.

Differences between 21st century terrorist organizations in Indonesia are more difficult to pin down then the traditional contemporary divide. Religious doctrine, historical affiliation, and organizational aims are all factors that differentiate the JI and ISIS cells. The most heated ideological debate in radical Islamic communities is between takfir mu’ayyan and takfir am. These are the terms used to determine if an individual should be excommunicated as a nonbeliever (kafir) based on their individual actions or because of their membership and participate in a kafir group.41 This is a vital difference between organizations because it directly affects how individual members and leaders interact with the state. Virtually all ISIS affiliated groups are proponents of takfir mu’ayyan and see all state employees, including prison officials, police, judges, and politicians, as enemies – even if said officials are also practicing muslims.

41 Support for ‘Islamic State’ in Indonesian Prisons.” IPAC Report No.15, January 19 2015
Individual participation with the democratic institutions or even general state institutions is banned. Therefore ISIS affiliated prisoners who believe in *takfir mu’ayyan* will not participate in any rehabilitation activities and pose a high risk of recidivism.

This dogma also affects the general members of ISIS cells by banning them from participating in civil duties; they can not vote, run for office, or participate in any form of Indonesian democracy. While this does not directly create violent action, it separates ISIS followers from the general public and state. If a follower is already leery of the government, then *takfir mu’ayyan* is the nail in the coffin that can cause permanent hatred of the state and potential violence.

However, indigenous extremist organizations, such as the JI, are followers of *takfir am*; they follow the belief that only individual action can determine a person’s status. In fact, JI leaders have actively fought against ISIS. In 2014, government authorities concluded that senior JI leaders were partners in combating ISIS. It’s unclear how great an effect this had in Indonesia, a country neither currently at war or recovering from one. But nevertheless, senior members of the JI were publicly critical of ISIS. They argued that ISIS, “was an organization, not a state, and that al-Baghdadi had not been selected as caliph by a religious council (*majelis syuro*), as Islamic law mandates. They also strongly objected to IS’s practice of declaring anyone who did not swear a loyalty oath as an enemy and a legitimate target for killing.”

The legitimacy of ISIS as a political actor and its acts of violence to achieve that aim were thoroughly critiqued by JI leadership.

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42 Sidney Jones and Sidney Solahudin, “ISIS In Indonesia,” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2015, p. 154-163
Though the JI has committed terrorist attacks in the past, the Bali Bombings as a prime example, the last decade has seen a sweeping rise of government action and arrests against their leadership.\textsuperscript{43} In 2007, after an armed alternation with police in Central Sulawesi, more than 40 members, including top leaders, were arrested, almost leading to the group’s destruction\textsuperscript{44}. The attack came after the gruesome beheadings of three Christian school girls in 2005. The girl’s heads were dumped in plastic bags outside of a local church with a note, which stated: “Wanted: 100 more heads, teenaged or adult, male or female; blood shall be answered with blood, soul with soul, head with head.”\textsuperscript{45} Within two years of the attack, the police mounted a full scale operation against dozens of different militants. Fourteen JI members were killed and dozens more arrested. The 2007 January clash was the last use of violence by JI in Indonesia to date.

The lack of leadership and funds fundamentally altered how successfully the JI functions as a terrorist organization. The term “neo-JI” has been coined by Indonesian police to describe it’s transformed state. One of the biggest differences is the prioritization of \textit{dawkwah} (preaching and religious outreach) over \textit{jihad}. The JI has not abandoned \textit{jihad}, but it's new military wing is meant to form a capacity for manufacturing and operating weapons in preparation for conflict with the Indonesia State or international actors.\textsuperscript{46} From 2014 to 2016, an unknown number of JI members were sent to non-ISIS militias in Syria to study military and combat skills in an active war-zone. Participants learned the inner workings of AK47s, FN pistols, M-60 rifles, and hand


\textsuperscript{44} “The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” April 27 2017, IPAC Report No. 36

\textsuperscript{45} Stephen Fitzpatrick,”Beheaded girls were Ramadan ‘trophies’” 9 November 2006 \textit{The Australian}.

"The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah"
grenades. However, there is no reliable information about who or where these members are, because JI returnees are rarely directly involved in *jihadi* crimes in Indonesia.

The “Neo-JI” is more interested in expanding its political capital among the growing number of young Indonesian professionals. While Pro-ISIS groups forbid any interaction with state institutions, JI members were allowed to participate in the 2017 elections. The JI even published a directive titled “Can Peaceful Demonstrations and the Jihad Movement Work Side by Side?” (*Demonstrasi Damai dan Gerakan Jihad Mungkinkah Bersanding?*) – the simple answer being yes. The peaceful demonstrations in 2017 that JI members participated in against a corrupt governor, a far cry from the bombings of a decade ago, were equivalent to “jihad by the pen.”

The JI may claim to want the implementation of an Islamic state in Indonesia, with full compliance of *Sharia* law, but its followers and leaders are not as keen as they once were to commit random acts of violence for the cause. In summary, the JI was once the dominant terrorist organization in Southeast Asia, but government intervention has decreased their capacity for violence and ties to foreign fighting, causes supporters to care more about *jihad* in war-zones in the Middle East then in Indonesia.

While many JI leaders have denounced ISIS’ ideology, a select but important few have pledged their allegiance. One of the JI’s most influential leaders is Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a cleric who, since his release on January 8th 2021, has served multiple prison sentences on charges of

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47 The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah p. 8

48 The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah p 1

49 The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah p 2

immigration violations in 2003 (the state originally also charged him with treason and providing false documents and statements to law enforcement), of conspiracy over the 2002 Bali Bombings, and of inciting others to commit terrorism in 2010.51 In 2008, Ba’asyir founded a splinter cell of the Jemaah Islamiyah, named Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). In September and April of 2011, multiple JAT members became suicide bombers, killing themselves and injuring dozens and dozens of people.52

The group maintained its popularity, until it faced massive repercussions in 2014, when Ba’asyir pledged his loyalty to ISIS. In March 2014, the tension that ISIS caused within the JI began to build to a climax. Ba'asyir was imprisoned in the maximum-security Pasir Putih prison in Nusakambangan, an island off the coast of Cilacap, Central Java. Pasir Putih houses only inmates sentenced to 15 years or more and those on death row. Of about the 1,400 inmates currently living at Nusakambangan, a dozen or more openly supported ISIS in 2013.53 These inmates made it a priority to influence senior figures imprisoned with them so as to influence the broad membership. The internal leadership, both incarcerated and free, were already split on who they supported in Syria. Some JAT leaders such as Afif Abdul Madjid not only supported ISIS, but swore an oath of loyalty of taking part in a military training course in Syria.54 However, Ba'asyir’s own son Abdurrahim supported al-Nusra, the official Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. The issue of external loyalty became so prevalent that Ba’asyir released a letter from prison in March


52 “Abu Baka Ba’asyir,” United Nations Security Council


54 Support of “Islamic State,” IPAC
of 2014 stating, “I do not want to become trapped defending one side and attacking the other, as some leaders and activists are doing. Because I am not there with you, I cannot evaluate who is right. Therefore I urge you to carry out jihad as a united body under a single command; do not go off and wage war on your own.”

In the end, Ba’asyir’s neutrality only lasted four months. During those months he was constantly bombarded with pro-ISIS arguments and discussion by fellow inmates and non-imprisoned JAT leaders. Finally, on June 29th, the day al-Baghdadi declared himself caliph of a new Islamic State, Ba’asyir and 23 other prisoners took an oath of allegiance. An ISIS flag was even smuggled in for the occasion by a wife of the prisoners. Ba’asyir’s oath had immediate consequences. More than 50% of JAT members denounced Ba’asyir and “jumped ship”; his own sons, Abdul “Iim” Rohim and Rosyid Ridho, abandoned JAT and formed their own jihadist group called Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah.

55 “Support of “Islamic State,”” IPAC
Indonesian Prison Negligence and Violence

The Indonesian state is not on the edge of collapse. Nor for that matter are Indonesian prisons and detention facilities. However, the failures of Indonesian prisons exemplify underlying issues that plague the state. Some of these issues can be traced back to colonial origins, which were never modified for an independent state. Similar nations in history, size, and religious demographics are not afflicted with these institutional problems to the extent Indonesia is. Primarily, because they did not endure a military conflict to gain independence after WWII or a dictatorship throughout the 20th century. Countries that did face colonization, a war for or after independence, and dictatorial regimes, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Cambodia all still struggle to varying degrees with the historical effects of colonial institutions and government procedures.

Just as the decisions imprisoned leadership make are vital to the continuation of these *jihadist* organizations, so to is internal prison radicalization, which may prove even more dangerous. Radical Islamists can be categorized into four main experiences of prison life:

1. Prisoners who are changed, either by the punishment or by rehabilitation, and no longer hold radical beliefs.
2. Those radicalized in prison after committing a non-terrorist affiliated crime.
3. Individuals who refuse to participate in rehabilitation efforts.
4. Prisoners who participate in rehabilitation programs, but commit terrorist acts after their release.
High radicalization rates in prisons are a direct result of the state’s failure to responsibly oversee an institution that controls the fate of vast amounts of lives. Penitentiary negligence is dangerous for prisoners, guards, and civilians and allows violent sown by radicals to incite riots, sieges, and hostage negotiations.

Indonesian prisons are overcrowded and ill-run to the point where riots and escapes are commonplace. Indonesia has 464 prisons and detention facilities with a capacity to hold 124,006 prisoners. But as of 2018, the number of prisoners incarcerated has doubled the holding capacity, totaling to 256,051. Though overcrowding is unequivocally burdensome alone, it becomes even worse if the necessary funds to alleviate the stress too many bodies place on the institutional cogs is unavailable or misused. Without funding, prisons become dangerous for both inmates and guards alike. The danger is heightened as increasing rates of convicted terrorists join the general population of prisoners who may incite riots or radicalize non-terrorist affiliated prisoners.

A prime example of violence caused by overcrowding, fund mismanagement, and terrorist instigation is the 2018 prison riot and siege of Mako Brimob. Mako Brimbok is a maximum security detention center, which in May 2018 was the site of a 36 hour siege resulting in murders of five police officers, all members of Indonesia’s counterterrorism squad Densus 88, and the death of one prisoner. The murders were gruesome – four of the dead were found almost decapitated.59


Though over two years have passed, the exact cause of the riot has never been isolated and made public knowledge, but it was most likely a mix of fighting over food scarcity and incitement by pro-ISIS convicts. These two elements showcase the immediate flaws of Indonesian prisons and in turn the state that controls these institutions. First is the issue of food, which is a problem of resources and funding. The siege began on the morning of May 8th, when a prisoner became indignant that food scheduled to be brought by a family member was late. Whether or not food delivery by outside sources is a problem within Mako Brimob is irrelevant. The vocal complaint of mistreatment by the individual prisoner heard by his peers was enough to be in-part of the cause of mass violence.

The other cause was incitement by a pro-ISIS inmate named Wawan Kurniawan. Wawan was arrested and awaiting trial on charges of terrorism, specifically conducting training in preparation for an attack.\textsuperscript{60} He was the local leader of a Jemaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) cell (the same organization the bomber written about in the Introduction, Sunakim, was apart of), not to be confused with Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) which Abu Bakar Baasyir formed. Though it is the case that high ranking leaders, such as Aman Abdurrahman, a spiritual leader, are affiliated with both groups. Unlike JAT, in the summer of 2018, JAD was deemed an illegal organization by the Law on Anti-Terrorism Acts and a South Jakarta court ruled that membership alone would lead to arrest.\textsuperscript{61} But even disbanded, JAD violence is continually active. Most recently on March 28th 2021, JAD members are believed to have been the perpetrators of the Makassar Cathedral


Suicide Bombings, which injured 20 and left only the bombers as casualties. JAD members and similarly ISIS inclined supporters are currently committing violence both within prison walls and in general society.

Indonesian prisons face problems that undermine the basic principle of a penitentiary – regulated containment. Riots currently jeopardize state authority, as does a less explicitly violent maneuver, escapes. Thousands of prisoners have escaped during their incarceration since 2013. Even if the majority of escapees are caught, there is a huge risk of violence if terrorist affiliated prisoners go unmonitored in the public. In 2013, a prison riot that killed five people, allowed about 150 inmates including nine inmates charged with terrorism-related offenses to escape. All nine escapees were recaptured, but one, Fadli Sadama an associate of the JI, was able to avoid capture for four months and cross international borders into Malaysia before his eventual arrest.

A more absurd example, if not even more dangerous was the escape of Roki Aprisdianto. In November 2012, Aprisdianto freely walked out of the Jakarta police headquarters dressed as a woman, wearing a full body veil, only his eyes exposed, he had bought from a fellow inmate, claiming they were for his wife. He had been convinced of leading an assassination squad of

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high school student from Klaten, Central Java.\textsuperscript{67} Within two weeks of his escape he had already begun to make bombs targeting police. This is what officials fear most – escaped convicts, who that state has no information on, building weapons of significant destruction to target government officials.

Aprisdianto is an example of the worst case scenario not ending in violence because of the government’s unforeseeable luck. And it was only luck that anti-terrorist personnel were coincidently with their wives on vacation when Aprisdianto removed his veil and was immediately caught. It was also extraordinarily lucky that the bomb he managed to build during his month long escape did not detonate. Luck will and should never be a viable means of administering one of the largest institutions in Indonesian government.

Other then provide us with a physical example of the flaws that disable Indonesian institutions, Aprisdianto also wrote a description of imprisoned life while on the run:

Every floor had two blocks, and the fourth floor was exclusively for terrorists. (I’m not ashamed of calling ourselves terrorists. I’m proud to be called a terrorist by the enemies of Islam! That’s what I am!)...

As soon as visiting hours began, all the blocks would be opened so we could go in and out of the visiting area even if we didn’t have visitors. Visitors were free to enter the blocks and come into our cells. In our block, we had four rooms that were known as “Biological Rooms” (RB) where our wives were free to come in and out… Maybe you won’t believe that we were free to have hand phones and laptops. Even though it was formally forbidden, every guard knew we had phones. We’d take calls in front of their faces.

Aprisdianto’s journal entry is fascinating in its ability to convey how a radical Islamist views himself. He is, “proud to be called a terrorist by the enemies of Islam! That’s what I am!” Such a declaration would be consequential information for the state to know. Only though his writing

\textsuperscript{67}“Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned”
does one obtain a clear understanding of his loyalties, but that does not mean that he was just as
vocal while incarcerated. Aprisdianto escaped, meaning the state wouldn't be able to track his
movements anyway, but if he hadn't escaped, had served his time, and kept silent or was never
recorded detailing his terrorist pride, it would be reasonable to expect another attack by him
within a year of release. However, if the prison was able to track and organize relevant opinions
he expressed while incarcerated, Aprisdianto might still have planned an assault, but law
enforcement would be far better situated to stop him carrying out the attack.

The issue of visitors and in particular wives is seen in Aprisdianto writings and come up
several other times. In Nusakambangan prison, a wife smuggled in an ISIS flag for the oath
swearing to al-Baghdadi. In comparison, Aprisdianto describes the relative freedom wives had
when visiting their spouses. Another example, is that of Abdullah Umamit, a convicted terrorist
and ISIS supporter from Ambon, who in 2015 smuggled his wife into his cell. Prison authorities
only recognized her presence after she had stayed for two days, and when caught, it was revealed
she had stayed in her husband’s cell several other times. There is a high chance that extremist
prisoners in Indonesia not only receive and give banned goods and information, but may even
escape the facilities they are held in. These are fundamental issues that must be solved if prison
institutions continue to be the main source of security against extremist attacks.

Indonesian prisons face extreme overcrowding and fund mismanagement. Which is why
riots can lead to successful escapes and why Umamit’s wife was able to hide among the inmates.
This mismanagement also forces prisoners to pay for their own basic necessities such food or

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68 “Update on Indonesian Pro-ISIS Prisoners and Deradicalisation Efforts,” 2016, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.
toiletries. The most common ISIS recruit are prisoners cut off from family or friends, struggling to survive. The organization offers physical protection, emotional support, and financial assistance. This is functionally the same as any group or gang that forms in prison. However, a key difference is the acts of violence perpetrated by a new member are planned within the prison, but conducted outside to destroy the state. For example, a prisoner might commit another crime when released, but a criminal organization, on the whole, is not interested in dismantling the entire state or government. They may commit criminal acts, attack law enforcement, but the primary aim is the organization’s financial stability. The jihadist members in Indonesia, have vastly different aims. They are solely interested in the complete dismantlement and destruction of the Indonesian government and the incorporation and funding of a global caliphate, though as pointed out previously, organizations have conflicting views on the international legitimacy of a global caliphate.

Since 2002-2015, the governments of Southeast Asia have arrested over 400 suspected terrorists tied to the JI, including its operational chief in 2003 and two senior leaders in 2007. Security forces have killed a number of JI's leaders as well, such as the group’s senior bomb-maker in 2005, operational leader Moammed Noordin Top in 2009, and senior leader Sanusi in November 2012. But in Indonesia, many of these prisoners have been or are scheduled to be released. From 2017-2019, 100 prisoners convicted of terrorist affiliated crimes were released. The district-level parole boards and Social Rehabilitation Directorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs are both willfully underprepared for the monitoring necessary to ensure no occurrence of


70 “Recent and Planned Releases,” IPAC
violence. Even the prisoners considered the highest priority for monetization, those who openly declared allegiance to ISIS, will likely not receive round-the-clock monitoring, though they are the most visible threat. However, visibility does not necessarily equate capacity for violence. A bigger threat are the prisoners who are not visibly anti-government, who are either new to \textit{jihadist} beliefs or pretended to repent, and will go on to commit terrorist crimes without any government notice.
A Discussion of Terorisme and its Legislative Effect

Terrorism is neither a new word nor concept. But it is worth exploring its Indonesian etymology, government usage, and legal incorporation. The word’s usage originates from the French terrorisme, the term used to describe the system of, “violent measures taken in order to come to political power or to maintain a government” during the French Revolution. However, the general idea of zealots committing acts of violence against a governing body is seen throughout recorded history. This points out a fundamental issue that haunts the term – its definition is highly disputed with no universal agreement. Meaning a state can easily apply its own interpretation to describe any ‘enemy’ as a terrorist. The state’s codification of Terorisme into law and its application to citizens can be seen as a mechanism for increased, unregulated state power.

Terorisme is most likely a loan word from Dutch, rather than English, whose spelling of the word is nearly identical to the French terrorisme. However, its usage in Indonesian politics and society directly correlates with the English language and terminology implemented by the American government during the War on Terror. Violence committed by radicals against the state, even bombings – the act which is a the defining characteristic of modern terrorism – was not generally described as such. Though the words teror (terror), teroris (terrorist), aksi teror (act of terror) were written frequently before the 2000s to describe bombings or assassinations, terorisme was notably absent. The word signifies an entire movement or collective that must be addressed by the government because it has grown into something that legitimacy threatens the

71 “Terrorism, n” Oxford English Dictionary
state. Or is perceived by the public as threatening to the state because citizens fear for their physical safety. As such, it was not until the 2003 Bali Bombings that terorisme used in media and law.

The term’s relationship with perception is key. The public perception of global terror, combined with an actual bombing, created swift legislative changes. In 2003, the Indonesian public was fully aware of the American War on Terror and their consumption of the reporting media led to specific perception of the Bali Bombings through the lense of terorisme. As the Indonesian public’s terminology adapted terorisme in general conversation, government officials began to acknowledge that terorisme, not only individual teroris, was an active ideology in the country. Prior to the bombings, an anti-terrorism bill was stridently opposed by the Indonesian People’s Representative Assembly, in part because it was seen as a law created to appease American pressure to support the War on Terror. But after the Bali Bombings, the bill was passed inconceivably fast in comparison to other legislation: “the mere fact that consensus was reached on a quite controversial legislation, illustrates the extent of the bombing’s impact on Indonesia’s legislators.”

Terorisme was fully incorporated into law and the consequences of the new legislation became highly debated. Indonesian politicians and citizens were greatly impacted by the bombings, nevertheless there was widespread concern over the word’s effect upon police authority and the crimes categorized-as terorisme. The concern was far from being superfluous. It has only been five years since Suharto had resigned. The violence and abuse his regime

contained was still at the forefront of many minds. Particularly, the mistreatment and corruption long identified with police and security forces. Simultaneously, questions were raised over the fact that terrorism had been made into its own legal category, which was given a broad definition that was then broken down into an array of crimes ranging from little severity to major threats against the state. But the suspicion of misuse, either by politicians or agents of the state, could not withstand the grief, fury, and fear that encompassed the nation.

And yet the public’s suspicion of misuse and distrust of the government, may be an underlying factor of how terrorists are currently treated in Indonesian prisons. First, Suharto’s government was notorious for imprisoning individuals who opposed him, no matter their innocence or guilt. In fact, the inability for individuals to peacefully express political descent was also a contributing factor to the polarization and radicalization of Aceh as an autonomous Islamic state against the Republic government. Indonesian democracy is only 23 years old. The history of political prisoners, mass killings, and other violations which occurred under Suharto is unlikely to have been forgotten, even if the government has not taken a public stance against or responsibility for his actions. It is this historical context which best sheds light to why Islamic radicals and prisoners in general are allowed a higher degree of freedom compared to their peers imprisoned in other nations.


Indonesian counter-terrorism laws were again revised and strengthened after the May 2018 Surabaya bombings. The police are now allowed to make ‘preventive strikes’ against individuals suspected of being members of extremist organizations. Hundreds have been arrested since, including for non-violent roles — among them hiding fugitives, withholding information, purchasing food supplies, buying airplane tickets and attending meetings. As terrorist convictions increase so too will the number of terrorist prisoners mixed into the general population. Although most have received short sentences of two to three years, the physical accumulation of radical Islamists will escalate the number of prison radicalizations.76

The other difficulty is the quickly approaching release of those convicted by the new law. In 2021, more than 150 of these prisoners will be freed.77 If the Indonesian government is unable to successfully track and prevent recidivism, then the new legislation will become useless. Arresting terrorists after the act, rather than preemptively does not make Indonesian society safer. Is the best one can hope for is that the ‘preventive strikes’ police are allowed to engage in will include second time offenders? Though there is a higher chance a former inmate has a greater awareness of police tactics resulting from their first arrest. Instead, the state must fix the structural issues that plague prisons to use its surveilling abilities to achieve maximum benefit.

76 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26546.3.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab6101db607ee48125c471b14525780f1
77 TERRORISM, RECIDIVISM AND PLANNED RELEASES IN INDONESIA IPAC
Chapter 3 - A Defense of Penitentiary Surveillance

On Prisons:

The implementation of surveillance is a step no state should take lightly – especially one whose history is entrenched with mass detention, torture, forced labor, and show trials. This final chapter will discuss the essential nature of Indonesian penal institutions and evaluate the risks of prison surveillance. In weighing the history of radical Islam and the Suharto dictatorship, the effects these two factors have on contemporary Indonesia guide me to conclude functional surveillance technology combined with population control efforts, such as building new facilities, is the most effective way to prevent terrorist violence.

Some intrinsic qualities of Indonesian prisons include mass overcrowding and internal and external corruption, both originating from Dutch penal codes and institutions. The vast majority of Indonesian prisons currently in operation were built by the Dutch, including Cipinang Penitentiary Institution, where Sunakim was imprisoned prior to his death. The government even acknowledged that “many blocks, barracks and cells in almost every prison, because of old age, are in such conditions as to be unfit and unsafe for quartering prisoners.” It is safe to assume that the combination of these conditions with overpopulation leaves most prisons technologically inept. Even if a prison does have CCTV, whose most useful quality is data accumulation, to ascertain if a terrorist will commit violence after their release, proves impossible to access because of the overcrowding.

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I would argue that though Indonesian prisoners are not physically isolated from prying eyes, privacy from the state can still be retained. Effectively utilizing a prison surveillance network is impossible when there are too many individuals to all watch simultaneously. The sheer number of bodies provides a mass shield. Physical privacy is unfeasible, as a prisoner will always be observed by fellow inmates, but as a result of this condition, officials are unable to sustain a prolonged and detailed surveillance initiative against an individual.

This is a vital difference from prisons in other nations. To fully comprehend the Indonesian context and judge the validity of proposed solutions to prison radicalization, it is worth exploring the fundamental nature and purpose of prisons. The polity of most nations expect prisons to have physical confinements and a nullification of some, if not all, individual rights. Prisons are perceived as the physical space in which the government places citizens who have been convicted of a crime or are awaiting trial. Prisons also afford governments the opportunity to have a scale of surveillance impossible in any other circumstance. The prisoner’s physical body may always be watched, while his autonomy is obviously limited. Prisons are also the location state sanctioned torture and executions occur. This is the fundamental groundwork of prisons within government institutions. They are sites where individual rights and safety are not guaranteed by law and may in fact be negated by law.

The cause of individual imprisonment varies greatly in terms of generation, state type, party influence, and social norms. Of these factors, generational differences produce the smallest changes in criminal prosecution, but those changes are the hardest to reverse once they have been

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81 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*, 1978, page 12
made. As decades come and go, moral judgments and societal norms slowly fluctuate and change. This creates an opportunity to alter legislation – even if a government is not democratic. On the other hand, the codification of law can be difficult to modify, meaning once a law is enacted, changing or repealing it takes a concentrated effort.

In comparison, the differences between state types are far more important in determining what and who will be deemed criminal. It is in a democratic government’s interest to apply the law fairly across all populations, so that no group is targeted or prioritized over another. A democratic government whose existence relies on the will of the majority does not want to provide a legitimate excuse to a segment of the population to question its fairness in the application of justice. However, fairness, justice, and the will of the people, are far less important, if not completely irrelevant, within authoritarian regimes or dictatorships. A dictator’s main priority, above all else, is to remain in power. Prisons become places to contain individuals that are perceived as a threat to the regime. Single-party or ruler states rely on a system of fear to silence critics within a culture of unquestioned loyalty. Punishment is violent and public. It is a spectacle. Examples range from the French Revolution’s guillotine to the stabbings and beheadings ISIS’s proto-state committed in Syria and Iraq. Depending on the regime and time period, the spectacle of punishment elicits several emotional responses; a citizen may feel fear, disgust, pity, anger, or satisfaction. What response a public punishment induces in the audience, depends upon on their perception of justice. If a viewer thinks a criminal deserved to be whipped, then she is likely to feel satisfaction rather then fear.

However, corporal punishment itself relies on an even more fundamental aspect of prisons: limited physical anatomy. Prisoners are confined to a single location without the ability
to leave. Of course, within the Indonesian context, as previously discussed, there is a far greater likelihood of a prisoner escaping and retaining his physical autonomy. But excluding that situation, the basic function of both modern and historical prisons is to confine a person away from society.

Confinement is a key aspect of Indonesian prisons and one of the assured aspects of prison life for radical Islamists. Unlike wealthier nations, Indonesia does not have the resources to install mass surveillance technology in its prisons, nor does it seem to have the resources to either build prisons or hire more staff, though many prisons are now on the brink of collapse.

Instead, the Indonesian government has prioritized deradicalization. Unlike Western countries, who on the whole employ an extraordinarily small amount of Imams per Muslim prisoner compared to Catholic priests or Protestant ministers, Indonesia has the advantage of being the largest Muslim-majority country in the world. But because Indonesia is majority-Muslim and many Islamist radicals lived along with the general population prior to their imprisonment, it may be even more difficult to deradicalize prisoners through Imams who teach Traditionalist or Modernist Islam (Indonesia’s two most prominent Islamic scholarly movements), compared to radical Islamic doctrine. Imams are also individual people confined to the limits a human body imposes. A single Imam would likely be able to deradicalize only five to ten prisoners at any given time, and far more need to be prevented from recidivating. Therefore, the state should invest in building functional prison surveillance systems along with more physical infrastructure in order to manage its incarcerated population.
On Surveillance:

An argument for surveillance implementation within Indonesian prisons must first confront the tool’s role in increasing state power, without a corresponding increase in civil power. It can nurture the power of both dictators and democratic governments through its ability to gather intelligence. Surveillance is as close as an individual can come to knowing another person’s private thoughts, feelings, and reactions. But surveillance only ever serves the surveyor and, as such, the distribution of power between government and citizen is permanently imbalanced.

But surveillance is not a new phenomenon; modern technology is not to thank for the possibility of spying on one’s citizens. This practice has likely existed since mankind developed hierarchies of leadership that could be crushed by popular dissent, i.e. certainly during biblical times and probably far before. However, until the 1840s, the shape of surveillance had remained almost exactly the same for thousands of years. Surveillance relied on the physical presence of a person who could observe and report. The creation of the telegraph fundamentally changed the speed at which such information was received.\(^{82}\) The advent of the radio and the telephone further increased that speed, but, more importantly, led to types of surveillance that did not risk personal safety: phone calls could be intercepted or coded radio signals cracked from the safety of ones office rather then in an enemy encampment.

But I would argue the most vital inventions were that of the video camera and the computer. A device that records continuously, attached to another that allows immediate access to the footage, seems worlds away from the ancient kingdoms and courts that relied on spies for

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their intelligence operations. But the basic concept of interpreting the feelings and thoughts of
the masses to determine the best course of action remains the same.

That video surveillance would be one of the most salient tools of authoritarian
governments comes as a surprise to no one. Fiction written over 50 years ago, published after the
World Wars, predicted its use and the consequences. The absence of privacy theoretically allows
a state complete knowledge of one’s activities and the ability to control and punish them. But
many dystopian texts go a step too far in their imagination of the system. Rather than each
individual being spied on by the state everyday, it is more likely that street cameras will be
installed on every block, on every doorstep, and inside every shop. Legal privacy may exist
within the home - in the context of state rather than corporate surveillance - but the moment one
steps outside, there is a flood of information accumulated by the government. Surveillance is a
useful and ethical tool if the enforced laws are morally sound and there are individuals failing to
follow said laws. But if the government’s laws are unjust, then surveillance becomes a tool to
suppress criticism; if all individuals follow the law, then video surveillance also becomes a waste
of money.

In a democratic society, the implementation of surveillance requires persuading citizens
that an increase of general comfort and wellbeing is worth giving up some privacy. In Indonesia,
a the case is even more volatile with as the nation faces the very real and dangerous threat of
terrorist violence. And as it has been previously shown, Indonesians are careful to consider what
tools a state should legally be Given that most radicalization happens in state prisons, prison
surveillance might be the most effective means of preventing harm.
The problem needing to be addressed is not what a realistic implementation of surveillance technology in prisons would look like. This thesis excludes questions of funding or legislation, which are impossible to answer with the limited information publicly available about specific prisons. Instead, I provide a theory based argument using Hobbes’ *Leviathan* that legitimizes the use of surveillance to keep the peace.

In Chapter 18 of Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. The sixth right of the sovereign is, “to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducting to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all books before they be published.” Hobbes’ arguments for absolute power, seen in this quote though the sovereign dictating what opinions are authorized to be written, published, and spoken, are not arguments a democratic Indonesian state would make, especially a relatively new democracy that is prioritizing democratic institutions and citizen plurality. However, the sixth right also introduces the sovereign as a peacemaker and gives the state the right to do whatever is necessary to preserve safety and prevent discord. This is a right that has remained true across the board, from sovereigns with absolute power to completely democratic, sortition-based governments. A primary concern of all governments is peace within their borders. Hobbes claims that citizens must allow the government those liberties necessary for upholding the security of the nation, including the violation of individual rights. The implementation of surveillance technology within prisons is an example of how parts of the sixth right can pertain to current legislative initiatives. Surveillance

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in prisons is a necessary right the state has, granted by the people through their participation in the democratic process in order to enact legislation or changes best “conducting to Peace.”

However, in an authoritarian regime, in which surveillance is a ruler’s most important tool to ensure continued power, citizens are never given the opportunity to understand and consent to their observation. They are monitored in far less obvious ways than through video cameras. And the concept of peace an authoritarian sovereign abides to may be far removed from what a normal citizen understands peace to be. Many authoritarian regimes use, through surveillance, massive amounts of violence that ensure ‘peace’ for the regime, but not for its citizens.

In sum, surveillance further entrenches the unshared authority of a singular ruler and significantly increases the government’s power in a democracy. The entrenchment or growth of power depends on the type of state involved, but occurs for the same reason – the gathering of intelligence – and can be justified through sovereignty rights theory. Surveillance allows one to know the innermost thoughts and responses individuals are willing to share with each other only privately. But only if the surveillance technology is placed in the optimal location. A CCTV camera on a block of any state in the European Union will collect little information about political dissent, to the extent such dissent remains off the streets. But it does track the movement of everyone who enters its lens and has been used to track down both violent criminals and protesters.

There is a case to be made that the incorporation of surveillance in one sector of society will lead to an increase everywhere. If mass surveillance is implemented in Indonesian prisons, then it will become the primary example all other initiatives cite. Cameras may never enter the
household, but they can certainly be installed everywhere else, until the state is able to view people’s public actions at all times as long as the camera is on and the recording saved. There is no mechanism for the people to adequately respond to the abuse of a surveillance network by a corrupt government. This is particularly prevalent in the context of the Indonesian government’s treatment of the word “terrorist,” as any citizen found to be a terrorist during an investigation can be charged and arrested. So far, the authorities have not abused this law; individuals arrested have been a part of known JI or ISIS cells that historically committed violence and planned to do so again. But it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where a defendant is unjustly labeled a terrorist and therefore unjustly surveilled or arrested.

A core problem of surveillance, besides the absence of any privacy, is the unequal level of power it gives to the state compared to the citizens. In democracies, civil power comes from participation in government institutions, voting, taxes, protesting, etc. These are measures to ensure that the people are controlling the state and not vice versa. But surveillance, which allows for mass intelligence gathering without restriction, does not provide citizens with the same information. Citizens are therefore participating in society on an unequal standing compared to the government.

However, the imagined world described above does not yet exist in Indonesia. There is no mass surveillance system throughout the country. And I would argue that the implementation of camera surveillance in prisons is unlikely to trigger the same initiative in the public sphere. Prisons are a particularly self-confined space, in which the state has every legal right to tape prisoners. It is also an extremely expensive technology that the Indonesian government would most likely be unable to afford on a national scale. But if the funds are available, prisons would
be the most optimal place for installation because law enforcement agencies must know if someone who has committed or threatened to commit acts of violence seems likely to recidivate. Video surveillance combined with building new prisons to decrease the population held in each one would be a useful tool to predict violence both inside and outside of prisons.

The crux of the issue is that individuals affiliated with terrorist organizations are committing acts of violence even after they have been imprisoned and documented as terrorists. Suicide bombings are a constant threat to Christian churches, police stations, and hotels. The amount of physical harm that these individual acts cause is relatively small, but they leave citizens feeling unsafe and cause them to question the effectiveness of the government they elected. If the prisoners who have been caught planning or actually enacting violence were surveilled in prison, the state could use that information to focus their limited resources on thwarting individuals with a known aptitude for violence.

There is a risk that the surveillance used in prisons will become a part of the tools that law enforcement and other branches of government use when dealing with the general population. One can never guarantee that a tool so easily abused by the state will not fall into the wrong hands. But I would still argue that the amount of violence occurring within prisons because of inhuman conditions, radical incitement, and the violence committed within society is so great that drastic measures must be taken to curb it. Surveillance will likely never occur on the national level because of financial constraints, and even if it could, the Indonesian government is still a democracy. Citizens have a say in its installation as well as a means to fight against the implementation in an impartial court. No matter one’s current perception of the Indonesian government - corrupt and financially insecure or strong and institutionally stable - there is a
reasonable argument as to why prison surveillance will not result in mass surveillance and how the latter could be prevented by civil participation.

The state’s ability to preemptively stop violence in general society is minimal at best. Ideally, the government would respect laws that protect individuals’ freedoms from being violated by the state. This significantly hinders the state’s ability to identify and contain violent individuals. However, prisons allow for the total control of inmates’ physical condition. They are the best location for the state to enact legal observation and control, especially of those who have or are likely to commit violence. When dealing with the general population, law enforcement agencies must have a suspicion, if not a confirmation, of criminal activity before surveillance is used. But in prisons, inmates no longer have that legal protection granted to them; the state is free to watch individuals whenever it pleases. An additional benefit is that surveillance allows for constant observation. Observation can alert staff to violent activity before it begins. If Wawan Kurniawan was under surveillance in Mako Brimob, he may not have been able to incite the riot and standoff so easily. There is an argument to be made against prolonged surveillance of any given individual, but in light of the harm done by radical Islamists both inside and outside of prisons, the state’s priority must be the safety and security of its citizens and its other prisoners, whose health and wellbeing is currently at risk.

Indonesian prisons are part of a system whose punishments are formed by incapacitation and retribution. A prison sentence is a kind of retribution that takes away the rights a free citizen has in Indonesian society. Retribution comes from the complete control and confinement enacted by the state on prisoners. Yet this type of retribution falls short in Indonesia. The only state-sanctioned retribution the majority of prisoners face is physical confinement. The corrupt nature
of the prison system allows for a degree of autonomy that would be impossible if the state took full responsibility for the inmates. The second type of punishment, incapacitation, is also not fully enacted in regards to prisoners who are terrorists. The incapacitation of violence within prison walls has failed over and over. The most recent and fatal example was Mako Brimob, but riots are a regular occurrence in Indonesian prisons. This exemplifies how the state has failed to control violence within the very confines it should have complete authority over. If the Indonesian state can not control terrorists in prisons, how can it hope to prevent violence once prisoners are released?

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Conclusion

A country like Indonesia, which encompasses such a huge amount of ethnic and cultural diversity within its borders, necessitates a discussion of its history before one can delve into current politics. Indonesia’s history is not particularly well known in the West, hence why several sections of this thesis provide small glimpses into the regions history. But the format of this thesis was also a response to a trend I have perceived in Western institutions, where academics focus entirely on theory in relation to a case-study without engaging the actual history of a location or peoples. I not only think such a style diminishes the beauty of political writing, but is also a real detriment to quality of an argument. It can be absurdly easy for those of us who writing about contemporary political events to pass over the complex history that has led to the current situation. But one must resist that pull at all times, particularly when discussing non-Western locations. The cultural and historical context unique to each nation, gives life to our writing, life that helps remove the stale boundaries between reader and writing. Political writing is sometimes consumed as if one is far removed from what is being read. This is a mistake! What other type of academia can immediately place itself directly in the present day?

In fact, my focus on Indonesia initially stemmed from a desire to write about the present day problems a non-Western nation faces in combating terrorism. This initial focus can decipher the connections between the broad arguments, conclusions, and stories in this thesis. Chapter 1 explores far into Indonesian history to illuminate the tangible repercussions of colonialism leading to the current growth of terrorist groups in Indonesia. Chapter 2 attempts, as much as an American civilian outside Indonesia can, to peal back the hidden layers of Indonesian terrorist groups and prisons to exhibit the contemporary conditions that lead to prison radicalization.
Finally, Chapter 3 discusses the essence of prisons, surveillance, and state authority, conveying my conclusion that a usable surveillance system is the most advantageous solution to prevent violence.

I was initially drawn to Indonesia because of the rapidly changing circumstances of ISIS and other terrorist cells in the country. But such change also meant my thesis was unable to always stay current. A major JAD suspected bombing occurred only a month ago and the first general in Indonesian history was assassinated in a rebel ambush a week before the thesis deadline. But accepting that it is impossible to predict when and where terrorist violence will occur, if I had more time I would explore how COVID-19 has effected Indonesian prisons and radicalization. A select few articles have been recently published but none soon enough or comprehensive enough to use in this thesis.

However, even a laymen could imagine the crisis Indonesian prisons must have been in last year. The combination of overcrowding, fund mismanagement, and an airborne virus may have actually crushed some of the prisons that where already at the breaking point. A broken prison is not only detrimental to the state, but prisoners as well. Prisoners are completely dependent on state infrastructure or else they need to provide entirely for themselves, but that process must become far worse when prisons are completely isolated from general society. On the other hand, complete isolation also meant that the issues of smuggling and terrorist leadership communication also halted. Now, I am eagerly awaiting to read the yearly report terrorist tracking organization in Indonesia publish, which will hopefully convey more information about the effects of this pandemic.