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Decisions, Decisions: A Look at Government Decision-Making in Response to the Threat of Terrorism

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Decisions, Decisions: A Look at Government Decision-Making in Response to the Threat of
Terrorism

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
Of Bard College

By
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Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
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Introduction

The prevention of terrorism is an issue countries have been grappling with for decades and longer. The question of how to formulate and implement counterterrorism policies has proven to be difficult for policy makers, because every case is unique. For some, increased policing and hardened borders has become the policy of choice. For others, community outreach to at-risk groups has been the way that policy makers hoped to prevent terrorism. Even for others, direct attacks on groups and increased intelligence has been the policy of choice. There is a wide range of potential policies that countries can choose from, however, there has yet to be a uniform formula for decision makers to come up with specific and effective counterterrorism policies. This begs the question: How do countries engage in the decision making process?

In this paper, I argue that each country's own history and experiences with terrorism, is what informs governments on how to learn from its past experiences with fighting violent independence movements, and apply those lessons to current threats of terrorist groups. I argue that policy makers use history strategically when formulating new counterterrorism policies. By this, I mean that policy makers look to the past for what worked and did not work, then implement a policy that will work the best in the moment. I argue that countries learn and evolve from their past experiences. Counterterrorism strategies and policies are the result of lessons learned from previous experiences with counterterrorism, that policies are path dependent. In order to better explore this idea, a few questions are central. Do governments learn from previous experiences? What explains potential differences in counterterrorism strategies between and within countries? What factors affect governments' decisions regarding terrorism? How do

terrorist groups learn and evolve? Answering these questions will help explain why countries implement specific counterterrorism policies.

Case Studies

In order to demonstrate how countries learn and evolve, I plan to create a comparative analysis between Spain and Great Britain. Within those cases, four separate terrorist incidents have been chosen to be the point of analysis in order to best analyze how governments choose policies, how those governments react to opportunities to learn lessons, and how they apply what they learned in subsequent incidents. In this project, I will compare the British government's response to the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) Brighton Hotel bombing in 1984 to the response to ETA, or *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, (Basque Homeland and Freedom)'s Plaza República Dominicana bombing in 1986. Then, I will compare the government's response to the Al-Qaeda London Bombing in 2005 and the response to the Al-Qaeda Madrid Bombing in 2004. In each of these cases, I will focus on counterterrorism policies that were created two years after the attack, and other legislation that was passed explicitly as a result of the attack. Two years was chosen as the time period to focus on in order to keep the analysis within a specific time period. Brief histories of the terrorist groups and the counterterrorism policies before each incident will be provided, in order to give a context to each attack. The structure provides multiple levels of analysis. I chose to structure this project in this way to see potential relationships between responses to separatist/nationalist groups and transnational terrorist groups. By doing so, I highlight whether or not there are important differences or similarities in how governments choose to address and respond to groups with different ideologies and motivations. I highlight

how policies do or don't change according to the threat the country is facing, and how lessons are learned and applied as one incident is followed by another. The comparative approach of cases studies with sub-categories will be the most effective way to find continuities and discontinuities among the different cases. Within this paper, I will explore the comparisons within and across Spain and the United Kingdom. In more explicit terms, I am interested in how governments decide on a specific policy, and whether policy makers look to past experiences to inform their decisions of what should be implemented.

The reason I chose two European cases to analyze is to demonstrate how different the rationale for countermeasures to terrorism can be, even if those countries have similar features at face value. Great Britain and Spain are the ideal cases to focus on because they are in close proximity and have fairly similar economies and government structures. Both countries have experienced an ethno-national, domestic threat throughout their histories. ETA in Spain and the IRA in Great Britain belonged to the separatist/ethno-nationalist terrorism wave, which focuses on having a "clear political or territorial aim that is rational and potentially negotiable, if not always justifiable in any given case."¹ Both ETA and the IRA fall into this category because they had clear political aims, often revolving around independence. For ETA, the group wanted an independent Basque state. For the IRA, the group wanted Ireland to be an independent republic from Britain. Both Spain and Great Britain were able to come to a peaceful, political resolution with the ETA and the IRA respectively, but those resolutions came after very different policy implementations. Both countries also dealt with and currently are dealing with a transnational terrorist threat, in the form of Al-Qaeda. Although both countries suffered similar, egregious

¹ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002), 40.

attacks by Al-Qaeda, their responses were very different, making the comparison even more compelling. Although Spain and the United Kingdom experienced similar threats to their security, their own histories and cultures influenced how each country responded to the attacks.

I chose ETA, IRA, and Al-Qaeda as the terrorist groups to focus on because of how much of an impact they had on the history of counterterrorism policies within each country. The IRA and ETA were chosen because of the longevity of their campaigns, and because both groups came to a political resolution between themselves and their respective governments. Al-Qaeda was chosen because it is one of the most significant terrorist groups not only in Spain and Britain, but also throughout the world. In Spain and Britain, there were parliamentary debates and reactions of politicians after each attack, resulting in changes to counterterrorism policies and legislations. Each of the groups have different motivations and goals, so comparing the government responses to these three organizations will provide useful results. Something important to highlight is that policy makers in both Spain and Great Britain explicitly stated that the counterterrorism policies used in the fights against IRA and ETA were not sufficient in the fight against Al-Qaeda. This is important to my analysis because it highlights the need for policy makers to not just base their policies off of one group, but to make the policies more general.

Two different events from each country are used in order to help create a timeline of different policy implementations and show the evolution of counterterrorism policies over time. By choosing specific events instead of the conflict as a whole, it is easier to narrow down the debates surrounding policies, as opposed to focusing on all of the debates. For ETA, the 1986 Plaza República Dominicana bombing was chosen to analyze because it was a direct attack on a group representing the government. I am choosing the Madrid Train bombing in 2004 because it

was the most egregious terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda in Spain, and remains to be today. For Britain, I am choosing to include the Brighton Hotel Bombing in 1984 because it was a direct attack on Margaret Thatcher, and members of the Conservative party. I want to see what types of responses and debates occurred after a direct attack on the Prime Minister, and if this was different from an attack on the general population. I am including the London bombings in 2005 because at the time, it was the deadliest, and largest attack by Al-Qaeda in Great Britain. These four examples provide a strong case study in order to answer the question: How do countries learn from themselves and each other?

Although the United States also endures instances of domestic terrorism and attacks by Al-Qaeda, it is not included in this study for a few different reasons. The United States example is a special case because of its government system. The United States has a presidential system of government, while Spain and the United Kingdom have parliamentary systems. The most important difference between the two systems is that the executive power within the presidential system is within a single individual, the president, but in a parliamentary system, the executive power is within parliament. Since the power lies within the full parliament, there is much more opportunity for debate when thinking about new policies. In a presidential system, the president has veto power. Therefore, even if Congress comes to a decision after a long debate, the president has the power to veto their decision. This is important to note for this project because the decision making process is a key part of my analysis. I decided to not include a non-democratic case, because I am interested to see how democratic countries respond and learn from their previous experiences with terrorism, and how their histories with democracy constrain their decisions. I am choosing two cases because it will be the easiest way to create the

comparative case study. It also allows for the simplest and most straightforward way to explore my research questions. The addition of more case studies would complicate the analysis in a way that would not be productive for the overall goals of this paper.

Definition of Terrorism Debate

The definition of terrorism has been disputed between academics and practitioners of counterterrorism. Terrorism is difficult to study because people view terrorism through different lenses; no one terrorist attack or group is the exact same as the next, and those who have experienced it see it in different ways. The motivations, tactics, and origins of groups all differ, even in the cases where the groups are offshoots from others. Each group is constantly evolving to match changing government policies.

Prominent figures within the scholarly discourse surrounding the definition of terrorism include Audrey Kurth Cronin, Bruce Hoffman, and Ruth Blakeley. Another definition was created by the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism. Cronin and Hoffman fall on the realist side of the theoretical discussion, while Ruth Blakeley uses a critical security studies approach. The U.N. is an international organization whose definition is applied to real life situations. Cronin argues that terrorism should have “a fundamentally political nature, [to implement] the surprise use of violence against seemingly random targets, and [use] the targeting of the innocent by nonstate actors.”² Her specific definition is “the threat or use of seemingly random violence against innocents for political ends by a nonstate actor.”³ The issue with this definition is that it

² Cronin, “Behind the Curve,” 33.

³ Cronin, “Behind the Curve,” 33.

takes out the possibility of state action being seen as terrorism. This a deliberate choice of Cronin, which may make the definition of terrorism too narrow.

Bruce Hoffman, in his book *Inside Terrorism*, defines terrorism as “ineluctably political in aims and motives, violent — or, equally important, threatens violence, designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia), and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.”⁴ Hoffman’s definition of terrorism is much more specific than the other definitions proposed. However, it can be argued that it is too specific. Also, his definition potentially leaves out terrorist groups that are organized as a network.

Ruth Blakeley explains that the current orthodox terrorism studies “tend to focus on the activities of illiberal non-state actors against the liberal democratic states in the North.” But she argues that the definition needs to include state terrorism, especially when countries from the North have used it to repress countries from the South.⁵ This is an interesting position to take, and is one that is not often talked about. It is compelling, especially her idea on what constitutes state terrorism in the context of democratic states. However, this overlooks state terrorism by non-democratic states. In order to be much more inclusive, this definition needs to include both democratic and non-democratic states for state terrorism.

The U.N. uses a much broader definition of terrorism. The committee states that:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Rev. and expanded ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 43.

⁵ Ruth Blakeley, “Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies,” *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (September 2007), 228, <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210139>.

(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, infrastructure facility or the environment; or
(c) damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.⁶

This definition is much more encompassing than the other definitions explored above.

This is an important definition because it allows for state terrorism. Although it does allow for more events to be considered terrorism, this definition may be too wide. In order for this definition to be meaningful to this paper, it should be narrowed.

The definition of terrorism in this paper will be a combination of elements from Cronin, Hoffman, and the U.N. Cronin's discussion on the surprise use of violence, and the targeting of the innocents by nonstate actors will be used within the working definition of this paper because in each case, innocents were targeted. Hoffman's emphasis on far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target will be used, because each of the instances of terrorism analyzed in this paper were far-reaching past the immediate victims of the attack. The U.N.'s emphasis on the intimidation of a population and to compel a government to act in a certain way, are important to how terrorism is defined in this paper. Explicitly, terrorism is defined as the threat or use of random violence against innocents by a nonstate actor that has psychological implications reaching further than the immediate consequences, in order to intimidate a population or compel a government to act in a certain way.

Although there are competing definitions, generally, state terrorism needs to be included in the definition of terrorism, because it is possible for states to incite fear into populations using

⁶ Alex P. Schmid, "Frameworks For Conceptualising Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (August 10, 2010), 199, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550490483134>.

violence. For this specific paper, however, terrorism by state actors is not necessary to the definition, because the case studies being used were all done by non-state actors. Although I view state terrorism as a possibility, it is not necessary to this analysis.

Literature Review

The decision making process for governments is one that takes much consideration. There are different influences that lead governments to make specific decisions. In this literature review, different methods of decision making will be explored, ultimately ending in a discussion on game theory as a way to inform decision making for policy makers.

Roderic AI Camp, in Chapter 9 of his book titled, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century*, AI Camp emphasizes the importance of networking as a way for policy makers to make decisions. Using influential Mexicans as his case study, he shows how “influential Mexicans use their informal associations in formal institutional settings to influence major policy decisions.”⁷ He explains how organizations can become principal political actors, not individuals.⁸ He uses the term organizational networking to explain how organizations help to shape political decisions.⁹ Governments make their decisions based off of the influence of power elites and organizations. This analysis may not be the best to use when thinking about counterterrorism policies however, because this analysis mainly focused on Mexico, and does little to generalize to the governments outside of Mexico.

⁷ Roderic AI Camp, “Decision Making, Networking, and Organizations,” in *Mexico's Mandarins, Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* (University of California Press, 2002), 211 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp21h.13>.

⁸ AI Camp, “Decision Making,” 213.

⁹ AI Camp, “Decision Making,” 213.

Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, in their article titled, “The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions,” discuss the importance of regulatory institutions on the government decision making process. In their article, they argue that the “creation of conflicts between agents plays a central role in the collect of information and the provisions of incentives in public life as well as in private organizations.”¹⁰ The authors explain that policy makers do not achieve their own goals or the goals of interest groups due to the division of authority among branches of government, through the existence of courts and a constitution.¹¹ The main point of this paper is that the decisions made by public decision makers are constrained and influenced by the creation of regulatory institutions, in order to better the general public and to ensure that policy makers are not making selfish decisions. The issue with this analysis is that this may be too narrow, because it does not allow for states of exception to take place. As a result of the decisions only being formulated around the laws and constitution that are set in place.

Rebecca Freese, in her article title “Evidence-Based Counterterrorism or Flying Blind? How to Understand and Achieve What Works,” Freese argues for Evidence-based practice as the best way to come up with successful counterterrorism strategies. She argues that “research is the foundation for the evidence needed to make informed decisions when developing and evaluating counterterrorism programs....”¹² She argues there are weaknesses in “the research needed to formulate counterterrorism programs....” and that there is also a “...lack of research that evaluates the effectiveness of these programs once they are in effect.”¹³ She explains

¹⁰ Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, “The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions,” *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 6, no. 1 (1990), 26.

¹¹ Laffont and Tirole, “The Politics of Government,” 5.

¹² Rebecca Freese, “Evidence-Based Counterterrorism or Flying Blind? How to Understand and Achieve What Works,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 1 (February 25, 2014), 39, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/324>.

¹³ Freese, “Evidence-Based Counterterrorism,” 40.”

Evidence-based practice should consist of two stages, the research and evaluative research process. The research stage is the “scientific research, both qualitative and quantitative, that builds the foundation of knowledge.” The evaluative research focuses on “performing research on already existing program[s] to determine their overall effectiveness in practice so that new decisions can be made as to how to change, alter, or improve tactics and strategies.”¹⁴ She argues that decisions are made as a result of evidence gathered by the decision makers. This is a compelling argument, however, it does not account for the influence of history on decisions.

Steve Bennett, argues in his article titled “Innovating Government Decision Making Through Analytics,” that using analytics is the best way to formulate government decisions. He argues that the use of data management, data visualization, anomaly detection, and optimization are the best ways to counter cognitive challenges in human decision making. These include judgement biases, difficulties intuitively understanding large dynamic range quantitative information, and difficulties making consistent decisions under uncertainty.¹⁵ Bennett describes analytics as “the scientific process of transforming data into insights for making better decisions.” He explains that analytics can provide a “significant amount of benefit in the form of evidence that can vastly improve the government’s ability to make sound defensible decisions for good mission outcomes and efficient operations.”¹⁶ His argument is compelling, because he is able to effectively explain why the use of analytics is a useful tool when policy makers need to make strategic decisions, but this does not help describe why governments make their specific decisions.

¹⁴ Freese, “Evidence-Based Counterterrorism,” 45.

¹⁵ Steve Bennett, “Innovating Government Decision-Making through Analytics,” *SAS Institute*, n.d., 19.

¹⁶ Bennett, “Innovating Government,” 11.

In order to best analyze the government decisions of Spain and Great Britain, a game theoretical approach is taken, as it most effectively shows why policy makers formulate certain decisions. Game theory explains “the outcomes of interactions based on rational choices by individual participants...[it] formalizes a game metaphor to study the strategic interactions among actors, where actors have to coordinate their behavior with that of others, and where actors anticipate on the behaviour of others to decide on their own strategies.”¹⁷ Game theory is the best way to analyze governments’ decisions on counterterrorism because it allows for the possibility for different strategic policy options to be implemented, rather than just narrowly focusing on one specific policy.

The theoretical framework of game theory is essential to this project. It is an appropriate lens to view decisions surrounding counterterrorism policies through, because it highlights the strategic interactions between targeted governments and terrorists. What makes this interaction different is that the choices of both parties are interdependent, and the use of game theory allows for that interdependency to reveal itself.¹⁸ In the general sense, game theory is a good analytical tool to apply to decisions around counterterrorism policies because it provides strategic decisions and rationale for both players in the game.

The aspects of game theory that are essential to explaining this project are as follows: prospect theory, spectacular versus normal attacks, and proactive versus defensive policies. These three concepts within game theory will help illuminate why governments choose specific policies. Although the Spanish and British governments did not use game theory when figuring

¹⁷ Leon Hermans, Scott Cunningham, and Jill Slinger, “The Usefulness of Game Theory as a Method for Policy Evaluation,” *Evaluation* 20, no. 1 (January 2014), 2, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1356389013516052>.

¹⁸ Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler, “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005), 184.

out how best to respond, the governments were strategically deciding on policies based off of their own histories, which can be explained using game theory.

An assumption I will be making in this paper is that terrorists are rational actors. Game theory is governed by the assumption that, “the unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals.”¹⁹ For actors within a game, their actions are motivated by “the wants or goals that express their ‘preference.’ They act within specific, given constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the conditions under which they are acting.”²⁰ Individuals make choices “in relation to both their goals and the means for attaining these goals....[they] must anticipate the outcomes of alternative course of action and calculate which will be best for them.”²¹ Individuals acting within this framework will make the choice that will maximize their benefits and limit their costs. In current political rhetoric, often times politicians and country leaders refer to terrorists and their organizations as irrational, because their actions and decisions do not fit within the framework of standards of the international community. However, I will be ignoring this idea, instead focusing on purely their choices in regards to the other actor in the game: policy makers within governments. I will be ignoring this specific idea of irrationality because terrorist groups act in ways in order to maximize their goals and profits, which is what game theory is able to model. By only focusing on the game theoretical definition of what it means to be rational, I narrow the definition of rationality, which will allow me to focus purely on each actors’ individual choices and render social perceptions

¹⁹ John Scott, “Rational Choice Theory,” February 27, 2009, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090227085005/http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>.

²⁰ Scott, “Rational Choice.”

²¹ Scott, “Rational Choice.”

about them as unnecessary to the analysis. I will also make the assumption that governments function as rational actors, reacting to the other actor within the game through rational choice in order to better their payoffs.

To account for the uncertainty around what a terrorist's next move will be, the use of prospect theory will help inform the reader of how policy makers make decisions. In the cases of counterterrorism and other "adaptive adversary decisions" there are "defender decisions, attacker decisions, and uncertainty about outcomes."²² Merrick and Leclerc's article, "Modeling Adversaries in Counterterrorism Decisions Using Prospect Theory," explains the differences between a descriptive approach and a prescriptive approach. A descriptive approach to counterterrorism shows "how people do behave when faced with such decisions, rather than how they should behave. Descriptive models seek to be predictive of decision makers' actual behaviour" while prescriptive modeling is used to "help the decision maker to make better decision."²³ In the article, the authors "prescribe how the defender should behave, but....solve for the attacker's behaviour using descriptive decision theory."²⁴ The authors descriptively model attacker decisions, while aiding defensive decisions through prescriptive models.²⁵ Prospect theory is a descriptive approach. Prospect theory is the theory that helps to explain how people actually evaluate choices and make decisions. This theory explains that when one is faced with losses, players are risk seeking (one is willing to gamble to avoid the loss rather than accept the certainty of a loss) but then when one is faced with gains, players are risk averse (one wants to

²² Jason R. W. Merrick and Philip Leclerc, "Modeling Adversaries in Counterterrorism Decisions Using Prospect Theory: Modeling Adversaries Using Prospect Theory," *Risk Analysis* 36, no. 4 (April 2016), 681, <https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12254>.

²³ Merrick and Leclerc, "Modeling Adversaries," 681.

²⁴ Merrick and Leclerc, "Modeling Adversaries," 681.

²⁵ Merrick and Leclerc, "Modeling Adversaries," 681.

take the sure bet over a gamble even if there is a higher expected utility).²⁶ This theory helps to explain why certain actors engage in risk seeking behavior while others engage in risk aversion behavior.²⁷ Prospect theory will be fleshed out more within the analytical chapter, but an introduction to it is necessary in order to inform the reader of what is to come.

The specific differences between spectacular and normal attacks, along with the differences between proactive and defensive policies shed light on why governments choose certain policies over others. Proactive policies are policies that involve taking direct actions against terrorist groups or their sponsors.²⁸ A proactive policy aims to seek out terrorists by eliminating their resources and base of command.²⁹ One of the most quintessential proactive policies is the preemptive policy, which is when terrorists and their assets are attacked in order to influence future attacks by the group. Other examples of proactive policies include freezing assets, retaliating against a state sponsor of terrorism, gathering intelligence, infiltrating a terrorist group, or developing new counterterrorism technologies like new bomb sniffing techniques.³⁰ Defensive policies, on the other hand, are intended to “*deter* an attack by either making success more difficult or increasing the likely negative consequences to the perpetrator.”

³¹ These policies are often done in response to an attack. Defensive policies include deterrence, hardening of targets, security upgrades, and shoring up the weakest links.³²

²⁶ Bennett, “Innovating Government,” 10.

²⁷ Bennett, “Innovating Government,” 10.

²⁸ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 184.

²⁹ Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M., “Terrorism & Game Theory,” *Simulation & Gaming* 34, no. 3 (September 2003), 329, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1046878103255492>.

³⁰ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 184.

³¹ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 184.

³² Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 184.

It is also important to highlight relevant literature on spectacular and normal events. Spectacular events are large-scale terrorist events which result in huge human and monetary losses.³³ A normal terrorist event is one that occurs more regularly and does not produce as much devastation or destruction. These ideas surrounding spectacular and normal terrorist attacks will help explain the types of attack ETA, the IRA, and Al-Qaeda did on Great Britain and Spain, and will provide explanations as to why governments implemented certain policies. All three of these concepts will be further explained in the fourth chapter, in order to get an in depth picture of what happened after these four events.

Structure

In chapter one of this project, the Spanish government's responses to ETA's attack on the Plaza República Dominicana will be compared to the British government's responses to the IRA's attack on the Brighton Hotel. This chapter will focus on the histories of the IRA and ETA, along with the history of the counterterrorism policies that were created before each respective attack, in order to create historical context. Then, the chapter will focus on the events themselves, and the immediate reactions to each attack. In this chapter, I hope to highlight how countries manage and react to ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism. Similarly with chapter one, chapter two will begin with a brief history of Al-Qaeda, then give some historical context to where counterterrorism policy was in that moment. Then, the two events will be explained, along with the subsequent political reactions. In chapter three, a game theoretical approach will be applied to these two cases, to highlight important differences and similarities between policies,

³³ Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler, "Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 2 (April 2010), 355, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709355414>.

and to understand how policy makers come to their decisions. An analysis of the different government responses will take place to explain why similar countries have different reactions to similar terrorist groups.

ETA and IRA

History of ETA and IRA

The Irish Republican Army, or the IRA, has had one of the longest paramilitary campaigns in recent years.³⁴ The group was active from 1969 to 2005, with a cease fire occurring in 1997. This paramilitary campaign came in the form of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or the PIRA. The PIRA was the armed side of the left-wing, Irish Republican political movement, since the split from the original IRA in 1969.³⁵ The PIRA and the older, original IRA, split in 1969, due to an ideological difference between the two factions. PIRA members saw the use of violence and terrorism as a better way to achieve the group's goals, rather than strictly adhering to the agreed upon political process.

The PIRA, along with its political wing the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), was an “overtly nationalist movement seeking the removal of British rule from Northern Ireland...”³⁶ The group's short term aim was to force the British military presence out of Northern Ireland. Its long term aims were outlined in the PIRA Constitution, including “to guard and honor and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Ireland. To support the establishment of an Irish

³⁴ John Horgan and Max. Taylor, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (September 1997), 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559708427413>.

³⁵ “Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, accessed April 16, 2019, <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/provisional-irish-republican-army-pira>.

³⁶ Horgan and Taylor, “The Provisional Irish,” 1.

Socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation. To support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful government in sole and absolute control of the Republic.” In order to achieve these goals, the PIRA engaged in “bombings, shootings, beatings, high-profile assassinations...kidnapping...extortion and armed robberies.”³⁷ The PIRA attacked civilians, those within the British government, and those who represented the British government, including police forces, in order to elicit a response from the British government. The group was organized as a “cellular-based, hierarchically organized authoritarian”³⁸ to ensure efficiency. This ensures efficiency for the group because it provides clear leadership, structure, aims, and goals.

The original IRA and PIRA were created as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This conflict started in 1920, when the British government decided to split up Ireland after years of warfare. The state was called the Irish Free State and it was an independent Republic of Ireland. An independent state in the predominantly Catholic south was created, while a smaller, northern district called Ulster with a Protestant majority, remained part of the United Kingdom, because the old IRA’s leadership agreed to allow Ireland’s six northern counties to remain under British rule.³⁹ The southern district descended into civil war over the partition, ending with Eamon DeValera becoming president of the new Irish Free State. He did not allow Ireland’s claim to the North.⁴⁰ In the North the Catholics, who often had republican or nationalist sympathies, faced discrimination throughout multiple facets of their lives, including in economic,

³⁷ Horgan and Taylor, “The Provisional Irish,” 1-2.

³⁸ Horgan and Taylor, “The Provisional Irish,” 3.

³⁹ Kathryn Gregory, “Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Aka, PIRA, ‘the Provos,’ Óglaigh Na Héireann) (UK Separatists),” Council on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2010, accessed April 21, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/provisional-irish-republican-army-ira-aka-pira-provos-oglaigh-na-heireann-uk>.

⁴⁰ Gregory, “Provisional Irish Republican.”

social, and legal sectors. Protestants, on the other hand, were sympathetic to British rule and considered themselves unionists, while controlling the patronage that gave out government jobs.

In the late 1960s, civil rights marchers engaged in civil disobedience due to discrimination against Catholics in the British-ruled province. However, these marchers were met by violent crackdowns by the Protestant-dominated police, which was called the Royal Ulster Constabulary. In response to this, the British government sent out army troops to the streets, in order to keep peace. These tensions are what led to the split in the IRA, one between the “Dublin-based ‘officials’ who advocated for a united socialist Ireland by peaceful means and the Belfast-based ‘provisionals’ who vowed to use violence as a catalyst for unification.”⁴¹ This splintering ultimately led to the creation of the PIRA.

Much like in Great Britain, Spain also dealt with a separatist/nationalist terrorist group. In Spain, the Euskadi ta Askatasuna, or Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) had a 50 year history, beginning during the Franco dictatorship, and ending in 2011 through a negotiated end and a ceasefire. ETA was a left-wing armed organization in Spain. The group saw itself as a “national liberation movement.”⁴² For 50 years, the group “waged a political struggle to secure the independence of the Basque region.”⁴³ ETA was formed in 1959 to fight for an independent Basque state. For ETA, the Basque region included four provinces in Spain, including the Basque Country and Navarra, along with three territories in France. The motivation of ETA was to secure the independence of the Basque region against the Spanish government. ETA

⁴¹ “Provisional Irish Republican.”

⁴² Petxo Idoiaga, “The End of ETA,” *Jacobin Magazine*, accessed April 16, 2019, <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain>.

⁴³ Javier Martín-Peña and Susan Opatow, “The Legitimization of Political Violence: A Case Study of ETA in the Basque Country,” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 17, no. 2 (April 2011), 136, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10781919.2010.550225>.

eventually became the radical expression of Basque culture and identity.⁴⁴ In 1975, after Franco's death, the region was able to achieve self-governance through the democratic process in Spain. However, ETA wanted complete independence and remained committed to achieve full Basque independence.⁴⁵ Many radical Basque nationalists believed that the "political transition to democracy was only a cosmetic change and that Spain remained a dominating and authoritarian presence in the Basque region."⁴⁶

ETA was formed as a direct result of the Franco dictatorship decision to crack down on the Basque language and on the civil liberties of those living in Spain. The radicalized nationalist youth broke from the more moderate PNV in response to the central Spanish state, and they emphasized the need for a direct attack against the Franco government.⁴⁷ Early ETA attacks focused on concentrated killing or sabotaging of extensions or representations of the Spanish state, including killing of targeted military or police personnel and the sabotaging of state run entities like trains. They sought to destroy the core of the Spanish state, both politically and directly to its infrastructure. These tendencies continued throughout its history.

Attacks

One of the IRA's most prominent attacks was the Brighton Hotel Bombing in 1984 when the group orchestrated a direct attack on the British government. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, along with many other government officials were at the Brighton Hotel for the annual convention of the U.K. Conservative Party. Patrick Magee, a member of the IRA, placed an

⁴⁴ Martín-Peña and Opatow, "The Legitimization of Political Violence," 136.

⁴⁵ Martín-Peña and Opatow, "The Legitimization of Political Violence," 136.

⁴⁶ Martín-Peña and Opatow, "The Legitimization of Political Violence," 137.

⁴⁷ Idoiaga, "The End of ETA,"

explosive device in the bathroom above the suite where Thatcher was staying, which resulted in 5 deaths and 31 injuries; Prime Minister Thatcher was not injured in the blast.⁴⁸ One of the most prominent people that was injured was Norman Tebbit, who was the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, along with his wife, who were both paralyzed. At the time, it was one of the IRA's most notorious attacks.

The motivation of the IRA to attack those at the conference was due to their anger towards the government for how the Irish were being treated. Those within the IRA believed that Margaret Thatcher and the British government were torturing prisoners, shooting demonstrators, oppressing the Irish through curfews, and holding Nationalists in prison without charge.⁴⁹ For those in the IRA, the bombing was a direct response to "1981, the hunger strike, and what [the] community experience[d] under Thatcher."⁵⁰ They believed they were bombing a government that was oppressive, and one that was directly attacking them.

Right around the time that the IRA was conducting their attacks in Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, ETA was engaging in a similar terrorist campaign. One of the more notorious attacks by ETA was the attack on the Plaza República Dominicana in 1986. The bombing took place on July 14th in 1986 in the República Dominicana Plaza. The attack was conducted by prominent members of ETA, including Antonio Troitiño, Inés del Río Prada, and Iñaki de Juana Chaos. The main target was the convoy carrying members of the *Guardia Civil*

⁴⁸ Catherine Mayer, "How the Brighton Bombing 30 Years Ago Portended Peace," Time, October 10, 2014, <http://time.com/3484611/brighton-bombing-thatcher-30-years-1984/>.

⁴⁹ Kieran Hughes, *Terror Attack Brighton: Blowing up the Iron Lady* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Politics, 2014), Chp. 4.

⁵⁰ Hughes, *Terror Attack*, Chp. 4.

from the nearby traffic school on *Principe de Vergara*.⁵¹ 12 officers lost their lives, while at least 30 other people were injured in the attack.⁵²

The motivation of the attack can be traced to a few specific events. The bombing took place one day before the opening of the newly elected parliament, three weeks after the Spanish General Election where the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) won the general election by a huge majority.⁵³ The bombing also came the day after the decision of the French government to extradite Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, the alleged military leader of ETA, also known as "Comando España."⁵⁴ These two events are significant for the context of the bombing. ETA members were angry over the loss of their leader to France, and the PSOE was the political party that supported the GAL, or the paramilitary group employed by the state to fight ETA.

Government Policies Before the Attacks

In order to better understand the context in which the government was making their decisions, it is important to include major aspects of the counterterrorism strategy from before each respective attack. By including major aspects of the counterterrorism strategy from before each attack, it will demonstrate how much governments used their history to inform their counterterrorism decisions. The use of additional counterterrorism policies also provides historical context to the policies that were created.

⁵¹ Héctor Vázquez, "25 años del atentado de la plaza de la República Dominicana," *El Diario Montañes*, July 14, 2011, <https://www.eldiariomontanes.es/rc/20110714/mas-actualidad/nacional/anos-atentado-201107141407.html>.

⁵² Vázquez, "25 años,"

⁵³ Vázquez, "25 años,"

⁵⁴ Pedro Conde Zabala, "ETA comete en Madrid el crimen más sangriento de su historia," *La Vanguardia*, July 15, 1986, <http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1986/07/15/pagina-4/32884532/pdf.html>.

Before the Brighton Bomb attack, the main form of dealing with counterterrorism for the British government was seeing counterterrorism through the lens of counterinsurgency and criminalization. In the British case, they used tactics like the enactment of emergency legislation in order to “simplify the laws of procedure and evidence to allow for preventive detention of suspects,”⁵⁵ focusing on pre-emptive intelligence collection and employing “the use of military in civil operations.” By using aspects of counterinsurgency within British counterterrorism, the government “provided a domestic, peacetime adaptation of strategies developed to deal with the essentially wartime exigencies of a colonial power....counterinsurgency strategies [were] being applied to all forms of civil action....”⁵⁶ The government was implementing counterinsurgency strategies into their counterterrorism tactics to deal with other forms of civil disobedience along with terrorism. The tactics the government implemented were “exceptional legislation; intelligence; pre-emptive controls; military involvement in civil disturbances; and media management.”⁵⁷ The government, by enacting these types of policies, were elevating the threat to a state of exception, which allowed the British government to create harsher policies in the name of security. The government also often engaged in talks with the IRA, which is an important difference between the IRA and Al-Qaeda.

Since much of the counterterrorism legislation centered around the criminalization of the IRA, the use of internal surveillance was an important implementation for the strategy of the government. The military, policing, and security services were integrated into counterterrorism strategy. The police force even before the Brighton Bombing was restructured to include highly

⁵⁵ Jenny Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency: The British Experience,” *Social Justice* 15, no. 1 (31) (1988), 84.

⁵⁶ Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency,” 85.

⁵⁷ Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency,” 86.

specialized police units to deal with specific crimes of terrorism.⁵⁸ Between 1965 and 1979, 27 Special Patrol Groups were created in order to fight crime. These measures were used in order to increase state power in the domestic sphere, by “tightening of political and social controls, particularly through the legislative delimiting of acceptable political behavior.”⁵⁹ Early British counterterrorism criminalized certain aspects of political activity to directly stop terrorists and terrorist sympathizers.

The criminalization and counterinsurgency strategies implemented to deal with the IRA led to the creation of a state of exception for the British government, where they were able to infringe on the rights of its citizens in the name of security. The laws were exceptional because they created “substantial alterations of the processes of criminal justice administration and in the capacity for legal systems to maintain common-law values.” The Prevention of Terrorism Act was the starkest example of this, because it cracked down on civil liberties and increased the power of the police all in the name of security for the general public. One specific section was Section 12, which stated “a person ‘reasonably suspected’ of involvement in specified offenses can be detained for up to 48 hours by police on their own authority without charge or access to a solicitor. This detention may then be extended to seven days by the Home Secretary.”⁶⁰ Specifically in the Republic of Ireland, the government passed the Emergency Provisions Act 1973, which suspended trial by jury. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act was passed as a temporary act, but then was extended to a five year life.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency,” 92.

⁵⁹ Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency,” 92-94.

⁶⁰ Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency,” 86.

⁶¹ Hocking, “Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency,” 88.

In parallel to Great Britain, Spain battled ETA through the criminalization of its members, yet the amount of counterterrorism policies was much smaller than that of Great Britain. During Franco's rule, there were no specific antiterrorism laws. This was due to the Franco government seeing any type of civil disobedience, including terrorism, as a threat to his power. Only after he was out of power was antiterrorism law incorporated into the criminal justice system. During the late 1970s and 1980s, antiterrorist measures were incorporated into specific criminal justice systems during the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) governments.⁶² Only after the reform of the criminal code (*Código Penal*) and the code of criminal procedures (*Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal*) were there laws put into place.⁶³

After the reform of the two codes, the Spanish government enacted a few specific laws which were directly written into the criminal code and the code of criminal procedures. These laws were enacted in 1977, 1980, and 1983. In 1977, the high court (*Audiencia Nacional*) was created through the *Real Decreto Ley*, in order to take over jurisdiction on all terrorist activity, ultimately replacing the Franco tribunal of public order (*Tribunal de Orden Público*).⁶⁴ In 1980, the *Ley Organica* limited the principle of presumption of innocence and the right to *juicio ordinario* (ordinary trial) which is recognized in the constitution in article 24.4. These two laws were foundations of antiterrorist measures that were implemented into the criminal justice system.⁶⁵ Detention became something policy makers focused on in order to counter the threat of

⁶² Salvador Martí, Pilar Domingo, and Pedro Ibarra, "Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Counterterrorist Measures in Spain," in *National Insecurity and Human Rights*, ed. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 1st ed., Democracies Debate Counterterrorism (University of California Press, 2007), 126. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1ppbw5.10>.

⁶³ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, "Democracy, Civil Liberties," 126.

⁶⁴ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, "Democracy, Civil Liberties," 127.

⁶⁵ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, "Democracy, Civil Liberties," 127.

ETA. In LO 14/83, article 527 stated that “terrorist suspects having incommunicado have the right to legal counsel, but not to a lawyer of their choice, and could not notify relatives or a third person of their arrest.”⁶⁶ LO 6/84 limited *habeas corpus*, along with allowing a judge to implement incommunicado detention if the person accused was suspected of terrorist activity.⁶⁷

By way of criminalization of ETA, the Spanish government attempted to dismantle ETA organisational structure and cells through criminal proceedings. ETA members would be arrested and prosecuted by state security forces and not be treated as a specific type of threat. The intelligence services of Spain also underwent different reforms during the 70s and 80s in order to improve processes and operations.⁶⁸ These services were in place during the Franco era to maintain the overall control of the country, not to specifically deal with terrorist groups. The time period between the Franco Era and the Plaza bombing was categorized by the notion that “security operatives [were able] to act preemptively and capture ETA militants before they were able to carry out terrorist attacks.”⁶⁹

The implementation of the dirty war by the government of Spain was the largest policy difference between Great Britain and Spain, and it demonstrated the legacy of the authoritarian government. The dirty war was a paramilitary campaign against ETA that was completely funded by the government. This was a tactic used within and after the Franco Era, but was eventually stopped in 1987 due to the controversy that arose surrounding this policy. This tactic was stopped shortly after the bombing took place. The Spanish government learned that acting

⁶⁶ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 127.

⁶⁷ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 127.

⁶⁸ Alberto Ballesteros, “Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Spain,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 10, no. 11 (2018), 9.

⁶⁹ Ballesteros, “Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” 10.

outside of the law is costly, and that illegal and illegitimate practices by states should not be allowed within a democracy.⁷⁰

Considerations

There are two important aspects of the British case to take into consideration when thinking about the government's response. The attack was conducted in order to kill Margaret Thatcher, who at the time, was the Prime Minister of Great Britain. This may have shifted the discussions within Parliament because the intention of the attack was to kill her in retaliation for her political decisions. The targeting of Margaret Thatcher was a specific choice made by the IRA and, as a result, the government may have had to reconsider their response to the attack.

Another aspect of this attack to take into consideration is that the IRA mainly functioned within the Republic of Ireland, but, The Brighton Hotel Bombing was done in England. Since it was in England, the attack may have elicited a greater or different response than before, because it took place where the government had a physical location. This might have had an impact on the government's reaction to the attack on the Brighton Hotel because before the attack, the government viewed the IRA as a terrorist group that was not a huge threat to England because the group mainly operated outside in the Republic of Ireland. However, once the bombing occurred in England, the threat level increased for the government.

When looking at Spanish counterterrorism, especially during the ETA era, it is important to consider the influence of the Franco authoritarian regime on the creation of counterterrorism laws. Since Spain had a long history of authoritarian governance under Franco, policy makers were much more aware of how much impacts laws have on civilians' personal rights. This was

⁷⁰ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, "Democracy, Civil Liberties," 130.

different than in Great Britain because the government had never had an authoritarian experience in recent history.⁷¹

Government Policies After the Attacks

After the Brighton Hotel Bombing, the immediate response of the British government was to preserve what was already planned. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to speak at the convention, although she did alter her speech to reflect what had just occurred. The government, four days after the terrorist attack, was debating whether or not to make amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. Those within the Lords Chamber were debating changes to the bill, including “road checks set up by the police” and “the powers of entry and search of premises given to the police in the quest for evidence.”⁷² There was a desire to change the amendment because as it was written, entry and search of premises only applied “if a person [was] known to have committed a murder the search for him could begin at once, but if he [was] known to be intending a murder it must be delayed.”⁷³ The amendment was ultimately denied, because those within the parliament did not believe that those wanting to search a premise should use both a circuit judge and a magistrate in order to get permission to search a home.

In the months after the Brighton Hotel attack, the British Parliament held countless debates on what to do in regards to countering the IRA threat. In the debates, the members of parliament called the event a crime. Minister of the State, Home Office (Lord Elton), explained

⁷¹ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 125.

⁷² Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 455 (1984) col. 1095. Accessed April 22, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1984-10-18/debates/5de3caca-e443-4de4-8e3b-9dd666caee68/PoliceAndCriminalEvidenceBill?highlight=terrorism#contribution-a512f58b-a44f-4ea4-bf78-b8a44050876d>.

⁷³ Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 455 (1984) col. 1095.

that the biggest legislative change to the Terrorism Act as a result of the Brighton Hotel bombing was the “extension of the powers of arrest and detention under Section 12 of the Act to those involved in international terrorism.”⁷⁴ There was focus on the importance of civil liberties within the discussion, because the provisions to the terrorism bill could be seen as infringing on rights of the people. In column 732, it was said by Lord Boyd-Carpenter that “it must be the case that the highest and most liberal of principles need to be examined very critically, and perhaps their operation suspended, when society is faced with the kind of situation with which our society has been faced.”⁷⁵ Lord Boyd-Carpenter, in this instance, was making the case to elevate the threat to a state of exception.

Along with attempting to broaden the role of the police, they also installed “recording machines....in police stations in London, Leicester, South Tyneside, the Wirral and Winchester.”

⁷⁶ Some in the government wanted to implement tape recording to better the security of the country. However, people in Parliament including Lord Elton, went against this idea, because he believed it “would not just [be] premature, but also counterproductive to oblige every force, in every part of the country, to embark on a scheme that we had not got right, with equipment which might not be the best.”⁷⁷ The Parliament did not end up agreeing, and did not change the legislature to allow specific recording devices.

⁷⁴ Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 460 (1985) col. 722. Accessed April 22, 2019, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1985-02-21/debates/3c47b3d3-260c-46fa-aa82-97386e9dd407/PreventionOfTerrorism\(TemporaryProvisions\)Act1984\(Continuance\)Order1985](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1985-02-21/debates/3c47b3d3-260c-46fa-aa82-97386e9dd407/PreventionOfTerrorism(TemporaryProvisions)Act1984(Continuance)Order1985).

⁷⁵ Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 460 (1985) col. 732.

⁷⁶ Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 455 (1984) col. 1181. Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1984-10-18/debates/5de3caca-e443-4de4-8e3b-9dd666caee68/PoliceAndCriminalEvidenceBill?highlight=terrorism#contribution-a512f58b-a44f-4ea4-bf78-b8a44050876d>.

⁷⁷ Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 455 (1984) col. 1180.

Detainment of criminals after arrest sparked a large debate within Parliament. There was debate as to whether those arrested should be held longer than 24 hours. Those arguing against it feared that “the time limit on his detention for the Poole offence may have been passed by the time he is arrested for it under Clause 31 and very likely will have been passed by the time it is possible to transfer him to Pool for it to be investigated.”⁷⁸ The argument against the bill was that they would let the suspect go too quickly before they would be able to transfer them over to Poole, so those within Parliament wanted to extend the period for detention. Ultimately, this attempt at a change was not agreed to. Following the Brighton bombing and the arguments in Parliament, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 was enacted as a direct result of this attack.

Even in the case of the Brighton Bombing, those in the Parliament were aware their history was important when considering how to move forward with counterterrorism. After the Brighton Bombing, those in Parliament were debating a way to move forward with an Anglo-Irish agreement. This Anglo-Irish Agreement was the attempt by Thatcher’s government to consult the Irish government on matters concerning Northern Ireland, in order to better relations between the two government entities.⁷⁹ In this debate, policy makers were focusing on the best way to end the violence. Policy makers argued for political or constitutional initiatives to bring the community in Northern Ireland together, along with other ways of bringing the different communities together. John Hume, a politician from Northern Ireland, explained that “there is only one clear-cut lesson to be learnt from this tragedy — that our past attitudes, have brought us where we are. Unless we agree to take a hard look at our past attitudes, we shall be

⁷⁸ Par. Deb. H.L., vol. 455 (1984) col. 1135. Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1984-10-18/debates/5de3caca-e443-4de4-8e3b-9dd666caee68/PoliceAndCriminalEvidenceBill?highlight=terrorism#contribution-a512f58b-a44f-4ea4-bf78-b8a44050876d>.

⁷⁹ John Bew, Martyn Frampton, and Íñigo Gurruchaga, *Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country*, Crises in World Politics (London: Hurst, 2009), 97.

going nowhere fast and we shall be committing ourselves to the dustbin of history, clutching our respective flagpoles.”⁸⁰ David Winnick also talked about lessons from history. He explained that he does not “believe that a united Ireland is possible in the near future.... There are all kinds of lessons to be learned from what has happened in Northern Ireland during the past 60 years.”⁸¹ Those within parliament knew that the history should be considered with how to move forward with counterterrorism policies after the Brighton Bombing.

Much like in the case of Great Britain, policy makers engaged in discussions surrounding counterterrorism policies. After the bombing of the Plaza, Herri Batasuna, which was a far left Basque nationalist coalition that supported the independence of the Basque state, called on the government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to negotiate with ETA, in order to end the violence.⁸² However, the government was unwilling to do so unless ETA decided to “lay down its arms.”⁸³ Since the Spanish government was unwilling to negotiate with ETA at the time, the addition to the counterterrorism strategy had to build off of what was already previously established.

In the year after the Plaza Bombing, those within the Spanish Parliament discussed the threat of ETA. The Plaza bombing was only mentioned once within the government document found, and it was mentioned among a list of other attacks ETA conducted.⁸⁴ In this debate,

⁸⁰ Par. Deb. H.C., vol. 87 (1985) col. 781. Accessed April 30, 2019. <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1985-11-26/debates/4815aeac-bb42-4ca2-9d9b-2230fd69f610/Anglo-IrishAgreement?highlight=ira%20lesson#contribution-f3fc6ac4-30d4-48e8-a73f-5fa918af979b>

⁸¹ Par. Deb. H.C., vol. 87 (1985) col. 816. Accessed April 30, 2019. <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1985-11-26/debates/4815aeac-bb42-4ca2-9d9b-2230fd69f610/Anglo-IrishAgreement?highlight=ira%20lesson#contribution-f3fc6ac4-30d4-48e8-a73f-5fa918af979b>

⁸² “9 Civil Guards Die in Madrid Blast,” *The New York Times*, July 15, 1986, Accessed April 22, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/15/world/9-civil-guards-die-in-madrid-blast.html>.

⁸³ “9 Civil Guards.”

⁸⁴ Cortes Generales, “Diario De Sesiones Del Congreso De Los Diputados Pleno Y Diputacion Permanente,” Congreso, no. 34, March 4, 1987, Accessed April 30, 2019, 1925, http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L3/CONG/DS/PL/PL_034.PDF.

parliament members debated changes to the Anti-Terrorist Law from 1984. El señor Huidobro Diez argues that the political arm of ETA should not be allowed to participate in the democratic process, because of the close ties between the two branches.⁸⁵ Don Felipe González argued for the addition of the political wing into the democratic process of the government. Diez argued that ETA terrorists need to be punished to the maximum, because of the direct attack that are doing to Spain, a western, democratic parliamentary.⁸⁶

The largest implementation was the addition of a longer detention sentence for suspected terrorists. In 1988, there was the creation of article 520 of LO 4/88 that allowed for incommunicado detention to be extended to 5 days.⁸⁷ Much of the legislation for the Spanish case was in the terms of criminality because the government viewed ETA members as criminals, rather than terrorists. Even after the bombing, the Spanish government continued to use its previous tactics against ETA. There was very little direct response by the government right after this bombing because it was seen just as another attack by the group.

Al-Qaeda

History of Al-Qaeda

Both Great Britain and Spain have had to deal with a terrorist threat coming from a transnational terrorist group in the form of Al-Qaeda. Founded in 1988, it is a global organization that is composed of two major components: a core, which is also known as

⁸⁵ Cortes Generales, "Diario De Sesiones Del Congreso De Los Diputados Pleno Y Diputacion Permanente," Congreso, no. 34, March 4, 1987, Accessed April 30, 2019, 1926, http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L3/CONG/DS/PL/PL_034.PDF.

⁸⁶ Cortes Generales, "Diario De Sesiones," 1928.

⁸⁷ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, "Democracy, Civil Liberties," 125.

Al-Qaeda Central, and five major regional affiliates, sometimes known as franchises.⁸⁸ Al-Qaeda has a wide network of regional and local militant groups that have taken on the ideology and name of the core group. There are also grassroots jihadists which are individuals or small cells of people that are inspired by the core of Al-Qaeda, but are not an official part of the group.⁸⁹ Al-Qaeda was established by Osama bin Laden, along with some of his affiliates. The group began as a “vanguard organization working with kindred groups to facilitate the jihad they believed was necessary to establish a global caliphate.”⁹⁰ Those within Al-Qaeda want to establish a new Islamic state, modeled after the medieval caliphate. The caliphate would be governed according to sharia law and would include all former and current Muslim lands, which stretches from Southeast Asia to Western Europe. This would be done as a long term objective, and the group would use instrumental, calibrated and “pragmatic”⁹¹ violence in order to further this goal.

For those who ascribe to the ideology of Al-Qaeda, the United States is the “pre-eminent evil spirit at war with Islam, a global oppressor and international bully, and the puppet master manipulating apostate regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and elsewhere.”⁹² Al-Qaeda members see the United States and its allies as the main obstacle to creating a global, Islamic caliphate. Those in Al-Qaeda are willing to attack the allies of the United States in order to impact the United States in a different way. Al-Qaeda in general is “pursuing a strategy of

⁸⁸William Rosenau and Alexander Powell, “Al-Qaeda Core: A Case Study,” *CNA Analysis & Solutions*, October 2017, 40. 3.

⁸⁹ Scott Stewart, “Defining Al Qaeda,” Stratfor, October 18, 2012, Accessed April 22, 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/defining-al-qaeda>.

⁹⁰ Stewart, “Defining Al Qaeda,”

⁹¹ Rosenau and Powell, “Al-Qaeda Core,” 5-6.

⁹² Lewis Herrington, “British Islamic Extremist Terrorism: The Declining Significance of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan,” *International Affairs* 91, no. 1 (January 2015), 6, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12184>.

attrition, playing a long game, hoping to sap the will of the godless Americans, the ‘worshippers of the cross,’ the ‘pigs and the monkeys,’ and the Jews, and other adversaries in order to continue the struggle.”⁹³

Al-Qaeda in Great Britain and Spain has been a relatively new phenomena for both countries when comparing it to the rest of the history of the two countries. Al-Qaeda members are willing to attack the allies of the United States in order to challenge their role in the Muslim world. This is why using Spain and Great Britain as cases are meaningful, because they are allies of the United States. In Great Britain, those who were members of Al-Qaeda were involved with engagement with Islamic political activism, which was sometimes referred to the “Islamic fundamentalist movement.”⁹⁴ This was used to describe the environment in which United Kingdom Islamic extremist terrorism has emerged. Members of Islamist extremist groups in the United Kingdom and Spain, including those in Al-Qaeda, are influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, who “feared globalization would corrupt Islamic society,”⁹⁵ During the 1990s, Middle Eastern dictators created harsh policies directed towards people practicing different fundamentalist ideologies, resulting in a mass exodus of preachers looking for places to live in Europe where they hoped to find people who ascribed to their preachings. Organized fundamentalist Muslims as a movement within European countries, specifically in the UK, do not constitute a homogeneous set of individuals, but rather only a small portion of Muslims.

⁹³ Herrington, “British Islamic Extremist Terrorism,” 7.

⁹⁴ Herrington, “British Islamic Extremist Terrorism,” 19.

⁹⁵ Herrington, “British Islamic Extremist Terrorism,” 20.

Attacks

The London Bombings in 2005 were a group of attacks carried out by members of Al-Qaeda. Multiple attacks took place on July 7th that targeted the underground subway and bus systems of London. The attacks were carried out by four men; Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, and Hasib Mir Hussain,⁹⁶ who were all were British citizens. Seven people were killed on a subway at Aldgate Square, six were killed at Edgware Road, 26 were killed at King's Cross/Russell Square, and thirteen died at Tavistock Square, while over 700 were treated for injuries.⁹⁷ All of the bombers were killed in the attacks. Three of the bombers were sons of Pakistani immigrants while the fourth was born in Jamaica, but had British citizenship. For the bombers, their motivation for the bombings was due to their belief that “democratically elected governments continuously perpetuated atrocities against my [Muslim] people all over the world.”⁹⁸ For the London bombers, they perceived the United Kingdom as supporters of the war in Iraq, and in their eyes complicit in the “bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture...”⁹⁹ of Muslims around the world.

Much like the UK, Spain dealt with a terror attack motivated by the government's decision to partake in the Iraq War and support the United States. On March 11, 2004, ten bombs in different backpacks were detonated on four commuter trains. In all, the bombs were detonated in three different stations, and killed 191 people and wounded more than 1,800.¹⁰⁰ Al-Qaeda

⁹⁶ “7/7 London Bombings: What Happened on 7 July 2005? - CBBC Newsround,” accessed April 21, 2019, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/33401669>.

⁹⁷ Intelligence and Security Committee, *Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* (May 2006): 6, accessed April 21, 2019, https://fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc_7july_report.pdf.

⁹⁸ “London Bomber: Text in Full,” September 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm.

⁹⁹ “London Bomber,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm.

¹⁰⁰ C. N. N. Library, “Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts,” CNN, accessed April 16, 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fast-facts/index.html>.

claimed responsibility shortly after the attack occurred, and those eventually connected to the crime were Islamic militants who were based in Spain but were inspired by Al-Qaeda.¹⁰¹

Government Policies Before the Attacks

Before the July attacks, the British counter-terrorism strategy was known as CONTEST. This strategy was put into place, and “brought together the work of all departments (including that of the intelligence and security agencies) under one aim: *‘to reduce the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence.’*”

¹⁰² The purpose of the strategy was to reduce the threat of an attack on Great Britain and to reduce the vulnerability of an attack on the country. The four aspects of the strategy were: “PREVENT.... PURSUE....PROTECT.... PREPARE....”¹⁰³ The British government’s intention with implementing this policy was to prevent terrorist attacks from ever happening through deradicalization policies, disruption of current terrorist activities, implementation of security measures to protect against any potential attacks, and preparation for any type of attack to take place.

The Terrorism Act of 2000 and 2001 were pieces of legislation that shaped counterterrorism policy in Great Britain during the early 2000s. The Terrorism Act of 2000 ushered in a new definition of terrorism that was not based solely off of the IRA threat. The definition of terrorism was created to have a wider reaching scope. Along with a new definition

¹⁰¹ C. N. N. Library, “Spain Train Bombings,”

<https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fast-facts/index.html>.

¹⁰² Intelligence and Security Committee. *Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*. London: Great Britain. UK Parliament, 2006. Accessed April 2019. https://fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc_7july_report.pdf, 5.

¹⁰³ Intelligence and Security Committee, *Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*. London: Great Britain. UK Parliament, 2006. Accessed April 2019. https://fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc_7july_report.pdf, 5.

of terrorism, the act also gave police forces broader jurisdiction to counter terrorism internationally and domestically.¹⁰⁴ The stop and search powers in Great Britain were extended to specific geographical areas and these powers could be used by law enforcement without any suspicion.¹⁰⁵

The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 also changed the counterterrorism policies of Great Britain. The most noteworthy change was the “indefinite detention without charge or trial of foreign nationals”¹⁰⁶ which was reserved for foreign nationals that were suspected of terrorism or who had solidified terrorist links that could not be deported to their country of origin.¹⁰⁷ This act also forced the disclosure of information by citizen for law enforcement purposes, and widened and re-enacted parts of the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act of 1964. Much of the legislation concerning terrorism during the early 2000s was implemented as a result of Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack in the United States.

In the wake of 9/11, policy makers chose to focus on maintaining and augmenting the policies they already had in place in order to fight against a potential Al-Qaeda threat. There were very few new policies implemented between the ETA attack and the Al-Qaeda attack. On May 25, 1988 the article 520 of LO 4/88 allowed for incommunicado detention to be extended to 5 days.¹⁰⁸ In 1995, with the introduction of LO 10/95, there was the creation of the definition of the “individual terrorist” where a suspect didn’t need to belong to a specific armed group. It also introduced the prison sentence for collaboration with a terrorist organization, which included

¹⁰⁴ Christian Honeywood, “Britain’s Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with Human Rights,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 9, no. 3 (September 2016), 30, <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1546>.

¹⁰⁵ Honeywood, “Britain’s Approach,” 30.

¹⁰⁶ *Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001*, London: Great Britain, Uk Parliament, 2001. Accessed April 2019. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/pdfs/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf

¹⁰⁷ Honeywood, “Britain’s Approach,” 30.

¹⁰⁸ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 127.

“any suspected form of cooperation.” Additionally, the criminal act of expressing support for terrorist activity was introduced.¹⁰⁹

The People’s Party (PP) administration in 1999 decided to meet with ETA members, adding negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government to the counterterrorism strategy. During the 1990s and early 2000s, counterterrorism laws were hardened through the introduction of measures that toughened criminal procedures for suspected and convicted terrorists. During this time, protest politics, perceived social dissent, and unconventional politics were criminalized. LO 7/2003 of June 30 2002, increased the maximum prison sentence through accumulated crimes to forty years and it made a stronger demarcation in sentencing between common criminal justice cases, and it altered conditions of detention. Article 510.4 of LO 13/2003, on October 24, 2003, extended incommunicado detention to thirteen days but allowed for the suspect to have a second forensic medical examination, which would be appointed by a judge.¹¹⁰ There was a polarization of political discourse where all radical politics of any kind were criminalized, because they were seen to be allies of ETA. Before the Madrid bombings, much of the counterterrorism laws were focused specifically on ETA terrorism and were written into the criminal codes of the country.

Considerations

It is important to highlight the influence of the Iraq War and the 2012 Olympics on the bombing in London. On March 18th, 2003, the British Parliament voted on whether or not Great Britain should enter into the Iraq War. Ultimately, the vote was passed with a majority of Labor

¹⁰⁹ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 127.

¹¹⁰ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 132.

and Conservative members voting to enter the war. For those advocating to enter the war, they believed that “Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles, and its continuing non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions, pose[d] a threat to international peace and security....”¹¹¹ so they were advocating to militaristically enter Iraq as a result. Many of those within Great Britain were supportive of the war only if another United Nations resolution was put into place along with Resolution 1441. However, those in Parliament decided to vote on whether or not to go into the war without another resolution, and an affirmative vote won out in Parliament. After Great Britain decided to enter into the war, Al-Qaeda made it clear they were not supportive of this decision. Osama Bin Laden explicitly stated that Great Britain would be among their targets for a terrorist attack due to the country’s involvement in the Iraq War. Bin Laden released a statement saying “We [Al-Qaeda] have the right to retaliate against the countries involved in the international coalition against Iraq, especially the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, Poland, Italy, and Japan.”¹¹² This statement illuminates a motivating factor as to why the terrorists planted bombs in London.

Another factor that influenced the terrorists decision to bomb London was London’s bid for the 2012 games. On July 6, the International Olympic Committee was going to vote on the host city. According to David Videcette, a Scotland Yard investigator, the London attack was supposed to happen 24 hours earlier, on the day of the vote. He explained that police had found text messages saying that the attack needed to be delayed because one of the attackers’ wife had

¹¹¹ Par. Deb. H.C., vol. 401 (2003) col. 760. Accessed April 23 2019, <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2003-03-18/debates/ddc70cf1-f37d-4936-bc03-d5a5ecb02d40/Iraq?highlight=iraq#contribution-cef52807-2c1c-49ba-818f-0fde77641a03>

¹¹² José G. Montalvo, “Voting after the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Democratic Elections,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93, no. 4 (November 2011), 1147, https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00115.

a miscarriage and the police found evidence of two of the attackers buying large amounts of ice in order to cool the bombs down.¹¹³ The reason why the attackers did not want London to get the Olympic bid was because they were part of an Islamic sect, Tablighi Jamaat, that was petitioning to build a large, headquarter mosque right next to the proposed Olympic site in London.¹¹⁴ However, the mosque would not have been able to be built because the Olympic committee required the “compulsory purchase of part for the land earmarked for the mosque, reducing the maximum size of the project.”¹¹⁵ The attackers may have been motivated by this as well as Al-Qaeda, since there were clear links between the bombers and the community of Tablighi Jamaat. This connection is important to highlight because it demonstrates another set of motivations for the attackers.

In Spain, it is important to note that elections for a new president were taking place at the same time the bombing happened in addition to their involvement within the Iraq War. The bombings most likely influenced the presidential election, due to Spain’s involvement in the Iraq War. In March 2003, the Prime Minister of Spain at the time, José Maria Aznar, who belonged to the Conservative Party called the People’s Party, joined the United States in the war against terrorism.¹¹⁶ The opponent at the time, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party or the socialist party, ran on a ticket that advocated for the removal of troops from Iraq and was not popular at first. This was due to much of the population supporting

¹¹³ Andrew Gilligan, “7/7 Bombings ‘Were Aimed at Olympic Bid,’” *Telegraph*, October 31, 2015, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11968330/77-bombings-were-aimed-at-Olympic-bid.html>.

¹¹⁴ Gilligan, “7/7 Bombings.”

¹¹⁵ Gilligan, “7/7 Bombings.”

¹¹⁶ Montalvo, “Voting after the Bombings,” 1147.

the war in Spain. After the terrorist attacks, public opinion switched and ultimately José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero won the election due to his desire to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq.

Government Policies After the Attacks

The London bombings in 2005 elicited a major response from the British government. After the attacks, The Intelligence and Security Committee posted a report that gave specific suggestions to the government. In that report, there were recommendations, along with criticisms about how the security forces handled the attack. The government decided to take the committee's recommendation of enhancing the threat level system that alerts the country what the current threat level is. The government decided to "simplify the system, reducing the number of threat levels and alert states...[along with] that the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the central security authorities in Government departments streamline and better coordinate the threat level and alert state systems by adopting common terminology, introducing uniform systems of ranking and signalling increases in the threat level and the alert states."¹¹⁷ Also, the government agreed to be more transparent with the public by having "a public communication campaign to explain the system and improved coordination of public messages on the threat...."

¹¹⁸ The government agreed that understanding the radicalisation process was important, and it was being carried out under the PREVENT strand of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy.¹¹⁹

The government committed to the "implementation of neighbourhood policing in all forces by

¹¹⁷ *Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, London: Great Britain, U.K. Parliament, 2006. Accessed April 23 2019, https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/200605_ISC_7July_Report_Govt_Response.pdf, 3.

¹¹⁸ *Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, 3.

¹¹⁹ *Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, 4.

April 2007, supported by an expansion of police community support officers from the current 6,300 to 16,000.”¹²⁰ The government promised to dedicate “£30 million extra...and £60 million in 2007/08 specifically to expand the capabilities of Special Branch and associated specialist counter-terrorism investigation functions in forces outside London.”¹²¹ FCO led activities that helped to counter radicalisation, including “[e]mpowering voices of mainstream Islam roadshow, Muslims of Europe conference, and the addition of more Arabic and Urdu media FCO spokespeople in the Islamic Media team....”¹²²

Along with the report, parliamentary debates took place in order to formulate a way to best handle and respond to the July attacks. In the days after the London attacks, the government focused on police investigations in order to apprehend the attackers. A year after the attacks, there was a parliamentary debate on the best way to move forward in countering terrorism. John Reid, a British Labour Party politician and Secretary of State at the Home Office at the time, explained that he wanted to overhaul the Home Office, reform the immigration and nationality directorate and rebalance the criminal justice system.¹²³ He was a proponent for keeping the same counter-terrorism strategy as before, but just tweaking it, by putting more emphasis on preventing radicalisation. He explained that “prosecution is, and will remain, our preferred way of dealing with terrorists and disrupting their activity.”¹²⁴ He also advocated for a more transparent system so the citizens of Britain would be more aware of the potential terrorist threat.

¹²⁰ *Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, 5.

¹²¹ *Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, 6.

¹²² *Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*, 7.

¹²³ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1123. Accessed April 23, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-10/debates/06071010000001/Counter-TerrorismStrategy>

¹²⁴ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1117.

He explained that he would keep the control orders already in place, and would continue to make new control orders if need be. Reid argued for a strengthened border security and tracking system. Reid also argued for “engagement in the Muslim community at the grassroots level....”

¹²⁵ David Davis, a British Conservative Party member, called for the “the reinforcement [of] our counter-terrorist intelligence operations”¹²⁶ before having a more transparent system in place.

Nick Clegg, a member of the Liberal Democrats, argued for a single integrated border police and to implement an electronic border system. Roger Gale, a member of the British conservative party, was concerned about the emergency services being run effectively against another attack like the London bombings. He wanted the Airwave system be able to work underground.

Andrew Mackinlay, a member of the British Labour Party, was concerned on keeping the seaports of Britain safe. Stewart Hosie, a Scottish National Party member, argued for budget allocation for counterterrorism strategies and intelligence to also include all parts of the UK.

Richard Shepard, member of the Conservative party, questioned the legislative proposals on the basis of civil liberties and the Human Rights Act 1998, and called into question the government’s interpretation of the basic rights of the citizens in the UK.¹²⁷ Throughout this debate, only Muslims were talked about in regards to counter radicalisation strategies.

Even a year after the event, Parliament was still debating on how to improve the counterterrorism strategy within Great Britain. One of the main arguments was over whether or not the previous counterterrorism strategy CONTEST was enough, and whether or not there needed to be a specific government organization to deal with counterterrorism. John Reid argued

¹²⁵ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1124. Accessed April 23, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-10/debates/06071010000001/Counter-TerrorismStrategy>

¹²⁶ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1119.

¹²⁷ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1127.

that he wanted to “bring further transparency and understand of the nature of the terrorist threat; [in order to] to raise awareness of the various strands of work that make up our counter-terrorist strategy; to explain publicly the United Kingdom’s system of threat and response and levels; and to undertake to make the United Kingdom national threat level public from 1 August.”¹²⁸ Reid argued for more transparency on issues surrounding terrorism and to get the public more involved on strategies. Nick Clegg (LD) advocated for a single integrated border police, and to implement an electronic border.¹²⁹ Reid also advocated that there should be “focus and concentration on community engagement in the radicalisation programme, and understanding it better in ideological terms and confronting it in debate and discussion....”¹³⁰ Steward Hosie (SNP) advocated for better intelligence on potential terrorist attacks.¹³¹

As a result of the parliamentary debates, the British government introduced new security measures. At a speech after the attacks on August 5th, 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair laid out twelve security measures that the government said would be “taken now, immediately, or under urgent examination.”¹³² These twelve security measures included deportation rights, new anti-terrorism legislation (Terrorism Act 2006), refusal of asylum due to participation or affiliation with terrorism, extension of stripping away of citizenship powers, setting a maximum time limit for future extradition cases involving terrorism, new court and pre-trial procedures for cases involving terrorism, extension of control orders, increase of court capacity of special

¹²⁸ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1119. Accessed April 23, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-10/debates/06071010000001/Counter-TerrorismStrategy>

¹²⁹ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1122. Accessed April 23, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-10/debates/06071010000001/Counter-TerrorismStrategy>

¹³⁰ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1124. Accessed April 23, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-10/debates/06071010000001/Counter-TerrorismStrategy>

¹³¹ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (2006) col. 1126. Accessed April 23, 2019.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-10/debates/06071010000001/Counter-TerrorismStrategy>

¹³² “Full Text: The Prime Minister’s Statement on Anti-Terror Measures,” *The Guardian*, August 5, 2005, sec. Politics, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1>.

judges to hear terrorist cases, proscription towards Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the successor organisation of Al Muhajiroun, new citizenship rules, increased border security, and consultation on the closure of places of worship that foment extremism.¹³³ These security measures sought to give the British government more power to prevent and remove those involved in terrorism.

A physical piece of legislation that was created out of debates within Parliament was the Terrorism Act 2006. The legislation was heavily influenced by Blair's speech following the bombings. This legislation introduced new offences including encouraging or inciting terrorism, the possession of terrorist publications, and the glorification of terrorism.¹³⁴ One of the largest aspects of this act was the hindering of rights of speech for those living in Britain. The act created the "offence of Encouragement of Terrorism....the offence of preparation of terrorist acts....offence of terrorist training...."¹³⁵ among other offences as well. An important thing to note is that the indefinite detention clause was repealed in 2006 with the creation of the new counterterrorism legislature because it was seen as an infringement on the civil rights of the British. The act was met with much controversy because of the restriction of rights that would entail as a result of the implementation of the new policies.

An important aspect to include within this case is how policy makers within the British parliament were aware that their previous policies were not sufficient in countering the threat of Al-Qaeda. In the Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report debate, John Reid explained that there have always been difficulties in the intelligence sector, but now with the emergence of global terrorism, the difficulties have only increased. He explained that "for nearly

¹³³ "Prime Minister's Statement."

¹³⁴ Christian Honeywood, "Britain's Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with Human Rights," *Journal of Strategic Security* 9, no. 3 (September 2016), 35, <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1546>.

¹³⁵ Home Office, "Correspondence: The Terrorism Act 2006," Gov.UK, April 11, 2006, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-act-2006>.

half a century after the end of the second world war, our intelligence agencies...played an important role in a conflict in the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland.”¹³⁶ He went on to explain that “...the form of today’s enemy has changed. In the past, we faced a foe with a structure...we often knew the structure of an active service unit of the Provisional IRA, along with its commander.” He then went on to explain that “not only did our former foe have a structure, but that structure was fairly static and unchanging. When it come to al-Qaeda and the like, we face an enemy that is structured only loosely, if at all, and comprises numerous largely autonomous groups...all that makes the job of our intelligence services much harder than it was before.”¹³⁷ The comparison of Al-Qaeda to the IRA demonstrates that British policy makers have learned from their previous experiences. What this demonstrates is how those within Parliament were aware of the history of their own counterterrorism threats, and recognized what needed to change from one threat to the next. Although the tool of counterterrorism remained the same, in this case intelligence services, the way it was implemented and used needed to change.

The Madrid attacks were met with a visceral reaction from the government, much like in the case of Great Britain. Those in power thought that ETA was responsible at first. Prime Minister José María Aznar explained in a call to a newspaper that “It was ETA, Antonio, don’t doubt it in the least.”¹³⁸ This sentiment was felt throughout much of the government. In an

¹³⁶ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (July 2006) Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report, col. 1308. Accessed April 30, 2019.

[https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-11/debates/06071165000001/IntelligenceAndSecurityCommittee\(AnnualReport\)?highlight=al-qaeda%20ira#contribution-06071165000046](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-11/debates/06071165000001/IntelligenceAndSecurityCommittee(AnnualReport)?highlight=al-qaeda%20ira#contribution-06071165000046)

¹³⁷ Par. Deb. H.C. vol 448 (July 2006) Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report, col. 1308. Accessed April 30, 2019.

[https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-11/debates/06071165000001/IntelligenceAndSecurityCommittee\(AnnualReport\)?highlight=al-qaeda%20ira#contribution-06071165000046](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2006-07-11/debates/06071165000001/IntelligenceAndSecurityCommittee(AnnualReport)?highlight=al-qaeda%20ira#contribution-06071165000046)

¹³⁸ Lizette Alvarez and Elaine Sciolino, “Bombings In Madrid: Election Outcome; Spain Grapples With Notion That Terrorism Trumped Democracy,” *The New York Times*, March 17, 2004, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/17/world/bombings-madrid-election-outcome-spain-grapples-with-notion-that-terrorism.html>.

emergency cabinet meeting, Interior Minister at the time Angel Acebes said, “ETA had been looking for a massacre in Spain.... Unfortunately, today it achieved its goal.”¹³⁹ However, that sentiment changed once new evidence was found. Once it was determined that Al-Qaeda affiliates were the ones who carried out the attack, there were some minor shifts in counterterrorism policies that dealt with new security measures, which directly impacted the Spanish Muslim community. There was a new law passed that regulated Islamic mosque and created the possibility of expulsion of foreign terrorist suspects (HRW 2005b: 8-9, 134).¹⁴⁰

Once politicians came to the conclusion that it was Al-Qaeda who was behind the Madrid bombings, the government of Spain was engaged in many different dialogues. The former president of the Popular Party (Partido Popular or PP), José María Aznar, explained in an epilogue to a book of memoirs, that the “very successes achieved in the struggle against ETA in recent years may have led us to lower our guard against the fundamentalist threat.”¹⁴¹ There was a sentiment throughout the government that the counterterrorism policies set into place before the Al-Qaeda attack were ineffective against the Al-Qaeda threat. José Antonio Alonso, Interior Minister from April 2004 to the spring of 2006, in 2005 said that “...this Minister, his team, and the entire government have been aware from the start that we should implement a set of measures which, while not eliminating the threat, would nevertheless make us more prepared to respond to this threat to our security, and therefore, to our freedom and the democratic values

¹³⁹ “Scores Die in Madrid Bomb Carnage,” *BBC News*, March 11, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3500452.stm>.”

¹⁴⁰ Martí, Domingo, and Ibarra, “Democracy, Civil Liberties,” 134.

¹⁴¹ Fernando Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and the Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” *Real Instituto Elcano*, October 14, 2008, 3.

that upholds it, to our lifestyle and our progress, and also to the security and freedom of our allies.”¹⁴² Again, in another congressional hearing, José Antonio Alonso explained:

“... when we arrived to the Interior Ministry, we told the professionals at the Police and Civil Guard information services: We have a serious problem in terms of Islamic terrorism, al-Qaeda terrorism and new international terrorism. Do we have sufficient resources? Do we have a strong enough structure? [...] Basically, the Police and Civil Guard information services told us two things: one, that we clearly have to increase the resources and personnel available to the external information units, that is, the Police and Civil Guard units that focus on international terrorism; and two, they also told us that we should create a professional structure that can receive information, analyse it, assess the risks of the new terrorism and, consequently, make operational recommendations to the Police and Civil Guard. And this is what the current team at the Interior Ministry is doing and we are hoping for results from this.”¹⁴³

Those within the Spanish government were aware that their previous strategies would not be useful in the fight against Al-Qaeda. The counterterrorism strategy of Spain both before and after the 2004 Madrid Bombings centered around the *Grupo Especial de Operaciones* (Special Group of Operations). This special group was a part of the Spanish *Cuerpo Nacional de Policía* (National Police Corps), and it has special response capabilities, countering and responding to terrorism, and is responsible for protection duties. Before the Madrid bombings, the Spanish security forces (*Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado* or FCSE) was another important institution that dealt with counterterrorism. It is worth noting that, like much of the legislation, the counterterrorism tactics and training used by the GEO was molded to only be able to counter ETA. The new threat by Al-Qaeda forced policies to adapt and change.

The largest change that came as a result of the Madrid bombing was that the Interior Ministry along with top specialists from security forces began creating and implementing new

¹⁴² Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 3.

¹⁴³ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 3.

policies.¹⁴⁴ At first, the Ministry was attempting to correct the weaknesses of the previous counterterrorism measures. The Ministry in May 2004 altered its structure by creating the “executive committee for the unified command of the national security forces (*Comité Ejecutivo para el Mando Unificado* or CEMU)” that then created the wide-ranging counter-terrorism plan (*Plan Operativo de Lucha Contra el Terrorismo*) which “aimed at preventing and responding to the different varieties of terrorism that pose challenges to Spain, through specific attention focused on al-Qaeda related terrorism.”¹⁴⁵

Along with the creation of the new committee, the government decided to strengthen police central units of information and intelligence. Creation of local information groups from the National Police and the Civil Guard were also created in places like Ceuta and Melilla.¹⁴⁶ Jobs were increased at both the National Police and the Civil Guard, in order to strengthen counterterrorism services. Hiring for interpreters and translators in the Ministry in Arabia and other relevant languages like Urdu were also increased.¹⁴⁷ New departments were created that specifically dealt with procedures and operational methods used by international terrorists, along with learning about what the government should be investing in. For example, the *Comisaría General de Información*, which was the counterterrorism branch of the National Police Force, added new units in strategic analysis, information systems and technologies, and cyber-terrorist.

¹⁴⁸

The biggest change to the bureaucratic structure of the government was the creation of the National Anti Terrorism Coordination Centre (*Centro Nacional de Coordinación*

¹⁴⁴ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 3.

¹⁴⁵ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 4.

¹⁴⁶ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 4.

¹⁴⁷ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 6.

¹⁴⁸ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 6.

Antiterrorista, or CNCA) on May 28th, 2004. The main point of this committee was to make coordination between different parts of government more streamlined. It was also used to unify different policing databases throughout the government. The government also decided to establish a Prevention and Reaction Plan to deal with “possible incidents involving non-conventional components and to prepare an appropriate response to threats”¹⁴⁹ involving nuclear, radioactive, bacteriological, or chemical components in 2005. Enabling regulations for the laws concerning the prevention and blocking of financing for terrorism was done in order to halt the financing of international terrorism. This was done in order to ban or block any financial flow, monitoring, position or operation related to the financing of terrorist activities.

The next step in attempting to mitigate radicalization amongst terrorist groups was in the prison system. In November 2004, criminals who had been convicted of crimes relating to international terrorism were dispersed among 30 prisons, in order to prevent radicalization from large concentrations of terrorists in one space. Along with this, particular prisoners were under surveillance by the FIES system (*Fichero de Internos de Especial Seguimiento*). In 2005, Spain transposed the EU directive of April 2004 that makes it “mandatory for passenger carriers to provide a prior list of the person who plan to cross and external border of the EU.”¹⁵⁰ Spain also pledged to implement the EU Action Plan for the Fight Against Terrorism. There was increased cooperation between the US and Spain after the Madrid bombings, and Spanish police forces worked closely with the police forces of predominantly Muslim countries.

¹⁴⁹ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 10.

¹⁵⁰ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 13.

A Game Theoretical Approach to Great Britain and Spain

Explanations of Theories

In order to best model how governments react to terrorist attacks, I will view the policy choices surrounding the Al-Qaeda, ETA, and IRA attacks through a game theoretical lens. This will provide a theoretical framework to describe how and why certain policies were implemented, along with seeing how governments learned from their previous experiences. This section will highlight the similarities and differences between the four separate events as well.

Optimal and Suboptimal Modeling: Reactive and Defensive Policies

In Optimal Counterterrorism modeling, it is argued that terrorists will respond to counterterrorism policies, which will produce substitution effects. In other words, a terrorist group will see the counterterrorism tactics, then change their type of attacks in order to sidestep the counterterrorism tactics implemented by the government. In order to mitigate this, a government must implement policies that will either “minimize the expected value of attacking the targets that are most valuable to the terrorists”¹⁵¹ or use counterterrorism strategies that are not target specific. Robert Powell argues in “Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources” that a government must first allocate resources to defend a target with the highest potential payoff for the terrorists, in order to sway terrorists from attacking that target. This decreases the potential payoff for the terrorist by increasing the cost of attacking value, so terrorists will look to the next target with the higher potential payoff to attack. Governments

¹⁵¹ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work,” *University of Chicago*, February 8, 2008, 5.

should repeat this process until there are no more resources left to allocate. The government should, then look to invest in counterterrorism strategies that are not target specific, like intelligence, border security, and counter-terrorist operations.¹⁵² This should be done in order to hinder the potential for terrorists to substitute the different targets by reducing payoffs overall, and allow for better defense against natural disaster or accidents that are not pre-planned.

In direct opposition to Optimal modeling, Suboptimal Counterterrorism modeling explains why there are potential inefficiencies in counterterrorism policies. In one line of argument, there is a distinction between proactive and defensive counterterrorism policies. Every counterterrorism policy can be put into the categories of proactive or defensive policies. As explained in the literature review, defensive policies are policies that react to a terrorist event, whereas proactive policies actively seek out specific terrorist groups. There are both pros and cons to each type of policy. In instances of proactive and preemptive counterterrorism approaches, there is a potential of public good provision, but it may be undersupplied. These approaches may also impose negative externalities on other countries by shifting the target of focus to them.¹⁵³ It is argued that politicians will “under-invest in proactive counterterrorism for two reasons: to free ride on other countries’ counterterrorism investments and to avoid reprisal attacks from terrorists.”¹⁵⁴ There is also potential for inefficiencies when it comes to informational asymmetries between multiple governments.¹⁵⁵ This is where governments have secret information on the vulnerability of specific targets. If the government were to follow

¹⁵² Robert Powell, “Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources,” *The American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (2007), 527-528.

¹⁵³ de Mesquita, “The Political Economy,” 6.

¹⁵⁴ de Mesquita, “The Political Economy,” 6.

¹⁵⁵ Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler, “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005), 199.

optimal counterterrorism policies, then it would defend those targets which are thought to have the highest payoffs for the terrorist groups.¹⁵⁶ This creates a paradox for the government because it wants to maintain secrecy but also provide security for the country. This is an example of suboptimal counterterrorism practices.

Proactive policies are the best way to counter terrorist groups for a few different reasons. In comparison to defensive measures, proactive measures display “the greater variety of underlying game forms, which implies a richer set of policy responses.”¹⁵⁷ In the case of many proactive policies, government officials are given more options as to what the potential outcomes may be when using these specific policies. When a government chooses to use proactive policies, these policies often yield “purely public benefits”¹⁵⁸ while most defensive policies “give private benefits and public costs, with countries competing to match one another’s actions to not draw the attack.”¹⁵⁹ In other words, if a country uses defensive policies, then other countries will be at greater risk to an attack, so they too will implement defensive policies, resulting in a race to build the biggest defenses. It then becomes a competition with each other to fortify their own nation, all the while the terrorist group is learning from the different policies and getting stronger. In proactive policies, this does not happen, because the proactive policies directly target the terrorist group, which renders them incapable of attacking any country.

Proactive policies are the better option when dealing with a domestic terrorist threat. In cases of domestic terrorism, “countries engage in preemption because limiting such attacks solely

¹⁵⁶ Robert Powell, “Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability,” *The American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4 (2007), 799.

¹⁵⁷ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 199.

¹⁵⁸ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 199.

¹⁵⁹ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 199.

benefits them.”¹⁶⁰ In game theory framework, the proactive policies are often used in domestic terrorism situations because the policies benefit the country and no one else. In preemptive policies against transnational terrorist groups, the benefits can be applied to other countries, resulting in a country potentially free riding off of the original country implementing the strategy and resources (the free-ride game). This would be a negative thing for the original country because they are expending resources while another countries expends nothing while still benefiting for the original country’s efforts. For the purposes of this paper, the use of defensive and proactive policies will be signifiers of the type of strategy being implemented by the respective governments.

Normal and Spectacular Events

In terrorism, there are two types of events that can occur: normal and spectacular attacks. A spectacular terrorist event is a large-scale terrorist event which results in huge human and monetary losses,¹⁶¹ while a normal terrorist event is one that occurs more regularly and does not produce as much devastation or destruction in each individual attack. In counterterrorism, preemption is the best way to counteract normal attacks, because deterrence only diverts the attacks by making such events more difficult, but preemption seeks out the terrorists by eliminating their base of operations and resources, completely ending the organization.¹⁶² For spectacular terrorist events, deterrence is the dominant strategy, because deterrence costs are less

¹⁶⁰ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 191.

¹⁶¹ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 356.

¹⁶² Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M., “Terrorism & Game Theory,” *Simulation & Gaming* 34, no. 3 (September 2003): 319–37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1046878103255492>. 329.

than preemptive costs. These two types of events will help to explain the reactions against the three different terrorist organizations.

Another important signifier of terrorist groups is whether they are M-type or P-type groups. A P-type is a politically motivated group that will accept partial concessions of a government.¹⁶³ Along with this, these types of groups will allocate “their remaining resources to political purposes if no accommodations are made....[they] are also concerned about losing the high moral ground from a never-ending terrorist campaign.”¹⁶⁴ A M-type is a militantly motivated terrorist group that “expend[s] resources on attacks if their demands are not fully met....Such terrorists have an incentive to create backlash attacks in reaction to their target’s response and may even franchise new groups for this purpose.”¹⁶⁵ M-type groups also present demands that can not be only partially satisfied, they must be fully satisfied or not at all.¹⁶⁶ These different categorizations are important to include, in order to help illuminate how governments react to and deal with each type.

Prospect Theory

The theory that provides the background to this project is Prospect theory. As described in the Literature Review, prospect theory is necessary to talk about when thinking about how actors make decisions in actual circumstances. Prospect theory was formulated as a way to counter and invalidate expected utility theory. This theory is used to model individual decision making when uncertainty is involved. The theory was initially developed for simple prospects

¹⁶³ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 356.

¹⁶⁴ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 356.

¹⁶⁵ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 356.

¹⁶⁶ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 356.

with specific monetary outcomes and simple stated probabilities, but has since developed to include more involved choices. Prospect Theory is based off of two phases in decision making: editing and evaluation phases. The editing phase “consists of a preliminary analysis of the offered prospects, which often yields a simpler representation of these prospects.” In the evaluation phase, “the edited prospects are evaluated and the prospect of highest value is chosen.”¹⁶⁷ This theory claims that whether an actor will show risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior depends partially on the way the choice is phrased. Prospect theory can account for the fact that certain actors may take risks if presented with losses, but will not take risks if presented with certainty. This theory is predicated on the assumption that “value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets.”¹⁶⁸ When thinking about counterterrorism policies, gains and losses are two concepts that are heavily considered when thinking about what policies will be implemented, because governments seek to minimize the losses of resources and people, and increase its gains. Prospect theory is necessary to apply to counterterrorism policy decisions, because it demonstrates why governments choose certain policies over others.

Prospect Theory Example

Below I will provide a model in order to demonstrate how prospect theory works. This will be a basic model to show what I mean when I say risk aversion and risk seeking behavior. This model was taken from Steve Bennett’s article “Innovating Government Decision-Making through Analytics.”

¹⁶⁷ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (1979), 274, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185>.

¹⁶⁸ Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 263.

The number that appears after each choice alternative in [brackets] is the number of respondents that chose that alternative.

Problem 1

Choice A: 80% chance of \$4,000 [20]

Choice B: \$3,000 for certain [80]

Problem 2

Choice C: 20% chance of \$4,000 [65]

Choice D: 25% chance of \$3,000 [35]

Here, we don't need to know the risk tolerance of the respondents, or their utility functions – we've measured their actual choices so we know the outputs of those things for these problems. Looking at Problem 1, the majority preferred choice B. So, from expected utility theory, we can say that for these respondents, the utility of choice B compared to the utility of choice A must be described by the following inequality, otherwise respondents would not have chosen B:

$$u(3,000) > 0.8u(4,000) \quad (3)$$

Now, looking at Problem 2, we see that most respondents preferred Choice C over Choice D. So we can say that for this majority of respondents:

$$0.2u(4,000) > 0.25u(3,000) \quad (4)$$

Multiplying everything in Inequality (4) by four to facilitate comparison, we get the following inequality, which is equivalent to Inequality (4):

$$0.8u(4,000) > u(3,000) \quad (5)$$

Comparing Inequalities (3) and (5) we can see that for the same respondents with the same inherent utility evaluations of \$3,000 and \$4,000 we get a complete contradiction of preferences under the same utility functions, just from the difference in how problems 1 and 2 are framed. This preference inconsistency violates expected utility theory – it's easy to see that Inequalities (3) and (5) just don't make sense together. Without going into as much explanatory detail, let's quickly look at the reverse problem – when we are talking about losses instead of gains:

Problem 1

Choice A: 80% chance of losing \$4,000 [92]

Choice B: Lose \$3,000 for certain [8]

Problem 2

Choice C: 20% chance of losing \$4,000 [42]

Choice D: 25% chance of losing \$3,000 [58]

Without working out the inequalities, we can see the same preference reversal with losses, but in the opposite directions - while we are risk averse when looking at gains (we'll take the sure bet over the gamble, even at higher expected utility), we are risk seeking when we are facing losses (we'll gamble to avoid the loss rather than the certainty of loss).

This model will help inform why policy makers in Spain and Great Britain made certain decisions.

Application to Cases

The use of prospect theory can be applied to the cases of Great Britain and Spain. In the case of the IRA attack, the decision makers in the British parliament intentionally elevated the threat to one that needed a state of exception, so the British government could legitimize its harsher security practices. This was done because there was uncertainty surrounding how the IRA would continue its campaign. Policy makers engaged in risk seeking behavior in this instance, because there was uncertainty around whether or not the IRA would attack England again, or that they would attack the head of government again. This incident also triggered the renewed attempts at an agreement and communication between the government of Ireland. This incident was one of the first incidents done in England, and it was the first attack directly aimed at the head of the government, so the government elevated the threat to exist in a state of exception, due to the context in which the attack occurred. Prospect theory can be applied to this, because the government was facing losses, which was the IRA conducting attacks in England, so the government engaged in risk seeking behavior, which were reinvigorated peace talks with the Irish government and harsher security policies in order to stop the losses. The government implemented strategic decisions when they decided to elevate the threat because policy makers needed a way to legitimate their new practices.

The ETA example did not elicit the same decision making process. Although policy makers did look to the history of how they had previously dealt with the ETA threat, there was not risk seeking behavior, because the attack was similar to the previous attacks done by ETA. Nothing was especially noteworthy about that attack, so decision makers did not need to engage

in new policies. There were only a few new policies implemented as a result of this specific attack, and were the result of many attacks over time taking place. Even in this case, however, the government was being strategic because policy makers were not restricting the rights of its citizens like during the Franco Era.

Similarly to the IRA case, both Al-Qaeda cases saw policy makers engage in risk seeking behavior, because they had never dealt with the Al-Qaeda threat before. Both Spain and Great Britain implemented new policies that were different from previous counterterrorism measures, because of the uncertainty surrounding the Al-Qaeda threat. This was done because in both cases because the governments were facing huge losses: losses of infrastructure, citizens, and monetary losses. In order to mitigate this, the governments decided to implement many new policies, including better surveillance and stricter border policies.

The parliamentary and governmental debates within the Spanish and British governments after each terrorist attack represent the editing and evaluation phases of the prospect theory. In each case, the government analyzed and discussed potential policy options that they could implement, listing the pros and cons of each specific policy. The policies were then evaluated by different decision makers to implement the best policy possible. When considering the different policies, politicians would consider how successful previous policies had been in the past and what occurred in the history of their own counterterrorism policies.

The cases of terrorism within Great Britain and Spain can be categorized as a M-type group or a P-type group.¹⁶⁹ Both the domestic instances of terrorism in Great Britain and Spain, with the ETA and IRA, can be categorized as P-type terrorist groups, whereas Al-Qaeda is

¹⁶⁹ Arce M. and Sandler, "Terrorist Spectaculars," 357.

considered to be a M-type. ETA and the IRA can be categorized as P-type terrorist groups, because both groups were politically motivated; both aimed to gain independence from a larger state. Both groups were also willing to partially concede to their respective governments.

Al-Qaeda is considered to be a M-type group, because their demands can not be partially satisfied, it is either all in or all out. The demands of Al-Qaeda were not necessarily tangible, rather focusing on ambiguous aims. This distinction is important, because it helps to inform the reader as to why the Spanish and British governments were not prepared for the Al-Qaeda threat. The governments had implemented policies that were only specific to the IRA and ETA.

The information on what type of terrorist group may not be readily available to governments, and policy makers may have incomplete information on the intentions of the terrorist group which would result in one of two types of regret: M-regret from not responding with the proper counterterrorism measures that limit “subsequent damage from militant attack”¹⁷⁰ and P-regret from conceding to a political group that would not have not continued attack.¹⁷¹ In order to minimize the potential effects of incomplete information, intelligence gathering should be used by governments in order to figure out exactly what category a group may fall into. In models with incomplete information, “the value of intelligence stems from better informing the governments on its choice of strategy.”¹⁷² For both Great Britain and Spain, their governments had incomplete information on the threat of Al-Qaeda, and each country underwent a terrorist attack as a result of this lack of information.

In the case of the Madrid and London Bombings, neither Spain or Great Britain were prepared for the type of threat Al-Qaeda posed to the national security of each respective

¹⁷⁰ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 357.

¹⁷¹ Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 357.

¹⁷² Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 365.

country. Since the “terrorist group [was] new with no past track record”¹⁷³ in either country, each government had incomplete information on the true motivations of the group. For this reason, no intelligence was set up in order to find out more information about the group, because there was no previous experience with the group. Instead, all of the counterterrorism policies, including intelligence building, were only geared towards ETA and the IRA. This lack of intelligence surrounding Al-Qaeda led to the attacks happening in both Spain and Great Britain. After the Madrid and London bombings, both Spain and Great Britain implemented better intelligence capabilities, which could be the contributing factor as to why another attack by Al-Qaeda hasn’t occurred. These intelligence capabilities included surveillance in public places, new intelligence systems within the government, among other new intelligence capabilities.

For ETA and the IRA, the respective governments did engage in preemptive/proactive policies after the Plaza bombing and the Brighton Hotel bombing. They were able to do this through the criminal justice system, by implementing longer detention times. In Great Britain, the government took it a step further and implemented new surveillance techniques as well. Although the new security measures implemented did not immediately stop the domestic terrorist groups, the continued use of proactive policies eventually led to both ETA and the IRA negotiating with their respective governments to stop engaging in their violent campaigns. The majority of the policies implemented during the eras of ETA and the IRA were proactive, with some defensive policies put into place. Both the British and Spanish examples demonstrate the idea that governments engage in proactive measures when faced with a domestic terrorist threat, much like what Sandler and Arce explained by saying “for domestic terrorism, countries engage

¹⁷³Arce M. and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 357.

in preemption because limiting such attacks solely benefits them.”¹⁷⁴ For both Great Britain and Spain, their use of proactive measures that directly affected the terrorist groups ultimately led to the defeat of the ETA and IRA in the forms of a cease-fire and a peace accord. Even though Spanish policy makers only implemented a few policies after the Plaza bombing, the policies were still proactive. Although both countries still endured terrorist attacks by ETA and the IRA after the implementation of the new policies after the two respective bombings, the use of proactive policies were what led to the negotiated ceasefire.

Since Al-Qaeda is an M-type¹⁷⁵ group, the use of deterrent policies should have been the best way to stop an Al-Qaeda attack. However, neither Spain nor Great Britain had enough deterrent policies put into place, because their previous counterterrorism strategies were only proactive policies that were directly aimed at IRA and ETA members. For this reason, both countries endured a spectacular event by Al-Qaeda, because their counterterrorism policies were not the right type of policies to deal with an M-type terrorist group. Politicians in both Great Britain and Spain explained that the governments were unfit for the threat that Al-Qaeda posed to their countries. Since both countries had only dealt with instances of domestic terrorism, they were not prepared for the different type of terrorism they faced in the threat of Al-Qaeda, so they were susceptible to a spectacular attack by the group. However, after the attack, both governments were able to implement defensive and proactive policies that have helped to stop potential spectacular attacks from taking place. The British and Spanish cases are exemplary of Arce and Sandler’s assumption that the best counterterrorism strategy includes both proactive and defensive measures. They explain that “counterterrorism requires a judicious mix of

¹⁷⁴ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 191.

¹⁷⁵ Arce and Sandler, “Terrorist Spectaculars,” 356.

defensive and proactive measures, including the gathering of intelligence.”¹⁷⁶ The Al-Qaeda case is important to note, because it demonstrates how the lack of use of defensive policies led to a spectacular terrorist attack taking place in both of these countries. Both Spain and Great Britain were ill-prepared for the threat that Al-Qaeda posed, because it was something that they had never seen before.

Once Spain and Great Britain endured a spectacular terrorist attack, both governments implemented the necessary measures to stop another spectacular attack by Al-Qaeda. Both Great Britain and Spain implemented a series of proactive and defensive measures in order to combat the potential threat. A few of the policies of Great Britain can be considered to be proactive, because they were directly targeting Al-Qaeda. Their support of the US in the Iraq war, and their own participation within the war was a proactive decision, because the British government was attempting to militaristically fight against members of Al-Qaeda, even though their decision to enter into Iraq was based off of flawed intelligence.¹⁷⁷ Another proactive policy implemented was the increased intelligence capabilities that was added to the Terrorism Act. Better intelligence capabilities are considered to be proactive because they are “taking direct actions against terrorists or their sponsors.”¹⁷⁸ These are just a few example of the proactive policies implemented by the British government after the London Bombings. The government coupled this with defensive policies as well. The increased surveillance around public spaces and public transportation sites in Great Britain, and increased border security are considered to be defensive policies, because these are meant to “deter an attack by either making success more difficult or

¹⁷⁶ Sandler and Arce M, “Terrorism & Game Theory,” 355.

¹⁷⁷ Stephen Castle, “Analysis: Britain’s Iraq War Inquiry,” *The New York Times*, July 6, 2016, sec. world, <https://www.nytimes.com/live/britain-inquiry-iraq-war/>.

¹⁷⁸ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 184.

increasing the likely negative consequences to the perpetrator.”¹⁷⁹ In the British case, the government focused most of their counterterrorism efforts on their own domestic spheres, putting emphasis on what could be done within the domestic sphere of Great Britain. Instead of directly implementing the laws into their legal code, they again elevated the threat into the area of a state of exception, where the focus was on the constraining rights of its citizens in the name of security. They were able to take what happened after the IRA attack and implement the same type of response, one where policy makers elevated the threat of Al-Qaeda to an extra-legal space.

Spain focused much of their counterterrorism policy outwards, increasing their cooperation among nations within the world through increased police cooperation, while implementing both proactive and defensive measures in the domestic sphere. The regulations on the financing of terrorism was one of the main proactive policies enacted by the Spanish government, along with the creation of the new government agencies whose main jobs were to find intelligence on groups, along with coordinating the police forces of Spain to stop potential terrorists. The defensive measures that Spain implemented included the creation of new government agencies that just streamlined and condensed the already implemented counterterrorism policies. The majority of the counterterrorism strategy was implemented directly through the Penal Code. This is the largest difference between the two countries, and one that is shaped by their respective histories concerning their previous governmental structure and their previous ways of dealing with terrorist threats. Both Great Britain and Spain were able to stop another spectacular Al-Qaeda attack from happening on their soil.

¹⁷⁹ Arce M. and Sandler, “Counterterrorism,” 184.

In the case of Al-Qaeda in both Spain and Great Britain, the Madrid attack came before the London attack. As a result of the attack the Spanish government increased its internal security measures, by changing the laws surrounding terrorism, and by hardening their border security measures. By implementing these deterrent strategies, this created an external cost on Great Britain, because they were not engaging in similar strategies, making Great Britain a more desirable target to Al-Qaeda to be their next target. In this case, Great Britain did not learn from what Spain had done, resulting in a spectacular terrorist experience.

In both cases, emphasis was put on many different defensive policies, with some large scale proactive policies. Although both Spain and Great Britain had different counterterrorism policies and had different rationale for both of them, they had success in preventing another spectacular attack by Al-Qaeda in their respective countries, because they were able to view their previous counterterrorism policies as being ineffective to deal with the new type of terrorism they were facing. This demonstrates that policy makers do consider the history and do learn from past mistakes and experiences. The combination of the proactive measures and defensive measures by both governments has proven to be effective against the threat of Al-Qaeda, because neither country has undergone another spectacular attack by Al-Qaeda since the London and Madrid bombings.

Something else to consider when looking at the Spanish and British cases is why Great Britain endured another spectacular terrorist event, while Spain only has suffered one . The Manchester event could be another backlash attack, even though that event was not done by Al-Qaeda, but by a single Islamic extremist. This backlash event could have been in response to Great Britain not pulling out of the Iraq War following the London Bombings. After the Madrid

bombings, one of the first things the new government did was withdraw their troops and support from the Iraq War. However, Great Britain continued to lend their support up until 2011.

There are important differences and similarities to highlight when it comes to the counterterrorist policies created after the Brighton Bombing and the Plaza República Dominicana bombing. Both organizations conducted bombings that were aimed at figures that represented the government. However, the IRA bombing was directly against Margaret Thatcher, who was the prime minister of Britain at the time, while the ETA bombing was aimed at military personnel who were not leaders of the government. This could be seen as the IRA having a direct attack on the government in trying to kill Margaret Thatcher, while the ETA were sending a message to the government that they would be attacking the protectors of the government, rather than the government itself. Both of the bombings took place in a public space, in order to make the attack visible to the public. In both instances, the public was not the main target of the attack despite being largely affected by each bombing. While the attacks were similar, the motivations of each group were different; in the IRA case, the group was responding to actions taken by Thatcher and the government against the larger population within Great Britain, while members in ETA were responding to elections and actions by the French government that directly affected the leadership of the group.

In both the British and Spanish counterterrorism strategies, and the parliamentary discussions, there were considerations for the civil rights of its people. In the British case, there was an attempt by some parliamentary members to infringe on the rights of citizens, including longer detention time and better surveillance technologies. However, these were ultimately voted down by the majority of the parliament, because they were worried that this would impact the

civil rights of the British citizens. The ultimate reform of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 was one that was both a proactive and reactive measure, but one that considered the rights of British citizens. This is different than the Spanish case, because this act existed outside of the law, within a state of exception, whereas in the Spanish case, the law was directly written into the Penal code, and did not exist within an extra-legal space.

In Spain, the Spanish government was also conscious of the rights of citizens. After the Plaza bombing, only one new law was passed, and it only increased the amount of time a person could be held within a detention center. This type of strategy can be categorized as a reactive, yet proactive policy, because it directly targets the terrorist, but it was created as a result of the attack. The counterterrorism strategy of Spain remained fairly consistent throughout its fight against ETA, by creating specific laws that were implemented into the Penal Code, whereas the British experience can be categorized as state of exceptions when dealing with the IRA threat.

However, there were authoritarian tendencies that did roll over from the Franco Era as ways to fight ETA. Along with the few countermeasures that were created, the government also continued its “dirty war” towards ETA members until 1987. This was a departure from the British case, because the government never implemented a guerrilla war against the IRA, only implementing specific police forces. The “dirty war” of the Spanish government was a remnant of Spain’s past; the British did not have a period of authoritarian rule so this type of tactic was not used. British policy makers were aware that they would be unable to get away with a tactic like that, because of their democratic history. What the comparison of the Brighton Bombing and the Plaza República Dominicana bombing does is to show that the history of a

nation is important to consider for policy makers when writing counterterrorism law, because it is the strategic use of history of the nation that helps to influence policy makers.

The London bombings in 2005 elicited a major response from the British government. Jytte Klausen, an European scholar, describes that the London attacks were a result of “homegrown” terrorism¹⁸⁰ and as a result, the British government was to “apply community-policing principles to counter-terrorism enforcement”¹⁸¹ while also making legislative changes to the Terrorism Act in order to be more preventative rather than reactive. This decision was made, and these measures were taken as a result of a few different factors. Michael Lister and Miguel Otero-Iglesias argue that there was so much legislative activism in Britain due to “institutional considerations and the impact of historical legacies.”¹⁸² For Britain the “temporal and geographic limitations placed on previous anti-terrorism legislation have led the UK parliament to habitually legislate on terrorism matter.”¹⁸³ The authors argue that the anti-terrorism policy paradigm in the United Kingdom is “one where Parliament routinely legislates on anti-terrorism, and where much of this legislation is temporary in nature”¹⁸⁴ because of the history that Britain had. According to the authors, the British legal framework of the government and society is based off of areas of exception, where if something happens, they create laws off of that specific event, it is much more reactionary than the Spanish government.

¹⁸⁰ Jytte Klausen, “British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35, no. 3 (March 2009), 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830802704566>.

¹⁸¹ Klausen, “British Counter-Terrorism,” 2.

¹⁸² Michael Lister and Miguel Otero-Iglesias, “New Problems, Old Solutions? Explaining Variations in British and Spanish Anti-Terrorism Policy,” *Comparative European Politics* 10, no. 5 (December 1, 2012): 564–84, <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2011.29>. 565.

¹⁸³ Lister and Otero-Iglesias, “New Problems,” 565.

¹⁸⁴ Lister and Otero-Iglesias, “New Problems,” 570.

The British government and British citizens also viewed the Al-Qaeda threat not through the lens of the IRA, so they were more willing to create new laws based off of this threat.

The Madrid bombings in 2004 elicited a specific response that was different from the case of the London Bombings. The bombings occurred right before the 2004 elections, and contributed to the defeat of the incumbent, José María Aznar, because he advocated for Spanish troops to be in Iraq. The winner of the election, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero eventually removed troops from Iraq. Fernando Reinares argues that although the Spanish government was well equipped for dealing with the terrorism they faced from ETA, they were not well equipped for the type of terrorism that Al-Qaeda implemented. He argues that the “country’s internal security structures were not as well adapted to dealing with much more recent challenges of terrorism”¹⁸⁵ because the Spanish police were not properly prepared for this. The police and other internal security structures were not given enough time to prepare for an attack of this scale, the government did not put enough emphasis on it, and the structures were not given enough resources.¹⁸⁶ The government recognized that this was an issue, but instead of changing legislature like the British government, they reformed the internal security structures without passing any major legislature. For the most part, there wasn’t any major legislative action taken after the Madrid bombings. Scholars argue, including Michael Lister and Miguel Otero-Iglesias, the reason for a lack of legislative exchange was due to “the more general nature of anti-terrorism legislation...along with moves away from Franco-era measures have led both to a more permanent and stable anti-terrorism approach, as well as one that is more cautious about undermining civil liberties.”¹⁸⁷ In Spain, the reforms that took place were mainly administrative,

¹⁸⁵ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 1.

¹⁸⁶ Reinares, “After the Madrid,” 2.

¹⁸⁷ Lister and Otero-Iglesias, “New Problems,” 565.

including changes to cooperation between government agencies, more efforts at preventing radicalization, enhancing the protection of key infrastructure targets, and enhancing the intelligence gathering capacity.¹⁸⁸ The policy paradigm in Spain is not “based on ideas/notions of exception” so it allows for more flexibility and adaptability of laws. The Spanish government and citizens also viewed the Al-Qaeda threat through the lens of the ETA, so the government assumed the legal framework was good enough to handle the Al-Qaeda threat.

In the case of Spain, policy makers could not ignore the long history of authoritarian rule when creating counter terrorist strategies and policies, which is why many of the policies the Spanish government created were written directly into the legal code, and were conscious of the civil liberties of its citizens. In the British case, however, policy makers did not have to worry as much about infringing on the civil liberties of its citizens, through creating counterterrorist policies as a result of a state of exception, rather than just writing it into the laws of the country. For this reason, policy makers were able to create policies that infringed on individual rights since they did it in the name of national security in response to an extra-territorial threat. These types of issues are what policy makers take into consideration when thinking about creating specific policies, because they need to be informed decisions that consider each nation’s specific historical contexts. One also needs to consider what type of terrorism the country is dealing with, and whether the country has a long history of dealing with terrorism. When thinking about a strategy, policy makers should consider making a strategy that includes both proactive and defensive policies, in order to optimize the public and private benefits for the country, and to minimize the possibility that a similar attack can occur on another country’s soil. Great Britain

¹⁸⁸ Lister and Otero-Iglesias, “New Problems,” 566.

and Spain are good examples to highlight because their counterterrorism efforts have limited their experiences with spectacular terrorist acts by terrorist groups.

Conclusion

This paper aims to demonstrate how governments learned from their previous experiences with threats of terrorism, in order to inform their policy choices later on. Specifically, this paper aims to demonstrate how previous experiences with ethno-national terrorist threats inform the policy choices surrounding transnational terrorist threats. The experiences of countries are important to consider when thinking about how and why policies are formulated. In particular, the lessons learned from an ethno-nationalist threat, should be applied to threats posed by transnational terrorist groups. The examples of Spain and Great Britain highlight the idea that governments should look to and learn from their past experiences, even if the terrorist groups are different. Something important to highlight is that in both cases, Spain and Great Britain assumed that their counterterrorism policies in place would be sufficient in their fights against Al-Qaeda, even though those policies were implemented to specifically deal with ETA and the IRA. This was not the case however, and both governments are on record explaining that their previous policies were not good enough to stop the Al-Qaeda threat. The cases of Spain and Great Britain highlighted these findings, by demonstrating what worked in each case, what did not work in each case. Spain and Great Britain were constrained by their own histories and experiences as well. Spain's legacy with having an authoritarian leader constrained what they were able to implement as a result, because policy makers had to be aware of infringing on the rights of their people so that they would not seem to be authoritarian. In the

British case, however, policy makers were able to have more flexibility when it came to what type of policy was implemented. The issue of personal rights was a discussion had after the Brighton bombing, but after the London bombings, the regards for rights was disregarded. The differences between the two cases demonstrates that the previous experiences with how countries dealt with threats to national security, specifically with terrorist threats, influence the decisions of policy makers.

The cases explored within this paper can be generalizable to the larger population of states. The generalizable aspect of this study is that countries must look to their own experiences, and to the experiences of other countries, in order to implement a successful counterterrorism policy. This analysis would be useful to apply to the United States, because they too experience ethno-national, domestic terrorism even if it is in a different context. In the future, there could be a few different ways to expand this study. More cases could be looked at in order to further prove the conclusions that have been made. An expanded study could include non-western states, in order to make the conclusions more generalizable past just democratic, western states. Another important aspect that could be studied is if the same learning process occurs within states that face the same type of terrorist threat throughout its history, rather than two different types of threats from groups. Another interesting avenue to explore would be to see if this same process takes place when thinking about other types of policy implementation, like when thinking about economic policies or social policies.

An important conclusion this paper came to is that governments engage in strategic decision making based off of the history of the country. Even though the respective governments viewed the attacks in different terms, all the policy makers still considered what had worked in

the past, and what had not worked. In the Al-Qaeda and British cases, the policy makers engaged in risk seeking behavior because they faced attacks that they had not seen before, while in the ETA example, the government did not engage in new policies because it was an attack that was similar to previous attacks.

Another important conclusion from this paper was that not the same policies can be applied to different terrorist groups, but the same strategy should be used when thinking about what policies to implement. In both the Spanish and British cases, the governments were not ready for the threat Al-Qaeda posed. But, the governments were able to learn from their mistakes and implement better counterterrorism policies after the Al-Qaeda attacks in order to stop more from happening. This demonstrates that government decisions are based off of experiences and the histories of the country.

A gap within this thesis was the use of government documents and parliamentary debates within the Spanish case. It was difficult to find specific transcripts and documents 1986, when the ETA attack took place. The record keeping of Spain is not as well kept as Great Britain, which may be due to the Franco Regime and its legacy. During the Franco regime, record keeping was not done on a regular basis, because the human rights abuses by the regime did not want to be put down in writing. There was no precedent of having to keep records of governmental debates, because there were very little records kept during the Franco era due to the government not wanting to write down the bad things it was doing to its own people. There was a lot more primary source material for the Great Britain case, so this project, at times, was heavy on the British literature. If the research were to continue, one would need to dig deeper into the Spanish archives, and find better sourced material.

An important broader connection to make as a result of this study is to understand the importance of context and what lens is being used when looking at how policies are formed. When creating a new policy, it is important to understand the context in which it is being created. Certain policies may work during one time, but may not work in the next, due to different social, economic, and political factors being considered. These factors change over time, so the counterterrorism policy being implemented, must account for these changing factors. Counterterrorism strategies must adapt and evolve according to the changing times; they can not remain static and unchanging. If policies remain static, like in the cases of Great Britain and Spain, then a country is much more susceptible to an attack. Preemptive policies may work in one instance, while defensive policies may work in another. The lens in which policy makers view policies is also important to consider. Policy makers must view the threat, and threat management through objective lens in order to create an effective policy. If one is not objective, they run the risk of creating a policy out of emotion, rather than having it be grounded in historical context.

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