How to Earn and Lose Your Constituency: A Case Study of New Jersey's Fifth Congressional District

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How to Earn and Lose Your Constituency: A Case Study of New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional District

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
Of Bard College

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### Table of Contents

**Dedication**: 5

**Acknowledgement**: 7

**Introduction**: 9

**Chapter 1: Literature Review**: 17  
  **I: Establishing a Base**: 17  
  **II: Congressional Power**: 2  
  **III: Public Perception**: 24  
  **IV: Campaign Funding**: 27  
  **V: Conclusion**: 28

**Chapter 2: The Rise and Fall of Scott Garrett**: 31  
  **I: Garrett’s Rise to Power**: 32  
  **II: Underlying Issues Surrounding Garrett**: 34  
  **III: Response by Democrats**: 41  
  **IV: Conclusion**: 43

**Chapter 3: Analytical Study**: 45  
  **I: Redistricting of the Fifth**: 46  
  **II: District Outlook**: 50  
  **III: The role of Campaign Finance**: 54  
  **IV: Turnout Trends at Ward Level**: 58  
  **V: The Voter Registration Dilemma**: 62  
  **VI: Ward Level Registration**: 65  
  **VII: Voting Results**: 69  
  **VIII: Conclusion**: 80

**Conclusion**: 83

**Bibliography**: 88
Dedication:

This Senior Project is dedicated to my father Eric, and my mother Joanne. Without a pair of sensational parents, a young man has to struggle to prosper. Luckily for me, I was blessed with two amazing human beings to guide me throughout my first twenty-two years of life, and have led me to a path of success. I credit everything I have accomplished in my life to you both, whether in the classroom, or on the baseball field. You have both molded me into a man that I am proud to have become.
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life. To Dill, you’re the closest thing to a twin brother I have ever had. Since you visited Bard your senior year of high school, I knew I had a companion for life. I cannot wait to see what you accomplish. You are always a brightness on my day, no matter how I am doing or how I feel. Dye up forever. To Ror, yerrr. I love you my man, you inspire me daily, and without you, I don’t think I would have learned to express my emotion more outwardly, which I have learned is vital. From riding pine to consistently in the starting nine, we have been through everything together. Your friendship will never go away, no matter how many miles apart we are. To Q, thank you for teaching me not to quit. Your leadership and love inspired me to put my head down and finish, and that is something I will never forget. To Ben, you are everything I ever have wanted in a brother. From classic sibling rivalry, to great friendship, I cannot be more proud to call you my brother. You are forever going to be smarter than me, and I only hope to learn from your work ethic and devotion. I love you. To Nik, thank you for being a great friend. No matter what you do in life, I will always believe in you. Your hilarity and genuine personality made the last two years of friendship worth the two years prior of not getting to know you. No matter what you do in life, I know you will succeed. Finally, to all my teammates, past and present, that have not been named. Playing on the field with every single one of you has been a privilege and a blessing. Every single one of you has taught me something about not only myself, but about how to be a better man. No matter what the outcome is on the field, our brotherhood that we all share will live forever. From dreading a morning life in mid-October, to celebrating a series win in mid-April, every single memory will be cherished, and I thank every single one of you for taking this journey with me.
**INTRODUCTION**

To be a new coming Democrat candidate in 2016 could have been considered a guaranteed loss, when looking back on it now. We saw Congress become Republican controlled, behind a “red wave” of sorts, led by Presidential candidate Donald Trump. Trump seemed to be a heroic figure for a collected group of middle class America, what he referred to as the “silent majority”. Trump inspired those with far-right winged political agendas to stand up for what they considered to be theirs, and the results of the 2016 election seemed to speak for themselves. Donald Trump had defied all odds in becoming the Forty-Fifth President of the United States, defeating many a lifelong politician to earn his spot at the desk of the most powerful man in the world. From being laughed about to being President, Donald Trump seemed to spark a revolution for Republicans. Where Democrats had previously taken hold of the Executive, and Legislative branches post-George W. Bush, the Republican Party had been searching for a voice to lead them back into power. Clearly, Trump was able to get the votes he was searching for, and there seemed to be no better time to be a Republican incumbent. Clearly, with a massive swing to the right, seen through the retaking of the House and Senate by Republicans in 2016, there really shouldn’t be many Republicans losing their districts, especially in districts won by Trump. However, in this time of Republican election domination, there is one particular conservative who not only lost his district, but lost to a Hillary Clinton- backed candidate.¹ This Congressman, Scott Garrett, represented New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional District, which had been the

incumbent for the past fourteen years. In an election where Republicans took both the House and the Senate, and won the Presidential, how could a Republican lose in a district that voted for Trump?

New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional district is located in Northern New Jersey, relatively close to New York City. The district includes four counties (Bergen, Passaic, Sussex, and Warren) and 79 municipalities. It has become more urban, due to the proximity to New York City. With a population of 746,385, the largest age distribution is found in the 45-54 year old bracket, with over 117,000. The median age of the district is 42.6, and 579,702 is over 18. The district isn’t overwhelmingly diverse, with 89.3% of people being white. The district does pretty well economically, which could be attested to the proximity to NYC, with a 4.2% unemployment. The mean household income was $134,359. The district is pretty well educated, with a 93.7% high school graduation rate, and 48.2% of residents hold a bachelor's degree or higher.\(^2\) What is important about these figures, is that they all go along with trends of the Republican Party. According to debt.org’s study of the economic demographic of Republicans and Conservatives, Republican districts tend to be suburban areas where older, well educated, upper-middle to upper class citizens live. This shows us that the district seems to be a good place for a conservative Republican, such as Garrett to thrive, which he does for fourteen years, until his eventual defeat in 2016.\(^3\)


The election of 2016 was between incumbent Republican representative Scott Garrett, who was first voted into office in 2002, Libertarian Claudio Belusic, and Democratic challenger Josh Gottheimer. Gottheimer, a UPenn and Harvard Law graduate, had a solid history in working inside politics. He was part of Bill Clinton’s 1996 reelection campaign, on the “rapid response team”. He later went on to work in the Clinton administration as a speechwriter, until the administrations end in 2001. While in Law school, Gottheimer worked for Wesley Clark, and later on John Kerry’s 2004 Presidential campaigns. After that, he worked on Hillary Clinton’s 2008 campaign as well, and kept close ties with the Clinton’s.4 After announcing his campaign for Congress in 2015, many Clinton backers were very open to his candidacy, and able to back him. The New York Times referred to him as a protégé to the Clintons5, and according to his campaign finance filings in 2015, which was about one million dollars by the end of September of that year, about one in six dollars raised was from a fellow Clinton White house or campaign alumni.6 Some of the major donors included three of Clinton’s former Press Secretaries, and two former chiefs of staff. While the backing from the Clinton network, and Gottheimer’s political history seem to be great accolades and experience to win a district, the district was still Republican, and had been that way for thirteen years. The challenges ahead of Gottheimer were great, and to win the district would be monumental for not only himself, but the entire party as a whole.


While Gottheimer’s success in the district is also interesting to look at, especially in a year where Republicans took Congress back, in many ways, Scott Garrett will be the focus of this project. Scott Garrett, a long term Republican, rose to power in a way that seems almost perfect. After winning elections in 2006 and 2008, both years where Republicans do poorly, which seemed to be due to the downward trend of President Bush’s popularity. This seemed to establish power for Garrett, as Democrats, after trying to take over his seat in 2008 with more financial effort than 2006, gave up in supporting candidates in the district. Garrett seems to be doing extremely well for himself, as he moved into a higher level of Congressional power, gaining a seat on the Financial Services Committee within Congress, and even heading a subcommittee. This gain in power has effect on how much financial gain Garrett receives from outside sources, since his committee directly dealt with Wall Street. However, Garrett is severely affected by the 2010 census redistricting, and other trends that suggest that he lost his district over the course of his incumbency. Garrett remains a firm conservative throughout his time in office, and after the redistricting of 2012 brought a new wave of Democratic voters to his district, it seemed that Garrett needed to either change his views, in order to appeal to his new members of his district, or go back to his base, and try to get as much support as possible. The problem with this was that when Garrett began to gain more power within Congress, he started to neglect his base, and lost a touch with his ever-changing district. There were multiple “bad votes”, that seemed to enrage his district, which can be shown by what seemed to be a drop in Republican turnout in the district, and these votes were continuously exploited by Gottheimer, leading to

what appears to be a mobilization of Democrats, especially heading into 2016. Along with this, anti-gay comments by Garrett seemed to be the final blow that ended up sinking his campaign.  

As a district that is moving in a more progressive direction, the publication of these comments did not bode well for the conservative, especially when large sums of money were being aimed to tarnish his name. It seems that these factors, which arose due to Garrett’s prior success, lead to his eventual downfall in 2016.

This project will focus on the Congressional career path of Scott Garrett, and how decisions and actions he makes and takes, along with those around him, throughout his time in office, seem to end up taking what was looking like a very long Congressional career, and turning it into an eventual loss in a campaign that, due to trends across the nation, Garrett should not have lost. I will look at Garrett’s time in Congress very closely, and look to find where he went wrong, and how the decisions he makes in office led to his downfall. I will look to compare these strategies used by Garrett, along with the mistakes he makes, with the ideas of scholars of American politics. I will give the district a close, analysis, examining trends that suggest that the supposed mistakes Garrett makes have an effect upon his political support in the district. I will show that Scott Garrett’s grand rise to power was mirrored by a dramatic decline, as a result of a negligence of the constituency that fueled his rise. When his base needed to change after 2012, Garrett seemed to refuse to change, and this ended up losing touch with his district. This gave the Democrats the opportunity to take control of the district, through a campaign portraying Garrett as a man whose values no longer reflected those of New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional district.

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This project is not about a single campaign, but rather the rise and fall of a long term incumbent, in an ever changing political climate, and how small mistakes in political navigation can lead to a loss of power.

This project shows that no politician is safe, no matter how they rise to power. Garrett was a representative who was seemingly untouchable for the vast majority of his years in office. However, this is clearly not the case. This project will cover important topics in Congressional politics, such as redistricting, developing power via a base at home and elsewhere, the importance of campaign finance, the idea of perception, both in the sense of how a constituency views an incumbent, and perhaps, more importantly, how an incumbent views their district, and their constituency. Garrett is a very interesting case to look at when examining all of these previous topics. Garrett, being of similar political affiliation with that of Donald Trump, clearly must have angered his base, and his district as a whole, since they voted for Trump over Clinton, yet elected a Clinton-backed Democrat over an incumbent whose ideas mirror that of Trump. Being able to identify these issues that make candidates vulnerable, even in favorable years, through a case such as Garrett’s, can help candidates decide if it is a reasonable decision to run or not. Being able to identify a candidate who is losing their base is vital for political parties. The goal of this project will be to not only study an important case where an incumbent lost his district when many things, such as national trends, suggest he shouldn’t, but also to draw from it a broader understanding of an incumbent’s relationship with his or her district.

Overall, what is so interesting about this case is that Garrett’s loss appears to happen out of nowhere. One moment Garrett is stable, and safe in a district he has a firm hold on; in the next, he is looking for a new job after being replaced by a newcomer. Politicians need to be extremely careful of the actions they take, and how those will affect not only their power in
Congress, but more importantly, how their district looks at them. This is where I believe Garrett’s biggest flaw arose, as he did not consistently change with the political tides of the country and his district. He remains stubbornly in his political ways, and when variables around him change, he does not change to fit those new conditions. With social media, and other sources of instant news at our fingertips, politics has changed remarkably from an era of daily newspapers and nightly news broadcasts. When a Congressman or woman makes a mistake that affects their district, the district will know about it almost instantly. While a strong incumbent with a good base is able to explain their mistakes to their constituents, it becomes much harder when a well-funded opponent, such as Gottheimer, has the means to ensure that the mistake doesn’t go away. Garrett, regarded as probably the most conservative representative in the entire North East United States, seemed to not adjust with the times, and the changes in his district. His district noticed it, Democrats noticed it, and it ends up leading to a premature downfall on what could have been a long political career, when, in a time of Republican control of government, he could have advanced his career significantly further.
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

Scott Garrett seems to follow an interesting path during his Congressional career. He does so many things right early on in his career, that it seems almost too good to be true. It turns out to be the case for Garrett, as it seems his downfall can be attributed to many small factors that seem to slowly add up into a large factor, and result in Josh Gottheimer sweeping the district from right under his feet. How does a candidate who has risen to power so gracefully, fall so rapidly? In order to answer this question, we must begin with how scholars in the field would respond to it. When looking at how to develop and maintain a long congressional career, it seems that there are four main requirements: (1) developing a base, (2) power in Congress, (3) maintaining a good public image, and (4) acquiring substantial and consistent campaign funding. These requirements are in chronological order, based on the arc of a Member of Congress’ career. While these requirements are normally achieved in this order, once all four are achieved, a loss of any requirement will lead to a potential downfall of a Member of Congress, which could happen in different orders. In this chapter, I will go through each of these four requirements, in order, and explain their importance to the rise in power for Members of Congress, and how a loss of each could lead to downfall.

I: Establishing a Base

When speaking of incumbents, the first objective when trying to develop power is establishing a base. What is so important about establishing a base is that with a solid grouping of support at home, it makes it hard to be beaten in an election. According to Fenno, elected
officials have three main goals, and the first is re-election. Without re-election, nothing else really matters if the candidate is re-elected. Re-election comes hand in hand with developing a solid relationship with your constituency. So, it is common for elected officials to try to go out and campaign unofficially while they are in office. Rallies, town hall sessions, and social media presence, seem to be ways that politicians today go about this. Name recognition is key for an incumbent in an election cycle, so being able to always be a known voice in the district you represent is vital.

Fenno describes his “home-style” approach to politics, which basically is how an incumbent operates regarding their specific home district. This home-style approach to politics falls in line with the three goals of Congressional incumbents. To have a home style approach to politics is to work through a strong relationship with the district. One of the most important aspects of this is the trust of the district. With trust, questionable votes can be explained easier, and politicians have room to work with regarding policy, and garnering power within Congress. Being active in the district, by hosting town halls, being at fundraisers and local events, and being personable, always looking to greet constituents, and never being afraid of tough questions, are things that Congressmen and women should do, in order to build a level of trust with those who live in their district. Developing a strong relationship is obviously important, especially in the early stages of a tenure. In order to develop this relationship, according to Fenno, incumbents group their constituencies into four subgroups. First, is the geographical constituency, which is the broadest grouping. This group is the largest of the four

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11 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* Pg. 136
12 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 177
13 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 1
groups, and contains the entire district and all voters within the district. Second, is called the re-election constituency, 14 which consists of the members of the district who are going to vote for you. Third, is called the Primary Constituency, 15 which includes those who will not only vote for you but will work on the campaign. Finally, is the Personal Constituency, 16 which consists of family, friends, etc. By grouping the total constituency, the candidate can look at their district in different ways. For example, by understanding those who will and won’t vote for you, the candidate can put more or less work into certain things such as campaign strategies. Something major to think about regarding home style approaches is that they need to be maintained, and be consistent. By being inconsistent, incumbents are at risk of losing trust in their district, and looking vulnerable to Challengers 17.

The initial approach of an incumbent is more of a trust building stage, called the expansionist stage. 18 This stage is where the incumbent builds on his following, and creating the framework of a solid following within their constituency. This where the incumbent will take try to use the title to his or her advantage. 19 Jacobson talks about the incumbency advantage as a tool used by those running for re-election. Certain advantages of the incumbency advantage include, free trips around the district, having a large staff, being able to actively serve the community while still running for re-election, and what is most important when looking for re-election, name recognition. 20 Once re-elected multiple times, Congressmen and women seem to look ahead, as their power within their own districts has been established. By winning a district over multiple

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14 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 8
15 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 18
16 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 24
17 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 158
18 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg. 176
20 Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. *The Politics of Congressional Elections* pg. 48
times, opposing parties will stop trying to run against a strong incumbent, since the money required to beat a strong incumbent will be potentially useless spending. Jacobson states that $500,000 of campaign funds will just give a challenger a ten percent chance to win an election.

Theoretically, a challenger will need to go into the millions in order to beat a strong incumbent, which without party backing, is extremely hard to do.

When opposing parties back away from challenging incumbents, the district becomes safe for the incumbent. This means that there is no direct threat of losing the district, since the previous victories by said incumbent, deter strong opponents from wasting their time and money in trying to defeat someone who has proven themselves to be difficult to be defeated. This comfortability in one’s district allows a representative to move on from this initial stage of developing a base, and move on to acquire a larger source of power in D.C.

II: Congressional Power

After developing a strong base within one’s district, the second stage of a Member of Congress’ career is developing power in Congress. Once elected officials win re-election, and develop a strong working relationship with their district, the next step is gain power within Congress, which mostly comes from party allegiance. Becoming a major player in Congress involves seemingly “selling out” at times, which means that the elected official will often vote on party lines on most, if not all, votes they cast. By pledging their allegiance to the party they represent, Congressmen and women are often rewarded with seats on important committees within Congress. These seats on these committees tends to lead to these officials receiving campaign money from outside sources, such as NGOs looking to gain influence over committee

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21 Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 53
22 Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 63
23 Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 215
members. The attractiveness of this outside money is extreme, as money is also severely important to consistently winning re-election. The excess campaign funds, plus added name recognition from being a major name within the party, seems to be a path to a long political career. Once an incumbent firmly controls his or her district, they tend to move on to working more in DC. This phase is referred to as the protectionist phase, which is when incumbents still try to keep good relations with their district, but are more focused on maintaining and less on building at home, while looking to acquire more power in Congress.  

Mayhew draws upon Fenno’s home style approach, and elaborates a theory of party loyalty as not necessarily a way to get elected and stay elected, especially in Congress. He speaks about the importance of parties in other countries election systems, and emphasizes a comparison with the party system in the United Kingdom. In the U.K., the idea of team ship is viewed as essential. The nomination system in the U.K. is controlled by parties, which means when they are looking for candidates, they are more than likely going to choose those who are on party lines with their votes. While the party does not directly endorse these nominations, the nomination groups at the local levels act as “cheerleaders” of sort, and do the parties bidding for them. Along with this, the parties have way more control than the people. Parties control television air time, which is crucial for candidates to get their voice across. While this television air time primarily is used to promote the party itself, being associated with a party in good standing with the people is an automatic advantage over opponents. This practically gives parties all the power they need to control who gets into office. Candidates for Parliament are more than likely to go along with party lines, since without it, their influence dries up. In the United States, things are relatively different. Mayhew argues that party loyalty, while still important at times, will not affect

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24 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg.176
whether or not someone can get into office. While certain parties can be popular in certain elections, as we see with voter swings, it is mostly affected by how the President is perceived. If the President is in good standing with the people, his or her party will more than likely be rewarded in an upcoming election with maintaining previously won seats, and winning new seats. If they are not looked at in good light, their party will more than likely lose seats. What is different about nominations in the United States is that they are done by primaries, which gives the party no real choice in who they want to represent them. The people get to choose which candidate will represent the party in the election. This gives an individual way more power over their own destiny in politics. They can spend what they want, via fundraising and other sources, and can use these funds to make themselves known to the district. Mayhew quotes a former Congressman who states “If we depended on party organization to get elected, none of us would be here.”26 This idea, stemming from the 1970’s seems to be slightly outdated, as party politics have reemerged, and trends of polarization have been found in recent politics. In Congress, an individual is freer to represent their district how they deem fit, and how the district wants them to, but there are still benefits from being loyal to one’s party. While Mayhew’s example of the difference between party loyalty in the U.K. and the United States shows a clear difference on the surface, newer trends of party polarization have shown that there is a definitely underlying similarity between the two. While party loyalty prior to initial election is not mandatory, to maintain one’s status as a representative it seems Congressmen and women often stay near party lines. The supposed benefit of party loyalty equals a rise in power in D.C, which would in return allow an incumbent to maintain power at home.

26 Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Pg. 27
While we understand why party loyalty, which leads to growth in power in Congress, may lead to maintaining power at home, what does power in Congress mean, and what are the benefits? Mayhew discusses the expected incumbent differential.\textsuperscript{27} This is any difference that can be perceived by any relevant political actor between what they believe an incumbent can do in office, compared to that of the challenger. These political actors can be from anywhere, as the money can come from anywhere. So, if big organizations that back an incumbent realize that the challenger better represents them and what they are for, they will pull the money from the incumbent and put that money into the challenger. This leads into Mayhew’s theory of a Dual Constituency.\textsuperscript{28} The idea that money can come from anywhere is very important to incumbents, especially as they start to slip into more of a protectionist stage. As they begin to gain power in DC, incumbents will begin to look at two different types of constituencies, those who are at home, and those who are not. More than likely, those who are not at home are who give the most money to incumbents. Many organizations and PACs give money to Congressional candidates who best represent them. However, those who have more power in Congress obviously become more important to them, as committee members tends to have a larger say on what goes in certain bills. Also having the support of a major name in DC is always a goal of organizations and PAC’s as their main goal is to get legislation passed that benefits them. So, all the incumbent has to do to receive large campaign donations, is to vote for legislature than benefits those who are paying him/her. So, for example, a pro second amendment based PAC is going to give their most money to those who vote for gun rights. The more an incumbent votes along party lines, or to appease big money, the more careful they must be. As time goes on, and the more they work away from home, the more candidates can lose touch with their districts. This can result from

\textsuperscript{27} Mayhew, David R. \textit{Congress: The Electoral Connection}. Pg. 39
\textsuperscript{28} Mayhew, David R. \textit{Congress: The Electoral Connection}. Pg. 69
“bad votes”, or bad publicity. In an age of social media, one scandal that involves social issues can ruin a career. So, in order to maintain power, an incumbent must tread lightly, and be able to explain any mistakes they may make, and make sure not to make any statements or “bad votes” that lead to a falling out within their district.

**III: Public Perception**

Fenno’s third incumbent objective, is good public perception. 29 This brings back the idea of a good working relationship with the district. In order to stay in good standing with your district, you must still make your voters happy with the way you vote. While one bad vote may not kill a politician’s career, a string of bad votes will put an elected official in the “dog house” so to speak. In order for a good relationship to continue, an elected official needs to be able to explain their votes to their district, and to get them either on board with the vote, or to understand why they did it. This bring back Fenno’s home-style approach. Being able to understand what votes your district will respond correctly to is vital when trying to maintain a good image at home.

Mayhew argues that Congressional seats are not as safe as they seem. Mayhew states that seats in Congress are never really guarantees, and Congressional elects must do everything in their power to stay in office, even if that means crossing party lines. While party politics can come into play when looking to expand power in DC, the most important thing is still keeping your base at home. He states that an incumbent’s position should remain conservative, in regards to voting along district lines. He says, “Probably the best position taking strategy for most congressmen at most times is to be conservative- to cling to their own positions of the past where

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29 Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* pg.54
possible, and reach for new ones with great caution when necessary.”  

However, it is always important to look on the national scale, and have an understanding of how popular vote is changing, in order to adapt. So, if a Democratic President is looked at poorly in the eyes of voters, it would be wise for a Democratic Representative to, at times, vote against unpopular bills. The President can make or break many Congressional careers. Those who continuously back an unpopular President in a marginal, or competitive, district, may see themselves losing their seats over trying to stay within party lines. The reverse is also true: if a President from a Congressional representative’s opposing party is extremely popular, and is viewed in great standing by the nation, it can be wise for that representative to start voting along with him or her, in order to show that they are backing the popular side. Now, this may affect future power being acquired in Congress, since crossing party lines can definitely hurt a representative’s relationship with their party. However, being able to understand one’s district, and knowing how to balance a relationship with their district and party loyalty is what makes maintaining power in Congress and at home a constant struggle. Those who are able to balance these relationships tend to have long congressional careers.  

According to Mayhew, it seems that voters tend to really have no idea what incumbents actually do, as long as they are not controversial. What is a generation of technology, where news is at our fingertips constantly, voters tend to still be out of touch with what is actually going on in D.C. So, the importance of public image is massive. Mayhew states that incumbents need to not worry about the average voter, those who stay relatively informed about major issues, but not so informed that they know every vote their representative makes, but rather those

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30 Mayhew, David R. **Congress: The Electoral Connection**. Pg. 67  
31 Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. **The Politics of Congressional Elections** pg. 172  
32 Fenno, Richard F. **Home Style: House Members in Their Districts** pg. 224  
33 Mayhew, David R. **Congress: The Electoral Connection**. pg. 47
who have influence in politics. Having good standing with major organizations that deal with important issues of the district is key to being able to maintain a good public image. Persuasive endorsements also make for good publicity for incumbents. Having endorsements from police forces, labor unions, teacher unions, and other major DC names will give an incumbent a more solid grasp on their constituencies.\(^{34}\) For example, if a wildly popular President or Vice President endorses a candidate, they are more likely to get elected, since the casual voter sees that the President or Vice President who they love supports them. With this being said, advertising is also vital. Being able to put yourself out to your constituencies as much as possible makes it easier for those who do not follow politics closely to become familiar with politicians. On the other hand, attack ads can kill a campaign. Sometimes expanding on the truth, the goal of attack ads are exactly the opposite of what positive ads are for. Attack ads are used mostly to blast a candidate, and to try to make casual voters associate them with bad things. This ties back into the idea of “bad votes” and potential scandals. So for example, if an incumbent has a history of voting for pro-life legislature, but a challenger finds out they previously had an abortion, attack ads will pose them as a hypocrite liar. Some organizations or opposing candidates have gone so far as to approach candidate’s siblings for testimony on why they will not be voting for their brother or sister. In today’s age of social media, ads can be almost constantly around you, whether or not your notice them. By constantly trying to implant an image of a candidate in your head, organizations and opposing candidates will stop at nothing to try to tarnish the name of an incumbent, in order to steal their seat for themselves. So, being able to stay away from bad votes and scandal becomes even more important for any incumbent, especially those in a protectionist phase.

\(^{34}\) Mayhew, David R. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. pg. 49
IV: Campaign Funding

What goes directly along with advertising is money. Money seems to be where elections are won, no matter how good the incumbent’s relationship is with their district. More likely than not, those who spend more, will win an election. Money can equal influence, so the more money put into an election, the more influence that candidate has over the constituency. Jacobson states that money is more important to challengers, rather than incumbents, since they need to get the word out. This does not mean that an incumbent can just coast through an election, since if they are massively outspent, a challenger can even the playing field. The question then comes, if massive amounts of money are needed to win an election over a strong incumbent, why do challengers even run? Jacobson states that maybe it is because they are naive, however it is more than likely that is not the case. What is more than likely is that if the incumbent was weaker, there would be more qualified politicians looking to take the seat away from them. So, even by losing an election to an incumbent, it may give these challengers better name recognition down the road, when they are more experienced and qualified. On the other hand, a good challenger can make a long term incumbent look weak. If a no name challenger comes into an election, and gives a long term incumbent a run for his or her money, that can really harm an incumbent’s appearance not only to his or her constituency, but to the opposing party as well. If the opposition sees that there was a slight weakness, they will attack that seat in the next election cycle with higher profile names and more money. Any time an incumbent looks vulnerable, whether it is due to a tough string of bad votes that negatively affect his or her image in the district, or a hard fought election that didn’t necessarily need to be difficult, the opposing party

35 Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 67
36 Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 70
will look to see if they can steal a seat.\textsuperscript{37} Along with this, as quickly as big money comes into an incumbent’s life, it can be taken away. PAC’s and NGO’s do not care whether or not a certain politician is in office unless if positively affects them. By giving money to an incumbent who has wrapped themselves up in scandal, it puts negative light on organizations who funded him or her. While Ferguson’s investment theory of political donations speaks on the idea that having access to the office alone being all that PAC’s and NGO’s want,\textsuperscript{38} if someone who is more likely to vote for a cause these organizations are passionate about, without bringing they will fund them against the incumbent. So, if a Congressman or woman is found to have said something damaging of character in their past, you will see the money they received from many organizations start to dry up. As long as the NGO’s and PAC’s get what they want out of legislation, they do not care who is in office.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{V: Conclusion:}

To conclude, the when looking to have a long term Congressional career, one must (1) develop a base at home, (2) develop power in Congress, (3) maintain a good public image, and (4) securing a consistent stream of campaign donations. The first means that a representative needs to build trust with their district and develop a solid base in that district in order to keep strong challengers away. By consistently winning, and winning by solid margins, incumbents won’t be challenged. Developing power in Congress can be achieved by following party lines, and hopefully getting appointed to committees, or other larger positions within Congress. This might mean that large organizations will want to finance their campaign. This is helpful, since a Dual Constituency provides enough financial stability to fight off any potential

\textsuperscript{37} Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. \textit{The Politics of Congressional Elections} pg. 70-71
\textsuperscript{39} Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. \textit{The Politics of Congressional Elections} pg. 77
challengers looking to come in with decent backing. Maintaining a good public image is vital, especially when looking at a Dual Constituency approach, since the incumbent must be able to explain certain votes, especially when they are more based on party loyalty, rather than loyalty to the district. Along with this, in the age of social media, it is vital for Congressmen and women to be aware of everything they say or do, since not only does it affect how your district views you, but how those who give outside money view them. Finally, establishing a solid cash flow, that can remain consistent throughout their time in office, will make it nearly impossible for someone to challenge them. This stems back to the idea of maintaining good public image, along with gaining power in Congress. Without power in Congress, and a maintained, solid, public image, it makes it difficult for outside money to want to support certain Congressmen or women. For a long congressional career, each of these four requirements must be met. If one falters, they all will falter. Whether big money stops supporting a candidate for regrettable comments leads to strong challengers pushing for one’s seat, or losing their base at home over consistent bad votes, trying to appeal to their specific political party, once a representative has achieved all four of these requirements, they must be able to maintain them all, or watch as their congressional career falls apart right in front of them.
CHAPTER 2: THE RISE AND FALL OF SCOTT GARRETT

What can be inferred from the previous readings, when referring to Scott Garrett’s loss? What I will now propose is that Garrett does all the right things in his career early on to have a long congressional career. He follows the path that Fenno lays out for Congressional success, and it seems to pay off for him, as after three straight victories, Garrett is a strong incumbent, who has moved to a Dual Constituency approach, as discussed by Mayhew, where big money continues to give Garrett more power. However, after the 2010 census redistricting, which shifts more and more Democrats into his district, Garrett begins to feel some pressure. It seems that Garrett has lost part of his base, when concerning himself with a Dual Constituency. Whether because they believed he was a sure victor, or that he has fallen out of touch with the district, his numbers begin to dip. At the same time, since he was so wrapped up in power in D.C, Garrett failed to establish a relationship with the new members of his district, which would end up being vital in 2016. This weakness begins to rear its head in 2014, when Garrett is challenged for the first time by an opponent with more than meagre financial backing. During this period, Garrett casts some questionable votes in Congress, which makes his district, which is no longer as Republican as it once was, enraged. Along with that, Garrett makes a statement on LGBTQ rights that could be considered completely out of touch, and he gets destroyed by it in the media. Since Garrett went for a Dual Constituency approach, he was reliant on the big business that gave him so much support previously to ensure he won again. However, these missteps caused a lot of damage on that front, and big organizations begin to pull their support as well, and Garrett is left to lose this race. This section will cover the story of how Garrett’s rise to Congressional
power was almost a textbook story of the previous literature covered in chapter one, but as his
district was changing around him, he made certain mistakes that made him vulnerable, and
resulted in Democratic pressure, leading to his surprise defeat in 2016.

I: Garrett’s Rise to Power

Scott Garrett seems to follow a very similar approach to his early career in politics as the
one mapped out by Fenno. After Garrett’s first victory, which secured him his seat in Congress,
his goal for his next two reelection cycles seemed to be primarily to fend off Democratic
pressure to win back the seat. In 2006, when Garrett was seeking his first reelection, President
Bush was not very popular among Americans.40 This election saw the Democrats simultaneously
take over the House and Senate for the first time in twelve years.41 This would be a challenging
election for Garrett, considering his incumbency was not as established as other representatives,
but he won. In 2008, Garrett believed that the election would be a challenge for him, due to the
emergence of strong Democratic Presidential candidate in Barack Obama.42 The DCCC, or the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee even valued Garrett’s opponent Dennis
Schulman as a priority candidate in their Red to Blue campaign, viewing Garrett as vulnerable,
and at risk of losing his seat43. However, this prioritization was made too late, as it did not end up

40 “Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush | Gallup Historical Trends.”

41 “Democrats Win Control of Congress.”. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/09/AR2006110900147.html.

42 “GOP Congressman Scott Garrett Surprised by Own Victory - Nj.Com.”

43 “National Celebrity Doesn’t Equal Victory In House Elections | RealClearPolitics.”.
adding any significant value to Schulman’s campaign financially, only garnering $83,000 of campaign funds for Schulman, in a race where Garrett was beating Schulman in campaign funds by a ratio of over 2:1. In the end, Garrett won this election by 15% of the vote, winning with 57% compared to Schulman’s 42%. In an article posted by NJ.com, Garrett claims to have even been surprised with how well he did in the election. What is important about winning the 2008 election is that Garrett has now survived a vicious midterm cycle for Republicans, along with another race where not only a strong Democratic leader wins the Presidential, but the DCCC viewed him as vulnerable. By winning in 2008 by a larger margin than expected, Garrett proved himself to be a powerful incumbent, and as such Democrats would be dissuaded from challenging him after he won supposedly close elections by double digits three times. This helps him massively when speaking of moving towards power in D.C., such as Mayhew suggests. What is important is that while Bush was still in office, Garrett was appointed onto the Financial Services Committee within Congress, which oversaw the entire financial service industry. What is important to understand is that not only does this mean that Garrett has established himself as a powerful member of Congress, who is being rewarded for his service, but that he now has the attention of Wall Street, since his say on policies and regulations now directly affect how Wall Street does business. This fits into Mayhew’s idea of a Dual Constituency, where once power is established, the incumbent moves away from establishing a base within his own district, to looking to establish power in Congress, which leads to big money from big organizations. This


proves to be a factor in the 2008 election, as Schulman views it as corrupt, and a reason Garrett should be voted out of office. He states, "This election was all about the corruption that pervades Washington," Shulman said. "A Washington where Garrett and others take thousands of dollars from industries they are charged to oversee. There's something really wrong about that. We lost the election but we were right. We were right to call Garrett out on that." There was a reason why raising money was so easy for Garrett, and it seems to be that he had Wall Street in his back pocket, so to speak. Having access to this sort of money at any time, while not really worrying about any challenge from the Democratic Party, seemed to indicate that Garrett had the potential for a long career in Congress, unless something drastic were to happen.

II: Underlying Issues Surrounding Garrett

Where Scott Garrett’s vulnerability is initially shown is directly after the 2012 redistricting based on the 2010 census. The way the redistricting process in New Jersey works, is that there is a redistricting commission, made up of thirteen members, consisting of six Democrats, six Republicans, and a final member chosen by the states Supreme Court. In 2012 this thirteenth member, who held the deciding vote, was in fact a Republican. Despite this, Scott Garrett’s district was changed to lean more Democratic by adding parts of New Jersey’s ninth congressional district. There were no members of the committee from Bergen County, which is the largest in the state. The reasoning behind the change seems to have been to pit the


Democratic representatives from the 8th and 9th districts against each other, by changing both of their districts maps substantially, causing both of them to run in the same district in the primary, and opening up a chance for Republicans to take over the other district.\textsuperscript{48} This strategy worked in the short term for the Republican Party, as in 2012 the state ended up even with six Democratic and six Republican representatives each.\textsuperscript{49} The transfer of so many Democratic voters to Garrett’s fifth congressional district seems to have been on the basis that he was a safe incumbent. However, in the long term, this ends up hurting Garrett. After not being substantially challenged in 2010, and establishing a powerful reputation in Congress and his own district, Garrett seemed untouchable by Democrats. So, it seems that Republicans were shifting Democrats into the fifth, in the belief that it would be extremely difficult to defeat Garrett, even in a district that was becoming a more balanced district.

What seems to not be accounted for by the commission is that while Garrett has a solid stronghold on his district, this was primarily due to the fact that the district was Republican in make-up prior to the change, and by a large margin.\textsuperscript{50} Scott Garrett had never had to go across the aisle and try to appeal to Democratic voters, since he could win without their vote. A man who was a known conservative would need to now find a way to not only continue to appeal to the Republicans in the district, but win over a new Democratic faction in the district.

\textsuperscript{48} “GOP Wins N.J. Congressional Redistricting Battle - Nj.Com.”

\textsuperscript{49} “NJ DOS - Division of Elections - 2012 Election Results.”

\textsuperscript{50} “NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Statewide Voter Registration Statistics Archive.”
The challenges faced by incumbents following redistricting have been observed in an article by Ansolabehere and Snyder. When discussing the effects of redistricting, Ansolabehere and Snyder suggest that “Changes in district boundaries hurt incumbents since they lose voters whom they had served and gain voters who don’t know them. There is, in fact, a large difference between the votes that incumbents win among familiar and new parts of their districts.” The authors go on to talk about the effects of change in partisanship being a major issue for incumbents as well, and the idea of the incumbency effect being diminished significantly by redistricting. So, what seems to be a secure district for Scott Garrett may not be that way. Garrett needs to, in order to continue his political dominance over the fifth, create a new base within the new parts of his district, while retaining his old base that remains. This could amount to a problem for Garrett, as his conservative views will be difficult to pass onto a new Democratic faction. So, it seems that the fifth, when speaking of Democrats, had to become a district in which was looked at very closely, to see how Garrett would do in regards to creating a new base in his new district, and if he could retain his original base. Any sort of slip up, bad votes, or bad media, could cause this new district to turn on him, since there was no more guaranteed Republican majority. Garrett needed to tread lightly, and be very cautious of making moves that would disrupt the Democratic part of his district, if he wanted to remain in office.

When Scott Garrett went into office, he was known to be a conservative. While New Jersey could be considered more of a moderate state, Garrett was completely far right, especially on social issues. Garrett puts very little effort into supporting the rights of women, and the rights of the LGBTQ community, via the way he votes on these issues in Congress. While in 2013, Garrett votes “no” on an amendment that would have removed protections for Native Americans and members of the LGBTQ community, he later votes against an amendment that would prevent independent contractors from discriminating against those in the LGBTQ community. Garrett is also a staunch pro-life supporter, receiving a 100% grade from the NRLC, or the Nation Right to Life Committee, showing that his stances on abortion are very conservative. To go along with this, he received a 0% grade from NARAL, a pro-choice group that rates politicians on their stances on abortion, such as the NRLC.\(^5\) In July 2006, Scott Garrett voted yes on a bill that was written to define a marriage as strictly between a man and woman, and previously voted to ban same sex marriage in 2004. Garrett was given a 0% grade by the HRC, indicating an anti-gay rights stance, and a 19% score by the NAACP, primarily showing Garrett’s anti-affirmative action stances. Later, in 2013, Garrett voted on a bill that protected anti-gay speech as free speech.\(^5\) While these are very conservative views, especially for a representative in the North East, Garrett’s district returned him time and time again suggesting that this did not affect his status as representative. His voting record seems to stay very conservative throughout, and consistently he wins elections. Regardless of whether this is because he has such a strong base within his district, or because of the power in Congress that he


established and the big money that was available to him as a result, Democrats realized that they would be wasting their time trying to defeat him, and that there needed to be something negatively said or done that really enraged the district. In line with Fenno’s discussions, as long as Garrett is in good standing with the district socially, and his public image does not get completely out of control, he should be in line for a long career. Fenno discusses things that could ruin a good relationship with a constituency, such as a string of bad votes in the district that cannot be explained, or having outlandish statements that your district just does not agree with whatsoever.

In 2014, Democrat Roy Cho, who is completely self-funded, and not supported by the Democratic party in any way, gives Garrett a pretty good challenge.\(^5\)\(^5\) Clearly, there is a Democratic base within the district that is forming after the shift of Democratic voters to the fifth, but since the party has not put any effort into trying to oust him, it is hard for Garrett to lose. As long as Garrett can stay in good standing with most of his voters, he should still be in good shape. However, prior to the 2016 election, Garrett does a pretty good job hurting his own public image. According to an article from NPR, from October 29, 2016, Garrett’s anti-LGBTQ rights stance may have cost him the 2016 election. In the article, titled *Anti-Gay Remarks Lost A Congressman Wall Street, And Maybe His House Seat*, author Joel Rose goes into detail on how his conservative views on issues such as abortion and gay rights may in fact cost him his seat in Congress. In 2015, Garrett, in a closed door meeting with the National Republican Congressional Committee, stated that he would be withholding his dues, until the party no longer supported

Republican candidates who were within the LGBTQ community.\textsuperscript{56} When these comments ended up leaking to the press, Garrett was flustered, and forced into damage control. The problem with these comments is that while Garrett may represent these values, the Wall Street organizations that Garrett had been receiving the financial support that made him such a strong incumbent from may not. In 2016, businesses naturally would want to stray away from comments such as those Garrett made, since social media spreads news such as this like wildfire. The last thing Goldman Sachs wants is a massive social movement against their company online, over their support of a candidate who represents anti-gay rights policy. So, major campaign contributors within the financial world, such as Goldman, Capital One, and large Japanese firm Nomura, all pulled their campaign donations from Garrett.\textsuperscript{57} Where Garrett was receiving about $600,000 on average from large financial firms, he now watched that number cut itself in half.\textsuperscript{58}

Scott Garrett seems to do a poor job of understanding the shift in his district after the redistricting. While Garrett still remains in office, and wins in 2012 and 2014, there seemed to be some weaknesses exposed. Just using the example of Garrett’s stance on LGBTQ rights, it seems that the country, let alone his district, are moving in a more progressive direction, while Garrett seemed to stay stagnant. Garrett clearly was operating on the basis that even if he was to lose


favorability in his district over certain viewpoints, he was still in a position of power where his donors could bail him out, and continue to fend off any challenger he faced. However, a mistake of the magnitude Scott Garrett made does not only put him at risk of ruining his developed relationship with his district, but it projected nationally that he was out of touch.

In 2016, gay rights was in fact a large issue within politics, and it still is today. In a study done by the Washington Post, 47% of the nation was pro-gay marriage when Garrett came into office in 2004, and while that was a low number, considering the progression in LGBTQ rights in the past 10 years alone, the idea of gay marriage was just beginning to gain traction in the mid 2000’s. However when Garrett made these anti-LGBTQ comments, the country was vastly pro-gay marriage, with 71% in favor. So, while Garrett stood his ground throughout his career, especially on social issues such as this, the nation did not agree, and would consider Garrett out of touch, since he was not willing to become more accepting, such as most of the nation had. Votes and comments such as these seem to have given Garrett a new reputation of someone who no longer represented the fifth the way they wanted to be represented. With a rise in Democratic voter ship in the district, and the decrease in Republican turnout, Garrett had proved his approach to his district may have been outdated. These trends, which don’t work in Garrett’s favor, along with a loss of large donations from previously loyal donors, allowed the Democrats to pursue Scott Garrett’s seat in 2016.

III: Response by Democrats

59 “Gay Marriage’s Road to Popularity, in 5 Charts - The Washington Post.”
This idea of Dual Constituency works well, as long as there is not much that is done in Congress, or said publicly, that changes the district’s opinion on him or her. As Mayhew says, one or two bad votes, or bad statements can be explained, but once they consistently add up, and begin to compile on one another, it is easy for a incumbent to lose a district. This seems to be what happened when Garrett is finally challenged by a well-backed incumbent. After Garrett’s anti-gay comments were made public, the DCCC, or the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, began to target Garrett’s seat in the fifth as an opportunity to take over a red seat. An article from NJ.com, called, Will voters remember N.J. Rep. Scott Garrett’s gay comments next fall? quotes Jeb Fain, a spokesperson from the DCCC, who refers to Garrett as “one of the most extreme and hateful members” Fain later goes on to comment on the DCCC commitment to going after Garrett’s seat: "Without a doubt, Congressman Garrett is a top target for us in 2016,"60 The DCCC later produced a 1,111 page document on Garrett, highlighting many different topics, all deriving from his political career and past. The topic lists span from veterans affairs, to abortion, all putting a negative spin on how Garrett has spent his time in office representing the fifth. For example, the report seems to question Garrett’s trustworthiness and caring about individuals in the district, when stating that he never has held a town hall meeting. This is important when speaking to the district’s trust in Garrett. Fenno talks about the most important aspect of a representative’s cycle in Congress being obtaining the constituency’s trust. The fact that Garrett did not hold a town hall meeting for most of his tenure in office, could mean


either that he was extremely confident in his standing with his district such that he did not feel
the need to hold these meetings or that he believed that he could win despite any political
damage not holding might bring.

What the DCCC report seems to find is that Scott Garrett has been completely out of
touch with his district,\(^{62}\) and while his victories may say otherwise, the downward trends that
show us a loss in Republican turnout, and a rise in Democratic registration and turnout, may
show us that not only is his base abandoning him, but he struggled to establish a base in the new
part of the district, which came to be after the redistricting of 2012. This is crucial to Garrett’s
incumbency, as once he was shown to be relatively vulnerable by Roy Cho in 2014, the
Democrats went all in. What made matters worse for Garrett was the comment that he made,
which brought Garrett into national attention. With the DCCC and other Democratic groups
looking to target Garrett, this made for a great time for a well-funded Democrat to come in and
try to take Garrett’s seat from him. That is what Josh Gottheimer looked to do in 2016, and
succeeded in doing so. His campaign went after Garrett, appealing to Democrats who really
hadn’t had a voice in the district for quite some time, since Garrett took strong control of the
district back in 2006 and 2008. The comments made led to digging into voting records that
brought up facts supportive of framing Scott Garrett as not being in support of a women’s right
to choice, even when she is raped\(^ {63}\). Votes such as these were used by the Democrats to pin
Garrett as a Tea Party conservative in a district that was no longer in line with those ideals.


While in 2004, the idea of LGBTQ rights was more of an issue you either supported or you didn’t, that was not the case in 2015 when Garrett makes his comments.

**IV: Conclusion**

Overall, Scott Garrett rises to power pretty much exactly how you would want to, if you were a Congressional candidate. He originally wins his district, and weathers two tough election years to be a Republican representative, giving him power as the incumbent, positioning him to fight off Democrats seeking election in the fifth. He is loyal to his party, which rewards him with the privilege of being a member of a committee that oversees big money, enabling him to garner more campaign money from large corporate interests. Garrett looks to be in line for a long career in office, until the redistricting of the fifth. The Republicans voted to make the fifth more competitive, seemingly to win over other seats in the immediate future, believing that Garrett was a powerful incumbent who was not challenged in 2010 and looked secure in 2012. Nevertheless, this may not have been a problem for Garrett if he had not lost touch with his district, or if he won over his new constituency before it was too late. However, after continuing to stay loyal to his conservative values, even when the district had demographically changed, and the nation had changed their outlook on many issues, Garrett weakened himself unnecessarily with negative comments regarding LGBTQ rights and lost support in both his donor constituency and in the district’s electorate. Garrett could have coasted to a long career in office, if he was not so stubborn on issues that clearly did not match that of his district. While party loyalty seemed to be important to him, what more power was there to gain? He was moving up as an experienced member of the Financial Services Committee and was even a chairman on a Subcommittee in charge of regulating big money. Garrett could have tweaked his ideology, in order to gain the
support of his new district, but he stuck to his guns, and it may have cost him his career as a Congressman.
CHAPTER 3: ANALYTICAL STUDY

Looking back, it seems that after a great rise to power, Scott Garrett, and those around him, seem to fall victim to his own success. The redistricting of the fifth seems to be the beginning of Garrett’s downfall. This movement brought a large number of new Democrats to the district, for what seems to be because of the fact that Garrett seems to have a strong hold of the district after two victories in down years for Republicans. After this, Garrett seems to fail to capitalize on this new demographic, and also is seeming to lose his base. With the changing demographic, and Scott Garrett sticking to his conservative values, it makes sense why numbers that seem to support Garrett go down within the district. The final nail in the coffin, so to speak, is Garrett making harsh statements regarding LGBTQ rights, where he finds big money donors pull out on him, and Democrat Josh Gottheimer taking advantage of Garrett’s comments, along with his voting history, to oust him of his seat. To try and justify this argument, I will be looking at multiple trends that seem to back the claims I am making. First, I will look at what I consider to be the beginning of Garrett’s downfall, the redistricting of the fifth in 2012, speaking on how Garrett does not capitalize on the opportunity to build a new base in the new demographic added to the district. I will then move on to look at the district as a whole, looking for any trends that prove that Garrett is losing his base, and district as a whole. I will then move onto looking more specifically at Bergen county, and looking even closer, to the ward level, to see if the trends found at the district level match that of ward level. After this, I will look at how campaign finance plays into these trends, and look to see if there are any correlations with that of voter turnout and registration by party, looking once again at district level as a whole, and then ward level. To close, I will try to explain how the following data and trends all work together to seemingly back up the hypothesis stated previously in this project.
I: Redistricting of the Fifth

The moment where Scott Garrett’s incumbency began to weaken seems to be the 2010 census redistricting of 2012. This census took away a solid chunk of Warren County from the district, and added a large portion of Bergen County to the Fifth. In total, the Fifth added 96 districts from Bergen while losing only 18, and losing around 10-15,000 voters from Warren County. What can only seem to be a direct correlation to the sudden rise in Democratic registration, Bergen County had become even more important to the structure of the Fifth. This is important, as Garrett needs to now move into this district, and attempt to establish a relationship with this new base. With such a high number of Democrats moving into the district, this would be a challenge for Garrett, that according to the following figures, he seems to fail.

FIGURE A)


FIGURE B)

New Districts Added To NJ 5 Voting Results 2014

FIGURE C)

In figures A-C, the districts that were added into the Fifth after the 2012 redistricting of the Fifth are looked at in terms of who they voted for, from 2012 to 2016. Clearly, there is a strong Democratic presence within these districts and towns, as the ratio of Democratic votes compared to Republican votes is quite high. For example, out of all the votes cast in the newly added districts in 2012, Garrett accumulated 17,951 votes compared to his opponents 36,414. In 2014 Garrett lost these districts by about 8,000 votes, Garrett with 12,432, and his opponent with 20,930. Finally, in 2016, when defeated by Gottheimer, Garrett accumulated a total of 16,748 votes compared to Gottheimer 39,675 votes in the area added in the 2012 redistricting. In 2016, I


69 The bars that are labeled with town names are all the combined votes from all the individual districts added to the fifth within the individual towns. Ramsey 7-8 and Wycoff 9-10 are districts added to a town who has previously been in the fifth, which is why the total vote numbers are so low compared to the other towns.

70 In 2016 the information for these individual districts was not available, as total vote count was only available at the town level for Bergen County.
was unable to access voter data for specific wards within towns, so the data for New Milford 9, Ramsey 7-8 and Wycoff 9-10 were no available for 2016. Since these wards are a small part of the total numbers provided, and they seem to fall in line with the rest of the town in regards of voting for Garrett consistently, it seems to not affect this specific table as a whole. This data seems to account for the sudden rise in voter registration for Democrats in the District, and can also explain why Republican registration seems to stay stagnant, between the addition of these districts and the loss of about 10-15,000 votes from Warren county, the district seems to have become evenly matched, where it previously favored Republicans. The massive margin of victory for Democrats in these districts could seemingly close a previous gap that the Republicans had been taking advantage of. However, while all of this seems to explain why there is a higher Democratic presence in the district, with the new Democratic base post-2012 redistricting, the question that needs to be answered is that of the Republican presence in the district, and what is going on with Republican turnout? At the end of the day, what has built Scott Garrett to be a strong incumbent was the strong presence of Republican vote, so what changes? Along with this, why is there such a drastic change heading from 2014 to 2016, but not 2010 to 2012, when the redistricting occurred?

II: District Outlook

While the redistricting of the fifth seems to be the supposed start of the negative trends that lead to Garrett’s collapse, it would be good to take a look at the fifth more generally. When looking for answers regarding changes in the fifth, you must begin the conversation with Bergen County. Bergen County, by population, is the majority of the district, and with the redistricting of the fifth, the county became even more of a majority of the district. For example, in 2016, out
of a total of 337,701 ballots cast, 237,540 came from within Bergen County. The following figure shows total votes, by party, for each of the counties within the fifth, from 2006-2016.

**FIGURE D)**

**CONGRESSIONAL VOTE IN NEW JERSEY’S 5TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, BY PARTY (2006-2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bergen</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Third Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>62,944</td>
<td>67,287</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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Prior to the 2016 election, and even more so prior to the redistricting of the fifth, Garrett tends to benefit from a large margin of victory in what could be considered his main base, or group of voters who will always vote for a candidate, within Warren and Sussex counties. For example, in 2008, when Garrett ran against Democrat Dennis Schulman, Garrett won the election by about 40,000 votes. In Bergen county, Garrett only won by about 11,000 votes out of almost 200,000. This is a relatively normal victory in Bergen for Garrett, who would tend to win Bergen by a relatively small margin, leaving the door open, so to speak, for an opponent to win the election in the smaller counties. The benefit of having a strong base in Warren and Sussex, and winning these counties by such a large margin, is that it not only ensures victory for Garrett, but pushes the margin of victory into a position where the victory is comfortable, and Garrett won’t look as a weaker incumbent.

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What is important about this is that the larger the margin of victory, the stronger the incumbent looks, and less highly qualified challengers will try to come and take the seat from Garrett. In 2008, Garrett won Warren with 27,697 votes, compared to Schulman’s 17,133, and he won Sussex with 32,487 votes compared to Shulman’s 16,371, which adds up to a total victory margin of 26,680 votes between the two counties. Garrett only won this election by a total of 41,620 votes. The base that Garrett has formed in Warren and Sussex gives him the security he needs to win elections easily. If the tables turned on him in Warren and Sussex, Garrett would have either lost the election outright, or the election would have made him look like a significantly weaker incumbent who the Democratic Party would have looked to target. Even a 10,000 vote swing would have significantly hurt him, as it would have left Garrett victorious by only 20,000 votes, to a candidate who spent significantly less money on their campaign. With Warren and Sussex giving him a nice cushion to work with, Garrett can comfortably win elections, rather than have to really work for his votes. Warren and Sussex seem to be where Garrett earns his respect as an incumbent. Since Bergen is usually so close, Warren and Sussex pick up the slack, so to speak, for Garrett. This could directly attribute to the laying off of the Democratic Party in the fifth, which leads to Garrett, and those around him, envisioning him as an incumbent who cannot be beaten.

This is where the problem of redistricting arises, as not only does the process add more voting districts in Bergen, but takes away some from Warren, which ends up adding to around 10-15,000 votes per election lost in Warren. This seems to come into play in 2014, as the margin of victory for Garrett shrinks to 22,870 votes, with Garrett winning the election with 104,678
votes to that of opponent Roy Cho’s 81,808. Cho put a little over 1.2 million dollars into his campaign, the most any opponent had put into their election since Garrett came into office. The question then arises, was that a sign of Garrett having a weakness within the district, after the 2012 redistricting, and it clearly beginning to show its head? What Garrett seems to be failing to do in the district, is capture a new base within the newly added towns and wards in Bergen, and obviously, after 2012, Roy Cho took notice.

**III: The role of Campaign Finance**

In 2014, Roy Cho almost won Bergen from Garrett, losing by only about 5,000 votes, while only spending about half of what Garrett spent, with about 1.25 million compared to Garrett’s almost 2.3 million. What the following figures will show are the amounts of money spent by Garrett in his reelections, compared to his opponents.

*FIGURE E:*

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What we see here is an attempted by Democrats to defeat Garrett, with Dennis Schulman raising $1.11 million, and yet being outspent, and defeated. After this, Garrett slides into a comfortable, stable stage of his incumbency. Democrats clearly refuse to challenge him, as the total money spent by Garrett’s opponents in 2010 and 2012 comes to a grand total of $71,060. However, for such a small amount of money spent on his campaign, 2012 opponent Adam Gussen only lost the election by 37,401 votes, being able to collect a total of 130,102 votes while spending only $51,440 on his campaign. What this tells us is that after the redistricting of 2012, Democrats, for how little money was being put into elections, had a pulse in the district, and were just waiting for well-backed candidate to run for the seat.

Along with this, voter turnout in Warren and Sussex counties, where Garrett seemed to win by such large margins, was decreasing at a rapid rate. Where voter turnout was 48% in Warren and 49% in Sussex, it dwindled to 35% in Warren and 36% in Sussex in 2014. Garrett still won those counties, and by a solid percentage, as he won Warren by 5,506 votes, and Sussex by 8,540 votes. This ended up being enough to push Garrett over once again, however, this drop in voter turnout had to be a cause for concern for Garrett, as while voter turnout was also down in Bergen, being at 44% in 2014, it was still a higher turnout than Sussex and Warren, with way more votes to be had.

**FIGURE F:**

![Voter turnout by county: election year](image)

**FIGURE G:**

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75 “NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Summary of Registered Voters and Ballots Cast.”
The two figures above show the turnout percentages in each election of Garrett’s incumbency, by county. As seen in Figure F above, voter turnout, runs on a strange trend. It seems that it generally increases, is when Garrett is defeated by Gottheimer in 2016, which could suggest a rise in Democratic turnout along with a well-backed Democrat. Warren County, which has been where Garrett had the most success throughout his incumbency, was the only county in the district to continue to drop in turnout heading into 2016. What this could possibly suggest, is that Garrett is losing his base, due to a loss of his base over the years, while Democratic turnout could be rising, due to the rise of a well-backed candidate. It seems, that these trends show us that Garrett is doing a poor job getting people out to vote. Considering the highest turnout rates during his time in office came during his first two reelectors, and after there is a steady decline,

until he loses office, there is definitely ground to say that Garrett could have slowly lost his base, and his district. A better way to look deeper into this is to see if this trend carries over to party turnout and registration, at the local level. If there is a consistent decline in both these numbers, for Republicans, and a rise for Democrats, Scott Garrett very well could have lost his base. Whether because of rash comments he made, consistent conservative votes in a district becoming more and more progressive, or just out of believing he was a sure victor every time he ran, it doesn’t matter. People stop showing up.

**IV: Turnout Trends at Ward Level:**

Bergen County takes up the vast majority of the votes within the district, I decided to get a closer look at voter turnout at the town and ward level. While there is a clear base within Warren, Sussex, and at times, Passaic counties, it is important to see whether there are parts of Bergen that show up and vote for Garrett during his run as Congressman.

*FIGURE H:*
What Figure I shows is a closer look at individual wards within towns across Bergen County, in midterm election years. In order for this to be as accurate and fair a study of Bergen

77 “BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
County as possible, I chose twenty wards at random from a list of wards within the county, using an application that is designed to randomly pick from a list that is plugged into the application. In order for this study to help show how the Fifth was turning out, I made sure to only include districts that were not affected by the redistricting of the Fifth. When one ward was picked, it was removed from the list, and then I would continue, in order to avoid repeated picks. What is important here is that in most midterm election years, the primary elections are more than likely in the House of Representatives, which means in the Fifth, Scott Garrett is the lead man. These statistics could be seen as alarming for Garrett, as turnout from 2006, all the way to 2014, shows a massive dip in turnout, throughout the county. This ends up being the election in which Garrett wins by the slimmest margin of votes during his incumbency, and it seems that it can be correlated with the lack of voter turnout.
Voter Turnout by Ward, Presidential year

Year

Bergen County Board of Elections

Votes

2008  2012

2016
On the other hand, what Figure J shows, is the difference in turnout in these same Wards, in Presidential election years. Here is what is alarming for Scott Garrett, there isn’t much of a difference between turnouts over this 8 year span, which contains three Presidential elections. If you compare the two, the turnout rate going down in midterm years and not Presidential years can mean a couple things. Either a) The district, and Garrett’s base of voters believe that he is a sure victory, and no longer are turning up to vote, or what seems to be more likely b) Garrett is losing popularity with his district, and his base is losing numbers from when he was seemingly in his prime, in 2006. What seems to be the best way to prove whether either of these theories are correct, is to give a deeper look at voter registration by party, to see whether or not there is a correlation between voter turnout and registration.

**V: The Voter Registration Dilemma**

When looking at if an elected official’s base is coming out to vote for him or her, you must start at the beginning of the voting process, voter registration. Registering to vote is a simple thing to do, and is something politicians want voters from their party, not the opposing party, to do. From the data that the New Jersey Division of Elections provides, voter registration rises within the Fifth from 432,335 registered voters across the district in 2010, to a grand total of 511,123 in 2016. 79

**FIGURE J:**

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78 “BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24

When looking at registration by party, it seems that over the course of these six years, Democrats are beginning to mobilize in the district at a far more rapid rate than that of their Republican counterparts. While by the 2016 election, Republican registration and Democratic registration are practically neck and neck, the rate of growth in registration in the prior six years leading up to this is not even close. What is interesting about this upward trend of Democratic presence is that while the registration numbers spike from 2010-2012 and 2014-2016, the Democratic registration does not change much from 2012-2014. This is consistent with Republican and

Unaffiliated registration as well, which suggests party polarization during presidential election years may be a large factor, and with the large number of Democrats moving to the district in 2010, it makes sense why there would be an uptick. The large rise in unaffiliated voters registering in 2010-2012 also can be attributed to the new wave of voters coming to the district, but the dip in registration in 2014-2016, along with the rise in Democratic and Republican registration may also suggest party polarization in presidential years. In total, Democrats are mobilizing more rapidly in the district post-2010 census, with an additional 44,472 registered Democratic voters in 2016 from 2010, the Democrats registration increased by 45.31% in the district, while with only 13,506 additional registered Republicans, the parties registration only increased by 10.27%.\textsuperscript{81} What is key to this individual case is that the gap of registered voters, which was once significantly wide with Republicans outnumbering Democrats by over 30,000 voters, has been closed to within a couple thousand voters. This shows the massive change in the district, in terms of party politics, after the 2010 census. It also shows that Garrett seems to not capitalize on this new area, as more registered Democrats means more than likely that those voters are not interested in voting for Garrett. Stemming off previous Figures I and J, this shows this percentage of increase from both Democrats and Republicans also points to a dip in Republican turnout for Garrett. With consistent rises in Democratic registration, along with dips in turnout in midterm elections, where Garrett is more than likely the focal point of the election, seems to continue to promote the idea that Garrett fell out of touch, and his voters are responding accordingly. However, this is still not enough correlating evidence to say with confidence that

\textsuperscript{81} “NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Statewide Voter Registration Statistics Archive.”
the claim that Scott Garrett lost his base is valid. What must be done next, is look at ward level registration, such as was done previously with ward level turnout, in order to see if this issue of registration is similar at the local level.

VI: Ward Level Registration:

In order to get the best understanding of whether or not the issue of registration is a sign that redistricting is the main issue in the fifth, or if there is a combination of added Democrats via redistricting, and a loss of Garrett’s base, we must look at registration at the local level, in order to compare it to turnout and total votes in the area.

FIGURES K-N)

Voter Registration Within Bergen County: Ward Level (Midterm Years)

Bergen County Board of Elections

82 “BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
Voter Registration Within Bergen County: Ward Level (Midterm Years)

Registered Voters

- 2006
- 2010
- 2014

Ward

- Bergenfield 6
- Demarest 2
- Oakland 8
- Waldwick 4
- Wyckoff 6
- Glen Rock 5
- Ho-Ho-Kus 1

Bergen County Board of Elections

83 “BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
Voter Registration Within Bergen County: Ward Level (Presidential Election Years)

Bergen County Board of Elections

84 “BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
Figures K-N show the trend of voter registration, within the districts inside Bergen County that were previously looked at in Section IV. What is significant about these graphs is that there really isn’t a drastic change. According to the graphs on turnout in these districts, where turnout is shrinking quickly, you would expect these graphs to be going downwards in trend themselves, yet, ever so slightly, the opposite is happening for the most part. The only ward with significant change is Wycoff 1, which could potentially be attributed to the redistricting of the district, which added two more wards to Wycoff, potentially spreading out the voters in the town. So, what does this mean? After analyzing previous Figures that show that not only is turnout

85 “BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
shrinking, while registration seems to be rising slightly, it seems that Republicans are just not showing up anymore. Democrats are starting to take hold of the district once again. The best way to prove this, is to look at total results in the district, and compare to the turnout and registration rates.

**VII: Voting Results**

To see if the dip in turnout compared to a slight rise in registration can lead to a conclusion that Garrett has lost his base, and failed to gain a new base in new areas added to the district after redistricting, We must look at vote totals for Garrett, and see if they correlate with lack of turnout in midterm years, along with Presidential years, where turnout doesn’t change much.

**FIGURE O)**

![Scott Garrett Total Vote Count 2006-2016 (Midterm)](image)

**FIGURE P)**
What these trends show us is that Garrett is losing votes. The only positive spike for Garrett is the Midterms from 2006-10, but that is when Garrett has his greatest margin of victory, and right before the districts were realigned, making the Fifth significantly more competitive. In Presidential years, where turnout in the district, along with voter registration are moving up, Garrett is still on a negative slope, suggesting that in fact, Republicans are either showing up less for Garrett, compared to their Democratic counterparts, or just not voting for Garrett when they do show up. To see if this is true, we must look at this at ward level, to see if these trends match with the wards in Bergen County we have looked at previously.

FIGURES Q-X

Total Votes for Democratic Opponent (Bergen County, Presidential Election Years)

"BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives" http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
What Figures Q-X are showing, when looking at the local level, is that while Garrett is losing votes, Democrats are gaining votes. On a consistent level throughout the previous charts, Scott Garrett is losing votes from 2010-2014, looking at midterm vote totals, along with from 2012-2016 with Presidential. Not only does this trend exist in practically every single Ward looked at in these graphs, it completely goes along with the other trends in these districts, such as dips in turnout but rises in registration. While obviously there is a sharper spike in Democratic vote from 2012-2016 than 2010-2014, we must look back at the money being put into this election. To put it in perspective, Garrett really only about doubles his previous spending high, while Gottheimer quadruples the previous spending high by a Democrat, which seems to help make money a large factor is this as well. This is a possible explanation for what is going on in the district, and supports the claim that Garrett is losing his voters. Since turnout, and votes for Garrett are falling, and registration, especially Democratic registration, along with votes for Democratic opponents are rising, it could be said that Garrett is losing his grasp on the district, and his base is no longer showing up for him. As has been said before, 2010 is not only the year where the least money is spent by a Democratic opponent, but is also the last year before the redistricting of the fifth. After the redistricting, trends began to move in Democrat’s favor, with rises in Democratic registration, and potentially turnout, based on what is shown here, it could be safe to say that Democrat’s saw a weakened seat in the fifth. The most drastic change in most of these wards is that of Democratic vote from 2012-2016 in the Presidential year chart, along with 2010-2014 in the Midterm year chart. What is significant about these elections is that, starting with 2014, Democrats began putting money into elections again. While Roy Cho’s financial contributions nowhere near match that of Gottheimer in 2016, the relatively sizable rise in vote
share for Cho in 2014, compared to previous midterm elections, along with Garrett’s slight drop in numbers, exposes a weakness that Garrett clearly does not account for. This weakness, through a mobilization of Democrats, seems to become amplified in 2016, after rash statements by Garrett seem to inspire Democrats to push to reacquire the seat in the fifth. Clearly, what all that was needed to mobilize the new Democrats in this district was money. As while the trends of voter registration and turnout show that Garrett may be losing favorability in the district, once large sums of campaign money are inserted into the equation, drastic change happens.

**VIII: Conclusion:**

What all the data put forth in this analytical study has shown for myself is that there seems to be a combination of issues in the fifth when speaking of how Garrett loses in 2016. It does not seem to be just a simple explanation, where one single factor is the main reason why, but rather a series of events that compiled to end up losing Garrett the district. It starts with the redistricting after the 2010 census, which weakens the strong Republican majority in the district, with a new rise in Democrats. After this, Garrett seems to be consistently losing his base, whether from not being as committed to his constituency as he once was, to making bad votes in Congress, while trying to gain power in DC. While this is going on, Democratic presence continues to rise, along with Democratic vote, and these trends must have caught the eye of Democrats. After Garrett proves he cannot win over this new demographic, the money spent in elections begins to become a factor again, with Roy Cho potentially showing some weakness in Garrett’s district. The final blow seems to be Josh Gottheimer throwing out massive sums of money, compared to Democrats before him. This ends up working, as Gottheimer succeeds in the mobilization of Democrats in the fifth, while Garrett cannot reciprocate with Republicans. Scott Garrett was unable to not only capitalize on a new demographic moving to his district, also
seems to lose his voter base, especially after Garrett makes crude comments on LGBTQ rights, and makes certain “bad votes” that make his district angry. After the 2010 census, New Jersey’s fifth congressional district was slowly moving towards Democratic representation, that Josh Gottheimer took advantage of after six years’ worth of negative trends for Republicans, and positive trends for Democrats. By throwing large sums of money into his 2016 election, Josh Gottheimer, and his donors succeed in mobilizing Democrats against a representative that these members of the district no longer believe represents them.
CONCLUSION

To conclude, finding where Scott Garrett falters is not an easy task. As stated previously, Garrett is very successful in building his congressional career. As discussed in the literature review, the four main requirements for congressional success are 1) developing a base, which after multiple wins within a district an incumbent moves onto 2) power in Congress, where party loyalty, is rewarded. While this is a risky game this allows for appointment to committee. What is important, especially when voting along party lines is 3) maintaining a good public image, where a Congressman or woman can explain why they voted a certain way. While after developing power in Congress, Congressmen or women find themselves acquiring substantial 4) acquiring substantial and consistent campaign funding. With power in Congress, a vote from a representative becomes subject to greater scrutiny, and outside groups will look to keep that person in office, or remove them. Garrett seems to execute this plan to a tee in his first six to eight years in Congress, establishing a strong base, which deters highly qualified candidates from running against Garrett. With no strong Democratic challenger in sight, Garrett has a comfortable hold on his district. Garrett then moves to developing power in Congress, and through his loyalty to the party, is rewarded with a seat on the Financial Services committee, and later a lead position on a subcommittee. Since Garrett’s committee deals directly with big money, Garrett becomes backed well by Wall Street. With a comfortable situation at home, and substantial financial backing from outside sources, Garrett has developed a strong Dual Constituency, as Mayhew describes. Garrett remains viewed well by his district up, as his margin of victory continues to grow, and it looks like Garrett is in line for a long term career.

Certain factors seem to lead to Garrett’s decline and later his downfall within his district. Starting with the redistricting of 2012, the Republican Party in New Jersey seems to believe that
Garrett is untouchable, and there is a shift of Democrats out of the eighth and ninth districts, and into the fifth. Garrett seems to neglect this new grouping of voters in the district that he needs to appeal to and that he also needs to continue to work with his base, making sure that it is strong as ever, considering the rise in Democratic registration after 2012. However, Garrett seems to stick to his guns, and continues to support conservative legislation and ideas, and it begins to backfire. After more than a few bad votes in a row, and some outlandish comments made about LGBTQ rights, along with multiple trends that have not been moving in Garrett’s favor, registration, turnout, and total vote wise, Roy Cho funds his own campaign, and challenges Garrett. Cho funding his own campaign, and being the first Democrat to challenge Garrett since the redistricting of 2012 exposes a grouping of trends, such as the negative trends of republican registration compared to total votes, compared to that of the drastic rise in Democratic registration and total votes. What Cho does, is shows the Democratic Party that the Democrats in the fifth are prepared and ready to mobilize under a well-funded, highly qualified candidates. This seems to open the door for Josh Gottheimer, who attacks Garrett for his statements, and votes, and takes advantage of the trends that Garrett seems to have been ignoring, costing him the seat.

What is there to learn from this conclusion? Primarily, not to become complacent, and stay in one’s ways, seems to be the best way to adapt and continue thriving in today’s political climate. Politics is nothing like it was in 2004, let alone 2008, when Garrett became a powerful incumbent. Social media by itself, seems to have amplified the idea of public image over mostly everything else in politics. If you can maintain a good social presence in today’s politics, you will be alright. Where Garrett could have survived is his outlandish comments. Making an anti-LGBTQ comment in the year 2015 will mess up one’s public image easily, especially when
someone is throwing money at commercials trying to turn your district against you. As Mayhew states, you may have to cross party lines at times, in order to stay on the side of favorability. If Garrett changed certain aspects of his political agenda to match that of his ever-changing district, he would probably still be in office today. However, this is not the case, and the stubbornness of Garrett led to his eventual demise. What New Jersey’s fifth district can teach other incumbents most is to have a consistent, yet flexible approach to understanding one’s constituency. When having a “flexible approach” one must be able to adapt to changes within an incumbents district, and not remaining stagnant regarding the view of one’s constituency. Making sure to not become power hungry, and neglecting the district, are vital to one’s success.

Overall, Garrett’s rise to success is a textbook example. He does all the things needed, and stated by scholars in the field, to establish a base, and develop power in Congress. Where Garrett ends up faltering is after this rise. Garrett ends up not paying as much attention to his changing district as he should, and this allows for negative trends to develop. In order to avoid these negative trends, which leads to vulnerability, Garrett needed to appeal to his new district, not being afraid to change some of his values for the betterment of the district, and the longevity of his career. With Garrett’s inability to recognize changes in the district, and adjust according, his district responds, and swiftly removes him when given the chance. This shows incumbents across the country, even those who believe they are safe, that while they may believe that the power they have acquired over the course of their careers may help them coast to long incumbencies, this may not be the case. The case of New Jersey’s fifth in 2016 proves that no matter who a Congressman is, or how much powerful they are, the people will always have the final say.
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