Engaging Family Values: Global and Religious Dimensions to LGBT Rights in South Africa

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Engaging Family Values:
Global and Religious Dimensions to LGBT Rights in South Africa

Senior Project submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
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To My Family
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Introduction

From the home to the floor of the United Nations Human Rights Council, family values are an ideological force consistently contributing to systems of social order. Rooted in 17th century Victorian bourgeois society, family values were the rationale for limiting sexuality to the home, where the primary purpose of family was to take custody of reproduction.\(^1\) Over three centuries, family values have evolved from the practices of Victorian society and been absorbed into new social contexts. The European process of colonization carried family values into new households, producing histories of a traditional family. For the purpose of this paper, I define family values as the set of moral and ethical values tied to patriarchal, heteronormative definitions of family produces spaces of freedom and inclusivity in regards to sexual expression. The traditional family assumes to be the heterosexual couple alongside their biological children. Ingrained in this definition is the assumption that the heterosexual family structure is the only natural form. This acceptance of a confined definition of family in the ideology of family values motivates oppressions of alternative forms of family and sexuality. Sexuality is historically silenced through the family values ideology. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) identities are just a few forms of sexuality that are silenced through this ideological force.

Family values often goes unrecognized as the ideological force in opposition to LGBT rights. We concentrate on the apparatuses that implement oppression rather than the hegemonic forces allowing these religious and state institutions to create a globalized framework in the 21st century. The family values ideology produces friction with the human rights ideology within LGBT because of the confinements/liberation of sexuality respectively within each. The family

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values ideology acts as a force to limit sexuality to the heteronormative. Human rights ideology acts as a force to protect forms of sexual orientation and gender identity, claiming the same natural qualities as the heteronormative. The human rights ideology, upheld by the United Nations, consumes LGBT rights into its theoretical discourse. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not explicitly mention LGBT rights, evolving conceptions of international human rights law allow for a broader interpretation to include the rights and the protection of the rights of LGBT people globally.

On December 10th, 2010 United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, delivered her Human Rights Day speech in Geneva, catapulting LGBT Rights to the center stage. Clinton’s speech demanded that sexual orientation and gender identity be protected by states as a human right. In the 60 years of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) existence, the spread of human rights ideology has produced contextual conflict with preexisting family values ideology. The human rights ideology marks a post-colonial growth of thought. Clinton states in her speech:

> This recognition did not occur all at once. It evolved over time. And as it did, we understood that we were honoring rights that people always had, rather than creating new or special rights for them. Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethnic minority, being LGBT does not make you less human. And that is why gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.²

Clinton’s remarks were considered a threat by many states that support the family values ideology. Because of this, several African state leaders understood Clinton’s statement as a threat to either prescribe to the LGBT component of the human rights ideology or lose foreign aid. A movement in African states toward restricting LGBT rights followed the 2010 speech.

International media and non-governmental organizations (NGO) reported the anti-homosexuality

and anti-transsexuality movement in predominantly western African states is upheld by the notion that LGBT rights are a western import. States such as Nigeria and Uganda proposed legislation to limit those minority groups and their freedom of expression. This is just one example of several in the ever-increasing clash of LGBT rights with family values. LGBT rights are held up by the human rights ideology as a rival globalized framework to the family values ideology. Until recent state and activist support, the family values ideology historically silenced LGBT rights. Limiting visibilities of LGBT people in states globally exemplifies the hegemonic force of family values. Family values continues to operate in African states presently despite clashes with the western-based ideological perspective of human rights.

The human rights ideology attempts to combat the silencing of narratives that ultimately represent the ideological attempt to limit the coexistence of minority groups in history. In her speech Clinton stated: “I want to talk about the work we have left to do to protect one group of people whose human rights are still denied in too many parts of the world today. In many ways, they are an invisible minority.” LGBT people are placed outside of dominant Western portrayals of history. History is an empowered narrative that constructs existing value systems, languages, and identities. The empowerment of one narrative as a historical truth demands the silencing of other narratives. The production of history demands the exclusion of truths. Power structures determine which narratives achieve a claim to history. Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes:

Power is constitutive of the story. Tracking power through various “moments” simply helps emphasize the fundamentally processual character of historical production, to insist that what history is matters less than how history works; that power itself works together with history; and that historians’ claimed political preferences have little influence on most of the actual practices of power. A warning from Foucault is helpful: “I don’t believe that the question of ‘who exercises

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power? can be resolved unless that other question *how does it happen?* is resolved at the same time.”

The hegemonic forces of family values determine how sexuality is defined, codified, and contained in social norms. The power of family values to historically silence LGBT rights plays a significant role in my research. Up until modern developments in LGBT rights, considered human rights in international political discourse, several forms of sexuality were simplified and silenced under the surveillance of family values. I use the term “LGBT” rather than LGBTI, LGBTQ, or several other acronyms that attempt to encapsulate minority forms of sexual orientation or gender identity. I do so not to separate out other minority forms of sexuality/gender, but because LGBT is the term predominantly used in the UNHRC when discussing the human rights ideology. Until the emergence of the human rights ideology, LGBT people had a silenced narrative on the sidelines of history. From the 1980s onwards, global powers such as states, the UNHRC, and human rights NGOs rose to relieve LGBT people from the oppression of family values.

In my paper, I extend my analysis beyond the religious and state actors that limit LGBT rights and focus on how family values is the force that perpetuates these limitations on sexuality. Foucault traces systematic efforts to limit sexual orientation and gender identity back to 17th century Victorian bourgeois society. He writes: “I do not maintain that the prohibition of sex us a ruse; but it is a ruse to make prohibition into the basic and constitutive element from which one would be able to write the history of what has been said concerning sex from the modern

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This constructive element of history claims family values as traditional in various contexts. Tradition definitively presupposes history. The claim to family values as preceding other comprehensions of sexuality demands power over systematic orderings of society. It silences and separates out alternative forms of sexuality from the family through religious and state apparatuses.

One of the greatest forms of systematic social ordering during the 20th century was the Apartheid era of South Africa. In 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP) established Apartheid, meaning “apartness” in Afrikaans. This was a systematic separation of race. Apartheid was fueled by sentiments of purity in the Afrikaner community, thus creating a total surveillance of racial segregation by the state, as well as by the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). The policing of race through legal and religious frameworks caused the same oppressive policing of sexuality. Written out of several histories of apartheid South Africa, communities presenting homosexual or transsexual forms of identity were confined to the same systematic surveillance as non-white races. The apartheid ideology contains the family values ideology. The family values ideology operates as a confinement of sexuality that ensures the separateness of race. By legalizing separateness, the apartheid state could control sexuality and race to maintain the ethnic purity of the Afrikaner population in the majority black South Africa. In several historical accounts of the liberation movement in South Africa, much attention is given to the racial aspects of apartheid. However, the fight against apartheid extends to the lesbian and gay rights movement in South Africa from the 1950s until the 1994 crumbling of the apartheid state.

I use the case of apartheid South African lesbian and gay rights movement as a historical study of how the oppressive forces of family values limit visibilities and produce silences of non-

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heterosexual structures of sexual orientation and gender identity. The silencing power of family values in history has significant effects on the lesbian and gay rights history of South Africa. Bisexual and transgender people are merged into the same definition of homosexuality in South African apartheid history. Rather than referring to the movement as “LGBT,” I use the terms lesbian and gay to encapsulate the movement that was majority led by upper class white gay males. As an attempt to demonize and inflate conceptions of lesbians and gays, religious and state apparatuses extended the definition of homosexuality to include transgender people. This blending of identity produced an exaggerated image of homosexuality during Apartheid that imparted a greater legitimacy to the oppressive structure. The DRC acted as a religious apparatus to promote family values and sexual limitations in the social order of the apartheid state. However, the end of apartheid manifested a new South Africa, causing discontent, trepidation, and animosity. The years following the collapse of apartheid were the setting for a developing framework of limitations and possibilities for the delicate nation. For my senior project, I use the South African DRC as an ethnographic case study for the hegemonic force of the family values ideology. I show how family values is promoted through the South African NP as the state apparatus during apartheid, and the DRC as the religious apparatus during apartheid and post-apartheid.

In the first chapter I analyze family values on a global scale. I argue that family values is a dominant force that operates through religious and state apparatuses to produce new forms of surveillance and repression of the family in terms of sexuality. I trace how Appadurai’s scapes can be used to understand the spread of family values as a hegemonic force. I then contextualize this spread of family values during the formation of the South African state, including the creation of the DRC. I use Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* to understand how these limitations of
sexuality are presented through the family values ideology ingrained in the DRC and the South Africa Afrikaner-dominated state.

My second chapter gives a history of the resisting forces to the establishment of LGBT rights in South Africa during apartheid. It delves into the colonial roots of the Afrikaner identity and how this impacted the strict apartheid constitution. I argue that the apartheid structure is built upon the limitations of sexuality in family values, which causes the surveillance of LGBT people. This surveillance in apartheid history built a delicate structure of visibilities in the lesbian and gay rights movement. The lesbian and gay rights movement gained strength once it promoted itself under the human rights ideology, causing a clash with family values. In 1996, South Africa became the first country to constitutionally protect individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation. Despite the flourishing civil rights activism within the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community, there is still opposition to homosexuality from members of the DRC.

In my third chapter, I provide an ethnography of the DRC in post-apartheid South Africa. I address how family values are produced in the DRC and how these are ingrained in the Afrikaner identity. In post-apartheid South Africa, there is a standard of inclusivity established to make reparations for the apartheid history. However, this national push for inclusivity through human rights rhetoric clashes with the Afrikaner identity in the DRC. I use my ethnography to reveal how the Afrikaner identity in the DRC negotiates its exclusivity through family values. Finally, I examine how policies of inclusivity demanded by a post-apartheid era clash with the repression of sexuality within family values.
In *History of Sexuality* Foucault wrote: “‘Tomorrow sex will be good again.’” He alludes to the emergence of the human rights ideology. The human rights ideology grounds this freedom of sexuality by supporting LGBT rights. However, the family values ideology clashes with this 21st century movement. The South African DRC shows this façade of acceptance of new forms of sexuality, without following through with the social order of the Church. This is not exclusive to the DRC. The clash is happening on a global scale. Family values demands a repression of sexuality. Human rights demands a liberation of sexuality. How these hegemonic forces operate through religious apparatuses and state apparatuses can be traced through the modern reforms of the 21st century

7 Ibid., 9.
Chapter 1
Family Values as a Hegemonic Force

Family values can be traced back as a pillar in the expansion of Christianity through colonization and the repression of sexuality in the 17th century. At the beginning of the century the Victorian regime constructed social regulations of sexuality that formed the family values ideology. Sexuality was silenced and confined to the familial structure producing claims of naturalness and purity. In History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault argues that the Victorian bourgeoisie repressed understanding of sexuality as one only tolerant in the family. Foucault writes:

Sexuality was carefully confined; it moved into the home. The conjugal family took custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproduction. On the subject of sex, silence became the rule. The legitimate and procreative couple laid down the law. The couple imposed itself as model, enforced the norm, safeguarded the truth, and reserved the right to speak while retaining the principle of secrecy.8

Sexuality functioned as the means to procreate and maintain a constructed purity. Foucault argument of sexuality moving into the home implies that societal structure begins with the family. The home allows the reproduction as a means to grow an ordered society. In this shift to home, and the heteronormative, all sexual acts considered taboo, such as sodomy and bestiality, were repressed under state law. Another prominent taboo was the viewing of sexuality outside the home. Foucault argues that Victorian bourgeois order demanded the sanitization and silencing of sexuality. Associated with cleanliness, the bourgeois order produced new truths of the “naturalness” of sexuality. To defend such truths, the bourgeois used state, religious, and scientific authorities. Law and religion embedded the heterosexual family as the only pure form of sexuality. Marriage and the construction of the family originated in the proceedings of the church in Victorian society. Marriage was a movement towards creating a home where sex was

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confined for the sake of reproduction. Any other sexual pleasures could be seen as straying from the sexual norms of humanity. Using scientific rhetoric of “natural,” Foucault argues that the bourgeois pushed sodomy and bestiality into producing different species of human. Foucault writes:

> It claimed to ensure the physical vigor and the moral cleanliness of the social body; it promised to eliminate defective individuals, degenerate and bastardized populations. In the name of a biological and historical urgency, it justified the racisms of the state, which at the time were on the horizon. It grounded them in “truth.”

The bourgeois claimed the heteronormative family as natural invoking a scientific and moral authority over sexuality. Extending beyond 17th century Victorian society, these societal norms are ingrained into the family values ideology for over three centuries. The heterosexual family as the confined space for sexuality generated the family values ideology.

In South Africa, the development of the DRC produced this same demand for sexual repression and silencing. The family values ideology came along with the colonial migration of the Dutch and the French Huguenots to South Africa. The rise of European colonial exploration was fueled by economic incentives for trading. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) dominated the global trading markets from 1602 to 1796 acting as a quasi-governmental entity. Attempting to dominate the Asian markets for spice trade, the VOC sent Jan Van Reibeeck to create a trading post at the most southern point of the African continent. On April 6th of 1652 the Dutch colonialists landed on the Cape of South Africa in the hopes of establishing a settlement. This led to the implementation of DRC new Roman-Dutch ruling law in the colony. “The Roman Dutch common law…criminalized a number of acts between adults—whether between men,

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9 Foucault, 54
between women, or between a man and a woman—if not directed towards procreation.”

Homosexual acts infringed upon the procreation of whites in the colony. Due to the low population of the Dutch in South Africa, the colonial authorities regulated sexual practice. Embedded with Calvinist religious implications, the Roman Dutch law intended to make sure that only what it considered “natural” sexual acts occurred. What was considered “unnatural” included many different practices such as bestiality, sexual acts between men, sexual acts between women, heterosexual sodomy, and incest. According to Foucault: “Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.”

The separation of homosexuality as inhumane fueled its repression and reinforced family values. Acts of sodomy were considered unnatural later shifting to homosexual identity as considered unnatural. This shift to producing a homosexual identity as abnormal was motivated by religious authorities such as the DRC. The DRC mobilized the family values ideology into the 20th century apartheid state by forming laws extending to the criminalization of visible homosexuality with the “men at party” clause, which I will address in Chapter 2. The codifying of homosexual repression starting with the Roman Dutch Law in the 17th century Cape settlement exemplifies the rise of the family values ideology globally.

Over the next three hundred years, family values shifted into a hegemonic force supported through religious and state authorities. The DRC and the Dutch, later Afrikaner, authorities maintained power through the control of the family. The family as the bedrock to

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12 Foucault, 43.  
13 The ethnic identification of Dutch colonists in South Africa as Afrikaner developed in the early 18th century.
social order limited the space for sexuality and pleasure. Through the control of pleasure, family values regulated the social norms of white South African society. The Dutch Law, until the start of the apartheid state, operated as the means to maintain power over these norms. Foucault discusses this power over social norms as social hegemony. The historical repression of sexuality by the DRC and state apparatus in South Africa exemplify Foucault’s theoretical argument. He writes:

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.\textsuperscript{14}

Family values as a hegemonic force is rooted in the religious, and naturally defined conceptions of the family. South African state and religious authorities throughout apartheid are a contextualized case where family values are carried out to regulate sexuality. This is pertinent in the struggle for lesbian and gay rights in South Africa during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. As Foucault mentions above, the hegemonic force of family values produces force relations filled with struggle and confrontation. The end of World War II established a new world order upheld by the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights ideology is the core to this new world order. Family values ideology is pitted against the human rights ideology since both operate through state authorities.

This clash of hegemonic forces in the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} century can be found in the lesbian and gay rights struggle in South Africa. The hegemonic force of family values silenced and regulated homosexual identity inevitably producing sites of confrontation and transformation in

\textsuperscript{14} Foucault, 92.
the apartheid era society. Once homosexual identity transformed into a protected human right in post-apartheid South Africa, family values lost sites of sexual regulation. However, under the apartheid system the DRC and the state negotiated structures of legal code to produce frames of understanding sexuality. These frames of understanding sexuality are controlled by the family values ideology in several contexts globally. The hegemonic force of the family values ideology, involving state, religious, and activist apparatuses that either support or resist this power, dominates systems of lived meaning and values. In this way, family values operates as an ideoscape as defined by Arjun Appadurai and maintains it’s hegemonic power through the support of mediascapes, which disseminate the ideological message. I give a theoretical analysis to Appadurai’s *scapes* to expand on how family values is a hegemonic force.

**A Theoretical Analysis of Appadurai’s Scapes**

In *Modernity at Large*, Arjun Appadurai made a phenomenal contribution to the study of the social forces of the world. From the 1960s to the 1980s, anthropologists conducted ethnographic fieldwork focusing the field on a spatial boundary in which a community or cultural group existed. In the 1990s, the examination of globalization boomed in the social sciences due to the popular discussion of mass migrations, multiculturalism, developing technologies, and global media. In 1996, Arjun Appadurai wrote *Modernity at Large* to challenge previous conceptions of the small scale organizing of people. Appadurai wrote: “The forces of cultural gravity seemed always to pull away from the formation of large-scale ecumenes, whether religious, commercial, or political, toward smaller-scale accretions of
I analyze the influences of Appadurai’s theoretical stance in comparison to other globalization and modernity analysts. A key question I seek to answer is how can the concepts of Appadurai’s *scapes* be reshaped into ethnographic fieldwork conducted presently? Must we study groups of people on global scales, or consistently consider the larger concepts of mediascapes, and ideoscapes? I apply these questions to my ethnographic research and it’s consideration of globalizing family values. I focus on how family values becomes a hegemonic force throughout history addressing the question of globalization in history. I use the Comaroffs’ writing to analyze Christian missionizing and how family values are challenged and then reinforced in global hegemony. Finally, I will consider how this applies to my ethnographic work in South Africa with the DRC. In this section I will analyze my own approach to studying family values in the DRC of South Africa when considering Appadurai’s theoretical stance on globalization as cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization.

Appadurai’s theoretical groundwork aligns with the postmodernist skepticism of a world created in large-scale cultural narrative. In *Modernity at Large*, Appadurai argues that large scale global interactions, through war and religions of conversion, have long pre-existed the modern world. The Christian missionaries dispersed throughout the colonial empires are just one example of this sustained cultural interaction on a global scale. But the burgeoning intensity of the new world order impacts cultural transactions to produce sites of restriction, and adaptation from the large-scale ecumenes towards smaller-scale accumulations. Appadurai challenges the notion that nation-states and structuralist depictions of global order determine social formations. Appadurai argues that since the development of colonial orders centered on European capitals

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16 Ibid., 28.
extended throughout the non-Western world, the intricate overlapping of ecumenes emerged. Family values were placed in the sprawling development of these colonial orders. Scholars interpreted the world to be shrinking during that time period. The development of mass-migrations, global trade, missionizing, and warfare are all developments that far predate the coining of the term “globalization.” However, Appadurai tackles the globalization theory as one based on a new, more intensive new role in the imagination of social life. Appadurai does not directly state how this new global order appeared other than the broad explanation of technological developments. The first form of technological development Appadurai uses is from Benedict Anderson in the dissemination of information via the printing press in creating “print capitalism” a new power in the world. When Appadurai mentions Anderson’s power of mass literacy, he does little justice to allowing us to understand his definition of the power of mass literacy. In addition, Appadurai does not place Anderson’s “print capitalism” argument on a timeline so we may see the development of the mediascape as a crucial effect of the technological explosion of the 20th century. Appadurai uses McLuhan’s theory of the “global village” to indicate that this new global order became a topic of interest in conceptualizing the creation of communities through media. We will revisit this when understanding Appadurai’s mediascapes.

Appadurai uses “imagination” in his theoretical grounding of scapes tipping his hat to Benedict Anderson. Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” is an imagining of a society as a collective community that is not based on the physical face-to-face interactions. Theorists commonly use imagined communities as the means to construction nation-states focusing on nationalism, however Appadurai discusses the imagination as a social practice that inevitably

17 Ibid., 29.
destabilizes the nation-state for a new global order. Taking on Anderson’s imagined communities, Appadurai develops the imaginings of the global cultural economy. He writes:

The imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of both labor and culturally organized practice), and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility. This unleashing of the imagination links the play of pastiche (in some settings) to the terror and coercion of states and their competitors. The imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order.\(^{18}\)

This imagination shows the ebb and flow between the agency of the individual, to the links in the organization of cultural practices, to the coercion of states. Unlike many modernists before Appadurai like Hamelink, Mattelart, and Schiller, he focuses on the tensions between cultural homogenization and heterogenization rather than perceiving the new global order as bearing strength for cultural homogenization, commodification, also construed as Americanization.\(^{19}\)

During the time period of Appadurai’s *Modernity at Large* several scholars were looking at the ways in which states used their coercive power to create a cultural absorption. Appadurai responds to this in a post-modernist way of seeing these massive shifts in the global cultural economy as “complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models.”\(^{20}\) The new order that Appadurai theorizes is not coming from a root, and the flow can no longer be centered on the imagined nation.

Appadurai bases his theory of *scapes* off of the idea that the global system is emerging with these ironies and resistances as a result of new relations of communities beyond landscapes. Appadurai does not perceive the new order as focusing on the rigid land borders imagined by states, but he takes the “scape” to frame the departure from the physical boundaries. Appadurai

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\(^{18}\) Ibid., 30.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 32.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., 32.
comes up with five different scapes to show the dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes.\textsuperscript{21} Appadurai writes:

These terms with the common suffix –scape also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-state, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighborhoods, and families. Indeed, the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part from their own sense of what these landscapes offer.\textsuperscript{22}

It is significant that Appadurai wants to frame the new global order semantically to the space boundaries, but scapes, transcend those spatial confinements. Appadurai does so because of the importance of landscapes to the understanding of imagined communities. For an imagined community to exist, it must transcend the face-to-face interactions. The construction of the diaspora relies on this idea, but Appadurai wants to move beyond seeing nationalism extending the spatial boundaries. Therefore the spatial separation for Appadurai’s \textit{scapes} is necessary to apply Anderson’s imagined social life. A global cultural economy relies on both the physical face-to-face interactions in communities and the ingrained imaginations of scapes. Appadurai argues that in the past two decades there is a trend of media and migration to deterritorialize to the extent that “which has led to the emergence of long-distance nationalism, “diasporic public sphere,” ethnic violence, and the growing disjunction of various economic, cultural, and political aspects of daily life.”\textsuperscript{23} What does this mean for ethnographic fieldwork? Where do we draw those boundaries of “the field?”

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 33.
Many structural anthropologists followed Levi-Strauss in the defining of their work as if constructing communities as intrinsically tied to an overarching social structural system of relations. Departing from structuralism in the bottom-up construction of communities, Appadurai does not address in his theoretical creation of scapes the spatial boundaries that an anthropologist must abide by to conduct ethnographic fieldwork. However, Appadurai does construct a strong groundwork for understanding scapes in relation to one another. The scapes provide spheres of influence to motivate the flow of values, technologies, money, and ideology. Mediascapes act as the support to the flow of ideologies regardless of those spatial boundaries.

Mediascapes and ideoscapes are grouped together by Appadurai because of their image-based narratives. Appadurai defines mediascapes as:

closely related landscapes of images which refer both to the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film-production studios), which are now available to a growing number of private and public interest throughout the world, and to the images of the world created by these media.24

Appadurai’s need to determine mediascapes as both the medium and the information itself reflects his consideration of Marshal McLuhan’s work, *Understanding Media: Extensions of Man*. McLuhan coined the term “medium is the message” in 1961 at what Appadurai considers the rise of this technological explosion creating a new global order. The medium as the message means that the relationship between how the information provided and the medium it’s provided in are synonymous.25 A famous example that McLuhan gives is the use of electricity for a surgeon at an operating table. The operation could not exist without the availability of electricity. Appadurai makes this consideration in theorizing mediascapes. The way in which people consume and interpret the information creates imaginings dependent on the mode of the

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24 Appadurai, 35.
information, and the audience (local, national, or transnational). Appadurai writes about the development of mediascapes in *Modernity at Large* in 1996, several years before the implosion of imagined communities in the digital reality. In recent times, many media theorists have debated the existence of digital dualism, the concept that online and offline realities are distinctly separate. If we follow Appadurai’s definition of mediascapes, he is extending the imaginings of social life to permeate the media landscape. Appadurai writes: “what this means is that many audiences around the world experience the media themselves as a complicated interconnected repertoire of print, celluloid, electronic screens, and billboards. The lines between the realistic and the fictional landscape they see are blurred.”

There is a fluidity of ideoscapes between the online and offline world to the extent that they merge. However, Appadurai seems to contradict this blurring of lines with the support of Meyerowitz rather than pulling from McLuhan’s “global village.” Appadurai writes: “We are now aware that with media, each time we are tempted to speak of the global village, we must be reminded that media create communities with “no sense of place” (Meyerowitz 1985).” Appadurai confirms Meyerowitz need to produce a sense of place in order to create a community. Yet Appadurai also argues that people live in imagined worlds and are thus able to subvert the imagined worlds of the official mind. The existence of online communities is a subversion of the imagined worlds of the official mind. But Appadurai supports Meyerowitz’s theory that there is no sense of place. Appadurai’s scapes demand a connection from the face-to-face groups to the larger imagined formations of nation-states, multinationals, and diasporic communities. According to Appadurai, the scapes he produces are

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26 Ibid., 35.
27 Ibid., 35.
29 Appadurai, 29.
30 Appadurai, 33.
the imagined new global order that breakdown the boundaries and deterritorialize states.

Appadurai draws the line at a physical reality and a digital reality. His perception of mediascapes as blurring the lines between the realistic and fictional landscape, but not producing a “global village” is contradictory. Although McLuhan’s original conception of a global village is a radical prediction of Internet-based social media, it is significant that online communities are informing reality and vice-versa transcending the mediascape framework of Appadurai. Appadurai’s work preceded the development of online communities, making his definition of mediascapes limiting in how it can produce new understanding and conflicts in ideoscapes.

Ideoscapes are rooted, like mediascapes in media, in ideology. Jean and John Comaroff define ideology as tightly integrated worldviews that are susceptible to the appropriations of authority. Ideology is unfixed and acts, at times unintentionally, as a mechanism for domination and resistance. It is the convergence of culture and power to present systems of morals and values. Power is “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization.” Power is not the mechanism for rule or the domination of a group. It is rather the relation of forces that yield constant struggles in the process of cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization. Appadurai does not provide his own definition for ideology or power, but makes consideration of the relation of ideology to the authoritative dimensions of semantics. Appadurai writes:

Ideoscapes are also concentrations of images, but they are often directly political and frequently have to do with the ideologies of states and the counterideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it. These ideoscapes are composed of elements of the Enlightenment worldview, which consists of a chain of ideas, terms, and images, including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation, and the master term, democracy.

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32 Foucault, 92.
33 Appadurai, 36.
Appadurai is fixated on the term democracy as a representation of how ideoscapes transmit state ideology. The terms used to propel ideology, such as democracy, shift based on context to context in their global movements to either liberate or pacify populations. Ideological terms inevitably become “terminological kaleidoscopes”\textsuperscript{34} that are set in motion by mediascapes, which allow actors to shift the paths of meaning with political intent. The point at which these terms gain dominance, the ideology becomes a hegemonic force. Hegemony, a concept first provided to scholars by the Gramsci’s \textit{Prison Notebooks}, is defined by Hall as “a dominant system of lived meanings and values, relations and practices, which shapes experienced reality.”\textsuperscript{35} Gramsci adds to this understanding by writing “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.”\textsuperscript{36}

Family values act as the hegemonic force of dominant fundamental groups since the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. Rooted in interpretations of biblical texts, and the emergence of Christian missionizing in European colonies, family values is associated with Christianity as the hegemonic force to assert dominance. Family values ideology is not rooted in a spatial landscape in the way Appadurai argues. It is transmitted through the flow of information in mediascapes and the flow of people. The colonial movements of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century transferred family values into new spaces. Over time, family values found space in mediums such as the Internet, NGO blogs, newspapers, and religious texts. Family values ideology is fluid through these mediums and exists in these

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 37.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Hall, Stuart. "Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity." \textit{Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies} (1996), 411-440.
\end{itemize}
imagined worlds described by Appadurai. This lack of geographic confinement gives power to the ideology. Family values uses imagined bounds of states as an authoritative body to promote itself. The mediascape transmits the ideological messages of family values allowing it to spread globally. In my ethnographic work, I identify to what extent family values can be perceived as a hegemonic force.

**Family Values: A Hegemonic Force Produced by Mediascapes**

On June 26, 2014 the UN Human Rights Council passed a controversial “protection of the family” resolution that espoused family values. South Africa voted in favor of this resolution and aggressively fought alongside fellow African states to monitor the definition of the family to neither include nor exclude LGBT groups. The absence of a definition for the family in the resolution allowed legal leeway for family values ideology to dominate the discourse of the resolution. The use of the family values argument is pitted against the progress of the LGBT movement globally, as well as in the DRC in South Africa. LGBT rights, as a human right, acts as the counterideology to family values within the United Nations, and between state powers. Appadurai discusses the ideoscapes as forming keywords in movements that may be construed and readjusted to audiences in different manners. The term family values acts a key word that is politicized and strengthened by religious organizations to enforce certain cultural values and morals on a global scale. Appadurai writes:

> Words require careful translation from context to context in their global movements, and pragmatic to the extent that the use of these words by political actors and their audiences may be subject to the very different sets of contextual conventions that mediate their translation into public politics.  

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37 Appadurai, 33.
38 Appadurai, 36.
“Family values” is used across contexts to reorder society by asserting the validity of the natural and traditional values as absolute truths. The family values of the Christian Right in the United States are not identical to the family values of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa. Yet, the dialogues and support for family values in the United Nations emerges from both lobbying groups. Where can we understand family values to be the same across contexts is where we can see mediascapes at play in the progression of ideoscapes. In addition, how each group uses family values to deny inclusion of homosexuality into their definition of the family exemplifies the cultural homogenization of family values in ideoscapes.

I define family values as the set of moral and ethical values tied to patriarchal, heteronormative definitions of family produces spaces of freedom and inclusivity in regards to sexual expression. However, these family values acts as a terminological kaleidoscopes that shift in definition for each individual and community based on how mediascapes produce frictions in the fluidity of ideologies. Although these family values include moral and religious beliefs, they are components of the greater focus of my work on their relationship to the family structure. Family values are discussed as an ideology within the Christian Right in the United States in terms of a natural family structure. Buss and Herman write:

When the CR refers to “family” and advocates a “pro-family” politics domestically and internationally, it is a very particular form of family: mother, father, and their (preferably biological) offspring. The CR has taken to calling this unit the “natural family,” distinguishing it from family forms they believe to be unnatural, both socially and religiously.39

How the family is defined is related to their views on sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as the importance of reproducibility and sexual repression in the family. In my ethnographic fieldwork I investigate if there is the same contextualization of natural family structure in family

values in the DRC. The rapid development of mediascapes and transmission of information produces both friction and flow between these contexts.

Christian Missionizing: The DRC Mobilizing Family Values in South Africa

Christian Missionizing throughout the colonial period\textsuperscript{40} in African states produced spaces of friction and flow in the development of family values ideology. After the 1884 Berlin Conference, several European empires broke up the continent into colonies. This formal establishment of colonialism expanded the missionizing efforts of evangelical churches in South Africa. During the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the DRC shifted its missionary goals to reach out to indigenous populations during the expansion of colonial efforts. Fearing a disintegration of Afrikaner nationalism during the increasing British presence, the DRC embraced its ethnocentrism and committed to expanding their faith to the indigenous people of present day South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The missions acted as a mechanism to colonize the minds of indigenous people incorporating the family values ideology.\textsuperscript{41} The presence of family values in the DRC supported the purity efforts of the Afrikaner community in South Africa. The idea of Afrikaner nationalist superiority could only be maintained if the heterosexual family was under surveillance by the DRC. During the golden century of missionizing Willem Saayman, an Afrikaner missionary and scholar, writes: “national survival depended on faithful adherence to its Reformed faith and the calling to plant this faith in darkest Africa, aware of how fellow believers in its “mother countries” were reviving in faith and mission, thus responded to all these impulses with new

\textsuperscript{40} The colonial period I reference here is during the scramble for Africa by European states from the mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century to the independence movements in Africa predominantly during the 1950s and 60s.

\textsuperscript{41} Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff.
missionary enthusiasm beyond its own borders.”42 This message of maintaining faith in the DRC includes family values terminology when discussing “mother countries.” It is relevant that family values is highlighted when discussing expanding its missionary efforts into unfamiliar areas. The DRC relies upon the family values ideology to maintain control over the purity of Afrikaners. The DRC often uses the familial structure to explain the close-knit relationship of the evangelical church networks despite the spatial distances caused by global flow. During the 19th century, the DRC discussed missions as either in the “home”, meaning the white Afrikaner church, or in the “foreign,” meaning the black indigenous populations. Using Foucault’s definition of home as the constrained space permitting sexuality, the DRC’s separation of mission types implies the Othering process of missionary efforts. Also included in the missionary efforts at that time was the implication of Africans as the “objects” of the mission while whites were the “subjects” acting as saviors.43 The DRCs use of terms like “home” and “mother” to categorize missionizing efforts enforces the dominant social thought of family values in the evangelical churches.

Family values were transmitted and altered to fit the appropriate contexts for Christian missions. In the past century, family values extended beyond an ideology within Christianity into a hegemonic force used and applied in state powers. The apartheid state is just one example of how family values are contextualized to assert hegemonic dominance. In Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, Jean and John Comaroff use their ethnographic fieldwork on the DRC in South Africa to portray how Christian missionizing pursued the colonizing of consciousness to maintain power through the possession

43 Saayman, 7.
of salient signs and symbols. The DRC’s attempt to colonize the consciousness of black South African communities was far from successful. Despite the DRC becoming the sacred authority as a mechanism to enforce state authority, the ideology both went through a cultural homogenization and heterogenization when adapted by the Tswana in South Africa. The Comaroffs write:

We shall examine the various ways in which the culture sown by the churchmen took root on the social terrain of the Tswana, some of it to be absorbed silently and seamlessly into a reinvented—or, rather, reified—ethnic “tradition,” some to be creatively transformed, some to be redeployed to talk back to the whites. We seek to demonstrate, in other words, how parts of the evangelical message insinuated themselves into the warp and weft of an emerging hegemony, while others gave rise to novel forms of consciousness and action.

The experience of the Christian missionaries in South Africa is one that exhibits Appadurai’s defining of global flow in ideoscapes. The ideology of the Christian missionaries was internalized by the Tswana, but not as the missionaries had intended. It was consumed as an ethnic ‘tradition’ and repurposed to resist the Afrikaner dominance over the evangelical message. The new black evangelical churches reinvented family values by separating out the Afrikaner ethnocentrism. The rise of DRC Christian missionizing included the spreading of Afrikaner nationalist identity. The connection of the Church to Afrikaner nationalism began in since the 1860s when the church separated from the colonial state. The DRC deeply felt that the “divine mission” defined their authority in asserting subversive forms of dominance over the Tswana as well as others in South Africa. Hegemonic forces cannot enforce dominance and control over consciousness entirely. Ideology is built upon signs and symbols that are susceptible to molding into new cultural representations. Family values as a hegemonic force goes through that same

44 Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff, 4.
46 Saayman, 46.
process. The contextualization of family values in black South African communities reveals itself in the ethnographic research of the Comaroffs. The Comaroffs write:

They are internalized in their negative guise, as constraints; in their neutral guise, as conventions; and, in their positive guise, as values. Yet the salient power of the sign. The unspoken authority of habit, may be as effective as the most violent coercion in shaping, directing, and even dominating social thought and action.\(^{47}\)

The Comaroffs’ example of Christian missionizing by the DRC is just one of many that took place during the Apartheid era. The Apartheid era, controlled by the Afrikaner-dominated NP as well as the DRC, is a case of how these shaping of values are largely invisible. Legal structures, educational processes, and religious indoctrination are all means to maintain a dominant ideology. These habits that the Comaroffs refer to are the invisible formations of hegemony. Hegemony serves to homogenize, but faces friction in how the ideology is adapted in new contexts. The family values ideology operates using this habit-forming process to ingrain signs and symbols into the consciousness of new social groups, while producing space to remove itself from identity formers, such as the Afrikaner context of the DRC. However, the family values ideology can be seen as a hegemonic force to define permitted identities. The ingrained family values in the DRC and Apartheid state led to the control of sexual identity. During the Apartheid era sexuality was under constant surveillance forcing homosexuality out of visibility.

\(^{47}\) Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff, 22.
Chapter 2
Visibilities in Resistance: The Politics of Gay Rights under Apartheid

“Homosex is not in black culture,” read a placard held by one of Winnie Mandela’s supporters in 1991 outside a South African Supreme Court. That year, Winnie Mandela, the self-proclaimed “Mother of the Nation,” was tried in the Supreme Court for the kidnap, assault, and intention to do serious bodily harm, along with three co-accused. Mandela’s defense case “codified homosexuality as sexual abuse, and characterized homosexual practice as a white, colonizing depredation of heterosexual black culture.”

Mandela attorney, George Bizos, framed the case as Mandela’s rescuing of youth from a sexually abusive priest in the Methodist Manse. In the eyes of her supporters, Mandela became the mother savior representing the familial moral values of black culture in South Africa. Mandela was the iconic representation of the black South African nation as a large family upholding the same moral values, making her a familial figure. In the press and the criminal court proceeding, Mandela’s defense strategy depended on the homophobic biases of the public and her identity as a heterosexual familial figure for the nation.

The trial demonstrated the desire in South Africa to perceive homosexuality as alien and imported. This discourse is not limited to Black South African communities. Among Afrikaners, homosexuality is seen as foreign and inconsistent with true Afrikaner identity. What motivates this perception? How does this sentiment reshape the homosexual identity in South Africa? And how do gay and lesbian communities in South Africa react and organize their community? Throughout South African history there are tremendous efforts to limit the visibility of homosexuality. The apartheid state was notorious for implementing laws and policing strategies

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to limit the visibility of homosexuals. Since the beginning of apartheid in 1948 homosexuality was perceived as an infection on the moral character of the nation. In this chapter I consider how state and religious authorities limited the visible existence of homosexuality. In addition, I show how predominantly white gay and lesbian communities organized when confronted with egregious hostility throughout the Apartheid era in the years 1948-1996.

The Apartheid Legal Code: Afrikaner Conceptions of Natural Sexuality

Under Apartheid, the NP sought to maintain the moral purity and integrity of the South African state. This motivation produced the Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969, which notoriously restricted the rights of gay men. Uncommon to South Africa’s popular history, the same draconian laws that intended to keep a racially pure population also restricted the rights of the gay populace. The NP government position on homosexual conduct came far before the apartheid era. Under the Roman Dutch Law, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the surveillance of sexual acts were embedded with Calvinist religious implications. Colonial authorities were concerned with the procreation of the minority white populace. Therefore the only sexual acts that were considered natural resulted in procreation. Roman Dutch law classified the unnatural practices to be bestiality, sexual acts between men, sexual acts between women, heterosexual sodomy, and incest. Committing an unnatural sexual act at that time was punishable by death. While many provisions of Roman Dutch law were dropped in the formation of the South African Republic, the prohibition of sexual activities between men remained in the common law of the NP-dominated government.

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51 Ibid., 265, 274.
The claim of a natural sexuality is rooted in the European colonizers’ scientific theories of degeneracy and eugenics during the colonization process of African during the mid- to late-19th century. Afrikaner colonizers rooted their white supremacist ideology in the colonial, and religious perception of a “natural and pure” race. To prolong the white purity, there was a clear interplay in Afrikaner values of the white race and heterosexuality as the normative structures. According to Anne McClintock: “boundaries were felt to be dangerously permeable and demanding continual purification so that sexuality, in particular women’s sexuality, cordoned off as the central transmitter of racial and hence cultural contagion.”

The patriarchal nationalist Afrikaner identity relied on women as the gatekeepers to their racial and gender purity.

The Apartheid structure supported the fear of a cultural contagion and sexually installed heterosexuality as the norm for Afrikaners. The focus on keeping a pure population, clean of blackness or homosexuality caused the “Apartheid government to place high values on heterosexual marriage, reproduction, and family life and established strict racial and social requirements to determine when procreative sexual activity…would be considered legitimate in the eyes of the state.” Therefore, the outlawing of sex between men ensured that the visibility of impurity could not threaten the power of the NP government. The visibility of homosexuality propelled the NP government starting in the 1960s to boost the policing of the lesbian and gay communities. Prior to the 1960s, the gay communities concealed themselves in the anticipation of public disapproval or worse, imprisonment for breaking sodomy laws.

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53 Ibid., 47.
1940s-60s: From Rent-Boys to Child-Molesters

Afrikaner Christian nationalist sentiments did not dissuade the inevitable existence of gay and lesbian subcultures in South Africa. Throughout the Apartheid era the major cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban were the safest spaces for homosexual subcultures to exist relatively without harassment.\textsuperscript{56} In the 1920s and 30s, Johannesburg grew out of the first mining rushes, which invariably caused a major migration of people from rural areas. Young men and women could “come out” as part of the homosexual subculture in the burgeoning city. Like in the United States during the depression and after World War II, youth were uprooted and moved away from homes to large cities thus newly able to find their own ‘personal autonomy.’\textsuperscript{57} However, the apartheid history of ‘separateness’ meant that there were few places where white middle class homosexuals and black migrant homosexuals met. The rare meeting places, or so called ‘melting pots’ of South Africa, where men could meet each other regardless of racial and class affiliation were District Six in Cape Town, and Fiesta and Sophiatown in Johannesburg.\textsuperscript{58}

Finding space within South Africa to express sexuality became an extreme challenge for lesbian and gay minorities. According to Currier:

State repression prompted gay men and lesbians to turn inward and concentrate on building gay cultural institutions, such as bars, social spaces, “health clubs,” and publications; these activities allowed white gay subcultures to exist but to remain publicly invisible.\textsuperscript{59}

Lesbians and gay men feared for their safety and thus relied on building a hidden community in order to live. This hidden community was often defined, in part as the “cruising scene” during the 1950s and 1960s. It was the place at which closeted homosexuals, or men who have sex with

\textsuperscript{56} Cameron, Edwin, and Mark Gevisser, eds. \textit{Defiant Desire}, 18.
\textsuperscript{58} Gevisser, and Cameron, 18.
\textsuperscript{59} Currier, 30.
men but do not identify as gay (MSMs) could come in contact with the gay subculture. Significant spaces within the cruising scene were the “health clubs” and café-bios. Health Clubs were clubs that maintained privacy of frequenters and was appealing to the ‘older crowd’ who remained closeted. Café-bios on the other hand attracted a younger crowd by running as, according to informants ‘ordinary cinemas where you could eat, smoke, and have it off while watching a movie.’ These café-bios attracted young men, frequently Afrikaners, to participate in the scene as ‘rent-boys.’ Rent boys are a form of male escort in South Africa in which young men will go “cruising” looking for the “rent.” The café-bios consisted of mostly Afrikaner male clientele and young Afrikaner boys offering the service to young men. Because of the word of mouth for these café-bios, they remained racially segregated maintaining a strong white dominance on service-providers. The gay Afrikaner community maintained the apartheid separateness in service to Black South Africans despite receiving similar discriminatory treatment under apartheid ideology. Starting in the 1940s, police began patrolling the ‘gay areas’ in order to limit the visibility of what it considered a moral offense to the state. The patrolling of ‘gay areas’ revealed the paradoxical relationship of the state with the homosexual subcultures. However, the consistent policing of the gay communities is more to do with visibility than with an extinguishing homosexuality. According to Glen Retief:

Despite occasional incidents of victimization, there do not appear to have been any organized campaigns against homosexuality in the early years of Nationalist rule. It seems, from later police reports, that gays were invisible enough for the state not to regard homosexuality as a serious problem. A 1968 police report, for instance, mentions that ‘the South African Police has dealt with various forms of homosexuality over the years. However it was regarded as isolated.’

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60 Gevisser and Cameron, 25.
61 Ibid., 26.
62 Ibid., 26.
63 Currier, 29.
When policing of homosexual conduct occurred during the first couple decades of the NP government, it was regarded as another form of regular South African law enforcement. The acceptance of sexual policing caused the self-regulation of the lesbian and gay community. This invisibility is exemplified in the development of the cruising scene, the gay and lesbian newspapers such as *EXIT*, and the development of the coded gay vernacular (examples ‘Moffie’—a gay male, ‘Priscilla’—police/the law, ‘Natalie’—black homosexual, etc.)66. The state criminalization of homosexual sex with a punishment of up to six years in prison was used to threaten lesbian and gay communities into hiding. The states moral policing and self-regulation of the lesbian and gay community caused homosexuality to be mostly invisible.

When the rare public images of homosexuality were portrayed in mass media there were two sensationalized stereotypes presented: the drag queen and the child-molester. In popular discourse, homosexuality involved the masquerading of men as women and the poisoning of youth’s minds into conducting homosexual acts.67 These stereotypes were highlighted in the infamous Forest Town Raid in January 1966.

One weekend in late January 1966 over three hundred gay men gathered for a party in Forest Town, a small suburb of Johannesburg. The police raided the party arresting nine men for ‘masquerading as women’ and one for ‘indecent assault on a minor.’68 Raids on these parties were infrequent due to the masked nature of the parties. Many gay men only spread word of the parties through various gay bars, or in code through publications. The gay community self-
regulated its visibility, but recent political changes and rumors led to this violent raid. The police targeted the Forest Town party because of its position in a well-off English-speaking suburb outside of Johannesburg. According to Gevisser:

Gay men who were active at the time recall that, in Johannesburg, Afrikaans cultural and religious organizations were agitating about the fact that wealthier Jewish and English men were corrupting their youths: most ‘rent-boys’ were young Afrikaners, often fresh from the platteland, and most of their clients were wealthier English-speakers.69

Motivated by the Afrikaner religious organizations, the police used the Forest Town raid as a horrific example of how gay men were threatening the Afrikaner “Christian National” control by committing “unnatural” offences that should be considered illegal. At that time the authorities did not have the legal framework to convict the gay men at the Forest Town raid. However, the raid triggered an onslaught on the gay community, specifically the Afrikaner gay community. The police deliberately targeted the lesbian and gay venues attempting to exterminate their moral indecency. Many gay meeting spots, and activity of the cruising scene became nonexistent.

Prime Minister Verwoerd swiftly pursued his clampdown on any form of gay liberation through legally restricting the rights of gays and lesbians in South Africa. In March 1967, Verwoerd’s Minister of Justice, PC Pelser, proposed an amendment to the Immorality Act to the House of Assembly. This law would officially make homosexuality statutorily illegal rather than the standing laws only condemning the visible male homosexual acts. The Christian Afrikaner organizations, supported by the DRC, had pushed farther than limiting the visibility of homosexuality. The fight became about the threat towards the Afrikaner youth, and therefore the threat to the purity of the Afrikaner bloodline. To maintain control of the Afrikaner identity, the State under Prime Minister Verwoerd attempted to oppress the entire subculture. This led to the largest mobilization of the gay community in South Africa at that point. It was the first time that

69 Ibid., 31.
lesbians and gays visibly organized with a political intent against the Afrikaner-dominated Apartheid State. In 1968 many gays and lesbians were struck by the panic of having their identity criminalized and some reacted by initiating The Law Reform Movement.

White gays and lesbians started the Homosexual Law Reform Fund, often called “Law Reform,” to combat the oppression of the proposed Immorality Act. Concentrated in the Pretoria-Johannesburg area, the Law Reform gathered members by calling a public forum in April 1968. The campaign was run primarily by 20 white gay members who controlled the organization in a segregated and a far from democratic manner. The Law Reform movement’s decision to keep black homosexuals and transgender members on the outskirts and their focus on a single issue is what contributed to their success. Their cause had to be relatable to the majority populace, which viewed the oppression of homosexuality to be a witch-hunt.70 The Select Committee, which determined the passing of the amendments, found rationale in the Law Reform Movement because of their ability to organize while maintaining the status quo. The Law Reform Movement was able to lobby the lawmakers within the National Party to remove the harsher criminal measures.71 The evidence amassed by the Law Reform movement halted the proposed anti-gay bill from becoming law. According to Gevisser the gay South African community had: “organized themselves for the very first time, not surprisingly very much in the way gay Americans had in the 1950s: quietly and professionally attempting to protect themselves by creating a niche within apartheid South Africa while not disrupting the status quo.” In the following year, the Select Committee reformed the proposed anti-gay bill into three amendments passed known as the Immorality Amendment Act to the 1957 Sexual Offences Act. The three

70 Gevisser and Cameron, 35.
71 Currier, 32.
amendments added to the Sexual Offences Act proposed the outlawing of dildos, the raising of consent to homosexual acts from 16 to 19, and finally the ‘men at party’ clause, which criminalized any ‘male person who commits with another male person at a party any act which is calculated to stimulate sexual passion or give sexual gratification.’ The raising of the age of consent highlights the fears of young Afrikaner boys becoming ‘rent-boys’. Raising the age of consent meant that the state could criminally charge gay men for conducting homosexual acts with the young Afrikaner men in café-bios or health clubs. Lastly, the ‘men at party’ clause raised the most dissatisfaction from the leaders of the Law Reform Movement. The men at party clause specifically targeted gays and lesbians in their ability to maintain a community hidden from the public. The Anti-homosexuality laws intended to reclaim Afrikaner men’s masculinity and sexual purity so that the Apartheid state could fight for the “strength to resist the black community onslaught.”

There was a polar reaction of the South African population in which some saw the passing amendments as sensible and finally protecting ‘innocents’ from the ‘problem of homosexuality.’ In that statement there is a discourse of fear of Afrikaner boys conducting homosexual acts. The fight that conservative Christian lobbyists and NP members came across as conducting a ‘witchhunt.’ After the passing of the three amendments in 1969, the *Cape Times* stated:

> Witchhunts directed against those thus afflicted [with homosexuality] would make the republic look ridiculous in the eyes of civilised people everywhere, apart from the gratuitous suffering it would have caused. At first sight the Select Committee appears to have produced humane, common-sense provisions for dealing with a problem that is as old as Western Civilisation.

The outright attempt by the religious organizations, primarily the DRC, to make homosexual identity illegal came across in press as a human rights violation. Although the South African

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72 Gevisser and Cameron, 35.
73 Reteif, 100.
74 *Cape Times*, March 1969.
social climate was not accepting of homosexuality, the legal restriction of an identity appeared to extreme to less conservative members of the NP.

After the passing of the amendments, the Law Reform could not maintain membership without its sole reason for existing. Once they found success in their single-issue campaign, there was little left to the group to continue on. However, the passing of amendments did reshape the social interactions and visibility of the gay and lesbian community in the major cities. The push of the religious conservative lobbies to keep gays ‘out of sight’ meant in some way keeping them under control and curbing the perpetuation of rent-boys. According to Gevisser:

> Although this severely curtailed the freedom of the movement of gay people who cruised, it also had another unexpected—and perhaps, more positive—effect: it formalised gay culture, creating as never before gay venues that became safe and dependable community meeting places for those white men and women who were allowed in.\(^{75}\)

As in the Law Reform movement, the gay community remained highly segregated. Segregation along racial lines continued in the gay and lesbian communities, as we see in the organization of gay organizations in the 70s and 80s.

**Organizing the Gay Community: Social Support versus Political Goals**

During the 1970s South Africa experienced a significant boom to the economy. This led to flourishing gay commercial life and the creation of gay neighborhood communities. Several gay clubs and businesses opened up in concentrated neighborhoods therefore contributing to higher levels of tolerance in pockets of urban areas. The visibility of the gay community was apparent in the disco scene of the 70s. This produced a comfort for more Afrikaner males to distance themselves from their families and move to urban areas and be openly gay. According to a bank clerk interviewed by Gevisser:

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\(^{75}\) Gevisser and Cameron, 37.
When an Afrikaans boy from the platteland comes out of the closet, he has to leave his home and family in a very big way. Just to be gay he has to fight all that conservative Afrikaner moralism and Calvinism. He is expelled, in a way. So he finds a new family among the other gays in the city. And he has nothing to lose by being open—he’s lost it all already.  

This account reveals the close-knit growth of the gay communities in South African city. In the bank clerks statement he discusses the trend of Afrikaner men leaving their families at a young age due to the lack of acceptance in their families from the perspective of an Afrikaner Calvinist family. The family is a fixation in the development of gay Afrikaner communities. This may be due to the blatant rejection of them from a family on the moral basis of homosexuality as perverse and a threat to the creation of a family. However, the gay community reimagines the family by organizing themselves into support groups. In Judith Butler’s *Gender Is Burning*, she analyzes how in the documentary *Paris Is Burning* the trans and gay community partaking in Balls reflects the reimagining of the gender binary that they strive to extract themselves from. Judith Butler writes: “Drag is subversive to the extent that it reflects on the imitative structure by which hegemonic gender is itself produced and disputes heterosexuality’s claim on naturalness and originality.” This imitative structure of norms of naturalness in heterosexuality in the family is reflected in the gay Afrikaner communities during the 70s. The Afrikaner gay communities attempted to reconstruct families through organizing support groups. In the 1970s, the migration of Afrikaner men caused them to formalize a commitment to their community. This is exemplified in the later production of the gay support networks like Gay Association of South Africa (GASA) and Gay Aid Identification Development and Enrichment (GAIDE).

In April 1972, a local attempt was made at the University of Natal in Durban to push forward the gay rights movement. One member of the Students’ Representative Council, Mark

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76 Gevisser and Cameron, 39.

West, organized a symposium to discuss the support of gay life being publicly accepted and placed within the South African society. Mark West stated: “I believe, as do my followers, that homosexuals should come forward and demand their rights. We should not be forced to meet in dark bars.” This was the first time in South African history that a public statement was made about gay rights framed as human rights. In West’s statement, he alludes to the forced invisibility of the gay community into only forms of nightlife and hidden locations. The visibility of the gay community to the state authorities was rising with the boom of the economy allowing West to make statements without fearing outright persecution. However, the authorities caught wind of the symposium and immediately pressured West to disband the movement he began on the University of Natal campus. Although Wests’ attempt to begin a student-led movement was shut down by the authorities, this media circulated event reflected similar developments within the creation of GAIDE in 1968.

GAIDE marked a desire for the gay movement to focus on creating venues for socializing rather than pursuing political goals. The statements of West focused on the political organization of the gay movement, causing an immediate crackdown of the state authorities. According to Stephen Roche, a member of GAIDE: “The politics were covert rather than overt: it had to do with providing people with a safe place in which to test themselves, with providing role models for coming out, and with bringing people together on the basis of common need and a commonly-shared oppression.” GAIDE started as a social club that attempted to cut across class, race, and create a greater cross section for the gay community. Contradictory to their

79 Currier, 32.
80 Gevisser and Cameron, 44.
81 Ibid., 44.
mission, GASA created an exclusive space for predominantly well-off gay Afrikaner men. GASA targeted members who were Afrikaner perhaps in an attempt to reconstruct the family that they had lost in the process of moving to the urban areas. GAIDE had to operate with minimal to non-existent discussions of oppression or public outreach. Any discussion of those ‘rights’ were considered suspicious by the authorities in addition to the conservative white gay community which sought to maintain the roles of social support they received in the organization. 82

GAIDE consisted of members who self-regulated any discussion on rights in order to survive. However, this was not a trend occurring globally. After the Stonewall Riots of 1969, the United States experienced a statewide gay rights movement including the beginning of Gay Pride Marches in 1970. Other countries began to follow in suit to fight against the state oppression of homosexuality. South Africa was still riddled with numerous police raids on gay clubs and bars using the new ‘men-at-party’ clause to legitimate their actions. This led to widespread frustrations by the gay communities and the desire to motivate a gay movement as they saw occurring in New York, and San Francisco in the global news. In 1978, after several years of disassociation with political issues, GAIDE fell apart. The founder of GAIDE, Bobby Erasmus emigrated exposing the failure to attract a large membership committed to the social support provided by GAIDE. In addition, the movement failed to attract lesbian women and black gay men with their focus on their conservative white reconstruction of family. What was interesting about this aspect was that the raids of the 1970s, such as the police raid at the New Mandys bar 83.

82 Ibid., 45.
83 During the 1970s, New Mandy’s Bar was a popular Johannesburg night club filled with clientele ranging from drag queens and rich Afrikaners who could express their gay identity blatantly. In 1978 Mandy’s Raid was the aggressive raid of the Bar, in which several clientele fought back against police. It is often dubbed South Africa’s Stonewall.
led to the conviction and harsh treatment of black gay men rather than white men. The police maltreatment of black men is portrayed in the higher conviction rate of black men committing sodomy than white men.\textsuperscript{84} Raids of gay clubs during the 1970s was a strategy to limiting visibility of homosexuality that was implemented by several states. This strategy was adopted from the United States by the South African Afrikaner authorities. On June 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1969 a popular New York City gay club in the Stonewall Inn was raided by police officers.\textsuperscript{85} The raid produced mass riots on the streets that historically marked the growth of the American LGBT movement. Catching onto this outright push against the state, gay urban communities in South Africa began to organize. By the 1980s, gay communities started taking part in the eruption of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.

In the late 1970s moving into the 1980s, more liberation groups organized publicly against the National Party’s hold on the Apartheid state. The culmination of the Soweto Uprising, the ANC terrorist attacks through the Umkhonto weSizwe(known as “MK” the militant wing of the ANC since 1961), and the overall liberationist activity in the townships caused President P.W. Botha to begin to institute his reform program to appease the liberation activists. In 1982 the power of the National Party waivered when the Conservative Party broke off in favor of white supremacist laws. Shortly thereafter in 1983 the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed in opposition to the apartheid state. The UDF was a non-racial coalition of hundreds of churches, student groups, workers, and civic organizations on the national, regional, and local level in order to protest the Tricameral Parliament constructed by NP President P.W. Botha. According to Gevisser: “For the very first time since the National Party came to power in 1948,

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there was a tangible sense that the decades of Afrikaner Calvinist rule were coming to an end, and that the strict apartheid packaging off of people would give way to a more liberated and integrated society. In 1982, the gay community in Johannesburg took advantage of this crack in the Afrikaner Calvinist rule to form the Gay Association of South Africa (GASA). GASA was formed out of three organizations: Lambda, a political group and AMO, and Unité, which were both supper clubs. By the following year there were more than 1,000 members who ranged from sports clubs, to religious societies and interest groups.

Visible Activism in the Rise of GASA

GASA organizers detached themselves from the liberation movement to gain a larger pool of support from conservative groups. GASA’s mission statement focused on providing “non-militant non-political answers to gay need.” By avoiding the militant and politicized elements in their mission, GASA attracted widespread membership, surprisingly including Afrikaner Christian conservatives. Because of the NP’s focus on militant liberation groups, Gay communities in Johannesburg were able to return to public spaces without fear of arrest under the “Men at Party” clause being enforced. In October 1982, only six months after the creation of GASA, over 3,000 people gathered to celebrate at a Gay jamboree at the Transvaal Country Club. According to a report made in the Star, “This is the first time in South Africa that gay people in this country will be gathering outdoor en mass for a day of fun and enjoyment.” The activities at the Jamboree ranged from braais (barbeques) to full out mud-wrestling. Although

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86 Gevisser, Mark, and Edwin Cameron, 48.
87 See Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA), University of Witwatersrand, GASA Collection, File 6, Address by Kevan Botha, National Secretary of GASA, 8th Annual Conference of the International Lesbian and Gay Alliance (ILGA), Copenhagen, 12 July 1986, pp. 2016.
GASA claimed to disassociate itself from the political realm, the creation of the Gay Jamboree was a landmark implicit political act pushing gay communities into the public sphere. One year later GASA dared to push farther into the public sphere when it opened the first national office in Hillbrow, Johannesburg. According to one of the members, Alex Robbertze:

There were worries that stones would be thrown at the windows, but it never happened. Once, someone suggested that we throw open the curtains and kiss for all of Hillbrow to see, and we did just that. We would often look out of the windows and see men, obviously out-of-towners, just standing there and looking up and pointing, as if they were tourists visiting a national monument!  

A daring statement even one decade before, visibly gay organizations and presentations were made in Johannesburg. However, the gay community allowed in the public sphere was limited to implicit racial segregation. The Apartheid state largely left GASA alone because of the shift of attention on the townships and the growing strength of the anti-apartheid liberation movement. GASA maintained a low profile in its first few years because of its membership. To maintain an “apolitical” reputation, GASA organizers discouraged the membership of black lesbians and gays, ultimately causing the downfall of the organization. While the white gay community flourished in the early 1980s in Johannesburg, black gay communities were further discouraged from organizing by GASA’s presence. The weakening apartheid government caused some bars and nightclubs, such as New Mandy’s, to push for racial integration. Some white gay men, predominantly GASA members, worried that “people of colour [were] ‘taking over,’ as they enforced racial segregation in gay venues. GASA gained most of its strength as an organization in towns outside of Johannesburg, despite its central offices location in the city. GASA searched

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89 Gevisser and Cameron, 49.
90 Currier, 32.
for membership in towns—Welkom, Bloemfontein, Kimberly, East London, Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg—where isolated gay white men could feel a link to the urban subculture.  

GASA’s prejudice towards non-white male members quickly became public knowledge to several other Gay and lesbian organizations. In the organizations attempt to be “apolitical”, they produced a contradictory all-inclusive mission statement, including: “uniting all gays under a democratic banner to offer an identity and foster confidence and self-respect among gays,” and “encouraging law reform by setting a positive examples to the authorities and non-gay society.”

Internal dissent over this implicitly political message towards the Apartheid state and “apolitical” stance amplified when the Simon Nkoli, a black gay male anti-apartheid activist with ties to the UDF, joined GASA in 1983. Many conservative members voiced strong objections fearing that through association GASA would appear more politically radical. In 1983, several more black gay members joined GASA, marking the first integrated gay organization in South Africa. When newly-organized black gay men started meeting in the GASA offices, several complaints by long-standing members were made about the “danger of theft” by allowing the black members in the offices. Nkoli and other black members were offended by the remarks made about their presence leading to the resignation of the black members. Simon Nkoli was one of few black members that remained part of the organization.

In 1986 GASA’s failure to respond to its internal racism was exacerbated in the trial and treason of Simon Nkoli. Nkoli was arrested at a UDF rent boycott demonstration in his home-township of Sebokeng, and thereafter held without trial for two years. The lack of due process in the Nkoli case garnered international attention. According to Gevisser:

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92 Gevisser and Cameron, 50.
93 Link/Skakel, December 1982.
94 Gevisser and Cameron, 53.
The confluence of his open homosexuality and his imprisonment as a soldier against apartheid made him immensely appealing to liberation-oriented gay organization around the world. In Nkoli, gay anti-apartheid activist found a ready-made hero. In Canada, the Simon Nkoli Anti-Apartheid Committee became a critical player in both the gay and anti-apartheid movements.95

GASA’s refusal to support Nkoli earned the organization international criticism. Nkoli’s trial was publicly ignored by GASA causing the 1986 annual meeting of the International Lesbian and Gay Alliance (ILGA) to concentrate on the inability of the South African gay movement to address their role in the anti-apartheid struggle. GASA’s refusal to perceive the anti-apartheid liberation movement as intrinsically tied to their gay rights activism exposed the hypocrisy of the organization. In August 1986, Kevin Botha, National Secretary of GASA, made addressed the widespread criticism the organization received at the ILGA annual meeting. Kevin Botha said: “GASA is a support organization without political aspiration”; and that the organizations “cannot begin to enter any debate on political structures or ideologies, neither our own country’s or any others.”96 Botha went as far as to say that their rationale for not supporting Nkoli was because he was additionally being charged with common-law murder and GASA could not sanction that criminal activity. Of course, it was the organizations white conservative members perspective that supporting Nkoli would be interpreted as a support for the illegal liberation struggle.97 In Botha’s speech he continued to condemn ILGA for singling out South Africa when numerous other gay liberation organizations internationally were not racially representative.98 The following year GASA was officially expelled from the ILGA. GASA quickly fell apart after the Nkoli incident once opposing politically engaged gay organizations formed. In 1986 when

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95 Ibid., 56.
96 Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA), University of Witswatersrand, GASA Collection, File 6, Address by Kevan Botha, National Secretary of GASA, 8th Annual Conference of the International Lesbian and Gay Alliance (ILGA), Copenhagen, 12 July 1986, pp.3-16.
97 Gevisser and Cameron, 56.
98 Croucher, 318.
President P.W. Botha declared a State of Emergency and the anti-apartheid struggle was gaining strength, an outburst of new organizations formed. GASA’s failure to address its role in the racially segregated apartheid state and its predominantly white male conservative membership compelled gay organizations to mobilize alongside the ANC, the UDF, and several other liberation organizations. Two strong gay organizations formed in the late 1980s, Gay Liberation Organization of Witwatersrand (GLOW) and Organization of Lesbian and Gay Activists (OLGA) playing a crucial role in the collapse of the apartheid regime and the recreation of state constitutionally protecting gay and lesbian rights.

**Gay Liberation: Challenging Societal Stigmas Towards Homosexuality**

In 1988 South Africa released Simon Nkoli from custody after garnering international scrutiny from Western states and anti-apartheid organizations. Nkoli became a distinguished black gay icon in the South African black gay communities. Soon after release, Nkoli organized with dozens of black gay activist to form GLOW in Witwatersrand. Unlike GASA, GLOW defined itself as a politically supportive ally to the liberation movement. The predominantly black organization attested the fact that homosexuality was a “white issue” claiming that the gay struggle was one facet of the broader anti-apartheid struggle. At the same time, another prominent organization—Organization of Lesbian and Gay Activists (OLGA)—was forming in Cape Town. OLGA’s membership was the most inclusive organization to lesbian membership, but like GASA was composed of predominantly white members. However, OLGA included dozens of intellectuals who were adamant about framing themselves as an anti-apartheid

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99 Ibid., 319.
organization.\textsuperscript{100} OLGA was one of the strongest gay liberation bodies to work closely with the UDF, and positioned itself quickly in the upper echelon of liberation politics.

Many liberation leaders disagreed with the position that gay rights should be considered part of the liberation struggle. Throughout the development of gay organizations from the law reform movement to the development of GASA, gay rights were framed as a white issue in the perspective of many leaders in the UDF and even in the ANC. In 1987 Ruth Mompati, a women’s rights activist and member of the ANC executive, insinuated in an interview that the gained visibility of the gay rights movement was a Westernized development and an un-African concern. Mompati stated “I cannot even begin to understand why people want gay and lesbian rights. The gays have no problems…I don’t see them suffering. No one is persecuting them…We don’t have a policy on gays and lesbians. We don’t have a policy on flower sellers either.”\textsuperscript{101} Mompati viewed the visibility of the gay rights movement to be derailing the efforts of the ANC to handle a larger issue of the racial liberation. This same sentiment was one year earlier debunked by the works of human rights advocate Edwin Cameron: “We exercise the freedom we think we might have in South Africa not by right but by favour, by indulgence. We are depending on, at best, the goodwill of the police to meet and act as we do; and at worst we are dependent on their blind eyes, their lack of knowledge or their inefficiency.”\textsuperscript{102} The NP government was slipping in control during the late 1980s and early 1990s causing a drop in monitoring of gay organizations. Right as the NP government had a blind-eye to OLGA and GLOW; they began to act on their political goals. OLGA and GLOW fought to frame the issue of gay rights as human rights, falling into line with the human rights the ANC and UDF were

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 319.
\textsuperscript{102} Gevisser and Cameron, 61.
claiming to uphold. Mompati’s statement in the interview of 1987 led to widespread criticism by fellow anti-apartheid activists within the ANC, and in the global North. Several British anti-apartheid and gay organizations “threatened to withdraw their support for the ANC if it did not retract Mompati’s statements.”

Because of Mompati’s statement, the ANC had to define itself as a pro-gay rights organization and implement a full-blown gay and lesbian rights policy. The ANC’s pro-gay rights position gave it one more faction to gain support from against the anti-gay NP government; the ANC was looking for as many liberal ideologies as possible to distinguish itself from the current NP government as nonracial.

After the release of several ANC members from prison in 1989, including Nelson Mandela, South Africa went through a dramatic demise of the apartheid state. In 1989 the new president Frederik de Klerk and Nelson Mandela began talks leading to the unbanning of several political parties. With the new legitimacy of the ANC, the liberation movement gained extraordinary momentum.

In 1990, the ANC initiated the launching of a public debate on a proposed Bill of Rights and the beginnings to an interim constitution to replace the Apartheid Constitution. From 1990 to 1993, the ANC Constitutional Committee held a series of inclusive conferences to formulate the broader ideas behind the constitution proposals. Within the interim-constitution, The Constitutional Committee produced a democratically elected Constitutional Assembly (CA) to draft a thorough final constitution rooted in inclusive participation. The ANC along with the NP, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Democratic Party (DP) constructed a Bill of Rights considering a protection of the rights of gays and lesbians from discrimination.

105 Croucher, 322.
GLOW seized this window of opportunity to place gay rights as a necessity in the new Constitution. OLGA and GLOW partook in coalition politics, relentlessly lobbied the CA to create a protection of groups based upon their sexual orientation. Throughout the process the gay rights organizations found extremes of both advocates and opponents. ANC members sympathized with the gay organizations after returning from exile in Europe and North America “but these leaders were also sympathetic to the rights and equality claims of the many gay activists who had been loyal comrades in the struggle against apartheid.”

Despite the great ANC support for protecting gay rights, the National Party still constructed a legal loophole to the proposed construction of the clause. The NP’s proposal read: “There shall be no discrimination on the ground of race, colour, language, sex, religion, ethnic origin, social class, birth, political or other views or any disability or other natural characteristic.”

Opponents to the NP proposal saw the wording of “natural characteristic” as too loosely up to the interpretation of a judge to allow discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Conservative Christian lobbyists pitted themselves against members of the ANC, OLGA, and GLOW when analyzing the phrasing that protected sexual orientation in the bill of rights. The only party to outright oppose the sexual orientation clause was the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP).

Kenneth Moshoe, the leader of the ACDP, said that the political party believed that:

> Homosexuality is a lifestyle that is unacceptable to the majority of South Africans, besides the fact that it is unchristian and anti-all religion. It is against our culture as Africans, although we know that there are people introduced to this lifestyle. I’m sure that they are an embarrassment to their ancestors. This is a white man’s disease that has been introduced into the black culture. This definitely comes from Europe.”

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106 Ibid., 323.
107 Gevisser and Cameron, 94.
109 Spruill, 5.
Moshoe echoed the same sentiments as the Winnie Mandela trial that took place one year before. The loudest cries at that time against gay rights came from within a black African population. The origin of homosexuality within the Black Christian groups was considered white problem; the same way the gay organizations were perceived and practiced from the 1960s until the late 1980s. Several members of anti-apartheid groups wrote in direct response to the ACDP’s lobbying objections by either mail or phone asking that the sexual orientation clause remain in the interim constitution. Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, an iconic ANC anti-apartheid leader, spoke out against the correlation of religion to homophobia proclaiming: “If the church, after victory over apartheid, is looking for a worth moral crusade, then this is it: the fight against homophobia and heterosexism.”\(^{110}\) Invoking the moral aspect of the anti-apartheid movement, Archbishop Tutu put the fight for gay rights in equal standing to the fight for desegregation. The Christian communities of South Africa experienced a great fractionalization in perspective on gay rights. Questions and debates over morality and “naturalness” of homosexuality were ingrained in the discussion of the sexual orientation clause. The sexual orientation clause quickly became the most contentious clause in the Bill of Rights.

OLGA and GLOW fought back at the moral and natural claims of conservative bodies making gay rights a conversation apart from the greater movement for freedom. OLGA and GLOW consistently framed their efforts for gay rights as an effort for their human rights. In August 1992 GLOW went to great lengths to reach out for “all progressive organisations, youth organisations and women’s organisations to show solidarity…The struggle for gay and lesbian

rights cannot be separated from the struggle for freedom for all South Africans.” At that time there was no country in the world protecting such a right. By the end of 1993 the Constitutional Committee produced an interim constitution including the sexual orientation clause based on the three-way agreement of the ANC, IDP, and DP. In 1994, the Interim Constitution came into effect after the 1994 election, when the country overwhelmingly voted for the ANC with 62.6% majority electing Nelson Mandela as President. On December 10, 1996 President Mandela signed the Constitution, later adopted by the South African Parliament. The sexuality clause in the Bill of Rights survived the extensive alterations of Parliament, reading:

3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against, anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).

In 1996 South Africa became the first state in the world to constitutionally protect the rights of gays and lesbians. The fall of the apartheid state in 1995 made way for the ANC to uphold human rights within the constitutional framework. Previous to the transition of state Thabo Mbeki, then Director of Information of the ANC, stated: The ANC is indeed very firmly committed to removing all forms of discrimination and oppression in a liberated South Africa…That commitment must surely extend to the protection of gay rights.” The gay rights movement had phenomenal success in shaping such progressive legislation through alliances made with political parties, and the framing of gay rights as human rights. Despite the great

accomplishments of the lesbian and gay rights movement at that time, the gay and lesbian activism and community remained largely invisible during the apartheid era. The legal restriction of the gay communities and organizations created long-lasting tensions and social stigmas into the 21st Century. These social stigmas recreate themselves in the politicized debate in South Africa, and internationally, in the protection of family values.
Chapter 3
Post-Apartheid Negotiations: Remnants of an Ethnic Church

On February 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1990 the world watched Cape Town erupt in political hysteria. F W De Kerk opened Parliament alongside Nelson Mandela to announce the unbanning of all resisting political parties. The ANC, the Pan-African Congress, and the South African Communist Party gained the right to represent a constituency. Archbishop Desmond Tutu awaited the announcement in St. George’s Cathedral alongside his congregation. Dubbing it the second coming, the Archbishop avidly symbolized the Anglican churches’ support for the deconstruction of Apartheid.\footnote{F.W. de Klerk announces the release of Nelson Mandela and unbans political organisations.” South Africa History Online. n.p., 2 February 1990. Web. 4 March 2015.} The DRC could not boast the same support of their Afrikaner President’s decision. Unbeknownst to the NP and the leaders of the DRC, F W De Kerk made the unilateral decision to change the political landscape of party politics in South Africa. According to O’Meara, both De Kerk and Mandela left their follower’s in the dark about their decision to compromise to halt the potential civil war. Up until the announcement, both sides were fervently slandering each other believing that a horrific revolutionary war was inevitable in the near future. O’Meara writes:

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Most of the rank and file on both sides were still wrapped up in a demonized view of the other, and convinced of the ultimate victory of their own moral cause—whether to bury apartheid or to destroy ‘communism.’ The rapidity with which both sets of leaders now started negotiating with this enemy thus generated deep unease in their respective political constituencies.\footnote{O’Meara, Dan. \textit{Forty lost years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948-1994.} Ravan, (1996), 216.}
\end{quote}

Cementing his name on the “right side” of history, F W De Kerk left his Afrikaner-based NP frustrated and destabilized. Up until that moment, the NP and the DRC were entangled state and religious apparatuses producing the Afrikaner identity during the Apartheid era. The Afrikaner
identity was built around Afrikaner nationalism dependent on discourses of religious, racial and cultural purity. 117 When the NP came to power in 1948, the vision of the new apartheid state was to reinforce the Afrikaner identity to create a ‘new’ South Africa. According to Jonathan Hyslop, Afrikaners were “encapsulated in a network of schools, social clubs, churches, [and] cultural and business organizations which created a self-referential Afrikaner ideological world.” 118 Family values were ingrained in the Afrikaner ideological world supported by the apartheid system. The centering of South Africa around the Afrikaner ideological world during the 20th century left many religious, educational, and social institutions searching for a new form of identity. Placed in this past identity were the family values ideology that perpetrated conception of purity, identity, and reproduction in the family that caused oppression on a systematic level. The DRC acted as the central authority to support family values within the Afrikaner-based apartheid ideology. As seen in Chapter 1, the DRC has close ties to the Afrikaner state, producing discourses of superiority towards populations such as black South Africans and LGBT groups. This overt self-expression of the Afrikaner identity is exemplified in the DRC missionary work going back to the 1940s. In 1943, J.C. van Rooy, a prominent DRC leader and chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond 119, advocated strongly for these discourses of superiority:

> God created the Afrikaner people with a unique language, a unique philosophy of life and their own history and traditions in order that they might fulfill a particular calling and destiny here in the southern corner of Africa. We must stand guard on all that is peculiar to us and build upon it. We must believe that God has called us to be servants of his righteousness in this place. 120

119 Verwey, Cornel, and Michael Quayle, 553.
These institutions maintain the family values ideology through the relation to Afrikaner nationalism. As espoused by J.C. van Rooy, the omnipresence of Afrikaner nationalism in the DRC was a mechanism to permeate traditions. These traditions van Rooy refers to include discourses of purity, reproduction, and superiority that negotiate forms of family values to be spread through Afrikaner missionary work. Ultimately, it was the DRC alongside the NP that catapulted the family values ideology into understandings of the Afrikaner identity. However, De Kerk’s announcement in 1990 uprooted the Afrikaner identity permanently shifting the power and therefore ideological purpose of a post-apartheid DRC.

Twenty-five years later, the Afrikaner populace is still negotiating identity without the stabilized authority of apartheid. How does this post-apartheid shift in power negotiate the Afrikaner identity? To what extent does this reshape the ideological force of family values within the DRC? And finally, how do modern post-apartheid ideas of non-racialism cause friction with family values as they are negotiated in the Church? In this Chapter, I provide an ethnography of the DRC in Cape Town, South Africa. I analyze how the family values ideology maintains power in the religious authority of the DRC, despite the falling of the state power.

I interviewed ten DRC members in the City Centre of Cape Town, as well as Tamboerskloof, through a snowball sampling technique. In addition to conducting interviews with informants, I regularly attended services at two of three of the Dutch Reformed Churches. I attended all services alone, and only attended those offered in English. To better understand my interactions and relations to informants, I shall give some background information on myself. I am a twenty-one year old American woman with a mixed ethnic background of both European and Native American heritage that has resulted in a pale complexion. During my fieldwork, my interactions with informants revealed that my complexion and American nationality classified
me as “white” in South Africa. This is of relevance to fieldwork conducted with the DRC as many of the interviews traced upon a racialized history in the current consciousness of Afrikaner members of the DRC. I address the grievances and frictions of the Afrikaner identity with racial tensions of the apartheid history. I also focus my analysis on how family structure and signs of the heteronormative family implicitly discourages LGBT membership in the DRC.

All interviews were conducted in the Churches regularly attended by the informants. Each informant was interviewed individually for half an hour and all informants agreed to an audio-recorded interview. All informants identified as being apart of the Afrikaner community. Of the ten informants, seven were male and three were female. Three informants were ministers of churches in Cape Town. Two ministers held services exclusively in English, while one minister held services exclusively in Afrikaans. I chose to interview members in Churches in Cape Town for the locations political and cultural relevance to the Afrikaner identity. Cape Town was the site of the first Dutch colony established during the 17th century. I interviewed informants from the first DRC established in South Africa, which offers services in Afrikaans. Cape Town has maintained a significant Afrikaner population and is the site of massive political change. Parliament residing in Cape Town allowed many NP members during Apartheid to attend Dutch Reformed Churches in the city. Despite this, many right-wing Afrikaner members during the political shift left the NP121 as well as the DRC. From 1981 to 1999 the DRC lost nine percent of its members—nearly 1 in every 10 member either stopped attending service entirely or

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121 From 1980s to 1990s the National Party also experienced increased English membership creating a party that presented itself as representing a white populace.
became a member of an independent Protestant church. Although membership of the DRC dropped since the end of apartheid, there are still 99 congregations within the Cape Town area.

This drop in membership reveals the impact of the shifting state powers on the DRC. Members lamented of an ‘old South Africa’ where Afrikanerdom reigned strongly in their relationship to the Church. The centrality of Apartheid ideology to Afrikaner identity caused trauma to members of the DRC during the collapse of the apartheid. According to Saayman: “The church had been intimately involved in the development of that ideology, and now that it disintegrated, the church also suffered a loss of focus and mission-directedness.”

The transition in ideology from Apartheid separateness to non-racialism produced frictions within the DRC ministry and membership. In post-apartheid South Africa, inclusivity dominated discussion in the ministry. Upholding the family values ideology, containing contextualized forms of purity in the Afrikaner identity, while inserting the policy of non-racialism caused a weakness in the DRC institution. One minister stated:

South Africa went through a lot of changes politically, but with the political changes came a change in the people. They people became critical of the leadership, of the party regime, and more so they became self-critical. They became critical of the leadership. They felt the church didn’t warn them that these were not the right policies to support.

In interviews, Informants often produced narratives of an old South Africa. This critical perspective came as a sort of betrayal of leadership. Implied in the minister’s statement is that the religious and state authorities of the Afrikaner population were keeping the constituencies/members out of the loop of political change. Many members drew their support

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124 Saayman, 101.
125 Interview, male, 28 January 2015.
for the DRC off of the Afrikaner identity. That identity was put in a state of crisis. When the minister states that they became “self-critical” there is a discourse of whites as under threat. The separateness of apartheid contained sexual and racial identities. For nearly half a century, the Afrikaners found solace in their family values ideological based oppressions through the legitimacy of the state. When De Kerk cut out this separateness of identity from the party politics, the DRC received great criticism. The Afrikaner populace shifted a great portion of the blame to the DRC because of its status as the moral religious authority. The DRC upheld the Afrikaner claim of moral superiority. That shift out of Apartheid that the informant discusses reveals the Afrikaner reliance on the DRC and NP for ideological support. The NP pressed the family values ideology by implementing policies ensuring that sexually deviant expression remained largely invisible. This surveillance of sexuality insured the purity of the Afrikaner identity and therefore their moral superiority. That moral superiority was legitimized by the DRC.

The DRC made claims throughout history that the Afrikaner purpose in South Africa was the mission to spread whiteness. Whiteness is embedded in the Victorian bourgeois conceptions of sexuality as heteronormative supporting a patriarchal system. Without this moral superiority, the Afrikaner populace was flung into a state of self-criticism. The self-critical aspect is rooted in the desire for purity within the Afrikaner identity. Purity is an idealistic conception of self that is built on the premise that there is a population that can spoil this identity. The Apartheid era Afrikaner identity strove for this form of purity that could only be reached through the confinements of sex and race. Once that systematic structure fell, the self-criticism of many Afrikaners came at the questioning of this family values rooted discourse of purity. The Afrikaner religious and state institutions slandered this ideology during the shift out of
Apartheid. The condemnation of separateness is maintained in the interviews of DRC members. However, this condemnation comes out of a need to maintain a façade of approval of the new post-apartheid state. Many members after the fall of apartheid left the DRC as well as the National Party out of a sense of betrayal. One informant stated:

The white government they elected allowed all those things to happen. They also felt that the church in those days was culturally close to the government. It was the same people in Parliament that belonged to the DRC. They became much more critical of more institutions, but particularly the DRC. The result of that was that many left the church to many other churches, preferably going to independent Protestant churches. Just churches who were on their own; not belonging to a denomination. For example toe Living waters congregation. Quite a large group from 1994 onwards just didn’t go to church any longer. We lost quite a lot traditional members. A lot left for cultural reasons. It was more accepted in the white Afrikaans community, and that has changed. For example, in the Baptist circles it wasn’t such a big change.  

This criticism of the DRC caused a great spike in independent churches. The shifting landscape of the post-apartheid era left the DRC struggling to maintain pride and communal support from members. Whiteness in government took new forms. Afrikaans membership in the NP fell in congruence with DRC membership. As the informant describes, the cultural similarities between the NP and the DRC came out of a support for systematic separateness contained in the Afrikaans identity. In post-apartheid South Africa, the DRC is still considered to be the ethnic church of Apartheid. My interviews revealed that the history of apartheid support within the Afrikaner community produces sites of friction. Many informants felt the need to disassociate with the Apartheid past by referring to an old South Africa. More importantly, many informants revealed a sense of blame and guilt pushed upon the institutions. The cultural support of the family values ideology in the Afrikaans community produced itself in the Apartheid system. Many members wanted to disassociate from this history by adopting new churches and a non-racialism ideology. According to Sharp: “Non-racialism as an ideal of societal transformation refers to a process in which a commitment to the ending of racial discrimination is

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126 Interview, male, 28 January 2015.
complemented by a concerted programme to provide wide-ranging redress for the disadvantages that the majority of South Africans suffered in the past.\textsuperscript{127} This movement towards policies of non-racialism in post-apartheid South Africa often falls short from recreating the social conditions. Non-racialist policy in post-apartheid South Africa are grounded in the human rights ideology. The non-racialized movement pushes forth ideas of equality and protection of rights that are placed into the new South African constitution.

The motivations to produce policies of inclusivity across racial lines are the same ones that the inclusivity of sexual orientation and gender identity are based upon. One informant who is a minister stated in an interview that the DRC, since a new ministry policy adopted in 2010, claimed inclusivity regardless of racial, gender, or sexual identity.\textsuperscript{128} Yet, that same shift in policy did not allow the acceptance of marriage outside the heterosexual form.\textsuperscript{129} Invoking the ideological roots of non-racialism, the informant promoted the socially accepting reforms produced in Post-Apartheid rhetoric of South Africa. However, informants invoked the idea of ‘non-racialism” at a superficial level. In one interview, I asked an informant to discuss whether the church had reached this non-racialism, or if it could still be considered today as an ethnic church. As a minister of the DRC since the 1990s, the informant discussed a history of inclusive policy that the ministry discussed alongside sister churches. The minister appeared to maintain the stance that his church, being in Cape Town an urban and more liberal pocket of DRC membership, was welcoming to all forms of identity. Despite this, the informant showed bitterness over the lack of compliance across all congregations. The trend that the informant

\textsuperscript{128} Interview, male, 28 January 2015.
\textsuperscript{129} “The “Protection of the Family” Resolution: The Role of South Africa.” \textit{Realising Rights.} The Legal Resource Centre. 15 September 2014. Web. 10 April 2015
often felt was that the churches maintaining an Afrikaner family majority that gave services in Afrikaans appeared to be ones that kept a superficial level of reform. The informant stated:

In practice we are struggling. On paper, it’s not like that. The church is open and welcome. We really want to unite with other churches as well. Especially those with the same sort of confessions we practice, the DRC is the spiritual home to the Afrikaner people who grew up in another South Africa, older South Africa. But it’s really hard for them to feel comfortable with new people coming in. We are really struggling to get everyone feeling welcome. The youngsters are gonna do it, maybe I’m too idealistic.  

The non-racial policies of the DRC are performative in several DRC congregations. Informants use narratives of an older South Africa to disassociate their membership with the Apartheid sentiments. In the passage above, the informant felt that a generational separation would be the cleansing to the Afrikaner community in the DRC. Nevertheless, the claim of the DRC as an ethnic church was never denied during interviews with all informants regardless of age. Several members hoped that inclusivity would come over time, but the clinging of “older members” to exclusivity by Afrikaner identity produces hostile spaces in some congregations. The Afrikaner identity is determined by racialized and patriarchal heteronormative definitions. In interviews, all members maintained that many right-wing Afrikaner families felt unrepresented in the DRC when inclusive policies were implemented. This led to the drop in membership, yet Afrikaner families still comprise the majority in historically white DRCs. All informants interviewed stated that they were apart of the church since childhood and continued to attend service with their families. This is exemplified in the prominence of Afrikaans language within services. One minister states: “There is a great importance of speaking English in church, changing the outside congregations not to exclude peoples.” While attending services of English speaking churches I was greeted by several members first in Afrikaans. In English-speaking churches, the initial use

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130 Interview, male, 22 January 2015.
131 During the 20th Century, DRC missionaries set out to establish black Dutch Reformed Churches. Those churches are referred to as daughter congregations, rather than sister congregations.
132 Interview, male, 26 January 2015.
of Afrikaans for community socialization maintains the Afrikaner exclusivity. Although the minister, quoted in the passage above, boasts non-racialism in his congregation, the trend in congregations is that there is a rooting to the DRC as Afrikaner. The minister hopes that the younger generation of ministers can renegotiate the relationship between the Afrikaner identity and the Church. However, the masked forms of family values permeating through the services and sentiments of Afrikaner members in the DRC produces spaces of hostility. In the following section, I explore how signs of family values promote exclusivity when considering alternative forms to heterosexuality.

**Salient Signs of the Family in the DRC Community**

Two teenagers were slumped over on the staircase leading into the Cape Peninsula Reformed Church. That Sunday evening, the new pastor held his one-year anniversary service. He was quite nervous and was able to sway the young musically talented teenagers into leading the congregation in song. Among several older couples and a few of the pastors friends in their thirties, I followed the congregation in the proceedings. The pastor began by preaching his gratitude for the support that the congregation offered him during his first year in the ministry. He turned to an elderly couple in the pews and asked them to stand. He praised them for their support and remarked to the couple that he felt honored that they took him into their home for support several times. He turned to the woman and remarked that she had being caring as a mother to him. Afterwards, the pastor beckoned the two teenagers over and gave thanks to them for their generosity of time. He jokingly implied that few youngsters would drag themselves out of their summer hangouts to attend a Sunday evening service. The lack of youth in the congregation reveals the diminishing support of the DRC that makes the ministry nervous.
Services often included families with young children, but lacked teenage youth. In interviews, all three ministers feared the distancing of children from the church. However, all ten informants confirmed that they began attending service at a young age. One minister stated: “I was the only youngster there in the evenings with my parents. I slept through it, but I was there. It was just so natural to do that.”

Family-based congregations are widespread within the DRC. As expressed in the passage above, children were present in the activity of the church. This particular minister, showed a dedication to the church in his early years far beyond his peers. Traditional Sunday school attendance has decreased dramatically according to informants.

The old structure of the Church detracts younger generations and families from continuing their reliance on the church. During the apartheid, the DRC acted as the religious institution to uphold the educational, economic, and moral status of each community. One minister stated with nostalgia:

“Our traditional Sunday school isn’t doing as well. The church doesn’t have a hand on the children. You used to need the church to get a job to get a nursery. It’s not like that anymore. So now it’s difficult now to get the children to the church and people there to get some loyalty from them.”

The loyalty to the Church during Apartheid came alongside the state support for Afrikaner identity. Afrikaners’ ability to obtain jobs and find superior forms of education came through the use of Afrikaans language in each formal setting. One informant stated: “The Dutch Reformed Church always had a youth leg or what you would call it. So we never felt that they didn’t look after us.” The informant is referring to the consistent attendance of children to the Sunday schools she experienced during the 1970s. She expressed that this was schooling given in Afrikaans and that all students there were Afrikaner as well.

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133 Interview, male, 22 January 2015.
134 Interview, male, 26 January 2015.
135 Interview, female, 26 January 2015.
The Afrikaans language operates as a cultural tool to promote and restrict spaces of opportunity within the DRC. During apartheid, Afrikaner identity played a larger role at producing formal and informal restrictions to economic and social mobility. Afrikaner identity has two prominent pillars that exist past the Apartheid era: whiteness and Afrikaans language. In the current DRC, members actively use the Afrikaans language to produce an Afrikaner identity to the Church as well as an Afrikaner identity of the family within the Church. Andre Brink argued in “English and the Afrikaans writer”:

> What, at the beginning of the Language Movement, was the forte of Afrikaans (the fact that it was a political instrument) has developed into an Achilles heel. For as the Afrikaner became politically dominant his [sic] language began to bear a stamp of exclusiveness—White Afrikaner Nationalist Calvinist exclusiveness.

Therefore, when the minister expressed a desire for the loyalty of current members to the Church, he was expressing nostalgia for the dedication to Afrikaner identity upheld by institutionalized exclusivity. The form of loyalty expressed reveals itself when closely tied to Afrikaner expression of self. The expression of Afrikaner identity is reshaped in post-apartheid South Africa. Afrikaners tend to detach themselves from the stereotypical aspects of their identity such as over racism, historical pride, and conservative dress. The stereotypical Afrikaner wardrobe comes from the 1970s caricature of Afrikaner men in “safari suits.” During the Apartheid, South Africans wore formal suits to attend church services. During interviews, members expressed that there is a loosening of conservative attire in the DRC.

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136 Verwey, Cornel, and Michael Quayle, 553.
138 Important example of this is the storytelling of Boer history, such as the war. During Apartheid south Africa, several educational systems demanded a depth in Afrikaner historical knowledge. This necessity of knowledge in social spheres is nonexistent in present day South Africa.
139 Verwey, Cornel, and Michael Quayle, 561.
Verwey and Quayle’s interview with an Afrikaner male produced this sort of distancing of the Afrikaner family from the conservative stereotype. They stated:

In response to the question ‘How would you define an Afrikaner?’ many participants referred to gross stereotypes of conservative Afrikaner: “and my family don’t wear long socks and short pants (laughing) you know, I mean…so um…in that way I feel well, it’s just, it’s not who me and my family are.”

In the ethnographic work conducted by Verwey and Quayle, the informant refers to her identity as Afrikaner in relation to her entire family. They as a unit, do not conduct themselves in conservative dress. However, their ethnographic work reveals that in post-apartheid Afrikaner identity, the use of Afrikaans is central to producing recognitions of community. During interviews, I posed the question to informants “How would you define the family?” All responses included the use of Afrikaans. One informant said: “I think the family most of the time as the nuclear family, the father the mother and the children. But uh, that’s not to say there is not the larger family, with the grandfather, the grandmother, the cousins. In Afrikaans we call that gestin. Then the extended is familie. Both are still important now.”

The reliance on Afrikaans to express the family substantiates the ingraining of the family values ideology not only in the DRC, but in the Afrikaans community as well. This use of Afrikaans in the DRC persists even in English-speaking congregations. English-speaking congregations boast strongly the non-racialized policies of inclusivity. But they still strategically attract their younger membership through the use Afrikaner ideological thought in the familial structure. It’s a paradox where the current rhetoric of inclusivity deters younger families from turning to the DRC as a community partner, yet falling membership is pushing the ministry to cling to the familial structure within the church.

140 Verwey, Cornel, and Michael Quayle, 560.
141 Interview, female, 24 January 2015.
The DRC is attempting now to support younger families so membership may grow. One informant noticed a shift in the relationship between the parents and their children that is influencing attendance in churches:

The youngsters like their more live churches. That’s fine with us. We do see that parents go where the children go. Their lives orbit around their children more and more. It’s not only the mothers, it’s the fathers now too. The father’s are really doing things that fathers never would have done 30 years ago. I think we’re 10-20 years behind the U.S. These are the changes I think about.

Alluding to gross stereotypes of fathers as distanced from children, the informant is promoting the existence of patriarchal system in the family. The informants pride in this shift reveals the friction between the traditional patriarchal family and modern conceptions of equality in genders and child-rearing. By referencing the United States, the informant is placing progress in the western space, with family values in the old South African context. The informant is also implying the demand for a fatherly figure in raising a child. Family values ideology claims that the father should be the independent actor who strays to and from the home, while the woman maintains the structure with child rearing. By the father dedicating more time to the child, it comes as a surprise to the ideological background of the informant. In addition, it is assumed in this conversation that there is a mother and father figure within the families of the church. The presence of children at the center of the father’s consideration extends into the DRCs focus on children for fostering consistent membership. The father is a site of friction between the family values ideology and the human rights ideology. The presumption of the father performing maternally is considered as progressive. Yet, the impressiveness of this reinforces the gendered dynamics of a family that demand heterosexual norms. The focus then becomes on reproduction in the family. For families to exist in the church, the informant assumes that children must be

142 Interview, male, 25 January 2015.
apart of the picture with a maternal and paternal figure. This creates an exclusive atmosphere in the family pride of the DRC.

The father as the independent actor is maintained in the family values of the DRC primarily in the rural areas. Several informants made remarks that there is greater susceptibility to inclusive atmospheres in urban areas like Cape Town than in farmlands. One informant said:

> In the city it’s easier, but in the Plattelands it’s less open. It’s not that easy. The other churches have their sort of values, or priorities. When we talk together, the man is still the head of the house. In my church, the man is still a little bit of it, but it’s more like we plan together and we lead together. So if we’re getting closer, than there’s a lot of things to discuss.\(^{143}\)

The patriarchal structure the informant addresses critically is bedrock to the confinement of sexuality. Foucault argues that the movement of a man in and out of the home as the leader portrays the limitations to new forms of family.\(^{144}\) The configuration of a family with two mother, or two fathers is unaddressed in all discussion of family by members of the DRC. Instead, the informant proposes that leading a new form of inclusivity would take the dominance of men. Already built into the idea of progression is male authority over home and therefore oppression of sexuality. The informant engages in a conscious distancing occurs in these remarks about values. The values are still in sphere of purity conceptions in the home. The priority of rural churches is suggested as maintaining the close link to patriarchal exclusivity in the Afrikaner community. The DRC acts as an institution to substantiate these values outside of the home and permeate them in the proceedings of the church. Foucault writes: “One must suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-

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\(^{143}\) Interview, male, 25 January 2015.

\(^{144}\) Foucault, 3.
ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole.”¹⁴⁵ The wide-ranging effects contextualized to the DRC are the implicit rejections of alternative forms of family structure.

The family is ingrained in the signs of the church. Although the DRC boasts outwardly that it desires new membership, the pursuit of inclusivity of Afrikaner families promotes family values and the ethnic historical remnants of the Church. Signs of the family are represented implicitly by the church to produce frames of understanding sexuality. These frames of understanding reinforce the oppressive force of family values towards outlying forms of sexual identity to the heterosexual. Three ways in which the Church involves family values in the signs of the church community are: the promotion of traditional families in membership, the imbedded discussion of family defined heteronormativity in the Afrikaans language, and the reference to the Church as a form of family.

Coping with the loss of membership, several congregations rebranded themselves to attract Afrikaner membership. Independent churches sprouting up caused several congregations to change their name in the hope that a new era of the church would rise out of the ashes. When asked the question about the omnipresence of family values in the church, one informant grieved over the new indoctrination strategies of fellow ministers:

Some churches call themselves family churches, which I don’t think you should do that. I think it is not intentional, but it can exclude some people. That isn’t inclusive. If I was a single person, I would think twice to join a church that presents itself as a family church, which some do in the suburbs.¹⁴⁶

The minister continued to state that his reasoning was for members of the church who were single, or widowed, would feel excluded from a family church. In this interview, the minister

¹⁴⁵ Foucault, 94.
¹⁴⁶ Interview, male, 22 January 2015.
neglected to consider that alternative forms of family to the heterosexual may exist in a congregation. When speaking of inclusivity, all informants actively discussed racial aspects of inclusivity due to the racist history of the Afrikaner community. In addition, they were concerned that single people could not find refuge in a church centered on families. The lack of consideration for homosexual, bisexual, or transgender identity within ideas of inclusivity acts as a mode of oppression in the church. Promoting the family values ideology, all informants lamented that single people could be involved in the church. Maintaining the structure of discussion around marriage, the informant did much discursive work to reinforce the patriarchal norms of family values. One informant stated:

The composition of our congregation are mostly families. But we have less families proportionally than the average congregation. Living in the suburbs, there are more single men and women who are not married. They’re young people, but we have a high proportion of single people due to location. We have widows too. But families are always an important part of our church.147

The composition of the informants state placing single men and women into conversation implies the heterosexual structure of the family. He went on to advocate that men and women could meet in the congregation since they built such a familial community. All informants insisted that there was a welcoming atmosphere, but continued to have low attendance rates by members who were not apart of families. This is in part due to the considerable remnants of the exclusivity aspects of family values in the DRC. Informants often mentioned that they felt that the church acted as though it was a larger family.

The DRC manifesting itself in the community as a family institution is shown through the close connection it has to the process of marriage and creating heterosexual couples. When discussing inclusivity, there is a need to focus on the family as involving marriage. A minister of an Afrikaans-speaking church stated: “The church is sort of the family. We don’t have a specific

147 Interview, male, 26 January 2015.
ministry for the people who went through divorce, who are just on their own now. So we do try to bring them in as family. We do see individuals, but it’s a small part of the church. Maybe 10% of members.” 148 The Afrikaans community interprets inclusivity in terms of marriage in the context of family values. Throughout the interviews, informants interpreted questions of inclusivity as a questioning of racial inclusivity or inclusivity of non-family based members. To make amends with these anxieties, informants placed the church as being inclusive to the extent of naming the church as a family. The services provided by the DRC show the church as an institutional symbol of the family. The relationship of the God (the Father), Mary (the Mother), the church (the home), and DRC members (the children of God) reveals the replication of the heterosexual family structure. The church becomes the space of sexual confinement. It is the only space where sexuality is permitted, and only in heterosexual form. The placement of marriage is in the church and it is God’s word, the head and father of the church, that permits such a unity to occur. On the Sunday evening service given by Pastor Francois, he ended telling the story of Eunuch in Matthew 19:12. The passage he reads: "For there are some eunuchs, which were born that way from their mother’s womb: and there are some eunuchs, which were made eunuchs of men: and there are be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s sake. He that is able to receive this, let him receive it." 149 Pastor Francois alludes to God’s gift of sexuality to humanity. The story of Eunuch is to emphasize the importance of marriage. Pastor Francois looks out to the young couples in their thirties as he reads this passage. He emphasizes the importance of creating these bonds that God allows of his

148 Interview, male, 22 January 2015.
children. While substantiating God’s place as the giver of heterosexual desires, the pastor is confirming the family values the DRC places throughout the signs of its services and narratives.

This extends beyond the DRC into the Christian adoption of the family values ideology. Globally, the family values ideology embeds itself into protestant institutions through this terminological kaleidoscope. The family is shaped into greater signs of religious devotion to create flows of the family values ideology. In addition, family values places itself into communal identities by controlling discourse over the home. In the Afrikaner community, family values held space in the religious institution even after the fall of apartheid. However, this placement of heterosexual norms in religious institutions pushes out LGBT groups. The friction of family values with LGBT inclusivity in religious institutions, such as the DRC, is due to the omnipresence of the heteronormative family signs. Modern human rights discourse demands policies of inclusivity of religious institutions. However, family values reifies itself in religious institutions to create implicit social forces against inclusivity that nullifies the performative aspects of the human rights discourse.
Conclusion

Family values is engaging the human rights ideology in global politics. The “protection of the family” resolution, supported by the South African state, reveals the focus of power on the family structure in the 21st century. Article 16, paragraph 3, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stipulates that “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” The family is regarded as a single unit entrenched with its own values and right to protection in the human rights ideology. Both ideologies make space for the family, but the defining of family and their traditional values is the point of fracturing between ideological forces. The silencing of family diversity at the Human Rights Council is a longstanding trend. The 28th session of the UNHRC, and discussion that followed displays the growing friction between the human rights and family values.

The trend of silencing new forms of family held strong in the “protection of the family” resolution. Delegates drew lines in defining the family, and passed a resolution without a definition included. Lacking a definition, the resolution upholds the family values ideology. When the resolution came to a vote, those in favor stood at 26 votes to 14, with 6 abstentions. In the space of the UNHCR, family values claimed dominance over human rights. The hegemonic force of family values placed power in state apparatuses to produce legal legitimacy of the traditional family. Director of LGBT Rights at Human Rights Watch, Graeme Reid responded stating:

The resolution refers to the “family” in singular form-deliberately excluding previously agreed upon UN language that recognizes the diversity of families in various social and cultural contexts.

Make no mistake, the wording was important and the monolithic use of the family is very significant.\textsuperscript{151}

This reaction swept through the LGBT rights organizations in the media. Following the release of the decision on June 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2014 the Human Rights Campaign, Human Rights Watch, the Washington Blade, the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights, as well as others condemned the passing of the resolution. LGBT groups lamented that the withholding of a definition left the resolution as a legitimizer to potential human rights violations towards LGBT groups. The reaction of human rights organizations in the media compelled further discussion by the UNHRC at the 21\textsuperscript{st} annual meeting if special rapporteurs/representatives, independent experts and working groups of special procedures. In the report of this meeting, the Chairperson of the Coordination Committee gave special attention to the discussion of the “protection of the family” resolution as a means to show discriminatory acts by states within the UN. After hearing from LGBT and Women’s Rights experts, the Chairperson stated: “We are also reassured that in the panel discussion, there was general acceptance that families are diverse and in this context, there should be no discrimination.”\textsuperscript{152} In an attempt to soothe the LGBT and Women’s rights representatives, the Chairperson spoke highly of the panel discussion. However, the panel discussion lacks legal support to restrict the potential of discrimination through the resolution. The codification of the family as a single unit provides family values dominance over human rights.


In the defining of the resolution, the family lacks a strong definition, but is imbued with family values terminology throughout. The use of terms “natural” and “traditional” in the resolution reveals the attachment to the family defined in the heterosexual structure. These terms are included in the Declaration of Human Rights as well as the in article 18 of the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights.153 This also implies the moral values associated with the family that discourage liberated ideas of sexuality. The support of African states for the resolution came out of the family values ideology despite rhetoric of human rights throughout the discussion. In passing the resolution, all 11 delegates from African states voted in favor. The unity of African states came with a strong push in favor from South Africa. Shocking several LGBT Rights activists in the media, South Africa leaned towards family values. According to Reid:

Given the fact that South Africa is often a lone voice in the region, the reluctance to take a principled lead in the face of pragmatic considerations was regrettable but perhaps understandable. But throwing its weight behind a resolution that contradicts the values enshrined in our own Constitution, including gender equality and the rights of LGBT people? South Africa has some explaining to do.154

The 21st century development of human rights cannot dissuade this process, but can only produce clashes such as the passing of the resolution. Since 2010, when Hillary Clinton made her LGBT Rights speech, African states are burrowing deeper into the family values. South Africa maintaining its diplomatic ties to other African states relies on the support of family values. The family values ideology is entrenched in the definition of African identity. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa is considered a liberally progressive African state enshrined with strong

legal protection of LGBT groups. This constitutional protection of human rights places South Africa as a westernized African state in the consciousness of other African states. However, their legal protections are incongruent with the values held by the state. South Africa is attempting to maintain a pan-African unity through supporting this resolution. Maintaining family values on the African continent in the UNHRC produces a traditionally embracing identity as African.

The interpretation of African identity in the Winnie Mandela trial is the same interpretation held today. During her trial, Winnie Mandelas statement that homosexuality is “un-African” shows the underlying embrace of family values within the African identity. Article 18 of the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights states:

1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral.
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family, which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community.\(^\text{155}\)

The natural unit of society implies Foucault’s theory on the use of scientific authority to maintain dominance over sexuality. The use of natural and moral in the defining of family protection in human rights assumes the superiority of heteronormative families. Resistance to LGBT Rights in African states imbue the same terms saying that homosexuality or transsexuality is unnatural and therefore lacking respect on the level of human rights. The unnaturalness also provides a means to state an immoral act, as South Africa claimed during apartheid. The terms provided act as a signifier to the greater claim of family values. Family values claims space in the human rights ideology through the “protection of the family.” Rather than an upright clash with human rights, family values creates a space to work within human rights that inevitably conflicts with the protection of LGBT rights. States such as South Africa use family values as an opportunity to

maintain a bond with other African states in identity. This lends South Africa to widespread criticism by LGBT Rights activists who scrutinize the state for supporting conflicting values. These values reveal the protection of LGBT rights on a global scale to be a façade when the protection of the family is considered. The end of apartheid in South Africa did not extinguish family values. The ideology places itself in communal identities to claim authority and maintain hegemonic dominance.

Family values in South Africa extend to the forming of Afrikaner identity in the DRC as well as African identity. Family values marks itself as the traditional form of family upholding moral values. Regardless of identity group, family values can adapt itself to new contexts. In Chapter 3, DRC members lamented a sense of belonging to the DRC in relation to their Afrikaner identity. The link that many placed on this was a connection of family to the Church. Family values unifies communities by distinguishing them from deviating forms of family and sexuality. The forming of identities through family values ideology produces a tension on the understanding of family values and how they are contextualized. While conducting the ethnography, I struggled with how communities define themselves and where an ideology can be traced through personal narratives. I considered how global flow of information influence the interpretation of the family values ideology and how this is reproduced in forming of identity.156

Must we travel and define constantly what the community is, and where it is in terms of space? The relevance of space determines the potential interactions and access that a community may have. A woman working at an investment bank on Wall Street is consistently exposed to information available through a media and financial mecca of the world, while a woman living in the suburbs teaching kindergarten may not experience the same tensions of financescapes and

156 Appadurai, 30.
mediaScapes. Appadurai assumes in his portrayal of scapes that the link between access and knowledge are direct. He does not investigate the complexities his scapes bring into fieldwork, but instead he challenges how anthropologists conceptualize “the field.” In my ethnographic work, I considered the mediascapes transmitted family values that produce current understandings of family in the DRC. A trend in personal narratives describing the family was the use of the term “natural,” a term susceptible to the terminological kaleidoscope of ideoscapes. It allows for reference to heteronormative without an outright rejection of LGBT identity. This term holds strength in the family values ideology as well as in the forming of Afrikaner identity. Inevitably, there is a struggle in ethnography to trace how the use of each term differs in context. Global ideologies, like family values, provide crucial understandings to identity formation separate from space-based confinements. In my ethnographic research I negotiated how space and state boundaries influence the production of family values as well as global flows of information. In the future, I hope to delve further in my research to how international political influences in the media produce and recreate family values in African states.

A global cultural economy relies on both the physical face-to-face interactions in communities and the ingrained imaginations of scapes. Both forms construct family values ideology in the South African DRC. The family values discussed on the floor of the UNHRC are related to those of the DRC. Information on family values and human rights is disseminated rapidly in the 21st century. The discussion of the “protection of the family” resolution emerged in dozens of platforms globally the same day that it passed. How this information is received in different spaces, whether it be through a UNHCR tweet or an LGBT tumblr post, it can renew or reinforce the definition of family values. Media attention is given to family values, yet current
ethnographic research on the ideology is sparse. Family values is clashing with human rights producing sites of conflict for LGBT rights on a global scale. The international support of LGBT rights as a human right is growing tremendously. Yet, the main ideological opposition to LGBT rights receives little scholarly attention. For LGBT rights to be fully protected under human rights ideology, greater consideration of family values as a hegemonic force must be given by scholars.
Bibliography


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