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Exploring the Rise in Anti-Immigrant Violence in South Africa: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Historical, Economic, and Political Factors

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Exploring the Rise in Anti-Immigrant Violence in South Africa: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of
Historical, Economic, and Political Factors

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
Yaseer Bolaji Abdulfatai

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
May 2023

Dedication

To my Dear Grandmother:

*Thank you for being the glue that brought together the extensive Ajia family.
I will forever be grateful for the lessons you've taught me and the time we've spent together.*

Ibijoke Violet Ajia

November 17, 1946 – October 9, 2020

Acknowledgments

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: An Overview of International Immigration	4
1.1. The Evolution of the Concept of Immigration Through the Nation-States Building Processes.....	5
1.2. Theories Explaining Factors that Influence the Inflow and Outflow of International Immigration.....	7
1.2.1. <i>Neoclassical Theory</i>	7
1.2.2. <i>The New Economics of Migration Theory</i>	8
1.2.3. <i>Segmented Labor Market Theory</i>	10
1.2.4. <i>Network Theory</i>	12
1.2.5. <i>Synthesizing the Theories of International Immigration</i>	13
1.3. The Potential Impact of International Immigration on Immigrant-Receiving Nations....	14
1.4. Conclusion.....	19
2. Chapter 2: The Background on International Immigration in South Africa	20
2.1. Picture of Migration into South Africa	21
2.2. Top Source Countries of International Migrant Stock in South Africa.....	23
2.3. Trends in Migration to South Africa.....	25
2.4. Conclusion.....	27
3. Chapter 3: The Multitude of Interplay of Historical, Economic, and Political Factors ..	28
3.1. Historical Context of the Apartheid Period in South Africa.....	29
3.2. The Economic State of South Africa During the Apartheid Period.....	34
3.3. The Economic State of South Africa During the Post-Apartheid Period.....	36

3.3.1. <i>Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)</i>	36
3.3.2. <i>Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy</i>	39
3.3.3. <i>Other Economic Development Plans within South Africa</i>	43
3.4. The Political Context, Policies, and Programs That Surrounded Immigration in South Africa.....	45
3.5. Synthesizing the Role of the Historical, Economic, and Political Factors in the Rise of the Anti-Immigrant Violence.....	49
Conclusion	57
Bibliography	59

Introduction

South Africa, a country known for its progressive constitution and richness in natural resources, is a place where migrants seek opportunities to attain upward mobility and improve the standard of living for themselves and their families without any upheaval from South African nationals and its government. However, it is becoming clear that there is a rise and growth in anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. Several documented instances of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa have been recorded from reports published by Human Rights (HRW) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

According to the OHCHR, a Zimbabwean immigrant was beaten and killed in Diepsloot, South Africa, in 2022 by groups of individuals that visited different houses to demand proof of valid immigration documents from the residents (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2022). Referencing the HRW, a 10th-grade student named Nathalie, who emigrated with her family from the Democratic Republic of Congo to South Africa, was severely beaten by students due to the fact that the students had a mindset that an immigrant should not hold an appointed position in school (Ueda, 2020). The anti-immigrant violence in South Africa resulted in the death of over sixty (60) individuals while aiding in the displacement of more than 100,000 persons in 2008 alone (OHCHR, 2022). The OHCHR also indicates that the anti-immigrant violence in South Africa continues to increase as informal organizations, including Operation Dudula, emerge to become powerful movements that encourage violence and murder against immigrants living in South Africa (OHCHR, 2022).

The emergence of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa sparks debates worldwide, including the cause behind the rise and growth of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. As a result, this thesis aims to take an approach to answer this debated question. This thesis contends

that the rise in the anti-immigrant violence in South Africa can be attributed to the interplay of historical, economic, and political factors, including the exclusion and marginalization of majority non-whites during the apartheid period, the economic state of the country, and the political rhetoric, policies, and programs that surrounded immigration in the country. By exploring the various factors, this thesis aims to elucidate their unique roles in fostering the rise and growth of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa.

In Chapter 1, the thesis examines how immigration has been perceived over various periods through the nation-states' building processes while critically analyzing theories that explain the multitude of factors that influence the inflow and outflow of international immigration. Additionally, this chapter explores the potential impacts of international immigration on immigrant-receiving nations. From there, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the background of immigration in South Africa. Specifically, this section examines the international migrant stock as a percentage of the overall population in South Africa over the post-apartheid period. Additionally, this chapter explores the top source countries of international migrant stock in South Africa over the post-apartheid period and the trends in migration to the nation. Within Chapter 3, the thesis focuses on analyzing the historical context of the apartheid period and the economic state of South Africa during the apartheid and post-apartheid period. This chapter also examines the political context, policies, and programs that surround immigration in South Africa. From there, this chapter engages in synthesizing the interplay of the various components that give rise to the anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. With that completed, the conclusion provides the space to revisit all the chapters discussed. Additionally, the thesis statement is reviewed and points for further research are discussed. With that, the thesis comes to an end with a discussion on the possible future of the South African nation.

Chapter 1: An Overview of International Immigration

1.1 The Evolution of the Concept of Immigration Through the Nation-States Building Processes

Immigration is a concept that has been studied over several periods of time. Drawing from Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002), the “nation-states building processes have fundamentally shaped the ways immigration has been perceived and received” (p. 301). Through a historical analysis in the context of the nation-states' building processes, it is easier to understand how the concept of immigration emerged and evolved.

During the pre-war era—1870s to the First World War—of the nation-states' building processes, there is evidence of the emergence of labor migration with severely limited restrictions as this period marked the search for lower-cost labor power and resources (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 312). While this period is characterized by a significant flow of migrants between various sending and receiving nations, it is also a period where there is a visualization of the notion of individuals holding ties with their country of origin although such an individual emigrates to another nation (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 314). Labor migrants typically temporarily emigrate to nation-states with various employment opportunities for upward mobility. However, they eventually return to their country of origin or migrate to another receiving nation if the employment opportunities or means of upward mobility in the first nation they emigrated to diminish.

While the pre-war era—1870s to the First World War—of the nation-states' building processes marked a significant flow of migrants, the period between the First World War and the Cold War forever changed how immigration was perceived. During the period of the First World War, the flow of migrants with minimal restrictions was negatively impacted as nation-states moved towards securing their borders (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 315). Additionally, in

the period between the First World War and the Cold War, the Chicago School of Sociology, along with other scholars, established an understanding where nation-states are categorized as having their homogenous race while migrants are typically seen as individuals that will not fit into the same homogenous race of the nation-states they emigrate to (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 316). Essentially, migrants pose a danger to an immigrant-receiving nation from a nationalist view since they will be seen as outsiders—different than the homogenous race within a nation—coupled with the fact that some typically retain ties to their country of origin.

Furthermore, how immigration took place between various nation-states evolved around the period of the Cold War and the period after. While immigration remained difficult as nation-states were more aware of securing their borders and fostering their nationalistic ideology, the comparative advantage witnessed as a result of the free flow of labor and resources among nation-states in the earlier periods continued to flourish the ideology of immigration and essentially a period of globalization among nation-states (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 321). As a result, the further development of cross-border networks coupled with re-assessing the concept surrounding national territories was witnessed. Additionally, immigration continued worldwide, now classified and explored under family reunification, refugees, skilled migrants, and unauthorized immigrants.

While this historical analysis in the context of the nation-states' building processes shows how immigration has been perceived over various periods, ranging from a period with an intense flow of migrants with minimal restriction to a period where immigration is classified and explored under various distinctions, it is important to note that this historical analysis simply accounts for specific points in time to provide a coherent understanding for the main focus of this work. With a brief insight into how the concept of immigration evolved, it is best to now re-

focus on the economic perspective on the theories explaining the factors that influence the inflow and outflow of international immigration.

1.2 Theories Explaining Factors that Influence the Inflow and Outflow of International Immigration

Looking at immigration between immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving nations, it is best to begin by focusing on theories that discuss the factors that play a role in the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation.

1.2.1 Neoclassical Theory

From a neoclassical perspective, several factors shape the immigrant flows across various migrant-receiving. According to Borjas (1989), “one of the key insights of the international migration literature: that there exists an ‘immigrant market.’ Just as goods are traded across international boundaries in the international goods market, people are also ‘traded’ across the same boundaries in the immigration market” (p. 460). Through this immigration market, there is a side where individuals who are considering migrating from their home nation to another nation have to consider various factors not limited to the potential benefits of emigrating to a specific migrant-receiving nation, the cost of relocating to the particular migrant-receiving nation in consideration, the legal constraints of migrating out of one’s home nation, and the legal constraints of the type of migrants that are allowed in the specific migrant-receiving nation in consideration (Borjas, 1989: 460). Furthermore, another side of the market is where migrant-receiving nations set legal constraints and boundaries through various policies determining the type of migrants allowed into their nation (Borjas, 1989: 460). Through both sides of the market, immigration occurs as migrants are looking to emigrate to maximize their utility and improve

their upward mobility. At the same time, migrant-receiving nations aim to attract migrants to develop their economies further, bolster their economy's growth, and attain other policy goals.

1.2.2 The New Economics of Migration Theory

Drawing from a complementary perspective, one can turn to the new economics of migration. The new economics of migration theory differentiates itself from the neoclassical approach in that it denotes that one of the factors that play a role in the amount of immigrant flows and stocks are based on the functionality and completeness of the labor markets within the sending nations. The neoclassical theory denotes that the labor markets within all nations are fully complete, functioning perfectly, and do not impact the decision of individuals and households to emigrate to another nation. However, the new economics of migration theory begs to differ in the manner that it denotes that the labor market plays a role among other factors that lead to an individual or household wanting to emigrate because a labor market that simply is incomplete, inaccessible, or not functioning perfectly creates hurdles that inhibit individuals and households from attaining economic advancements and upward mobility (Massey et al., 1994: 711).

In addition, the new economics of migration theory differentiates itself from the neoclassical approach in remittances as a factor that plays a role in the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation. According to Massey et al. (1994), "In order to self-insure against risks to income, production, and property, or to gain access to scarce investment capital, households send one or more workers to foreign labor markets" (p. 711). While the neoclassical model denotes that migrants will move to a different nation to increase their income and eventually reduce the role they play in their sending nation's economy, the new economics of migration denotes that migrants play an essential role in the sending

nation's economy because migrants send remittances to their home nation to enable their relatives have more access to capital for the growth of their household.

Furthermore, the new economics of migration theory differentiates itself from the neoclassical approach in that it denotes that reducing a migrant's relative deprivation plays a role in the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation. From the neoclassical perspective, it is argued that the potential benefit of increasing the amount of income and capital one has will play a significant factor in determining if such a person will emigrate to another nation regardless of their socioeconomic status in their country of origin (Borjas, 1989: 460; Massey et al., 1994: 714). However, the new economics of migration theory denotes that a migrant's sense of relative deprivation coupled with the income distribution within their nation will play a role in determining if such migrant will emigrate to another nation (Massey et al., 1994: 714). Through relative deprivation, one who lives towards the lower end of the socioeconomic status ladder within their nation is more incentivized to migrate to another nation than those living towards the higher end of the socioeconomic status ladder because migrating will enable them to increase their income and capital as they compare themselves to others within their nation. Additionally, the theory explains that nations with income inequality will have more immigrants aiming to migrate than nations with equal income distribution due to the point that there will be a higher sense of relative deprivation for those at the lower end of the socioeconomic status ladder within the nation riddled with income inequality (Massey et al., 1994: 714).

Through the new economics of migration, it is evident that it takes the ideology and understanding of the neoclassical perspective further. By explaining that a labor market's incompleteness and inaccessibility, remittances between an immigrant sending and receiving

nation, and a migrant's sense of relative deprivation all play a role in the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation, it is evident that the new economics of migration perspective complements the neoclassical view due to the point that it provides a unique perspective in advancing the understanding of international migration.

1.2.3 Segmented Labor Market Theory

Looking at another complementary perspective of the neoclassical and new economics of migration theory, one can turn to the segmented labor market theory. In the segmented labor market theory, it is denoted that the inflow and outflow of migrants in a nation are based on the demand needed to foster the agenda of economic growth within the nation in the capitalistic world (Massey et al., 1994: 715). According to Massey et al. (1994), "Inherent tendencies in modern capitalism lead to a bifurcated labor market, creating a primary sector that produces jobs with secure tenure, high pay, generous benefits, and good working conditions, and a secondary sector typified by instability, low pay, limited benefits, and unpleasant or hazardous working conditions" (p. 715). By viewing the labor economy of a nation within these sectors, a nation can demand a limited number of migrants to enter their nation to fill in the gaps not occupied by natives within each sector in a manner that will further bolster the economic growth of the nation.

When analyzing the theory, evidence shows that different labor markets among various nations are segmented. In addition, it also shows that immigration is utilized as a tool for an immigrant-receiving nation to bring in workers to fill in the gap within the sectors of the labor market in a manner that will bolster their economy. For instance, several United States immigration policies are curated in a way that brings in certain types and skills of migrants into the nation to fill the gap left by natives in a manner that further bolsters the United States'

economy. Additionally, Qatar utilized immigration as a tool to fill in the gaps left by natives within the labor market to achieve their goal of preparing for the 2022 World Cup that essentially boosted their economy and showcased Qatar in the light of prosperous economic development to the rest of the world (Donini, 2019; Farhad, 2013).

Although this theory provides a unique understanding of the movement of immigrants across nations from a demand perspective of the immigrant-receiving nation, it is evident that it complements the neoclassical and new economics of migration theory. According to Massey et al. (1994), “Recruitment represents one of several possible inducements to migrate, but immigration flows are also related to wage differentials, capital constraints, and risk diversification” (pp. 721-722). While it is clear through the segmented labor market theory that an immigrant-receiving nation creates a demand perspective to enable immigrants to enter their nation, one must denote that migrants also make a supply perspective. Migrants do not simply look at the demand as their primary and ultimate reason to emigrate to another nation. For a migrant to determine if they will migrate to another nation, they have to decide if the nation they want to relocate to will provide them with the maximum potential of increasing their upward mobility.

Additionally, migrants must analyze the potential benefits of the wage differentials between their country of origin and the countries they aim to emigrate to. Furthermore, migrants still have to consider many other factors, ranging from peace and stability in the nations they want to migrate to the legal and capital constraints of emigrating to the nation. With this, immigrants have to want to migrate to a specific nation to fill the demand created by the immigrant-receiving nation because other factors in place foster the inflow and outflow of migrants in a nation than what is understood within the segmented labor market theory. Thus, the

segmented labor market theory complements the neoclassical and new economics of migration theory because it aids in further understanding the supply and demand for the inflow and outflow of migrants in a nation.

1.2.4 Network Theory

When analyzing another theory that distinguishes a factor influencing the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation, one can turn toward the network theory. According to Martinez-Brawley and Zorita (2014), “immigrants congregate around these networks, which enhance the possibilities of employment, the availability of housing, and in general, offer a mediated interpretation of the new culture” (p. 125). Network in the context of immigration can be denoted as the connections between individuals and families in immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving nations typically created through familial, friendship, or community ties. Through these connections, individuals and families aiming to migrate are theorized to have a lower barrier because the links can aid in reducing the cost while simultaneously increasing the benefits of migrating to another nation to seek peace, stability, and improve one’s upward mobility in life (Massey et al., 1994: 728). As a result, the connections, as distinguished in the network theory, are one of the factors that play a role in the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation.

One can turn towards the United States immigration policy to better understand the network theory because parts of the immigration policy are prime examples of how these connections between individuals and families influence migration within a nation. According to Duleep and Regets (2014), “the demise of a national-origin quota system for U.S. immigration and its replacement in 1965 with a policy emphasizing family reunification opened the gates to a large and increasing flow of immigrants differing in national-origin composition from prior U.S.-

immigrant flows” (p. 823). The United States adopted and has long utilized a reunification immigration policy whereby United States citizens can petition certain immediate family relatives to attain a green card to reside in the United States. Through a United States citizen’s petition for their immediate family relatives, the relatives will be able to legally work in the United States to attain upward mobility, all while having an avenue to achieve citizenship in the country after meeting several requirements. Additionally, the connection between United States citizens and their immediate family relatives provides them with access to housing, which reduces the cost of immigrating to the United States. Furthermore, this connection can give the immediate family relatives a better means to learn the cultures, customs, and values of the United States, essentially allowing them to assimilate better and quickly learn how to navigate living in the United States.

Essentially, the network theory shows that a migrant’s connections can aid in reducing the cost and barriers of emigrating to a nation where their connections reside. Additionally, it shows that the connections can aid in increasing the potential benefit that the migrant gains when relocating to the nation where their connections reside. With this, it is evident that network connections—as characterized within the network theory—are a factor that can influence the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation.

1.2.5 Synthesizing the Theories of International Immigration

Drawing from the neoclassical perspective, one understands that there are two sides to the immigration market—the migrants and the nations. Through these forces coming together, one better understands how the immigrant market between an immigrant-sending and an immigrant-receiving nation works. Looking at the new economics of migration theory, it is evident that it takes the understanding of the neoclassical perspective further by distinguishing how labor

markets' functionality, remittances, and relative deprivation can also play a role as factors that influence international migration. Additionally, the segmented labor market theory shows that international migration can be influenced based on the demand created by immigrant-receiving nations that aim to fill the gaps within each labor market sector not occupied by natives in a manner that will further bolster the economic growth of the nation. Furthermore, the network theory shows that connections typically created through familial, friendship, or community ties between individuals and families in immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving nations can influence international migration.

By recapitulating the various theories above, it validates the point that several theories of international migration are complementary. The theories mentioned differed in various aspects and provided a unique perspective on factors influencing migration between nations. Bringing the various theories of international immigration together allows us to understand better what influences international migration.


1.3 The Potential Impact of International Immigration on Immigrant-Receiving Nations

Looking at the impact of immigration on immigrant-receiving nations, it is evident that various approaches exist to explain and understand the potential impact.

From one perspective, the impact of immigration on a host nation is distinguished in that immigration is seen through the supply-demand model in a perfectly competitive labor market. In this model, there is a change in the labor supply while the labor demand is fixed in the short run and varies in the long run (Borjas, 2013). To best explain the impact of immigration through the supply-demand model, one can turn to Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1

The Impact of International Migration on Immigrants' Wage and Employment




Note. Reprinted from “Economic Theory and International Migration” by G. Borjas, 1989, *The International Migration Review*, 23(3), p. 479. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2546424>

Figure 1 conveys what occurs to immigrants' wages and employment when migrants enter a host nation's labor market. From Figure 1, it is evident that an increase in the supply of immigrants from line S_i to S'_i along the labor demand line (D_i) will lead to the increase in immigrant employment as represented in the movement in the equilibrium from point X_i^* to X'_i , all while leading to the decrease in an immigrant's wage as represented in the movement in the equilibrium from the point R_i^* to R'_i .

While Figure 1 shows how immigration will affect immigrants' wages and employment in a host nation's labor market, Figure 2 represents how it will affect the wage and employment of natives within the host nation's labor market.

Figure 2

The Impact of International Migration on Natives' Wage and Employment



Note. Reprinted from “Economic Theory and International Migration” by G. Borjas, 1989, *The International Migration Review*, 23(3), p. 480. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2546424>

From analyzing Figure 2, it is evident that a reduction in the labor demand from the line D_L to D_L' along the labor supply line (S_L) leads to the reduction of native's wage and employment as represented in the equilibrium from point R_L to R_L' and X_L to X_L' respectively. Figure 2 also shows an increase in the labor demand from line D_L to D_L'' along the labor supply line (S_L) leads to the increase of native's wage and employment as represented in the equilibrium from point R_L to R_L'' and X_L to X_L'' respectively.

Through Figures 1 and 2, there are several points distinguished: the number of immigrants entering a nation can decrease immigrants' wages, there is an outline that native's labor demand will reduce in a manner that decreases their overall employment and wages, and there is another outline that native's labor demand increases in a manner that will increase their overall employment and wages. By analyzing the scenario where native's labor demand reduces, it is evident that this is based on the assumption that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes in the production in the labor market, implying that there is more supply of the


specific type of labor that essentially allows labor to be cheaper for firms (Borjas, 1989: 480). However, this scenario would be different when immigrants and natives are complementary. When the inputs in the production aspect of the labor market are complementary, there will be an increase in the demand and wages for natives because immigration will make the complementary factors produced by immigrants and needed in the production of goods and services more available and cheaper (Borjas, 1989: 480-481). Essentially, the increase or reduction in the wage and employment for natives in a host nation's labor market can occur based on immigrants' degree of substitution and complementary factors to the natives in the production of goods and services within the labor market.

Taking the understanding of immigrants as substitutes to natives further, it is evident there can be a dynamic effect on the overall employment and wages of natives and immigrants in the labor market despite the understanding, as seen in Figures 1 and 2, that immigration to a nation in which migrants are substitutes to natives will reduce the employment and wages of both the natives and the immigrants. Drawing from Raphael and Ronconi (2007), "As before, immigration leads to a decrease in wages, an increase in overall employment, and a reduction in native employment. An increase in capital stock in response to the immigrant wave will add one additional adjustment to our original story" (p. 421). Firms within the labor market of an immigrant-receiving nation typically benefit from an influx of immigration because it allows them to increase their capital stock since they would essentially be paying lower wages while increasing the output of their production (Borjas, 2013: 168). Additionally, firms will further benefit because migrants positively affect the demand for goods and services since parts of their income are spent within the immigrant-receiving nation for goods and services. As firms continue to benefit from the influx of immigration, the dynamic effect on the overall

employment and wages of natives and immigrants in the labor market can be better understood when interpreting Figure 3.

Figure 3

The Dynamic Effect of Natives and Immigrants' Wage and Employment in the Long-Run



Note. Reprinted from “Labor Economics (6th ed)” by G. Borjas, 2013, McGraw-Hill, p. 168.

Figure 3 shows that when firms benefit from the influx of immigration, they will utilize the capital stock gained in expanding the production of goods and services by increasing the labor demand for natives and immigrants within the labor market. Through this, the labor market will see some form of appreciation in the employment and wages of natives and immigrants within the labor market. While the degree of appreciation in the employment and wages of natives and immigrants depends on the shift in the supply and demand in the labor market, it is evident that the employment and wages of natives and immigrants will not fall to the drastic levels as can be denoted in Figures 1 and 2.

1.4 Conclusion

Several theories surround the influence of the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation. Furthermore, none of these theories alone can wholly and thoroughly explain what influences the amount of immigrant flows and stocks between a sending and a receiving nation. Additionally, it is evident that there are potential impacts of immigration on immigrant-receiving nations. While immigration can influence the wages and employment of both natives and immigrants within a labor market of a host nation stemming from the immigrants' degree of substitution and complementary factors to the natives in the production of goods and services, it is also evident that a dynamic effect comes into play.

With this denoted, the next chapter focuses on the background of international immigration in South Africa. Notably, the chapter provides context on the number of international migrants in South Africa, the top source countries of international migrants in South Africa, and the factors that potentially influence their decision to migrate to South Africa.

Chapter 2: The Background on International Immigration in South Africa

2.1 Picture of Migration into South Africa

The scope of the determinants of migration into South Africa has changed over time. Based on the fact that this research focuses on the growing anti-immigrant violence across South Africa over the post-apartheid period, this research will solely focus on the international migration stock in South Africa over the post-apartheid period. Drawing data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, one can see the international migrant stock in South Africa at mid-year as a percentage of the total population at five-year intervals between 1995 and 2020. In 1995, there was 2.4 percent of the international migrant stock (both sex) in South Africa when compared to the total population (both sex). In 2005, the international migrant stock (both sex) in South Africa as a percentage of the total population increased to 2.8 percent. Looking at 2015, the international migrant stock (both sex) increased to 5.8 percent when compared to the total population (both sex).


When differentiating between the males and females' international migrant stock in South Africa as a percentage of their population by sex in South Africa, it is evident that foreign-born males have a higher rate of immigration to South Africa than foreign-born females. According to Dodson (1998, as cited in Maharaj, 2009), "Gender imbalance among African immigrants to South Africa was clearly evident. African immigrants are composed of significantly more males than females" (p. 366). Looking at 1995, 3.0 percent of foreign-born males were living in South Africa while 1.9 percent of foreign-born females were living in South Africa, when both are compared to their sex population. In 2005, the number of foreign-born males and females living in South Africa increased. At this point, 3.3 percent of foreign-born males were living in South Africa, while 2.3 percent of foreign-born females were living in South Africa, when both are compared to their sex population. In 2015, there was an increase in

the migrant population of both sexes living in South Africa. At this point, 6.5 percent of foreign-born males were living in South Africa, while 5.2 percent of foreign-born females were living in South Africa, when both are compared to their sex population. From analysis, this gender imbalance resulted from several concerns not limited to the dangers of travel for women, the high cost, and the stereotypical gender roles of women to stay back in their countries of origin to care for their children (Maharaj, 2009: 366).

Overall, the data analysis shows that the international migrant stock in South Africa during the post-apartheid period has been increasing over the years. For a detailed chart of the international migrant stock in South Africa during the post-apartheid period, see Figure 4.

Figure 4

International Migrant Stock at Mid-Year as a Percentage of the Population by Sex in South Africa (1995-2020)



Note. This data is from “International Migrant Stock 2020” by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2020.

2.2 Top Source Countries of the International Migrant Stock in South Africa

Through noticing the increase in the international migrant stock in South Africa over the years, the next thing that comes to mind is their country of origin (source countries). While there are several source countries that the international migrant stock in South Africa comes from, this research will only highlight the top ten source countries. See Table 1 for the top ten source countries, calculated by adding the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs' data on international migrant stock at mid-year in South Africa (five-year interval data from 1995 to 2020).

Table 1

Top Ten Source Countries of International Migrant Stock at Mid-Year in South Africa

(Adding up the five-year interval data between 1995-2020)

Top Source Countries	International Migrant Stock (1995-2020)
1) Zimbabwe	2 054 768
2) Mozambique	2 053 252
3) Lesotho	1 001 836
4) United Kingdom	642 183
5) Malawi	323 636
6) Namibia	295 027
7) Eswatini	255 005
8) Democratic Republic of the Congo	217 588
9) Somalia	184 115
10) Botswana	184 049

Note. This data is from “International Migrant Stock 2020” by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2020.

By analyzing this chart, it is evident that several inferences can be made about the international migrant stock in South Africa. At first glance, the leading source countries of migrants in South Africa can be derived. Table 1 shows that Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho are the top three countries with the most international migrant stock in South Africa

when adding the five-year intervals data between 1995 and 2020. When diving deeper into the data accumulated over five-year intervals between 1995 and 2020, it became evident that the number of international migrant stock in South Africa from certain source countries decreased as the years progressed. For instance, while the United Kingdom has a significant number of international migrant stock in South Africa, when adding the five-year intervals data between 1995 and 2020, the international migrant stock in South Africa from the United Kingdom decreased with there being a - 47.08% percent change in the international migrant stock in South Africa from this source country between 2010 and 2015. The same can also be said for Namibia. Namibia had a - 55.39% percent change in the international migrant stock in South Africa between 2010 and 2015. In addition, there are countries not captured in this chart above because they had significant numbers of international migrant stock during 1995, 2000, and 2005 data capture of international migrant stock in South Africa, but their numbers fell below other countries as the time period progressed. For instance, Germany and Portugal were among the top ten source countries during 1995, 2000, and 2005 data capture of international migrant stock. However, these countries became less dominant in having international migrant stock in South Africa as the time period progressed.

Additionally, there is evidence that the number of international migrant stock in South Africa from certain source countries increased as the years progressed. For instance, the international migrant stock in South Africa from Malawi increased with a 57.02% percent change in the international migrant stock from this source country between 2010 and 2015. The international migrant stock in South Africa from the Democratic Republic of the Congo also increased with a 139.52% percent change in the international migrant stock from this source country between 2010 and 2015. While several inferences can be made when analyzing the top

ten source countries of migrants living in South Africa, the deductions highlighted are significant to be pointed out.

2.3 Trends in Migration to South Africa

It is without a doubt that the trends in migration to South Africa are fascinating to explore and understand. Drawing from a historical context, it is evident that South Africa is a country that has dealt with migration in various forms over several decades (Maharaj, 2009: 363-364). According to Maharaj (2009), “Census data reveals that in 1911 there were 229,207 non-South Africans from the region in the country...The main foreign laborers in South Africa mines were recruited from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe” (pp. 363-364). As a result of the need for workers in several sectors of the South African economy, including the mining and agricultural sector, there was an increase in the migration of labor workers from other African countries to South Africa.

Additionally, the South Africa Destabilization Campaign under the apartheid regime significantly generated an immigrant surge from neighboring countries in the Southern African region into South Africa (Hicks, 1999: 397). Given that the destabilization campaign enabled various strategies to be implemented to weaken neighboring countries that posed a threat to the apartheid regime project, the South African nation witnessed over 300,000 refugees making a land journey into South Africa alone (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 4). However, Maharaj (2009) evidently associates—utilizing census data—that the number of migrants in South Africa also declined between 1951 and 1985 as a result of “apartheid restrictions imposed after 1948 on African migrants” (p. 364). Additionally, the Labour Market Review (2007) denoted that “in the late 1980s, the South African gold mining industry entered a long period of restructuring and downsizing as a result of declining ore reserves, rising costs and a stagnant gold price” (p. 10).

With this, it is evident that migrants in South Africa continued to decline during this period as they entertained the search for better employment opportunities in other countries and regions.

Soon, it became evident in the 1990s that immigration to South Africa continued to rise again. According to Maharaj (2009), “in the 1990s immigration to post-apartheid South Africa became a potentially explosive issue. The reasons for this are stepped in a variety of social, political, and economic situations not only in countries of origin but in destination areas as well” (p. 364). From the start of the inclusivity of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and the United Democratic Front (UDF) as liberation movements in South Africa all the way to the release of Nelson Mandela from prison coupled with the negotiations through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), South Africa was on a journey of transitioning towards a post-apartheid period with unity and equality in mind (Gumede, 2015: 137). Furthermore, the announcement and implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1994 and 1996 respectively, showed that the South African government aimed to improve access to public resources and basic life necessities while fostering the economic growth of the nation (Wehner, 2000: 184-185).

While the South African government aimed to proceed towards a path of further growth for their economy during the post-apartheid period, neighboring countries had growing social, economic, and political situations that fostered immigration to South Africa. Drawing from The World Bank (1999, as cited in Maharaj, 2009), “the countries surrounding South Africa, with the exception of Namibia and Botswana, are among the poorest in the world” (p. 367). Through analyzing Zimbabwe, a neighboring country with South Africa, there is a presence of signs that

they faced a myriad of issues not limited to the economic crisis due to high inflation, the suspension of aid by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the forced removals of white farmers and seizure of white-owned farms, food shortages, the economic meltdown in 2008 (characterized by hyper-inflation and movement towards the use of foreign currencies), sanctions placed by other countries, and the isolation of the country from the international community (Gruzd & Lalbahadur, 2020: 19). Looking at Mozambique, a neighboring country with South Africa, they faced conflicts, including the Mozambican Civil War and insurgency in northern Mozambique. Additionally, Mozambique has been hit with extreme floods, as seen in 2000, 2001, and 2007 that displaced hundreds of thousands within the nation (de Sherbinin et al., 2011: 66). Looking at Lesotho, it is evident that its uniqueness of proximity to South Africa provides opportunities for citizens of the country to explore labor and employment opportunities as the new South African government aimed to transition South Africa to a path of further growth in the post-apartheid period.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter shows evidence of international immigration into South Africa. While international migrants constitute a small percentage of the population in South Africa, it is evident that the majority of the immigrants come from other African nations. This stems from the fact that several African nations face a myriad of issues, ranging from political instabilities to poor economic states, coupled with the fact that these individuals see South Africa, or as the Reverend Desmond Tutu coined, the Rainbow Nation, as a place for a better life and a potentially promising future for themselves and their families. With this denoted, the next chapter will focus on the South African nation's historical context, economic state, and political sphere to paint the picture of the environment immigrants enter.

Chapter 3: The Multitude of Interplay of Historical, Economic, and Political Factors

3.1 Historical Context of the Apartheid Period in South Africa

The Republic of South Africa, as the world knows it today, has been long shaped by a historical narrative and period—the apartheid period. Apartheid, an Afrikaans word meaning “separateness,” is a regime project of the Afrikaner National Party (National Party) to empower white South Africans in dominating the South African economy through the segregation—in other words, “separateness”—of the racial groups in South Africa. According to Adam and Moodley (2005), “Afrikaner nationalism, with exclusive control of the South African state, institutionalized the informal Anglo segregation policy into formal, legalized apartheid” (p. 51). Prior to the Afrikaner National Party winning the 1948 South African general election, there was a significant presence of turmoil in South Africa because the nineteenth century that marked the discovery of natural resources—including diamond and gold—paved the way for British imperialism to turn South Africa into an industrialized nation (Adam & Moodley, 2005: 50 - 51). Essentially, the nation witnessed the Boer war as a result of the fact that British imperialists began building and fostering their influence in the region to gain power and resources from the nation even though the Boers warned them against taking such actions (Adam & Moodley, 2005: 50 - 51). Although the Boers were defeated in this war, Adam and Moodley (2005) denote that “the trauma led to a quest for revenge and the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism... This forced assimilation [British’s colonial policy] triggered a counter-nationalism that clamored for equality of an impoverished people with their English overlords. The Afrikaner intellectual ethnic mobilizers stressed pride in the now fully developed new Afrikaans language” (pp. 50-51). Given that the British colonial policy was made to press the British identities of background, culture, and language onto other groups, Afrikaners fostered unity and solidarity within their

group through the development of the Afrikaans language and the retainment of their national identities.

Given the Afrikaners' unique position in South Africa, coupled with their unity and solidarity, their winning of the 1948 elections in South Africa allowed them to control the South African state. Adam and Moodley (2005) state, "the National Party replaced segregation with apartheid, an unprecedented project of statutory racial reordering. Its main architect was the new charismatic leader of the National Party, Hendrik Verwoerd" (p. 51). After the Afrikaner National Party (National Party) gained power in 1948, the party set in motion the apartheid regime project and implemented discriminatory policies over the entire apartheid period in order to achieve the goals of the project of ensuring that white minorities in South Africa control and gain from South Africa and its economy. In order to achieve the goals of the project, the Afrikaner National Party employed a divide-and-conquer ideology of characterizing individuals in South Africa into racial groups—whites, colored, Indians, and blacks—all while further differentiating the characteristics and ethnicizing blacks in order to control the majority of non-white South Africans (Adam & Moodley, 2005: 51). The characterization made it easier for the segregation of whites and non-whites in several aspects of life in South Africa.

Drawing from van den Berghe (as cited in Adam & Moodley, 2005), the separateness in South Africa—apartheid—occurred in different forms: micro-apartheid, meso-apartheid, and macro-apartheid. On the micro-apartheid level, segregation is noted because whites and non-whites are separated in the manner of the bathroom accessible to each group, the seating spaces in transportation available to each group, the places each group could eat at, and even the doors each group should enter from (van den Berghe, as cited in Adam & Moodley, 2005: 52) . Essentially, the minuscule—micro—things in an individual's life are separated between the

racial groups in South Africa. Looking at the meso-apartheid level, segregation is evident on this level because the majority non-whites are relocated from more lucrative areas and city centers to other areas with less access to opportunities for upward mobility (van den Berghe, as cited in Adam & Moodley, 2005: 52). Through this, it is ensured that the minority whites reside within these areas and city centers that have a much lower contest and significantly better access to the economic resources for their upward mobility while non-whites are marginalized in their access to these same resources. In addition, the macro-apartheid level shows a great deal of separateness between the racial groups because it was ensured that blacks were to be only located within the lands and areas designated for them and could only have the possibility of staying in spaces reserved for the minority whites if they acquired permission (van den Berghe, as cited in Adam & Moodley, 2005: 52). Furthermore, the pass laws significantly limited the movement of non-whites in South Africa because it limited non-whites to certain areas and stipulated punishments and criminal sentences for non-whites that are found without a passbook and those that are outside their designated areas. By understanding the forms of apartheid, as denoted by van den Berghe, it is evident that the Afrikaner National Party implemented various mechanisms to ensure they could achieve their goals of the apartheid regime project—the separateness of minority whites and majority non-whites in South Africa.

As the Afrikaner National Party implemented various mechanisms to grow the apartheid regime project, resistance against the project grew within South Africa. According to Hicks (1999), “after South Africa implemented its apartheid policies, domestic resistance organizations quickly formed, most notably the African National Congress (ANC)” (p. 396). Formed in 1912, the African National Congress aimed to take a stand and fight for Black South Africans' rights, freedom, and liberation. With increased support and alliance of individuals and organizations

from other racial groups, the goals of the organization shifted towards fighting for the rights, freedom, and liberation of marginalized South Africans regardless of their racial category (Adam & Moodley, 2005: 55). The ANC essentially pushed a resistance agenda against apartheid through various protests, gatherings, and meetings over different periods, all while creating awareness of the atrocities that are committed against non-whites in South Africa under the apartheid regime project. Furthermore, the ANC played a significant role in the Congress of the People meeting that led to adoption of the Freedom Charter of 1995 that acclaims South Africans— regardless of their background, culture, and race—should have equal rights and liberties among one another.

While the African National Congress (ANC) took several initiatives to make progress in the resistance against apartheid, other organizations emerged. Established in 1959, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) took a different approach by solely focusing on the liberation of black South Africans during the apartheid period. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) held various meetings, gatherings, and protests to make progress in the resistance against apartheid, all while creating awareness of the negative impacts of the apartheid regime project against black South Africans. Notably, the Pan African Congress (PAC) played a role in planning the Sharpeville protest to take a stand against the pass laws implemented in South Africa that restricted non-white South Africans. During the Sharpeville protest, several individuals lost their lives and others were injured as the police opened fire on the protestors. In fact, Hicks (1999) denoted that “the resistance movement against the apartheid government culminated in civil strife and violence which peaked during the 1980s” (p. 396).

With the pressure mounting on the Afrikaner National Party to dismantle and terminate the apartheid regime project, it became evident that the apartheid period started coming to an

end. The new National Party leader at the time, F. W. de Klerk, saw the apartheid regime project as a project that is no longer sustainable because the support against apartheid continued to grow from within and outside the nation, there was growing brain drain in South Africa, and there continued to be a lack of peace and prosperity within the nation (Adam & Moodley, 2005: 55-56). As a result, F. W. de Klerk worked with members of the African National Congress, Pan African Congress, and other key anti-apartheid players to forge a path for the post-apartheid period.

After years of negotiations, the Afrikaner National Party reached an agreement that brought the end apartheid period and the beginning of the post-apartheid period and a democratic process for the South African nation. According to Adam and Moodley (2005), “the National Party decided to negotiate a historic compromise from a position of relative strength while the whites were still ahead... The compromise for whites involved handing over political power to the black majority, but in return leaving the economic order essentially intact” (p. 56). Although the negotiations and compromise terminated the apartheid regime project, it did not adequately place measures to support the upward mobility of the majority non-whites in South Africa. It is evident that the apartheid regime project essentially allowed for minority whites in South Africa to retain a significant amount of the economic resources within the nation because the majority non-whites were segregated and relegated on the micro-apartheid, meso-apartheid, and macro-apartheid levels. As a result, the majority non-whites did not have as close to equal access in making wealth, owning land, and accessing various social and economic resources. The majority non-whites had severely limited rights within the nation. Given that this is what transpired during the apartheid period, the majority non-whites were at a significant disadvantage in attaining upward mobility in a nation that they have been long marginalized in.

3.2 The Economic State of South Africa During the Apartheid Period

Given that South Africa is rich in natural resources and has economic conditions that make it favorable for growth and prosperity, it is only normal to claim that such a nation will prosper in its economic growth over various periods. However, it is discernible that the South African nation stagnated in its economic growth over the entire apartheid period. According to Moll (1991), “South Africa’s comparative output-growth record is poor, and its record in terms of growth of manufactured exports and total factor productivity verges on the disastrous. Any one of these indicators would not be decisive, but taken together, they make a powerful case” (p. 289). Moll (1991) advanced an understanding that the conditions of South Africa’s economy over the apartheid period should apply to four propositions to determine if their economy grew efficiently and prospered. These propositions include having an economic growth rate higher than the pre-apartheid period while accounting for shifts in global economic conditions, having an equitable output growth rate during the apartheid period when analyzing other developing nations, meeting and adjusting to the varying demands for the products made within the nation, and having an equitable productivity growth and technological advancement during the apartheid period when analyzing other developing nations (Moll, 1991: 274). Through this research, Moll (1991) found that South Africa did not apply to these propositions over the apartheid period as the apartheid regime project failed to further prosper the economic growth and development in South Africa. Instead, the regime project played a significant role in stagnating the nation over the apartheid period.

Taking the analysis of South Africa’s growth and development further, it is evident that South Africa had a significant economic downturn after 1973. During this period, the government debt as a percentage of the nation’s GDP increased from 0.9 percent in 1989-1990 to

10.8 percent in 1993-1994 (Padayachee, 2005: 550). Additionally, the South African government ran a tight monetary policy to bring down inflation from 15.33 percent in 1991 to 8.94 percent in 1994 and brought down its foreign debt to GDP ratio to 14.8 percent at the end of 1993 (Padayachee, 2005: 551). While the South African government at the time managed to reduce the inflation rates and foreign debt to GDP ratio, it was at the opportunity cost of further growing the economy and increasing employment levels (Padayachee, 2005: 551). Between 1980 and 1993, it is evident that the per capita gross domestic product “rose in only four years, and only in one after 1984, for an annual average decline of almost 1% for the fourteen years” (Weeks, 1999: 796). Essentially, the tight monetary policy aided in keeping inflation rates low and stabilizing prices but did not solve the limited access to education, housing, water, and employment for the majority non-whites or the exorbitant poverty and income inequality rates within the nation that all occurred as a result of implementing the framework of the apartheid regime project.

Furthermore, the intellectual ability and unique skills of the majority non-whites were significantly less utilized within the economy to foster its growth and prosperity, given that the minority whites were the individuals who held highly respectable and skillful jobs while the majority non-whites were simply utilized for their labor. In fact, the lack of peace and prosperity within South Africa between the minority whites and majority non-whites coupled with the sanctions placed on South Africa to promote the dismantling of the apartheid regime also stagnated the nation’s economy. With this, it is evident that the South African economy was in a period of disarray and turmoil as a result of the failed practices and policies of the apartheid regime project.

3.3 The Economic State of South Africa During the Post-Apartheid Period

Through Nelson Mandela leading the African National Congress (ANC) and working with Frederik Willem de Klerk, agreements were reached to end the apartheid period while paving the way for a nonracial democracy for the South African nation. In the post-apartheid period, South Africa is at a crucial point where their policies will significantly determine what happens to the nation in the future. Drawing from Moll (1991), “economic policy-makers in South Africa in the 1990s have little room to make mistakes: poor state economic and social policies over the next decade or two could both perpetuate poverty and slow growth and reduce the chances of South Africa catching up towards the developed countries in the foreseeable future” (p. 291). With the stagnant growth that plagued South Africa over the apartheid period, the early years of the post-apartheid period are crucial because the policies and practices implemented will either aid in the growth and development or the further deterioration of the nation. As a result, it became a priority for the newly elected government of South Africa, immediately upon dismantling the apartheid regime, to create economic policies that would foster the growth and development of South Africa.

3.3.1 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

Based on the conditions of the South African economy coming out of the apartheid period, the new South African government should be concentrated on improving the nation’s macroeconomic balances, raising employment rates, increasing economic growth, reducing poverty and income inequality, and expanding access to the basic needs for all individuals in South Africa as this will foster the growth and development of South Africa (Padayachee, 2005: 553). Given that the African National Congress (ANC) was aware of the pressing needs of South Africa, the new government revealed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

After revisions and final adoption, the RDP was implemented as the main framework to improve the South African economy following the end of the apartheid period. The RDP was created based on six principles: an integrated and sustainable programme, a people-driven process, peace and security, nation-building, reconstruction and development, and the democratization of South Africa (O'Malley, n.d.). The ANC government conveyed that “an integrated programme, based on the people, that provides peace and security for all and builds the nation, links reconstruction and development and deepens democracy” (O'Malley, n.d.). Through the principles, the ANC had a philosophy and foundation to guide them as they laid out the RDP as a means to address the multitude of problems plaguing South Africa, including the limited access to housing and employment, inadequate access to education and health care within the nation, and the failing economy.

As a means of solving the multitude of problems facing the South African economy, the RDP was essentially created as a demand-side economics project whereby the government aimed to reduce the rates of poverty and inequality within the nation in a manner that would increase the demand for goods and services, positively driving economic activities that will flourish the South African economy. The RDP listed five key policy programmes: meeting basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy, democratizing the state and society, and implementing the RDP (Corder, 1997: 185-187). In meeting the basic needs, the ANC wanted to boost and improve access to homes, water, electricity, sanitation, employment opportunities, health care, and welfare (O'Malley, n.d.). By enhancing human resources, the ANC wanted to ensure that individuals in South Africa have quality access to education and technical training while developing their literacy skills (Corder, 1997: 186). The ANC also aimed to democratize the state and society in a manner that gives more power to the people while rebuilding the

economy through reconstruction and development (O'Malley, n.d.). Finally, the ANC aimed to implement the RDP by reallocating part of the state budget towards the RDP goals while creating structures within the government that would enable this program to run efficiently (O'Malley, n.d).

With the overall goal in mind of the ANC when creating the RDP, it was mentioned in the RDP Based Document that the programme would enable the creation of 2.5 million jobs within ten years, building 1 million homes and providing electricity to 2.5 million homes by 2000, providing access to water and sewage systems to 1 million homes, redistribute agricultural lands, improve their health care system, among several other target goals (Marais, 1996: 213). However, the finalized RDP White Paper replaced the direct target goals with a more generalized target of what the government aimed to achieve with RDP. All in all, the new government of South Africa saw this programme to further develop and promote the growth of the South African nation.

From analyzing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), it is evident that the programme had a considerable positive impact on the South African economy in some aspects. Despite being below the population growth, South Africa's economy grew by over 1 percent between 1993 and 1995 (Weeks, 1999: 796). Additionally, Weeks (1999) indicated that "for the first time in four years per capita income did not fall in 1994, and in 1995 there occurred an increase outside the margin of statistical error" (pp. 796-797). The ANC government also developed its welfare system during the RDP period in a manner that created free health care for pregnant women and children while tackling the issue of food insecurity by providing free meals to between three and a half million and five million school children (Cling, 2001, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 332; Padayachee, 2005). The government increased the population within

South Africa that have access to electricity to 63 percent and ensured that five million individuals have better access to medical services since they connected two million households to electricity and built five hundred clinics (Cling, 2001, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 332).

However, it is also evident that the RDP has not performed well in other aspects because there have been significant challenges. The funds for the RDP project proved insufficient to tackle the inadequate access to key infrastructures and services within the nation (Luiz, 2007, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 332). Additionally, the public administration had several challenges with implementing the RDP program because of the lack of an efficient coordination system within the structure of the ANC government coupled with being unable to effectively implement and foster parts of their key policy programmes (Mosala et al., 2017). There was also a lack of resources to fully achieve the goals of the RDP project (Wallis, 1995, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 332). Furthermore, the government denoted that the breakaway from the RDP stems moderately from the fact that the programme does not adequately tackle the inherent problems plaguing the system that drives poverty and inequality in the nation (Cheru, 2001: 507). After two years of implementation, the RDP was dismantled in 1996 to introduce GEAR.

3.3.2 Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was seen as a demand-side policy framework that would not sufficiently and adequately tackle the issues of poverty, inequality, and economic growth within the South African nation. Subsequently, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy was introduced in June 1996 as a better way to tackle the problems plaguing the South African nation. The transition from the RDP to GEAR is seen as a means of entirely leaving the apartheid period behind because one of the main deals reached to end the apartheid period allowed the majority non-whites to have access to political

power but fell short of developing and changing the economic policies of neoliberal restructuring that was already instituted during the apartheid period (Cheru, 2001: 507-508).

The GEAR strategy, a supply-side project and macroeconomic policy, is curated as a means to tackle the issues of economic growth, poverty, and inequality through the means of increasing the goods and services within the economy in order to foster job creations and business expansions that will boost the South African economy (Cheru, 2001: 508). Essentially, the framework laid within the GEAR strategy is that reducing employment would be a crucial means to foster the economic growth of South Africa (Weeks, 1999: 798). Within the strategic framework, several target goals were established. For the 1996-2000 period of the programme, target goals of a 6 percent increase in the growth rate by 2000 and annual job creation of 400,000 were denoted, implying that the nation would witness an average growth of 4.2 percent coupled with an annual increase in non-agricultural employment by 2.9 percent by 2000 (Weeks, 1999: 798). Additionally, the target goal to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3 percent by 1999 while increasing private investments at 11.7 percent annually was all set (Mosala et al., 2017: 333; Weeks, 1999: 800).

By analyzing the economic impact of the GEAR strategy framework on South Africa, it is evident that the impact varies in different aspects (see Table 2).

Table 2

A Comparison of the GEAR Goals' Projections and the Actual Achievements Between 1996 and 1999

	Annual average, 1996-1999	
	Projected in GEAR	Actual
Intermediate targets		
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP)	3.7	3.1
Real government consumption (% GDP)	19.0	19.6
Real nonexport growth	8.4	6.7
Real private sector investment growth	11.7	1.2
Real bank rate	4.4	12.3
Average tariff as % of imports	7.6	4.4
Economic Outcomes		
GDP growth	4.2	2.4
Inflation (CPI)	8.2	6.6
Annual change in formal, nonagricultural employment	270,000	-125,200
Gini coefficient	...	0.68

Note. Reprinted from "The South African Economy, 1994-2004" by V. Padayachee, 2005, *Social Research*, 72(3), p. 557. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971781>

Reviewing the performance of the GEAR strategy between 1996 and 1999, it is evident that some of the actual performances were positive when compared to the set targets during the period. South Africa managed to control its fiscal deficit and inflation rate while reducing the average import tariffs between 1996 and 1999. The fiscal deficit as a percent of the GDP stood at 3.1 percent during the period, compared to the average target of 3.7. The nation had an average Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 6.6 percent during the period, compared to the average target of

8.2 percent. Additionally, the actual average import tariff stood at 4.4 percent during the period, compared to the average target of 7.6 percent.

However, some of the actual performances remain disappointing compared to the set targets between the 1996 and 1999 period of the GEAR strategy framework. The annual average GDP growth during the period was lower at 2.4 percent, compared to the average projected target of 4.2 percent. The annual average real bank rate drastically rose to 12.3 percent during the period, compared to the average projected target of 4.4 percent. The private sector investment growth remained low at an annual average of 1.2 percent, compared to the average projected target of 11.7 percent. Additionally, the annual change in formal, non-agricultural employment was at -125,200 in 1999, compared to the target of 270,000.

While the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy positively impacted the South African economy, the negative impacts cannot be simply dismissed. Although the fiscal deficit and the inflation rate were controlled due to the government's fiscal austerity, it did not enable any evident progress in reducing the real bank rate, which drastically increased to an average of over 10 percent (Weeks, 1999: 802). Additionally, the low growth rate coupled with the low private sector investment growth and reduction in formal, non-agricultural employment, played a significant role in the increase in the unemployment rate to well above 30 percent within the South African nation (Gevisser, 2009, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 333; Weeks, 1999: 802). Additionally, the inequality within South Africa, as measured by the GINI coefficient, was at 0.68 in 1999, indicating that the South African nation was highly unequal then.

3.3.3 Other Economic Development Plans within South Africa

With the South African government's failure to tackle the issues of economic growth, poverty, and inequality within the nation through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy, several other economic development plans have been instituted to tackle the persisting issue that continues to plague the nation.

The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative—South Africa (ASGISA) was implemented within the South African economy in 2006 to tackle the persisting issues within the nation. The initiative denoted several issues plaguing the South African nation, including rising unemployment rates, poverty, and inequality. With the issues stated in the initiative, the main goal indicated within the initiative framework was to tackle the problems by investing in the public infrastructure, fostering private investments, improving access to education, and reducing the inequality gap in the nation (Tregenna, 2011: 627). The initiative set target goals of reducing poverty and unemployment by 50 percent by 2014 (Anon, 2006, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 334). Additionally, this initiative had target goals of improving the South African nation's growth to an average growth rate of a minimum of 4.5 percent between 2005 and 2009 while increasing the same average growth rate to a minimum of 6 percent between 2010 and 2014 (Mosala et al., 2017). Furthermore, this initiative included goals of improving public expenditures on fixed capital investments and reducing the inequality rates within the nation in a manner that fully reduces the disparity between the first and second economics in the nation (Jeffery, 2010, as cited in Mosala et al., 2017, p. 334; Mosala et al., 2017).

Despite the ambitious target goals within ASGISA, the initiative was scrapped in 2010, leaving mixed results of its impact on the South African nation. ASGISA aided in improving

public sector spending within the nation as the spending within this sector increased to 9.6 percent of the GDP in 2009/10, compared to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2006/07 (Mbola, 2009). However, there was still a persistent problem of poverty and unemployment within the nation. Between 2005 and 2010, the GINI index only reduced to 63.4 percent in 2010, compared to a GINI index of 64.8 percent in 2005, representing that the problem of inequality within South Africa continues to be persistent (The World Bank, n.d). Additionally, unemployment was still high, with the unemployment rate at 23.2 percent in 2010, compared to the unemployment rate at 28.3 percent in 2006 (The World Bank, n.d).

After removing the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative—South Africa (ASGISA), it was replaced by the New Growth Plan (NGP) in 2010 to tackle the same issues of unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The NGP is a development plan focused on improving labor absorption within the nation as it aimed to create five million jobs by 2020, aiming to reduce the unemployment rate to 15 percent (a reduction of 10 percent) (Tregenna, 2011: 628). The NGP denoted several job drivers where employment can be created in a manner that further boosts the economy if such drivers are positively invested in. These drivers include public investment in infrastructure, the growth of labor-absorbing activities in main economic sectors, the utilization of social capital, and the development of rural spaces (Tregenna, 2011: 628).

Although the NGP had an ambitious plan to create more jobs within the economy, the development plan was discontinued within two years of its implementation. As a result, the NGP cannot be thoroughly analyzed to determine if it would have reached its target goals of improving employment levels, reducing poverty, and boosting the economy. However, the unemployment rate in South Africa stood at 21.8 percent in 2012, compared to 23.2 percent in

2010, all within the two-year timeframe that the NGP development plan was instituted in the nation (The World Bank, n.d).

With the discontinuation of the New Growth Plan (NGP) in 2012, the National Development Plan (NDP) was introduced to the South African nation within the same year. The development plan still reemphasized the need to tackle the issues of poor economic growth, poverty, unemployment, and inequality within the nation. Within this plan, target goals were set to create 11 million jobs and reduce the Gini index, utilized to measure inequality, from .69 to .60 in South Africa by 2030 (Mosala et al., 2017). The development plan also seeks to improve the government by establishing and fostering mechanisms that drastically reduce corruption and ensure accountability (Mosala et al., 2017). Given the target years of 2030 set in stone for the National Development Plan (NDP), it cannot be thoroughly analyzed to determine the full extent of its success or failure. However, the unemployment rate in the nation has remained disappointing over the NDP period as it stood at 28.8 percent in 2021, compared to the unemployment rate of 21.8 percent in 2012 (The World Bank, n.d).

3.4 The Political Context, Policies, and Programs That Surrounded Immigration in South Africa

Over the apartheid period, the political actors within the apartheid regime project aimed to fully control individuals that departed and arrived in South Africa while ensuring that the minority whites remained the ones with the most significant access to the resources and opportunities within the nation. As a result, they worked on drafting and implementing immigration policies within the nation that surrounded these four pillars: “racist policy and legislation; the exploitation of migrant labor from neighboring countries; tough enforcement legislation; and the repudiation of international refugee conventions” (Crush and McDonald,

2001: 2). With the political actors' goals in mind, it is without a doubt that several immigration policies were implemented in South Africa to ensure that they control the movement of individuals to the nation and within the nation. Notably, the Aliens Control Act of 1991, implemented towards the end of the apartheid period, aimed to control individuals' movement to the nation severely. Essentially, the political actors under the regime aimed to ensure that individuals with white skin were welcomed into the nation while immigrants of color were unwelcomed. Additionally, they wanted to ensure that migrant labor was utilized to further benefit the minority whites that owned businesses within the nation while ensuring they enforced various stringent avenues of policing immigration. Furthermore, the political actors within the nation were uninterested in implementing refugee policies for individuals who were displaced from other nations.

With the end of the apartheid period, political actors within the South African government had a different attitude towards immigration in South Africa. According to Peberdy (1999, as cited in Crush and McDonald, 2001), "A recent study of the history of South African immigration policy shows that the first impulse of new governments has consistently been to articulate a new vision of national identity and, simultaneously, to redefine the racial and cultural boundaries of belonging and exclusion" (p. 9). Political actors within the South African government embarked on the reconstruction and development of the South African nation in a manner that would foster the inclusivity of all the citizens in the nation. Through the nation-building reconstruction and development that involved a redefinition of inclusivity and exclusivity of an individual in the nation, political actors did not truly value immigration to the nation (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 4). As a result, political actors within the South African government focused on distancing themselves from the racist policies and attitudes on

immigration and the lack of a robust refugee protection program from the apartheid period without further enacting plans that will foster immigration to South Africa. Essentially, the political actors' main goal at the end of the apartheid period was to create economic development plans that improved economic growth while allowing the majority non-whites South African citizens to gain access to resources, employment opportunities, education, and welfare, among other opportunities that have all been severely restricted for them over the apartheid period. With these goals in mind, the political actors were uninterested in allowing immigrants from other nations to access these opportunities and resources intended mainly for all South African citizens.

Consequently, due to the political actors' reluctance to understand the value of an immigrant coupled with their lack of interest in fostering immigration to South Africa, they began taking a stance in controlling immigration in a manner that perpetuates hostility against immigrants in the nation. According to Crush and McDonald (2001), "In 1995, the Minister of Home Affairs persuaded Parliament that the Aliens Control Act of 1991 was, in fact, too soft... Parliament sanctioned various amendments which gave the Department new powers and abilities to police in-migration" (p. 6). Political actors are aiming to control immigration in South Africa as they denote both legal and illegal immigration as one of the significant factors that divest employment opportunities and welfare opportunities from natives while corrupting officials (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 7). In fact, these actors excessively inflate the number of unauthorized migrants within the South African nation when making the information available to the public to rationalize the rigorous methods that are utilized to police immigration within the nation (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 6).

With official statements from political actors, including personnel from the South African Department of Home Affairs, that sound the alarm on the supposed threat and danger of immigrants in South Africa, various formal and informal programs begin to arise that perpetuate violence and hostility against immigrants in South Africa. Hicks (1999) states, “Informal organizations have arisen to heed Minister Buthelezi's 1994 call for the South African public to report suspected undocumented immigrants. Community organizations have created ‘community laws’ for detecting and arresting suspected immigrants” (p. 403). Additionally, the South African police continued to foster arbitrary and unwarranted abuse that occurred on immigrants in South Africa from the informal and community organizations as they classified arrest of migrants under crimes statistics and utilized draconian tactics that involved constitutional rights violations and ethical abuses to police immigrants as well (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 6; Klaaren and Ramji, 2001).

Although there had continued to be an effective defense for stricter immigration control in South Africa, particularly from officials within the South African Department of Home Affairs, that reverberated in public, both White and Green Papers on International Migration were drafted on how the South African nation should proceed with the issue of immigration in the nation. Within the Green Paper on International Migration that was drafted by think tanks, including the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA), there was a movement for a better immigration system that separates refugee-based immigration while creating a system that allows for immigration based on skills (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 10; Klotz, 2000: 841). However, the White Paper on International Migration mainly focused on strictly policing illegal immigration to ensure that the reconstruction and development of the nation effectively work instead of addressing the rise in xenophobia within the nation (Hicks, 1999: 414).

While the Refugee Act of 1998 was passed after the creation of the White and Green Papers on International Migration, the ideology behind the White Paper on International Migration was stalled in passing to become law due to several negative critiques of the proposal. Subsequently, the White Paper ideology was dropped from becoming law to create a different immigration plan in 2001—implemented in 2002 as the Immigration Act 13 of 2002—that replaces the Aliens Control Act while enticing skilled workers to immigrate to South Africa given that a significant brain drain in the nation (Crush and McDonald, 2001: 11). Regardless, it is evident that the damage has already been done. As a result of all the political officials' rhetoric, policies, and programs that emphasize immigrants as a danger and threat to South African society, immigrants living within the nation are still faced with hostility and violence from various fronts as various informal operations and organizations still emerge with goals of removing illegal immigrants from the nation. For instance, Operation Dudula and Put South Africa First are among the various organizations that perpetuate the hostility and violence that immigrants in South Africa face because these organizations search for and work to remove unauthorized immigrants, which they believe are a significant cause of the economic issues plaguing the South African nation.

3.5 Synthesizing the Role of the Historical, Economic, and Political Factors in the Rise of the Anti-Immigrant Violence

It is indisputable that there are immigrants that emigrate to South Africa. Additionally, the framework was laid out to understand the various theories that explain why individuals typically emigrate from one nation to another while exploring the potential impact of international immigration on immigrant-receiving nations. Furthermore, there is a comprehensible picture of the historical context of the apartheid period in South Africa, the

economic state of South Africa during the apartheid and post-apartheid period, and the political context, policies, and programs that surround immigration in South Africa. With this, the question of the reasoning behind anti-immigrant violence in South Africa resurfaces.


Referring back to the historical context of the apartheid period in South Africa, it is evident that the majority non-whites were significantly excluded from the society as the apartheid regime project marginalized them on micro-apartheid, meso-apartheid, and macro-apartheid levels. Hicks (1999) denotes that “more importantly, the regime [Afrikaners] hoarded the social and economic resources for the white minority by promulgating openly discriminatory legislation. The welfare of the non-white majority deteriorated as the National Party systematically deprived the majority of medical, educational, housing, and social welfare assistance” (p. 395-396). As a result of the apartheid period, the majority non-whites were marginalized from having adequate access to employment, resources, and opportunities that meet their basic needs. Furthermore, the South African economy faced a period of economic downturn after 1973, with being able to keep inflation rates low and stabilize prices but unable to improve access to education, housing, water, and employment for the majority non-whites and reduce the poverty and inequality rates that grew as a result of the apartheid regime project.

With the end of the apartheid period, South Africa posited itself to the world as a nation with a new beginning aiming to develop its nation, improve its economic growth, drastically reduce poverty and inequality, and create an abundance of access to resources and opportunities for its citizens residing in the nation. As a result, the South African government fostered several economic development plans to achieve its goals. Ranging from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy to the National Development Plan (NDP), the South African government has fostered

various initiatives to tackle the issues of poor economic growth, poverty, unemployment, and inequality within the nation. Regardless, the main issues within the South African nation persevered over the years, as can be denoted in Figures 5 and 6.

Figure 5


The Unemployment Rate in South Africa Over the Years



Note. This data is from “DataBank | World Development Indicators” by The World Bank

Figure 6

The Inequality Rate in South Africa Over the Years




Note. This data is from “DataBank | World Development Indicators” by The World Bank

There were positive impacts as a result of the implementation of various economic development plans in South Africa. For instance, the government improved its welfare system and increased the number of individuals with access to electricity. The government also controlled its fiscal deficit and inflation rate while improving the nation’s financial standing (Padayachee, 2005: 564). However, Figures 5 and 6 show that unemployment and inequality remain significant problems in the nation. Despite the number of economic development plans pursued in the South African nation during the post-apartheid period, the inequality rate—as measured by the GINI index—remained above 55 percent over the years that the data was captured. Additionally, the unemployment rate during the post-apartheid period remained above 18 percent over the years that the data was captured. Furthermore, Figure 7 details the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line as a percentage of the total population in South Africa.

Figure 7

The Poverty Headcount Ratio at the National Poverty Line (% of Population) in South Africa Over the Years



Note. This data is from “DataBank | World Development Indicators” by The World Bank

Figure 7 indicates the percentage of the South African population that cannot afford the basic needs to live within the society. Despite the limited data available, Figure 7 shows that the issue of poverty within the South African nation persists despite the various economic development plans implemented to rectify the issue. With the issue of poor economic growth, poverty, unemployment, and inequality continuing to persist within the nation despite the various economic development plans that have been implemented, the then ANC Secretary General, Cyril Ramaphosa, already knew—prior to having results of the various implemented plans—that the lack of an effective solution would become detrimental to the nation. According to Business Day (1995, as cited in Corder, 1997), “unless there is substantive improvement in the standard of living of South Africans in the foreseeable future, we could see a level of unrest and popular dissent far greater than that of the mid-'80s” (p. 201). It is easily discernible that citizens of the South African nation will be extremely frustrated with the lack of an effective solution to drastically curb the issues that plague the nation in a manner that will improve the standard of living for all South Africans. With the growing frustration that occurred as each economic development plan continued to be unfruitful in several aspects, political actors were met with frustrations from the public.

Instead of mainly focusing on implementing effective solutions to improve the standard of living, political actors essentially played a significant role in redirecting the blame for the poor conditions of the nation on immigrants through the rhetoric and policies they brought forth. According to Klotz (2000), “What apartheid defined as the 'black' threat, South Africans now generally apply to the continent as a whole, the amakwerekwere. 'Africa' remains a place outside its territorial boundaries, an area rife with crime and political instability” (p. 839). During the post-apartheid period, political actors within the South African government essentially wanted to

ensure that the majority non-whites had adequate access to the resources and opportunities they had been deprived of over the apartheid period. As a result, the political actors did not believe there would be value of an immigrant and had limited interest in fostering immigration to South Africa because they wanted to ensure that the redistribution of resources was among South African citizens. With the underwhelming results from the economic development plans that aimed to improve economic growth while reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality, political actors began displacing the blame on immigrants. For instance, Hicks (1999) denotes that “Buthelezi [the then minister of the South African Department of Home Affairs] claims reconstruction and development plans will not be realized unless South Africa stops the flow of immigrants, and [he] has tried to alienate immigrants by instilling fear into the public” (p. 401). Political actors, including officials from the South African Department of Home Affairs, fostered rhetoric that painted immigrants in South Africa as a threat and risk that inhibits the positive growth of the South African economy. They achieved this through their public rhetoric while fostering public policies—the continuation of the Aliens Control Act past the apartheid period and the introduction of the White Paper on International Migration—that aimed to be stringent in controlling immigration.

As a result of the rhetoric made by political officials, the impact can be perceivable on two different levels. From one aspect, news sources continue to fuel the rhetoric as an increasing number of reports published places responsibility for crimes, unemployment, and drug trade on immigrants despite a significant lack of evidence to corroborate the claim (Klotz, 2000: 839). From another aspect, the rhetoric led to the creation of informal organizations that utilized draconian tactics that typically involved ethical and unlawful abuses to find unauthorized immigrants, ultimately creating a hostile environment for immigrants within the nation.

All things considered, it becomes clear that a majority of South African citizens (majority non-whites) faced marginalization during the apartheid period. At the period's conclusion, most South African citizens hoped for a positive change in their standard of living. With their hope continuously diminishing as the progress in improving the issues of economic growth, unemployment rates, poverty, and inequality lacks advancement, the citizens become frustrated. Instead of the political actors focusing on implementing better and more effective solutions to improve the economy, they played a significant role in redirecting the South African natives' frustration on the immigrants within the nation. As a result of the multitude of components, the South African nation witnessed a rise and growth in anti-immigrant violence in the nation.

Conclusion

The majority non-whites are eager to be included in a society that originally had significant barriers in enabling them to achieve success and growth in life. The end of the apartheid period felt like a promise to the entire population of South Africa, including the majority non-whites, that the opportunity to grow and succeed is here. However, the majority non-whites are simply left with nothing but frustration and anger when such a promise never comes to fruition. Essentially, the high poverty and inequality rates coupled with the lack of unemployment opportunities within the South African nation adversely affect the majority non-whites who simply want to have the opportunity of growing and succeeding in a manner that increases that upward mobility in the nation. With nothing but frustration and outrage within the population group, political actors leverage and redirect such feelings towards a marginalized group that enters their nation in the hopes of improving the lives of themselves and their families—immigrants. With redirection of the frustration and outrage, it reverberates in the streets through the rhetoric made regarding immigrants and the informal organizations established to police immigration within the nation. As a result, the anti-immigrant violence within the nation rises.

Migrants in South Africa are essentially seen as one of the scapegoats for the multitude of issues plaguing the South African nation from effectively and efficiently ensuring that all individuals living in South Africa have the means of adequately improving their socioeconomic status in the nation. To be clear, the narrative to blame the African National Congress (ANC) government for the complex issues the South African nation faces is not wholly appropriate. For instance, blame is set in stone for the ANC government because the government failed to implement effective economic development plans to improve the nation further. In fact,

economists predicted that the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy would have an ill-fated result while proposing alternatives that could benefit the nation (Weeks, 1999: 809-810). Nevertheless, these predictions were disregarded and unwelcomed when GEAR was implemented. However, the blame does not lie with the ANC government because the Afrikaner National Party also played a role in shaping the South Africa known today. By hoarding the social and economic resources for a select group of individuals during the apartheid period, the Afrikaner National Party exacerbated the poverty and inequality rates in the nation, generally ensuring that the majority non-whites received the short end of the stick. All in all, a multitude of interplay of historical, economic, and political factors gave rise to the anti-immigrant violence witnessed in the South African nation.

Future research in understanding the cause behind the rise in anti-immigrant violence in South Africa should also consider the potentiality of cultural factors playing a role. Notably, it should be explored to determine if immigrants, being a danger to the isomorphism of the values and ideologies of South African citizens, play a role in the rise and growth in anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. Additionally, the extent of the negative impact the state capture in South Africa had on the South African economy should be further explored.

With all said, while it is imperative to look back to understand the causes behind the issues plaguing the nation and factors that give rise to the anti-immigrant violence within South Africa, the South African nation needs to look towards the future. Through practical and efficient policies created and implemented with the support of the entire South African government and its citizens, the nation can be in a remarkably better place than its current position.

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