Black Drugs: Narcotic Temperance and Moral Productivity in Egypt, 1882-1920

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INTRODUCTION:

The impetus for this project came when I stumbled on a description of the International Opium Commission’s 1909 meeting while doing unrelated research. The meeting, held in Shanghai at the behest of the United States, united consumers of opium with major producers with an eye to banning opium trade and production. The Commission and its subsequent international Conferences paved the way to what is the status quo regarding the legality of narcotics in our world today, as most narcotic substances are illegal in most states. The Ottomans, however, did not attend any of these conferences, which seemed unusual given that they were invited, that they controlled a vast amount of agricultural land suitable for the cultivation of *papaver somniferum*, the opium poppy, and that more minor opium-producing countries such as Persia and Siam did attend the conference. In exploring the reason for the Ottomans’ absence, I learned, to my chagrin, that the answer to the Ottoman absence from the Commission and the Conference was fairly uninteresting, unambiguous, and not particularly suitable for a thesis—opium production was too important for the finances of the Ottoman state to even contemplate curtailing, a major source of revenue at a time when the Empire was constantly strapped for hard cash, and a vital crop for the poor farmers of Anatolia’s mountainous interior—but my search raised further questions.

Opium was one of the Empire’s most important exports in terms of both volume and profit, but Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert’s *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-8535.2010.00020.x
Empire, 1300-1914, a great work of scholarship and a first-class reference work, makes only passing references to it and only in an import-export context, only as an entry on a table denoting the value of exports or the types of goods that the Empire exported. Opium was not just a trade good, however, not just a commodity like wheat or rice, which the Ottomans also exported. Opium, to my mind, was something more. Opium is a narcotic and must likely, if substantially grown in the Empire, which it was, have had some kind of effect on the social history of the Empire. Opium would have had to have internal consumers as well as producers. Those consumers, I felt, might have had an identity as consumers, or might have been assigned one by others at some point. The Ottoman opium user or opium addict might have been stigmatized, and if so, by whom, and when, and why?

Despite this, Inalcik and Quataert’s two-volume magnum opus on the economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire omitted the mention of opium almost entirely and mentioned it only in economic terms, not social. This is not by any means unique to their work. As Julia Clancy Smith points out, illegal activities and trade, a category which includes narcotics within it, are all too often relegated to the history of crime or of medicine, neatly excised from other histories even when they might have been relevant, perhaps significantly so. But, like medicine, narcotics cut across historical disciplines. They have, and have always had, the potential to at once delineate and muddle identities of all kinds, whether that be class, culture, race (from its construction in the early modern era on), religion, sexuality, or any other group identity. Narcotics exist at the border between the in-group and the out-group, at the moral and

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2 See Halil Inalcik et al., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
the immoral, and the study of narcotics and of temperance is in many ways a study of these borderlands.

As mentioned below, the state of the scholarship on temperance and narcotics in the Middle East is murky, particularly when compared to the literature on temperance movements and narcotics in East, South, and Southeast Asia or on Prohibition and the American temperance movement. Because of this and because of other factors mentioned below, I could not continue to put myself at more disadvantages. I felt I would have to abandon examining narcotics in the context of the Ottoman Empire proper and instead focus on a Middle Eastern polity that had an English-speaking colonial administration for a time in order to maximize my chances of being able to find usable information. I decided, therefore, to focus my thesis on Egypt during the British occupation (1882-1952). This work does not cover all of that time, however, focusing mainly on the period 1882-1920, with a notable exception made for an important event that took place in 1925. This periodization is not arbitrary. These four decades roughly coincide with the apex of the global temperance movement’s momentum and influence, and this periodization roughly concludes with the beginning of Prohibition in the United States and the change of narcotic consumption habits in Egypt. Opium and hashish, known as “black drugs” and grown and consumed in Egypt for centuries, lost popularity to the imported, processed “white drugs” of cocaine and heroin after the First World War.4

This thesis was written over the 2020-2021 academic year, during the Covid-19 pandemic. Physical archives, which can be vital to historical research, were therefore off-limits during the

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construction of this thesis. Many institutions have, given this context, made efforts to either start or speed up digitization of their collections, but unfortunately at the time of writing few archives had digitized copies of primary sources that appeared relevant to this thesis.

Additionally, temperance in the Middle East in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is an incredibly understudied subfield, at least in English-language academia. Missionaries in Egypt are, through the innovative work of Heather J. Sharkey and Beth Baron especially, being increasingly well-served by academia, particularly as regards education and their construction of physical institutions. There is very little literature on missionary attitudes to narcotics and temperance, however, which is somewhat surprising given the historical context of the missionary movement and the narcotics temperance movement (discussed in Chapter 2). Scholarly literature on the effendiyya (discussed chapter 4) has also undergone a spectacular flourishing in recent years, but, with the notable exceptions of Liat Kozma and Omar D. Foda, little attention has been paid to their interactions with temperance, particularly during the period this thesis focuses on (1882- circa 1920, or 1882-1925, depending on one’s viewpoint). This is a trend that seems to, hopefully, be abating: Foda and Kozma’s work on the subject, along with the work of Samir Boulos, whose discussion of missionary temperance is, though brief, invaluable, have all been written in the past decade, and it is hoped that this may be the beginning of a historiographical trend.

Researching and writing this thesis presented me with other challenges as regards sources. I am unfortunately, due to my lack of language skills, limited to English-language sources. This, combined with my lack of access to physical archives and the embryonic state of
English-language academic writing on temperance and narcotics in the Middle East during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, severely limited the pool of sources, both primary and secondary, that I was able to draw on over the course of writing and researching this thesis. Because of this, this paper unfortunately uses very few primary sources, most of which are drawn from other scholars’ works, there are points in which this thesis uses relatively few secondary sources, and there are even occasional points where this thesis commits the cardinal sin of citing a source from a secondary source.

As such, this thesis is necessarily limited and flawed in many ways, and there may, at points, be too much speculation in it. I do, however, hope that this thesis contributes to deepening scholarly conversation on temperance in the Middle East. By attempting to compare missionaries, effendiyya, and Azharis in Egypt with medieval Muslim jurists and situating them all within a framework of temperance and the shared ambition of the construction of a moral, ‘modern’ Egypt, it is hoped that we may better understand how these actors related to one another and, therefore, why temperance at once faded globally and left the complex legacy—in Egypt, the Middle East, and the world as a whole—that it did.

Chapter One briefly discusses the agricultural history of opium and cannabis in general and in Egypt and the Levant in particular as well as discussing medieval Muslim discourses on intoxicants in general and hashish in particular. This chapter introduces the three rhetorics of class, mental health, and sexual morality that are returned to in Chapter Four and in the conclusion. Chapter Two discusses the American history and international context of narcotic temperance and the international conferences which led to the current status quo of narcotic
prohibition over much of the globe. It provides context for understanding the rhetorics of and motives behind the actions of the three groups which this thesis studies. Chapter Three focuses on English-speaking missionaries in Egypt, especially American missionaries. This chapter attempts to give context to missionary efforts on—and interest in—temperance in Egypt. Chapter Four introduces the other groups at the core of this thesis, the effendiyya and the reformist Azharis. This chapter aims to give context to how these groups interacted in the context of temperance, compares their discourses of temperance to each other and to the medieval jurists discussed in Chapter One, and discusses their aims in attempting to advance temperance in Egypt. Finally, this thesis concludes with a discussion of why it is that these groups are and can be compared to each other given their differences, why they are compared in the framework of the three discourses articulated in Chapter One, and why the temperance movement and moment died away during and after the 1920s.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

“Cannabis”, in the context of this thesis, refers only to plants of the genus Cannabis and is not used identically to the term “hashish” in this paper. Franz Rosenthal, this thesis’ main source on medieval cannabis discourse, attempted to single out specific discussion of cannabis products from other plant-derived intoxicants such as opium or henbane in his book, but in some ways this was an impossible task and he openly acknowledged it as such. As can be seen from the fact that they were still categorized together within the rubric of “black drugs” in Egypt during the period of this thesis, opium and cannabis, and their respective narcotic products,

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maintained some degree of a lack of semantic differentiation even during a period where categorization began to become a norm. As such, the reader may at times find it more helpful to read this thesis’ use of “hashish” as “cannabis and other plant-based intoxicants” or “cannabis and opium” instead. Additionally, Egypt was and is majority-Sunni, and the vast majority of the jurists discussed by Hallaq and Rosenthal were as well. This thesis does not focus on Shiite Islam and, therefore, most if not all references to “Islam” or “Muslims” in this thesis may be taken to read “Sunni Islam” or “Sunni Muslims”.

CHAPTER ONE: BLACK DRUGS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

Opium has been present and consumed in Egypt and the Levant since Antiquity. The opium poppy was likely first cultivated “during the sixth millennium BC in the Western Mediterranean”. It then spread “to the rest of the continent”, reaching “north-west Europe by the end of the sixth millennium”, where it may have been used for medical, spiritual, and/or leisure purposes. Sumerians cultivated the juice of the opium poppy around 4500 BCE and Egyptians cultivated opium for both its narcotic properties and for medical use from at least 3000 BCE. Tombs from the Eighteenth Dynasty (1550-1350 BCE) contained artifacts with prominent depictions of what is undoubtedly the opium poppy, as did a site in Syria of approximately similar vintage. Clearly, then, the poppy was not merely an aesthetic fascination of the Egyptian

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upper class but had a leisure, spiritual, or medical usage. Artworks depicting poppies and hundreds of containers dating back to Antiquity that once held crude opium have been found in Egypt and the Levant,⁹ part of a trading system that may have been centered on Cyprus.¹⁰

Cannabis is of similar vintage in the region. The plant has yet older roots in Central and Eastern Asia, as well as what is now Siberia, but it reached Egypt by at least the 14th century BCE (and perhaps far earlier). The tombs of Akhenaten and Rameses II both contain traces of the plant (hemp fragments in Akhenaten’s case, cannabis pollen in Rameses’ case).¹¹ Its use appears to have been largely medical and sartorial in nature, though the varietals that grew in the area would have contained a fairly large amount of tetrahydrocannabinol (commonly shortened to THC), the chief psychoactive component of the plant, and the evidence for a primarily medical use is contested.¹² Certainly, by the time of Herodotus (the mid-fifth century BCE), at least one society most definitely used cannabis for spiritual or leisure purposes. The Scythians, a steppe people, purified themselves after funerals by “set[ting] up three poles leaning together to a point, cover[ing] them over with woolen mats… mak[ing] a pit in the center beneath the poles and the mats”, which they threw hot stones into. The Scythians “then took the seed of this hemp and, creeping under the mats… throw it on the red-hot stones”, where it “smolders and sends forth so much steam that no Greek vapor-bath could surpass it”. The Scythians frequently availed

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¹² Clarke and Merlin, Cannabis, 247.
themselves of this practice, “howling in their joy” at the cannabis smoke.\textsuperscript{13} Archaeological evidence seems to confirm Herodotus’ veracity on this subject.\textsuperscript{14} 

The ambiguity lessens during the era of the Ptolemies and the Romans, however, as “[a]wareness of [c]annabis’s medicinal value shifted from Egyptian through Arabic and then to Greek and Roman medical traditions”.\textsuperscript{15} The tradition of cannabis use persisted through Arab medicine before Islam and later became a fairly important component of the Islamic pharmacopoeia. Cannabis was used as a diuretic, an anti-emetic, an anti-inflammatory, an analgesic, an anti-epileptic, and an anti-parasitic\textsuperscript{16}. It was, however, apparently viewed only as a medicine for several centuries.

Cannabis’ usage as an intoxicant posed theological problems for Muslim scholars. The Prophet had unequivocally banned the consumption of wine, but whether the Prophetic injunction extended to other intoxicants—or perhaps all intoxicants altogether (and if so, whether that ban had exceptions)—was unclear, and a subject of some debate among Muslim jurists. The principle of \textit{qiyas} or “analogy” in a juridical context ultimately determined the general consensus on intoxicants. The reasoning for the Prophet’s specific prohibition of wine was analyzed. Wine was banned, it was agreed, because it was intoxicating. Therefore, all other substances that intoxicated as wine did, whether they be other varieties of alcohol or non-alcoholic substances, were to be prohibited as wine was.\textsuperscript{17} Cannabis is never mentioned in the Qur’an, and it is not

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14}Guerra-Doce, “Origins of Inebriation”, 757
\textsuperscript{15} Clarke and Merlin, \textit{Cannabis}, 246.
\textsuperscript{16} Clarke and Merlin, \textit{Cannabis}, 246.
\end{flushleft}
referenced in hadiths from the early Islamic period. In fact, there seems, bafflingly, to be no evidence of cannabis being used in any capacity beyond the medical in the Muslim world until the twelfth or thirteenth century. Its usage as an intoxicant seems to have spread from the eastern frontier of the Islamic world, from the Indian subcontinent, through Persia and Mesopotamia, to Egypt and the Levant, and even, finally, to the western edge of the Muslim world, in Spain.

As recreational usage of cannabis spread, the drug lost its inherent association with medicine but picked up new associations in the process. Sufis and other mystics who eventually became subsumed into the broader Sufi identity, who most likely were the drivers of much of recreational cannabis’ westward migration, wholeheartedly embraced cannabis as a devotional tool, claiming it helped them to achieve divine communion. They became generally the most fervent theological defenders of cannabis’ moral standing (though this was not by any means unanimous; see Rosenthal 124).

Recreational cannabis in the medieval and early modern Muslim world seems to have found its largest constituency in the urban poor (though rural peasants were likely consuming it at similar rates at the time, we have little evidence to substantiate this). Hashish was much easier to make and distribute than wine, and cannabis was a readily available agricultural product throughout the medieval period in Egypt. Cannabis’ production for recreational use was mostly

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18 Rosenthal, The Herb, 41.
20 Rosenthal, The Herb, 45.
23 Rosenthal, The Herb, 142.
prohibited, but the production of hemp fabric and cannabis’ theologically and legally-permitted use as a medicine ensured that the plants remained unmolested enough for large-scale urban consumption of hashish to remain economically and socially feasible (legitimate medicinal uses also ensured that the opium poppy continued to grow in Egypt through the period and that opium continued to circulate among the Egyptian masses as a result). al-Badri’s list of extant slang terms for cannabis also records what occupations the terms were in use among, and nearly all of the professions were of “the lower and lowest strata of society”. One of the three main recurring themes in the orthodox Islamic criticism of cannabis and hashish users is a criticism of the drug by its association with the lowest of society, with the rhetoric of class. The many detractors of hashish criticized the poverty and the “bad moral character” of the users. Class and hashish are a constant; they tangle around each other almost inseparably in this history, and the archetypal user of hashish for the detractor, no matter the environment in which they were born and never mind the fact that hashish was “like wine, common to both Zayd and Amr” (that, in other words, hashish consumers could come from upper socioeconomic strata as well as lower), has been transformed by its use into a pathetic figure, rendered almost subhuman by its malign powers.

Class is not the only recurring theme in medieval Muslim criticisms of hashish to recur in this history, though. As important is the rhetoric of mental health. Anti-hashish Muslim writers persistently associated cannabis with frivolity and superficiality of thought as well as insanity.

26 Rosenthal, The Herb, 34.
27 Rosenthal, The Herb, 140.
and criminal behavior.\textsuperscript{29} It was thought to remove inhibitions of all kinds, but especially sexual inhibitions. It is in this way that we find the third constant theme of the medieval anti-hashish discourse. Cannabis was linked with effeminacy and male same-sex encounters, particularly passive male sexual activity, and seen as a corruptor of innocent youth into this and other societally-resented acts.\textsuperscript{30} Intoxicants were reviled by the vast majority of Muslim jurists not only because intake meant the temporary loss of control over one’s faculties and the removal of one’s inhibitions, but also because they believed intoxication, no matter the intoxicant, turned the user into a fundamentally different person.\textsuperscript{31} One of Islam’s tenets is the prohibition of self-harm or in any way damaging the divinely-bestowed human body, and in taking an intoxicant, whether it be wine or opium or cannabis or something else altogether, the indulger or addict altered and damaged themselves irrevocably,\textsuperscript{32} creating not merely a personal but a profound societal ill or profound societal threat.

Prohibitions of hashish were occasionally mooted by jurists and even occasionally put into practice by medieval Egyptian rulers, perhaps most notably by the thirteenth-century Mamluk sultan Baybars (r. 1260-1277), who cracked down on hashish, wine, and prostitution in Cairo. The campaign, which saw “hashish... thrown on fires, taverns… smashed, brothels torn down, and offenders severely punished”\textsuperscript{33}, and which was continued by his successor al-Mansur

\textsuperscript{29} Rosenthal, \textit{The Herb}, 56, 74, 94-95.
\textsuperscript{30} Rosenthal, \textit{The Herb}, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{31} Rosenthal, \textit{The Herb}, 91.
\textsuperscript{32} Dormandy, \textit{Dark Dream}, 36-37.
Qalawun (r. 1279-1290),\textsuperscript{34} nevertheless did not have any sort of particularly lasting effect on consumption habits. Both after and during this upheaval (which might be characterized less as a “revival of religious fervor where doctrinal considerations as such determined the government’s attitude” and more as an outgrowth of “an acute fear [on the part of the secular authorities] that a potential social evil threatening the welfare of the state might eventually get out of hand”),\textsuperscript{35} cannabis and opium were still grown semi-covertly in the silty soil of the Nile flood plain. The poor continued to consume their refined end products.\textsuperscript{36}

These prohibitions were fundamentally ineffective for several reasons. Firstly, as discussed above, there were enough legitimate uses for cannabis and opium that the medieval Egyptian state had great difficulty stopping their cultivation. Secondly, the typical medieval user of hashish and opium (especially hashish) used them, as Rosenthal points out, fairly asocially. Urban addicts had a few gathering-places, and small, private hashish parties were not unheard of, but the disdain that respectable society had towards the addict, as well as the paranoia that hashish could induce, likely encouraged more solitary recreational drug experiences, which were obviously harder for the secular authorities to crack down on.\textsuperscript{37} Thirdly and most fundamentally, the intoxicants were simply too popular to eradicate. The theological case for the prohibition of recreational intoxicants was perceived as fairly sound by most orthodox Muslim jurists, but it did not have much impact on the population as a whole, who apparently managed to reconcile recreational use of plant-based intoxicants with their religion fairly easily. They did not see the

\textsuperscript{35} Rosenthal, \textit{The Herb}, 161.
\textsuperscript{36} Rosenthal, \textit{The Herb}, 132.
\textsuperscript{37} Rosenthal, \textit{The Herb}, 137-140.
use of hashish and opium as immoral and harmful to the person and society in the way that jurists and some rulers of the period seemed to.

In the face of widespread, discreet intoxication in defiance of strict prohibitions, both secular and religious authorities seem to have quailed. The various prohibitions on intoxicants were “fighting a losing battle with the reality of the social environment”, a battle that the jurists and secular authorities seem to have generally conceded with merely a sigh of resignation followed by a strange silence, an unspoken agreement that hashish (and other non-alcoholic intoxicants) was “a subject to be treated gingerly and to be bypassed whenever possible”. 39

CHAPTER TWO: PROHIBITION, TEMPERANCE, AND THE ANTI-NARCOTIC MOVEMENT WORLDWIDE

Evangelical Protestant Christianity has been a vital part of the American story since the colonial era. Charismatic orators such as John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards preached to rapt, impassioned audiences in the early 18th century, developing new forms of popular, populist Christianity which focused more on one’s personal relationship to God than traditional ceremonies. A century later, figures such as Joseph Smith offered up newer visions of Christianity, ones which encompassed not only one’s personal theological health but society’s, and explicitly linked the two in their moral visions. Revival meetings and itinerant preachers spurred an “unparalleled growth in church membership”, “enhanced American Christian discourses about creating a godly republic”, and “stimulated a wave of social activism that led to

38 Rosenthal, The Herb, 130.
the foundation of several benevolent societies and missionary organizations".\textsuperscript{41} These products of the Second Great Awakening espoused a patriotic religion, a belief that American Christianity had a duty to export its values and gifts, to “convert the world to Christianity and democracy”\textsuperscript{42}. These were Christianities of the white, rural midwestern and northeastern middle class, of the independent farmer and craftsman living in a rapidly expanding country, and the missionaries that left America for distant lands in the next century would in large part be the children of those kinds of people.

Inextricably tied up with the drive to Christianize and democratize the world was the drive to perfect it in other ways and to purge what ardent believers saw as grave social ills from both the American and global body politic. One of the most important projects of 19th and early 20th-century American Protestant Christianity was the temperance movement, which sought to encourage personal abstention and, later, to prohibit the consumption of alcohol.\textsuperscript{43} Alcohol was thought by temperance advocates to be “productive of pauperism, degradation, and crime”, \textsuperscript{44} a destroyer of the family and of the morally upstanding citizen. It was consumed by much of American society generally, but most associated with those segments of society that the white, largely rural, socially respectable middle-class temperance advocates looked down upon, by the

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urban working class and immigrants of varying colors and creeds. The calls for at first, personal temperance and, later, societal prohibition of alcohol emanating from Dry America (“dries” being supporters of temperance/Prohibition, as opposed to “wets”) grew and grew until the Eighteenth Amendment, which banned alcohol production and consumption (with minor religious exemptions) nationwide was ratified by Congress and the necessary states to make Prohibition the law of the land on January 16th, 1919.

The temperance cause was transformed from a somewhat stodgy, though reasonably popular, cause advocated for primarily by rich East Coast merchants and elderly preachers into a constitutional amendment-passing force by a new, predominantly—though not exclusively—female generation of activists after the Civil War. These activists and their newly-formed organizations (most notably the Womens’ Christian Temperance Union and the Anti-Saloon League) exerted pressure on legislatures to make concessions to the temperance lobby, held rallies, gave speeches, and wrote pamphlets and letters to newspapers.

American Prohibition is a vital part of the temperance story, and certainly the context that most would associate with the movement. But this is not all that temperance was. Temperance was a global phenomenon, driven by American (and often British) missionaries, especially women, wherever they were stationed, and it did not exclusively target alcohol, though alcohol was often the main target. Internationally, missionaries used the same tactics of ‘moral suasion’ and legislative pressure that brought Prohibition into being to push for global narcotic prohibition.

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46 Peck, Prohibition Hangover, 9.
The narcotic prohibition movement was originally spurred by developments in Asia, and it was inherently connected to the expansion of British and, later, American imperial rule in the region. In the eighteenth century, the East India Company looked enviously at the opium trade Portugal was conducting between India and China, and the Company, having gained more control over Eastern India, was in a position to crowd out the Portuguese and seize the India-China opium trade for themselves.\textsuperscript{47} As the Company took over more of the subcontinent, their poppy cultivation expanded dramatically and ever more opium flowed to China.\textsuperscript{48} Eventually, the waves of addicts lying broken and dying in the streets and the prospect of all of China becoming dependent on opium prompted the Chinese Emperor to ban the importation, sale, and use of the drug and to “[decree] capital punishment for those who smoked or sold opium” in 1830.\textsuperscript{49} This, however, did not stop the Company’s opium trade, which merely went underground, in partnership with smugglers.\textsuperscript{50}

By 1839, the Chinese government could no longer tolerate the smuggling, and it was willing to make a serious attempt to enforce its prohibition and risk war with the foremost Great Power of the world, Britain, in order to stem the flow of opium into their ports.\textsuperscript{51} Commissioner Lin Zexu’s seizure of opium from British and American merchants at the port of Canton in that year set the First Opium War into motion, but it also caused a rift between American and British merchants.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{48} Sahu, “Genesis and Growth”, 530-531.
\bibitem{49} Sahu, “Genesis and Growth”, 531.
\bibitem{50} Sahu, “Genesis and Growth”, 531.
\end{thebibliography}
Both Americans and Britons had made fortunes off of the Chinese opium trade in the past, including such famous American names as Warren Delano, Jr. (grandfather of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt) and John Jacob Astor, America’s first multimillionaire.\textsuperscript{52} When Lin’s demand that foreign merchants that should “arrive [in a Chinese port] shall never to all eternity bring any opium: should any ship after this bring it, then her whole cargo on board is to be confiscated and her people put to death; and that they willingly undergo it as the penalty of their crime” was made to the foreign merchants docked in Canton, however, the American contingent shockingly agreed to Lin’s terms (over the objections of the American consul in Canton) while the British decamped to Hong Kong. Moreover, the Americans “declared their firm opposition to the opium trade, noting ‘whether we view the subject in a moral and philanthropic light, or merely as a commercial question, we are extremely desirous to see the importation and consumption of opium in China at an end’”.\textsuperscript{53}

This remarkable volte-face from the American merchants, many of whom had personally dealt in opium until Lin’s ultimatum in Canton, was due in large part to the efforts of the first wave of American missionaries to China and, in particular, one E.C. Bridgman. Bridgman’s articles, published in both the \textit{Missionary Herald}, an established missionary periodical, and in his own missionary periodical focused solely on China, aimed to educate the American public (or at least the demographic sections of the American public that tended to support missionary and temperance activities generally) about China in general and the pernicious effects of the


\textsuperscript{53} Lazich, “Opium Trade”, 203-204.
opium trade in particular. Missionaries such as Dr. Peter Parker rallied American public opinion behind China’s opium policies and lobbied the American government to intervene. Parker failed in his endeavor but did succeed in convincing President Tyler (governed 1841-45) to crack down on American smugglers. While the humiliating Chinese defeat in the First Opium War (1839-42) and the resulting Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842, allowed Indian opium to stream into China and once again line British coffers, many Americans had now become cognizant of the personal and social harm that opium, like alcohol, could wreak and missionaries had demonstrated that public consciousness-raising and governmental lobbying could be effective at achieving change.

The issue of opium prohibition, while never quite forgotten in missionary and evangelical circles, would only truly flare up again in American public discourse at the tail end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The Spanish-American War of 1898 left America with new colonial possessions, transforming the United States from a polity spanning one landmass into a truly global imperial power. Among these possessions was the Philippine archipelago.

The Spanish colonial government had historically allowed the use of opium in the Philippines, but had controlled it by instituting the lucrative practice of opium farming, that is, “auction[ing] off the right to exclusively distribute and sell opium within a proscribed area for a given time period, leaving it to the ‘farmer’ to enforce his monopoly”. When America occupied the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, however, the opium farm system, a widespread

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54 Lazich, “Opium Trade”, 207.
practice in colonial Southeast Asia and a vital source of revenue for frequently cash-strapped colonial governments, was scrapped and replaced with a tariff on opium imports. The ensuing high rates of smuggling and loss of opium farm revenue over the next several years, however, led the American government to consider reinstating the farm system.

Prior to this, there had been minor, insignificant lobbying efforts among some temperance advocates seeking to ban opium consumption entirely in the Philippines, but the prospect of the farm system returning left missionaries and temperance advocates in high dudgeon. American missionaries and evangelicals saw the conquests of 1898 as a golden opportunity to further purify and Christianize the world, to “make the new [American] empire a Godly one.” “Licensing opium”, however, “challenged the whole basis of what missionaries and reformers saw as the purpose of American colonialism, that is, moral uplift and an example to other imperial powers”, and “[o]pium smoking sanctioned in the [United States’] most prominent colony, the Philippines, would undermine the efforts of American evangelicals in their informal moral empire being established in India, China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands”. Allowing a drug considered to be “a greater scourge” and “even more dangerous in the ‘Orient’ than alcohol” to prosper in the land that was the grandest symbol of American and evangelical ambitions could not be brooked.

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57 Wertz, “Idealism”, 467-468.
60 Wertz, “Idealism”, 473.
61 Wertz, “Idealism”, 471.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400836635.
63 Tyrrell, Moral Empire, 148-149.
This sort of ‘opium Domino Theory’ prompted a furious response from missionaries in the Philippines as well as, crucially, Dr. Wilbur F. Crafts and his International Reform Bureau, an organization that lobbied for “important and much-needed legislation along all lines of moral reform; to defeat immoral legislation; and to arouse interest among good citizens for civic betterment” by “supporting international efforts against drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and assorted other vices”. The Bureau quickly reached out to its “national network of similarly-minded churches and lay organizations”, sending “circulars and petition forms across the nation and channel[ing] the thousands of responses to the President”.

President Theodore Roosevelt, having received substantial support from reformers and missionaries in his first presidential campaign and facing an election in the near future, walked back the opium farming plans and decided to appoint a commission, headed by Bishop Charles H. Brent, an important anti-opium yet non-evangelical Episcopalian missionary to the Philippines, charged with traveling around East and Southeast Asia and comparing the myriad systems of opium regulation. The end result of the commission’s investigation and the subsequent political wrangling in Washington was that there would be a three-year period of transition to total opium prohibition in the Philippines and that the US government would tacitly “set opium prohibition as a goal of U.S. diplomacy”. After decades of relative irrelevance, the

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65 Wertz, “Idealism”, 478.
anti-opium cause had at a stroke secured a remarkable concession and scored a remarkable victory. Seeing opportunity at long last, anti-opium and anti-narcotic advocates pushed for more.

While evangelicalism never had quite as much sway in Britain as it did in the United States, the First and Second Great Awakenings (c. 1730-55 and c. 1790-1840) had occurred on both sides of the Atlantic and British anti-vice and temperance movements accordingly had their share of adherents.70 In 1906, the decidedly temperance-friendly Liberal government of Henry Campbell-Bannerman, having secured a commanding electoral mandate, vowed to end the Sino-Indian opium trade on the grounds of “moral indefensib[ility]” and negotiated an agreement with China to gradually wind down the trade over a ten-year period as long as China reduced domestic use and cultivation of opium by similar proportions over the period.71 Seeing this progress, Bishop Brent wrote to a receptive President Theodore Roosevelt and suggested that an international conference to discuss global narcotic prohibition should be organized. Britain and China would not agree to an international conference, which would have legally binding consequences, but would agree to an international commission to discuss the matter, which was not binding by nature.72

The Commission was held in Shanghai in February 1909, and it brought together representatives of thirteen countries, including the Great Powers with eastern interests, but also countries that produced opium, such as Siam and Persia. The Ottoman Empire, as we have

72 Wertz, “Idealism”, 486.
already discussed, was absent. The intent of the Commission was originally to “ensure that the phasing out of opium imports according to the arrangements made” in the Ten Year Agreement “should not lead to their replacement from other sources” and to “help China with the gargantuan task…of enforcing [its] ban on opium cultivation and smoking throughout the Empire”, and indeed, that was the Commission’s primary focus. America had very real geopolitical ambitions in Asia that a diplomatic victory at the Commission would help to promote, namely, providing “moral and political leadership in the region” and countering Japanese influence. However, between 1909 and 1912, when the Hague Convention met to turn the Commission’s recommendations into international law, the conversation had expanded far beyond China to take up a whole new cause altogether: international narcotics control and perhaps even international narcotics prohibition.

At Shanghai in 1909, the American delegation, led by Bishop Brent (who also presided over the Commission, a conspicuous nod to the power and influence of the missionaries), and Dr. Hamilton Wright, a physician and prominent anti-narcotics campaigner, attempted to secure total prohibition of smoking opium worldwide, with limited exceptions for medical use and for phase-out periods in cases where those might become necessary. This, however, was unacceptable to Britain and the other major European powers, who were opposed to ending the lucrative trade completely or taking significant, substantive steps to slowly close it down.

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73 Tyrrell, *Moral Empire*, 159.
75 Wertz, “Idealism”, 491-492.
The parties to the Commission came away from Shanghai with a few milquetoast condemnations of the opium trade and support for China’s endeavors to control it, as well as generalized consideration of opium as a “matter for prohibition or careful regulation” but did not call for any subsequent binding international convention to follow up those words with action.\(^76\) 1909 was not a complete failure for the United States or for anti-opium and anti-narcotic associations, however. America had secured what many viewed as a moral victory against the continental powers and improved Sino-American relations in the bargain, and the missionaries had begun to make a case for internal American opium prohibition, which would come to fruition in the Harrison Act of 1914.\(^77\) America, and the missionary organizations worldwide that pushed for temperance and prohibition, came away disappointed from the talks, though more determined than ever to secure some form of global prohibition, and neither had given up on the idea of an international conference that would purge the world of the evils of narcotics and spread upstanding, Christian values to peoples they saw as benighted souls.

Part of the success of the renewed wave of missionary anti-narcotic lobbying after 1909 was due to the fact that opium was at this point no longer quite as unique as it used to be. Newly-developed opium derivatives such as heroin, originally marketed by the German pharmaceutical manufacturer Bayer as a medicine,\(^78\) as well as cocaine, were being used, as opium had increasingly been over the past several centuries, by both citizens of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations, though the newer, more highly-processed drugs saw higher initial uptake in

\(^76\) Wertz, “Idealism”, 492.
\(^77\) Tyrrell, Moral Empire, 162.
the so-called ‘civilized’ world. Egypt, a so-called ‘uncivilized nation’, for instance, would only see heroin and cocaine become drugs of the populace as well as the elite after the First World War. While rates of addiction to opiates in America actually began to decline after 1896, they, like alcohol, increasingly became associated with the urban poor and immigrants. Like ardent American Prohibitionists, many European social reformers, especially German reformers, associated alcohol with the urban poor as well, and it is very likely that opiates were beginning to be seen in the same light in other European countries. The prospect of narcotics afflicting not only some distant ‘savages’, opening up lucrative new markets for narcotic-producing states in the process, but also the working-class in the metropole, creating a potential loss of productivity, a rise in crime, and the perceived accompanying destruction of moral values and creation of social unrest doubtless served to concentrate the minds of the European governments who refused to make firm commitments in 1909.

The 1912 International Opium Convention (also known as the Hague Convention, after its location), the successor to the Shanghai Commission, made binding—or at least appeared to make binding—a rather sweeping (in comparison to 1909) series of propositions. The production of raw opium was to be regulated—though not suppressed or reduced—in producing countries, prepared smoking opium to being “gradual[ly] and effective[ly] suppress[ed]… but set no time limit within which this suppression [wa]s supposed to be brought about”, provided for the restriction of opium derivatives and cocaine to “strictly medical and legitimate purposes”, and

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79 Aurin, “Chasing the Dragon”, 422.
provided a framework for resolution of the opium problem in China.\textsuperscript{81} Germany, however, which wished to protect its pharmaceutical industry while still appearing to participate in the Convention, insisted that the entire Convention’s provisions “would only become valid when universally recognized”,\textsuperscript{82} which would delay the Convention’s practical effect—and stymie the anti-narcotic movement altogether—-until after WWI ended and the defeated Central Powers were forced to accept the terms of the Convention by the terms of Article 295 of the Treaty of Versailles.\textsuperscript{83}

As the world entered the 1920s, however, the many compromises and ambiguities of the Hague Convention looked increasingly insufficient and outmoded, and yet another Convention was organized, this time by the new League of Nations, and met in 1924-25, with the goal of creating a “more comprehensive, enforceable framework for international drug control”.\textsuperscript{84} The American delegation, once again featuring Bishop Brent in a leading role and once again backing a heavily anti-narcotic agenda, this one insisting on global opiate prohibition with immediate effect, once again clashed with the European Great Powers. The Europeans asserted that, given the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in China and the resulting lack of control that the new Republic of China had over many provinces and their opium cultivation, that China had to restore control


\textsuperscript{82} Wertz, “Idealism”, 495.

\textsuperscript{83} Wertz, “Idealism”, 497-498.

\textsuperscript{84} Wertz, “Idealism”, 498.
over its territory before a pathway to full global opium prohibition could begin. This resulted in America and China pulling out of the talks.\textsuperscript{85}

Despite the withdrawal of the American and Chinese delegations, and thus the prospect of global opium prohibition vanishing, the remaining nations did agree to the straitening of the Hague Convention in many respects, as well as increasing the variety of substances that would be prohibited. Curiously, enough, as Liat Kozma points out, the Egyptian delegation to the 1924-25 Geneva Conference proposed, to a largely ignorant crowd of delegates, that hashish was as or nearly as destructive as opium, and argued accordingly for a prohibition regarding cannabis, which was not approved given Indian opposition, but did eventually result in the Convention “prohibit[ing] the export of hemp resins to countries which ha[d] prohibited its use”.\textsuperscript{86}

Kozma’s article is, as she says, an “attempt to challenge old historiographies which portrayed European empires as willing agents of addiction in non-Western societies too naïve to resist”, arguing instead for the centrality of “local merchants, indigenous entrepreneurs, and… local elites… in the development of drug markets and policies”.\textsuperscript{87} Kozma makes an extremely good point in decentering American and European temperance from the story of cannabis prohibition, and instead emphasizing the role of Egyptian elites, arguing that they acted independently of imperial interests when engaging in their advocacy for cannabis temperance. However, Kozma’s analysis, as striking and persuasive as it is, nevertheless undervalues to some

\textsuperscript{85} Wertz, “Idealism”, 498.
\textsuperscript{87} Kozma, “Local Ban”, 444.
extent the parallel discourses of—and connections between—for lack of better terms, “Islamic” and “Western” temperances/narcotic prohibition movements in creating this Egyptian proposition for cannabis prohibition at Geneva, bringing it to the attention of the Great Powers, and thus ultimately the world’s general lack of cannabis legalization in the present day.

Missionaries, who played an extremely important and controversial role in British Egypt in many different fields, were often close to the very elites that Kozma correctly denotes as important. Although, as we have just established, they were central to creating and propagating the “Western” narcotic prohibition movement that produced the Conferences and Commissions, they are not mentioned in her analysis at all. Our question, then, and the raison d’etre of this thesis, is to attempt to fill this gap and to inquire how Kozma’s “Egyptian elites”, Protestant missionaries, and working-class Egyptians interacted with one other within the context of, in particular, narcotic temperance.

CHAPTER THREE: MISSIONARIES IN EGYPT

In order to examine the intersection of our two temperances, “Islamic” and “Western”, in Egypt, we must examine the missionaries who ventured to Egypt during the British occupation

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88 The reader may, fairly, question the use of these terms and worry about the essentialism inherent in these usages. There is, however, perhaps no better way to describe these styles of temperance. Foda calls this thesis’ “Western temperance” “Anglo-American temperance”, but this term is not sufficient given the fact that this rhetoric was not limited to British and American citizens. Additionally, Western proponents of temperance thought less about bringing the specific values of their nation to peoples they wished to make temperate (though American temperance advocates certainly did this, as we have seen) and more about bringing generalized ‘modernity’ and ‘civilization’, both of which were seen more as ‘Western values’ rather than nation-specific values, to them. Similarly, one may quite reasonably object to this thesis’ use of “Islamic temperance”, and indeed “Egyptian temperance” was considered as an alternate term. As we will see, though, non-missionary Egyptian temperance advocates generally grounded their temperance drives in a specifically Islamic milieu and in specifically religious rhetoric. Both of these terms are problematic for a variety of reasons, but they nonetheless convey a sense of how and in what context temperance proponents were orienting themselves and their rhetoric.
of 1882-1952 more closely and attempt to understand what kind of changes they instigated and reactions they provoked, what their place in Egyptian society amounted to, and how they defined and justified their missions to Egypt. In order to discuss this, we must first understand the demographic makeup of foreign missions to Egypt.

Egypt had some Catholic missionaries, who had a fairly longstanding historical presence and who were generally as well-liked by the populace as foreign missionaries could be, but during the British occupation, the vast majority were Protestant. There were a few Germans and Swedes, but the vast majority of missionaries in Egypt were either British or American. They represented a variety of different denominations, though most Americans were Presbyterians or Congregationalists. Their doctrinal differences were generally (though, crucially, not always) set aside while abroad in favor of their shared social attitudes. Organizations such as the Egypt Inter-Mission Council (founded 1921) showed the desire for missionaries to operate independent of sect and act as one unit to further their shared goals.

Protestant missionaries of the period in all contexts, straddling as they did multiple locales and cultures, naturally had multiple constituencies which they needed to serve. First and most obviously, they needed to nurture communities of converts to their faith in the country that they found themselves in, to win the hearts and minds and souls of the peoples they proselytized to, but they were also accountable to another community. Their coreligionists in their home country (and sometimes in other countries too; for example, Mary and Margaret Leitch, a

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90 Sharkey, “History Enmeshed”, xiii-xiv.

prominent missionary pair, found much success in fundraising in Scotland as well as America\(^{92}\) who put dollars in collection plates and made endowments in their wills to missionary organizations naturally expected to see souls brought towards salvation for their pains.

In the Middle East, the ultimate goal of the missionary was the mass conversion of local Muslims to Christianity of whatever denomination the missionary favored, but the laws and societal pressure that forbade Muslims from converting away from the faith made this a forbidding task, and on the rare occasions when it happened, tensions between missionaries and Muslims of all classes spiked. It was considered easier to convert the “indigenous Christians of the Orient”, who were perceived to be “‘nominal Christians’… [who] had become weak under the pressure of ‘Muslim fanaticism’” and had to be returned to the proper Christian fold.\(^{93}\) In Egypt, however, Protestant missionaries were largely unsuccessful at converting souls to Protestantism, despite decades of effort. While missionaries made a few converts, mostly from the Coptic community, the numbers remained fairly—some would say very—small.\(^{94}\) In order to keep the money flowing or, viewed in a less cynical light, to continue to promote their vision of Christianity and civilization in Egypt, missionaries altered their tactics. They founded orphanages, schools, libraries, hospitals, and universities, some of which survive, in somewhat altered form, to the present day. Missionaries had more direct impact in Egypt through the institutions they built and the reactions they provoked than through conversion itself, and that, whether unconsciously or consciously, was how they justified their work to their domestic

\(^{92}\) Tyrrell, *Moral Empire*, 32.

\(^{93}\) Sharkey, “History Enmeshed”, xix.

\(^{94}\) Sharkey, “History Enmeshed”, xxvii-xxviii.
audience. In the process, they spurred resentment from Egyptian nationalists and religious conservatives, which would culminate in their expulsion under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1967.

While the replacement of conversions with institutions was especially true in Egypt, missionaries in the Middle East and the Maghreb in general were institution-builders of a very high grade. In many cases, in fact, that was the reason they were allowed to set up missions in the lands of the Ottoman Empire. In Tunisia, for instance, the state allowed Catholic missionary organizations to arrive in order to manage the influx of foreign Catholic immigrants, “to minister to an unruly population over which the beylical state enjoyed little formal legal jurisdiction” and were viewed essentially as “unpaid social workers and guardians of moral order” by the state. 95 Missionaries, through their institutions, were, in short, tasked with “ensuring that families acquired the rudiments of middle-class sobriety” generally, and were often allowed in specifically for this purpose. 96 While the power of the British government over Egypt goes a long way towards explaining the persistence of the missionary presence in Egypt, the tangible benefits of missionary institution-building and the intangible positive moral and cultural influence effendiyya hoped would filter down to the public at large surely strengthened their position, at least in elite and governmental circles, to some extent.

Many articles have been written about missionaries’ attempts to reconfigure lives and society in British Egypt, but few have considered the impact of temperance ideas in any form. Missionary temperance in the Middle East is a surprisingly understudied phenomenon in general, and missionary narcotic temperance even more so. The scholarly literature in English is

95 Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans, 259.
96 Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans, 256.
extremely fragmentary, and online, readily accessible, useful English-language primary sources about the period 1880-1920 are rare (the state of the scholarship and sources improves to some extent when the 1930s and 1940s are considered). An Arabic-speaking scholar with access to physical archives in America, Britain, and/or Egypt could do some fascinating, pioneering work in this area, particularly regarding gender and the Egyptian working class (who are especially neglected by the extant English historiography). But this apologia is too long and flagellatory to convey a completely accurate picture; we do have some knowledge of how missionaries interacted with users of alcohol and “black drugs” in Egypt, what they considered to be their places in society, and the measures they did undertake in their attempt to instil temperance—and a Western temperance culture, at that—in Egypt.

For Protestant missionaries in Egypt, intemperance was an inherently urban vice, one which seduced young men from the provinces new to city life (though “drug and alcohol addiction” was regarded “as a problem that might affect both women and men, young and old”97), and it was separated, broadly, into two forms. Alcohol, much of it imported from Europe and America (though arak, made from dates, had been extant in Egypt since long before the British arrived, and several locally-produced beer companies sprung up during the period in question, most notably Crown, Pyramid, and Stella),98 was considered one and the same as hashish or opium in terms of its status as an intoxicant, but, due to its origin in the ‘civilized’ world,

rhetoric similar to that of the missionary argument for Chinese opium prohibition largely
dominated the discussion of imported alcohol in Egypt. Fears of ‘native races’, ‘noble savages’,
who were, at best, “cultural[ly] [inferior],...passive receptors of everything Western”\textsuperscript{99} being
corrupted by profiteering, exploitative Westerners ran high in missionary circles, especially so
given that drinking had become especially “prevalent among the official classes and the young
men who have come into contact with Europeans, and who are anxious to imitate what they think
are Western civilized habits and customs... The upper classes, through the presence and example
of Europeans, who nearly all drink in public and in private, are using wines at table, and thus
drinking habits are being formed in our best families, and with the drinking go swearing,
gambling, betting, and other licentiousness”\textsuperscript{100}

For Protestant missionaries in Egypt, the fact that alcohol by and large seduced and
corrupted the “best families”, the Egyptians who were closest to the missionary project, most
prominent in government, and the rock on which their hopes for ultimate ‘civilization’ and
Christianization of Egypt rested, made alcohol Public Enemy Number One as far as intoxicants
were concerned. Hashish and opium, on the other hand, were largely phenomena of the poor and
were not derived from European or American sources. As such, while both were noted by
missionary prohibitionists, categorized as intoxicants, and fought with similar strategies, alcohol
is mentioned more prominently in some missionary discussions of temperance in Egypt, though


\textsuperscript{100} Wilbur F. Crafts et al., Protection of Native Races Against Intoxicants & Opium: Based on Testimony of One Hundred Missionaries and Travelers (United States: F. H. Revell Company, 1900), 73-74. Accessed May 5, 2021.

https://www.google.com/books/edition/Protection_of_Native_Races_Against_Intox/DWRJAAAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0
nearly always in the same breath as other drugs, one of the main missionary temperance organizations in Egypt actually “mainly concerned itself with intoxicants”\footnote{Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 123.} and it was stressed that “intemperance in every form” was a danger.\footnote{Crafts et al., Native Races, 73.}

Missionaries in Egypt concerned with temperance fought alcohol and narcotics in several ways. Mission schools taught about temperance and encouraged temperance among students, mission organizations distributed pamphlets in English and Arabic about the dangers of alcohol and narcotics, set up sanitary hostels “under Christian supervision and with leisure activities”,\footnote{Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 153.} lobbied the British government in London to “secure from [Egypt] the same [total alcohol] prohibition which the British government has recently [1900] given to the Soudan”,\footnote{Crafts, Native Races 74} and “wrote letters to prominent officials… as an interest group for the temperance cause”.\footnote{Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 122-123.}

Like the medieval Muslim jurists we encountered in Chapter One, when missionaries discussed alcohol and narcotics, they stressed the “devastating effects these substances [alcohol and narcotics] might have on health, but also on the moral and religious integrity of a person. Therefore, prevention of habits that might threaten health was also regarded as dangerous for the spiritual life. Hence, the missionaries closely linked body and soul.”\footnote{Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 154.} Due to the perceived necessity of Egyptians to lead a ‘civilized’ life as well as a Christian in order for the mission to succeed and the perceived path to Muslim conversion extending through exposure to Christianity and ‘civilization’, from a missionary perspective the individual issue of temperance was in fact a
larger, societal issue. The intoxicant’s effect on the part and the whole were intimately interconnected.

This is not the only striking parallel that we might note between the jurists and the missionaries. As Samir Boulos points out, while “temperance endeavours were apparently an inherent part of missionary work in Egypt... they were almost unmentioned in German and English [the missionary language groups he studied] missionary sources”. Missionaries were great, prolific writers, sending letters and broadsheets all around the world to fellow missionaries and their compatriots back home, covering all subjects to do with their missions at the most voluminous length and in the most minute detail, and endlessly lobbying local, colonial, and homeland authorities for various causes. Despite this, temperance endeavors, which not only should logically exist but which, on the available evidence, were clearly important in missionary efforts in Egypt, go almost unmentioned in missionary sources, a subject of some frustration to both Boulos and this author.

A similar kind of silence to that same, strange unspoken agreement of the medieval jurists that non-alcoholic intoxicants were “a subject to be treated gingerly and to be bypassed whenever possible” hangs over us. The looming question, then, is why? What is this missionary silence? Why does it exist? What qualities does it share with medieval Muslim temperance? Why does it or does it not extend to other groups in British Egypt such as the effendiyya or the Azharis? Despite this silence, did missionary temperance endeavors have a clear effect on the situation on the ground or on other Egyptians’ rhetoric of temperance? Did indigenous Egyptian

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temperance have an effect on the missionaries’ Western temperance, as practiced in Egypt, in return?

Some of these questions will be answered in the pages to come, some may be answered in the future by others, and some may never be answered at all. Reckoning with these questions, however, is crucial to an understanding of just why those Egyptian delegates advocated for a total global prohibition of hashish quite so vehemently at the Conference of 1925.

CHAPTER FOUR: EGYPTIAN DISCOURSES OF TEMPERANCE

Understanding the missionary silence and the actions of the Egyptian delegates to the Conference in 1925 requires examining non-missionary temperance discourses in Egyptian society during the British occupation but before the “white drugs” of cocaine and heroin became widespread in all strata of Egyptian society, around 1920. Broadly, Egyptian discourses of temperance of the period were prevalent among two important, closely aligned but clearly defined groups, and the first part of this chapter’s discussion will introduce them.

The first group of importance was the effendiyya (sing. effendi). The effendiyya were a new class in a nation whose class structure was rapidly changing. From the 1890s, industry had transformed urban Egyptian labor, creating, in effect, a proletariat similar to that found in Germany or Britain or the United States during the period, “propertyless wageworkers in relatively large and modern enterprises...[a class which] gradually acquired consciousness of itself through its experience of, and resistance to, exploitation and oppression in the workplace”.
But the effendiyya did not aspire to be part of the new Egyptian working-class, did not consider themselves to be working-class, and engaged in persistent discursive efforts to differentiate themselves from and prove themselves superior to the new Egyptian working class and the extant “traditional al-Azhar trained” upper-class. They were urban clerks or white-collar professionals of one kind or another, oftentimes educated in European or American universities, who identified as “secular, Western, and elite”, preoccupied with the West and Egypt’s technological and social inferiority and interested in “bridging the intellectual gap between the West and Egypt”, bringing reform and modernity to what they perceived as a stagnant society.

The ways in which the effendiyya asserted and performed their modernity, and, thus, their position in Egyptian society are crucial to the understanding of temperance in Egypt. Taste and consumption were significant and deliberate points of differentiation for them. They wore Western-style clothes, maintained different kinds of households, and read different newspapers.

Most interesting is their attitude to temperance, which was strikingly bipolar. In “The Pyramid and the Crown: The Egyptian Beer Industry from 1897 to 1963”, Omar D. Foda notes many effendiyya drank alcohol, and that “[a]lcohol served as an ideal commodity for the effendi to

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110 Foda, “Pyramid and the Crown”, 143.

111 Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 136.

perform modernity because its consumption achieved a double effect: while linking its Egyptian drinker to the "modern" European, who drank on social occasions, it separated him from both the nonelite and the religious Egyptian, who viewed alcohol as socially suspect at best or as religious anathema at worst...In the case of colonial Egypt, alcohol consumption represented the rejection of the traditionally trained al-Azhar shaykh in favor of the effendi”.

The charge of temperance in Egypt, however, was also in large part an effendiyya effort. The Egyptian delegation to the Conference of 1925 was made up of white-collar Egyptian professionals who could fairly be classed as effendiyya, while the main non-missionary temperance organization in Egypt was an essentially effendiyya-operated and effendiyya-oriented project. The Egyptian Temperance Organization (henceforth referred to as the ETA or the Association) was a generally “male, middle-class, and Muslim organization” that sought to “eliminate intoxicants… from Egypt in order to bring it back into line with its proud Islamic past”. The ETA “used Islamic language” in its “arguments for temperance”, but also “drew inspiration from the latest techno-scientific arguments for temperance”, as well as, unsurprisingly, “[P]rohibition in the United States”. The Association referred to “the fight against the consumption of intoxicants as a jihad, Egypt as an umma (community), and... the end of the liquor trade in Egypt as the purification... of the country from the filth... of intoxicants”, but they also agitated for (and eventually succeeded in mandating) Western ‘scientific’ temperance tracts to be made a mandatory part of the Egyptian national school curriculum”.

113 Foda, “Pyramid and the Crown”, 143.
114 Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 117.
115 Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 133, 135.
116 Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 133, 134.
The ETA’s temperance drive, like the subculture of the alcohol-drinkers Foda mentions in “The Pyramid and the Crown”, was thoroughly part of the effendiyya project of national societal reform, but featured heavy influence from Western temperance and Christian missionary and temperance associations, such as the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union of Egypt. It took cues, however, not only from the West, but also from the long, rich Islamic tradition of total temperance (that is, temperance from all intoxicants), and, despite its usage of the rhetoric of science, modernity, and the West common to the worldview of more secular-identified effendiyya, could not be said to be wholly secular in nature. The same project of national renewal and the same passion for Western-identified modernity was shared among the most fervent beer-drinkers and the most fervent temperance advocates. The dividing line was secularism.

The work of the ETA was not a blind imitation or simple adaptation of the work of Western temperance advocates. Rather, as Foda points out, the ETA took pride in the long history of temperance in Islam and “[b]y linking temperance to the Islamic tradition, the ETA took a movement that… was very much couched in Christian triumphalism and subverted it so that the West and Christendom were the ones that needed to catch-up.”¹¹⁷ In other words, effendiyya temperance was not blind imitation but a syncretic construction. Moreover, the discourses of effendiyya temperance at once mirrored the discourses of temperance of the medieval Muslim jurists we discussed in Chapter One and justified the effendiyya’s claim to the uniqueness and social position of their class.

¹¹⁷ Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 130.
We will discuss how exactly this is shortly, but in order to do so, we must consider the position of our second group of importance, which I will henceforth call the “reformist Azharis”. The centuries-old mosque-school of the Azhar had produced theologians and leaders for centuries, with some students coming from as far away as Indonesia to learn. In parallel with and in dialogue with the rise of the effendiyya, however, a new wave of Muslim reformers came to prominence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Figures such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) hit upon similar themes to the effendiyya temperance advocates, but from inside the institutions of religion itself, and religious revival was for them as crucial as, and intertwined with, national revival. Their ideas became very influential in the institution that was synonymous with the Egyptian religious establishment, Egyptian Muslim orthodoxy, and the Egyptian elite in general, and along with these calls for revival came the call for temperance.

In order to understand the ways in which temperance was advocated for by these reformist Azharis, we must attempt to understand their ideas and background, and there may be no better way to do this than to briefly examine the life and ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh, perhaps the most prominent, influential, and popular of them all. ‘Abduh was a graduate of the Azhar and worked as a government censor and as the editor of the official state newspaper before the British occupation of Egypt. In the wake of the ‘Urabi Revolt, which he had supported, and

the new British occupation, he was exiled from Egypt, splitting his time between France and
Ottoman Lebanon. During this time, he edited another newspaper, this one a pan-Islamist
anti-colonial periodical, with his fervently anti-colonial mentor al-Afghani, but eventually broke
with him out of a newfound belief that “cooperation with Europe would provide better results
than confrontation”.

He was invited back to Egypt in 1888, technically by the Khedive, but in
reality by Evelyn Baring, the Earl of Cromer, who was, de facto if not de jure, the true ruler of
Egypt. Cromer was, despite ‘Abduh’s prior support for the ‘Urabi Revolt and his links with
al-Afghani, impressed by him and appointed him to a series of positions, culminating in the post
of the Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899.

The office of Grand Mufti was an exceedingly important one. In addition to the judicial
responsibilities of the post, the Muftiship was extremely politically relevant, especially because
the Mufti was responsible for issuing fatwas, that is, formal opinions about the religious
permissibility of a given action, upon request. This was a marker of the great trust that Cromer
had in ‘Abduh and the great importance to the British of putting a reformer, someone willing to
take British interests into account and to not stir up anti-colonial sentiment, in the position. As
Grand Mufti, ‘Abduh advocated for various types of religious reform. 'Abduh saw these reforms
as vital to his vision of a 'modern' Islam and a 'modern' Egypt, and the ways in which he
discusses these reforms and connects them with temperance are equally vital to our
understanding of temperance in Egypt and, perhaps, in general.

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https://www.google.com/books/edition/Muhammad_Abu_dh/Whu9DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0
‘Abduh, who was at the time the Grand Mufti of Egypt, wrote about the “necessity of religious reform” which would allow graduates of the Azhar to “explain to the Egyptians that they constitute[d] one physical entity; every organ works for the benefit of all and the suffering of one organ is the suffering of all”, to “fight immoral behavior” and to be “responsible to the poor worker who spends his earnings on cocaine, opium, hashish, wine, and other dangerous drugs”.

The agents of ‘Abduh’s reform movement would “save those who are wounded by these dangerous sicknesses and murderous vices like wine, gambling, and drugs”, and by so doing would “produce in the nation what no group would be able to do… building[ing] morality in the nation and educat[ing] its souls”.

The moral and societal project that was considered necessary to be built by the reformist Azharis and temperance-advocating effendiyya carried with it certain resonances. ‘Abduh’s rhetoric of religious reform is couched in terms of the welfare of the poorest of Egyptian society, and of Egyptian society more generally, but it is also strongly paternalistic. ‘Abduh’s working-class Egyptians are here portrayed as assailed on all sides by vice and intoxicants which eat away at not only their earthly prospects and not only their souls, but at the body politic more generally. They are incapable of fighting these ills on their own, of educating themselves, and require the guiding hand of a beneficent moral, religio-scientific elite to build temperance, morality, and modernity.

123 The following was published in 1906, half a year after his death, by Rida’s journal al-Manar.
There is a term, used earlier, which is rather loaded. The term in question is “orthodoxy”.

It is used in this context because of how ‘Abduh treats temperance and in what context he discusses it. ‘Abduh’s project of religious reformation and his proposed elite are faced with defeating what he terms “innovations and superstitions” that detract from the truth and vitality of Islam in its original virtuous state. In particular, he cites the Sufis as bringers of harmful, irrational ideas and devotes a substantial portion of his tract to attempting to counter their arguments. Given the longstanding association of Sufis with hashish, their presence here may be no accident, but there is a more important reason for that juxtaposition and for my use of the word “orthodoxy” in this context. ‘Abduh’s discussion of religious reform and temperance shows his attempt to enshrine his theological bent as orthodoxy in Egypt, to cement the worldview of his class, and of his particular vision of reform, as the legitimate, unchallenged religious authority of Egypt and as the fulcrum upon which his ideal of an Egypt that was an “example to be followed in the Orient” was to be built. Sufi orders and Sufi theological thought are, for ‘Abduh, immoral because they are not productive and not productive because they are not modern. This conjunction of morality, productivity, and modernity in the interest of building a more moral society is at the root of ‘Abduh’s linkage of temperance and religious reform, and it is the context in which we must consider temperance rhetoric in—and out—of Egypt.

Into this framework, we may fit the three discourses of temperance that we discussed in Chapter One, that of class, mental health, and sexual/gendered morality. We may attempt to compare the ways in which organizations such as the ETA and the Egyptian delegates to the Convention attempted to build a distinctively Egyptian temperance identity and to assert their

126 ‘Abduh, “Religious Reform”, 47.
modernity to the attempts of medieval Muslim jurists to build a purer society to the efforts of Protestant missionaries to evangelize Muslim Egypt through temperance and civilizational rhetoric. This ‘discourse-matching’ and discursive analysis of temperance rhetoric allows us, perhaps, to understand why temperance ideas and movements died away in Egypt as they did in America and around the globe but left the legacy behind that they did, and why missionaries in Egypt were so silent about their temperance efforts.

Expressed in ‘Abduh’s work, we see an echo of our medieval jurists’ rhetoric of class in discussing the effects of hashish on the individual and on society. If, however, the medieval addict existed in a sort of class of their own below standard social classes, hashish seen to be “bring[ing] the addict down to a level where nothing remains in him… combin[ing] all the qualities that negate the existence of a well-ordered society”, ‘Abduh’s addicts, in contrast, are identified with a particular class, the new Egyptian proletariat. His addicts are equally lacking in agency and far from the top of the social ladder, far, too, from the type of citizens that make a ‘moral nation’ or a ‘well-ordered society’, but they are nonetheless productive or potentially productive citizens, workers, who could be more productive and more virtuous citizens if they had guidance from ‘Abduh’s mooted guardians of morality, not strung-out no-hopers wasting away in an alley, far from even heavenly salvation. Nevertheless, ‘Abduh’s discourse of class continues the tradition of linking intoxicant usage to the lower classes, deeming it—and vice generally — a societal ill of the urban poor which needed to be corrected and seemingly absolving the rich and the new upwardly-mobile effendiyya ‘middle class’ of any part in the perceived current moral turpitude and decrepitude of Egyptian society (though assigning them a

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role in his reform movement). ‘Abduh’s temperance rhetoric also draws a clear dividing line between the worker and everyone else.

Effendiyya temperance’s relationship with the discourse of class is similarly comparable to the class discourse as expressed by the medieval jurists, though, like that of ‘Abduh and the reformist Azharis, not identical. Like ‘Abduh, too, theirs was concerned with class in the context of productivity as well as the evils that intoxicants and general vice brought on society, the nation, and the individual per se. As Kozma points out, the effendiyya saw the 1879 ban on hashish as “part of a civilizing process” that could tame the “lower classes”, a “crowd that should be disciplined into rationality”.129 This ‘crowd’ was perceived by the effendiyya as lazy, whiling away their days in cafes, drinking coffee and consuming hashish, all while their time could be put to the more productive use of industrial labor. For the effendiyya, national progress and their national civilizing mission required the transformation of the Egyptian poor into Western-style proletarians, and intoxicants were a major obstacle to this process. The “black drugs” of hashish and opium were a “symptom of Egypt’s moral degradation” that made the Egyptian worker—and, by extension, Egypt—stagnate, “sit[ting] idly all day like women”, while the West advanced.130

As we have seen in a previous chapter, temperance in missionary rhetoric in Egypt was tied up with class as well to some extent, though one that diverged significantly from the discourse of class of the medieval jurists, effendiyya, and reformist Azharis. As we have seen, American temperance (and Western temperance as a whole) was inherently classist, relying as it

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129 Kozma, “Local Ban”, 446.
did on paternalism and hatred on the part of rural, middle and upper-middle-class Americans towards the urban poor. Missionary temperance in Egypt, however, seemed directly concerned less with the control of the lower classes that Western temperance advocates were preoccupied with in their home countries and that the effendiyya and reformist Azharis were preoccupied with in Egypt.

While figures like ‘Abduh emphasized class uniqueness and the role that the upper classes could play in building a new, modern Egypt by uplifting and morally enlightening the lower classes, serving as positive role models, missionaries in Egypt worried about the resistance to vice of the upper classes themselves and of their potential to be negative role models of temperance in Egypt. If their ‘civilized’ elite, the ‘best families’ of Egypt, were habitual alcohol drinkers or gamblers or brothel-goers or heroin or cocaine addicts, how could they truly be said to be civilized at all? Why would ‘civilization’ be attractive to a working-class Muslim Egyptian? If ‘civilization’ wasn’t attractive, why would Protestant Christianity be? If Protestant Christianity appeared ultimately unattractive, if the total conversion of Egypt for Christ appeared ultimately impossible, why should congregants back home or missionaries seeking to go abroad devote time and resources to Egypt at all? Like the effendiyya and the reformist Azharis, missionaries had a natural interest in delineating the elite from the masses, of viewing intoxicants as a disease of the working class, curable by exposure to ‘civilization’ and modernity in the form of the effendiyya and reformist Azharis, and an obstacle to creating their vision of a civilized, modern, Protestant Egypt. In order to control the poor, the missionary temperance endeavor had to first control the elite.
Another discourse of the period which had parallels in the medieval jurists’ discourses of temperance is the discourse of mental health. The twin associations of the addict with, on the one hand, unseriousness, laziness, and undue frivolity and insanity and criminality on the other found purchase in effendiyya temperance rhetoric. Hashish’s impact on mental health was strongly linked to their class and national project and followed these two throughlines. The inebriation and the delirium that black drugs produced was, from the perspective of the effendiyya, a visible sign of the sluggishness and the archaic, inferior ways that they sought to root out. This, too, intertwined with the rhetoric of productivity that effendiyya temperance advocates deployed. As Kozma points out, “[d]isorder, the inability to discipline time, space and mobility rationally, was becoming a political issue. In this context, the idleness of the hashish smoker and his inability to control his mind and his time were emblematic of those traits that Egyptian society, and particularly its lower orders, needed to abandon to serve collective progress”. Laziness, for the effendiyya, was not just the product of a stagnant culture that required reform, but the end product of the consumption of a narcotic. Their brand of temperance was important because, from their perspective, lack of hashish consumption among the ‘crowd’ or the ‘lower orders’ or the ‘workers’ would go quite some ways in and of itself to achieving their goals, to taking the Egyptian lower classes and making them productive, modern workers.

This is, however, not how the Egyptian delegation, effendiyya all, attempted to justify their proposed cannabis ban at Geneva. For them, the rhetoric of ‘Oriental indolence’ and productivity was, though significant, secondary in their relation of mental health and cannabis, at least on the international stage. Rather more important was the second branch of cannabis/mental health discourse.
health discourse, the rhetoric of hashish, insanity, and criminality. Dr. Mohamed El Guindy, the head of the Egyptian delegation, told the assembled conference-goers that hashish was “a toxic substance, a poison against which no effective antidote is known”, that it was “the principal cause of most of the cases of insanity occurring in Egypt”, causing “from 3[0?] to 60 percent of the total number of cases occurring in Egypt”. El Guindy went on to assert that “a ban on cannabis would contain a threat which was currently plaguing mainly Eastern countries, but would eventually reach Europe as well”, and “that the effects of hashish addiction and consumption were comparable to, if not worse than, the effects of opium consumption”, a narcotic with which most other diplomats at Geneva were naturally much more familiar.

The attacks on hashish as promoting criminality and insanity, as we have seen in Chapter One, have deep roots, but the exclusive focus on the issue of insanity and criminality at the Conference provoke questions. As Kozma points out, domestic effendiyya temperance literature did characterize hashish addicts as wife-beaters, did say that hashish and opium were condemning Egyptian society to stagnation by “messing with our brains, destroying our minds”, domestically, the discourse of black drugs sapping productivity seems to have been favored, while abroad, the discourse of black drugs causing criminal behavior and insanity seems to have been favored. Both fall under the umbrella of mental health, and both emphasize the destructive

132 Westel W. Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem: The Geneva Conferences, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), 379. Accessed May 5, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.3b812087 The range of 3-60% given by Willoughby seems unusual and unlikely to prove what El Guindy was arguing for. Kozma cites El Guindy’s statistics as referring to between 30-60%, a much more reasonable-sounding figure in the context of this discussion (see Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 454) It is likely that there was simply a typo in Willoughby’s account.

133 Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 454.

134 Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 447.
effects of hashish on the user and society, but there is nevertheless difference between them, and
nevertheless clearly a reason why the rhetoric of insanity was preferred at Geneva.

While convincingly arguing for the reason behind the difference in rhetoric on the
national and international stages is far beyond the scope of the thesis, a little speculation may
help us to understand the motives of the effendiyya in coming to the conference and engaging in
temperance activity in general. The other delegates at the conference may have, coming as they
did largely from countries that had a significant industrial base already and thus no need to build
workers out of the lower-classes, been less interested in the rhetoric of productivity and more
worried about the medical and judiciary expenses and possibility for violent revolt that an
increase of insanity and criminality might provoke. Regardless of the motivation for couching
their attack on hashish in these terms, it is clear that the effendiyya picked their rhetoric and their
target carefully, and ultimately that is what is most important.

The black drugs united the effendiyya in condemnation. If alcohol exposed a faultline
between the more pious and more secular members of the effendiyya due to its ability to allow
them to assert one’s secularism and admiration of all things European in its consumption while at
the same time being clearly religiously prohibited, opium and hashish served as perfect symbols
of Egypt’s woes, of its ‘Oriental decadence’. It provided the perfect opportunity for all
effendiyya, regardless of their degree of piety, to assert their modernity and class position in
rejecting it. We have seen how this was done on a national level, through temperance efforts, but
Geneva serves as a salutary example as well, from a more international perspective. The
effendiyya attempted to solidify their claim to expertise and modernity by citing the work of
British colonial doctors (most notably Dr. John Warnock, “medical director of the Egyptian hospital for the insane in the 1890s and 1900s”), identifying a fear and a rhetoric that at once had deep local roots and could resonate with other diplomatic delegations, and giving those fears a scientific frame of reference other diplomats could understand (i.e. comparing hashish, an unknown, to opium, a known, and couching their advocacy in statistics and reports).

In short, the rhetoric of mental health in all its permutations in effendiyya temperance efforts was useful nationally because it allowed for temperance-inclined effendiyya to present themselves as a sort of parallel to reformist Azharis like ‘Abduh, as guardians of the worker’s and the nation’s mental—rather than moral or religious—health. On the international stage, mental health was a discourse that allowed for the effendiyya to assert their uniqueness, importance, and modernity through advocacy, allowed them to show themselves not in blind assent to Western experts and ideas but as innovators in genuine dialogue with them. Because of this, the rhetoric of mental health was perhaps more prominent among effendiyya temperance advocates than among missionary temperance advocates in Egypt or the reformist Azharis.

Missionary temperance pamphlets such as the one cited by Samir Boulos in his “Cultural Entanglements and Missionary Spaces: European Evangelicals in Egypt (1900-1956)” and produced by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union of Egypt (incidentally the same organization that Foda focuses on as representative of missionary temperance in Egypt) do occasionally seem to mention mental health, but it seems to mainly have been done in relation to the discourse of mental health and productivity. While alcohol temperance in an American context frequently stressed the deleterious effects alcohol had on crime (particularly domestic

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135 Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 445.
violence) and insanity rates, missionary temperance in Egypt apparently tended to focus more on the weakness, both physically and mentally, that the black drugs supposedly provoked. Boulos’ quoted pamphlet, albeit dating a little outside our period (1927), demonstrates this very well. The pamphlet tells the story of a boy named Muhammad who became addicted to hashish, as a result of which “his small body grew thin and his face that was already pale became even paler. His face [...] appeared like the face of an old man, ravaged by the days, since this is the effect of this drug on the human body. It fully absorbs the strength of body, destroys the strength of will and spoils his heart. Even if he is in the bloom of his youth he becomes unfairly weak like the tree that is infected by vermin and is only suitable to burn.”

If the effendiyya and the missionaries were using the same discourse of mental health and temperance in practically the same way in Egypt, but neither were using the discourse of mental health/productivity outside of Egypt to the same extent, this particular form of the discourse must have had, or have been perceived to have, some shared attraction to some audience both the effendiyya and the missionaries were interested in reaching. The pamphlet mentioned above was explicitly written “for a young audience”, for boys and girls in missionary-run schools.

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139 In the research for this thesis, no English-language record of any reformist Azharis talking about the mental health effects of the black drugs has been found, and as such, they do not feature further in the discussion of the mental health discourse here, but on page 126 of “Anna and Ahmad”, Foda cites a Shaykh Muhammad Farag al-Sanhuri as including a chapter on the mental health effects of alcohol in his tract *Al-Muskirat*. It may not be unfair to assume that it was an at least occasional topic of discussion in reformist Azhari writings on temperance generally.

While some mission schools in Egypt operated with the education of lower-class children specifically in mind and many had a mix of students from various social classes, most, particularly schools in urban areas, had an enrollment of predominantly middle and upper-class families.

Mission schools were vital to the missionary effort in Egypt and had the twin goals of driving direct conversions, which was largely unsuccessful in Egypt, as we have discussed previously, and inculcating children who were friendly to the missionary enterprise and adopted missionary mores. Regardless of religion, missionary schools in the period generally were quite religiously diverse. Christians, Muslims, and Jews all attended missionary schools, and they were generally not directly preached at when doing so. The logic behind why their temperance discourses targeted to these children discussed the black drugs’ effect on mental health in terms of personal productivity and health instead of insanity is likely twofold. Firstly and more obviously, children in general may find discussions of insanity and crime statistics less relevant to their daily lives and less potent a motivator in abstaining from alcohol and substances than imagining drastic personal physical and mental decline. Secondly, however, the pupils at mission schools were by and large children of the elite, being reared to be the elite of the future. Their parents could well have been effendiyya, already preoccupied with industrial and scientific productivity and building a modern Egypt on those foundations, but, as we have seen, not all abstainers from alcohol or other vices. Missionaries could well have hoped to educate the parents

142 Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 2, 74.
143 Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 29, 82.
as well as the children by couching their attacks on alcohol and substances in the already-extant rhetoric of productivity, hoping to ultimately ‘civilize’ Egypt in their image through ‘civilizing’ those that were already inclined to be receptive to their message.145

Having discussed our two discourses of temperance, we now turn to our third, that of sexual morality and gender. As we have seen in Chapter One, medieval Muslim jurists tended to associate intoxicants, and especially hashish, with sexual licentiousness, male same-sex encounters, and effeminacy. This discourse too is found in Egypt during this period, discussed by our three groups. Like our other discourses, it is not paralleled in every aspect, but a large amount of intersection and/or inspiration exists between them. The most obvious point of difference is that of explicit male homosexuality. No English-language source found during the research process for this thesis, whether it be missionary, effendi, or Azhari, discussed same-sex activities or identities in the direct context or resulting from the consumption of opium, cannabis, alcohol, or any other intoxicant. This being said, it may behoove us to examine how the black drugs and sexual morality seem to have been perceived to have intersected in Egypt during the period.

Broadly, the discourse of sexual morality was, like the discourse of mental health, distinctly two-pronged. One prong has to do with the effeminacy hashish (and, perhaps, opium as well) was seen to have provoked and the other is more generalized, relating to prostitution, though the two are more related than they may initially appear.

145 Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 68. Certainly, according to Boulos, one of the prime purposes of missionary education, as stated by the missionaries themselves, was to “influence society by having an impact on its future elites”. It is not such a stretch to think that the way missionaries taught temperance might be a product of that motivation in addition to general altruistic feeling.
We have already seen, earlier in this chapter, a piece of effendiyya temperance rhetoric which castigated hashish users for “sit[ting] idly all day like women”. This equating of intoxicant usage, effeminacy, and laziness is nothing new, as we saw in Chapter One. Egypt during this period was a society that seemed newly “fear[ful] of blurring the lines between femininity and masculinity and between heterosexuality and homosexuality, as well as the collapse of social codes for decent behaviour in public”.¹⁴⁶ Wedding dancers who had routinely blurred and subverted gender norms in their performances for centuries were being newly suppressed and oppressed by the Cairo police.¹⁴⁷ Many advocates of a ‘modern Egypt’ associated that modernity and progress with a rigid gender binary and logically likely associated people who flaunted that binary, particularly men who embraced femininity, or who had sex with men, with laziness, cultural stagnation, and with intoxicants. Temperance was a totalizing drive, and its targets necessarily had to be seen as linked. Prostitution seems to provide another salutary example of this fact.

For many Azharis and effendiyya temperance advocates, prostitutes, much like the black drugs, were seen as “a leading symbol of decadence, social decay, urbanisation and exploitation.... Commercial sex… came to dramatise the plight of the beleaguered nation. Activists saw sex workers as a danger to the social order of the ‘virtuous nation’.”¹⁴⁸ Unlike the black drugs, however, prostitution was seen by most abolitioniststo be an inherently British-derived issue, and was used in an anti-colonial rhetorical context, generally advocating

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for the suppression of prostitution as opposed to the system of regulation that the British enforced.\textsuperscript{149} ‘Abduh, however, who tended towards less overtly anti-colonial rhetorics of modernism and national revival, saw prostitution as a social disease and a cancer on the Egyptian body politic, but one that was ultimately curable by marriage, which would take shiftless men and convert them into morally upright, “healthy and productive citizens”, ready to abstain from vices and intoxicants of all kinds.\textsuperscript{150} The rhetoric of prostitution was really part of a broader agitation and temperance fervor against vice in Egypt, which encompassed sex work and the black drugs, but also gambling and alcohol, and which was prosecuted by all three of our discussed groups. Each group had two classes whose attitude to vice concerned it. For the temperance-inclined effendiyya, it was their own class and the poor. The reformist Azharis also were interested in their own class and the poor. The missionaries were interested in the effendiyya and the poor.

Each group, as we have discussed, was concerned with the ultimate moral uplift and the ‘modernization’ of Egyptian society, which required the elimination of vice and the promotion of science—sometimes pseudo-science—and productivity. In order for any of these groups’ ambitions to be realized, the poor had to be uplifted, and in order for that to happen, an example had to be set. Azharis who gambled or smoked opium discredited religious authority in the eyes of many; effendiyya who drank or visited prostitutes discredited ‘modern ways’ in the same fashion. Even if those classes did set moral examples, if the poor chose to refuse to accept these

\textsuperscript{149} Hammad, “Regulating Sexuality”, 196, 202.
groups’ visions and continue living as they had before, those ‘modern ways’ would necessarily
be discredited to some extent. The story of Egyptian temperance is the story of that discrediting
and of temperance’s failure on the national stage, but its fairly longstanding success
internationally as regards narcotic prohibition and prohibitions of other kinds of out-group
activities or identities.

CONCLUSION: POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND THE LEGACY OF THE

TEMPERANCE MOMENT

In order to conclude this thesis, it is necessary to, depending on one’s point of view,
either correct a possible misunderstanding or confess a lie. This thesis is not fundamentally about
Egypt. This thesis is not fundamentally about the “black drugs” of hashish and opium in Egypt
from 1882-1920/5. This thesis is not about “Islamic temperance” and “Western temperance” or
how those two streams of temperance differed or blended to create a distinctively Egyptian
temperance.\textsuperscript{151} The fundamental point of this thesis, in fact, is that these two distinct ways of
framing temperance are, though perhaps accurate, not altogether useful, that these two streams
are tributaries flowing from the same river, that these temperances arose out of shared needs by
similar groups who had similar priorities. This thesis is ultimately about four groups—the
medieval jurists discussed in Chapter One; the predominantly American temperance advocates
and missionaries who brought the ‘Western temperance’ style to Egypt, discussed in Chapter
Two and Chapter Three; the effendiyya, and the reformist Azharis, both discussed in Chapter

\textsuperscript{151} That is, however, essentially Foda’s assertion in “Anna and Ahmad”.
Four— that shared, despite their differences in time period, cultural upbringing, and degrees of religiosity, fundamental commonalities. This thesis is about those commonalities, about why it is possible to reasonably compare these groups at all and why our framework of the three discourses of class, mental health, and sexual morality is, as this thesis argues, valid.

Our four groups all sought to reorder society to create new, more moral, societies and saw temperance as vital to this goal. In attempting to achieve their visions for these new worlds, they sought to not only cement and define the relevance of their class, to acquire cultural power, but to do so through cementing the moral worldview of their class over society as a whole and over groups that they considered immoral in general. In so doing, they used the same rhetoric and ways of framing and objecting to substances, activities, and ways of being that they found immoral. In their drive to eliminate all of these behaviors and build their ideal societies, they connected them, made their reform visions total. They set their temperances against all forms of the things they saw as vice in the name of productivity, morality, and, in the case of our nineteenth and twentieth-century actors, modernity (which was for them, as we have seen, just a more complicated framework for expressing the same dichotomy of the moral and immoral). It is because of this that we cannot talk about a “Western temperance” and “Islamic temperance” as truly separate frames of reference. While a shared Abrahamic tradition likely informed some of

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152 It should be noted that this rather cynical-seeming motivation is not the only reason these groups militated against the things they found immoral. Humans remain humans across time and space, and genuine moral feeling and a genuine desire to help those who these groups felt strayed from a moral path doubtless played a significant role in these movements.

153 The effendiyya’s morality, after all, was built on productivity, nation-building, and emulation of perceived Western modernity; anything that was seen as hampering those efforts was immoral by definition. The same could broadly be said for the reformist Azharis, to perhaps a slightly more limited extent. The missionaries’ morality was similarly reliant on perceived notions of Western modernity, Western productivity, and Western civilizational and religious superiority. Here, too, anything perceived to be antithetical to activities they saw as promoting those notions was at once immoral and non-modern.
the choices of targets of these temperance movements (e.g. prostitution and people who did not conform to the gender binary or the sexual binary), the reason these groups all used the same discourses they did and chose the many similar targets that they did was a result of convergent evolution, not some grand cultural or religious inheritance.

The reason for this convergence is important. We have seen how important to group/class identity the idea of national revival through temperance, in the case of the effendiyya and reformist Azharis, and global revival through temperance, in the case of the missionaries and temperance advocates, was. In the case of the medieval jurists, these rhetorics of revival might not apply per se, but they also connected individual use of intoxicants and the other brands of vice that they saw as resulting from it to, and construed it as, a societal and religious wound that they were heavily invested in seeing healed. All our discussed groups put productivity at the core of their morality, equated the two, and sought to improve productivity/morality by forcing out-groups, especially the poor, to stop engaging in behaviors that they saw as immoral/unproductive. Productive citizens, for these groups, fit the definition of able-bodied, able-minded, conforming to a “modern” (for everyone but the medieval jurists, a word which might in their case be replaced by “pious”) notion of gender roles and sexuality, and who worked as they were ordered to. The point this thesis is attempting to make is not that these groups were necessarily incorrect about the relation of productivity to intoxicant usage (though gender and sexuality certainly have no bearing on it); a heavy user and addict of, say, alcohol or opium might well be less able to work than an abstainer. Rather, the point is that productivity was at the heart of all our groups’ notions of morality and progress, resulting in similar movements and rhetoric. In placing the production of productivity/modernity/morality among the poor and other
out-groups at the core of their identities as a class and at the center of their grand cultural project, they left themselves unprepared for what might happen if their project failed. If the state could not be persuaded or coerced into enshrining temperance ideals into law or if, even with the power of the law behind them, the poor and the heterodox could not be controlled to this extent, what would that mean for advocates of temperance or, indeed, the classes that spawned temperance projects?

In Chapter One, we briefly discussed the failure of various medieval anti-vice and anti-intoxicant campaigns in Egypt and noted that, in the wake of those failures, that non-alcoholic intoxicants and their mass popular consumption became a subject best avoided. We also noted a curious ‘missionary silence’ on the part of missionaries in Egypt regarding temperance activities in Chapter Three. These silences are not accidental, and they come as a direct result of this centering of temperance as a vital part of class identity. In America, Prohibition’s complete failure caused global temperance movements to lose saliency and momentum and led most temperance organizations in America and abroad, including Egypt, to sink into obscurity.\textsuperscript{154} In Egypt, not only did temperance activities fail to have a substantial impact on the opinion of society as a whole or on the workings of the state (the British colonial government of Egypt never viewed alcohol or the black drugs as a serious problem or banned prostitution),\textsuperscript{155} but the dangers of narcotics, both real and imagined, actually grew. As mentioned before, cocaine and heroin became drugs of the multitudes after the First World War

\textsuperscript{154} Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 147-148.
(which the British did take seriously).\textsuperscript{156} Cannabis and opium are still grown, covertly or otherwise, in Egypt today and still have consumers.\textsuperscript{157} Given all this, it is not surprising that these group silences developed. Temperance became an embarrassment and talk of national or religious revival or global uplifting was generally hard to square with the reality that the world as a whole was just as vice-filled as it was before and the morals and social positions of the groups driving temperance just as relevant, or perhaps even less, than they were before.

This is not to say that temperance and other moral movements of the time did not leave a long legacy; they did. The United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, signed in 1961, accomplished what the evangelical narcotics temperance advocates of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century and the effendiyya could only dream of. The Single Convention added cannabis and opium and all their derivatives to Schedule I status, making them illegal among all signatories to the Convention and thus basically worldwide. This arguably could not have happened without the work of, among many others, F.C. Bridgman in China, Wilbur Crafts in Washington, Charles Brent at the Shanghai Commission, or Mohamed El Guindy in Geneva, without, in short, these groups and their attempts to assert their class position and to build moral societies in their own image. Drugs and other ‘vices’ such as prostitution or LGBTQ+ identities or (in more limited fashion) gambling had become seen, like they had in Baybars’ day, as threats to the healthy, productive operation of the modern individual in modern society and thus contrary to the interests of the state, and this may be the biggest legacy of the temperance movement. In making productivity central to morality, and rhetorically positioning vices as unified against that

productivity, temperance failed repeatedly on a national level around the world but succeeded, on some level and perhaps not permanently, on the international. In some ways, our chosen groups did succeed in imposing their moral visions on the world.

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158 Narcotic prohibition may be—and anti-LGBTQ+ prohibitions are—currently slowly in the process of breaking down globally.


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