2018

Who Was the Man in Mexico? The Degree to Which the Mexican State Enjoyed Autonomy and Sovereignty With Respect to Its National and International Relationships From 1958 to 1964

Sebastian Carrasco
Bard College

Recommended Citation

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects at Bard Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Projects Spring 2018 by an authorized administrator of Bard Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@bard.edu.
Who Was the Man in Mexico?

The degree to which the Mexican state enjoyed autonomy and sovereignty with respect to its national and international relationships from 1958 to 1964.

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
Sebastian Carrasco
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
May 2018
Acknowledgements

To my Advisor, Professor Miles Rodriguez, who has been guiding my investigations for almost a year. Thank you for your wholehearted energies to channel my passions for Mexico and making heads or tails from my incessant ramblings over my weeks’ readings and writings. No matter how one spins the wool, Mexico is an incredibly complex topic, domestically and internationally. Somehow I landed myself in project synthesizing both elements through the catalyst of a hidden world further inflamed by a highly volatile time period. Lastly, for your unwavering patience through thick and thin, I can only express my sincerest gratitude.

Mom and Dad, Granny and Dada, Abuela and Abuelo, this project is for you, a culmination of 21 years of experiences and the upbringing of at least two wonderful cultures; without your unbelievable nurturing, the last four years at Bard would have been impossible. Through this institution I was afforded the opportunity to reflect, reexamine, and change the precipitous course of my life, a Bardian metamorphosis. I finally came to the realization the most important lesson of all and my chrysalis: Discipline. Without discipline, this thesis, among many other ventures would have collapsed before they even began. Ultimately, a thank you cannot scratch the surface of my appreciation and indebtedness, but perhaps three words can: I love you.

To my family and new friends in Mexico, New York, and England, who have offered a constant supply of support and enthusiasm, renewing the faith in my ability to work persistently towards the pursuit of exposing the light of truth in a world slowly lapsing into a void of distortions. In the turbulent waters of geopolitics that embroil our countries’ histories in this new Cold War, the fantastical and absurd are more real than one might believe.

Clock Table Collective, you have all been tremendous allies for the last two years, and have created an unrivalled social setting and space for which strong personal connections have bloomed. You have all seen me at my best, at my worst, and continually carve out time to listen to my monologues ranging from personal frustrations, coffee consumption, Henry Kissinger, BBC’s Planet Earth, tomato soup, Gerald Barry, bizarre history factoids, and my senior thesis. Thank you for being a part of my life, it means more to me than you might know. A tremendous hug to you all.

Last but certainly not least, my dear friend Alci. The last ten years have certainly been a roller coaster ride, but your assistance throughout the years have been extraordinarily insightful and invaluable; a mentor. You have continually kindled the fire of historical analysis and skepticism that has served as undercurrent for my thesis, but more importantly as an application for my general academic career. I’ll never forget the call of Rosa Luxemburg, “Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently.”
Table of Contents

Introduction...........................................................................................................................................1

Part I..........................................................................................................................................................19
   Chapter One: Beginnings of the CIA Empire [1946-1954]...............................................................19
   Chapter Two: The Foundations For a Covert Empire [1956-1958].....................................................27

Part II........................................................................................................................................................38
   Chapter Three: The Tempo, Functions, and Rhythms of LI.............................................................38
   Chapter Four: Close, But No AMCIGAR…and Its Subsequent Reactions [1959-1964]..52
   Chapter Five: Re-organizing the American State [1961-1962].......................................................64
   Chapter Six: November 22, [1963-1964]............................................................................................75

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................81
Bibliography...............................................................................................................................................86
“Life left us all where we were meant to be or where it was convenient to leave us and then forgot us, which is as it should be.” Roberto Bolaño, *The Savage Detective*
Introduction: All These Events Really Happened

“Covert operations are important, illegal manipulations of society done secretly”¹

John Whitten, CIA official

Mexico’s relations, within academic contexts of historical cause and effect changes over time, tend to stem from its association with overtly imperialist overlords. These ranged from Spain to the United States, to a revolving door of Mexican-born, invader caudillos that assumed power through violent uprisings from the early 19th century to the early 20th century.² Once the record of these tumultuous phases passed through the digestive system of academics and amateur historians alike, Mexico slowly took a backdrop to the geopolitical powerhouses of World War II and the Cold War. The state became “an exceptional country”,³ achieving authoritarian civilian control by 1950.⁴ Perceptions of active conflict dictate the focus of typical foreign policy, regardless of its overt or covert nature. This in turn has the potential to shape the general framework of assimilating and pureeing information for the masses. Mexico in particular has had a corybantic and varied history – from its inception at the hands of Spanish rapists and murderers, like Hernando Cortés, up until the present, in which the Mexican general election between José Antonio Meade and Ricardo Anaya Cortés is set for 1 July, 2018. What these invasions have in common is an outright military presence, imparted throughout the regions of Mexico, and a standard assumption of occupation. Far less well-known, however, is the invasion of covert intelligence agencies at the highest levels of government. New CIA files have proven that three Mexican presidents – López Mateos, Díaz Ordaz, and Echeverría Álvarez –

⁴ Ibid., 79
were official informants (including during their tenures as cabinet appointees) of the United States Central Intelligence Agency under the direction of station chief Winston Scott.¹

One factor that is especially pertinent, though not necessarily limited, to a United States stratagem is proximity. Broadly speaking, as a geographic entity, Mexico is situated in prime locale – for northern or southern invasions, as a fulcrum for the operations of nations, or for independent rebellious groups to stockpile assets in order to trigger explosions of radical ideology. Despite its total size of 758,450 square miles,² modern Mexico, defined as the time during and after the consolidation of the party-state in 1929, somehow remained exempt from the Cold War norms of rampant military juntas sponsored by clandestine U.S. forces. Adapting this mindset all but excluded Mexico from having any agency during the Cold War, whilst retrospectively diminishing the role of its earlier modern state formation in the early 1930s, which had encompassed external U.S. pressures for oil; internal pressures from Japan with regards to oil and natural resources, and from Germany³ with regards to manipulating Mexico with Nazi propaganda to force an alignment with Axis powers. Although Nazi propaganda and Japanese trade deals did induce successful independent bilateral relationships in the short term, their very presence, together with the actions taken by the Mexican Government, belies a party-state mentality that climaxed in the early 1970s. This was all made possible through extensive conceptual application of saccadic masking⁴ in which – because there was no symbolic structure of Japanese or German power – movement and propagation of their respective economic–political agendas were left relatively unhampered and unobscured.

---

¹ Morley., 90-91
This phenomenon additionally allows one to understand precisely why the Mexican Government denied the U.S. Government permission to build any military bases in Mexico, as this symbolic manifestation of U.S. imperialism would hark back to the 1847 seizure of Mexico City and the amputation of fifty percent of Mexican territory through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and later the 1914-17 occupation of Veracruz. The dichotomous relations built by the Mexican state with foreign parties appears, upon further inspection, more akin to a business tycoon strengthening his Fortune 500 company; the most flagrant examples of a CEO behavior being demonstrated during the respective sexennios of Miguel Alemán and Luis Echeverría Álvarez. Overt policy became the mask of verisimilitude, while covert action embodied the policy of truth. While this is not necessarily revelatory information within the grand scheme of governmental operation, when placing this concept within the period of Mexico’s more stable state formation between 1929 and 1946, it not only imparts agency to Mexico’s sovereignty – that power to enforce laws – but accordingly dictates a somewhat paradoxical modus operandi that might have reduced its claim to sovereignty and dedication to nationalism. How then, would an idiosyncratic entity like the iterations of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), espousing rhetoric that claims a commitment to uphold nationalist revolutionary ideals, eventually fall victim to a direct, covert, invasion by both intelligence branches – namely the CIA and FBI – of a neighboring foreign power between 1950 and 1970? The most uninvolved answer is self-preservation, but when one attempts to tear away the layers of deception, a cesspool of major themes resurfaces under the umbrella of compartmentalization: the very definition of sovereignty in the age of espionage; the politics of how primary sources are revealed and used and the extent to which this history cannot be taught, the degree to which the

---

11 Between 1929 and 1946, the party-state evolved in name from the PNR, PRM, then eventually to the PRI
Mexican state enjoyed autonomy with respect to its national and international relationships, not only with the U.S. but with other Latin American nations like Cuba from 1946 to 1970; the degree to which the Mexican state consented to international alliances that might have reduced its claim to sovereignty and dedication to nationalism; and the ways in which international relationships and significant events that occurred in Mexico had wider global impacts than have been previously known, expected, or assumed. This investigation will attempt to unravel who really governed Mexico during this time period: the President of Mexico; the Mexican state (PRI); the Mexican national defense force, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS); the U.S. State Department; or its intelligence agencies, the FBI or CIA.

Simply beginning in 1950 is insufficient to understand the magnitude of elements operating at once; similarly in 1946, when the PRI was officially founded. One must begin in the early 1930s in order to pinpoint patterns of behavior, identifying Mexico’s broader political physiological disposition as a post-revolutionary state within the fabric of draconian global change, in an attempt to iron out the motivations of an establishment that somehow asserted and balanced three distinct positions in an ultimate act of agency representing present, future, and past. These were: neutrality as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); pro-capitalist favoring of the highest bidder; and pro-nationalistic support of sovereign, independent international relations – perhaps harking back the rebellions of Mexico’s past. This is especially poignant as a reaction to the aggressive 19th century U.S, Monroe Doctrine,\(^\text{12}\) which was thus supplemented by an ascending “concept of hemispheric defense, based on promoting military cooperation between all nations of the Western Hemisphere in order to repel external aggression”\(^\text{13}\) in the wake of fascist populism in Europe and Japan. However, Mexico, in a truly magnificent act of agency in 1937 and 1938, expropriated both railroads and oil industries from


\(^{13}\) Paz., 3
eager American investors,\(^4\) allowing Lázaro Cárdenas the ability to freely renegotiate trade deals. This, coupled with the emergence of Nazi agents in Mexico City, not only blindsided the U.S. State Department, but concurrently placed bargaining chips in Cárdenas’s hands in relation to economic-political deals with both the United States and Axis forces. During the years 1940 and 1941, the Mexican Government initiated a vital move for a greater degree of bilateralism with the U.S., which not only constrained movement of U.S. military officials,\(^5\) but also “resisted the establishment of U.S. military bases on its territory...and rejected the possibility of a joint military command, which would have implied the deployment of U.S. troops on Mexican soil as well as the subordination of the Mexican Army to a U.S. officer.”\(^6\) This brazen defiance of U.S. advances demonstrates a deftness and heightened awareness on Mexico’s behalf of its diplomatic position, and of U.S. desperation in the face of war, which allowed Mexico the latitude to impose restrictions against patent intrusions of its imperialist neighbor. Mexican statesmen were able to unearth the political pressure points of the U.S. in its most difficult times and manipulate outcomes based around this. “Mexico developed its negotiating skills, taking advantage of the fears and the security needs of its powerful neighbor. For the first time Mexico enjoyed a certain leverage over the United States.”\(^7\)

If junctures of war create opportunities for individuals to climb socio-political ladders, one could reason that the same logic applies on an exponentially larger scale, such as to an entire country. Mexico’s vociferous lineage of military coup d’états dating back to the 1820s, substantial concern about the one-party state refinement process and military subjugation – or rather the fear of increased “military-politico” power\(^8\) – denied Mexico under President Avila Camacho the equal footing with the U.S. it expected. Paz notes that a particular climate echoed

\(^4\) Ibid., 3
\(^5\) Ibid., 6: Plainclothes only
\(^6\) Ibid., 6
\(^7\) Ibid., 6
\(^8\) Ibid., 7
in Mexican relations with the U.S., in which “Mexican authorities had an underlying fear that the army and the navy could acquire political power through their dealings with the United States.”19 Thus two substantial shifts in governmental machinery took place in the wake of both Mexican and U.S. fears.

First, because Mexico – with its immense natural resources and immense stonewalling of American military expansion – was ascending to its place on the geopolitical table, the U.S. Government had to revise its strategy, shifting to bolster the work of the “Office of Strategic Services (OSS), [which] competed for leverage in the intelligence field with J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)”,20 which served more sinister functions than merely attempting to indirectly influence Mexico’s foreign policy. These agencies, including the Military Intelligence Division (MID) discreetly wove themselves into directly influencing domestic Mexican elections from 1940 onwards. As Aaron Navarro claims, “[a]s the United States attempted to maintain official neutrality in the Mexican presidential contests, debate raged over which candidate, Almazan or Amaro or Avila Camacho, would best serve U.S. interests in the long run.”21 On the other hand, the Mexican PRM, over the course of a 20 year span between 1930 and 1950, chronically afraid of cracks in their castle of glass, effectively accomplished what most countries have been unable to do: “Bring the military under firm civilian control, transform it into a more professional fighting force, and effectively scotch the political aspirations of the officer class, all the while reducing the percentage of GDP spent on national defense”22 in order to focus on strengthening the ruling PRM/PRI through constructions of opposition.23 The lynchpin of this Mexican transition of defense budget allocation was the development of the covert fighting force, the DFS. Perhaps one could argue that the shift from overt military power

19 Ibid., 7
20 Ibid., 7
21 Navarro., 79
22 Ibid., 79
23 Ibid., 78
to the covert preeminence of intelligence services was merely a product of the transition of World War II into the Cold War, but this reason alone is at best tenuous\textsuperscript{24} as the United States retained one of the largest militaries in the world as a containment force under the Truman Doctrine,\textsuperscript{25} fighting in the Korean War during the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 70s. This is not to say that Mexican interests were not invested in overt military defense, but rather this was a tool that later reemerged with their insistence on the nationalization of oil.\textsuperscript{26}

A strong argument must be made for Mexico’s rising interest in the international arena. With the direct threat of the U.S. looming large to the north, the perceived virus of fascism during the 30s and 40s, and then communism in the latter half of the 20th century, “[t]his decision was emblematic of the transition of the intelligence services from indirect to overt agents of the political agenda of the president and, by extension, the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). This shift, accelerated by growing budgets and foreign training, made the intelligence community itself a prime tool for subverting, co-opting, or destroying electoral opposition to the political elite.”\textsuperscript{27} Although the impending American threat was indeed omniscient and somewhat infinite, the era-appropriate international ideological time bombs bestowed Mexico with the opportunity to prove its tripartite balancing act of “exceptionalism” and saccadic masking, in dealing with Japanese and German\textsuperscript{28} foreign nationals, while also fending off the U.S. during the golden age of fascism from the mid-1930s until the end of World War II in 1945. In fact, the origins of the Mexican party-state as a

\textsuperscript{26} Paz., 5: “Although Mexican officials were quick to support the cause of hemispheric defense, it soon became evident that Mexico’s cooperation on military issues would be contingent on compromises in other fields, particularly the solution of the oil question.”
\textsuperscript{27} Navarro., 151
\textsuperscript{28} Paz., 27: “Mexico had been trading with Nazi Germany since 1934.”
“business state” might even have most corporeal significance “[b]efore [World War II], and from a strictly legal point of view, [as] there were no grounds for banning Germany from obtaining the raw materials it needed from Mexico.” Germany boasted a population of around 6,000 nationals within Mexico, and exploited this connection through the Auslands-Organization to strengthen its budding propaganda machine, which itself aimed to inflame staunch anti-American sympathies. Most essential for German operations between 1934 and 1940, in both swaying Mexico to the Axis side and in securing monopolies over Mexico’s natural resources, was to remain out of sight and out of mind from. In this respect, Arthur Dietrich ingeniously strategized forms of mobilization that rested on the foundation of German immigrants, but ultimately stemmed from the passions of the Mexican population. This was most effectively put to the pen by individuals like José Vasconcelos, José Pagés Llergo, Rubén Salazar Mallen, and Rafael Zubaran Campany. The United States, through its own intelligence reorganization efforts, noted via FBI observations in Mexico City that “German propaganda started to be perceived as a threat to the United States and a real obstacle to closer relations with Mexico.” As described and corroborated in meticulous depth by Aaron Navaro in his book Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954, the U.S. – in a half-baked, yet still potent attempt to block Nazi forces in Mexico – would intervene in the 1940 Mexican elections, by “[backing] the opposition candidate Juan Andreu Almazán...[as] Dietrich’s activities were becoming a nuisance to a Mexican government [allegedly] unable to cope simultaneously with local problems and U.S. pressures.”

---

29 Ibid., 27
30 Ibid., 28
31 Ibid., 27: Paz Outlines Dietrich’s four step plan, but I will focus specifically on the press.
32 Ibid., 30
33 Which according to Navarro, was less to do with the FBI’s effectiveness, but more due to Auslands-Organization’s blatant encryption mishaps.
34 Paz., 31
Unfortunately, the reaction by U.S. State Department officials had merit but, as National Archives and Records Administration records indicate, the German presence not only affirmed the growing covert threat within the U.S. consciousness, but also a reality that produced tangible, albeit exacerbated results. “The Nazis have an organization in Mexico which is next to perfect, in which all the Germans living in Mexico are enrolled, and whose tie is the ideology of terrorism.” This is perhaps exaggerated, but is nonetheless important as the effectiveness of intelligence digestion into foreign and domestic policy does not necessarily correspond to the total authenticity of the information itself, but the perception that it is true, as it equates to a feeling or partiality of truth that eventually leads to ideological infection. In the meantime, the relentlessness of German interests prevailed; their display of military might by invading Europe left Mexican officials more open than ever to considering hardline alliances and trade monopolies based on pre-existing historical conditions. Much like the United States, Germany’s extreme pressures to achieve overtly perennial footholds ultimately left it at a disadvantage, whilst the Mexican Government was left on the high ground with the agency to selectively benefit – if viewed solely as business – from both Germany and the U.S., as Cárdenas would reason, solving any economic insecurities. Essentially, the Cárdenas regime demonstrated its deft skill at overt declarations in tandem with covert actions by “[dealing] with the Axis regime much more than has ever been admitted, while all along claiming to favor Allies” for the most

35 Ibid., 31
37 Paz., 32, 34: “German propaganda claimed that once the war was over, the United States could not compete with a victorious Germany who would sell manufactures at very low prices. It also stated that after capturing the French and British merchant marines, Germany would be able to carry freight at very low prices, forcing the United States out of business….The fall of European countries in the spring of 1940 lent credence to German claims about the imminent victory of the Reich.”
39 Paz., 34
40 Ibid., 34
pragmatic reason, “[l]ess out of sympathy for Hitler than as a result of their antipathy towards the United States.” However, as crucial as the U.S.–German diplomatic passive–aggressive rivalry was important to Mexico’s counterbalancing act, which ultimately left Nazi Germany and the United States in limbo, Mexico’s geopolitical maneuvering to squeeze the best deals from the United States and Japan over topographical assets was the result of pure business acumen and pressures.

Ultimately, Germany’s long-term failures stemmed from not focusing solely on attaining control over Mexico’s natural resources, but instead swaying the natural consciousness of a country towards declarations of Axis alignment through exploiting anti-American sympathies. Their failures were also due to the expansion of U.S. intelligence services resources – and perhaps to failures of the Auschlands-Organization, which correlated with the increasing effectiveness of the FBI and MID – who interceded in attempts to take back control of negotiations, much to the chagrin of the American agencies. The Mexican Government was sending the U.S. a very clear message: they had no claims to establish military bases nor on their expropriated resources. This became all the more clear when dealing with another major Axis power, Japan, which in 1935 “[b]egan to be more interested in securing large quantities of raw materials, particularly strategic minerals for its war industry.” This first stage of its success was partly due to “The Treaty of Amity and Navigation signed by Mexico and Japan on October 8, 1924: this agreement awarded Japanese citizens privileges not enjoyed by other foreigners [in Mexico], and it remained in force until 1933.” Despite the dissolution of the treaty in 1933, the nine-year head start of this non-violent diplomacy set the Japanese Government leagues ahead of the United States and Germany when Cárdenas expropriated the oil industry in 1938.

---

41 Ibid., 34: Paz further argues that “Cardenas postponed any action against German intelligence agents for as long as he could while keeping up a prodemocratic discourse: thus Mexico kept its options open.”
42 Ibid., 35
43 Ibid., 35
Japanese representatives like Kisso Tsuru understood the sensitive nature of expanding into the oil venture, "see[ing] the long-term advantages of securing a strong foothold in the Mexican oil industry…[and that] the oil question in Mexico was highly politicized and much caution needed to be exercised…" when striking deals and bribes with Mexican politico-businessmen behind closed doors. Instead of exploiting anti-American motivations, Japan used provisions within Mexican law, as "[a]fter the expropriation, the participation of foreigners in the oil industry was banned, and it could never have been openly acknowledged that Japan had a vested interested in that industry." This planning appears strong, certainly a precursor to standardized Mexican politics, as fifteen to twenty years later in the PRI there remained a bottom line understanding between Japanese companies like La Laguna, run by Tsuru, or the Pacific Oil Company, run by Taiheiyo Kaisho, and the central government in Tokyo that these negotiations remain covert as "neither Japanese private interests nor the Japanese Government wanted to be openly associated with the deals."

Mexico’s bizarrely unique situation at this juncture in 1940 requires reflection. Lázaro Cárdenas’s consolidation of the national party, the PRM, in addition to nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, thrust Mexico into a wildfire of geopolitics to which it was perhaps unsuited. Nonetheless, it performed correctly, which was a determining factor for its place within the post-war global dynamics. In order for Mexico to properly navigate the sea of international relations, Mexico had to strengthen and reinforce its rather unkempt domestic politics. The one-party state amalgamation project was incredibly ambitious, especially in proportion to Mexico’s land mass,

---
44 Ibid., 40
45 Ibid., 40
46 Ibid., 41 Additionally, “The Japanese project sponsored by Kisso Tsuru, head of La Laguna, included the exploitation of the oil concessions previously obtained, as well as the negotiation of some new ventures. It entailed clandestinely bringing to Mexico a considerable number of officials of the Pacific Oil Company (Taiheiyo Kaisha). Tsuru’s fruitful contacts with Mexican officials in prominent positions suggested this could be possible. For the past several years Dr. Tsuru had been in business with various politicians linked to Emilio Portes Gil and Francisco Múgica, including Generals Juán Barragán, Dámaso Cárdenas, and Antonio Villareal. Perhaps the most useful contact was Modesto C. Rolland, former under secretary of communications and since 1939 under secretary of national economy.”
the density of cities like Ciudad de Mexico, and the country’s ethnic diversity, including immigrants from such countries as Japan and Germany. Relative order had to be maintained, which could be reduced to a two-step process: decimating the power of the military and exponentially increasing domestic, partisan police forces and intelligence services. “By 1947,” writes Aaron Navarro in Chapter Four of *Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954*, “Mexico boasted an outwardly professional intelligence service modeled on the organization and techniques of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).” A stable political state emerging from the ashes of ten years of civil wars, or the fear of lapsing back into this, drove the political elites to conditions of unadulterated paranoia. Venustiano Carranza understood this best in 1918, by commanding “[i]nformation on his friends and enemies in order to maintain political control [Departamento Confedencial].”

During its lifespan, the iteration of Mexican Intelligence, the DFS, which was prevalent during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, became the personal hand of “Presidential authority” – unlike its corresponding branch based in the United States, the FBI. This is itself was troubling considering the relationship between Mexico’s commander-in-chief and the CIA. Much like its 1918 ancestor, the DFS “afforded the political elite a valuable (and legal) tool for suppressing dissent…” During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the role of covert programs was rising, and more resources were given to the MID, FBI, and DFS. The agencies, like the secret police of many authoritarian states, “were professionalized…[and] also became more politicized and established lasting ties to the bureaucratic and political agenda of the PRI.” Most importantly, as is discussed throughout the rest of Navarro’s book, the intelligence-gathering of the DFS

---

47 Navarro., 150
48 Ibid., 153
49 Ibid., 185
50 Ibid., 185
51 Ibid., 186
allowed for political competition to be snuffed\textsuperscript{52} almost as quickly as it gained traction; a silent hand that paved the way for a form of stability which was the basis “[o]f the PRI’s electoral dominance over the decades after World War II.”\textsuperscript{53} Even if Mexico was suddenly propelled into the geopolitical spotlight during World War II, Mexico had the backdoor luxury of major global powers vying for its resources, in addition to limited fighting\textsuperscript{54} which allowed for covert action to be concentrated almost solely towards the progression of the Mexican party-state, thus allowing it to negotiate with the United States, Germany, and Japan on very familiar terms.

Ergo, when talks between Mexico and Japan on the germination of oil pipelines and oversees wartime trade was discovered by the United States and an embargo was accordingly enforced, it represented a key moment for the Mexican Government – regardless of whether it recognized these events happening in the context of their historical linearity or not. In a pivotal page towards the end of the chapter “Mexico and the Axis Threat” in Paz’s book, she explicitly details two points of significance during this moment of realization. First, the power of the American Embassy and Ambassador\textsuperscript{55} in handling foreign relations, and the commitment to clandestine politics by the Mexican President\textsuperscript{56} – either because of his ignorance of autonomous local politics\textsuperscript{57}, which in itself is problematic, or because of his cunning\textsuperscript{58} as a the spearhead of Mexico’s awakening power. Subliminally, the groundwork for Mexico’s post-war policy and future is laid out. Mexican policy, more specifically that of “Cárdenas’s flirtation with Japan during his last year in office was consistent with his attitude toward Germany. More than an

\textsuperscript{52} Navarro delves deep into the political sabotage majority candidates perpetrated through the medium DFS agents during the 1940 [Chapter 1], 1946 [Chapter 3], and 1952 [Chapter 5] elections

\textsuperscript{53} Navarro., 186

\textsuperscript{54} 201st Air Squadron

\textsuperscript{55} Josephus Daniels

\textsuperscript{56} Cárdenas

\textsuperscript{57} Paz., 44 “As the records suggest, this was not the only instance where the Japanese ‘mixed’ with corrupt Mexican officials in relation to oil…”

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 45: “It later emerged that...the Mexican Air Force could not use more than 216,000 gallons a year, therefore indicating that the greater part of the order was intended for re-export to Japan.”
ideological identification there was a need to create a counterbalance in relation to the United States. By acting in this tripartite manner during his sexennio, Cárdenas granted more freedom of movement and leniency towards the non-military physicality of foreign powers, albeit with ideological constraints, as best as could be implemented throughout Mexico. Acting in this manner not only placed a heavier emphasis on the actions of external policy on Mexico’s domestic situation, but in addition greenlit Mexico as a grab-bag for covert movement, including the roles of intelligence agencies as sanctioned by their respective governments, and rebellious “foco” groups fighting against those very powers. Mexican policy therefore created strengths through seeming paradoxes.

For one, it confused the U.S. State Department into allegiances which acted as a type of bargaining chip for Mexico, whilst simultaneously using forms of state-terror to keep its population in check through the quintessential American ideal of fighting Communism; this certainly kept the gateway of money flowing from the United States. One can only speculate that American government officials saw between these cracks, turning away from the issue of oil and overt hemispheric defense to using Mexico’s perceived advantage as a backdoor for the FBI and CIA to gain a foothold in the hub of espionage, thus truly beginning a golden age of surveillance and counter-espionage. Mexico had inadvertently been invaded by the United States once again. This dynamic only complicates matters further, as arguments and counter-arguments over the victims and victors of these clandestine policies becomes a catch-22, ultimately affecting not only international relations but the consequences and fallout of Mexico’s domestic Cold War historical legacy.

Reducing multiple major furtive dynamics spanning roughly more than 77 years can be challenging, as one must attempt to piece together histories that were deliberately kept secret; perceptions of truth can be perceived as fiction or are often too incomprehensible to classify.

---

59 Ibid., 45-46
The global fallout from World War II provided Mexican and American services with this chance: the fascist threat and related business opportunity slowly bled into the great Red menace of Communism. Unlike Germany and Japan, the poster children for fascism in Mexico during the 1930s and 40s, global declarations for the demise of any communist terror had a biography of spite, fear, and persecution. German and Japanese migrants dating back to the early 1920s settled in Mexico with the relatively undiluted intentions of establishing new political–economic alliances in the wake of a reborn Mexico, triumphing form the ashes of ten brutal years of civil wars. During the dawn of World War II, Germany and Japan each endeavored respectively\(^{61}\) to maximize resources from Mexico—German attempts to convert the country as a whole and Japanese attempts to secure land for oil production and transportation.

Efforts to subvert fascist progression in Mexico by Mexican or American forces appeared as a secondary facet to World War II: reactionary and superficial, designed only to subvert major aggressions as they emerged, additionally coinciding with an alteration in U.S. attitudes towards its southern brethren. Direct military confrontations based around moralism or realism in Latin America would tarnish the U.S. Government’s reputation, especially when its legacy included the disasters of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The 1955 ratification of the Warsaw Pact\(^{62}\) only solidified global commitment to omnipotent surveillance states, for which the FBI’s tenure in monitoring Mexico City from around 1939\(^{63}\) established a firm foothold for American operations throughout Latin America, especially for the newly established Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.

The intentions and actions of Japan and Germany for roughly a decade, coupled with rising post-war fears, especially for the ambitious Mexican party-state, neatly converged to a

\(^{61}\) Though no evidence suggests their efforts were cooperative.


\(^{63}\) Jefferson Morley., 85: “The FBI, which had maintained an office in the Mexican capital since 1939.”
dynamic of “[h]eavy U.S. involvement in training and supplying the Mexican services in order to
guarantee their reliability in protecting the common border.” There was a price to pay, however,
as increasing effectiveness of the DFS allowed the “FBI [ascendency] in Latin American
intelligence operations.” The delicate dynamics of this FBI ascendency, paving the way for CIA
domination in the late 1960s, also reinforced the authoritarian nature of the PRI such that “[t]he
repressive capabilities of the intelligence services combined with the political zeal of the PRI
leadership provided the party the means to dominate political life for decades.”

One must not take lightly the impression left by individuals throughout the fortification of
state formation and behavior in international relations during the mid-20th century. In particular,
Lázaro Cárdenas, the grandfather of the nation, set the precedent for U.S.-Mexican relations
throughout the Cold War. By nationalizing oil in 1939 when it was crucial, barely twenty years
after the Mexican Revolution, he became the first Latin American head of state to enter the
post-World War II period of anti-colonial struggles, solidifying Mexico's position by claiming
neutrality through the Non-Alignment movement, thus promoting the idea that the third world
should be independent. It is difficult to imagine future sexennios leaving behind footprints as
impactful as Cárdenas’s; Cárdenas became the gold standard for Mexican presidencies, not
only in stature, but under the tutelage of Cárdenas.

As post-World War II recuperation morphed into the Cold War, Mexico began to unfurl its
political ideology as a haven for political refugees in an act of solidarity, simultaneously shifting
priorities from exporting its own revolution to hyper-nationalizing myths. The revolution did leave
a structure of government, however; a “Hegemonic Party”, an independent, corporate entity,
influenced by traces of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism in addendum to prioritization of
U.S. State Department interests which chronically influenced Mexico’s geopolitical alignment.
Reactionary, but never neglecting its profound sense of national dependence, Mexico’s

---

64 Navarro., 186
65 Ibid., 186
domestic policy revolved around a set of institutions that defined the *perception* of the country as a more developed and stable society than many of its neighbors, which accordingly developed Mexico’s agency to please as many countries as it could through its tripartite balancing act. There was no outright denial, instead there was an opting to wear out and thin the competition through negotiation until they backed off. Pressures to uphold stature and the spirit of the myths of the Mexican Revolution could alternatively enable the necessary justifications for an invisible hand, such as the CIA, in the overwhelming pursuit to project Mexico as intrinsically stable.

The CIA did not simply begin its illustrious career in 1946 as the despised powerhouse in Latin America that overthrew or paid off democratically elected governments to uphold its dedication to eradicate communism. “The Association for Responsible Dissent estimates that by 1987, 6 million people had died as a result of CIA covert operations. [In fact] Former State Department official William Blum correctly calls this an ‘American Holocaust.’”

The CIA supported some of the deadliest, longest-lasting right wing authoritarian juntas in human history; some of these countries, like Chile, Guatemala, and Argentina, remain as bloody hell holes; others that emerged from the dark stains of the Cold War are still attempting to reclaim their history and punish those responsible through the legal system. The CIA came from more simple origins, from dreary offices in London, England, barely able to support the success of its operations.

---


In the age of Wikileaks and declassified National Security Archives documents, one constant remains: the Central Intelligence Agency, which enthusiastically supported men like Augusto Pinochet or Efraín Ríos Montt, ingeniously implementing failsafes to distance itself enough from its crimes in order to remain unpunished for its flagrant human rights violations. Even countries like Mexico, which have often been cited by historians like Peter H. Smith as the exception to the “traditional Latin American narrative” did not remain untouched by American intelligence, but were played. The face of Mexico’s one-party system masked the CIA agent, Winston Scott, who injected a viral network of agents to create the most important information collection and counterintelligence operations station in the world. This is, once again, superficially bizarre if one accepts Mexico as a rising, independent geopolitical juggernaut, exploiting the vulnerability of the world theatre during World War II in order to assert itself as a paragon of Latin American influence.\(^{70}\)

Part I: Living in Mexico, 1956
“Our Mexico station was the most elaborately equipped and effective in the counterintelligence field of any we had in the world,”71 John Whitten

Chapter One: Beginnings of the CIA Empire [1946-1954]

The decade between September 1945 and August 1956 appears overtly inconsequential in the span of global history. The Korean War, spanning from 1950 to 1953 is certainly not irrelevant, but as NATO Pact and Marshall Plan recipients solidified alliances in tandem with the opposing Eastern European Warsaw Pact members, the theatre of new age warfare skirmishes had been staged. The success of the Manhattan Project quickly thrust nations into the frenzies of the atomic age, exponentially escalating domestic and international tensions towards the precipice of M.A.D72(ness).73 Woven within and entombed beneath this Shakespearean drama, a more sinister epoch of Western geopolitical strategy unfurled from “Ryder Street, [where] that soldierly bond [was] forged working in [the] cold”74 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) headquarters in London. Over informal dining experiences, two sets of men in the latter half of two decades bookended the forging and demonstration of American counterintelligence supremacy. First Kim Philby, one of the most infamous double agents in espionage history, and Winston “Scottie” Scott75 kindled the fire in 1946, allowing the OSS to transition into the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), which eventually grew and rebranded itself as the Central Intelligence Agency,76 and which, “for the next twenty-five years...grew into a worldwide empire

71 Morley., 89
73 In the United States for example, McCarthyism swept the nation in a Red Scare tornado.
74 Morley., 53
75 Ibid., 41
76 Ibid., 42 “The SSU was rechristened the Central Intelligence Agency and assumed the lead in relations with the British secret service. Win’s relationship with Philby smoothed the way.”
of violence, propaganda, influence, and power.”⁷⁷ Over a decade later, in August 1958, Scott would dine with an unnamed informant in Los Pinos⁷⁸ and “[f]rom that summertime breakfast [in Mexico] would emerge the operation known as LITEMPO, a network of paid agents and collaborators in and around the Mexican president’s office that proved to be one of Win’s greatest professional accomplishments.”⁷⁹

Empires do not simply run themselves, however, and this is especially true for a cloak-and-dagger enterprise. Talented liars and ambitiously patriotic individuals, through covert actions, attempt to enact their interpretations of national policy upon countries or organizations, whilst keeping the extent of their actions redacted within one’s own agency, other national agencies or government branches, and secret from the public masses that their movements supposedly protect. Any failure of duty could have untold consequences, including personal betrayal – the most catastrophic. Winston Scott, Allen Dulles, and Philip Agee understood these intricacies perfectly.⁸⁰ Saccadic masking, the pinnacle of successful espionage operations, indicated a chameleon-like adeptness in carrying out orders in plain sight, a lesson that British and American Intelligence did not learn soon enough in Eastern Europe.⁸¹

In order to thoroughly understand the CIA’s paramount position in Mexico City, one must interweave the macro and micro developments of the institution and of its eventual station chief, Winston Scott. As Scott rose through the ranks of the espionage world,⁸² it became clear that

---

⁷⁷ Ibid., 13
⁷⁸ Residence of the Mexican President
⁷⁹ Ibid., 90
⁸¹ Corera, Gordon. The Art of Betrayal: The Secret History of MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service. London: Phoenix, 2012; Operations to destabilize Communist presence in Romania and Poland suffered disastrous consequences as a result of the notorious infestation of double agents such as the Cambridge Five embedded within MI6: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and, John Cairncross or Victor Rothschild in accordance with the lack of adaptability for ground agents in the face of sudden change.
⁸² Morley., 43: “Win and Kim each lived the private dance of a double life. Each understood that the other served the useful purpose of sustaining his own architecture of dissembling. Kim knew that Win’s fellowship ratified his standing as the British intelligence official most congenial to the Americans. Win
his entire career, highly influenced by his time in London and the effect of MI6’s Oxbridge club world, would be defined by unwavering belief in the sanctity of personal loyalty. The CIA’s first five years as an independent American institution yielded less than stellar results in the fight against Communism, both on the global battlefront and in addition to its diplomatic relations with MI6. When Kim Philby was eventually exposed as double agent in 1951 after around seventeen operational years, one can imagine the deeply profound sense of betrayal felt by Scott. He knew Philby personally as a family friend and as professional colleague, having helped him to move through the ranks of covert bureaucracy and as a representative of the freshly formed CIA. Matters were not helped either for the Central Intelligence Agency or for Scott: “[a]s inspector general, [he] had to deal with the realities of the agency, and they could be publicly humiliating. In December 1952, the Soviets made the CIA spooks look especially silly.” One can only imagine the psychological stresses this places on a government agency or individual, as treachery after deceit after deception stacks up exponentially, inducing crippling self-doubt in national allies, close personal friends, and the ability for the self to be a patriot fulfilling his duties. Although Scott’s predicament as a tool of the American government did not necessarily improve in the short term, an almost clinical drive for absolute control and success can be traced to this time. This psychology certainly applies towards the CIA as an institution operating

knew that Kim’s hospitality sustained the so-called special relationship between England and America, not to mention his image as husband and devoted father.

83 Ibid., 41-42: “Over lunch, he asked Win if he might clarify the plans of the U.S. government. He had heard Americans saying that the SSU, the new name for OSS...The question was settled within the year. The SSU was rechristened the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and assumed the lead in relations with the British secret service. Win’s relationship with Philby smoothed the way.”

84 Scott’s 1958 LI program in Mexico City at the highest levels was specifically built from this platform. Morley., 58-60: “Philby’s impact on world history, the CIA, and his American associates was profound. By the summer of 1951, he had been a Soviet spy for seventeen years. His superiors in the Soviet intelligence headquarters later calculated that he, Burgess, and Maclean had provided more than 20,000 pages of valuable classified documents and agent reports over the years. Philby had kept Moscow apprised of British and U.S. intelligence reorganization efforts after the war. He had short-circuited the Anglo-American campaign to promote anticomunist rebellion in Albania, the Balkans, and Ukraine (although several CIA hands came to believe those secret uprisings probably would have failed anyway due to their own shortcomings).”

85 Ibid., 64-65
within Latin America, but more importantly towards Winston Scott, representing the idealistic, microcosmic synergy between the more conservative democracy of the late 1940s and 50s, and his own personal ambitions. This did not however indicate a smooth, linear ascension towards his promotion to field station chief in Mexico City running LI. It is in this manner that one can view Scott as a microcosm of the autonomous CIA, protecting and propagating American values in the global conquest of ideology (and territory). Thus, there was a shift of focus towards Western Hemisphere containment, in an attempt to uphold the faces of the Monroe and Truman Doctrines, against a perceived easier target, as the KGB was too relentless in the Eastern Bloc.

What were Scott’s core ambitions, the platform that was supercharged during the espionage fiascos of the early 1950s? “Win felt strongly that it was imperative for the new agency [the CIA] not just to collect information via espionage but to also mount secret operations against communist forces everywhere.” Nonetheless, merely having committed goals does not reflect the methodology and means of achieving such formidable objectives. It is no coincidence that Scott concocted some of his most important career plans at luncheons with Kim Philby, Allen Dulles, Jim Angleton, or high ranking Mexican statesmen, as “[h]e excelled at that most benign of the espionage arts, the art of making friends with people with different loyalties. His specialty was ‘liaison.’ [During World War II] He bonded with the British, knowing how to elicit their cooperation and secrets, despite the fact that they were self-interested and sometimes snobbish.” This is fundamentally important for Scott’s tenure as Mexico City’s station chief between 1956 and 1968, as this allowed him personally to seamlessly navigate and exploit the PRI’s politics of “friendships”. Before any of this could be established, however, the CIA – which was the underdog within the global context of the Cold War – had, much like the

87 Ibid., 50
88 Ibid., 42
Mexican state during the late 1930s and World War II, to uniquely assert itself as a serious actor.

There was no better way to do this than with success, or more specifically, Operation Success; a paradigm of the Truman Doctrine under the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, taking place five years before Fidel Castro and Che Guevara ousted Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959. The ability to install Colonel Castillo Armas would demonstrate the commitment to which defense of U.S. interests became an outward expansion of actively intervening in the affairs of countries in which the U.S. perceived a foothold for communist influence, blinding State Department and intelligence members to the realities of the target country in favor of radical anti-communist ideology. The unequivocal triumph of this program was paramount for two crucial reasons. First, the failures on the Eastern European front crippled the resolve of foreign operations to live up to nationalist rhetoric. Second, dispensing self-proclaimed American justice in their own backyard determined the future capacities of U.S. intelligence programs in Latin America, thus setting the parameters and standards for future

91 Morley,, 69: “In learning the story of the CIA’s campaign against Guatemalan democracy, Michael [Scott’s son] was relieved to find out that his father was on the sidelines.”
92 Ibid., 63-64: “The agency’s agenda of aggressive secret operations against the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, which Allen Dulles had been pushing since at least 1948, had collided with at least two hard realities. First, the British and French secret services did not have a lot of patience for rhetoric about “rolling back” communism in Eastern Europe. The European allies thought “rollback” to be a pipe dream, if not a script for war. They felt the communists in power in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest were there to stay. Fantasies of overthrowing them via cliques of financially dependent exiles in distant capitals were American romance, not serious politics. In the words of one British historian, “The British and American secret services now found themselves increasingly at odds on the ground.”
The bloody coup\textsuperscript{95} of 1954 followed this model to the letter,\textsuperscript{96} which resulted in a major moral boost for the State Department, but also simultaneously provided the set up to the punchline of the joke which was Operation AMCIGAR. In the foreword to the 41 page CIA briefing about SUCCESS, Chief Historian of the CIA, J. Kenneth McDonald, states that “Nick Cullather’s Study of PBSSUCCESS reveals both why CIA thought PBSUCCESS had been a model operation, and why this model later failed so disastrously as a guide for an ambitious attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs 1961.”\textsuperscript{97} In a cruel deliverance of bathos that only hindsight could truly illuminate, “[t]he State Department’s review of Latin America in late 1952 found it ‘improbable that the Communists will gain direct control over the policy of any Latin American state, at least during the next several years.’ The Soviet Union had no presence in Guatemala. Communist diplomats in neighboring Mexico rarely visited.”\textsuperscript{98}

This still does not quite pinpoint the psychological principles that propelled such polarizing outcomes in the 1954 and 1961 covert operations. If the Truman Doctrine served as an umbrella that merely articulated a general consensus of the Western Cold War aesthetic, a more contextual framework of American ideological stabilization must have been consolidated to allegedly rid their backyard from communist pests. In \textit{Talons of the Eagle}, Peter H. Smith eloquently described a ten-step plan that allowed men like Colonel Castillo Armas or Fulgencio

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{94} Agee., 46: “Finally, there is the matter of penetration of local services by the CIA. For many reasons, not the least of which is protection of the CIA itself, operational operational doctrine demands the continued effort to recruit controlled agents within liaison services. These agents, or prospective agents, are usually spotted by CIA officers assigned to work with the local service to exchange information, to train the local service to and to work on the operations mounted by the local service to support the CIA. Thus a CIA station may have an information-exchange program going with a local service, a joint telephone-tapping operation with the local service and an officer or two of the local service on the payroll as a penetration of the same service. Penetration of liaison services, however, is more properly a counter-intelligence function.”

\textsuperscript{95} Morley., 61: “The CIA’s covert operation propelled a growing democracy into decades of civil war that cost some 200,000 people their lives.”


\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 5

\textsuperscript{98} Morley., 66
\end{flushleft}
Batista to usurp or retain their footholds in Latin America on behalf of the United States. The CIA, with the power and agency to pull the trigger on any of these plans, unreservedly shot first, asked questions later without regard for the consequences – which all but became the norm throughout Latin America. From the execution of the Guatemala coup onwards, “[o]n the clandestine side, the prevailing CIA view was different: any communist influence was a sign of incipient Soviet control [in the context of the Cold War] no matter what Guatemalan democracy decided.” Though not necessarily involving Winston Scott to the extent one would see a mere few years later in Mexico City, it is vital to recognize the Mexican Government’s stance through the ordeal. Their passive denial towards Secretary John Foster Dulles’s policy regarding the Pan-American dedication to subverting international Communism through a vote of abstention during the “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954” months before CIA operations destabilized the country is certainly a testament towards Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and the PRI’s ability to double down on Cold War geopolitics. The lack of both hardline rejection and any commitment towards Dulles’s policy left Mexico in the good graces of both the Latin American governments and the U.S. State Department. Ernesto “Che” Guevara certainly took advantage of this opportunity, after witnessing the collapse of Jacobo Arbenz’s government, which, as

---


100 Morley., 66


Mark T. Hove contends in his article “The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala”; opened his eyes to Latin America’s struggles. He then fled to Mexico City where he and Fidel Castro would exponentially radicalize Cold War bipartisanship. Meanwhile, “Win celebrated over lunch with Jim Angleton. It was a great day for the agency.”

---


105 Morley., 71
Chapter Two: Foundations For a Covert Empire [1956-1958]

Whether or not the CIA knew of or seriously counteracted any of the Cuban guerrilla activities before the Cuban Revolution is difficult to ascertain, especially in lieu of Scott's establishment in the Mexico Station. What is abundantly clear is the timeliness of Woodrow Wilson's sentiments about Latin America in 1917: “What America has to fear, if she has anything to fear, are indirect, roundabout, flank movements upon her regnant position in the western hemisphere.” In the meantime, Operation Success fulfilled its function better than many could have hoped, “prov[ing] that Americans could subvert, sabotage, and destroy their perceived enemies and feel good about it.” However, as this narrative rests both on the CIA's exploits and Winston Scott's personal accomplishments, the period between the Arbenz Coup in 1954 and the formal installation of the Mexico City Station in 1956 left Scott in an increasingly frustrated position. His drive, motivation, and dedication towards the CIA and the United States remained a constant linearity, in contrast to the realities of internal bureaucracies, which left Scott stuck at a cul-de-sac in his career. In addition to feeling particularly jaded, he perceived the system was devaluing his time and efforts, thus depriving him of the wave of upward mobility that Jim Angleton and Bill Harvey were riding after the success of Guatemala. This sting hit Scott particularly bitterly in light of an initially deceptive thrust into the upper echelons of the agency. “As the winter of 1954 turned into the spring of 1955, Scott had secured a position of trust in the commanding councils of the CIA, not as a policy maker but as a troubleshooter.” The life of war ten years prior, of imminent destruction in the face of V-2

106 Shoultz., 344
107 Morley., 76
108 Ibid., 78: “Win could have been forgiven for feeling he was on the path to nowhere. He had been sidelined from the operational work of the agency...But Angleton and Harvey had moved onward and upward while he still was giving lectures on the organization of the British secret services to the young men who would go out to do the real job.”
109 Ibid., 75
rockets, had slowly corroded into monotonous paper pushing in which Scott “[n]ow...attended a lot of meetings, many of them unrelated to the intelligence-gathering work he loved.”¹¹⁰ Desperation and resentment festered, all the more aggravated by the arrival of his newborn son, Michael, and a thyroid condition.¹¹¹

Interestingly, Scott’s initial deployment to Mexico stemmed not necessarily from a blind sense of loyalty, but from a desire to escape to an “exotic” locale, Latin America, a place for a gringo to craft his own story. For Scott, “[l]ife was going to be just fine, just as soon as he could get the hell out of Washington. Dulles responded with a deserved prize. Scott would be the chief of the CIA’s station in Mexico City.”¹¹² Unfortunately, not much more explanation is given within Jefferson Morley’s book, nor through other attainable primary or secondary sources, regarding either Scott’s status as the new station chief, or an overall idea of the relationship between the CIA and Mexico City. To extrapolate, insofar as information does exist, what this does indicate is the convergence of covert and overt American outlook and policy towards Mexico. First, if one accepts that there was no embassy built in Mexico City until 1960 – why was this? Did the U.S. Government assign little to no strategic value to Mexico City until Winston Scott made it important? Where did the CIA work in its stead? If the U.S. embassy on Paseo Reforma was indeed operational when Scott began work in Mexico, the lack of concrete information for something seemingly so simple is questionable. The CIA did, in fact, have an inconspicuous presence in Mexico City five years earlier under E. Howard Hunt, but then dismissed his post to

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 78
¹¹¹ Ibid., 79
¹¹² Morley., 79: “The next morning Win walked into Dulles’s office to ask for a new job. He wanted out. He wanted something in Latin America. He had fond memories of Cuba, living with Ray Leddy in Havana, and playing baseball in the hot sun. He had once promised Paula he would take her to Rio or Havana, and now he wanted to make good on it. Life was going to be just fine, just as soon as he could get the hell out of Washington. Dulles responded with a deserved prize. Win would be the chief of the CIA’s station in Mexico City.”
focus on Operation Success in 1953. More mysterious is the perplexing job of historically placing America’s overt diplomatic representation, the embassy, in conjunction with Scott’s arrival. Scott was placed in Mexico City in late 1956 or early 1957, where he not only worked out of the embassy on Paseo Reforma, but “was officially part of the State Department too. For public consumption, his job title was First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy.” Other limited sources place the initial construction of the embassy in 1960, and final completion in 1964. Morley certainly helps matters not by omitting chronological infrastructure in Chapter Seven “The American Proconsul”. Perhaps minutely important in the grand scheme of CIA enterprises in Mexico City, the noticeable lack of information, a black box, perhaps attests to successful saccadic masking in the covert world; the tip of an iceberg of deception in the digital age.

Assuming that Mexico City’s tantamount strategic location was ambiguous, a country whose focus on inward domestic consolidation left it in a precarious balancing act, especially in the wake of the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, Scott inherited a personal and institutional quandary: how to carve his legacy into the annals of the CIA whilst simultaneously wading through Mexican politics to solidify allegiances and plant the seeds of American foreign policy. Assuming Howard E. Hunt made little to no progress, Scott opted to hit the ground running and “wasted no time in stepping up the scope and power of CIA operations.”

---

113 Ibid., 85: “The debut of the CIA in Mexico had not been auspicious. One of the first CIA operatives in Mexico was E. Howard Hunt, a graduate of Brown University and a novelist with a gift for clichés. He came in 1951 as chief of the OPC station. A brash man of outspoken conservative convictions, Hunt inevitably offended the sensibilities of some at the embassy and more than a few Mexicans, who mistrusted his Yanqui style. When he moved on to join Operation Success in Guatemala in late 1953, he was not missed by many.”

114 Ibid., 85


117 Morley., 85
acting as CIA station chief however, Scott had his personal work cut out for him; as a newcomer, he suffered the major disadvantage of an being American who also shared the name of a general heavily weighted by a hundred years of American imperialism.\textsuperscript{118} His situation was additionally handicapped by neither speaking Spanish, nor having any powerful connections.\textsuperscript{119} Additional pressures were compounded by the hierarchy in Washington that felt that Guatemala’s triumph was an exception in a losing fight against Communism.\textsuperscript{120} Little would the CIA understand at the close of 1956 that Scott’s appointment to a relatively unknown CIA field station would be the Hail Mary the United States Government did not know it needed. The CIA empire that Jim Angleton desired\textsuperscript{121} would spawn from Scott’s abilities to synthesize business and pleasure through personal relations “with the leaders of the Mexican government [with whom] he could be his natural self, an easygoing man, equally at home in male or female company...He seduced Mexicans just as he had enchanted the British after the war: with a sly, con dent, soft-spoken American charm.”\textsuperscript{122} Scott was simply reverting to techniques that 16th century Spaniards knew all too well, the conquest of “the soul of mankind.”\textsuperscript{123}

It is at this crossroads in which the Mexican PRI’s international system of double dealing in conjunction with its domestic policy of consolidation and friendships collided with Scott’s own ambitions and need for complete operational control. Unlike the Mexican-American business

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 86: “He knew full well that ‘Win Scott’ was not a popular name among Mexican officials. One hundred ten years earlier, another Win Scott from Washington—General Winfield Scott of the U.S. Army—had arrived in Mexico City, at the head of a column of U.S. soldiers. They occupied the city for nine months in 1848.”
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 85: “The politics of Win’s assignment in Mexico were not simple. The United States was not popular in a country that it had alternately bullied and ignored for a century.”
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 76: “Dulles’s view [was] that the CIA was in danger of losing its secret war against the KGB. In the months that followed, Doolittle came to agree. He thought the agency was a mess, ‘a vast and sprawling organization manned by a large number of people, some of whom were of doubtful competence.’”
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 84: “‘[Jim] Angleton, as chief of the new Counterintelligence Staff, was building an empire.’”
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 85-86
\end{itemize}
negotiations for oil and military bases during World War II, which immediately triggered a
defensive reaction by the Mexican Government – a new wave of American imperialism overtly
targeted towards them – Scott spoke the soft language of elites: individual wealth. The crucial
element boiled down to the perception of the actors involved in the interactions and where the
agency of the final outcomes lay. In the former, Mexico’s agency was in its power to stall and
deny the penetration and control of a United States Government institution. Scott’s strategy did
not represent imperialism, rather a mutual relationship between one individual and another as
“[h]e spoke to powerful Mexicans as a warm and reliable friend from the modern empire to the
north...Win Scott came with technology, cash, and friendship.”124 After all, he was the new kid
on the block, therefore how powerful could he be? As it turned out, Scott’s deadliness reflected
the seamless point wherein politics melded with informal dinner conversation; his arrival in
Mexico City during the latter half of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’s sexennio correlated to a juncture in
the Cold War chess game where the CIA had to transcend its function as a purely reactionary
force, and instead mold itself into the dominant global predator, where “[i]ts hidden
hand...remained unbound.”125

[At this occasion, it would be remiss not to mention a major disadvantage of this project.
Much of the evidence is biased towards the American perspective, in which the consequent task
of establishing a relatively hardline Mexican perspective is limited to English language sources.
Thus, for the moment, speculating on Mexican ambition and motivation, especially that of the
president, is filtered through a distinctly American viewfinder, although future inquiries most
certainly would include Spanish records from CISEN or other government sources.]
Superficially, the PRI under Adolfo Ruiz Cortines would appear to operate on a completely
different set of principles than that of the United States. Instead of propagating the image of a

124 Morley., 86
125 Ibid., 77
world-class police force, the PRI opted to focus on projecting “an aura of legitimacy”\textsuperscript{126} as it upheld its post-revolutionary zeal. World War II certainly allowed Mexico some upward mobility as a master negotiator between Japan, Germany, and the United States. That notwithstanding, the fear of domestic instability always loomed large over the country, which left the government to pivot its post-war strategy to exclusively emphasize image and branding, much like a corporation. Evidently this paid off, as:

“Mexico stands out [still] as a paragon of political stability within contemporary Latin America [during the Cold War]. There have been no successful military coups since the nineteenth century and hardly any serious attempts since the Revolution of 1910-20. Presidential successions have become genteel negotiations within the semi-official party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which has dominated the electoral arena for more than half a century. Civilians have gained control of the ruling apparatus.”\textsuperscript{127}

Imagine the scope of a project in which a government could not only deal with its domestic and international problems adeptly, but simultaneously project a “tacit presumption of continuity, a sense almost of timelessness.”\textsuperscript{128} Extraordinarily, this adds dimensions to the potency of saccadic masking; in tandem with a long line of totalitarian governments,\textsuperscript{129} Mexico’s first victims of government chicanery were its own citizens. The ingeniousness of this deception rests in the catch-22 that serves as Mexico’s vehicle of affluence during the Cold War. By presenting a non-threatening image of itself to its northern neighbor, Mexico “defied ideological labels. In its

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 83
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 83
foreign policy, the PRI governments were anti-communist, but public opinion and the party line demanded distance from the United States.”

Underneath its stately exterior as a paragon of successful Latin American however, the PRI was continually waging a repressive campaign to subordinate and assimilate its citizens in an attempt to annihilate any modicum of dissidence or resistance to their rule. This was the Cold War after all, and any threat involving Communism would invite American intervention.

Guatemala was fresh on the CIA’s collective consciousness, so the best support Mexico could hope for in 1956 was “[Scott’s] task, as defined in a yearly mission statement from headquarters...combat[ing] communism. Mexicans shared a real interest in this agenda.”

Ergo, Scott’s established personal charms with Mexican elites and his sense of duty to the CIA – eerily like his early work with Kim Philby – would finally create the possibility for Scott to establish an American counterintelligence empire. Scott’s early contact with Mexican aristocracy not only served as deux ex machina for the United States Government, albeit four years later, but for Ruiz-Cortines’s government “and the leaders of Mexico’s security agencies [that] spoke the rhetoric of revolution, they increasingly feared the reality of the society they ruled — and therein lay Scott’s opportunity. The Mexican power elite had to be anti-American in public

130 Morley., 86

131 Mexico CIA, Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Congressional, White House, and FBI Files. Accessed April 23, 2018. http://www.paperlessarchives.com/mexico.html: “Meanwhile, Mexico's population more than doubled in less than thirty years, from 16 million in the mid-1930s to 34 million in 1960. The resulting population pressure, as well as the concentration of services and new jobs in urban areas, encouraged massive urban migration, most notably in and around Mexico City. The proliferation of urban shantytowns in the capital's outskirts became a growing symbol of the imbalance between urban and rural development in postwar Mexico.”

132 Smith., 87: [The] authoritarian regime which Mexico has maintained throughout the contemporary era. For this, it is necessary to assess the system’s ability to satisfy the preconditions for stability — political balance, economic growth and rapprochement with the United States. These preconditions depend, in turn, on a number of salient factors: (1) the composition of the ruling coalition; (2) the coherence of the ruling coalition; (3) the power and legitimacy of the ruling coalition; (4) the policy orientations; and (5) the actions, responses and reactions of the system's constituent groups.

133 Morley., 86

134 Ibid., 89; “[Winston Scott” brought all the lessons of his years as London station chief to bear on the Mexico City station.”
discourse. In private, they wanted to protect their privileges.”

One of Scott’s first major political contacts was Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios,136 the eventual head of the DFS, “known for his prominent beak, was smart and practical and would in time reign as the most powerful law enforcement official in Mexico.”137 It is conceivably through this initial contact with Barrios between 1956 and 1958 that Scott was able both to gauge the horizons for further action and inform the U.S. Government of Mexico’s strategic importance as a hot zone in this Cold War. “In Washington, Mexico was [finally] viewed as a battlefield. For the Soviet KGB, Mexico offered a foothold in the Western Hemisphere.”138 Mexico’s insistence on remaining “neutral” during the Cold War additionally amplified this idea; by allowing the Cuban and Soviet embassies to remain open,139 they could claim solidarity and anti-imperialism while furtively concealing any perspicacity of totalitarian or authoritarian tendencies.

This underlying psyche would certainly magnetize with Scott’s professional objectives in Mexico “driven by Washington’s bipartisan imperative of turning back communism, [antithetical to] the espionage of his Soviet counterparts was driven by their Marxist-Leninist understanding of the historical fate of Mexico.”140 In tandem operated Scott’s need for direct success under his personal supervision, wherein personal failures and betrayals could be minimized. It was during his first few years as the representative of the CIA in Mexico that left Scott at an exigency in which he needed astounding means to implement a phenomenal program, requiring years of restructuring: namely to control Mexico by recruiting the highest bureaucrats in its political system. A program so ambitious does not spawn overnight, and so Scott and his equal, Anne Goodpasture, needed first to first convert chaos into order by restructuring the CIA field offices.

135 Ibid., 87
136 Ibid., 87: “El Pollo (The Chicken), as he was known…”
137 Ibid., 87
138 Ibid., 88
139 Ibid., 88
140 Ibid., 88
The thoroughness in which Scott overhauled the Mexico Field Office\textsuperscript{141} reflected his methodology and a tenacity that would fundamentally dictate the effectiveness of the LI/TEMPO program beginning in the summer of 1958. If Scott and Goodpasture could shoulder the burden of an onerous, yet relatively microcosmic project with such deftness, then perhaps merging the vehicle of the PRI onto the highway of the American Cold War outlook was not so very far-fetched. Additionally, Scott’s voraciousness in establishing solid foundations for covert operations put him at odds with the American Ambassador, Robert C. Hill.\textsuperscript{142} Unfortunately, territoriality, government bureaucracy, and formality would forever plague institutional frameworks, creating roadblocks to Scott’s grandiose schemes – the embers of intra-agency rivalry burned bright. It was particularly because of these strained relations during a formative two year period that a fascinating power shift began to take place: the ambassadorial duties of Hill became ceremonial, while Scott’s reformation of his new station led to a hostile takeover not only of the embassy space, but of its duties, and at some point in 1957 it was clear to Hill that he should “agree [to Scott’s work] only on the condition that the embassy would have no responsibility for CIA actions. Soon Scott’s station was performing tasks that had not occurred to Hill, like tracing the names of visa applicants and persons on the guest lists for embassy functions.”\textsuperscript{143} It is currently unclear whether this was a truly mutual “agreement” or if Hill was simply completing the bare minimum of his duties. Through this course of action however, Scott had hit the ground at a full sprint and had – both literally, with Mexican elites, and figuratively, with Hill – declared his zeal, thus firmly rooting himself at the beginning of a decade-long tenure.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 89: “At night everybody had to take all their papers and put them into safes in a central room protected by security alarms. He overhauled the station’s le room. He instituted a new ling system, producing new index cards, new personality les, and new subject les. He vastly expanded the photographic files. File cabinets began lling up with arcane but necessary documents such as the manifests of the flights of every airline coming or going from Mexico City. He was ambitious and exacting.”

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 88: “Win clashed right off with Ambassador Robert Hill, an engaging if fusty man who did not even speak Spanish.”

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 88
Impressively, prior to receiving the full support of the Mexican Government and branches of the U.S. Government for his systematizing “LI”, much – if not all – of Scott and Goodpasture’s groundwork was limited to whatever office work or lower level connections both of them could muster. This was coupled with their political and strategic ingenuity, which shone through on two distinct occasions. First, when Scott “noticed there was a row of four townhouses overlooking the garden of the Soviet embassy on Avenida de la Revolucion, he arranged for a lawyer friend, code-named LIMOUSINE, to buy them all.”144 Second, by using the cover of diplomatic parties and loosened tongues of guests “who boasted, quietly and accurately, that [they] had access to all outgoing communications of certain Soviet bloc countries….Once a month Win [Scott] would meet the man in a parked car at a random location and escort him to a safe house.”145 Scott was finally carving the tangible staircase of upward mobility that he so resented of his colleagues back in Washington. In the few months leading to his clandestine meeting at Los Pinos in August 1958, Scott’s architectural legwork resulted in noticeable reactions from his colleagues and Mexican contacts. First, Scott completed his hostile takeover, effectively assuming direct control of the American Embassy by physically relocating the CIA offices to the top floors.146 Second, Scott’s two years of service lent credence to his position as the premier American contact in Mexico in the view of Mexican agents. “As Win worked his contacts and built his nets, he became the go-to guy. The Mexicans called the CIA station, ‘the real embassy.’”147 As Scott’s reputation, foothold, and power grew in Mexico City, so did the tumultuous situation 2,223 kilometers eastward. The small island nation of Cuba was starting to make the U.S. Government sweat, despite “[its rejoice] in the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala… The dictator Batista, once useful to the Americans, now seemed more obtuse than

---

144 Ibid., 88-89
145 Ibid., 89
146 Ibid., 90: “Not surprisingly, the ascendancy of the “real embassy” in the CIA station on the top floor of the U.S. embassy on Reforma did not always sit well with the diplomats on lower floors.”
147 Ibid., 90
shrewd."\textsuperscript{148} Although the August 1958 meeting at Los Pinos would officially inaugurate the LI
program, it would only display desired effects after January 1, 1959; its conditions for operations
would perfectly synchronize international policy with domestic functionality and vice versa. In
order to comprehend this dichotomous dance, one must first delve into and unpack the function
that would indeed make “‘[o]ur Mexico station...the most elaborately equipped and effective in
the counterintelligence field of any we had in the world.’”\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 90
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 90
Part II: Information and Informality Retains Power

Philip Agee: “Winston Scott, the Chief of Station in Mexico...has very close relations with both the President, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, and Minister of Government, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.”¹⁵₀

Chapter Three: The Tempo, Functions, and Rhythms of LI

1958 serves as a critical date, not necessarily within a congregation of M.A.D. Cold War geopolitics, but for the intimacies and intricacies involved between two nations, represented by two men, dining at Los Pinos “[f]rom [which] that summertime breakfast [in August 1958] would emerge the operation known as LITEMPO, a network of paid agents and collaborators in and around the Mexican president’s office that proved to be one of Win’s greatest professional accomplishments.”¹⁵¹ Jefferson Morley diminishes the significance of what was not only established, but formally legitimized in this meeting: informal relationships conducted within formalized power structures, the saccadic mask. A new class of questions about the nature of national sovereignty must be raised in its stead. In a post-World War II environment, dominated by coalitions of countries, such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), intended to establish universal law, the set of provisions categorizing self-determination and national sovereignty takes center stage. In the very first provision, the 1996 UN ratification “[r]eiterates that, by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right, freely and without external interference, to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and that every State has the

¹⁵₀ Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary., 268
¹⁵¹ Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico., 90
duty to respect that right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."\(^{152}\) If the perception of Scott’s involvement at the highest levels of the Mexican state were purely in a friendly capacity, offering only meager benefits, despite his stature in the CIA, any degree of domestic political assertion on the PRI’s behalf could be exploited as incidental; a loophole. The real complexity lies within the covertly explicit intentions of both the historically current Mexican president and Winston Scott. Even if one cannot impose the 1996 UN charter on a Cold War framework, the 1949 Geneva Convention most certainly would apply. One of the thematic concerns of the entire document lies in “the fear that the Protocol might affect State sovereignty, prevent governments from effectively maintaining law and order within their borders."\(^{153}\)

But if Scott’s CIA in Mexico was able to conduct its own agenda whilst simultaneously possessing a sovereign head of state to uphold a seamless and timeless table, this connection might be viewed as morally unrighteous, but perhaps a legal grey area. This might be an acceptable analysis if one perceived this relationship as unilaterally skewed towards American domination. Mexico’s political agency as a master manipulator and negotiator is vital to this relationship, thus creating the impression of mutual dependency. If the post-revolutionary Mexican state imposed a multidimensional standard upon its constructed image that had to be upheld: a stable modern democracy, neutrality, continuous spirit of revolution, and a presidential stateliness that would always do Lazaro Cardenas justice. If first impressions appear overwhelming and demanding – hardly enough for the business conglomerate of the PRI to sustain – the underlying reasons for enthusiastic support from covert American forces, especially when the tacit agreement stems from friendships. The subsequent intuition should at


first swing towards contradiction and hypocrisy on behalf of the Mexican state. For an independent institution so vehemently anti-imperialist, thus American, the CIA and FBI’s travails in Mexico would theoretically cause international scandal. Though fewer sources exist or are accessible regarding FBI operations than the already selective pool of CIA files, their presence dating back to 1939, in conjunction with the establishment of the CIA in the early to mid-1950s, reflects a profoundly different two-fold action on both American and Mexican governments. By abandoning candidly direct military and state department parlance with each other, each opted instead to subvert the public attention and discard the very game of politics, red tape, and law to achieve results. In this vein, the contradiction of the PRI’s covert and overt policy serves the purpose not of fulfilling revolutionary rhetoric, discarded during the Manuel Ávila Camacho and Miguel Alemán sexennios, electing instead to exploit any means at their disposal. Only then could the PRI manage persistently to retain power by assimilating or crushing any modicum of subversion in the domestic sphere, additionally maintaining an air of harmless strength in the international arena.

These assertions would mean little without contextualizing their place in the historical timeline, which itself would yield little unless one isolated and deconstructed the fundamental functions and depths encompassed by LI. At its most elementary, the moniker LI was given to any operations or operatives within Mexico.154 Any interrelated programs or agents were assigned a number: LITEMPO-1, LITEMPO-2, LITEMPO-4, LITEMPO-8 for high-level government agents155 or LIEMPTY and its offshoots in LIEMPTY-1, LIEMPTY-2, LIEMPTY-6, LIEMPTY-9, LIEMPTY-14, LIEMPTY-19. A distinct mark of Scott’s generally ambitious character was his trickle-down approach. Both he and Anne Goodpasture conducted low-level

155 Morley., 305: “The names of the agents in the LITEMPO network are still classified information. However, their identities can be definitely determined two ways: (1) by examining internal evidence and (2) through comparison of contemporaneous documents from different sources.”
recruiting during their first two years in Mexico City, but the LI program was initiated from the highest level of government as an "orchestration of a political friendship and national alliance";\(^ {156}\) as such the first assigned agent in his program was President Adolfo Lopez Mateos, successor to Miguel Aleman, known as LITENSOR. Much as Mexico held “elections” every six years, a facade for a system known as “El Dedo”, in which the outgoing president would pick a close PRI cabinet member for the Presidential title, so operated their friendliness with the CIA. Both Gustavo Diaz Ordaz in 1964 and Luis Echeverria Alvarez in 1970 respectively became known as LITEMPO-2 and LITEMPO-8. As Agee explicitly corroborates, “[o]perations are heavily weighted towards liaison (which rests on the unusually close relationship between Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, the president of Mexico and Winston Scott, the Chief of the Station) and operational support (surveillance, observation posts, travel control, postal intercepts, telephone tapping).”\(^ {157}\)

Operational support implies further penetration and corroboration with the Mexican Government. LITEMPO did not simply refer to the Mexican president; it included but was not limited to other cabinet members and Mexico’s version of the FBI and CIA, the “Defensa Federal de Seguridad (DFS), the police force of the president...”\(^ {158}\) The firsthand ties with the DFS is absolutely paramount within Mexican operations; direct contact with policy makers is certainly important, but the ability for Scott to relay orders directly to both the Mexican president, and head of security services would be the catalyst for their covert successes for ten years. Thus, Captain (then Lieutenant) Fernando Gutierrez Barrios of the DFS, one of Scott’s earliest political contacts and friends, also became an annexation of the program, as LITEMPO-4. This structure furthermore allowed Diaz Ordaz\(^ {159}\) assurances of consistently ascertaining subversive threats and the means by which to extinguish them. As Ferguson Dempster, MI6 station chief in

\(^ {156}\) Ibid., 92  
\(^ {157}\) Agee., 511  
\(^ {158}\) Morley., 94  
\(^ {159}\) “LITEMPO/Operational Report 1-31 October 1963 CIA Secret Report.” National Security Archives
Mexico, and Philip Agee both comment: “[they] especially appreciated the daily report on enemies of the nation’ that Win delivered to Díaz Ordaz. Agee said the ‘daily intelligence summary’ included sections on activities of Mexican revolutionary organizations that helped the Mexican security forces ‘in planning for raids, arrests, and other repressive actions.’”

Retention, incentivization, and continuity of these high-level government systems was undeniably a concern for both Scott and the CIA hierarchy in Washington. Even if Allen Dulles had faith in Scott’s assessment of Mexico’s strategic value, the fear of inconsistent results could be the biggest setback. A two-pronged approach was thus developed to keep each side eager. First, Scott and Díaz Ordaz were busy running Mexico in tandem, so routine representatives had to be able to continually keep avenues of information open. Thus, Díaz Ordaz elected his nephew, Emilio Bolano, a car dealer and LITEMPO-1, and Scott “[c]hose one of his best friends, a reliable FBI man in the embassy legal staff named George Munro, to handle the details of their secret relationship.”

Second, the political advantage of LITEMPO could act as enough of a stimulus for short term efficacy, but, as seems to be the case with many elite castes, stockpiling personal wealth is a key motivation for cooperation; monetary gain and materialistic bribes were the lingua franca. Though the CIA had reservations about the value of work in ratio to amount paid, clearly those concerns were abandoned, as demonstrated by the exponential increase of LITEMPO expenditure from the end of Lopez-Mateo’s sexennio through the first few years of Diaz-Ordaz’s sexennio, beginning at “$55,353 [to support] four employees, a five man surveillance team, ‘walking around’ money for Munro, and stipends for agents” increasing to “fifty employees and a reputed annual budget of $50 million, [which] was described as ‘classic’ by the agency’s

---

160 Ibid., 259
161 Ibid., 91: “Díaz Ordaz, a homely lawyer with an impressive work ethic, chose one of his nephews, a car dealer named Emilio Bolanos, to serve as his contact with the Americans.”
162 Ibid., 91
163 Ibid., 92
inspectors.”164 It was precisely in these negotiations that PRI officials outdid themselves; they successfully exploited the economic supremacy of a U.S. agency like the CIA, ensuring that CIA expenses included direct payment for their informants. Lopez Mateos, for example, through his personal relationship with Scott, wrung a steady payment of $400 from him for his official services.165 In addition, Scott's arrangements, through Munro, necessitated the appeasement of Lopez-Mateo and Díaz-Ordaz's private lives. “[He] bought a car for a girlfriend of Díaz Ordaz's. When Lopez Mateos heard, he insisted that [Scott] buy a car for his girlfriend, too.”166 Through this duality, “[Scott] recruited agents for the LITEMPO program by showing that there were practical advantages for Mexicans who privately cooperated with the Americans.”167 Scott and Munro inadvertently formulated a new Mexican-American elite, a covert club similar to MI6 during the Cambridge Five scandals. This circle of mutual dependency allowed for the simultaneous catalysts of “[t]he Mexican apparatus of repression and LITEMPO [to grow] together. [Thus] Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, an up-and-coming power in DFS, became LITEMPO-4. An ambitious aide to Díaz Ordaz named Luis Echeverría was LITEMPO-8.”168

For these relationships to remain and sustain functionality implies clockwork precision in the Mexican Field Station. Scott and Goodpasture’s reorganization in 1956 clearly set the precedent for its operations well into the 1970s, as noted by Agee:

“The Mexico Station, in spite of its wide-ranging operational activities and numerous personnel, is well known for its excellent administration. Two administrative officers and a secretary handle finances and property, but Win Scott, the Chief of the Station, is exceptional in his attention to administrative details as well as to leaving to advise the receptionist where he is going and when he will be back. Morning tardiness is not

164 Ibid., 258
165 Ibid., 92
166 Ibid., 92
167 Ibid., 93
168 Ibid., 94
tolerated, cables and dispatches are answered promptly, and project renewals and operational progress reports are expected to be submitted on time. Considered altogether, the Mexico City station is a tight operation – it has to be with fifty employees and a budget of 5.5 million dollars.”

Consolidation and efficiency must have been prevalent throughout the station. It is especially noteworthy to contrast office funding. If the total CIA expenditure of $50 million is an accurate estimation of funding, then the heavily skewed budget expenditure reflects Scott’s priorities in running the embassy offices. If one additionally believes Agee’s estimation, the CIA field office truly ran a tight ship, using only 11% of the eventual $50 million, opting instead to focus the remaining 89%, or $44.5 million, on their elaborate payouts, stakeouts, surveillance, and counterintelligence. The value placed by Scott on total secrecy could be one explanation for this discrepancy, in accordance with his own faith in his ability to oversee and control a foreign office and agents. But this incredible distortion would more accurately reflect the very fears Scott had seen realized in the early 1950s: Kim Philby’s betrayal and the failed CIA and MI6 operations in Eastern Europe. The overwhelming financial support dispersed in field operations would guarantee that the CIA’s hold on Mexico would be omniscient and omnipresent. Every important government figure was paid handsomely, every street corner of interest was watched by operatives, and communist embassies were infiltrated and bugged. After all, “[a]t lunch, [Scott had to be able to] offer his Mexican friends a cornucopia of intelligence on communists and other enemies. How could the Mexicans not be impressed with the soft-spoken First Secretary of the U.S. embassy?” Scott’s exemplary operations budget additionally indicated his crushing determination to limit extraneous variables to achieve successful results; a priority in infiltrating and strengthening his low-level contacts would only reinforce the upper echelons of his government contacts and dictate steady channels of information. Most importantly, Scott’s

---

169 Agee., 550  
170 Morley., 94
steadfast and meticulous infrastructure spoke to his own personal pride in his work. Scott’s early establishment in Mexico necessitated a radical professional upheaval, proving his merits as a foreign officer. Yet Scott’s deep-seated symbioses not only retained their clockwork proficiency, but in fact proliferated before the success of the Cuban Revolution. The levels of rigorousness and viscosity demonstrate a keen demeanor and personal pride in one's own work akin to an artist crafting his or her pièce de résistance. “The records section is the largest and most efficient of any station in the hemisphere and is said to be Scott’s pride. It contains detailed personality files on thousands of Mexicans and foreigners resident in Mexico, in addition to intelligence subject files, project files and index files. The records section is administered by a qualified records officer with two full-time assistants and four working wives.” 171

On the streets of Mexico City, this meticulousness is best exemplified by Project LIPSTICK, renamed LIEMPTY, and its subsystems. Considering the enormity of operations in Mexico City, one can partition operations into four categories: bureaucratic informants, undercover informants, surveillance locations, and programs. LIEMPTY fit into the third category, as did LIMUST,172 enacted during Scott’s first year, “[w]hen he noticed there was a row of four townhouses overlooking the garden of the Soviet embassy on the Avenida de la Revolucion, he arranged for a lawyer friend, code-named LIMOUSINE, to buy them all. He had a plan.”173 These townhouses would be the first step in keeping track of the subversive sharks in open waters. Two significant examples included LIERODE/LIONIN, a photographic surveillance station overlooking the Cuban Embassy;174 and a three-part installation that completed

171 Agee., 551
173 Morley., 88-89
coverage of the Soviet embassy, comprising LILYRIC, a third story apartment; LICALLA, “another observation post in the back of the closest of five houses bordering the Embassy property”; and LIMITED, located directly across from the embassy entrance. Although the Soviet and Cuban embassies became the immediate focus of PRI-CIA operations in the historical timeline, close watch was also kept over Soviet allies, indicated by LIHABIT, the base of operations, which allowed a joint reconnaissance venture of the Czechoslovakian embassy.

LITEMPO and LINTESOR, touched upon earlier, exclusively inhabited the bureaucratic informant category, while exceptional ground operations served as eyes and ears on the streets. Even though counterintelligence technology was evolving during the Cold War, available equipment in the late 1950s and 60s was either modern and unreliable, or outdated and analog, relying on teams of individuals to operate. Therefore the most contemporary information and data was collected from ground operatives. Seven notable examples, ultimately reporting to the Mexico Field Office, are revealed in two preeminent declassified sources: the Mary Ferrell Foundation and Philip Agee’s CIA Diary; Agee himself describing “[m]y assignment in headquarters...to the Mexico branch as officer in charge of support for operations against the Soviets in Mexico City.” First, LIMOTOR recruited students at several Mexican universities to keep tabs on the Soviet embassy and the Soviet intelligence officers;
LIRICE/LIJERESEY\textsuperscript{183} was attributed to on-foot CIA surveillance teams “whose true names are unknown”; LIENTRAP was a CIA photographic surveillance truck;\textsuperscript{184} LIEVICT more directly used a network of radical Mexican anti-communist Catholics;\textsuperscript{185} LICOWL referred to the “owner of [a] small grocery store near [the] Soviet Embassy...where the Soviets buy foods and ends including their soft drinks”;\textsuperscript{186} LICOZY 1 through 5 was a particularly crucial program which embedded double agents “against the KGB”;\textsuperscript{187} LIOVAL was the moniker given to a recruited English teacher in order to collect information from “Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and known senior KGB officer”;\textsuperscript{188} LIFIRE dealt with the “Mexico City station travel control and general investigations team.”\textsuperscript{189} First, it is no wonder that Winston Scott was obsessive about order in the home office in contrast to the plethora of pieces moving about on the Mexican chess board. One must certainly commend Anne Goodpasture and George Munro’s tremendous assistance in both the day-to-day operations of the field station and in retaining communiques with LITEMPO officials at Los Pinos. Secondly, the $44.5 million annual expenditure does not appear, superficially, to be as outlandish for operatives, especially considering the revolving constituents involved in the PRI-CIA operations. These programs became paramount to Diaz-Ordaz who “knew how to use the information generated by Win’s surveillance operations to protect the power of the ruling elite.”\textsuperscript{190}

The intelligence and counter-surveillance programs that were so endemic in Mexico City involved incredibly intricate support systems: data collection ranging from audio-surveillance,
wiretapping and mail intercepts, to establishing non-official CIA covers and covert financial channels. Applying the same two declassified sources, nine programs emerge as the most substantial during Scott’s tenure: LIDENY, LIENVOY, LISAMPAN, LIROMANCE, LIFEAT, LIMUD, LIBIGHT, LILINK, LILISP. The first five programs exclusively dealt with audio-surveillance. As Agee alludes to in his diary, “[j]oint operations with Mexican security services include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive action.”191 LIDENY was a broader wiretapping project, a “unilateral telephone-tapping operation”192 begun by “installing new wall-boxes for the embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters will have been cast by the TSD.”193 LIENVOY was a more politically precise surveillance collection in which “Soviet telephones [were] constantly monitored...targeting Cuban and Soviet embassies and run in conjunction with the Mexican DFS.”194 This was only the first foray into invasive surveillance however, as LISAMPAN initiated physical “bugging operations[s] against the Cuban [and Soviet] embassy”195 directly planting microphone transmitters, LICOOL,196 into furniture pieces, LIROMANCE.197 If one adheres to Article 41 of the Geneva Convention, as Ashley Deeks argues in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks, “[o]ne possible interpretation of this provision is that states’ parties have agreed that their diplomats will not spy in the receiving state, as that would violate the receiving state’s domestic laws.”198 But the case becomes exponentially more murky when a domestic government like PRI simultaneously endorses and cooperates in

191 Agee., 540
192 Agee., 634
193 Ibid., 546
195 Agee., 634
retrospective illegal ventures.\textsuperscript{199} As confirmed by authors like Jefferson Morley, Philip Agee, and John Dinges,\textsuperscript{200} “In practice, sending states commonly use diplomatic missions as bases from which to spy on receiving states, a fact that is known to the receiving states.”\textsuperscript{201}

How can one place the U.S-Mexico situation, in which the receiving state ardently claimed solidarity with its leftist brothers against the U.S., when the reality was more dubious and self-serving? Even if formal structures spawned from and were viewed as informal personal relationships, their operations, in UN charters, should have adhered to some conception of the conventions, “[h]owever, the practice by states both before and after the treaties’ adoption (which reflects widespread espionage)... all strongly suggest that states traditionally have not viewed existing treaties (or CIL) as regulating...surveillance in a meaningful way.”\textsuperscript{202} Thus, PRI-CIA relationships, predominantly interested in self-satisfaction through blatant international violations, would continue to enforce a policy of containment of communist subversion in the international arena, but also through dominance in the domestic sphere. As a testament to the strength of the mutual relationship between Scott, Lopez-Mateos, and Diaz-Ordaz, he “also arranged for taps on the phone lines used by domestic political rivals of Lopez Mateos and Díaz-Ordaz such as Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a leftist labor leader, and [even] former president Lazaro Cardenas, who thought Castro’s example offered a way to renovate Mexico’s revolution.”\textsuperscript{203} A subsequent project of massive data ingestion, called LIMUD and LIBIGHT, involved the waylay of mail. Whereas the former was broader in scope, the latter more


\textsuperscript{200} Dinges, John. The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Tree Continents. New York: New Press, 2005

\textsuperscript{201} Deeks., 313

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 313

\textsuperscript{203} Morley., 94
specifically dealt with transferring the “[m]ail opening operation in Mexico City, with Soviet and/or Cuban targets.” 204

Two other contextual programs are central to understanding ground-level support networks that reinforced CIA operatives and operations in Mexico City. LIENVOY, LIMUD and their associated operations required mediums to decode and translate a plethora of information; specialists of the highest caliber who could work with a hurricane of intercepts, then disseminate the most vital news. Thus LILINK “was set up for three operations officers undercover as import representatives. The Office of Communications designed a special cryptographic machine that looks like an ordinary teletype and that transmits and receives encoded messages via a line-of-sight infrared beam.”205 Even more radical and fundamental to rooting out subversives was LILISP, a “funding mechanism for covert action projects in Mexico”206 including the cultivation of clerical propaganda, the mouth of the west. “LILISP paid 95 percent of the costs of a Catholic Church periodical whose articles included features on ‘Christianity vs. Communism, the true face of communism, dialogues between a campesino and a more politically sophisticated friend on land reform and education, the menace of Castroism as it affects the Mexican countryside, [and] what the Sino-Soviet conflict means to the average Mexican.”207 To say that the CIA was pervasive in Mexico could not be more of an understatement. Through these programs and information systems helmed by Winston Scott, the CIA instigated relationships which intertwined two government systems in a closed loop of mutual dependency and held onto the melting pot of Mexican society with an iron fist. But two factors of the PRI-CIA relationship must be made explicit. First “[t]o say that Win had the ruling class of Mexico in his pocket was little

---

205 Agee., 513
207 Morley., 121
exaggeration. He was America’s proconsul.”\textsuperscript{208} But more importantly, and despite Scott’s enormous importance towards the sustenance of the PRI, he was not the most powerful man in Mexico. “By the mid-1960s, Win was effectively the second most powerful man in Mexico, outranked only by Díaz Ordaz.”\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 94
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 260
Chapter Four: Close, but no AMCIGAR...and its Subsequent Reactions [1959-1964]

If there is one major takeaway from deconstructing some of the most pertinent functions of the LI program, it should be the attempts of pervasive hierarchical coverage of Mexico City. On paper, these systems and subsystems would appear airtight, which is precisely why their successes, and more importantly their failures, within the Cold War historical framework become paramount. More specifically, how did the personal, informal relationships of LI/TEMPO affect its application in reaction to Cold War foreign policy functions? When the success of the Cuban Revolution set the world aflame on January 1, 1959, State Department fears of communist control in Latin America, which initially pressed the U.S. to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala, would finally be realized. Woodrow Wilson’s fears from 42 years earlier would be realized. The PRI’s terror of systemic unraveling would only intensify as Mexico’s modern hero, Lazaro Cardenas, would openly support “the [triumph of how the] once inconsequential Fidel Castro had trounced the military organized crime alliance that controlled the government in Havana.”\(^{210}\) Even more alarming was “Fidel Castro’s brief stay in Mexico...Shortly before Win arrived in August 1956, the DFS [under Captain Gutierrez Barrios] had arrested Castro and twenty-three *companeros* at a farm outside of Mexico City...[but] decided to let him go.”\(^{211}\) In 1959, however, the Cuban Revolution radically forced anti-communist CIA operations into higher gear, additionally necessitating a reevaluation from the U.S. embassy of Mexico’s vehement claims of political stability and alignments of interests.\(^{212}\) Although Cardenas was a national hero, mythical even, he was still human, and something would have to be done if his socialist rhetoric interfered with PRI-CIA operations. Perhaps “panic” is ill-suited to describe

\(^{210}\) Morley., 92
\(^{211}\) Ibid., 87
U.S. foreign policy, and is more apt to describe Mexico’s insecurities regarding the potential shattering of its glass PRI house; regardless, the tiny island nation of “Cuba suddenly was a huge political problem for the United States in Mexico. Castro’s victory inspired admiration on the streets of Mexico and unsettled [Scott’s] friends at the top of the government.”

An increase in Mexican domestic control and surveillance would not be a sufficiently severe reaction to this matter. If the CIA wanted to protect U.S. borders by subsequently retaining its foothold in Mexico, it had to demolish the threat at its source.\(^{214}\) If Che and Fidel could stage a guerilla movement from Mexico, why could not Scott? The expectation was evidently a duplication of Operation Success; the reality was the greatest blunder of professional career. “The great AMCIGAR [later known as Operation Zapata] fiasco of 1960 demonstrated that, even after four years as station chief, Win still had a few things to learn about the ways of Mexico.”\(^ {215}\) By 1960, LITEMPO was still in its infancy, and still required time to mature before being incorporated effectively into major international operations. The failure of the U.S.-backed Fulgencio Batista regime to defeat the Cuban revolutionaries sent shock waves around the Western Hemisphere, with the realization that any marginalized and disenfranchised group could strike a crippling blow against a major geopolitical power. Adding insult to injury for the U.S. Government, Castro’s struggle resonated with a younger demographic both in Mexico and in the United States, for example “[w]hen the Cuban communist spoke at Columbia, Harvard, and Princeton, young Americans applauded.”\(^{216}\)

Between 1959 and 1960, The State Department had to quickly shift paradigms from preventative containment to contemporaneously combating the revolutionary wildfire through any means – even armed invasion, and even if the establishment of LI was not necessarily

\(^{213}\) Morley, 92-93
\(^{214}\) Ibid., 101: “Win, like most everybody at headquarters, was worried about the runaway popularity of Castro’s revolution in Mexico and the United States.”
\(^{215}\) Ibid., 101
\(^{216}\) Ibid., 101
ready. They had to act, as “[b]y March 1960, [CIA Director] Allen Dulles had seen enough. He went to the White House with a plan to overthrow Castro.” The State Department simply had to transplant the same formula that had deterred Guatemala from becoming, in their eyes, a Soviet satellite state, into Cuba’s new revolutionary directorate. However, cracks formed within the very infrastructure of their anti-Castro blueprint. The CIA drove the undercurrent of most American foreign policy, based on a false assumption that an exception was the rule: “Throughout the history of political thought, the idea of a state of exception has fascinated and repelled political theorists who have seen in the idea both the only way to defend a state in peril and the clear road to dictatorship.” Since Operation Success exceeded expectations, the thinking indicated a one-to-one linear transformation in Cuba. Innate overconfidence plagued the American psyche, however, and they blatantly ignored the historical backbone of failures from the late 1940s into the 1950s. Even disregarding the CIA’s own checkered history, the variables that would transform Cuba into an exponential challenge were severely underestimated. “The scale would be much larger, and Cuba, unlike Guatemala, was surrounded by water, not undeveloped countryside where Americans could operate freely...Few doubted the formula would work.” It was to be a multilayered approach, spanning six months, formed on the basis that covert propaganda would weaken Castro’s government enough for an uncompromising ground assault. Thus, the CIA reached out to the one group who despised the new revolutionary government more than the Americans – Cuban exiles living

---

217 Morley., 102
219 Morley., 102
220 Ibid., 102: “Operation Zapata, as the plan was dubbed, would follow much the same course of action used to oust Jacobo Arbenz six years earlier. It would culminate, six months later, in the invasion at the Bay of Pigs.”
221 Ibid., 102: “The United States, using overt and covert means, would isolate the anti-American regime diplomatically while fomenting internal rebellion. Propaganda and paramilitary action would reinforce each other.”
in Miami, Florida – encouraging them to reclaim the island through a counter-revolutionary movement called AMCIGAR.  

AMCIGAR, as a microcosm of Zapata’s complete meltdown, rested on the combined, intertwined overestimation of abilities on the macro and micro planes of CIA operation. Principally, AMCIGAR, though never directly mentioned by its moniker in the official CIA history, calls attention to the darkly theatrical attitude of the CIA bureaucracy. The CIA rhetoric, specifically relating to financing of the new Cuban Government, in which “[t]he distribution of costs between fiscal years [1960 and 1961] could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations,” implies a narrow minded approach where the margin for error is solely contingent on the operation succeeding; no back up plan exists in the face of failure. Additionally, notwithstanding the cockiness of success, the entire anti-Castro operation began under the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, and when his term ended and John F. Kennedy’s began on January 20, 1961, Kennedy had to commit to the operation and its momentum months before its implementation, on April 17, despite being distant from its inception. The CIA understood this, vehemently considering the “state of U.S.-Mexican relations at the time President Kennedy took office. The CIA, not the State Department, spoke for the U.S. Government.” From their first encounters in early 1961, there commenced a strenuous relationship between the CIA and Kennedy that served as an undertone throughout his short term in office.

---

222 Ibid., 101: “AMCIGAR was the CIA’s code name for the executive committee of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, a loose coalition of Cuban political parties and civic organizations opposed to Castro that had decamped to Miami.”
224 Ibid., 412
225 Morley., 108
226 Ibid., 408-409: “Although there is no gainsaying that the CIA was in charge of the Bay of Pigs operation, the records cited in this volume demonstrate that in its attempts to meet its obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the US Government -- to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro
On the Mexican front, the institution of the CIA, assumedly understanding Scott’s four years of work, misunderstood the tenacity of his friendships, and Scott clearly overestimated the type of power he actually wielded as an agent of the CIA in Mexico City “secur[ing] the Mexican rear guard.” Cracks in the blueprint became visible when the CIA was denied its staging ground for AMCIGAR in San José, Costa Rica by the Costa Rican Government. Due to Scott’s installation in Mexico City, it theoretically served as good a place as any to move AMCIGAR, but “[o]rdering the relocation of the AMCIGARs to Mexico City in the summer of 1960 embodied the Americans’ arrogance.” The fact that they were of Cuban descent did not inherently bother Mexican officials – rather it was the condescending American approach, the “cultural chauvinism and ideological arrogance... Few of the operatives working to violently overthrow Castro’s new government knew much about the country or the people they sought to liberate.” It was in this vain, this unsophisticated insight into the intricacies of regional variance in the Latin American sphere, that allowed the CIA to assume that AMCIGAR individuals could seamlessly blend into and move unhampered within Mexican society solely because they spoke Spanish. More importantly, Scott overextended the boundaries of his friendship and mutual alliance with Lopez-Mateos and Diaz-Ordaz, by making calls over their heads. Scott had “carelessly assumed that his budding friendships with Lopez Mateos and Díaz Ordaz guaranteed that the agency’s favorite Cuban counter revolutionaries could come and go through Mexican territory as they pleased.”

---

227 Morley, 103
228 Ibid., 103
229 Ibid., 103
230 Ibid., 103
231 Ibid., 104
Mexican Government was for purely domestic reasons;\textsuperscript{232} this demonstration was perhaps viewed by the PRI as an attempt by Scott to consolidate more power on behalf of the United States. The first attempt cut the Mexican presidential office out of the equation and undid the previous fifteen years of delicate consolidation and double dealing. Matters were not helped by a startling lack of understanding of Mexican history, including a very loud and crass presence within the city itself.\textsuperscript{233}

AMCIGAR preparations continued to spiral out of control. AMCIGAR operatives were exceedingly loud and unruly, persistently violating the local laws of their Mexican hosts. The CIA was as much directly at fault as the Cuban exiles in their unwillingness to adapt to the new Cuban parameters. Unlike Guatemala, the CIA thought little of learning about the island itself: “[b]y comparison, [Scott and his] colleagues knew little of Cuba.”\textsuperscript{234} What they did know was outdated by at least twenty years, when “Cuba [had] beckoned as a white man’s sexual playground.” Lopez-Mateos and the PRI were also in a bind. They had equally to preserve an immaculate standing in terms of financial and logistical support from the United States, and their ideological, revolutionary brothers from Cuba. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution and with AMCIGAR operatives treating Mexico City as the wild west, the PRI had to make a concerted effort to regain control over an international situation from which they felt they were slowly being excluded. For the PRI, one of the worst offences was Scott’s assumption that his operatives could maneuver without respect for the Mexican institution, despite making an explicit agreement that “Díaz Ordaz’s people at Gobernacion would approve the Cubans

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 103: “Win checked with Lopez Mateos and Díaz Ordaz, who said they had no objections as long as the Cubans did not violate any Mexican laws.”
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 103: “The exiles favored by the agency were typically from Cuba’s Catholic elite, the backbone of the country’s middle class. They were nationalist and anticommunist. They were island cosmopolitans trying to wage war from Mexico, a vast foreign nation whose identity was forged in the anticlerical revolution of 1910. The Americans had persuaded their Cuban clients to publicly demonstrate their independence by submitting to Washington’s whim.”
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 104
‘provided [there is] no evidence of Cuban-[CIA] connection and Cubans lived within Mexican laws.’\textsuperscript{235} One major step the PRI took to limit AMCIGAR exposure was to clamp down on international travel, which could readily expose Mexico’s covert alignment with the U.S. and their intricate infrastructure to root out communists. “Overnight, the agency’s Cuban allies found themselves barred from boarding commercial airline flights to Mexico.”\textsuperscript{236}

Irreparable damage had been done, however. Cuban officials, in attempts to establish solid international relations, were already on the defensive edge. Furthermore, the CIA completely miscalculated the direct effects the past would have on the present, especially in relation to Operation Success. Before staging his revolution from Mexico City, Che Guevara became radicalized when he saw the havoc reaped upon Guatemala. “Guevara, who had lived in Guatemala in 1954, had seen firsthand the psychological warfare campaign behind Operation Success and he had learned. He and Castro knew what to expect from the CIA, and they set out systematically to deny the North Americans the ability to repeat it. Washington constantly underestimated the ability of Cubans to see through the CIA’s machinations.”\textsuperscript{237} In the introduction to the official history, Jack B. Pfeiffer claims that “[i]n the most simplistic of terms, the US Government’s anti-Castro program which climaxed at the Bay of Pigs might have succeeded only if...plans as evolved by CIA had been retained intact.”\textsuperscript{238}

Taking into consideration both the tremendous force of revolutionary Cuban zeal, and Che’s firsthand experience of SUCCESS, the AMCIGAR operatives certainly made enough noise in Mexico City for anybody with a modicum of curiosity and counterintelligence capabilities to detect.\textsuperscript{239} It appeared as if the Cuban exiles transplanted into Mexico were more trouble than

\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., 105-106
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 105
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 105
\textsuperscript{238} Pfeiffer., 1
\textsuperscript{239} Morley., 106; “The Cubans’ U.S. connections were obvious, as was their inability to operate within Mexican law or CIA security practices.”
they were worth after all. “Within weeks of their arrival the Cubans were proving a daily disaster. [Scott] wanted the AMCIGARs gone, and soon they were.” 240 Apparently Lopez-Mateos and his administration agreed, judging how their international alliances were on the brink of destruction. 241 Scott, ever the master of bureaucratic friendships, stabilized the PRI-CIA relationships, and avoided an overt international scandal by pivoting the focus of international efforts into the domestic sphere, where the PRI would unequivocally handle covert support. Scott ingeniously “let the Mexicans solve their political problems and get rid of the Cuban interlopers without having to refuse a direct U.S. request…[What was perceived as a] concession to Mexican courtliness yielded the first real intelligence accomplishment of the LITEMPO program.” 242 While Scott rectified the CIA’s standing with Mexico, he also assisted in retaining the mask that “[t]he Mexicans had protected their pride and sovereignty.” 243 Instead, Scott figured, the CIA could maximize its efforts of containment within Mexican borders, starting with the 1961 Latin American Peace Conference in Mexico City; and Lopez-Mateos could maximize his role as a LITENSOR agent. AMCIGAR, as a microcosm for blatant international action displaced into Mexico, represented a perfect fractal for why “Operation Zapata proved to be a perfect failure… [including] brittle assumptions that the Guatemalan formula could be transplanted to Cuba….And there was the much-noted inability of the Cubans to keep a secret.” 244

But this history involves the reevaluation of Mexico as a significant actor during the Cold War, which included Lazaro Cardenas, a wild card. Because of Cardena’s highlighted solidarity with the Cuban revolutionary spirit, “[i]n March 1961 [one month before the Bay of Pigs

---

240 Ibid., 106
241 Ibid., 106: “It seemed as though we could hear a sigh of relief from Los Pinos,’ the Mexican presidential residence where Lopez Mateos lived.”
242 Ibid., 106
243 Ibid., 106
244 Ibid., 108
invasion], former Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas convened the Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace (or Latin American Peace Conference). The gathering drew international attention to the miserable conditions in Latin America, denounced the United States’ imperialist activities, and defended the Cuban Revolution.”

Lopez Mateos understood the pressures he would receive from both Cuba and the CIA with regards to the conference. He was supposed to balance current benefits of American imperialism with a historically anti-imperialist lineage and “sought to position his administration as a kindred, though not communist, government.” Lopez Mateos understood the reverence he was supposed to uphold for Cardenas, but also knew of the dangers Cardenas posed to the stability of the PRI regime if he continued public support for Cuban communists and riled up troublesome unions in addition to rising student movements. Los Pinos also faced the prospect of resigning itself solely to the whims of the CIA. This was heavily felt when Allen Dulles visited Scott’s Station in Mexico, declaring that “‘Cuba is now definitely communist and it is a problem for all of Latin America as well as for the U.S.A.’ In other words, the United States was expecting Mexico to help topple Castro [in Cuba].”

Lopez-Mateos must have been able to sense the aggression and the desperation emanating from his American colleagues and devised a single plan to address two problems. If he could convince two major players within the CIA that “his domestic political problems were real, including a communist-sponsored Latin American Peace Congress, upcoming negotiations with the railway workers, and so forth [most likely referring to Cardenas]…” then he would

246 Morley., 107
248 Morley., 107
249 Ibid., 107
preserve his eyes and ears on the ground, while additionally enforcing what he perceived as his dominance in the PRI-CIA relationship. Lopez-Mateos was not out of his precarious situation yet, as he had only dealt with half of the equation; now he had to strategize a favorable position with the Cuban Government that would not jeopardize their previous arrangements with the Americans. Thus Lopez-Mateos deflected his quandary onto the Mexican populous, as “’[t]here is a lot of sympathy for Castro and his revolution in Mexico. This factor has to be weighed by me in all actions concerning Cuba. For this reason Mexico cannot take any overt action.’”

In addition Lopez-Mateos refreshed Scott and Dulles on Mexico’s neutral stance, since “Mexico had a tradition of noninterference in the affairs of other nations.”

It is unclear what the extent was of Lopez-Mateos and the PRI’s knowledge of the Cuban counter invasion, and whether that reinforced their decision to retreat from any overt involvement with the Bay of Pigs. The CIA did not walk away empty handed from this exchange however. Precisely because the conversation had been steered towards Mexican domestic policy, Scott and Dulles received a verbal affirmation from the Lopez-Mateos administration towards unwavering political control over communist subversion in Mexico City. In the end, “Lopez Mateos cited the Mexican constitution, hastening to add that he would do whatever he could to help the CIA disrupt and hamper the conference...[Additionally] the Mexicans did provide ‘under the table’ help to the CIA’s campaign to overthrow Castro.”

Aside from the integrated LI program, which necessitated a renewed vigor in the wake of its newfound obligations in March 1961, this would also include interim oil deals on behalf of Munro and Bolanos, and keeping a keen eye over Lazaro Cardenas. It is remarkable how casual the encounter seems to have been between Dulles, Scott, and Lopez-Mateos – more like a familial dispute, than a formal conference between

---

250 Ibid., 107
251 Ibid., 107
252 Ibid., 108
253 Ibid., 108: “Win’s lieutenant George Munro boasted that he and Emilio Bolaños, LITEMPO-1, had delivered 50,000 gallons of Mexican oil to fuel the exile armada.”
representatives of two countries – leading one almost to forget that “[t]he CIA, not the State Department, spoke for the U.S. government” and that the Mexican representative was not merely some ambassador, but the sovereign head of state. It is this confusion of informality that resulted in a waste of valuable resources in the planning of the Bay of Pigs, including Mexico refusing covert support because of overt policy, further supported by Cardenas’s ploy in 1961 to declare international accord with Cuba.

The CIA’s station in Mexico City neatly settled their business, circumventing much of the catastrophe of Operation Zapata, notwithstanding AMCIGAR. Unfortunately, one of the main concerns of AMCIGAR operatives, “the much-noted inability of the Cubans to keep a secret,” came back to haunt Zapata, as the “White House, reporters and editors in Washington got word in Miami that an invasion of Cuba was coming. Castro’s security forces already [now concretely] knew it.” By the night of April 17, 1961, not only did the CIA operation collapse on itself in execution – the Cuban Government halted them at every turn – but the most colossal failure suffered was their inability to keep covert. “The agency had been stripped naked in public, its secret operations obscenely on view. The agency’s humiliation was complete.” This would leave such a deep scar on the CIA and would inflame paranoia to such an extent that Mexico would only serve as the launch pad for a new covert empire that would not stop until all of Latin

254 Ibid., 108
255 Ibid., 108
256 Ibid., 108
257 Ibid., 109: “The Cuban leadership, well versed in how the Guatemalan operation succeeded, expected that this psychological warfare campaign would be followed by a pseudo-invasion with the goal of splintering the Cuban leadership and bringing pro-American forces to power. Castro’s security forces started arresting everybody known or suspected of involvement in antigovernment groups. When the exile invasion force landed at the Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) on the night of April 17, 1961, Phillips’s propaganda claims vastly exceeded the actions of the U.S. allies on the ground. The anti-Castro student leadership that Phillips had cultivated in Havana was either in jail or hiding in European embassies. The University of Havana campus, the political heart of the capital, was dominated by defiant Castro supporters, pledging their lives to defense of the homeland. On the battlefield, Castro and his military commanders deployed their forces to the Bay of Pigs area on the island’s south coast, where the exile invasion force was landing.”
258 Ibid., 109
America “exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires.” The CIA, which began shaky relations with the young Catholic president, would hold Kennedy in contempt, despite the faulty foundations of Zapata, for never calling in reinforcements in the face of an operational miscarriage. This was merely another layer draped over a multidimensional temperament of overconfidence which mishandled Cuba to such an exponential degree that the CIA essentially went into overdrive, and by late 1961 had begun to serialize its policy of overthrowing Latin American governments, starting with Ecuador. Calling directly on U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kim L. Scheppele’s argument situates itself perfectly within the Cold War Latin American framework, stating “[an] international state of emergency that requires other countries to make exceptions to both international law and their constitutional orders.” Mexico for the moment, was safe, but the overtly rejuvenated anti-capitalist and pro-Cuban consensus, as a response to both the Cuban Revolution and the 1961 Peace Congress, would cause the country to follow its own trajectory.

---

259 Pfeiffer., 410
260 Morley., 109: “Agency officials simply assumed Kennedy would authorize more flights to support the rebels, as had President Eisenhower during Operation Success. The president had assumed the operation would succeed without U.S. intervention. Both were wrong.”
262 Scheppele., 1004
The Cuba fiasco demonstrated to the U.S. State Department and Castro that the renewed CIA mission in Latin America had very definite limits and the spirit of revolution, *foco*, still resonated strongly with a Latin American audience. The CIA once again found itself staring into the precipice, which put Scott in an especially precarious position. In the worst-case scenario, his six previous years of work would be dismantled, or, in a slightly better-case scenario, passed off to another operative who did not understand any of the intricacies of Mexico and Mexican relations. If his masterwork of intelligence craft was going to succeed, then Scott had to overlook the functions of his field station offices. No more mistakes, no more uncontrollable and incompatible foreign operatives. The CIA as a global institution had taken a blow, but Scott could still salvage the prestige of *his* work in Mexico City. Scott must finally have understood the full parameters that he could work within and around. It was clear from his meeting with Dulles and Lopez-Mateos that ex-President Cardenas’s resurgence back into public politics could rile up dissent where there need be none; clearly Mexico wanted to position itself as victorious in its tripartite balancing act with Cuba and the United States. Lopez-Mateos and the PRI had to recall their predecessors’ World War II strategy in which they shrewdly played off the interests of Nazi Germany, Japan, and the United States, while remaining uncompromised. As Renata Keller argues, “Mexico presented unique challenges and opportunities for both its neighbors [U.S and Cuba], and the governments of all three countries persistently pushed and tested each other in their efforts to maximize the benefits of Mexico’s exceptional position.”

Mexico provided enough incentive for Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union to appear as if they could move unfettered. The trick ideally, was to choke the threat before it became a national nuisance. How fortunate for Lopez-Mateos and Gobernacion

---

Diaz-Ordaz that the CIA would mutually agree to root out domestic disturbances. The March 1961 Peace Congress was behind both the PRI and CIA, and though it had not been sabotaged as hoped, it had left a distinct mark on both institutions. Now, both had a scapegoat, Cardenas, in case his leftist solidarity necessitated armed conflict. Indispensably, because of Mexico’s position as a negotiator, they could face off U.S. pressures and be the only Latin American country to allow the hosting of Soviet and Cuban embassies.

Even though this irked the U.S. State Department, individuals like Winston Scott and Adolfo Lopez-Mateos capitalized on this situation to elaborate their cooperative efforts to achieve what many others could not: a surveillance program on communist targets more comprehensive than any other in the world, which would include infiltration of those very same Cuban and Soviet embassies. The LIMUST houses Scott had bought in his first two years in Mexico City would finally operate in full swing. Another Cuba would never be allowed to happen if Scott and the CIA could prevent it. It might be understandable why any information intercepted pertaining to LI on communist activities, could falsely be extrapolated as global paranoia.

However, matters become muddled when the Cubans did indeed attempt to propagate the spread of communist ideology in Mexico. A 1994 CIA Historical Review sheds insight into a more or less standard viewpoint that was dominant through Cold War years: “Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relations with Latin America not only as a dependent client serving Moscow's interests but also as an independent actor influencing Soviet policies and tactics.”

Renata Keller furthers this position by contending that “Fidel Castro followed Adolfo Lopez Mateos’s lead, and crafted contradictory overt and covert foreign policies toward Mexico...the Cuban government used its embassy and consulates in Mexico to spread propaganda and

---

264 Morley., 118: “Allen Dulles had been fired as CIA director, another casualty of the Bay of Pigs.”
possibly even to support revolutionary activities in Mexico and elsewhere.” Hyperbole like myth, is rooted in truth; sometimes truth is also stranger than fiction.

As the latter half of 1961 passed after the Bay of Pigs disaster, the U.S. had an overt trick up its sleeve: the Organization of American States. The famous “Declaration of Punta del Este” of August 17, 1961 achieved a few important goals. First, it served as an excellent public relations stunt for the Kennedy administration in terms of its ability to win back the good graces of Latin America in a distinctly anti-American period. During this convention of various Latin states, including Mexico, Kennedy’s proposed Alliance for Progress, a multibillion stimulus package akin to the Marshall Plan, would act as a lifeline for many struggling countries, in addition to presenting a more actively positive approach in Latin America affairs from the United States. Second, it would function as a perfect cover for both American sponsored coups, like Ecuador in 1961, as well as a legitimate subsidiary for military and technical support from the CIA. Third, it would continue to reel Mexico back into the talons of the U.S. if they swung too far left and would even incentivize members of the PRI to act against Lazaro Cardenas and other radical leftists in order to retain their wealth and power. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the declaration would ideologically persuade the rest of the OAS members to deny Cuba entry. In this sense, August 17, 1961 would generally be viewed as a success. Back at the new “embassy [which] had moved into a modern building on Reforma that announced the American government’s presence much more openly than it ever had before,” Ambassador Thomas Mann was not pleased with Mexico’s abstention in the OAS vote and thought that Mexico

266 Keller., 8-9
268 The first half of Philip Agee’s CIA diary testifies to his direct involvement in Ecuador and Uruguay.
269 Morley., 112
would cut ties with the United States to favor their new Soviet and Cuban contacts. Although certainly a valid concern, Ambassador Mann must not have understood the depths of the connections Scott had built and the scale of his surveillance programs; perhaps more embarrassing was a fundamental misunderstanding of double dealing as a basic function of Mexican politics. Mann’s interaction with Lopez Mateos on December 18, 1961 exemplifies not only why Scott was the CIA’s main contact in Mexico, but the difficulty for American diplomats in general in fathoming the inner machinations that gave Mexico its Cold War status. In his summation of the meeting Mann states, “I commenced conversation by saying that I recognized Mexican policy must be based on Mexico’s own estimate of its self-interest. On other hand, I was sure he would understand vote in OAS plus projected visit created problem for US...I said foregoing left my President difficult choice since I was certain he wished friendship with Lopez Mateos, but on other hand had to consider US public opinion and interpretation...”

Mann partly acknowledges Mexico’s right to self-determination in such international matters, but appears to accept their OAS abstention at face value. Even when Mann acknowledges the “absolute character Mexican doctrine non-intervention, I hoped he would understand importance US give doctrine democracy also in OAS charter...” his reactions oscillate between skepticism, denial, and delusion. He continues to assert, “We sincerely believe we are on side of angels when we support right of people all countries chose their own government and when

---

274 Morley., 120: “When the White House persuaded fourteen of the twenty-one ministers in the Organization of American States to expel Cuba from the organization in January 1962, Mexico abstained.”
275 Mann., 2
we say there is parallelism between peace and democracy.” Ironic, considering Scott’s parallel work in the very same building, thus reaffirming how little Mann actually knew of CIA operations in Mexico City.

When Kennedy, in the wake of the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress, planned a state trip to Mexico in the following June of 1962, Scott demonstrated to Ambassador Mann how integrated he was into Mexican society and Cold War politics: “Mann [officially] ceded control of contacts with Lopez Mateos to the CIA. The CIA station chief, not the new ambassador, was in charge of the U.S. relationship with the Mexican chief of state, an unusual arrangement that would endure for years.” Scott had been cultivating his connections with Los Pinos for at least six years, using George Munro as his liaison; it is still unclear how much Scott informed the Ambassador of his operations, but if Mann had retained his functions, he could have naively and counterintuitively unraveled Scott’s operations. Scott, even with the relief of full control, still felt the pressures from the chain of command to ensure that Kennedy’s state visit was successful, to stabilize discontent, and simultaneously to uphold his consignment towards Lopez-Mateos and the PRI. Therefore, when Scott went to work at his Mexico City station on Paseo Reforma “[e]ach day, he went to his neat modern desk and tended to the complex task of covertly collecting intelligence…The CIA itself faced scrutiny and criticism like never before. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had sworn to aides that he wanted to splinter the agency into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.” Scott’s desideratum was to remain unphased under all these pressures. How felicitous for him that Lopez-Mateos’s PRI was just a table away and would enthusiastically support counter-surveillance in the city.

276 Ibid., 2
278 Morley., 118
279 Ibid., 112
280 Ibid., 117: “Win’s access to President Lopez Mateos remained invaluable.”
The respective Soviet and Cuban embassies would pose the synchronous challenge and opportunity that would define Cold War counterintelligence. First, the challenge “[t]he Cubans established [was how their] presence...opened up fraternal relationships with the embassies of the communist bloc. The Cubans, in short, had broadened and deepened the KGB’s beachhead in the Western Hemisphere.”

Second, due to Scott’s earlier tenacity in establishing LITEMPO in 1958, he was prepared to meet the challenge head on with Lopez-Mateos, and even surpass expectations in 1962. From the ashes of AMCIGAR and the Bay of Pigs, PRI-CIA operations kept constant tabs on passenger manifests travelling to and from Cuba. Through their street operatives, Lopez-Mateos and Scott photographically surveilled the Cuban embassy like hawks within Project LIPSTICK/LIEMPTY. The DFS-CIA collaboration preparations would, in the months leading up to Kennedy’s state visit in June 1962, additionally serve as a catalytic backdoor to implement long-term domestic surveillance throughout Mexico City. The state visit would become the imperative test in judging the CIA’s cooperative capacity to continuously stage, collect, and execute functions for a high value target. Vitally, Scott devised two general methods for intercepting all communications pertaining to Mexico City: LIFEAT for wiretapping and LIMUD for mail interception. Now Scott needed civilians who could readily inform on young communist upstarts who would “‘agitate the general public, to obtain national and international publicity, and to provoke brutal repression on such a scale as to embarrass both the Mexican government and its guest.’” The DFS would be too crass for this matter and had the potential to shatter the international image of the PRI’s Mexico if a massacre took place. Scott subsequently initiated

282 Morley., 113-114  
283 Ibid., 124
his LIMOTOR\textsuperscript{284} surveillance for university students, and LIEVICT for radical Catholic anti-communists.\textsuperscript{285} If the American president was to wade into murky waters, there had to be absolutely no direct threat emanating from the Cuban and Soviet embassies, therefore Scott also incorporated sedentary programs like the triplets of LILYRIC, LICALLA, and LIMITED, as well as LIERODE/LIONION; and nomadic reconnaissance protocols like LIJERSEY/LIRICE and LIENTRAP would shadow targets of interest. LITESNOR and LITEMPO agents could provide auxiliary assistance through their approval of visas of Cuban emigres, which not only served as a tantamount source of intelligence,\textsuperscript{286} but also granted LITEMPOs and the PRI valuable agency within the U.S.-Mexican power dynamic. The byproduct of this perceived sovereignty was the dispelling of any notion that the Mexican Government had any significant presupposition to the U.S.\textsuperscript{287} It certainly makes sense why “[t]he Mexico City station was clearly the best in the Western Hemisphere...and probably one of the best in the world. The station was aggressive and well-managed....The technical facilities and capabilities were extraordinary and impressive. The results could be quantified. Win’s staff had produced no fewer than 722 intelligence reports in the past year, 45 percent of which came from telephone tap operations.”\textsuperscript{288}

Because of Scott’s surveillance, he knew what type of unrest would erupt days before Kennedy touched down in Mexico City; he was prepared. He called for all hands to be on deck, including the personal involvement of LITEMPO-4,\textsuperscript{289} his longtime friend, Captain Gutiérrez

\textsuperscript{288} Morley., 117
\textsuperscript{289} “Sylvia Duran’s Previous Statements Re Lee Harvey Oswald’s Visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City Warren Commission Unclassified Exhibit 2121 (extract).” National Security Archives. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB204/5.pdf.
Barrios. Perhaps it was Scott’s ability to exploit all disposable resources, or a more personal faith towards Mexican Intelligence Services, DFS, to step up and successfully preserve order during a critical, public spectacle of peaceful international affairs. Kennedy’s visit to Mexico represented a greater symbolic act than reparations for his host, but a prospective new orientation for hemispheric cohesion in the overt and covert domains. The Alliance for Progress would also sinisterly imply an Alliance for Subversion, and thus “the ideological struggle between the United States and Cuba was joined in the heart of Mexico City. After the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy wanted to present his Alliance for Progress as the benign face of American power willing to help the people of Latin America.”

Kennedy’s work in Mexico City would indeed provide the PRI the opportunity to “derive great benefits from President Kennedy’s visit…In the name of the continuing Mexican Revolution…[and maintain] absolute control over the political life of the country…” As a result of their efforts, Kennedy’s trip was a resounding success, ultimately serving to reinforce the saccadic mask of overt friendship, covert operations, and accordingly allow LITENSOR and LITEMPOS to double deal.

Only three months after the conclusion of Kennedy’s trip to Mexico, in October 1962, Cuba once again became an international lynchpin in the Cold War grenade. This does not imply a stillbirth of global international operations however, which unconditionally escalated after 1959, merely the direct pertinence of Scott’s work with LITENSOR/LITEMPO and their role in shaping its de-escalation. Without Lopez-Mateos, Diaz-Ordaz, and the connections of the PRI, the Cuban Missile Crisis might have taken a much different direction. History tends to remember

---

290 Morley., 123: “‘These agencies have a pickup list of 2,000–3,000 potential troublemakers who will be arrested and jailed three days prior to President Kennedy’s arrival and held until completion of the visit.’”
291 Morley., 123: “Win thought the LITEMPOS were prepared to maintain order during Kennedy’s visit.”
292 Ibid., 123
293 Ibid., 123
294 Morley., 142: Jefferson Morley crafts a parallel story about the CIA operative Dave Phillips, who “had recruited, funded, managed, and sustained the DRE [Cuban Student Directorate] as an instrument for the purposes of advancing the U.S. policy of getting rid of Castro.”
Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Fidel Castro as the principal negotiators, but Mexico played an invaluable role in "[resisting] U.S pressure to break relations with Cuba, and how they navigated such threats to national and hemispheric stability as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 [and eventually] Kennedy’s assassination in 1963." It is difficult to assert whether or not the U.S. State Department admitted the opportunity factored by Mexican neutrality and its double dealing into Kennedy’s negotiations, but considering the thin line that already separated thermonuclear annihilation and relative peace, it was likely indispensable.

When U.S intelligence agencies “confirmed that missile bases under construction in the Cuban countryside were designed for Soviet long-range nuclear missiles…” Scott’s immediate reaction was to consult his friend Lopez-Mateos, LITENSOR, and Diaz-Ordaz, LITEMPO-2, to gauge how their response advantaged them in their negotiations between October 16 and October 28. Evidently, “[a]s the crisis went on, his friendship with the LITEMPOs proved valuable.” The challenge in concretely supporting these assertions is hampered due to the scarcity of available evidence. One can temporarily circumscribe this issue by using constructed evidence presented thus far. Mexico established itself as capable of pulling the strings of both Cuba and the United States and a country which seemingly valued self-preservation as its highest priority. By no means would Mexico endorse another invasion of Cuba, but neither would it condone the Soviets covertly supporting their ideological brethren in a M.A.D. manner. The lack of Cuban and Soviet embassy audio-surveillance, or even an indirect allusion gained through LIENVOY and LIROMANCE, could further indicate that no such programs existed or the information remains classified. Meanwhile, Diaz-Ordaz declared “that

---

Keller., 11


Morley., 140

Ibid., 140

The few that exist in English are partially or fully redacted; the others are in Spanish.
Mexico always supported Cuba’s right to have defensive weapons, but these missiles were clearly Russian-controlled offensive weapons, which could threaten the United States, or Mexico, for that matter. Díaz Ordaz called Lopez Mateos, who stated the same position publicly.

Win’s friendship with both men helped ensure statements favorable to Washington’s position.\textsuperscript{300} This stance is further corroborated in a 1964 conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Diaz-Ordaz,\textsuperscript{301} and could indicate an untapped reservoir of collusion. Nonetheless the “strategic impact of CIA man’s [David Phillip, but one must assume it is equally applicable to Scott] audacious work and confirming his unseen influence on the Kennedy administration’s Cuba policy.”\textsuperscript{302} Logic thus follows that if Scott’s intelligence helped release tensions from the crisis, and his work was dependent on LITEMPO and other base LI operations in Mexico, then their ability to somehow feed the CIA just enough information to dissuade Kennedy from starting a third world war is remarkable. More research on this matter will be conducted in the future.

This is notwithstanding that the CIA viewed that “Kennedy’s handling of the missile crisis had [only] postponed the Cuba problem, not solved it.”\textsuperscript{303} It was too close a call with irrevocable stakes. At least it was no Bay of Pigs. But this necessitated another level of penetrative espionage and infiltration, supported by LITENSOR, but involving data collection sourced from their enemies and analyzed by CIA technicians. Sometime between Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Scott implemented a system called Project LIENVOY and LIROMANCE, most likely using double agents code-named LINILE, to plant audio-surveillance devices, LICOOL, in both the Cuban and Soviet embassies. Scott now had omnipotent control in Mexico City, and “vigilant control of every aspect of the station’s operations. No one could

\textsuperscript{300} Morley., 141
\textsuperscript{302} Morley., 141
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 141
have known at the time that...Win Scott...would come to play a central role in the massive intelligence failure, still obfuscated by CIA secrecy four decades later, that would culminate in the murder of President Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963."\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., 152
Chapter Six: November 22 [1963-1964]

November 22, 1963, perfectly exemplifies how successful functions can fall prey to systemic failure. From prevention to investigation, Scott’s ubiquitous LI program somehow suffered an aneurysm in which surveillance equipment suddenly malfunctioned, and intelligence disappeared. Too many coincidences, and spontaneous lapses in judgment and professionalism, present a picture of an amateur hack job, not a carefully crafted masterwork of counterintelligence that would risk international scandal if the UN or Soviet Allied countries discovered that an American violated Mexico’s “neutrality” and sovereignty, delegating three of its heads of state to informant status. Regardless of the complexities of LI’s Cold War realities, the perception would fundamentally ruin the PRI and the CIA. Especially pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy’s alleged killer, “[i]t was not a tale of conspiracy or of a ‘lone nut’ but a saga that eluded all five official investigations of Kennedy’s assassination and all the hundreds of writers who had explored the subject.”305 It becomes particularly hard to fathom how the acumen of audio-visual evidence306 between the CIA, FBI and the DFS about Oswald, let alone other potential targets, would become so misinterpreted and perverted in the sham called the Warren Commission.307

All the loose ends and intelligence malfunctions of bureaucracy easily invite rampant speculation and conspiracy theories about third men. This is not the goal of this investigation, however; it is merely to query such a radically antithetical CIA performance during a steadfast improvement in global efficacy. Oswald thus becomes a fulcrum for this analysis, partly because his movements preceding his arrival in Mexico were less than subdued, including work for the

305 Ibid., 169
Soviets and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which indisputably landed him on the radar of both the CIA and FBI.\footnote{308} In fact, “Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention of four different CIA collection operations...AMSPELL, LIERODE, LIENVOY, and LIEMPTY.”\footnote{309} Matters once again become complicated when Scott himself contradicts the Warren Commission's claims, despite an infallible memory, that any and all information collected between September 27 and October 2 1963 “concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: US Ambassador Thomas C. Mann.”\footnote{310} Scott’s Mexico City station reputation was not hyperbole however, particularly in regard to embassy surveillance and he “had a hard-won reputation for knowing everything about the Cuban embassy. His operations were designed to ensure that every phone line was tapped, every visitor photographed. The Warren Commission’s statement implied the station had failed in one of its strongest areas. Win rejected the notion.”\footnote{311}

Despite some of Scott’s memory lapses, the data collected by LIERODE and LIENVOY spoke a very different story\footnote{312} to the State Department’s official narrative. Scott’s surveillance captured Oswald in Mexico City on September 27, 1963, attempting to gain visas from both the Soviet and Cuban embassies, “passing for a fifth time through the viewfinder of the newly installed LIERODE camera...”\footnote{313} as opposed to the idea that they were “‘malfunctioning or something.’”\footnote{314} This particular malfunction “did not happen until October 1, according to [Scott].”\footnote{315} Oswald’s visits to these establishments would further be substantiated by LIENVOY transcripts, first when Sylvia Duran, a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy exchanged

\footnote{309}{Morley., 169}
\footnote{310}{Ibid., 178}
\footnote{311}{Ibid., 178}
\footnote{312}{Ibid., 179: “ The station’s program of photographic surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound in Mexico City, called LIERODE.”}
\footnote{313}{Ibid., 181}
\footnote{314}{Ibid., 181}
\footnote{315}{Ibid., 180}
words with a representative of the Soviet embassy and then on October 1, when Oswald placed a call to the Soviet embassy to schedule a visit with KGB officer Valeriy Vladimirovich. As one of Scott’s key officers, Anne Goodpasture noted, “[t]he caller had mentioned [Oswald’s] name. That was the key, said Goodpasture.” This situation was precisely a microcosm of day-to-day operations under Scott’s jurisdiction including its expediency and method. “The CIA tape of the Oswald call was marked ‘urgent’ and delivered to the station within fifteen minutes.” This was the stakes of a program like LIENVOY; any information had to be collected and categorized in a timely manner in case of another Cuban Revolution or Missile Crisis. Due to the nature of counterintelligence, Goodpasture “knew, especially [to] duplicate [the] tape of Oswald’s October 1 call to the Soviet embassy…” Likewise, Project LIEMPTY was instructed to “photograph all persons who approached the [Soviet] guardhouse.” The very notion that LI failed to report Oswald’s activities in Mexico is an area up for debate, but considering Scott’s personal stakes in supporting his station’s success, that proposition is unconvincing. Scott’s determination to uphold American values by any means at any cost would serve as his modus operandi during his tenure at the agency. An individual creating waves as explicitly as Oswald would, in the general Cold War context, become a prime target as a communist subversive.

Equally impressive was Scott’s coordination with Gobernacion Diaz-Ordaz and his sub-secretary, Luis Echeverria, future Mexican president and LITEMPO-8 to track down any leads and conduct interrogations on citizens who had even a remote connection to Oswald. They

---

316 Ibid., 180-183
317 Ibid. 183
318 Ibid., 183
319 Ibid., 186
320 Ibid., 186
321 Ibid., 186: “The Warren Commission’s assertion notwithstanding, they agreed that the CIA station knew about Oswald’s contacts with the Cubans at the time they happened. They differed over whether those contacts had been reported to CIA headquarters—Win said yes, Phillips said no—but they both admitted that they knew of the contacts.”
were to use aggressive tactics in their investigations to extract every last shred of evidence. For example, individuals like Sylvian Duran, who was “to be held incommunicado until she gave all her details of her contacts with Oswald...Within an hour, President Lopez Mateos called...his friend wanted to share intelligence.”

Scott would make a concerted effort to gather anything he could get his hands on and relay this information to the necessary individuals as soon as he could. Either because of his own personal pride or his professional oath towards his country – he would never deliberately mishandle information – Scott “was a vigilant and accomplished anti-communist who was unlikely to conceal intelligence, deliberately or accidentally, about a pro-communist, pro-Castro troublemaker who sought to violate U.S law [in the wake of the 1963 Cuban Embargo] by visiting Cuba.”

Accordingly, after consolidating the information for the next week, “on October 8 Scott was ready to report to headquarters about Oswald. He had a transcript from LIENVOY, [and] a photograph from LIEMPTY...Scott sent [a]...cable to CIA headquarters.”

At what point in the information train did Scott’s transmission of his intelligence get lost, and by whom? The hierarchy of CIA organization appears to have existed to retain order in the covert chaos; at the same time, different branches could effortlessly bury certain information if needed. Clearly, enough of the fundamentals seeped through in order to briskly craft 888 pages that would exclusively spin evidence, ultimately framing Oswald as the sole patsy involved in

---

323 Morley., 210
325 Morley., 189
326 Ibid., 187: ”According to LIENVOY 1 Oct 1963 American male who spoke broken Russian said his name was Lee OSWALD at the SOVEMB 28 Sept when he spoke with Consul who he believed be Valeriy Vladimorovich KOSTIKOV. Sub[ject] asked Sov guard Ivan OBYEDKOV upon checking said nothing received yet but request had been sent. Have photos male appear be American entering Sovemb 1216 hours leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athletic build circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top. Wore Khakis and sports shirt Source: LIEMPTY.”
327 Ibid., 240: ”The Warren Commission Report on Kennedy’s assassination, issued in late September 1964, found that Oswald alone and unaided had killed the president for reasons known only to himself.”
the assassination. As it turned out, “[t]he record shows that top officials digested the information on Oswald with care and deliberation.”\(^{328}\) Where did the photographs of Oswald end up? Considering that “[n]o CIA surveillance photographs of Oswald have ever surface[d],”\(^{329}\) someone in the chain of command must have had a distinct reason for making sure they never saw the light of day.

Was it the concern that Lyndon B. Johnson and the might of “United States [might] attack Cuba in retaliation for the murder of [Kennedy]?”\(^{330}\) What was the explanation for “the CIA…[destroying] the tapes in 1986”?\(^{331}\) Perhaps it was that the CIA “did not much care for Win’s account because it called into question the agency’s position that Oswald was but a blip in their eyes.”\(^{332}\) There appears to be a black box of causal links that do not appear to connect to anything. If the idea was to halt Scott’s station work in Mexico, it certainly failed, since PRI-CIA operations to stabilize Mexican domestic politics in the face of communist subversion would remain fully operational, even as Lopez-Mateos’s sexennio ended and Diaz-Ordaz’s began in late 1964. Oswald would cease to provide any more answers for the CIA and for historians after being assassinated by Jack Ruby on November 24, 1963. Clearly there were some insights Scott kept to himself during the rest of his tenure in Mexico City, judging by the speed with which “[t]he agency [took] possession of [Scott’s work after his death in 1970]...a stack of tapes three of four inches thick...marked ‘Oswald’...[including] The treasure in the trove...a 221-page manuscript entitled ‘It Came to Me’. The story that Win Scott told in those pages displeased and disturbed his longtime friends in CIA headquarters, including Angleton and the director of Central Intelligence himself, Richard Helms...the agency had dodged a proverbial bullet.”\(^{333}\)

\(^{328}\) Ibid., 181
\(^{329}\) Ibid., 181
\(^{330}\) Ibid., 211
\(^{331}\) Ibid., 186
\(^{332}\) Ibid., 181
\(^{333}\) Ibid., 7
The Kennedy assassination and investigation leaves many questions unanswered to this day. The most pressing insight is a startling lack of closure, despite what the Warren Commission claims. Scott, despite shepherding the CIA-PRI alliance into LITEMPO-2’s sexennio in 1964, thus continuing a distinctly intense battle for stability, would never back down from the claim that “his people had watched Oswald everywhere he went in Mexico City and reported everything to Washington.” The incontrovertible challenge with studying the covert world however, is wading through the perspectives and motives of individuals whose very business is to withhold truths in ever varying degrees – or maybe their affairs never allowed them the luxury even of that.

334 Ibid., 201
Conclusion: The Show Must Go On [1964-1970 and Beyond]

The Kennedy assassination and investigation created a vortex of confusion within intelligence communities around the world. Which individuals were connected with whom? At what point did they visit certain locations? And how would this dictate alliances and the pace of covert action? Cold War counterintelligence was only in its first decade, and the bloodiest, most frantic operations were yet to come. In Mexico City, Scott still had a country to co-manage, and two sexennios to smoothly usher in: that of Gustavo Diaz-Ordaz from 1964 to 1970, and Luis Echeverria-Alvarez from 1970 to 1976. Scott himself would pass away in 1970, and control of his field station would transfer to John Horton in 1971, who would attempt to uphold its functions. Diaz-Ordaz’s work as LITEMPO-2 would critically define the PRI-CIA relations as quashing alleged Cuban influence through the catalyst of urban dissent – the result of a massive rural to urban shift. This served as the backdrop to much of late 1950s through to the 1970s and would jumpstart massive industrial growth. “The consequent achievement of stability has thus come to be hailed as the political component of the post-war 'Mexican miracle'.”

The reputed miracle, in light of evidence that has been resurfacing over the last decade, was really a byproduct of Scott’s LI initiative, though credit must still be given to the PRI for the post-World War II subservience of its army, state officials, and mandatory unionization as a means of stabilization. This glorious economic growth served as an additional factor that

---

335 Morley., 232: “November 22 helped make Win Scott a legend in the annals of the CIA. The Mexico City station’s handling of the assassination and its aftermath enhanced Win’s already considerable reputation in the upper reaches of the U.S. government. Kennedy’s murder had exposed the sorry state of the Secret Service, the Dallas police, and the FBI, all of which failed in their duties to protect the president. By contrast, the performance of the Mexico City station, while not perfect, was a matter of immediate pride inside the agency.”

336 Smith., 83

337 Background analysis on modern Mexico has shown

338 Ibid., 85: “Between 1940 and 1960 the GDP grew from 21.7 billion pesos to 74.3 billion pesos (in constant 1950 prices, thus adjusting for inflation), an average annual increase of 6.4 per cent. During the
strengthened the duality of Mexico’s saccadic mask over its citizens and international communities. In the self-effacing task of understanding the imposition of international politics in a domestic arena between 1950 and 1970 however, certain staples of Mexican politics were excluded, “like the railway strikes of 1958-9…[by the] railway-workers’ union, the Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Republica (STFRM).” The tug of war between the unions and Diaz-Ordaz would plague his rather unremarkable presidency and “[u]nlike Lopez Mateos, who managed to blend coercion with an artful dose of co-optation, Diaz Ordaz tended to rely on force and discipline alone.” Whether this aggressive shift stemmed from Diaz-Ordaz or Winston Scott is unclear, even with evidence presented by the National Security Archives and Jefferson Morley’s book, Our Man in Mexico. Which was the chicken and which the egg? What remains clear is that this adjustment suited this new stage in the PRI-CIA relationship within the Cold War timeline, when Western anti-communism was more than an outlook; it was an imposition and a testament of political machismo, and the fastest way to garner alliances with U.S. agencies. The PRI’s mastery of double dealing, especially through its geography as a staging ground for Lyndon B Johnson’s and Castro’s governments, would heat up Cold War relations while still vowing “an ideological solidarity with Zapata, Villa and other major figures of the Revolution, and [asserting] Mexico’s sovereignty from the United States, still in the grip of the Cold War.”

---

1960s Mexico managed to sustain this level of growth, achieving - despite one of the most rapidly swelling populations in the world - a solid per capita growth rate of 3.3 percent per year.”

339 Ibid., 110

340 Ibid., 118:


342 Smith., 114
Cardenas’s symbolic power had more of a tangible influence in Mexican politics than the PRI, and evidently Scott would find this acceptable. The trick in retaining the saccadic mask was in straddling the zone “comfortable with the consensus and order that the one-party Mexican political system prized. ‘Liberty is fruitful only when it is accompanied by order’ [Lopez-Mateos] declared in his inaugural address. He described his government as one of the ‘extreme left within the constitution’... He espoused the egalitarian ideals of the Mexican Revolution, if only rhetorically.” Retaining this perception would become an obsession for PRI and the pride of Díaz-Ordaz, and his tactless method in dealing with unions and leftist students continuously contributed to his short temper. Having won the bid as host for the 1968 Olympics, he would have to present Mexico City as immaculate, sending his bellicose personality into overdrive. Mere weeks before the opening ceremony, on October 2, 1968, Díaz-Ordaz would snap and order the deaths of roughly 400 students at Plaza de las Tres Culturas. “Without advance warning, white-gloved security agents waved in security forces that opened fire on the helpless crowd. At least two thousand demonstrators were placed under arrest. An official report admitted forty-nine people were killed; a New York Times correspondent placed the death toll at more like two hundred, with hundreds of others wounded. It was a brutal massacre, since remembered as Mexico’s contemporary noche triste (‘sad night’).” The saccadic mask was officially shattered, but whereas in the Oswald investigation, in which too much loose information led nowhere or was deliberately buried by intelligence or State Department bureaucracy on both sides of the border, the Tlatelolco Massacre illustrates a sudden aloofness,

343 Morley., 93: ‘Win also arranged for taps on the phone lines used by domestic political rivals of Lopez Mateos and Díaz Ordaz such as Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a leftist labor leader, and former president Lazaro Cardenas, who thought Castro’s example offered a way to renovate Mexico’s revolution.”
344 Ibid., 91
346 Smith., 121-122
about which a shockingly little amount of cohesive information is known. Recent re-investigations are currently being conducted within archives in Mexico and hopefully Central Intelligence reports from the Freedom of Information. Tlatelolco is certainly worth of its own dedicated paper, where one must ask whether it was just another blunder in the annals of the PRI-CIA relationship, or a carefully calculated trial ushering Mexico into the fold of Latin American dirty wars and state terrorism?

Perhaps it was the product of a changing of the guard. Scott’s passing ended an era of classic intelligence cooptation, in addition to a much more independently minded LITEMPO-8, who worried less about upholding a perception of excellence and instead was more oriented to overt displays of power. The efficacy of the PRI-CIA relationship through the 1950s and 1960s hinged on Scott’s understanding of friendship politics and the machinations of the Mexican conglomeration – the PRI. The introduction of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger into the equation would shift the personal relationships away from the CIA station chiefs, and more towards the Commander-in-Chief, taking Chilean and Argentine relations in the 1970s as a frame of reference. What role then did the CIA play in the second phase of the Mexican “Dirty War” of the 1970s? Quite serious guerrilla movements sprouted in Guerrero state, which set the stage for the low-intensity dirty war – low-intensity in comparison to policies in Argentina and Chile. Mexico provided diplomatic support to the Sandinistas during the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979. How did this affect CIA operations in the country? The Sandinista question was a retread of the Cuba situation from the 1960s; support for a revolutionary movement seeking regional independence from U.S. dominance through the overthrow of a U.S.-backed dictator. The already murky insight into the degree to which the Mexican state consented to international

349 “The Dawn of Mexico’s Dirty War Lucio Cabañas and the Party of the Poor.” National Security Archives, nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB105/index.
alliances that might have reduced its claim to sovereignty and dedication to nationalism; and the ways in which international relationships and significant events occurred in Mexico that had wider global impacts than have been previously known, expected, or assumed, drastically switch tracks, but subsequently arrive at the same conclusion: self-preservation, but at what cost?

Current capabilities prevent one from properly answering these questions within the twenty-year LI-nearity, as the title would suggest; nor does an omnipotent dissection of the global events spanning LITENSOR’s sexennio provide a conclusion, as is the reality of the paper. There is always more to scrutinize. At this juncture, this body of work serves as a launchpad for future exploration of a distinctly intricate world of espionage, conjoining more international perspectives, particularly primary and secondary sources written by Mexicans, and elaborating and expanding on sources used thus far. This project hopes to simultaneously shed light on Mexico’s active involvement within a Cold War geopolitical history, at the direct, technical expense of its nationalist identity. Informality assisted in repulsing a unilateral relationship, but Scott’s ingenuity was illegal;\(^{350}\) its perception not so much, considering its covert nature. This serves as a testament towards a U.S. outlook which disregards the sanctity of international law, and a blatant distrust and disrespect towards Latin American countries. Scott’s example however, exposes the extent to which history cannot be taught and compartmentalized. Here, the DNA of domestic politics inherently intertwines with international arenas and vice versa, confounding an already complex biography of power. If sovereignty is the power to enforce laws, who was sovereign and how can this sovereignty transpose itself to the rest of the Cold War? Who really was the man in Mexico? Might one ever unravel a definite truth, or will it continue to be obfuscated by those in power who hold it?

Bibliography

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


Reference Sources


Livingstone, Grace. America's Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror. UChicago Press, 2009.


