Bard

Spring 2022

The Elusive Rainbow Nation: Assessing Post-Apartheid Reconstruction Strategies in Johannesburg, South Africa

Ashley May Eugley
Bard College

Recommended Citation

Bard

The Elusive Rainbow Nation:

Assessing Post-Apartheid Reconstruction Strategies in Johannesburg, South Africa

Senior Project Submitted to

The Division of Social Studies

of Bard College

by

Ashley May Eugley

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

May 2022

Dedication

To my siblings Austin and Arianna:
Thank you for the love, lessons, and memories.
I am proud to be your sister.

Austin Taylor Eugley
April 4, 1998 – September 19, 2019

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my **Senior Project Advisor, Sanjay DeSilva**, for advising me with such great patience and attentiveness. Your knowledge, guidance, and support were invaluable to me throughout the writing and research process. Without you, I believe my college experience would have taken an entirely different trajectory. I will miss our conversations greatly.

To my board members, Sanjay DeSilva, Peter Klein, and Monique Segarra: Thank you for taking the time to review my project and for giving me feedback, encouragement, and critique.

To professors DeSilva, Klein, Martell, and Suzuki: Learning from you was a distinct pleasure. Your courses were exceptional and among my favorites from my time at Bard. Thank you for challenging me to think differently about the world. I will miss being your student.

To my mother, Christine:

Thank you for always believing in me and pushing me to realize my full potential; for teaching me how to be both a realist and an idealist; and for sharing your adventurous spirit with me. You always told me that *I can do anything that I set my mind to*. Although it took 22 years, I think I finally believe you.

To my father, Tony:

Thank you for listening to me and cheering me on; for teaching me how to be a fixer; and for helping me cultivate a sense of wonder for the world. You always remind me that I can overcome any obstacles that life may throw at me. Because of you, I trust in my self-reliance and ability to *grow through what I go through*.

To my wonderful friends and family: Thank you from the bottom of my heart for showing me such unending compassion, understanding, and love; for teaching me what it means to laugh, celebrate, and enjoy the little moments; for reminding me to take care of myself; and for always showing up for me. I am incredibly fortunate to have all of you in my life. You give me strength.

Finally, to all of those who endeavor to read this project: Thank you.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAM	Anti-Apartheid Movement
ANC	African National Congress
BBP	Better Buildings Programme
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CBD	Central Business District
FWC	FIFA World Cup (2010)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
GEPDP	Greater Ellis Park Development Plan
GVA	Gross Value Added
ICT	Information, Communications, and Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import-Substitution-Industrialization
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NP	National Party
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
WCAC	World Class African City

Abstract

This paper examines how South Africa's political and economic orientation following the nation's democratization in 1994 enabled a continuation of Apartheid-era patterns in the City of Johannesburg. In particular, it contends that governmental decentralization, neoliberalism, and global city aspirations—enshrined in both local and national policy documents—turned attention away from addressing internal deprivations. Rather than redistributing social and economic power, uplifting the Black-majority, and allowing urban stakeholders to play a central role in policy formation and decision-making, Johannesburg's City Government catered to elite outside interests, effectively introducing new forms of segmentation and disenfranchisement. Although the African National Congress committed to transform South Africa into a Rainbow Nation characterized by racial equality, social cohesion, and peace, this promise remains unfulfilled nearly three decades after the fall of Apartheid.

Preface

It matters what thoughts think thoughts.
It matters what knowledges know knowledges.
It matters what relations relate relations.
It matters what worlds world worlds.
It matters what stories tell stories.
— Donna Haraway

This Senior Project is the culmination of three years of research into South Africa. During my studies, I explored topics as broad as land reform; informal settlements; public employment; city planning; museums; transit; occupational discrimination; mining; and baboons. I read paper after paper (again and again), believing that the more I read and the more I learned, the more likely I was to understand the complexities of this country. Despite my diligence, there was—and always will be—something fundamentally absent from my understanding. I am an outsider. I have never been to South Africa. I do not know what it is like to experience the topics I discuss herein. Furthermore, my positionality as a White female student from the United States automatically impacts the way that I understand, think about, and discuss South Africa. While I attempted to be mindful of my position as I wrote, this project should not be understood in isolation from the limitations and implications of my external, detached, and privileged position.

It is a privilege to render South Africa as an object of study. As much as I may involve published histories, policies, theories, and empirical evidence to support my writing, this project only tells a very small part of the story. Similarly, while I advance a number of claims, critiques, and conclusions, I do so from a position that may inhibit my ability to be objective, accurate, or fair. I urge my readers to hold the words of South Africans over observations and judgements made from afar. Only by recognizing one's place in the production of knowledge may they stand in solidarity with the pursuit of more certain truths and empower those who live these realities.

Introduction

*We shall build a society in which all South Africans, both Black
and White, will be able to walk tall without any fear in their hearts,
assured of their inalienable right to human dignity—a Rainbow
Nation at peace with itself and the world.*
— Nelson Mandela

South Africa's transition to democracy following the election of the African National

Congress (ANC) in 1994 officially brought an end to centuries of racialized authoritarian rule. At

the hands of the colonial (c. 1652–1934) and Apartheid (1948–1994) regimes, the Black-majority

was systematically disempowered, brutally oppressed, and restricted from social and economic

freedoms.[1] Democratization brought hope that South Africa would finally become a "Rainbow

Nation" characterized by diversity, social cohesion, peace, and non-racialism (Palmer 2016: 1).

The ANC Government—led by President Nelson Mandela (1994–1999)—enthusiastically

embraced this narrative, committing to rebuild South Africa and enshrining principles of racial

equality in the country's 1996 Constitution. Initially, it seemed that progress towards a more

inclusive, equitable, and harmonious future was inevitable.

Nearly three decades after the fall of Apartheid, the Rainbow Nation promise remains

unfulfilled. Democracy has yet to transform South African society, correct patterns of racial

difference, or overcome the lasting vestiges of Apartheid rule at the national or local level. As a

result, Johannesburg—South Africa's economic powerhouse and a former White-only

enclave—remains extremely divided across race, gender, and economic metrics. The city's White

residents enjoy ready access to quality education, public services, high-paying jobs, and

economic security whereas Johannesburg's Black residents bear a disproportionate burden of

poverty, insecurity, and unemployment. The persistence of extreme racial inequality is at odds

---

[1] For details on Apartheid's abuses, see Jacob Dlamini's *The Terrorist Album* and Antjie Krog's *Country of My Skull*.

with the ANC's enthusiastic commitment to Rainbow Nation ideals. These dynamics beg the question: why has so little changed in the post-Apartheid period?

This paper examines how South Africa's political and economic orientation following democratization enabled a continuation of Apartheid-era patterns in the City of Johannesburg. In particular, it contends that governmental decentralization, neoliberalism, and global city aspirations turned attention away from addressing internal deprivations and actualizing Rainbow Nation promises. Rather than providing residents with a right to the city[2] by redistributing social and economic power, uplifting the Black-majority, and allowing urban stakeholders to play a central role in policy formation and decision-making, Johannesburg's City Government catered to elite outside interests (e.g., international trade, finance, private development), effectively introducing new forms of segmentation and disenfranchisement.

The first chapter unpacks the motivations and implications of decentralized governance in South Africa. It critiques the assertion that local government autonomy is a pathway to accountability, justice and equality in a post-Apartheid context. Drawing on Johannesburg's policy frameworks, budget constraints, economic structure, and socioeconomic condition, this chapter argues that unless the local sphere is endowed with adequate resources—including financial and administrative capacities—decentralized governments will be vulnerable to external interests and may fail to generate positive social change.

The second chapter explores the embrace of neoliberalism at the national and local levels and argues that this orientation undermined South Africa's Rainbow Nation promises. In particular, it looks at how the National Government's transition from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR)

---

[2] The right to the city concept contends that all urban inhabitants should have the ability to participate in city life and appropriate, change, and occupy urban space in ways that meet their needs and desires (Purcell 2002: 103).

strategy set a precedent for municipalities to embrace neoliberal agendas. Furthermore, it closely examines how local policies that sought to transform Johannesburg into a global city—through neoliberal methods including privatization, market liberalization, and fiscal austerity—eroded urban rights and enabled racial inequality to persist.

The conclusion brings decentralization, neoliberalism, and Johannesburg's global city aspirations into conversation. It contends that these forces worked together to prevent Rainbow Nation promises from becoming reality. Decentralization made Johannesburg vulnerable because this model failed to provide the City Government with adequate resources for reconstruction. In effect, policy-makers catered to the interests of elites in order to make ends meet. Concurrently, neoliberal values and global city visions encouraged local officials to focus their attention on elite interests—such as economic growth, business-friendliness, and appearances—effectively undermining their commitment to social justice and equality. Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications of this study for alternative contexts, arguing that addressing extremely unequal socio-economic conditions requires policy interventions that center local needs as opposed to market forces and hegemonic ideologies.

Chapter 1: Making a Just City through Decentralization?

1.1 Introduction

The fall of Apartheid brought the potential for fundamental change and transformation. As South Africans hopefully reimagined the social, structural, and economic fabric of their country, new questions about the desired roles, functions, and form of governance arose. How could a new government safeguard the future of the country and prevent incomprehensible abuses of power—such as those experienced under Apartheid and colonialism—from happening again? How could the nation proceed in a different direction with democratic principles enshrined at every level of civic organization, even at those levels that once upheld Apartheid? Furthermore, how could South Africa's government serve and reflect the interests of its people?

To answer these pressing questions, South Africa adopted a far-reaching system of decentralization when the country democratized in 1994 (Pieterse 2019: 20). The Constitution explicitly obligates the state to "provide democratic and accountable government for local communities," effectively enshrining civic involvement in the country's foundation (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996: Section 152 as cited in Sikhakane and Reddy 2011: 92). The decentralized approach ostensibly gave local governments the power to engage with marginalized, underrepresented, and historically excluded groups, diffuse social tensions, and ensure local cultural and political autonomy (Beall 2004: 1; Bardhan 2002: 185). Decentralization devolved responsibility from the national sphere to the local sphere, shifting the relative powers, expectations, and duties of governmental institutions.

1.1.1 Theoretical Significance

Many of the underlying motivations for the decentralized approach are consistent with the right to the city and spatial justice frameworks. These theoretical lenses highlight local participation as an essential component of achieving good governance and fairly distributing resources—whether they be institutional, material, or physical—within societies (Rocco n.d.). The right to the city[3] emphasizes that urban inhabitants should have the ability to "appropriate urban space and participate in city life in ways that meet their needs and desires" (Purcell 2002: 103). Furthermore, they should not only have access to resources, but be empowered to change the city as they see fit (Harvey 2008: 23). The right to the city is in many ways an anti-capitalist and revolutionary concept. It contends that those who inhabit cities should be endowed with the capacity to decide what kind of urbanism they want, whether or not this is facilitated by the government (Frantzanas 2014 :1074; Kuymulu 2014: 10).

The concept of spatial justice[4] expands upon the just city approach. This lens centers distributive justice[5] and procedural justice,[6] positing that cities must provide even access to physical (e.g., waste disposal, infrastructure) and nonphysical (e.g., jobs, communities) urban resources, alongside clear channels for participation and involvement in decision-making. Both of these lenses call for a transformation of urban organization from a focus on the state and non-state actors to urban inhabitants themselves. Notably, spatial justice puts greater emphasis on operating within existing structures whereas the just city approach encourages their dismantling. Given that decentralization is predicated on participatory decision-making and local government

---

[3] The right to the city concept was first advanced by Marxist scholar Henri Lefebvre in *Le droit a la ville* (1968).

[4] Edward Soja first introduced this concept in *Seeking Spatial Justice* (2010).

[5] Distributive justice involves fair access and allocation of public goods, resources, and services (Rocco n.d.).

[6] Procedural justice calls for stakeholder involvement in the ways that cities are "negotiated, planned, designed and managed" (Rocco n.d.).

accountability, this model ostensibly aligns with the ideals espoused by the right to the city and spatial justice theories insofar as the role of the state is concerned.[7]

1.2 The Post-Apartheid Government Structure

The post-Apartheid South African Government (Figure 1) consists of three major categories[8]—the National Government, Provincial Government, and Local Government—which are distinctive, interdependent, and non-hierarchical (Cameron 2014: s83). This three-pronged structure was pragmatic and informed by history; sharing authority, obligations, and capacities among different political units ostensibly safeguarded the New South Africa from being subjected to the influences of a corrupt centralized authority. Summarizing the work of other scholars, Chilenga-Butao (2020) explains that the

> main reasons for the choice of a democratic 'decentralised unitary state' (Humphries and Rapoo 1994: 9) were social cohesion (Simeon and Murray 2001), allowing a 'common citizenship' (Friedman 1993: 10); and most importantly, as a conduit for 'access to the state and to economic resources' (Friedman 1993: 10) (20).

Beyond their obligations to intergovernmental collaboration, adherence to national policies, and observation of the tenets of the 1996 Constitution, each of these entities is autonomous, holds unique responsibilities, and plays a distinct role in the overall governance of the country.

---

[7] Importantly, these theories do not view the state as the sole arbiter of justice; inhabitants are encouraged to produce urban space in a way that meets their needs, whether that is through existing state structures or outside of them.

[8] South Africa also has an independent judiciary that is responsible only to the National Constitution and laws.

Figure 1. South Africa's Political Structure
(Widmer and Lombard 2005: 13)

1.2.1 The National Government

The National Government is responsible for federal legislation, overseeing

non-provincial and non-local issues (e.g., national defense and trade), and for coordinating

between provinces and municipalities. The Parliament—a component of the national

government—is responsible for legislation and policy-making. This body contains the National

Council of Provinces (NCOP)—which includes the views of provincial and local governments in

national decision-making through ninety representative delegates—and the National

Assembly—which consists of 400 elected representatives ("The Three Spheres" n.d.). The

Cabinet is the other main body of the national government. It comprises the senior political

leadership of South Africa: The President, Deputy President, and the Cabinet of Ministers ("The

Three Spheres" n.d.). The National Assembly is responsible for electing the president, and in turn the president is responsible for appointing the deputy president and cabinet ministers. The national government acts as a representative body for South African politics that aims to serve and uphold constitutional promises throughout the country.

1.2.2 The President

Cyril Ramaphosa—elected by the National Assembly in 2018—is the incumbent President of South Africa, with David Mabuza serving as the Deputy President. As discussed, these officials are members of the National Government's Cabinet. Since the fall of Apartheid in 1994, there have been a total of five democratically elected presidents in South Africa (Figure 2), namely Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), Kgalema Motlanthe (2008–2009), Jacob Zuma (2009–2018), and Cyril Ramaphosa (2018–Present) ("Profiles" 2019). Thus far, all of South Africa's democratic presidents have been members of the African National Congress (ANC), the Apartheid liberation movement turned political party (Alden 1993: 62).

Figure 2. Timeline of South African Presidents
(Author's Own)

Nelson Mandela (Figure 3) is perhaps the most famous of South Africa's presidents. A revolutionary leader, ANC organizer, and former prisoner of the Apartheid State,[9] Mandela played an essential role in the fight against Apartheid by popularizing Rainbow Nation ideals and negotiating the end of White-minority rule. He remains a "figure of resistance and rebellion, suffering and humility, progress and politics," and is celebrated as the "rainbow nation personified, [and] the signification of the New South Africa" (McMann 2017: 570). Mandela's justice-based ethos and embrace of non-violent approaches—epitomized by his emphasis on reconciliation and forgiveness as a pathway to harmony—has inspired racial liberation movements and social progress across the world (Rueckert, Brand, and Sepehr 2018). It is important to recognize Mandela's contributions to the post-Apartheid imaginary because his visions may serve as a benchmark to evaluate progress in South Africa's democratic era.

Figure 3. President Nelson Mandela
(Freed 1994)

[9] Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for a total of 27 years, from 1962 to 1990 ("Trials" n.d.).

1.2.3 The African National Congress

The African National Congress (ANC) is South Africa's current governing party at the national level. As depicted by Figure 4—which shows the partisan affiliation of local governments after South Africa's 2016 Municipal Elections—municipalities throughout the country are led by an ANC-majority government, suggesting that the party is also influential at the local level.[10] The ANC originated in 1912 as a way to unite South Africans in the struggle for political, social, and economic equality ("What is the ANC" 2022). This organization fought against racism in South Africa for over 100 years and played a vital role in the development of the Freedom Charter (1955)[11], the creation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)[12] (1994), and the formation of the South African Constitution (1996). Today, the ANC's official aims and objectives include creating a "united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society" by freeing South Africans from political, social, and economic barriers and improving quality of life ("What is the ANC" 2022). The ANC was an essential force and visionary behind the anti-Apartheid movement and remains central to the making of a New South Africa today.

---

[10] Notably, the Democratic Alliance (DA)—a broadly centrist party whose supporters are 50 percent White—governs the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (located next to Johannesburg in Gauteng Province), and Cape Town (the country's second-largest city and the legislative capital) (Harris 2014; Htonl 2016). These are the primary areas where the ANC does not have majority control over the local government (Morange and Fol 2014: 9)

[11] The Freedom Charter was a rights-based document that explicitly codified the values of the organizers of the anti-Apartheid struggle. This document called for legal, social, political, and economic equality, democratic governance, human rights, employment opportunities, housing, and peace ("What is the ANC" 2022).

[12] The RDP was the ANC's original policy framework. It committed the government to meet basic needs, rebuild the economy, and democratize South African society (Ferguson 2015: 4; "What is the ANC" 2022).

Figure 4. The Partisan Nature of South Africa's Local Governments, 2016
(Htonl 2016)

1.2.4 The Provincial Government

Provincial governments are situated within each of South Africa's nine provinces (Figure 5). These entities contain both provincial legislative and executive authorities[13] and a wide array of democracy-supporting institutions. Among these are the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities, and the Commission for Gender Equality ("Structure" 2020). These entities oversee, monitor, and investigate adherence to constitutional mandates in order to

---

[13] South Africa only has a national court system, meaning that the judiciary—and therefore the administration of legal justice—is the sole responsibility of the national government.

safeguard democracy and prevent violations of human rights, laws, and justice ("State

Institutions" n.d.). The presence of these institutions at the provincial level reflects South

Africa's constitutional commitment to realize and maintain Rainbow Nation ideals.

Figure 5. Provincial Map of South Africa
(Norval and Wright 2017: 25)

Provincial governments complement the efforts of local governments and the national

government in order to ensure the smooth functioning of democracy at multiple levels of South

African society (Titus 2001: 19). Interestingly, one of the key tasks of provincial governments is

to "promote the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform

their functions and manage their own affairs" by overseeing municipal budgeting, service

delivery, and planning processes (Titus 2001: 19). They are also tasked with developing

frameworks for economic and community development within their jurisdictions, and bear

responsibility for

> social services like education, health and social development; economic functions like agriculture and roads; and provincial governance and administration which include the legislature, provincial treasury, local government and human settlements (National Treasury 2014: 94).

Many of the expectations levied upon provincial governments are ambiguous and require them to

coordinate with the national and local spheres.

1.2.5 Gauteng Province

The Gauteng Provincial Government oversees three metropolitan municipalities—the

City of Ekurhuleni, City of Johannesburg, and City of Tshwane—and two district

municipalities—the Sedibeng District, and West Rand District—which themselves are further

subdivided into local administrative districts (Figure 6). Despite only accounting for around 1.5

percent of South Africa's land area, Gauteng has the largest population[14] out of all of the

provinces and contains around a quarter of South Africa's national population ("Gauteng

Municipalities" n.d.). According to estimates from 2011, the province employs around 33.8

percent of the country's labor force and its gross value added (GVA) to the national economy is

approximately 35.2 percent (Harrison et al. 2014: 3). Clearly, Gauteng Province plays an

important role in South Africa's national economy.

---

[14] Gauteng Province's population is around 15.5 million according to estimates from 2020 (Munthree 2020).

Figure 6. Gauteng's Metropolitan and District Municipalities
(Htonl 2017)

Notably, Gauteng's contributions to employment and economic growth in South Africa as a whole are due in large part to the City of Johannesburg. According to a provincial report from 2020, Johannesburg is responsible for around 14% of South Africa's national gross domestic product (GDP), and contributes 44% of Gauteng Province's total GDP (Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs Department 2020: 23). These figures are consistent with the post-Apartheid trends that are depicted by Figure 7. Furthermore—according to estimates from 2011—the city employs around 12.8 percent of South Africa's official labor force (Harrison et al. 2014: 3).

Johannesburg has a significant impact on Gauteng's provincial affairs and policy agendas due to

its unparalleled contributions to the regional and national economy.

Proportional Contribution	Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality		Gauteng Province	
	1996	2011	1996	2011
National Population	6.5	8.6	19.3	23.7
National Gross Value Added	11.8	13.7	33.0	35.2
National Employment	10.3	12.8	29.6	33.8

Figure 7. Contributions of Johannesburg and Gauteng Province, 1996 and 2011
(Author's Own, based on data from Harrison et al. 2014: 3)

When it comes to the administration of government within Gauteng, there is some

overlap between the provincial and local sphere. While the design of post-Apartheid governance

intended to encourage collaboration between different state units, the relatively unclear

delineation of responsibilities—even as spelled out in national policy documents—engenders

confusion, fragmentation, and duplication (Cameron 2014: s84). These dynamics are especially

pronounced where such objectives as housing provision, public transportation, and planning are

concerned,[15] delaying progress towards social, economic, and infrastructural goals. Considering

that one of the motivations for adopting the decentralized model was the ability to make the

government more efficient, the necessity for different state apparatuses to continually coordinate

and negotiate their roles and responsibilities is of note. In any case, the Gauteng Provincial

Government is intended to directly support local governments within its jurisdiction, act as an

---

[15] The responsibility for housing is shared by national and provincial governments, and implementation of housing plans is often delegated to local municipalities. Transportation is the responsibility of both national and provincial governments (e.g., national highways, provincial roadways), whereas municipal public transport (e.g., city streets, bus systems, et cetera) is a municipal function (Cameron 2014: s84). Furthermore, planning is shared between government units as well such that while the national government articulates national planning visions and documents, "provincial planning is an exclusive provincial competence" and "municipal planning falls under the mandate of the municipalities" yet is overseen by the provincial government (Cameron 2014: s84). These shared responsibilities are complex and unclearly delegated, leading to significant overlap in governmental administration.

intermediary between the local and national sphere, and maintain its own legislative, executive, and administrative functions as they pertain to the province as a whole.

1.2.6 The Local Government

The final sphere of government in South Africa's post-Apartheid framework is Local Government, the state apparatus with the most tangible impacts on the lived experiences of South Africans. In accordance with the 1996 Constitution, Local governments are responsible for basic service provision (e.g., water, sanitation, municipal roads, solid waste disposal, electricity, and healthcare) and the pursuit of social and economic development, broadly put (Cameron 2014: s83). Notably, municipalities bear primary responsibility for the provision of services within their jurisdiction, although some oversight from the provincial sphere aims to "protect and promote minimum standards of local government service delivery and ensure that local government fulfills its constitutional mandate" (Titus 2001: 19).

Local governments are categorized as Metropolitan Municipalities, District Municipalities, or Local Municipalities according to their size. Metropolitan municipalities are responsible for the development and delivery of all local government services within urban metropoles ("The Three Spheres" n.d.). District and local municipalities tend to be located in rural and less-populated areas, but still have the same obligations to service provision and development as larger municipalities. This reflects the assumption that is implicit to the decentralized approach that different units of government possess similar technical and administrative capacities (Bardhan 2002: 189).

In some cases, governance is further segmented within the local government framework. For example, while the City of Johannesburg as a whole is technically a metropolitan

municipality, governmental administration is decentralized into seven distinct regions—Region A through Region G—in order to accommodate the needs of Johannesburg's large population[16] (Figure 8). Each of these regions is an administrative unit of the municipality; they are responsible for the provision of basic community, social, and physical services while still falling under the authority and budget of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. While in theory this approach means that the government is designed to be representative, locally accountable, and responsive—consistent with the mores of the right to the city framework which call for democratic participation in the production and use of space and resources—it also introduces the potential for segmentation in the capacities of local government structures and how constituents experience, access, and use these institutions.

---

[16] The population of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Area was over 5.5 million according to 2018 estimates (Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs Department 2020: 11).

Figure 8. Regions of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality
(Scott 2015: 18)

1.3 Going Back: Apartheid's Selective Decentralization Approach

The Apartheid era embraced a form of governance that may best be described as *selective decentralization*[17] wherein administration was largely top-down and racially segmented. During Apartheid, South Africa was geographically divided into areas for White settlement—primarily cities—and Black settlement—primarily rural areas. This enabled the adoption of a political structure that was predicated on racial division, as depicted by Figure 9. Under this segmented model, the government worked to privilege the interests of the White-minority, allowed the

---

[17] "Selective decentralization" is intended to reflect an original term produced by the author of this Senior Project. The author was dissatisfied with the convention in scholarship of articulating Apartheid's governance as *either* decentralized or centralized when it appears to have assumed a more hybrid approach than these terms indicate.

repressive racial policies and Apartheid visions of the White-led National Party[18] to be promoted

and reinforced at every level of government, and restricted local political agency and autonomy

(Nel and Binns 2003: 112). While so-called White South Africa benefited from well-funded and

centralized state institutions that were aligned with nationally-articulated visions, Black South

Africa experienced a highly decentralized political structure that widely lacked resources.

Government was—in essence—a tool of Apartheid that was leveraged to elevate and maintain

the position of the White-minority while simultaneously disempowering the Black-majority.

Figure 9. Racially Segmented Governance Under Apartheid
(Wittenberg 2006: 333 as cited in Chilenga-Butao 2020: 18)

---

[18] The National Party (NP) was founded in 1914 to serve the social, economic, and nationalist interests of South Africa's White settler-colonists. In its early days, the NP was primarily composed of Dutch-descended Afrikaners, but later gained a following of English-speaking Whites. This party was dedicated to upholding White supremacy (i.e., Apartheid) and controlled South Africa's National Government for much of the twentieth century—from 1948 to 1994 ("National Party" 2020). While in power, the National Party pursued racially oppressive policies that engendered mass human rights abuses, widespread social injustices, and economic inequalities. Although fall of the Apartheid Regime following South Africa's 1994 Elections marked the official end of National Party rule, the extreme impacts that this administration had on South African society persist in the present day.

1.3.1 Examining Apartheid Governance

Prior to democratization, governance was somewhat centralized. Local governments were dependent upon the fiscal, organizational, and administrative resources of the national government and had limited autonomy (Calitz and Essop 2013: 139). This design allowed the implementation of Apartheid at the local level and limited the potential for local governments to resist racialized rule (Maharaj 2002: 1). Under the leadership of the national government, localities maintained the power of the White-minority and worked to control the lives of Black South Africans through repressive tactics including political exclusion and spatial separation (Swilling et al. 1991: 175 as cited in Maharaj 1997: 263). The centralized model was clearly well-suited for the National Party's racial segmentation goals.

While the Apartheid-era certainly saw forms of centralized governance—as reflected by the ideological attunement between the national and local spheres and the structural composition of government—it was not an entirely centralized system.[19] A more accurate assessment of the approach would acknowledge the inherent discrepancies in experiences of government according to race, such as that invoked by the *selective decentralization* conceptualization. The Apartheid system of governance leveraged decentralization for central control and racial division (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006: 30 as cited in Chilenga-Butao 2020: 20). As Maharaj (2002) notes, the

> apartheid planning discourse was organised along the lines of racial separation and operationalised through spatial partition. More specifically, [Black South] Africans were denied access to, and participation in, all [official White] political structures, and hence had little or no influence on decision-making (1–2).

Thus, while the government was centralized insofar as it served White communities and their interests, it was selectively decentralized for Blacks who were widely left to their own devices

---

[19] Some scholars, such as Cameron (2014) explicitly claim that "South Africa had a centralised form of governance" under Apartheid (Cameron 2014: s83). Although there were centralized components, this attribution is incomplete and misrepresentative of the racially segmented structure.

where matters of representation, resource distribution, political and social organization, service

provision, and other conventional tasks of government were concerned.

1.3.2 The Governance of Johannesburg Under Apartheid

   Established as a White-only city during the colonial and Apartheid eras, Johannesburg

was one of the local municipalities that fit into the centralized government structure of White

South Africa. Throughout the twentieth century, Johannesburg's City Council—primarily

consisting of White male leadership—received significant fiscal, managerial, and organizational

support from the central government, enabling the replication of the National Party's Apartheid

agenda at the local level. City authorities strategically enacted laws that prioritized the interests

of Whites and controlled the agency and abilities of Blacks. These included policies that limited

urban property rights,[20] racially divided residential settlement,[21] and restricted the agency of

Black laborers[22] (Harrison and Zack 2012: 558). As a result of its connection to the centralized

structure, Johannesburg had the resources and institutional capacity to develop infrastructure and

provide local services to its White inhabitants. In contrast, Black-majority settlements—often

found in urban peripheries and rural areas—did not have the capacity to provide for local needs

through state institutions due to their decentralized structure and autonomy. In effect,

Centralization gave Johannesburg the resources to elevate its physical, economic, and social

position relative to decentralized Black localities, further segmenting society across racial lines.

---

[20] One of these policies was the Natives (Urban Areas) Act (1923) which required Blacks and Whites to reside in separate areas within Johannesburg (Christopher 1983: 146).

[21] Policies like the Group Areas Act (1950) assigned racial categories (e.g., White, Native, Coloured) to residential areas in Johannesburg, enabling Apartheid-aligned spatial engineering efforts such as relocation and informal settlement clearing (Johnson-Castle 2014).

[22] Influx control measures and pass laws sought to enable the exploitation of cheap Black labor while simultaneously preventing inter-racial settlement in Johannesburg (Savage 1986: 181). Blacks could only labor in Johannesburg if they possessed documentation allowing them to do so, and if White interests demanded them (Mears 2011: 4).

1.3.3 Final Comments on Selective Decentralization

One of the primary outcomes of the selective decentralization model was the cultivation of racial inequality and segmentation. With local government under the centralized model considered the responsibility of White municipalities and used as a tool of control, repression and disempowerment by the Apartheid State—and with the local governments under the decentralized model lacking adequate resources and functional capacities to serve Black communities—the Black-majority was excluded from harnessing or benefitting from state resources[23] (Bekker and Jeffery 1989: 3 as cited in Maharaj 1997: 263). The racialization of governance under Apartheid emboldened the pursuit of the National Party's social, political, spatial, and economic goals at multiple levels of society, ensuring the viability of this political system. Government was not intended to provide for the needs of South Africans at large, but rather to uphold the power of the White-minority at the expense of the Black-majority.

1.4 Decentralization: Impetus, Implications, and Obligations

The end of Apartheid brought an era of decentralized, democratic government to South Africa (Pieterse 2019: 21). Decentralization offered new opportunities for political engagement and agency by empowering the local sphere, contrasting with the approach of the Apartheid era which used government as a tool of disempowerment and social, economic, and political

---

[23] This brief overview of Apartheid-era governance is incomplete without consideration of the Bantustans. Also known as Black Homelands and Bantu States, these areas were located in rural areas of South Africa. They evolved out of the Land Act of 1913 which set aside 7 percent (later increased to 13 percent) of South Africa's land for Black settlement (Ferguson 2006: 55). The Apartheid State leveraged the Bantustans to legitimize racial differentiation. They were removed from the main economic centers of South Africa, limiting the opportunities that were available to those who were forced to live within them (Noble and Wright 2013 as cited in Burger et al. 2016: 1101–1102). Aligning with the selective decentralization approach, the Bantustans received little to no funding from the central government, entrenching spatial divisions (Burger et al. 2016: 1102). For all intents and purposes, these areas were conceived of as independent political units that could develop independently (Ferguson 2006: 56). This distinctive separation between governance in White South Africa and the Black Homelands had significant implications. Not only did it produce myriad racially-divided institutional structures, it also meant that there was a complete absence of effective local government in rural areas outside of former White areas (Beall 2004: 6). This complicated the task of post-Apartheid governance, especially given the embrace of a decentralized model.

exclusion. Devolved power meant local independence and the potential to build the interests of

marginalized groups into the polity (Murray and Simeon 2012: 235). This concerted emphasis on

participation reflected the new government's commitment to realizing spatial justice, social

equality, and ensuring universal rights by aligning state institutions with local needs.

Furthermore, the decentralized approach addressed concerns over democratization being more of

a performative gesture than a lived reality in South Africa. As journalist Lynda Schuster notes,

> to legislate away white-minority rule at the national level—as happened, in essence, in the 1994 elections—was one thing; to abolish apartheid locally, where it has assumed some of its most odious forms, is quite another… Government affects people's daily lives most at the local level: that is where the promises to redress apartheid's injustices must be kept, where the real changes in South Africa will be felt, where democracy will either succeed or stumble (Schuster 1995).

Decentralization—understood as a way to counteract Apartheid by enhancing political

participation and improving state accountability, transparency, efficiency, and

responsiveness—was foundational to visions of a racially equal South Africa (Beall 2004: 2).

This positioning also mirrored the mores of the right to the city imperative insofar as it reoriented

the structure of decision-making away from a centralized and context-detached authority and

towards the people (Purcell 2002: 101). The decentralized model offered South Africans new

avenues to appropriate, change, and occupy space, allowing new imaginations and possibilities.

Under the decentralized system, local governments became the implementing

mechanisms for the promises made by national authorities. Transforming South Africa into a

Rainbow Nation—although a nationally-articulated imperative—was not imagined as the sole

responsibility of the central government. Rather, in addition to providing basic services and

administrative functions, municipalities were expected to overcome local manifestations of

Apartheid's spatial and economic engineering, and pursue development projects (Dewar 1992 as

cited in Pieterse 2019: 21). This wide range of unprecedented obligations is significant,

especially given the fact that local governments were not necessarily endowed with the resources or capacities to address all of their newly-devolved roles. Nevertheless, decentralization was advocated as a pathway to transformative change and social progress, influencing its uptake.

The justice-based impetus for decentralized governance in South Africa must not be considered in isolation from the broader context. Decentralization—affiliated with neoliberal values including market liberalization and privatization—was a popular idea in global development discourses during the late twentieth century. Influential advisory organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Commission for Human Settlements supported this strategy and cited its potential to spread democracy, enhance state efficiency, and facilitate economic growth (Bardhan 2002: 185; Maharaj 2012: 6; Parnell and Robinson 2006: 340; Miraftab and Kudva 2015: 230; Nel and Binns 2003: 109). According to a study by Crook and Manor (2000), around 80 percent of countries across the globe had implemented some form of decentralized governance by the mid-1990s, affirming that this was not a novel approach (Crook and Manor 2000 as cited in Fox and Goodfellow 2016: 246). Thus, although decentralization was articulated as an essential aspect of post-Apartheid nation-building and actualizing Rainbow Nation ideals, the decision to adopt this model was also influenced by factors that were unrelated to the South African context.

1.4.1 Contextualizing Johannesburg's Post-Apartheid Landscape

National democratization and concurrent government restructuring brought major changes to the City of Johannesburg. On paper, Johannesburg was no longer an enclave of Apartheid but was rather a city open to all South Africans, indiscriminate of racial identity. This new positioning was significant. In the first decade following the end of Apartheid,

Johannesburg's population grew by over one million people—from just under 2.3 million in 1994 to just over 3.5 million in 2004—as formerly excluded South Africans aspired to engage with urban opportunities ("Johannesburg" 2022). Over this period, Johannesburg also saw the influx of new private investments, experienced considerable economic growth[24] and underwent economic, political, and institutional shifts (Winkler 2009: 369). It seemed—at least initially—that Johannesburg was transforming into a city that was socially inclusive, open to new actors, and committed to rectifying its past.

Population growth and private development brought new challenges and questions to Johannesburg. The city's population boom was mostly explained by Black migrants relocating from rural areas to informal settlements near historically Black townships in Johannesburg's periphery (Bradlow 2015: 64). Concurrently, private investments led to the establishment of malls, corporate offices, and other institutions that reflected the interests of Johannesburg's well-off inhabitants—and thus did not aim to serve socially and economically excluded groups—throughout the city (Bradlow 2015: 64). These patterns mirrored the city's Apartheid-era segmentation, with Whites concentrated near the core and with ready access to services, amenities, and economic opportunities and Blacks located in less-developed areas that were far removed from these same resources.

The involvement of private capital coincided with Johannesburg's broader structural economic shifts. During the late twentieth century, Johannesburg's primary and secondary sectors—characterized by industries such as manufacturing and mining—shrunk as tertiary sector industries—including service-based jobs in commerce, finance, and banking—grew. The decline of manual jobs deepened inequality by limiting opportunities for labor market

---

[24] Between 1996 and 2017, Johannesburg's average GDP growth rate was 3.6 percent, higher than provincial (3.0 percent) and national averages (2.7 percent) ("Economic Growth" 2018). This is largely due to growth in the financial and business services sectors which consistently outperform average rates ("Economic Growth" 2018).

participation among those who lacked sufficient education, skills, and experience[25] to find work

in the competitive tertiary sector (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 39). Furthermore, given

the broader context of primarily Black rural-to-urban migration, job scarcity, and an official city

unemployment rate[26] hovering around 25 percent, the lack of inclusive economic opportunities

further segmented Johannesburg and complicated the task of decentralized governance.

Johannesburg's post-Apartheid shifts placed new pressures on its physical infrastructure,

spatial layout, and the availability of opportunities, strengthening existing inequalities and

replicating Apartheid patterns (Bradlow 2015: 65). As the economic powerhouse of the country,

Johannesburg's City Government was also implicated in the pursuit of growth and economic

development (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 338). While private investment aligned with the goals

of economic growth and development, it undermined the city's responsibility to realize social,

spatial, and economic equality by functioning as a vector of exclusion. Similarly, while

population growth involved new and diverse actors in local government decision-making,

settlement patterns reflected Apartheid segmentation—with Whites concentrated in livable,

planned, and well-maintained areas proximate to economic opportunities and public services,

and Blacks widely relegated to unplanned shantytowns that were disconnected from the formal

economy—reaffirming the racialization of space and employment. Decentralization meant that

---

[25] South Africans had starkly different opportunities for human capital accumulation according to their race. Whites typically resided in communities with reliable access to infrastructure, education, and well-funded social services. Conversely, Black areas typically had dysfunctional systems of government, underfunded schools, and limited employment opportunities (Fiske and Ladd 2006: 106). This segmentation prepared these groups for different economic roles; unskilled jobs were almost entirely filled by Black Africans whereas skilled jobs disproportionately employed Whites (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 39). As Johannesburg deindustrialized, the availability of low-skill, manual job opportunities decreased, causing higher unemployment among Blacks because they were less endowed with competitive skills that would enable them to adapt to a changing economic structure (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 42).

[26] The official unemployment rate reflects the number of people who are actively seeking work as a proportion of the entire labor force. Notably, this metric excludes discouraged workers (i.e., those no longer looking for jobs in the formal economy), and therefore may not be fully representative of the actual number of people who are unemployed.

the City of Johannesburg faced the challenge of negotiating between diverging obligations and goals in a vastly unequal context that was inherited from the Apartheid era.

1.4.2 Johannesburg's Decentralized Policy Agendas

While decentralization was celebrated for its social justice, human rights, and racial equality implications at the national level, the focus in Johannesburg was slightly different. The fall of Apartheid brought an end to the centralized governance model which had historically funded and supported select municipalities throughout South Africa. As a result of this transition, Johannesburg's financial condition and organizational structure were in disarray. In order to address the challenges of extreme inequality and pursue Rainbow Nation goals, the City Government implemented strategies that simultaneously engaged the ostensibly opposing objectives of poverty relief and economic growth (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 337). Decentralized governance levied a wide range of obligations onto Johannesburg and led the City Government to enact policies that did not necessarily offer justice or rights-based improvements.

The ANC-affiliated City Government attempted to develop a decentralized model of urban governance[27] that aligned with Rainbow Nation ideals, enabled socio-economic reconstruction, and provided services (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 95). Through collaboration with stakeholders—including ANC leaders, union representatives, private corporations, and constituents—the City Government developed iGoli 2002. Launched in 1998, this plan created Johannesburg's integrated metropolitan government,[28] unified the tax base, and allowed private companies to aid in the provision of urban services in order to address backlogs

---

[27] These urban governance models are also called City Development Strategies (CDS) and Urban Development Strategies (UDS) in the literature.

[28] iGoli 2002 made Johannesburg a "Unicity" by bringing together formerly segmented areas and government structures and establishing new city boundaries (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 342).

(Parnell and Robinson 2006: 342). iGoli 2002 was a politically polarizing and contested strategy because it embraced neoliberal ideologies by making a role for the private sector in tasks of local government (Sihlongonyane 2016: 6). Despite the broader implications of privatization, one of its motivations was to help the City Government realize its post-Apartheid obligations.

iGoli 2002 set the stage for iGoli 2010 (visioning began in 1999), which further consolidated Johannesburg's metropolitan structure and asserted the importance of economic growth for providing basic needs (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 343). This framework made greater provisions for the private sector and established a vision of turning Johannesburg into a globally competitive "World Class African City" (Sihlongonyane 2016: 6). Although iGoli 2010 evidenced the City Government's embrace of private actors and market forces as a way to realize social progress, it was produced by a participatory city visioning process that involved a number of stakeholders (Sihlongonyane 2016: 6). This attribute aligned with the goal of decentralized governance of giving constituents a say in the government's policy measures and decisions.[29]

Following the iGoli plans was Joburg 2030 (enacted in 2002), a policy agenda that was influenced by iGoli 2010 but more clearly linked to discourses of globalization and neoliberal economics (Sihlongonyane 2016: 7). Joburg 2030 promoted Johannesburg as a world class city that was open to external capital, international competition, and private actors (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 350). According to an analysis by Sihlongonyane (2016), Joburg 2030 sought to make the city more competitive and attract private investment by encouraging a

> shift towards high-value-added manufacturing and a stronger service economy, enabling the city to emerge as an export-oriented hub, closely integrated into the global economy with an emphasis on trade, transport, information, communications and technology (ICT), finance, business services, and tourism (7).

---

[29] Notably, iGoli 2010 was never formally implemented by the Johannesburg City Government due to interruptions from the municipal elections in 2000 (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 342). Instead, its visions were incorporated into the city's next development plan, Joburg 2030.

Joburg 2030's focus and policy development process diverged from the iGoli plans. Rather than prioritizing service delivery or matters of social justice, Joburg 2030 was oriented to neoliberal logic, urban promotion, and global competition. Furthermore, although Joburg 2030 was advocated as being "home grown and geared to the needs of Johannesburg's own citizenry," it was developed by elites and members of the City Council without consultation with local stakeholders (Sihlongonyane 2016: 7).

Decentralization offered local governments considerable autonomy while simultaneously involving a range of new responsibilities, actors, and diverging interests. Johannesburg's iGoli and Joburg 2030 policy agendas make clear that the imperative to actualize equality was impacted by global economic pressures and local government capacity limitations. According to one critique, in attempting to negotiate a post-Apartheid vision of Johannesburg, the City Government "did not explicitly seek to alter the conditions that make it difficult for marginalized, excluded or minority groups to participate in the life of the city in the first place" (Lipietz 2008: 145). Rather, local authorities adopted visions and plans for Johannesburg that were ineffectual and misaligned with their political promises, enabling the persistence of Apartheid inequalities and preventing decentralization from engendering a right to the city.

1.4.3 Decentralization and Post-Apartheid Equality

Despite the promises of democratic decentralized governance, racial inequality remains extremely high in contemporary Johannesburg. According to data from the 2011 Census, the physical layout of the city still reflects Apartheid-era segregation (Figure 10). Inter-racial mixing is limited; Whites disproportionately occupy well-endowed middle- and upper-class suburbs to the Northwest of the Central Business District (CBD) while Blacks are concentrated in the South

and along the urban periphery. In tandem with these spatial patterns, access to resources—such as housing, education, income, healthcare, employment opportunities, and social supports—is also divided by race due to the segmented investments in community structures and institutions made during Apartheid (Harrison and Zack 2012: 558). Interpreting Figure 11—which depicts unemployment in 2016—in conversation with the demographic layout of Johannesburg shown by Figure 10 suggests that areas with primarily Black settlement experience higher unemployment than areas with White-majority settlement. Furthermore, the city's Gini Coefficient[30] was the same in 2009 (62) as it was in 2019 (62), suggesting that extreme income inequality has persisted over two decades into the democratic era[31] (Nemavunde and Lomahoza 2020). Johannesburg may have diversified in terms of political representation and population, expanded its capacity to deliver services, and made investments in public infrastructure in the democratic era, yet its social, economic, and spatial inequalities remain (Bradlow 2015: 65).

---

[30] The Gini Coefficient measures income inequality on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being perfect equality (i.e., equal distribution–everyone has the same income) and 100 being perfect inequality (i.e., completely unequal distribution–one person has all of the income). Although this statistic does not reflect demographic divisions in income distribution, it may be extrapolated from the context that the concentration of economic power in the hands of the White-minority due to the legacies of colonialism and Apartheid is a driving factor behind this large value.

[31] To further contextualize these trends, Figure 12 shows changes to the national Gini Coefficient over time.

Figure 10. The Social Tapestry of Johannesburg[32]
("Mapping Diversity" 2016)

---

[32] This graphic shows the persistence of racial segregation in the City of Johannesburg nearly two decades after the official end of Apartheid rule. Beyond the lack of racial mixing in settlement, it is also important to note that majority-White areas typically have better access to services, employment opportunities, and education.

Figure 11. The Distribution of Unemployment in Johannesburg
("Spatial Inequality" 2016)

Figure 12. South Africa's Gini Coefficient, 1993–2015
(Author's Own, based on data from Index Mundi 2019)

The decentralized system—while offered as a pathway to make the government more responsive and efficient—appears to have enabled the persistence of the status quo instead of bringing about transformative social progress (Bardhan 2002: 185). Speaking on South African cities at large, South Africa's National Treasury (2015) explains that the

> dispersed and fragmented spatial patterns of our cities contribute significantly to the serious structural challenges they face. Although some progress in providing basic services to urban residents have been made, our cities remain segregated and exclusionary… this is made worse by the fact that urban governance itself still reflects Apartheid fragmentation (National Treasury 2015: 6 as cited in Pieterse 2019: 24).

According to this analysis, the persistence of inequality in Johannesburg is related to the city's spatial fragmentation and a network of compounding inequalities. As evidenced by the iGoli and Joburg 2030 plans, the task of overcoming inequality, exclusion, and social deprivation was distorted by the involvement of private actors, increasingly limited public participation in policy drafting, and an emphasis on the market in matters of urban governance (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 94). Decentralization introduced many vulnerabilities for local governments that eroded progress towards Rainbow Nation goals.

1.5. Decentralization's Vulnerabilities

In South Africa, local governments bear responsibility for a wide range of obligations—including combatting Apartheid legacies, actualizing justice, and realizing social and economic equality—despite lacking the resources and incentives to achieve these goals (Cameron 2014: s83–s84). Although the decentralized model promised to make the government more efficient, responsive, and accountable, it did not significantly improve the condition of Black South Africans, bring about social equality, or fundamentally transform the country in accordance with Rainbow Nation visions (Murray and Simeon 2012: 240). One of the primary reasons why cities like Johannesburg remain highly unequal is because local governments are expected to raise the majority of their own revenue, distorting incentives and policy agendas.

1.5.1 Fiscal Decentralization

Fiscal decentralization is an important aspect of South Africa's post-Apartheid approach to governance. Under this model, local governments must raise around 90 percent of their own revenue[33] to fund their administrative and operational duties[34] (Beall 2004: 15). This dynamic is significant given that municipalities receive a very limited amount of funding[35] from the national government despite being tasked with operationalizing nationally-articulated goals. Between 2017 and 2020, local governments received an average of 8.7 percent of national revenue per

---

[33] Sources of locally-derived revenue vary according to context but typically include taxation, rates on property, and surcharges on fees for municipal services (Beall 2004: 15).

[34] Local governments use their revenues to pay salaried employees, construct and maintain infrastructure, provide services, and pursue development projects.

[35] Although the vast majority of municipal funds are raised internally, the Constitution guarantees an "equitable share" of nationally raised revenue for the local sphere to expand access to basic services (Cameron 2014: s85). Funds are allocated according to the proportion of poor households within local jurisdictions (Cameron 2014: s85). According to the National Treasury's 2014 and 2021 Budget Review, South Africa's municipalities receive a sum of around 9 percent of national revenue each year (National Treasury 2014: 93; National Treasury 2021: IV). The majority of the nationally-raised revenue is allocated to national departments and provincial governments.

year (Figure 13). Although they may obtain additional grants or transfers at the discretion of the provincial government and NGOs, municipalities generate most of their revenue internally.

Division of Nationally Raised Revenue			
R billion/percentage of GDP	2017—2018	2018—2019	2019—2020
National Departments	592.6	634.3	749.7
Provinces	538.6	572.0	613.4
Local Government	111.1	118.5	123.0
Percentage Share			
National Departments	47.7%	47.9%	50.4%
Provinces	43.4%	43.2%	41.3%
Local Government	8.9%	8.9%	8.3%

Figure 13. Division of Nationally Raised Revenue in South Africa
(Author's Own, based on data from National Treasury 2021: IV)

In South Africa's post-Apartheid landscape, governmental powers and responsibilities have been devolved to local authorities, but the resources that are necessary to implement them have not (Nel and Binns 2003: 115). In many cases, South African municipalities do not possess sufficient funds to meet all of their obligations because there is an imbalance between available revenue and expenditure demands (Cameron 2014: s85; Nel and Binns 2003: 115). This is even true in the City of Johannesburg, where the municipal budget was R73.3 billion[36] for the 2021/2022 year (Arnoldi 2021). Johannesburg is South Africa's richest and most populous city and has the largest municipal budget and tax base in the country. Despite this unique position, Johannesburg still experiences significant financing issues (South African Cities Network 2020: 7). The city's physical infrastructure, ability to provide basic services to all of its inhabitants, and efforts to address poverty and deprivation locally are inadequate because the City Government

---

[36] R73.3 billion is equivalent to approximately $4.98 billion (USD).

lacks funding. Municipalities are expected to fill critically important roles in the administration

of governance and societal reconstruction in South Africa, yet they receive insufficient resources

and coordination from the center to fulfill all of their obligations (Cameron 2014: s83). These

dynamics help explain the distinct lack of transformation post-Apartheid.

1.5.2 Considering Urban Entrepreneurship

The shortcomings of decentralization in South Africa led to the involvement of new

actors and interests in matters of local government. To attend to all of their responsibilities in a

context of resource limitations, municipalities embraced tactics of urban entrepreneurship.[37]

According Harvey (1989), urban entrepreneurship

> has as its centerpiece the notion of a 'public-private partnership' in which a traditional
> local boosterism[38] is integrated with the use of local governmental powers to… attract
> external sources of funding, new direct investments, or new employment sources (7).

By making space for private actors in public affairs, local governments could ostensibly amass

additional funding to address local needs, solicit organizational and managerial guidance, and

better adhere to their responsibilities. Fiscal decentralization meant that cities had to compete to

attract private investment and funding to make up for the difference between their revenue

sources and their expenditures. This distorted their incentives and agendas as municipalities put

enhancing their appeal to capital first, and addressing internal deprivations and needs second.[39]

---

[37] In this context, "urban entrepreneurship" refers to the concept developed by Marxist scholar David Harvey in his 1989 article "From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism." Rather than reflecting a general ethos of entrepreneurship in urban settings, it describes when urban governments themselves embrace entrepreneurial behaviors. Although Harvey conceives of this term in the context of cities (hence "urban" entrepreneurship), this term may also describe other governmental institutions (e.g., rural local governments) that embrace neoliberal/capitalist values in policymaking and stakeholder engagement.

[38] "Boosterism" reflects efforts by a combination of actors in the local sphere—including the chamber of commerce, business leaders, financiers, industrialists, and property developers—to promote a locality (Harvey 1989: 6).

[39] Section 2.4 discusses examples of the City Government's urban entrepreneurial tactics in greater detail.

It is important to question how well this orientation to private interests aligns with the original intentions of the decentralized approach to governance in post-Apartheid South Africa. Decentralization was offered as a mechanism to "promote democracy and participation, such that local people are directly involved in decisions and developments which affect them personally" (Nel and Binns 2003: 109). In contrast, entrepreneurial governments prioritize the interests of capital, focus on providing a good business climate, and assume that local conditions will improve as a result (Harvey 1989: 11, 8). This orientation is reflected in Johannesburg's iGoli and Joburg 2030 plans which articulated economic growth, global competitiveness, and privatization as essential ways to provide for urban needs (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 348). Despite such positive articulations, entrepreneurial dynamics often cause greater disparities in the distribution of wealth and income and increase the prevalence of poverty, effectively inhibiting social progress (Harvey 1989: 12). Decentralization makes municipalities vulnerable to external influences because they lack sufficient resources and support from the public sector to provide for all of their devolved roles.

1.5.3 A Note on Elite Capture

Local governments are also vulnerable to elite capture in the decentralized model. This occurs when powerful social groups, corporations, or individuals covertly dominate matters of local governance through economic ultimatums and other coercive tactics (Olowu and Wunsch 2003: 6 as cited in Chilenga-Butao 2020: 21). The risk of elite capture is significant in the South African context because democratization did not occur in tandem with aggressive redistribution strategies[40] (Tazanu 2019: 9). As a result, racial disparities were not fundamentally altered;

---

[40] As South Africa's leadership negotiated the end of Apartheid, they implicitly maintained the hegemonic position of the White-minority by opting to not forcibly redistribute resources to the Black-majority. At the time, this decision seemed pragmatic given internal social tensions and the experiences of neighboring Zimbabwe—which

Whites maintained their wealth, high-level jobs, businesses, and property, giving them disproportionate influence over matters of local government, especially in cities like Johannesburg where they comprised a significant portion of the population.

While elite capture was a nation-wide risk in the post-Apartheid context due to the disproportionate distribution of social and economic power between racial groups, it had acute manifestations in Johannesburg. This process is reflected in the successive erosion of public involvement in the iGoli and Joburg 2030 plans; participation and tactics of deliberative democracy fell away as the economic interests of elite private actors placed new pressures on city authorities (Lipietz 2008: 156). For decentralization to effectively promote democratic principles and achieve broader social goals, it must be accompanied by changes to existing power dynamics (Bardhan 2002: 202). Elite capture threatens the ability of decentralized governments to overcome Apartheid; it promotes a continuation of the status-quo, favors the interests of those with social and economic power over the majority, and threatens democracy.

1.6 Chapter Conclusion: Local Governments, Local Problems

Decentralized governance was a fundamental component of democratic nation-building and reconstruction in South Africa. By devolving power to the local sphere—and concurrently holding local governments responsible for delivering upon promises made at the national level—South Africa's post-Apartheid visionaries believed that the government would be more accountable and responsive to local needs. Decentralization was offered as a one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges facing South Africa; it could ostensibly overcome the lingering side effects of Apartheid; bring about racial justice, social equality, and political inclusion; and

---

opted for an aggressive redistribution approach after the fall of White-minority rule that led to virtual economic collapse. South Africa adopted a relatively non-interventionist approach to nation-building because its leadership wanted to avoid extreme economic disruptions and social unrest.

increase quality of life throughout the country. With decentralization shrouded in such positive language, it became a widely unquestioned imperative in South Africa's democratic era.

Despite its promises, decentralization proved vulnerable. Local governments struggled to collect adequate revenue to address all of their responsibilities, lacked sufficient organizational and administrative capacities, and fell victim to the visions and influence of private capital. These factors eroded the social justice and rights-based motivations of decentralized governance by distorting incentives and forcing local governments to assume entrepreneurial behaviors that enabled the replication and persistence of Apartheid patterns. Even decades after the decentralized model was established in Johannesburg, the spatial, economic, and social dynamics of the city had not fundamentally changed (Pieterse 2019: 22). In this context, decentralization did not bring about a right to the city or act as a tool of social empowerment. Johannesburg remains unequal today because the neoliberal policy agendas of economic growth, global competition, and privatization obscured the pursuit of Rainbow Nation ideals at the local level.

Chapter 2: Johannesburg, A 'World Class African City'

2.1 Introduction

National democratization and governmental decentralization led the City of Johannesburg to assume new responsibilities, face unprecedented obstacles, and grapple with diverging incentives. The Rainbow Nation vision—embraced by ANC leaders and the citizenry at large—promised a post-colonial and post-Apartheid landscape wherein non-racialism, social justice, economic equality, and democracy would be the new normal. Under the decentralized model, local governments across the country bore primary responsibility for actualizing these principles in South African society. Municipalities were mostly autonomous units of the democratic governance structure; they were expected to raise the vast majority of their operating revenues, develop policy visions and frameworks for their jurisdictions, and pursue development projects to enhance local conditions independently. Importantly, post-Apartheid reconstruction and nation-building was widely predicated on the assumption that social progress at the local level would facilitate transformation on a national scale.

After the fall of the Apartheid Regime, Johannesburg faced the enormous task of counteracting the legacies of racialized social, spatial, and economic engineering that left the city in shambles. In tandem, the City Government was forced to negotiate its new economic openness with its obligation to provide for internal needs. To address these challenges, Johannesburg's City Government made space for the involvement of private actors and economic logics in matters of local government. Notably, this embrace of the private sector mirrored national policy trends—epitomized by the shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy—and aligned with contemporaneous development discourses that offered neoliberalism as a way to generate shared

prosperity and democratize societies. By 1999, Johannesburg's City Government had embraced

urban entrepreneurialism,[41] neoliberalism, and a vision of becoming a globally-linked "World

Class African City" (WCAC)[42] in central policy documents (Winkler 2009: 364). This

orientation to external forces distorted Johannesburg's internal obligations, failed to provide

inhabitants with a right to the city,[43] and allowed extreme inequalities to persist.

2.2 Contextualizing the Pursuit

Before exploring Johannesburg's post-Apartheid orientation, it is important to understand

how the city came to occupy such a privileged economic position that becoming a WCAC

appeared as a feasible and rational policy objective. Johannesburg's economy is closely linked to

its natural resource endowments, history as a mining city, and the impacts of protectionist

import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) policies. During the colonial period, Johannesburg

functioned as a White-controlled African node in the colonial system. This positioning allowed

the city to develop linkages with early systems of international trade and exchange throughout

the African continent. Johannesburg's economy developed and diversified quickly, leading to

significant population and GDP growth. Despite its privileged position, Apartheid-era economic

sanctions held Johannesburg back from becoming a central figure in the global economy. During

the democratic period, development discourses and national ideological shifts influenced policy

---

[41] As theorized by Harvey (1989), urban entrepreneurship is a process whereby local governments adopt tactics of self-promotion and boosterism to attract private investment and industry (Harvey 1989: 7). Through public-private partnerships, municipalities aim to enhance their socioeconomic condition and reduce the need for state intervention.

[42] Global cities are command points in the world economy that play a key role in facilitating international economic interactions, including systems of exchange, extraction, production, and consumption (Sassen 2005: 29). Global cities are a product of the increasingly transnational and hypermobile nature of certain services and industries (e.g., finance) and the geographic dispersal of economic functions across the planet (e.g., producing consumer goods through international supply chains) (Sassen 2005: 28).

[43] The right to the city concept—advanced and adapted by seminal scholars like Henri Lefebvre (1968), David Harvey (2008), and Edward Soja (2010)—examines the extent to which urban inhabitants are endowed with the ability to use, change, and appropriate space, with relevance for matters of justice and bottom-up empowerment.

agendas and visions of urbanity, encouraging Johannesburg's City Government to embrace neoliberal values and aspire to global city status.

2.2.1 Johannesburg's Economic Foundations

Throughout the colonial and Apartheid eras, Johannesburg occupied a unique economic position that was shaped by the colonial capitalist and industrial economic system (Worden 1994: 34 as cited in Mears 2011: 3). Founded in 1886, the city's population, economy, and urban form evolved out of the dynamics of mineral extraction along the Witwatersrand Gold Fields (Harrison and Zack 2012: 552). At its peak in 1970, South Africa contributed 78 percent of the world's total gold output, with a significant portion of gold production occurring in mines in and around Johannesburg (Harrison and Zack 2012: 559). Although the mining sector contracted during the second half of the twentieth century, Johannesburg's economy continued to grow and prosper and remained central to South Africa's national economy.

The growth of the mining industry catalyzed Johannesburg's economic development and diversification, giving rise to the city's prominent industrial and financial sectors (Harrison and Zack 2012: 562). In 1887, Johannesburg became the site of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), connecting the city to an elite system of finance, banking, and speculation (Harrison and Zack 2012: 557). Johannesburg also served as the corporate and physical center of the mining industry and was home to a number of manufacturing firms that were established in part to meet the material demands of the mining sector (Harrison and Zack 2012: 557). As a result of its diverse economic activities, colonial status, and contributions to the world's gold supply, the city was well-connected to regional and international trade.

South Africa's national policy orientation played an important role in Johannesburg's economic development and industrial diversification. From the 1930s until around 1980, South Africa's National Government—led by the White-minority—relied on a macroeconomic strategy called import-substitution-industrialization (ISI). Initially, this approach was a reaction to the import disruptions that occurred during World War I and World War II (Harrison and Zack 2012: 556–557). By incentivizing domestic production through state subsidies and protectionist trade policies, ISI enhanced South Africa's economic independence (Adewale 2017: 146).

In addition to its relevance during wartimes, ISI strategically helped the National Party uphold the Apartheid system. Under this model, South Africa produced essential goods—such as clothing, chemicals, construction materials, and food—internally, reducing its dependence on imports and shielding the country from the threat of economic isolation, sanctions, and coercion by foreign states (Adewale 2017: 146; Harrison and Zack 2012: 556). Many of South Africa's new industries and manufacturing plants were situated in and around Johannesburg due to its large population and supply of laborers, trade-friendly infrastructure, and existing status as the country's corporate headquarters from the mining boom (Innes 1984 as cited in Harrison and Zack 2012: 556). These dynamics reasserted Johannesburg's position as South Africa's economic powerhouse by bringing disproportionate benefits to the city's labor market and local economy. At a national level, protectionist macroeconomic policies led to economic diversification, created employment opportunities, and served the interest of the country's White-minority leadership.

During the 1960s, anti-colonial and anti-Apartheid sentiments generated new pressures that threatened South Africa's political and economic system. Activists[44] called for corporate

---

[44] The Anti-Apartheid movement (AAM) was especially prominent across college campuses in the U.S. and Europe. Student protests led colleges to divest their endowments from South African stock, precipitating widespread private disinvestment and economic sanctions (Kaempfer, Lehman, and Lowenberg 1987: 460–461). These tactics aimed to incentivize policy change in South Africa by adding additional economic pressure to this already-excluded country.

disinvestment and aggressive state sanctions as a way to incentivize policy change and liberate

South Africa from White-minority rule (Figure 14; Kaempfer, Lehman, and Lowenberg 1987:

458). Accordingly, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) enacted an

oil embargo against South Africa in 1973, threatening economic disaster because there was no

domestic substitute for this essential product (Levy 1999: 415). Around this same period,

countries like the United Kingdom and United States enacted trade and financial sanctions

against South Africa, and a large amount of investment was withdrawn by both public and

private actors (Levy 1999: 415). In effect, South Africa's economic growth was reduced by an

estimated 1.5 percent per year from the 1980s to the early 1990s (de Klerk 1999: 70 as cited in

Schneider 2003: 30). These external pressures had profound impacts on South Africa's domestic

economy and incentivized NP and ANC officials to negotiate the end of the Apartheid system.

Figure 14. Model of International Political and Economic Pressure on South Africa
(Kaempfer, Lehman, and Lowenberg 1987: 459)

Despite its early prestige, rich endowment of natural resources, and linkages with global

actors from the colonial system, Johannesburg could not become a WCAC during Apartheid.

South Africa's self-inflicted ISI policies and the country's economic exclusion by foreign actors

prevented South African cities from competing and participating in the global economy at a

significant level. Long prevented from realizing its potential as a central player in the international capitalist order, the transition to majority rule—and concurrent lifting of sanctions, barriers, and investment deterrents—opened up new possibilities and opportunities. This history contextualizes the City of Johannesburg's unique position and enthusiastic pursuit of participating in the global economic system following democratization.

2.2.2 Influence of Contemporary Discourses

When South Africa was liberated from Apartheid in 1994, neoliberal ideology was pervasive, preeminent, and highly influential across the globe (Scully 2019: 171). Around this time, the welfare state model—which empowered governments to take on an active role in providing for the health and well-being of its citizens through social policies—was under intense scrutiny. Organizations like the World Bank, and countries including the United States and United Kingdom advocated for neoliberal values—including fiscal austerity, privatization, deregulation, market liberalization, and cuts to public spending—as a foundation for development, economic growth, and spreading democracy. Thus, fully realizing the social benefits of democratization was complicated by the limits that neoliberalism placed on state actions (Scully 2019: 185). While South Africa's extreme racial inequality created a political imperative for the government to intervene with robust social welfare strategies, the focus on neoliberal approaches to development and redistribution limited the post-Apartheid policy space.

2.2.3 Characterizing Global Cities and Neoliberal Urbanism

Johannesburg's post-Apartheid condition is intertwined with global city visions and the coinciding logics of neoliberal urbanism and urban entrepreneurialism. In brief, global cities are

central nodes in the world economy that serve as sites of industry, investment, production, consumption, and influence (Sassen 2005: 28–29). They tend to be characterized by high economic growth, concentrations of wealth, well-developed trade infrastructure, and tertiary sector industries. Municipalities that aspire to global city status adopt neoliberal policy agendas and embrace entrepreneurial tactics to attract private investment and make themselves more competitive in the world economy (Harvey 1989: 7; Vives Miró 2011: 2 as cited in Jaffee 2013: 120). Rather than targeting local needs, city governments often spend their limited resources on promotional projects to enhance their appeal to capital (Lemanski 2007: 449). This orientation is predicated on the notion that participation in the world economy will generate local improvements—such as shared prosperity, development, and economic growth—lessen the state's administrative and financial burden, and give cities more power and influence in the global sphere. As a result, entrepreneurial municipal governments aim to make themselves business-friendly and attractive to international capital through neoliberal policies.

Neoliberal urbanism makes issues of social deprivation and inequality peripheral to economic metrics. While the positive aspects of global cities tend to be their most prominent features in development discourses, this condition introduces a number of negative externalities. Among them are social polarization, political disenfranchisement, the growth of informal settlements, labor market exclusion, spatial segmentation, and gentrification (Friedman and Wolff 1982: 322 as cited in Fox and Goodfellow 2016: 90; Lemanski 2007: 451; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009: 51). The benefits of being a global city are not equally shared among urban citizenries: social and spatial segregation is an ever-present byproduct (Sassen 1990, 1994 as cited in Lemanski 2007: 450).

Global city aspirations skew the incentives of urban governments. Neoliberalism posits

that competitive, open, and unregulated markets are the optimal and most efficient way to

achieve socio-economic development (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009: 50). Accordingly, city

governments subordinate their policy agendas to elite interests and the demands of capital,

sacrificing local accountability and responsiveness. As Smith and Guarnizo (2009) explain,

> [a] primary goal of city governments is to promote economic development connected to
> global capital circuits. They no longer seek to directly improve the everyday living
> conditions of the inhabitants, but rather to create environments attractive to corporate
> investments in global competition with other cities (296).

These dynamics are especially problematic in post-colonial cities like Johannesburg where

inequality, poverty, social disempowerment, and an uneven distribution of resources is already

the norm (Lemanski 2007: 448). The promises of the market allow urban governments to turn

their attention away from internal needs and imbalances, yet this orientation effectively enables

the persistence and reproduction of undesirable conditions (Schneider 2003: 23).

2.3 Post-Apartheid Policy Frameworks

Shortly after South Africa's democratization, Johannesburg's City Government began

promoting itself as a "World Class African City" (Sihlongonyane 2016: 6). The country's new

economic openness, Johannesburg's autonomy, and the contemporary popularity of neoliberalism

encouraged city authorities to involve market forces in matters of urban governance. At first, this

seemed pragmatic. Given Johannesburg's new municipal structure and its limited administrative,

organizational, and financial resources, involving the private sector in service provision could

ostensibly help the local government respond to immediate needs. Yet, neoliberal values soon

became foundational to Johannesburg's approach to development and governance—as evidenced

by iGoli 2010 and Joburg 2030—eroding the city's initial focus on directly rectifying local and

lasting manifestations of Apartheid. These trends mirrored the ANC's embrace of neoliberal logic at the national level, as reflected by its shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. By adopting neoliberal values and pursuing a central role in the global economy by becoming a WCAC, Johannesburg's City Government failed to transform its urban landscape post-Apartheid.

2.3.1 The National Sphere

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was the ANC's initial policy framework for post-Apartheid South Africa. Enacted in 1994, it called for heavy state involvement to eradicate Apartheid legacies and realize the Rainbow Nation promise of a "democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future" for South Africa (Government of National Unity 1994: 4 as cited in Corder 1997: 184). Notably, the RDP was predicated on the conviction that the market system was unable to address inequality, thus warranting oversight and intervention by the state (Adelzadeh 1996: 66; Chipkin 2003 as cited in James 2013: 38). This people-first, market-second orientation reflects the RDP's so-called "socialist resonance," which was at odds with the primacy of free market capitalism in global development discourses at the time (Narsiah 2002: 29). Under the RDP, the state was expected to facilitate redistribution by providing for basic needs (e.g., housing, jobs, services, infrastructure), rebuild the economy, and democratize South African society (Corder 1997: 185–186; Moolla, Kotze, and Block 2011: 139). One of the primary aims of this policy framework was to realize Rainbow Nation ideals and empower Black South Africans whose capabilities and opportunities were suppressed under White-minority rule.

The RDP was not without flaws and shortcomings. Implementation was complicated by the decentralized system, which obligated mostly autonomous municipal governments to play a

key role in service provision and development (even though this policy was enacted at the

national level). Furthermore, South Africa's finances were in disarray; the government inherited

major budget deficits from the Apartheid era—and its available revenue sources did not match its

expenditure demands—leading policy-makers to claim that they "could not possibly afford all of

the things the ANC wanted" without intensifying the nation's economic problems (Schneider

2003: 36). Beyond these factors, the ANC Government was advised by the World Bank and

International Monetary Fund (IMF), multilateral institutions that promoted neoliberalism,

economic stabilization, and structural adjustment policies in developing countries at this

historical juncture (Narsiah 2002: 30). While the RDP sought to uplift South Africa through state

intervention, the broader context disincentivized social welfarist approaches to redistribution and

reconstruction. In effect, fiscal and monetary discipline[45] became non-negotiable policy

imperatives in the eyes of the nation's political leaders and policy advisors (Narsiah 2002: 30).

The ANC replaced the RDP with the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR)

strategy in 1996, just two years after democratization. While the RDP framework saw the market

as a vector of inequality and called for redistribution as a pathway to growth and shared

prosperity, GEAR explicitly embraced neoliberal values; it discouraged state involvement in

societal reconstruction and social well-being, and prioritized privatization, fiscal austerity,

economic growth, and attracting foreign investment (James 2013: 38; Hall 2004: 220; Narsiah

2002: 29). GEAR was predicated on the logic that a market-friendly development strategy would

efficiently and inevitably correct racial inequality, unemployment, and redistribute social and

---

[45] South Africa's National Government did not accept loans from international development organizations like the World Bank or the IMF because they wanted to preserve the country's sovereignty and shield the newly-democratic nation from coercion (Rustomjee 2006: 431). Thus, in order to finance the RDP and other essential programs, the ANC had to levy taxes. Given South Africa's high unemployment and poverty rates—as well as the dysfunctional and segmented governance structure—this was no simple undertaking. These factors influenced the National Government's decision to enact GEAR, a "home-grown structural adjustment program," which called for policy changes and institutional shifts to encourage private investment (Rustomjee 2006: 431). Involving the private sector was imagined as a way to reduce the state's financial obligations while maintaining the government's autonomy.

economic power in post-Apartheid South Africa (Ferguson 2015: 4). In tandem, GEAR was prompted by the rapid collapse in the value of the rand and significant decline in the confidence of foreign investors that took place between 1994 and 1996 (Rustomjee 2006: 431; Schneider 2003: 43). This context put pressure on South Africa's ANC Government to take steps to reduce the risk of economic collapse, and at the time, neoliberalism offered a ready solution.

The shift from RDP to GEAR was significant, especially considering that prior to the 1994 Election, the ANC—a historically left-leaning political organization—was "openly hostile to the neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank" due to their potential to enhance inequality and erode domestic well-being (Schneider 2003: 43–44). Under GEAR, South Africa's National Government contended that the market would naturally and efficiently bring about redistribution and overcome structural inequalities. This orientation implicitly preserved the economic power of the White-minority and left marginalized and disadvantaged groups to negotiate with largely unregulated market forces on their own. GEAR worked to absolve the state's responsibility to make South African society more equal through direct intervention.

2.3.2 Economic Restructuring

Market liberalization brought an end to South Africa's economic exclusion and made its industries vulnerable to global dynamics. As protectionist tariffs that aimed to bolster the productive capacity of the manufacturing sector during Apartheid were lifted, cheap imports flooded the domestic market, causing South African plants to close (Narsiah 2002: 35). In effect, the jobs available in the primary and secondary sectors contracted significantly. At the same time, restructuring caused rapid growth in the tertiary sector as former barriers to trade, investment, and exchange were revoked in favor of free market approaches. Overall, the net

number of jobs in South Africa shrunk by over half a million in the first decade of democracy

due to these broader economic shifts (Murphy 2002). By advocating for a minimalist state,

GEAR disincentivized governmental intervention in patterns of labor market inequality and

failed to protect disadvantaged groups from the externalities of privatization and competition.

Black South Africans shouldered a disproportionate burden of unemployment and

underemployment due to the economic restructuring that occurred under GEAR. In 1997, White

males were 32 percent more likely to be employed than their Black counterparts at any skill level

(Burger and Jafta 2010: 18). Furthermore, in 1994 and 2014, Black laborers were more often

employed in low-skilled[46] and semi-skilled jobs than Whites (Figure 15). Even possessing

competitive skills did not automatically generate improved employment outcomes; a study from

2006 found that 42 percent of skilled Black South Africans worked in low-earnings jobs whereas

36 percent of skilled Whites worked in high-earnings jobs (Altman 2006: 76). This data indicates

that the labor market was not more inclusive post-Apartheid, contrasting with the neoliberal logic

embraced by GEAR that competition produces efficient and equitable results.

There are two primary explanations for these uneven labor market outcomes. On one

hand, Black South Africans may have lacked the skills, education, and experience necessary to

compete for jobs—especially in a context of mass structural unemployment—due to their

intentional human capital suppression under Apartheid (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 39).

As the economy shed lower-skilled manual jobs and gained high-skilled tertiary sector jobs,

those without certain marketable talents and endowments were more likely to lose out (Sassen

2005: 30). On the other hand, the embrace of neoliberal ideologies under GEAR disincentivized

labor market intervention and implicitly allowed discriminatory practices to persist. These

---

[46] Although terms like "low-skilled" and "high-skilled" are pervasive descriptors in academic literature, they impose an unnecessary hierarchy onto perceptions of employment and gloss over the fact that every type of job has value and requires unique skills. Such terminology is invoked for consistency purposes only and not to place judgment.

factors combined to prevent different racial groups from competing on equal footing. As of 2019, the official unemployment rate[47] for Black South Africans was 36.5 percent—nearly five times higher than the unemployment rate of 8.8 percent for Whites—suggesting that the government's passive approach to addressing structural labor market inequalities was ineffective (Galal 2021). Furthermore, the persistence of racially-uneven outcomes nearly three decades after democratization reveals that the ANC consistently failed to realize its Rainbow Nation promises.

Figure 15. Employment Composition in South Africa by Race and Skill, 1994 and 2014 (Adapted from Statistics South Africa 2014: 4)

Johannesburg's economic dynamics aligned with national trends. After democratization, the city's tertiary sector industries of finance and commerce experienced rapid growth while the

---

[47] The official unemployment rate reflects the number of people who are actively seeking work as a proportion of the entire labor force. This metric excludes discouraged workers (i.e., those no longer seeking formal jobs), and therefore may not be fully representative of the actual number of people who are unemployed.

mining and manufacturing industries stagnated and contracted (Figure 16). In 1996—when

GEAR was first implemented at the national level—the primary and secondary sectors made up

approximately 28.7 percent of the jobs in Johannesburg, whereas the tertiary sector contributed

around 71.3 percent of the jobs (Figure 17; Harrison et al. 2014: 6). By 2011, these figures were

18.1 percent and 81.9 percent respectively, suggesting that the country's new economic openness

under GEAR brought significant changes to Johannesburg's economy (Figure 17; Harrison et al.

2014: 6). The state's passive approach to post-Apartheid reconstruction under GEAR combined

with Johannesburg's legacy of racial discrimination, spatial segmentation, and economic, social,

and political exclusion to hold the Black-majority back from benefitting from these changes.


Figure 16. Change in Employment by Sector in Johannesburg, 1946–2009
(Adapted from Harrison and Zack 2012: 563).

Economic Sector	Percent Contribution to Johannesburg's Total Employment	
	1996	2011
Primary	2.6	1.8
Secondary	26.1	16.3
Tertiary	71.3	81.9
Total	100	100

Figure 17. Employment by Economic Sector in Johannesburg, 1996 and 2011
(Author's Own, based on data from Harrison et al. 2014: 6)

2.3.3 The Local Sphere

Under the auspices of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),

Johannesburg's City Government initially promised a people-driven approach to local

development that would center community needs and overcome the legacies of repressive

White-minority rule (Myambo 2017: 80). In the words of Johannesburg's first post-Apartheid

Mayor, Isaac Mogase (1995–2000), the ANC-led City Council was striving to create an

"innovative transformation and development plan with the primary goal of effective, efficient

and sustainable democratic governance" (Mogase 1999: 3 as cited in Beall, Crankshaw, and

Parnell 2002: 94). Such hopeful rhetoric suggested that Johannesburg's leadership was

committed to embracing the RDP at the local level; giving residents a right to the city by

providing them with accountable, responsible local government and clear channels for

participation; and aligning their policy agendas and urban visions with local needs.

Prior to implementing a comprehensive plan for urban governance and development,

Johannesburg's newly-democratized City Government made attempts to bring about social

equality, integration, and redistribution (Lipietz 2008: 148). Capital investments in historically

disadvantaged areas of the city and attempts to establish local participatory planning processes

were commonplace efforts (Lipietz 2008: 148). Among other projects, Johannesburg's City Government—in collaboration with the Gauteng Provincial Government and the National Government—worked to construct low-cost public housing units in high-deprivation areas like Soweto (Moolla, Kotze, and Block 2011: 139). They also sought to expand access to basic amenities—such as public transportation, plumbing, and electricity—in order to concurrently modernize the city and combat Johannesburg's highly racialized landscape. Although these efforts embodied the tenets of the RDP and aligned with Rainbow Nation promises, their effectiveness was constrained by the city's inadequate financial resources, limited redistributive capacity, and complicated organizational and administrative structure in the wake of Apartheid (Lipietz 2008: 148). These factors contributed to a distinct lack of progress in the immediate post-Apartheid period, and encouraged the City Government to develop new strategies.

Each of the City Government's post-Apartheid policy agendas—namely, iGoli 2002, iGoli 2010, and Joburg 2030—embraced neoliberal logics and (albeit to differing extents) embodied a desire for Johannesburg to become a global city. These frameworks drew the goals of enhancing Johannesburg's competitiveness, fostering global economic participation, and increasing the city's appeal to capital into the same planning discourse as providing for basic needs and addressing urban inequality—with the former objectives eventually superseding the latter in official policy documents (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 339). City authorities claimed that the neoliberal values of economic growth, privatization, and competition were fundamental to providing for underserved, marginalized, and poor urban inhabitants. In their eyes, "equity and poverty reduction could not occur without enhanced municipal efficiency or sustainable growth" (Allen et al. 2001: 43 as cited in Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 100). In accordance with this perspective, Johannesburg's City Government failed to adopt strategies that directly

intervened in patterns of inequality—such as market regulation, social protections, and welfarist-approaches to service provision—leaving marginalized groups vulnerable to the externalities of the city's participation in the global economy.

Through iGoli 2002, the City Government embraced tactics of urban entrepreneurship, sought to promote Johannesburg as the "Pulse of Africa," and worked to reassert the city's role as the economic powerhouse of the country (Sihlongonyane 2016: 6). One of the primary outcomes of iGoli 2002 was the privatization of basic services like water and electricity[48] (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 345). In effect, access to services was in large part a function of residents' ability to pay. These dynamics disregarded questions of equity; the potential "positive effect of uniform water and electricity standards upon public health, labor productivity, employment or geographical (racial and class) integration;" and the fact that the poor may struggle to pay free market rates for essential goods and services (Bond 1997 as cited in Schneider 2003: 44). Given that Johannesburg's Black residents were more likely to be poor, unemployed, and live in underserviced areas with inadequate infrastructure, forcing them to contend with widely unregulated corporations to access essential services under iGoli 2002 blatantly ignored the local context and intensified patterns of racial inequality. While Johannesburg's City Councilors claimed that iGoli 2002 "prioritizes the underserved and the poor" by making more resources available, it actually increased the vulnerability of marginalized urban inhabitants (Fihla 1999: 6 as cited in Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 99).

Johannesburg's subsequent policy agendas—iGoli 2010 and Joburg 2030—embraced neoliberal values and global city visions more explicitly than iGoli 2002. In these documents, becoming a WCAC was a central aspiration, whereas social equality, justice, and counteracting

---

[48] Companies like the Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM) became new and essential actors in matters of urban service provision due to the iGoli 2002 framework (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 95).

Apartheid were decidedly secondary. According to one of Johannesburg's senior policy strategists, "serving the inner city areas, which are now largely black and poor, was a lower priority than turning Johannesburg into a world class city" (Friedman 2005: 761 as cited in Sihlongonyane 2016: 5). Clearly, these neoliberal policy prescriptions did not seek to realize Rainbow Nation goals or provide urban inhabitants with a right to the city. Overcoming deprivation and racial segmentation was no longer a primary focus; the City Government's desire to participate in the global economy overshadowed its earlier commitments to equitable, participatory, and inclusive development.

iGoli 2010 echoed the neoliberal, market-based strategy of iGoli 2002. This approach sought to make Johannesburg attractive to business and stepped further away from the call for state intervention in matters of equality and redistribution that was espoused by the RDP (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 339). Notably, iGoli 2010 failed to include policies that would allow historically marginalized and excluded groups to participate in urban life and decision-making (Lipietz 2008: 145). It embraced an agenda that was predicated on urban entrepreneurship and the privatization of public services, turning attention away from internal needs (Mabin 2007 as cited in Didier, Peyroux, and Morange 2012: 6; Myambo 2017: 80). Due to political interruptions from Johannesburg's second municipal election in 2000, iGoli 2010 was never formally implemented (Parnell and Robinson 2006: 342). Instead, it served as a foundation for Joburg 2030, the city's long-term development and governance framework that was enacted in 2002.

Joburg 2030 enthusiastically embraced the objective of making Johannesburg a global city.[49] In accordance with this vision, the City Government bore responsibility for enhancing

---

[49] Global cities serve as key control points and headquarters for major multinational corporations (Sassen 2005: 28). In order to attract elite private actors and companies, city governments seek to make themselves competitive through distinction. In plain terms, they want to offer the private sector something unique and elsewhere unattainable. These attributes—especially if they are irreproducible—enhance their competitiveness in the global urban system.

Johannesburg's appeal to external actors through place marketing, business-friendly policies, and promoting the city's competitive and comparative advantage in the financial and business services sectors (City of Johannesburg 2001: 147 as cited in Sihlongonyane 2016: 7).[50] Joburg 2030 called for Johannesburg's "economy and labour force [to]… specialize in the service sector so that the economy will operate on a competitive global scale [to] drive up tax revenues, private sector profits, and disposable incomes" (City of Johannesburg 2002: 3 as cited in Winkler 2009: 368). Joburg 2030 explicitly aimed to "tip the balance away from service delivery and towards economic development" in matters of urban governance (City of Johannesburg 2002 as cited in Lipietz 2008: 146). This policy agenda placed renewed focus on positioning Johannesburg as the "gateway to Africa" with unparalleled command and control functions in the regional economy, and the ability to attract multinational corporations, global capital, and private investment to its own benefit (City of Johannesburg 2002 as cited in Lipietz 2008: 141).

The embrace of neoliberalism and push towards global economic participation at the local level ignored the unique and pressing demands of Johannesburg's incredibly segmented social, economic, and spatial structure. The iGoli and Joburg 2030 plans shifted the focus of the local government and threatened to enhance and maintain urban inequality. By asserting that private sector involvement and market forces are an efficient and reliable basis for creating employment opportunities, redistributing income, and generating revenue, the City Government absolved its responsibility to realize Rainbow Nation goals through methods of direct intervention. Instead, globalizing Johannesburg's economy and facilitating economic growth became central objectives. The City Government's post-Apartheid policies aimed to make Johannesburg an elite WCAC rather than bring about social justice or equality.

---

[50] These behaviors align with Harvey's (1989) urban entrepreneurialism concept.

2.4 Johannesburg's Global City Visions in Action

The embrace of neoliberalism and global city aspirations in Johannesburg's

post-Apartheid policy frameworks had profound implications. Under iGoli 2002 and Joburg

2030, attempts to adhere to the municipality's constitutionally-mandated responsibilities,[51]

reconstruct the city, and bring about racial equality became embroiled in the City Government's

efforts to enhance Johannesburg's external appeal. In other words, rather than comprehensively

addressing internal deprivations through targeted interventions, the City Government focused on

luring visitors, firms, and private investors, hoping that social progress would be a natural

consequence of this orientation (Sihlongonyane 2016: 5). Notably, many of Johannesburg's

post-Apartheid development projects—such as the Inner-City Regeneration Project, the Better

Buildings Programme, and the city's 2010 FIFA World Cup preparations—catered to the private

sector, negatively impacted already-disempowered stakeholders, and turned attention and

resources away from pressing internal needs. In effect, Johannesburg's City Government failed

to provide residents with a right to the city and allowed inequality to persist.

2.4.1 Inner-City Regeneration

Regenerating Johannesburg's Central Business District was one of the key priorities of

the City Government under Joburg 2030. This region—located at the heart of the city—was

characterized by dilapidated buildings, a large population, and widespread poverty following

democratization (Winkler 2009: 364). These undesirable conditions impacted the perceived

business-friendliness of Johannesburg's inner-city and played a role in the relocation of the JSE

---

[51] The 1996 Constitution obligated South African municipalities to:
> provide democratic and accountable government for local communities… ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner… promote social and economic development… promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (Republic of South Africa 1996: 74).

from the CBD to Sandton—a wealthy suburb to the North—in 2000, drawing elite private sector

actors away from this former business hub (Pieterse and Owens 2018: 5). In the eyes of city

officials, the state of the CBD was an obstacle to achieving the WCAC vision that was laid out in

Joburg 2030, necessitating intervention (Winkler 2009: 364).

The City Government's Inner-City Regeneration Project was predicated on private sector

involvement, neoliberal market logic, and gentrification. It was framed by an overarching goal to

"raise and sustain private investment leading to a steady rise in property values," suggesting that

the social and spatial exclusion of lower-income groups—including existing residents of the

CBD—was a built-in externality (City of Johannesburg 2003: 2 as cited in Winkler 2009: 368).

The local government embraced entrepreneurial tactics to encourage the private sector to

redevelop the inner-city. Accordingly, local authorities declared the CBD as an official Urban

Development Zone, allowing investors to qualify for substantial tax breaks. This incentive

brought around US $750 million worth of private investment to the inner-city region between

2004 and 2008 alone (The Star 2008: 6 as cited in Winkler 2009: 369). Alongside providing tax

breaks, the City Government implemented the Better Buildings Programme (BBP) to improve

the aesthetics of the CBD and attract investment. These strategies made clear that Johannesburg's

City Government was more concerned about appearances and catering to the interests of elites

than making the city livable and inclusive for a range of socioeconomic groups.

Under the BBP, the City Government identified 250 "bad buildings" in the CBD and

expropriated 125 of them to private developers (Winkler 2009: 370–371). These buildings were

often informally occupied by the "poorest and most vulnerable residents of the inner city"—who

were more likely to be Black due to Apartheid's legacy—suggesting that their new subjectivity

as sites of development through which WCAC visions would be realized disproportionately

impacted marginalized groups (Wilson and du Plessis 2005: 3 as cited in Winkler 2009: 370).

Although the BBP had a direct impact on the stock of low-cost housing that was available in the

inner-city, it did not always provide substitute accommodations for evicted tenants. Furthermore,

the BBP only called for ten of the expropriated buildings to be redeveloped as low-cost

"transitional housing projects in which tenants may reside for a maximum of two years" (City of

Johannesburg 2007: 53 as cited in Winkler 2009: 374). As a result of the BBP, a significant

portion of the CBD's poor population was forced to relocate because they either could not afford

to live in the rehabilitated buildings or were legally obligated to move.[52] The BBP facilitated the

privatization of the CBD's housing market and intensified spatial segmentation in Johannesburg.

As private developers converted dilapidated buildings into modern, attractive apartments

that aligned with Johannesburg's WCAC vision, as many as 25,000 tenants were displaced from

Johannesburg's inner-city (Winkler 2009: 371). The director of the Inner-City Regeneration

Project enthusiastically supported this transition, claiming that

> through our regeneration [initiatives], we are going to make millionaires out of a lot of
> people! What is happening is that a higher calibre of people is now moving in. They are
> taking up the penthouses, and they are creating the world class city that we are talking
> about (Interview with City of Johannesburg Director of Inner-City Regeneration 2004 as
> cited in Winkler 2009: 369).

The BBP manager expressed similar sentiments during an interview: "I say to those developers

wanting to make a profit: come in, we want you on board; we're trying to create a world class

city. So, we need to attract the right people to live here" (Interview with Better Buildings

Program Manager 2004 as cited in Winkler 2009: 370). City officials were clearly aware of the

socially polarizing externalities that their rejuvenation strategy elicited. Rather than making

efforts to account for the negative impacts on marginalized groups, they embraced an

---

[52] Many former CBD residents relocated to informal dwellings throughout Johannesburg. Figure 18 depicts the approximate geographical distribution of concentrations of informal settlements in Johannesburg as of 2012.

entrepreneurial spirit and called on private developers to gentrify the inner-city, all with the end goal of achieving their WCAC vision.

Joburg 2030's Inner-City Regeneration Project stands in stark contrast with the City Government's promise to create an inclusive, equitable, and spatially integrated city in the post-Apartheid period. Instead of enacting policies that served Johannesburg's poor and marginalized inhabitants, the City Government adopted a business-friendly approach that prioritized neoliberal values—including capital accumulation, privatization, and competition—and sought to repopulate the CBD with elite middle- and upper-class individuals. While local authorities argued that this strategy helped make up for the public sector's lack of financial capacity to repair Johannesburg and provide services, the CBD projects were not solely implemented to benefit residents (Didier, Peyroux, and Morange 2012: 7). Regeneration was a central component of the City Government's WCAC vision, even if it produced negative externalities like intensified social segmentation, displacement, and spatial exclusion. This suggests that making Johannesburg a global city was more important to local officials than bringing about social inclusion, urban justice, and equity.

Figure 18. Key Locations in Johannesburg
(Author's Own, base map from Myambo 2019: xiii)

2.4.2 The 2010 FIFA World Cup

South Africa was home to the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC). To date, it is the only country on the African continent to win the bid to host this popular international sporting event. The FWC preparations represent one of the largest infrastructure investments in South Africa to date, and these expenses were justified under the pretense that they would generate domestic prosperity, growth, and development (South African Government 2010 as cited in Molloy and Chetty 2015: 1). In total, South Africa spent over US $4.9 billion on its preparations for the World Cup (Molloy and Chetty 2015: 1). This impressive sum included over $1.2 billion for infrastructure and stadium construction, $1.2 billion for transport, and $387 million for promotion and broadcasting (Steger 2013: 4). Although the FWC was coordinated at the national level, these tenets aligned with the Joburg 2030 vision of making Johannesburg a global city and a key player in the international economy. Accordingly, Johannesburg's City Government embraced the FWC as an opportunity to promote the city, enhance its international visibility, attract investment, and assert its world class status.

The FWC was celebrated as a way to bring investment, employment, infrastructure upgrades, economic growth, and development to South Africa. According to President Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), the "2010 Soccer World Cup will make an important contribution to our effort to accelerate our progress towards the achievement of the goal of a better life for our people" (Mbeki 2006 as cited in Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley 2011: 18). Hosting the FWC was thus articulated as a way to achieve Rainbow Nation goals. Despite its positive associations, there were a number of opportunity costs involved in this undertaking. Notably, funding the FWC necessitated budget restructuring and resulted in cuts to social programs such as public housing projects and investments in high-deprivation areas (Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley

2011: 21). As one critic pointed out, South Africa "could have mobilized all the money and political will invested in the World Cup for houses, schools, libraries, parks, crèches, hospitals and sports facilities in every part of every city" in order to improve the lives of its people and combat lasting social inequalities (Cowell 2009). Instead, South Africa invested billions of dollars into infrastructures for the FWC to improve its international image and attract capital. Notably, the fact that the government successfully funded and organized the FWC contrasts with the claim made by ANC politicians that South Africa does not have sufficient resources to combat Apartheid without private sector involvement.

In Johannesburg, the FWC had profound impacts on low-income residents and informal traders. One of Johannesburg's FWC stadiums was located in Ellis Park, a neighborhood within the CBD (Figure 18). Under the City Government's Greater Ellis Park Development Plan (GEPDP), officials worked to modernize and revitalize the area to enhance its appeal to visitors and potential investors. Consistent with previous CBD renewal strategies, the upgrading process displaced low-income residents and excluded those who were impacted by the GEPDP from the decision-making process (Bénit-Gbaffou 2009: 208 as cited in Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley 2011: 21). Furthermore, informal traders were prohibited from doing business proximate to Johannesburg's stadiums,[53] meaning that they could not derive substantial economic benefits from the FWC despite the fact that this major event was happening in their community (Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley 2011: 23).

The FWC also had significant implications for Johannesburg's public transportation infrastructure. In order to provide viable transit options for the hundreds of thousands of soccer fans that were expected to arrive for the FWC, the City Government allocated funds towards modernizing Gautrain—the existing rail network—and establishing a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)

---

[53] This was due to FIFA's trademark requirements and the drive to make the CBD seem conducive to business.

system called Reya Vaya in collaboration with the Gauteng Provincial Government (Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley 2011: 24; Adewumi and Allopi 2013: 1). Infrastructure investments were concentrated near the FWC stadiums, the airport, and in popular tourist destinations, meaning that peripheral districts and high-deprivation areas were widely excluded from these services (Figure 19; Pieterse and Owens 2018: 8; Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley 2011: 24). Notably, the prioritization of FWC infrastructure delayed other development projects, demonstrating that making Johannesburg attractive to private sector interests overshadowed the City Government's existing commitments (Steinbrink, Haferburg, and Ley 2011: 24). Furthermore, the fact that the City Government justified transit investments to serve external interests—but not those of its inhabitants—demonstrates that internal needs were not a central priority of local officials.

The 2010 FIFA World Cup drew international attention to South Africa. The games were broadcasted across the world, and had over 3.2 billion viewers (Steger 2013: 3). This meant that South African cities were thrust to the forefront of the world stage as the benevolent hosts of this exciting global competition. In Johannesburg, the FWC allowed the City Government to exercise entrepreneurial strategies and assert its status as a WCAC, two objectives that were central to the Joburg 2030 development and governance strategy. Wanting to promote Johannesburg as a business-friendly hub that was conducive to the demands of the global economic system, appeal to private investors, and cater to tourists, the City Government pursued a series of targeted regeneration projects and infrastructure investments. Unfortunately, these efforts failed to adequately involve stakeholders, delayed infrastructure projects in high-deprivation areas, and displaced low-income communities and informal traders from the inner-city. Global participation had negative impacts on the communities that the City Government swore to uplift, empower, and protect when Apartheid fell.

Figure 19. Public Mass Transportation and Deprivation in Johannesburg
(Adapted from Pieterse and Owens 2018: 9).

2.5 Chapter Conclusion: Global Preeminence, Local Fragmentation

The fall of Apartheid promised an era of transformation in South Africa. At the national level, the ANC Government initially enacted the RDP—an expansive welfarist policy aimed to equalize South Africa's economy and society through heavy state intervention—to bring about Rainbow Nation visions. Due to the influence of neoliberal ideologies, the nation's significant financial constraints, and the political desire to elevate South Africa's position in the global economy, the RDP was replaced by GEAR in 1996. GEAR called for a non-interventionist state and viewed the market as the primary mechanism through which redistribution, social progress, and development aims would result. Unfortunately, GEAR did little to bring about racial equality or improve South Africa's economic performance post-Apartheid because this policy framework prioritized neoliberal values over internal needs (Schneider 2003: 45).

The policy agendas of Johannesburg's City Government were consistent with national trends. Through iGoli 2002, iGoli 2010, and Joburg 2030, authorities brought neoliberalism to the local level, privatized public services, and pursued global city status. This orientation to external actors—epitomized by the city's CBD plans and FWC preparations—enhanced and maintained inequality. By catering to private interests rather than expressed public needs, Johannesburg became less accessible and inclusive for marginalized residents (Myambo 2019: 2). These dynamics are consistent with the literature on global cities which posits that they prioritize exchange values and market forces over considerations of the use value or livability of urban space (Purcell 2014: 10). By subordinating itself to the demands of the global economy, Johannesburg's City Government allowed inequality to persist and failed to create a just and inclusive city. In order to overcome Apartheid and realize Rainbow Nation goals, the state must be more involved in social empowerment, reconstruction, and redistribution.

Conclusion

As long as poverty, injustice, and gross inequality
persist in our world, none of us can truly rest.
— Nelson Mandela

The Rainbow Nation vision remains a failed promise in post-Apartheid South Africa because the democratic government adopted decentralization, embraced neoliberal values, and catered to the interests of the global economy in domestic policy agendas. Since 1994, Johannesburg has experienced limited progress towards social, political, spatial, and economic equality.[54] Black South Africans continue to face disproportionate barriers to economic and political participation and widely lack access to basic needs including formal housing, transportation, services, and employment. The City Government's policies increasingly turned their attention away from the unique demands of Johannesburg's racialized landscape—focusing instead on enhancing its status as a World Class African City and attracting the private sector—intensifying deprivation among historically marginalized groups while uplifting elites. Although they may have rights on paper, Black South Africans are still awaiting transformation.

The persistence of inequality is not solely due to the lasting impacts of White-minority rule, but also to the shortcomings of the government's post-Apartheid reconstruction efforts. Decentralized governance promised to enhance the state's accountability and responsiveness by bringing the government closer to the people. Despite this rhetoric, there are no *a priori* reasons why decentralized governments would automatically be more inclusive, attentive, or effective (Beall 2004: 2). As evidenced by the City of Johannesburg, without possessing adequate human and financial capacities, local governments may not be able to shift existing power dynamics and may face incentive distortions. The decentralized model encourages local governments to give

---

[54] Some studies even demonstrate that racial inequality increased after the end of Apartheid across income, discrimination, and spatial settlement (Keswell 2004: 2; Pieterse 2019: 22; Schneider 2003: 45; Sherer 2000: 321).

particular consideration to private actors because public-private partnerships are seen as a way to provide for local needs when the state is incapacitated. This external orientation threatens to undermine political commitments when they do not align with the prerogatives of capital. Decentralization may work to the detriment of democratic principles and prevent municipalities from responding to local needs directly, even if prevailing discourses suggest otherwise.

The vulnerabilities involved in the decentralized governance model provided support for the inclusion of neoliberal values in post-Apartheid policies. Neoliberalism offered the market as a way to redistribute social and economic power, correct inequalities, and bring prosperity. These promises were understandably appealing for municipalities that lacked the capacity to engender such outcomes on their own. Johannesburg's City Government bought into this neoliberal narrative, contending that private actors and global city status would lead to much-needed infrastructure investments, jobs, services, and development outcomes in their iGoli and Joburg 2030 plans. Accordingly, the City Government offered economic incentives, business-friendly policies, and world class appearances to attract the private sector. Unfortunately, such pursuits intensified internal social and economic polarization, eroded the rights of disempowered groups, and failed to center matters of equality, justice, and well-being. South Africa remains extremely unequal today because post-Apartheid reconstruction strategies turned the state's attention towards external forces and away from its Rainbow Nation commitments.

Although this paper focused primarily on the City of Johannesburg, the theories, ideas, and concepts discussed herein have relevance beyond the South African context. In post-colonial or otherwise highly-unequal societies, policy frameworks that embrace hegemonic ideologies and market forces may exacerbate existing problems. As the South African case demonstrates, while decentralization offers local autonomy and public participation as ways to spread

democracy and increase the government's responsiveness, this model suffers from capacity

constraints and vulnerabilities that inhibit progress towards socially-desirable goals. Similarly,

while neoliberal policies that promote competition, private investment, and limited state

intervention may be advanced as a fix-all solution to social and economic challenges, such

frameworks may actually enhance segmentation. Furthermore, while municipalities across the

world have embraced global city visions, this orientation caters to elite interests rather than

internal needs, facilitating the continued exclusion of marginalized urban inhabitants. Clearly,

such approaches introduce new obstacles and increase the burden on disempowered groups.

To address inequality, governments must be endowed with financial resources, receive

adequate administrative support, and center their agendas on empowering the people. Borrowing

from Lefebvre's right to the city concept, instead of allowing the state and elite private sector

actors to make decisions that do not address the needs of the majority, all inhabitants should have

the right to participate centrally in decision-making (Purcell 2002: 103). This does not simply

mean that municipalities should facilitate participation, but that they should put the expressed

desires of constituents above all else. Furthermore, as renowned philosopher and economist

Amartya Sen posits, expanding individual agency and the "overall freedoms of people to lead the

kind of lives they have reason to value" should be essential pursuits of development (Sen 2000:

10). To achieve these outcomes, policy agendas must be predicated on local needs and focused

on rights, participation, and equality, rather than dominant ideologies and top-down discourses.

Governments must take on an active role in the pursuit of justice, equal opportunity, and

the redistribution of social and economic power because state passivity enables a continuation of

the status-quo. While this paper does not aim to propose solutions, its contents suggest that

policy interventions must be people-focused, context-specific, and continually reviewed and

reconsidered. Critical examination of how solutions may fail to generate change, erode political commitments, or otherwise cause undesirable externalities is essential to achieve social progress. As Nelson Mandela aptly proclaimed, "it is in the character of growth that we should learn from both pleasant and unpleasant experiences" (Mandela 1997 as cited in Mandela, Hatang, and Venter 2011). To bring about change and actualize post-colonial visions, governments must be willing to shift their approach and resist solutions that put external interests above internal needs.

Bibliography

Adelzadeh, Asghar. 1996. "From the RDP to GEAR: The Gradual Embracing of Neo-Liberalism in Economic Policy." *Transformation,* 31: 66–95.

Adewale, Aregbeshola R. 2017. "Import Substitution Industrialisation and Economic Growth – Evidence from the Group of BRICS Countries." *Future Business Journal,* 3(2): 138–158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fbj.2017.06.001.

Adewumi, Emmanuel, and Dhiren Allopi. 2013. "Rea Vaya: South Africa's First Bus Rapid Transit System." *South African Journal of Science,* 109 (7/8): 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1590/sajs.2013/a0029.

Alden, Chris. 1993. "From Liberation Movement to Political Party: ANC Foreign Policy in Transition." *South African Journal of International Affairs,* 1 (1): 62–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220469309545092.

Altman, Miriam. 2006. "Wage Determination in South Africa: What Do We Know?" *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, 60 (1): 58–89. https://doi.org/10.1353/trn.2006.0002.

Arnoldi, Marleny. "City of Joburg Tries to Strike Balance between Revenue, Relief in New Budget." Creamer Media's Engineering News, May 25, 2021. https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/city-of-joburg-tries-to-strike-balance-between-revenue-relief-in-new-budget-2021-05-25.

Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* 16 (4): 185–205. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533002320951037.

Beall, Jo, Owen Crankshaw, and Susan Parnell. *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg*. London, UK: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002.

Beall, Jo. 2004. "Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South Africa." Crisis States Research Center, LSE, *Working Paper Series,* 1 (54): 1–21. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/28206.

Bradlow, Benjamin. 2015. "A Democratic Infrastructure for Johannesburg" *The Just City Essays,* 1: 63–66. https://doi.org/https://www.thenatureofcities.com/the-just-city-essays/#TOC.

Burger, Ronelle, Servaas van der Berg, Sarel van der Walt, and Derek Yu. 2016. "The Long Walk: Considering the Enduring Spatial and Racial Dimensions of Deprivation Two Decades After the Fall of Apartheid." *Social Indicators Research,* 130 (3): 1101–1023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1237-1.

Burger, Rulof, and Rachel Jafta. 2010. "Affirmative Action in South Africa: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact on Labour Market Outcomes." *Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity*, Working Paper No. 76: 1–26. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b2ced915d622c000b5d/workingpaper76.pdf.

Calitz, Estian, and Hassan Essop. 2013 "Fiscal Centralisation in a Federal State: The South African Case." *Southern African Business Review,* 17 (3): 131–155. https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sabr/article/view/110930.

Cameron, Robert. 2014. "Vertical Decentralisation and Urban Service Delivery in South Africa: Does Politics Matter?" *Development Policy Review,* 32 (S1): s81–s100. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12070.

Chilenga-Butao, Thokozani. 2020. "Decentralisation and Recentralisation in South Africa's Local Government: Case Studies of Two Municipalities in Limpopo." *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa,* 103 (1): 12–35. https://doi.org/10.1353/trn.2020.0011.

Christopher, A. J. 1983. "From Flint to Soweto: Reflections on the Colonial Origins of the Apartheid City." *Area,* 15 (2): 145–149. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20001914.

Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs Department, Republic of South Africa. *City of Johannesburg Metropolitan GAU.* Johannesburg, SA: 2020: 1–36. https://www.cogta.gov.za/ddm/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/City-of-Johannesburg-October-2020.pdf.

Corder, Clive K. 1997. "The Reconstruction and Development Programme: Success or Failure?" In *Quality of Life in South Africa*, edited by Valerie Møller, 183–203. Social Indicators Research Series. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1479-7_8.

Cowell, Alan. "World Cup Whose Meaning Goes Beyond Soccer." The New York Times, December 28, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/world/africa/29iht-letter.html.

Didier, Sophie, Elisabeth Peyroux, and Marianne Morange. 2012. "The Spreading of the City Improvement District Model in Johannesburg and Cape Town: Urban Regeneration and the Neoliberal Agenda in South Africa." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 36 (5): 915–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2012.01136.x.

"Economic Growth." Work in Joburg. City of Johannesburg, 2018. https://www.joburg.org.za/work_/Pages/Work%20in%20Joburg/General%20Advice/Links/Economic-Growth.aspx.

Ferguson, James. "Introduction. Cash Transfers and the New Welfare States: From Neoliberalism to the Politics of Distribution." In *Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution*, 1–33. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.

Ferguson, James. "Paradoxes of Sovereignty." In *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, 50–68. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

Fox, Sean, and Tom Goodfellow. *Cities and Development* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.

Frantzanas, Sotirios. 2014. "The Right to the City as an Anti-Capitalist Struggle." *Ephemera Journal,* 14 (4): 1073–1079.
http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/right-city-anti-capitalist-struggle.

Freed, Leonard. *SOUTH AFRICA. Presidential Elections. SOUTH AFRICA. Johannesburg. 1994. Nelson MANDELA Speaks at an African National Congress (ANC) Rally.* Photograph. 1994. https://jstor.org/stable/community.9738357.

Galal, Saifaddin. "South Africa: Unemployment Rate by Population Group 2019-2020." Statista, March 2, 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1129481/unemployment-rate-by-population-group-in-south-africa/.

"Gauteng Municipalities." Municipalities of South Africa. Accessed April 11, 2022.
https://municipalities.co.za/provinces/view/3/gauteng.

Hall, Ruth. 2004. "A Political Economy of Land Reform in South Africa." *Review of African Political Economy,* 31 (100): 213–227. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262257.

Haraway, Donna. "Staying with the Trouble: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Cthulucene." In *Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History and Crisis of Capitalism,* edited by Jason W. Moore, 34–77. PM Press, 2016.

Harris, Mari. "The Supporter Profiles of SA's Three Largest Parties - Ipsos." Politicsweb, February 5, 2014.
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-supporter-profiles-of-sas-three-largest-partie.

Harrison, Philip, Graeme Gotz, Alison Todes, and Chris Wray. "Materialities, Subjectivities and Spatial Transformation in Johannesburg." In *Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg after Apartheid*, edited by Philip Harrison, Graeme Gotz, Alison Todes, and Chris Wray, 2–39. Wits University Press, 2014.
https://doi.org/10.18772/22014107656.5.

Harrison, Philip, and Tanya Zack. 2012. "The power of mining: the fall of gold and rise of Johannesburg." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30 (4): 551–570.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2012.724869.

Harvey, David. 1989. "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism." *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography,* 71 (1): 3–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/04353684.1989.11879583.

Harvey, David. 2008. "The Right to the City." *New Left Review,* 53: 23–40.
https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii53/articles/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city.

Htonl. *Map of Gauteng with municipalities named and districts shaded (2016)*. February 4, 2017. Wikimedia Commons. Accessed April 11, 2022.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Gauteng_with_municipalities_named_and_districts_shaded_(2016).svg.

Htonl. *South Africa 2016 LGE governments formed.* September 4, 2016. Wikimedia Commons. Accessed April 19, 2022. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Africa_2016_LGE_governments_formed.svg.

Jaffee, David. 2018. "Neoliberal Urbanism as 'Strategic Coupling' to Global Chains: Port Infrastructure and the Role of Economic Impact Studies." *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space,* 37 (1): 119–136. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654418771134.

James, Deborah. 2013. "Citizenship and Land in South Africa: From Rights to Responsibilities." *Critique of Anthropology,* 33 (1): 26–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/0308275X12466682.

"Johannesburg, South Africa Metro Area Population 1950-2022." MacroTrends, 2022. https://www.macrotrends.net/cities/22486/johannesburg/population#:~:text=The%20current%20metro%20area%20population,a%202.63%25%20increase%20from%202019.

Johnson-Castle, Patricia. "The Group Areas Act of 1950." South African History Online, December 19, 2014. https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/group-areas-act-1950.

Kaempfer, William H., James A. Lehman, and Anton D. Lowenberg. 1987. "Divestment, Investment Sanctions, and Disinvestment: An Evaluation of Anti-Apartheid Policy Instruments." *International Organization,* 41(3): 457–473. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706752.

Keswell, Malcolm. 2004. "Education and Racial Inequality in Post Apartheid South Africa." In *Growing Gaps: Educational Inequality around the World,* 1–28. Oxford Scholarship Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732180.003.0004.

Kuymulu, Mehmet Baris. 2014. "Claiming the Right to the City: Towards the Production of Space from Below." *CUNY Academic Works*, 1–242. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/439.

Lemanski, Charlotte. 2007. "Global Cities in the South: Deepening Social and Spatial Polarisation in Cape Town." *Cities,* 24 (6): 448–461. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2007.01.011.

Levy, Philip I. 1999. "Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?" *American Economic Review,* 89 (2): 415–420. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.415.

Lipietz, Barbara. 2008. "Building a Vision for the Post-Apartheid City: What Role for Participation in Johannesburg's City Development Strategy?" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* 32 (1): 135–163. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00767.x.

Maharaj, Brij. 1997. "The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid Transformation in South Africa: The Case of Durban." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 15 (2): 261–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589009708729614.

Maharaj, Brij. 2002. "Urban Governance and Management of Cities in Post Apartheid South Africa." Paper presented at *Rencontres scientifiques franco-Sud-Africaines de l'innovation territoriale, Grenoble - Avignon, France*. January 2002. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00749561.

Mandela, Nelson, S. K. Hatang, and Sahm Venter. *Nelson Mandela by Himself: The Authorised Book of Quotations*. Johannesburg, SA: Pan Macmillan Press, 2011.

"Mapping Diversity: An Exploration of Our Social Tapestry." Statistics South Africa. Republic of South Africa, May 20, 2016. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=7678.

McMann, Mindi. 2017. "Framing the Narrative: Ethical Relationships in Post-Apartheid South African Museums." *College Literature,* 44 (4): 558–590. https://doi.org/10.1353/lit.2017.0034.

Mears, Ronald. 2011. "Historical development of informal township settlements in Johannesburg since 1886." Paper presented at *Economic History Society of Southern Africa Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa.* September 2007. Cape Town: Economic Research SA, http://www.econrsa.org/workshops/presentations/2011/paper-historical-development-informal-township-settlements-johannesburg.

Miraftab, Faranak, and Neema Kudva. "Governance." In *Cities of The Global South Reader*, edited by Faranak Miraftab and Neema Kudva, 229–235. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015.

Molloy, Eamonn, and Trish Chetty. 2015. "The Rocky Road to Legacy: Lessons from the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Stadium Program." *Project Management Journal,* 46 (3): 88–107. https://doi.org/10.1002/pmj.21502.

Moolla, Raeesa, Nico Kotze, and Liz Block. 2011. "Housing Satisfaction and Quality of Life in RDP Houses in Braamfischerville, Soweto: A South African Case Study." *Urbani Izziv,* 22 (1): 138–143. https://doi.org/10.5379/urbani-izziv-en-2011-22-01-005.

Morange, Marianne, and Sylvie Fol. 2014. "Neoliberalisation, city, and spatial justice." *Justice Spatiale / Spatial Justic*e, 6: 1–29. https://www.jssj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Intro-Eng-numero-6-jssj2.pdf.

Munthree, Chantal. "2020 Mid-Year Population Estimates." Press Statements. Statistics South Africa, Republic of South Africa, July 9, 2020. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=13453.

Murphy, John. "Some Rise but Most Sink in Soweto's Sea of Slums." Baltimore Sun, October 6, 2002. https://www.baltimoresun.com/bal-te.soweto06oct06-story.html.

Murray, Christina, and Richard Simeon. 2012. "Promises Unmet: Multi-Level Government in South Africa." In *Varieties of Federal Governance*, edited by Rekha Saxena, 232–260. Delhi: Foundation Books. https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9788175969209.014.

Myambo, Melissa Tandiwe. 2017. "Africa's Global City?" *New Left Review,* 108: 75–86. https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii108/articles/melissa-myambo-africa-s-global-city.

Myambo, Melissa Tandiwe. *Reversing Urban Inequality in Johannesburg*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.

Narsiah, Sagie. 2002. "Neoliberalism and Privatisation in South Africa." *GeoJournal,* 57 (1/2): 3–13. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026022903276.

"National Party." Encyclopedia Britannica, October 1, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa.

National Treasury, Republic of South Africa. *Budget Review 2021,* 1–233. Pretoria, SA: 2021. http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/review/FullBR.pdf.

National Treasury, Republic of South Africa. "Provincial and local government." In *Budget Review 2014,* 93–106. Pretoria, SA: 2014. http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/review/chapter%207.pdf

Nel, Etienne, and Tony Binns. 2003. "Decentralising Development in South Africa." *Geography,* 88 (2): 108–116. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40573829.

Nemavunde, Mpho, and Khetho Lomahoza. "Joburg Demographics and Key Socio Economic Indicators." In *Group Strategy, Policy Coordination and Relations Issue, 23:* City of Johannesburg, 2020.

Norval, Mary, and Caradee Y. Wright. "The Epidemiology of Cutaneous Melanoma in the White and Black African Population Groups in South Africa." In *Cutaneous Melanoma: Etiology and Therapy,* edited by William H. Ward and Jeffrey M. Farma, 23–38. Brisbane, Australia: Codon Publications, 2017. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK481848/figure/chapter2.f1/ doi: 10.15586/codon.cutaneousmelanoma.2017.ch2.

Palmer, Fileve T. 2016. "Racialism and Representation in the Rainbow Nation." *SAGE Open,* 6 (4): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244016673873.

Parnell, Susan, and Jenny Robinson. 2006. "Development and Urban Policy: Johannesburg's City Development Strategy." *Urban Studies,* 43 (2): 337–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500406710.

Peck, Jamie, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner. 2009. "Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutations." *SAIS Review of International Affairs,* 29 (1): 49–66. https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.0.0028.

Pieterse, Edgar, and Kate Owens. 2018. "Johannesburg: Confronting Spatial Inequality." *World Resources Report Case Study*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1–28. https://www.wri.org/research/johannesburg-confronting-spatial-inequality.

Pieterse, Edgar. 2019. "Urban Governance and Spatial Transformation Ambitions in Johannesburg." *Journal of Urban Affairs,* 41 (1): 20–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1305807.

"Profiles of the Presidents." 20 Years of Democracy (1994–2014). South African History Online, August 27, 2019. https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/20-years-democracy-1994-2014-profiles-presidents.

"Provincial Government." Government System. South African Government. Accessed April 11, 2022. https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/provincial-government.

Purcell, Mark. 2002. "Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant." *GeoJournal,* 58 (2/3): 99–108. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GEJO.0000010829.62237.8f.

Purcell, Mark. 2014. "Possible Worlds: Henri Lefebvre and the Right to the City." *Journal of Urban Affairs,* 36 (1): 141–154. https://doi.org/10.1111/juaf.12034.

Republic of South Africa. *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*. South Africa: 1996, 1—178. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5de4.html.

Rocco, Roberto. "What Is Spatial Justice?" *Spatial Justice Blog*. Accessed November 15, 2021. https://spatialjustice.blog/.

Rueckert, Phineas, David Brand, and Jana Sepehr. "Seven Ways Nelson Mandela's Legacy Still Resonates Today." Global Citizen, July 16, 2018. https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/nelson-mandela-legacy-education-women-health/.

Rustomjee, Cyrus. 2006. "Pathways Through Financial Crisis: South Africa." *Global Governance,* 12 (4): 431–448. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800630.

Sassen, Saskia. 2005. "The Global City: Introducing a Concept." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs,* 11 (2): 27–43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590544.

Savage, Michael. 1986. "The Imposition of Pass Laws on the African Population in South Africa, 1916–1984." *African Affairs,* 85 (339): 181–205. http://www.jstor.org/stable/723012.

Schneider, Geoffrey. 2003. "Neoliberalism and Economic Justice in South Africa: Revisiting the Debate on Economic Apartheid." *Review of Social Economy,* 61(1): 23–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/0034676032000050257.

Schuster, Lynda. "The Struggle to Govern Johannesburg." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, September 1, 1995. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/09/the-struggle-to-govern-johannesburg/376455/.

Scott, Thomas. "Considerations in City Economic Development Strategy." Presented at the *Johannesburg City Improvement District Forum*, Johannesburg, 3 February 2015. https://www.jicp.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/TGS-CIDD-01-03012015.pdf.

Scully, Ben. "The Social Question in South Africa: From Settler Colonialism to Neoliberal-Era Democracy." In *The Social Question in the Twenty-First Century: A Global View*, edited by Jan Breman, Kevan Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden, 1st ed., 170–187. University of California Press, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvr7fcnz.15.

Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2000.

Sherer, George. 2000. "Intergroup Economic Inequality in South Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era." *American Economic Review,* 90 (2): 317–321. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.317.

Sihlongonyane, Mfaniseni F. 2016. "The Global, the Local and the Hybrid in the Making of Johannesburg as a World Class African City." *Third World Quarterly,* 37 (9): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1159507.

Sikhakane, B. H., and P. S. Reddy. 2011. "Public Accountability at the Local Government Sphere in South Africa." *African Journal of Public Affairs,* 4 (1): 85–102. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/57699.

Smith, Michael Peter, and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. 2009. "Global Mobility, Shifting Borders and Urban Citizenship." In *Cities of the Global South Reader*, edited by Neema Kudva and Faranak Miraftab, 295–299. London: Routledge, 2015.

Soja, Edward W. *Seeking Spatial Justice*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.

"South Africa - Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)." Income Distribution. Index Mundi, December 28, 2019. https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/south-africa/indicator/SI.POV.GINI.

South African Cities Network. *State of City Finances Report 2020*. Johannesburg, SA, 2020: 1–75. https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/SOCF-2020-Report.pdf.

"Spatial Inequality, Johannesburg." Urban Age. LSE Cities, October 2016. https://urbanage.lsecities.net/data/spatial-inequality-johannesburg.

"State Institutions Which Support Constitutional Democracy." Parliamentary Monitoring Group. Accessed April 6, 2022. https://pmg.org.za/page/state-institutions-supporting-democracy.

Statistics South Africa. *Youth employment, unemployment, skills and economic growth, 1994–2014*. Pretoria, 2014: 1–15. https://www.statssa.gov.za/presentation/Youth%20employement,%20skills%20and%20economic%20growth%201994-2014.pdf.

Steger, Manfred B. "Globalization: A Contested Concept." In *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, 3rd ed., 1–16. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Steinbrink, Malte, Christoph Haferburg, and Astrid Ley. 2011. "Festivalisation and Urban Renewal in the Global South: Socio-Spatial Consequences of the 2010 FIFA World Cup." *South African Geographical Journal,* 93 (1): 15–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2011.567827.

"Structure and Functions of the South African Government." Government System. South African Government, 2020. https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/structure-and-functions-south-african-government#:~:text=South%20Africa%20is%20a%20constitutional,as%20distinctive%2C%20interdependent%20and%20interrelated.

Tazanu. 2019. "Racial Undertones on Violence and Human Bodies: White Migrants' Online Epistemologies of Insecurity and Discomfort in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *International Journal of Critical Diversity Studies,* 2 (2): 6–21. https://doi.org/10.13169/intecritdivestud.2.2.0006.

"The Three Spheres of Government." Community Organiser's Toolbox: Understanding Government. Education & Training Unit South Africa. Accessed April 6, 2022. https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/spheres.html.

Titus, Zam. 2000. "Keynote Address: Provincial Government in South Africa." In *Provincial Government in South Africa*: Umtata, 17–20. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Foundation, 2001. https://www.kas.de/en/web/suedafrika/single-title/-/content/provincial-government-in-south-africa.

"Trials and Prisons Chronology." Nelson Mandela Foundation. Accessed April 13, 2022. https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/trials-and-prison-chronology#:~:text=Nelson%20Mandela%20was%20arrested%20on,and%20time%20spent%20in%20confinement.

"What is the ANC?" African National Congress Eastern Cape, 2022. https://anceasterncape.org.za/about/what-is-the-anc/.

Widmer, Rolf, & Ray Lombard. *E-Waste Assessment in South Africa*. Swiss Global E-Waste Programme, 2005: 1–41. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242728295_e-Waste_Assessment_in_South_Africa.

Winkler, Tanja. 2009. "Prolonging the Global Age of Gentrification: Johannesburg's Regeneration Policies." *Planning Theory*, 8 (4): 362–381. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26165924.