Fragility and Resilience of the International Financial Structure: Some General Conditions and their Applicability to Current Conditions

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Outline

I. Introduction: The economy as a nonlinear, time dependent and multidimensional system and the existence of a system of borrowing and lending based upon margins of safety increases the nonlinearity, time dependence and dimensionality of the system.

II. The structure of financial relations: Hedge, speculative and Ponzi financial postures as "cash flow" relations.

III. The Minsky hypothesis: Over a protracted period of good times the weight of speculative and Ponzi financial postures increases and this attenuates the robustness of the financial structure so that as the process continues the financial structure becomes increasingly fragile.

IV. The heavier speculative and Ponzi financing are in the total financing of an economy the greater the normal functioning of the economy depends upon markets and institutions which refinance positions. Normal functioning will be disrupted if the markets and institutions that do the refinancing are stressed.

V. Central banking and fiscal deficits as devices which thwart the tendency of the economy to become chaotic or incoherent. Late post war resilience as the result of an effective thwarting institutional structure.
V. Therefor fragility is a consequence of a normal functioning evolution of the economy and resilience is a consequence of the power of the institutional structure to dominate the endogenous processes.

VII. The coherence of the post war economy as a beneficial side effect of American economic dominance and the use of the fiscal policy model to sustain aggregate demand and aggregate profits.

IX. Albin's Proposition: "The agents in the model have a model of the model"

IX. The 1991 power relations: The main actors and the model of the model that they have?

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I. Introduction

The fragility and resilience of financial structures reflect the same fundamental relations, whether the structure be of an agent, (such as a household, a firm or a financial institution), a national economy, or the international financial order. These fundamental relations are the structure of payment commitments on liabilities, the normal sources of the funds with which these payment commitments will be validated, and the provisions for refinancing, working out or repudiating commitments as stated on liabilities when the contingency, that the normal sources do not yield sufficient funds to meet commitments, becomes the actuality.

Our subjects are economies in which there are systems of borrowing and lending based, as Keynes put it, upon margins of safety. These borrowings and lendings are
devices by which control over resources, in excess of those
which the borrower’s own resources can command, are
achieved. In exchange for financing such control "now" a
lender receives a commitment from the borrower to make
payments in the future. In particular in the fundamental
capitalist borrowing - lending exchange the resources which
are controlled as a result of the financial transaction are
capital assets. In the modern world, in addition to being
used to finance capital asset control, borrowing on a large
scale has been used to finance household consumption,
government deficits and deficits in international payments.
Therefore the fragility and resilience of the international
financial order depends upon financial relations among a set
of capital using capitalist economies, each of which has a
sophisticated, complex and evolving financial structure,
which in turn may be more or less fragile or resilient.

In these economies the capital asset, labor force
characteristics and the financial structure link every today
to yesterdays and tomorrows. George Allen, the late great
coach of American football teams stated the principle that
the future is now, which of course is a guiding principle
for decisions to invest. Investment decisions depend upon a
comparison of a time series of payment commitments which
need to be made now, with present views about a time series
of expected future cash flows that operating the capital
goods that the investment will become will yield.
However for a capitalist economy Allen’s dictum needs to be expanded for "The past is now." inasmuch as payment commitments entered upon in the past come due and investments made in the past are the income earning capital assets of the present. Furthermore even to economists "Now is now.". Capitalist economies are economic structures whose behavior through time depends upon the evolution of financial relations, i.e. payment and financing commitments involving yesterdays, todays and tomorrows through calendar time.

These complex time considerations mean that the mathematical representation of capitalist economies will take the form of equation systems which are multidimensional, time dependent and nonlinear. As we now know such equation systems generate paths through time which are not well behaved: periods of apparently coherent macroeconomic behavior are interrupted by periods of apparently incoherent macroeconomic behavior. This implies that there are endogenous relations within economies which tend to create organized behavior even as there are relations that can develop which tend to foster disorganized, incoherent or chaotic behavior. Furthermore the path through time that such systems generate, the transitions from coherence to incoherence and back again, as well as the time spent in each type of behavior are not predictable.
A broad implication of these considerations is that the traditional view of economies as equilibrium seeking and maintaining systems needs to be abandoned. Economies need to be considered as systems which move through time, where the path depends upon the endogenous dynamic generating system and the impact of institutions and random events.

Capitalist economies are systems in which there are production, life cycle and financial links among yesterdays, todays and tomorrows. This implies that the system, i.e. the capitalist economies, are likely to spin out of control from time to time. Furthermore the purely production and life cycle characteristics of economies are likely to be slow moving relative to the pace of change of financial output and price variables, as the economy spins out of control. For example the production and human characteristics of the American economy were not substantially different in 1933 than they had been in 1929. The financial and the price level variables of an economy - in particular the prices attached to capital assets - can and do move rapidly from time to time.

These observations mean that the observed intermittent incoherence of capitalist economies are most likely due to the incremental complexities that introduced by the capitalist financial characteristics

Every unit in a capitalist economy can be characterized by an income statement and a balance sheet. The balance sheet states the units assets and liabilities as of some date in a common denominator, some money. The income statement states the receipts and spending and therefore the net profits or savings over some period in the same common denominator as is used in the balance sheet. It is important to note that these common denominators are national currencies.

For our purposes here the important connection between the income statements and balance sheets of an economic unit are that the liabilities on a balance sheet can be read as commitments to make payments either on demand, when some contingency occurs or at specified dates. Furthermore there are meaningful penalties for not fulfilling payment commitments. A balance sheet can be read as a particular date's prior commitments of future cash flows or future payments that will be made out of wages, gross profits, taxes or receipts from international trade.

The normal sources of funds to fulfill the payment commitments are income cash flows. Most importantly these income cash flows are the gross profits before taxes for business firms, wages for households, tax revenues for national and local governments and net trade receipts for the international accounts. These income cash flows may or may not be sufficient to fulfill the payment commitments on
debts. If they are insufficient then the commitments can be fulfilled by various balance sheet operations. I have long classified balance sheet commitments - income flow relations as reflecting hedge, speculative and Ponzi financial postures. These somewhat flamboyant terms (The characterization of some not necessarily fraudulent financial postures as Ponzi affronted some colleagues, because Ponzi was quite obviously a swindler before his episode was finished and to my colleagues mind many who capitalize interest are not necessarily swindlers) may have distracted from my message.

A unit is a hedge financing unit when the income cash flows are sufficient in the current period and over the foreseeable future to fulfill all of the legally committed payments. Firms which are mainly equity financed so that there are no commitments to repay any principle sum and whose dividend payments are conditional upon future income are always hedge financed units. For hedge financed firms the threat of disruption of operations because of financial pressures is not large.

A second type of financing posture is what I called speculative finance in that the unit's income flows can fulfill the interest payments on its indebtedness but is not large enough to fulfill commitments to repay principle. Furthermore the prospects are that the unit will be able to
pay interest at the same level over the foreseeable future. This means that the unit can roll over its outstanding debts, it can issue new debt to raise funds to pay the principle due on maturing debts. Speculative financing units finance long positions with short debts: Governments that use Treasury Bills, Savings and Loan Associations and Commercial Banks are examples of units that speculative finance at least part of their positions.

The third financing posture is Ponzi finance. In this posture the units cash flows are not large enough to meet the interest payments due on its debts. These interest payments are met by increasing indebtedness. Inasmuch as indebtedness is increased even as there is no increase in assets, Ponzi finance involves a decrease in the equity account and an increase in the future interest and principle payments. Furthermore debt and interest commitments increase even as there is no increase in the unit's earning capacity. The ability of a unit to Ponzi finance is limited, for as the ratio of payment commitments to expected cash flows increases the willingness of lenders to hazard financing the unit decreases. In the transformation that is taking place right now in the American economy examples of Ponzi financial postures are turning up in the business press almost every day. If one doesn't like the term Ponzi finance the term "capitalizing interest" can be substituted.
The robustness or fragility of a financial structure can be measured by the ratios of hedge, speculative and Ponzi financial structures in the economy relative to the size, expected increase and assuredness of cash flows. The fundamental propositions of the financial instability hypothesis that I put forth more than 15 years ago are:

If we do the multimarket equilibrium of Keynes in a manner that integrated finance then
1. There are financial regimes in which the system generates a stable equilibrium and there are regimes in which the equilibrium is unstable.
2. Over an extended period of good times the financial regime migrates from being conducive to stability to being hospitable to instability in that the proportion of units that engage in speculative and Ponzi finance increase.

The merger and take over movement of the 1980's clearly led to an increase in speculative and Ponzi finance: this increase followed a strong demonstration that effective government action can contain a recession.

III. Refinancing positions: the normal functioning of financial markets and institutions.

As was mentioned earlier not all units can meet their payment commitments by their income receipts: this is especially true of banks and other financial institutions
but it is also true of organizations that use the modern commercial paper market. Such units expect to meet a portion of their payment commitments out of funds that they borrow from institutions or raise in markets. This means that their normal functioning depends upon the continued availability of funds from the markets in which they expect to do this refinancing. It is a major concern of policy that the continued availability of funds for refinancing short term debt that finances long period assets be available.

IV. Fragility as the result of normal functioning.

In an economy dominated by hedge financing units there are a great deal of short term funds in business portfolios and banks are liquid. In these circumstances short term rates will be substantially lower than long term rates. banks and other financial markets or institutions will be ready to advance short term funds to finance longer term positions. Business and financial institutions will take advantage of the term structure; even households may be able to make on the carry. As a result there will be good cost reasons for substituting some short term debt for both equity and long term debt in liability structures. Furthermore the low interest rates associated with robust financial structures mean that it pays to substitute long term debt for short debt in the asset structures of lenders.
What is good for a unit, what conforms to a units maximizing under the constraints of some total ability to externally finance or hold assets, may well undermine the very robustness of the financial system.

The overall profit flows to business is determined by the composition of aggregate demand. In the simplest statement we have:

gross business profits = gross investment.

The low interest rates of a robust, mainly hedge financed economy makes the payment commitments for financing projects low relative to the profit flows that can be expected from well conceived investment projects, i.e. those which are designed to win out in the competition among capitals for profits. With financing available investment is maintained and even increased: increased investment in the aggregate increases profits. High and rising gross business in a world where units experiment with speculative financing validates the experiments. Emulation of the successes of the plunders is fostered by the agents who operate on the lending side of the financial markets; after all bankers are merchants of debts. Their profit depends upon the demand for

In a period of mainly hedge financing there is an internal inconsistency between financing terms and profit expectations. The result of the internal inconsistency is an increase in speculative financing. When the slack in the sources of financing are absorbed interest rates rise. When
this takes place heavily indebted speculative financing units find that they need to bridge finance payment commitments. Not only do speculative financing units become Ponzi financing units but as a new era thinking takes over de novo Ponzi financing schemes are accepted as brilliant innovations. As was mentioned earlier Ponzi financing, whether the result of market forces that transform speculative financing into Ponzi financing or as a result of a la Milken de novo Ponzi financing schemes, decreases equity and increases debts without either contributing to the overall availability to generate profits or to improve the ability to compete for profits of the Ponzi financing unit.

A capitalist economy is financially fragile when the system is highly indebted, the debt structure is heavily weighed with short term debt so that refinancing is necessary and a substantial portion of units are Ponzi financing. The eroding equity positions associated with Ponzi financing makes the aggregate of investment subject to sharp declines and in a highly indebted situation this increases the proportion of debtor units that are "Ponzi financing". Such a financial structure is very vulnerable to units needing to sell out position in order to make position, which can lead to rapidly declining asset prices and to any decline in business profits.

The lending institutions such as banks depend upon their debtors meeting their payment commitments if they are
to acquire new assets, to finance investment. A failure of banks to extend refinancing loans can lead to units trying to make position by selling out position, which can be disastrous to asset values. Simultaneous a decline in financed investment will lead to a decline in profit flows, which will diminish the margin of safety that protects lenders. A contagion process is at work; the economy can well spin out of control.

V. Central Banking and Other Thwarting Devices: REcent Resilience a the result of the Institutional structure.

Thwarting devices are structural features of the economy which dominate the internal processes in determining the path of the economy. Such thwarting devices may not always be operative but are operative when the economy seems to spin out of control. We have two types of thwarting devices in modern capitalist economies. One is the central bank, which as the lender of last resort tries to contain the need for units and banks to make position by selling out position: such refinancing both puts a floor under asset prices and assures that the financing facilities for banks and businesses do not collapse.

A second is the government deficit which can be used to assures that aggregate profits are sustained in the face of a decline in business investment.
These two have been able to contain the recessions of the post-war period. The question in 1991 is whether these two are adequate in the power relations that now rule.

VI. The Coherence of the Post War World Economy as a Beneficial Side effect of American economic Dynamism and the Fiscal Policy Model of the Economy as a guide to policy.

VII. Albin's Proposition: The Agents in the model have a Model of the Model.

VIII. The 1991 power relations: What is the model of the model that the main actors have.

Orwell: All agents are equal but some agents are more equal than others.

Germany's central bank "Fight inflation at all times"

Japan: Export now and forever.

Germany and Japan: Beggar my neighbor policies

The likelihood that policy will be inept in 1991 is too high for comfort An Anxiety Index.
The belief in the self righting properties of market economies is unwarranted. Nevertheless it pervades economic policy thinking. The American international financial position that enabled it to use the fiscal policy model was undercut in the 1980's. The success of global capitalism in the 1990's depends more upon what form Japanese and German policy take than upon what the United States does unless the United States is willing to hazard an international regime that developed under its auspices in the third quarter of the 20th century.