

Spring 2024

Born-Again Governance: Evangelists and the Republican Party

Jacob Andrew K. Epter
Bard College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2024



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#), and the [Religion Commons](#)



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License](#).

Recommended Citation

Epter, Jacob Andrew K., "Born-Again Governance: Evangelists and the Republican Party" (2024). *Senior Projects Spring 2024*. 83.

https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2024/83

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects at Bard Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Projects Spring 2024 by an authorized administrator of Bard Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@bard.edu.

Born-Again Governance: Evangelists and the Republican Party

Senior Project submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
Jacob Andrew Krembs Epter

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

May 2024

*This project is dedicated to Margaux and Lisanne.
You are the unwavering motivation behind my lifelong intention to fix what is broken in this world.*

~

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Simon, I am eternally grateful for your time and knowledge on this project. Without your guidance and overall effort I would not have been able to create what I have. Thank you for your advisement, it was and is fundamental to the project's completion.

Roger, your continued faith in my abilities and your assistance throughout the duration of my education has ensured that I was able to begin the Senior Project at all. Thank you for guaranteeing I lived up to everything I was and am able to accomplish.

Mom and Dad, your undying love and support has made me who I am entirely. Throughout any number of challenges, you pushed me to make intelligent choices and work harder than I ever thought possible, and because of it I have found success. That success can be attributed to you both as much if not more than it could ever be attributed to me.

Harrison, without you I would have slept through this entire semester. Thank you for physically dragging me out of bed, for insisting I continue working when I wanted to stop, and for stopping me when I wanted to work long into the night. I am grateful to you during this project and for the past four years for lending an ear towards harebrained ideas and analyses and for telling me perhaps too bluntly when those ideas had no merit.

Tris and Ben, you deserve an award for reminding me time and time again who I am and what I stand for. For the numerous times I watched altogether too many consecutive hours of sermons and temporarily fell prey to conversion tactics, I am forever appreciative that you both had no qualms in enforcing my true beliefs.

Orion, thank you for letting me explain concepts to you so as to ensure I understood them myself, and for reminding me now and throughout my undergraduate career to take numerous breaks.

Sam, thank you for everything. I am here with and because of you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
<i>What Begs the Question?</i>	2
<i>Introductory Hypotheses</i>	7
Part One	13
Chapter One	14
<i>Soft Power, Hard Power, and Non-State Actors</i>	15
<i>Resistance to Modernization</i>	19
Chapter Two	24
<i>Religious Recession, Religious Resuscitation</i>	24
<i>Progressive Perversion and Moral Preservation</i>	28
<i>Entering the Political Stage</i>	34
<i>Same Values, Same Votes</i>	39
Part Two	44
Chapter Three	45
<i>Methodology, Categories, and Data</i>	46
<i>Empirical Support for Analysis</i>	56
Conclusion	62
<i>Epilogue: Hard Power Manifestations in the Present</i>	65
Works Cited	69

INTRODUCTION

From an early age, American citizens are taught that an integral part of our system of governance is the separation of church and state, a doctrine which is undeniably present in the foundational documents of the nation. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states clearly that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”¹ In simplest terms, this means that the United States government is prohibited from establishing a federal religion; acting in ways that favor one religion over others; acting in ways that favor religion over non-religion or vice versa, or prohibiting free exercise of religion.² The right to freedom of religious practice and the stark divide between government and faith is often taken for granted in America. The United States as a country was founded on such freedoms, and it would seem unfathomable to live as an American citizen without them. Thus the separation of church and state and the right to religious freedom on which it rests are much more than a legal doctrine. They are deeply embedded in the very core of American political society, in the entire federal system of checks and balances, and in Americans’ overall conception of citizenship.³ Yet there has been an ideological shift over the past several decades causing behavioral changes in which a subset of the American population believes and acts as if the United States is a Christian nation. More specifically, American Evangelists in partnership with the Republican party have increasingly performed as if the doctrine separating church and state no longer holds true. To understand what created this shift necessitates asking the question this

¹ ‘U.S. Constitution - First Amendment | Resources | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress’, accessed 5 November 2023, <https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/>.

² ‘Establishment Clause’, LII / Legal Information Institute, accessed 5 November 2023, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause.

³ Greenhouse, ‘Separation of Church and State in the United States: Lost in Translation?’, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 13, no. 2 (2006): 493, <https://doi.org/10.2979/gls.2006.13.2.493>.

paper seeks to explore: what drew the American Evangelist coalition into the Republican party, and why?

What Begs the Question?

To answer this question, it must first be established that it is a question worth asking. Prior to doing so one must understand the historical and political contexts for the ways in which the American right to freedom of religion came to be. While the right to religious freedoms and the separation of church and state are front and center in America's governing documents, the battle to ingrain those protections into the Bill of Rights was hard-won. The Articles of Confederation contained no specific ban on governmental support of any religion.⁴ It was only through the work of James Madison that the amendment separating church and state was written into the Constitution at all. Prior to the doctrine's implementation, the goal of most governmental reformers was not religious *freedom* but rather religious *toleration*. As Madison saw it, “‘toleration’ made freedom a favor sanctioned by the established sect, rather than a natural and inalienable right.”⁵ After a great many years of debate and constantly changing legislation, June 8, 1789 saw Madison presenting the Bill of Rights before Congress, containing a clause which stated: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or in any pretext, abridged.”⁶ The language of this clause was modified and adapted into the wording Americans are familiar with today, and thus, the right to freedom of religion

⁴‘Articles of Confederation (1777)’, National Archives, 9 April 2021, <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/articles-of-confederation>; Irving Brant, ‘Madison: On the Separation of Church and State’, *The William and Mary Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (January 1951): 3, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1920731>.

⁵ Brant, ‘Madison’, 6

⁶ Brant, 14

was solidified in the United States Constitution. Interestingly enough, Madison's lifetime did not see this same protection extended beyond the federal government to the states.⁷ There was no federal barrier against states supporting a religion until the incorporation of the First Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States has held since the 1940s that Due Process, which prohibits any state from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"⁸ protects religious freedoms under state governance as well as federal.

With all this said, it should be obvious that America is not a nation of any specific religion. There is no federal religion in the United States; to have such a thing would be unconstitutional. Yet studies show that this is not a sentiment shared by all American citizens. A 2022 study conducted by Pew Research Center found that 60% of American adults believe the Founding Fathers intended this country to be a "Christian nation." More than 40% of Americans believe that it *should* be a Christian nation, and around 33% believe that it already is.⁹ It is intriguing to note that the percentage of Americans who believe their country was intended by the Founding Fathers to be a Christian nation (60%) is similar to the percentage of Americans in a separate Pew Research study who self-identified as some denomination of Christian themselves (63%). Furthermore, there has been a noticeable trend of campaigning politicians using that same rhetoric - that is, stating that America is or should be a Christian nation - in addresses and debates. One example of this is South Carolina Republican Senator Tim Scott and the statements he regularly made during his campaign for president. In speeches and at multiple Republican

⁷ Brant, 19

⁸ 'Due Process Generally | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress', accessed 3 December 2023, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14-S1-3/ALDE_00013743/.

⁹ Pew Research Center, '3. Views of the U.S. as a "Christian Nation" and Opinions about "Christian Nationalism"', *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), 27 October 2022, <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2022/10/27/views-of-the-u-s-as-a-christian-nation-and-opinions-about-christian-nationalism/>.

presidential debates, Senator Scott has repeated some variant of the same line: that this nation is “founded on Judeo-Christian values” and that his goal as president would be to return America to those supposed roots.¹⁰ Senator Scott frequently quotes scripture in his public addresses, and has formed the basis of his campaign around his Christian upbringing and his continued practice and belief in the faith.¹¹

There is a sort of dissonance in this way of thinking. The very core of the American government is its Constitution, a document which explicitly states that the country is free from any national religion. There is no mention of Christianity in any of America’s foundational documents. Furthermore, in the Constitution there is no mention of any sort of God.¹² Given these truths, why have studies shown such a pronounced correlation between American politics and Christianity? Understanding said correlation is of paramount importance to an understanding of modern American political workings. For scholars to make sense of the current political climate in the United States, to understand the views and values of the American population, to preserve the rights of all American citizens, and to predict future happenings, it is necessary to determine the fundamental reason behind this point of view. Therefore one must ask: what is causing this perception of the United States as a Christian nation?

Perhaps it is because American politics and the Christian faith have become increasingly entangled over the past several decades. This sort of entanglement is particularly noticeable in the Republican party. The Republican National Convention’s most recent published platform

¹⁰ 5 Applause Lines From Tim Scott at the Iowa State Fair - The New York Times’, accessed 14 November 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/16/us/politics/tim-scott-stump-speech-iowa.html>.; *Full Video: Watch the Third GOP Presidential Primary Debate in Miami*, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dmXI99oC4k>.; Maya King and Shane Goldmacher, ‘For Tim Scott, the Debate Was the Moment That Wasn’t’, *The New York Times*, 25 August 2023, sec. U.S., <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/25/us/politics/tim-scott-debate-performance.html>.

¹¹ King and Goldmacher, ‘For Tim Scott, the Debate Was the Moment That Wasn’t’.

¹² Rebecca Leppert and Dalia Fahmy, ‘10 Facts about Religion and Government in the United States’, *Pew Research Center* (blog), accessed 3 December 2023, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/07/05/10-facts-about-religion-and-government-in-the-united-states/>.

contains a section titled “The First Amendment: Religious Liberty.” In this section they express support for public display of the Ten Commandments “as a reflection of [American] history and our country’s Judeo-Christian values.”¹³ This section also affirms support for the right to prayer in public schools, as well as the belief that religious institutions should receive government funding to support their missions. This last point is particularly striking when looked at alongside Madison’s views of government providing financial support to institutions of any faith, which he deemed unconstitutional as it would in a way condone an “establishment of religion.”¹⁴ There are countless other examples of religious statements throughout the platform, further showing the prominence of Christian faith throughout the Republican party. These issues have been divisive since the 1960s, and the fact that they are still present in the modern Republican platform indicates the longevity of this alignment.

While it is obvious that the modern Republican party platform openly supports Christian agendas and moral values, it is thus far unclear as to how this alliance between Republicans and Christians came to be. Furthermore, the values that the Republican party platform endorses are not the values of all Christian denominations. As an example, their stated belief in “traditional marriage” - that is, marriage between one man and one woman - is not one that is shared among the entire Christian Faith. The Episcopal Church in particular is in full support of same-sex marriage and maintains an overall positive attitude towards homosexual congregants and clergy.¹⁵ This support is reflected in other Christian faiths such as the United States Presbyterian Church, the United Church of Christ, and the Quaker Society of Friends.¹⁶ Therefore, in order to

¹³ ‘About Our Party’, GOP, accessed 3 December 2023, <https://gop.com/about-our-party/>.

¹⁴ Brant, ‘Madison’.

¹⁵ ‘Stances of Faiths on LGBTQ Issues: Episcopal Church’, Human Rights Campaign, accessed 3 December 2023, <https://www.hrc.org/resources/stances-of-faiths-on-lgbt-issues-episcopal-church>; The Episcopal Church. ‘LGBTQ+’. Accessed 9 April 2024. <https://www.episcopalchurch.org/organizations-affiliations/lgbtq/>.

¹⁶ David Masci and Michael Lipka, ‘Where Christian Churches, Other Religions Stand on Gay Marriage’, *Pew Research Center* (blog), accessed 3 December 2023, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/12/21/where-christian-churches-stand-on-gay-marriage/>.

determine where this alliance originates, it is necessary to ascertain specifically what type of Christianity is being supported so completely.

Using the example of same-sex marriage, it is possible to narrow down which Christian denominations are being most supported by the Republican party. Christian groups in opposition to same-sex marriage are Evangelicals, Southern Baptists, United Methodists, Catholics and Lutheran Missouri Synods.¹⁷ Out of these five denominations, all but Catholics are considered Evangelists.¹⁸ Evangelizing as a practice can be defined as the practice of preaching the gospel and attempting to convert an individual or group to Christianity.¹⁹ Therefore, one does not have to identify oneself specifically as an Evangelical to evangelize or be considered an Evangelist. The four denominations listed above all practice some sort of evangelizing or have evangelistic practices written in their doctrines. Hence it can be concluded that the majority of Christian values being represented by the Republican party platform fall under the purview of Evangelists. For the purpose of this paper, “Evangelist” will be used as an overarching term to refer to these sects of Christianity which are being studied. The alignment of certain Catholic beliefs and the platform of the Republican party is also worth noting, but the added practice of conversion within the Evangelist coalition plays a specific role in this paper’s research. Considering that conversion is a pillar of Evangelist faiths, the ability to successfully bring people into the church is a necessary element of practicing within a denomination that evangelizes. As such, the ways in which Evangelists perform outreach and the way they interact with the general public retains relevance in their political involvement and overall ends. Additionally, given that the majority of

¹⁷ Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Same-Sex Marriage’, *Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), 7 December 2012,

<https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/12/07/religious-groups-official-positions-on-same-sex-marriage/>.

¹⁸ Dalia Fahmy, ‘7 Facts about Southern Baptists’, *Pew Research Center* (blog), accessed 3 December 2023,

<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/06/07/7-facts-about-southern-baptists/>.

¹⁹ Danielle Kurtzleben, ‘Are You An Evangelical? Are You Sure?’, *NPR*, 19 December 2015, sec. Politics,

<https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/458058251/are-you-an-evangelical-are-you-sure>; ‘EVANGELIZE Definition & Usage Examples | Dictionary.Com’, accessed 3 December 2023, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/evangelize>.

denominations can be categorized as Evangelists, this paper will use this label for the purpose of simplicity.

Given the above explanation of ideologies and the importance of conversion practices, one can establish that the aforementioned alliance can be considered to be between the Republican party and Evangelist Christians. It is apparent that the Republican party has a distinct Evangelist agenda and supports many Evangelist values. It is also clear that this Christian representation in the American political sphere stands alongside a belief held by a majority of Americans that the United States is or is meant to be in some respect a Christian nation, which in turn shows the necessity of exploring this phenomenon. Therefore one can return to the original question: what drew Evangelists into the Republican party, and why?

Introductory Hypotheses

There are several possible historical contexts to explore as one strives to answer this question. Perhaps most evident is the shared moral conservatism of Evangelists and Republicans. Morality can be defined as “the ethical propriety of conduct;” conservatism can be defined as “a disposition to support traditional values, norms, and institutions.”²⁰ Thus, “moral conservatism” refers to the preservation of traditional moral values, norms, and institutions. These values include things such as the previously mentioned opposition to same-sex marriage, as well as a pro-life view of reproductive freedoms,²¹ a conservative view on sex and pornography, and a

²⁰ Eric Woodrum, ‘Moral Conservatism and the 1984 Presidential Election’, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27, no. 2 (1988): 192–210, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1386715>.

²¹ Philip Schwadel, ‘The Republicanization of Evangelical Protestants in the United States: An Examination of the Sources of Political Realignment.’, *Social Science Research* 62 (February 2017): 238–54.

belief in “traditional” family dynamics and gender roles.²² The two parties also have similar values regarding such things as government social security and welfare programs.²³ Additionally there is the potentially less obvious shared value of backing the state of Israel, for which Evangelist Christians are the strongest American supporters.²⁴

Alongside these shared values is a history of power and influence. Following what Robert T. Handy called a “religious depression,”²⁵ Evangelists needed to revitalize their prominence in order to continue the spread of their message. The late 1930s saw the advent of radio broadcasting, followed closely by the entrance of television into the mainstream. These new forms of media allowed Evangelists to rebuild themselves through the following decades. However, a momentous shift towards progressive policies and political ideologies weakened Evangelist influence and legitimacy within the public sphere. This weakness, and the subsequent decline in Evangelist legitimacy in the public sphere, necessitated that the 1960s became a time of change.²⁶ Occurring during this period was the increasing notability of the feminist movement, which overlapped closely with the prominence of reproductive rights in American politics. Both movements had their separate drawbacks for Evangelists. The feminist movement contributed significantly to concern for family values within the Evangelist coalition as traditional gender dynamics were challenged.²⁷ The fight for a federal right to abortion was anathema to Evangelist

²² Frank Lambert, ‘Review Essay: Religion and the American Presidency’, *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 20, no. 2 (2010): 259–69, <https://doi.org/10.1525/rac.2010.20.2.259>.

²³ AXEL R. SCHÄFER, ‘EVANGELICALS, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE WELFARE STATE’, in *Piety and Public Funding*, Evangelicals and the State in Modern America (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 123–62, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhzqs.7>.

²⁴ PETER HAYS GRIES, ‘How Ideology Divides American Liberals and Conservatives over Israel’, *Political Science Quarterly* 130, no. 1 (2015): 51–78.

²⁵ Joel A. Carpenter, ‘Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942’, *Church History* 49, no. 1 (1980): 62–75, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3164640>.

²⁶ Thomas C. Berg, ‘“Proclaiming Together”? Convergence and Divergence in Mainline and Evangelical Evangelism, 1945-1967’, *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 5, no. 1 (1995): 49–76, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1123965>.

²⁷ Berg, ‘Proclaiming Together’

morals and beliefs. Taken together, Evangelists were seeing their influence and legitimacy slip away.

Following the 1973 decision to federally legalize abortion in *Roe v. Wade*,²⁸ Evangelists were now in desperate need of change, as evidenced by an outpouring of protestations from the group that will be elaborated upon further in this paper. An increasingly progressive America resulted in the power and influence of Evangelists decreasing, necessitating a change in their approach to evangelizing and otherwise spreading their message. Their opportunity to regain public influence necessitated a move into American politics, which came in the form of presidential candidate Jimmy Carter. While Carter was a Democrat, his strong Southern Baptist faith in combination with his vehement anti-abortion stance made him an optimal candidate for Evangelist support. Carter courted the Evangelist vote, making campaign promises of a faith-driven America. He drew Evangelists into the political spotlight, where they had not held prominence since the 1920s.²⁹ However, Evangelists quickly found that once elected, Carter was not as willing as he had previously seemed to blur the line between church and state. His rhetoric and his personal beliefs did not align with his policies. As scholars Flint and Porter explain, “[Carter’s] advocacy of the Equal Rights Amendment and gay rights, and his failure to support mandatory prayer in public schools or to move to ban abortion were all anathema to their religious principles.”³⁰

By the end of Carter’s presidency, Evangelists were not only against him, but against the Democratic party as a whole. Therefore, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan was perfectly primed to collect the Evangelist voters Carter had let slip. Frank Lambert states that

²⁸ *Roe v. Wade*, No. 70-18 (Burger Court 22 January 1973).

²⁹ Andrew R. Flint and Joy Porter, ‘Jimmy Carter: The Re-Emergence of Faith-Based Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2005): 28–51.

³⁰ Flint and Porter, (35)

“Reagan passed the Religious Right’s test for the presidency. He openly played to their fears and hopes.”³¹ Reagan’s election and the high levels of support he received from Evangelist Americans clearly marked the Evangelist reemergence into the American political sphere.

This paper seeks to explain the specifics of what drew Evangelists into the Republican party. It will take several approaches to doing so. Firstly, Part One will introduce a two-part analysis answering this paper’s question. The overall conclusive theory utilizes the framework of power application set forth by Joseph Nye. Using Nye’s basic explanations of hard and soft power, this analysis will liken hard power’s “push” and soft power’s “pull” to the different methods of influence and impact Evangelists employed to retain relevance and protect traditional morality. Through framing the analysis in conceptions of power application it is able to address underlying motivations behind the need for Evangelists to enter into the general political sphere, positing that the group was unable to successfully preserve their morals and ideologies through their power alone. This failure necessitated the acquisition of supportive power, which this paper argues was found through harnessing legislative backing. Additionally, the conclusive theory will propose a second factor of a resistance to modernization necessary to preserve key facets of the Evangelist doctrine in the face of progressive policy. While the framework of power application explains why Evangelists were drawn into politics, it does not provide conclusive evidence for why the group found themselves specifically aligned with the Republican Party. Introducing the theory of resistance to modernization supports this aspect by making connections between the goals of Evangelists in politics and the platform of the conservative Republicans.

Part One then will expand upon all factors mentioned in the previous section, providing further depth to the historical and intellectual contexts of this development. It will explore theories of moral conservatism as a catalyst for this religious-political alliance. Through a

³¹ Lambert, ‘Review Essay’

chronological analysis of politics and history beginning in the 1920s, individual factors such as abortion, homosexuality, school prayer, and support for the state of Israel will all be investigated and their importance to the question determined.

To further support said theory, Part Two of this paper will delve into a methodological approach to data collection. This approach involves close historical analysis of one particular prominent congregation: the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. Graham is recognized by many scholars to have been a frontrunner in the Evangelist religious revival of the 1930s, broadcasting his message of Christ and salvation to millions through a series of what he called crusades. The project will examine the messages of Graham's sermons and statements throughout the years. Archival records of Graham's sermons are publicly available through both his website and through several sources on YouTube and other websites. By taking particular note of when and how the content shifts, the hope is to be able to further understand which specific factors led Evangelical Americans to bring their beliefs into the political sphere. This case study will examine a span of approximately five decades, looking from Graham's early sermons in the 1960s to his more recent sermons in the early 2000s.

Taken together, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive exploration of the world of Evangelists and Republicans in American politics. The first section, involving historical and academic research, offers explanations and contexts for this paper's overall question. The methodological approach allows the paper to support the explanations of the first part using empirical evidence in addition to the academic research provided in Part One. Through an understanding of Evangelist's need to access new forms of power and their inability to embrace modern societal attitudes, coupled with the results of the case study, this paper seeks to address

the question of what drew Evangelists into the Republican party and to briefly examine the aftereffects of these groups as they work in combination.

Part One

CHAPTER ONE

Part One of this paper has two goals. Chapter One will lay out the groundwork for the aforementioned conclusion the paper ultimately draws, detailing Joseph Nye's conceptions of hard and soft power as a framework for understanding the Evangelist-Republican political alignment. Through this lens, Chapter One will also explore the factor of resisting modernization and describe the ways in which the framework of hard and soft power and the inability to modernize work in tandem. Chapter Two aims to provide historical and political context surrounding Evangelist and Republican beliefs and the ways they align. It further attempts to look at a brief history of Evangelical social presence and influence throughout the past century. The first section of Chapter Two will examine the fall and rise of American Evangelists in the first half of the twentieth century, paying particular attention to their efforts to revitalize their influence and the motivation behind such efforts. The second section focuses on the various moral and political issues facing Evangelists beginning in the 1960s and the ways in which various presidential figures played on the fear these issues inspired to gain the Evangelist vote. The third section takes a brief look into a post-Reagan Evangelist world, noting the continued impact of his presidency on the relationship between Republicans and Evangelists. Chapter Two will serve to explain and support the overall theory proposed in Chapter One.

Soft Power, Hard Power, and Non-State Actors

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye explains the concepts of soft and hard power in his 2011 book *The Future of Power*.³² He defines hard power as *coercion* and soft power as *persuasion* and *attraction*.³³ Nye also explores the concept of non-state actors being participants in war and government, emphasizing the importance of recognizing these actors and operating around and within their impacts and influences. For the purpose of this first analysis, Evangelists are considered to be a non-state actor. Nye's conceptions of power provide a clarifying framework through which one can view the journey of Evangelists becoming involved in the Republican party. As Nye does, this paper considers soft power as "pull" and hard power as "push."

In the 1920s Evangelists experienced a religious depression as a result of a post-war American attitude and the concurrent Great Depression, which will be expounded upon in greater detail in Chapter Two. To revive their congregations and influence it was therefore necessary to gain trustworthiness as a genuine institution worth the time and money of American citizens, which leads the analysis into the concept of soft power. As Nye understands it, soft power relies on trust as well as persuasion.³⁴ In a chapter of *The Future of Power* specifically explaining soft power and its usages in international affairs, Nye gives examples of external influences. He details how in 2007 Steven Spielberg sent Chinese president Hu Jintao an open letter asking for China's help pushing Sudan towards accepting United Nations assistance for peace in Darfur. This resulted in China sending a "pressure campaign" to Darfur shortly after.³⁵ One could easily

³² 'BIOGRAPHY: Joseph S. Nye', U.S. Department of State, accessed 27 March 2024, [//2009-2017.state.gov/s/p/fapb/185594.htm](https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/p/fapb/185594.htm).

³³ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, 1. ed (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011) xiii

³⁴ Nye, x.

³⁵ Nye, 83.

liken this type of persuasion to the entire concept of evangelizing. A highly charismatic individual such as televangelist preacher Billy Graham using his own life and his particular celebrity to persuade thousands of people to join the church is a strong example of a non-state actor using soft power. Billy Graham's ability to use his own experience being born again gave him credibility, allowing him to utilize said credibility to influence. Soft power can also be found in media output; for example, Hollywood movies may provide other countries with a positive or otherwise interesting view of the United States. The nature of television and radio means that it can reach individuals in the comfort of their own home, apart from external influences that may prevent them from opening their minds to the messages of such media. Since Graham's sermons were televised, one could argue that a similar response occurred in any number of individuals. Nye also emphasizes that soft power cannot be wielded alone; it requires multiple partners to employ it successfully.³⁶ The spread of Bible institutes across the country as a response to the religious depression gave Evangelists a wide range of partners through which to recruit even more congregants. Furthermore, the reliance of soft power on attraction meant that appealing to young people in a manner that attracted them to the congregation was essential.³⁷ As "a relatively new type of institutional structure," Bible institutes were fresh, trendy, and altogether interesting to the youth population.³⁸ They managed to draw a portion of Americans to an institution that desperately needed their attendance, displaying a successful implementation of the soft power of attraction. Here, the analysis foreshadows Chapter Two, which equates Bible institutes with a nation establishing educational institutions in foreign countries to expand their soft power.

³⁶ Nye, 84.

³⁷ Nye, xiii.

³⁸ Carpenter, 'Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942' 66.

Once credibility and persuasion is established, it must be maintained for soft power to continue to achieve its ends. Evangelists were able to revive themselves sufficiently to prevent them from going under and were able to use various mediums of outreach to maintain and increase their relevance. Aided by the fact that their morals and values aligned largely with the overall views of the American population, Evangelists did not have a significant pushback. There was no friction between what they wanted and what the majority wanted. Yet as progressive ideologies such as access to abortion and queer rights gained traction and people began to push for legislative change and social acceptance, it was clear that Evangelist influence would be insufficient to preserve the country's traditionalist ideals in such a manner that they would still align with those of the church. The persuasion element of Nye's conception of soft power relies in part on knowing what the other side wants, and in this case, what the other side wanted was antithetical to core Evangelist beliefs.

When soft power fails, an actor can turn to hard power. Again, soft power can be described as pulling, while hard power entails a strong push. In a governmental setting, hard power can refer to such things as military force or economic sanctions. But in the case of a non-state actor that cannot utilize violent force or sanction a population of private citizens, hard power could manifest as accessing legislative power to maintain the ideals of this actor despite the wants and needs of other parts of an electorate. This analogy is one part of an explanation for why Evangelists found themselves entering the political sphere. Their soft power had failed them. The people were speaking out and voting for policies that would directly contradict their important ideological standpoints. Now, instead of pulling Americans towards their ideological viewpoints or preventing their views from shifting through persuasion and trust, Evangelists had to employ pushing their values into law. If Americans did not want to abide by traditional and

conservative values, what better way to bring their cooperation than by codifying those values into legislation that cannot be disobeyed without consequence?

Even while mobilizing to vote in preferential candidates who appealed to the Evangelist base, the group still tried to maintain some level of influence and impact outside of politics. This further strengthens this analysis by bringing in a third concept from Nye: smart power. Nye defines smart power as “the combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction.”³⁹ Combining the soft power of Billy Graham’s crusades, which packed stadiums and continued well into the early 2000s, with the hard power of governmental and legislative support for their motives over the demonstrated wants of non-Evangelists is the perfect marriage of both types of power to achieve smart power. This analysis posits that Evangelists used soft power to gain influence and attraction until that approach began to prove unsuccessful. Following this failure, they allowed themselves to be courted first by Jimmy Carter and then by Ronald Reagan to enshrine their beliefs into American law. Carter’s inability to produce their desired results led them to Reagan, who was able to advance where Carter had fallen short. Reagan’s success led to his reelection, and his party’s support of policy and protection of values that aligned with the wants of the Evangelist coalition cemented Evangelist trust and loyalty towards the Republican party.

³⁹ Nye, xiii.

Resistance to Modernization

While the above explains why Evangelists found themselves entering the overall political sphere, it does not address why they aligned themselves with the Republican Party specifically. To explain this factor, one can cite an Evangelist resistance or even inability to modernize in the face of declining influence. The tactic of embracing modernism had been successful in previous instances of decreased soft power; the Evangelist religious depression of the 1920s was fought off in large part through modernizing the church and its outreach tactics. Appealing to the American youth and embracing modern technological advances allowed Evangelists to remain relevant and influential as an institution. This relevance and influence persisted until progressive policy took center stage, imperiling the protection of Evangelist values. What then might have happened had Evangelists embraced modernization in the 1960s?

Considering the fact that these progressive values were in themselves antithetical to Evangelism, modern adaptation was simply not possible. While it had succeeded before, this particular shift in American values did not just constitute a decrease in religious interest. It was not as easy as acclimatizing to television as a means for sermons or courting the interests of the youth population. Evangelists were forced to resist modernization rather than accepting the changing tides and working within them. In its end, this removed what had previously been their social salvation.

When faced with the necessity of remaining steadfast in the conservation of traditional values, who better to turn to than the predominant conservative political party? Since the 1896 election of conservative President William McKinley, “Republican” and “conservative” have over time become nearly synonymous in the United States.⁴⁰ McKinley’s conservative policies

⁴⁰ ‘Republican Party | Definition, History, & Beliefs | Britannica’, 30 March 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Republican-Party>.

were largely monetary, favoring “high tariffs on foreign goods and “sound” money tied to the value of gold.”⁴¹ Throughout the next several decades, the Republican vote was divided between the progressive Teddy Roosevelt and the more conservative William Howard Taft. This division split the Republican vote and led to the election of Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and 1916. However, Woodrow’s “brand of idealism and internationalism” proved less attractive to the American electorate than the Republican pro-business platform, securing them the presidential elections from 1920 to 1928.⁴² Yet the party’s unwillingness to provide direct federal intervention during the Great Depression lost them their majority status and put the federal government in the hands of the Democratic party. This loss of influence and attraction parallels that of the Evangelist coalition during this time period, though the two groups had yet to align themselves. It was only with the nomination of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 that Republicans were able to reenter the presidential office. By this time, the scope of their conservative policies had expanded beyond business and economics. In addition to these prevailing values, the party now encompassed a platform of fierce anti-communist rhetoric and anti-civil rights legislation.⁴³ These values have persisted and expanded, eventually including such beliefs as the preservation of marriage between one man and one woman and the restriction of federal abortion access.⁴⁴

Thus when unable to stand their ground alone, Evangelists had no choice but to find themselves a supporter of conservative Republican politicians. When their support proved rewarding, the group was able to remain in the political sphere and use their newfound influence to push policy which supported and protected their core beliefs. The Republican party has yet to

⁴¹ ‘Republican Party | Definition, History, & Beliefs

⁴² ‘Republican Party | Definition, History, & Beliefs

⁴³ ‘Republican Party | Definition, History, & Beliefs

⁴⁴ ‘About Our Party’, GOP

significantly fail them, providing an explanation for why they continue to reinforce that political alignment to this day.

Neither the hard and soft power framework nor the resistance to modernization can stand alone. Instead, they must be viewed in tandem to comprehensively answer this paper's question. The framework of hard and soft power solely explains why Evangelists entered into the general world politics, but cannot conclusively justify their specific alignment with Republicans. Resistance to modernization fails to explain why Evangelists first found themselves entranced with Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter. Had their primary goal been to join a conservative party, there is no reason to believe they would have backed a Democratic candidate. Instead, it seems as though Evangelists at first needed fast action. Carter's campaign promises provided them with an instant solution to the problem they were facing. A second issue with using modernization resistance as a standalone explanation is that it does not account for the efforts of Evangelists outside of direct political involvement. Their counter-activism to progressive movements was swift and fierce, reflecting a level of modernization. While these counter-activist movements did not entail embracing modern views, they can in some senses be considered an attempt to embrace modern styles of protesting. Perhaps Evangelists believed that utilizing the same methods as those they opposed would sway the opponents in their beliefs, or at least bring those on the fence back to their side of the divide. Certainly one could argue that Evangelists did not resist modernization entirely; rather their attempts to modernize as a countermeasure to opposition simply failed. If one views these particular instances of counterprotest as an attempt to subscribe to modern social attitudes, this facet of the argument may have some merit. However, in past instances where modernization was utilized to regain influence, Evangelist views were still representative of the views of the majority. Modernizing in the past had largely

entailed updating the ways in which the group reached the public. Once their message could be spread, it was not difficult to impart as the views the group preached were commonly held. This time, the issue at hand was not that Evangelists could not reach a large number of people but rather that their views and the views of the public were at odds. The early Evangelist counterprotest measures are indicative of the coalition attempting to reach Americans as they had done in the past, demonstrating an effort to employ previously successful soft power applications. Unfortunately for them, reaching the populace was useless if the people did not want to hear what the group had to say or if they outright rebuked it. To successfully modernize now would be to change deeply convicted moral standpoints so as to make their message one that would be positively received, and this was just not possible. As such, they were left with no other option than to enter conservative politics, emboldened by the need to push their values into law and tantalized by the promises they were made.

Thus this paper concludes that an adaptation of hard power combined with a resistance to modernization drew Evangelists into the Republican Party. For the second time, Evangelists were faced with a decrease of influential abilities on the general public as the majority's ideological standpoints began to shift. This decrease in influence can be likened to a decrease in soft power, or "pull". Yet unlike the first instance in the early 1900s, there was no space for Evangelists to adapt to these novel factors as doing so would directly contradict the church's doctrines. Adaptation was less about expanding outreach and reinvigorating American religious conviction and hopeful attitudes, as it had been in the past. Now, it involved embracing and supporting progressive policies which ran contrary to core Evangelist beliefs. Inability to modernize sufficiently meant there was no path for them to revitalize their soft power, which in turn necessitated the search for a different facet of power. They found their answer in legislative

support, applying the “push” of hard power through political involvement. Given their inability to fully integrate modern ideological stances into their own practices, Evangelists ultimately aligned themselves with the more conservative of the two political parties. Republican platforms resisted modernization to a similar extent and supported this resistance through legislation, consequently ensuring that the group would remain unwavering in their loyalty to Republican candidates so long as their needs were affirmed and subsequently met.

CHAPTER TWO

Religious Recession, Religious Resuscitation

Evangelists have not always had the prominence in American society that they enjoy today. Chapter One touched briefly on the 1920's Evangelist decrease in influence, which historian Robert T. Handy termed "a religious depression" concurrent with the Great Depression.⁴⁵ During World War I, Americans found themselves taken up with the spirit of war. They were able to maintain an attitude of optimism which was bolstered by religious leaders. However, in the postwar decade, this spirit was unable to prevail. The Great Depression of the 1920s reflected this, but it was also reflected in the so-called religious depression that occurred alongside it.

Handy posits that this religious depression was likely a result of several factors. First and foremost, the general disillusionment of postwar Americans, even without the declining morale of the Great Depression, meant that they became distant from the ideas of certain Christian religions. "One opinion study showed that although about 78 percent of the views about traditional Christianity published in 1905 were favorable and only 22 per cent were unfavorable, by 1930 the situation had almost reversed, so that 67 per cent of the opinions published were unfavorable."⁴⁶ A second factor was that these long-standing churches, stuck in their ways, were unable to keep up with modern societal attitudes. Aided by the appeal of a fresh approach to faith, newer religious sects began to crop up and subsequently poached members from older,

⁴⁵ Robert T. Handy, 'The American Religious Depression, 1925-1935', *Church History* 29, no. 1 (1960): 3-16, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3161613>.

⁴⁶ Handy, 'The American Religious Depression, 1925-1935'

more traditional churches. Interestingly enough, it appears as if Evangelical Christianity was the primary religious group to experience this religious depression. “Jewish congregations enjoyed a healthy growth in the 1926-36 decade, reporting a 13.7 percent increase. Roman Catholicism also grew, but considerably more slowly than in the preceding ten year period.”⁴⁷ A third and final factor contributing to this decline was the direct effect of the Great Depression on church attendance and membership. While the former two reasons simply existed alongside the Depression, Handy maintains that the overall impact of the Great Depression’s effect on the American peoples’ hope and optimism contributed at least slightly, elaborating that “[t]he American spiritual depression and the decline of Protestantism in the 1920's were intimately correlated.”⁴⁸

As is clear by their continued relevance in the present day, this religious depression would not prove fatal for Evangelism in America. The advent of radio and television would become a saving grace for the group, allowing them to broadcast their message to a wider audience. As mentioned previously, a key factor of Evangelism is the practice of evangelizing, or spreading the Gospel.⁴⁹ In fact, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association website states in their “What We Believe” section that “We believe that the ministry of evangelism (sharing and proclaiming the message of salvation only possible by grace through faith in Jesus Christ) and discipleship (helping followers of Christ grow up into maturity in Christ) is a responsibility of all followers of Jesus Christ.”⁵⁰⁵¹ As such, a decrease of membership and church attendance meant that the Gospel was not being spread, and conversions were scarce. It was thereby imperative for

⁴⁷ Handy, ‘The American Religious Depression, 1925-1935’, 13.

⁴⁸ Handy 8.

⁴⁹ ‘EVANGELIZE Definition & Usage Examples | Dictionary.Com’

⁵⁰ ‘The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association - What We Believe’, Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 28 October 2023, <https://billygraham.org/about/what-we-believe/>.

⁵¹ Bible verses cited by Billy Graham Org. to support this belief: Matthew 28:18-20; Acts 1:8; Romans 10:9-15; 1 Peter 3:15.

Evangelists at this time to rejuvenate their congregations and the scope of their outreach; failure to do so reflected a failure in the duties of their faith. Crucial to this revitalization was their understanding of one of the factors mentioned by Handy: the changing attitudes towards religion of the modern world. The combination of contemporary postwar sentiments and newer, smaller religious sects provided Evangelists with formidable opponents in the court of public opinion. Specifically, the younger generation was not embracing traditional Christianity the way it used to. Attendance of Sunday evening services decreased exponentially, as did Sunday school enrollment. In 1930, C. Luther Fry found that "the proportion of young people attending church schools is greater today than in 1906, but less than in 1916."⁵² Fewer young congregants meant less souls to save. As already established, Evangelism rests in part on the pillar of conversion and the continued outreaching of Christ's word necessitated by it. Motivated by the need to replace their lost numbers and continue their conversion efforts, Evangelists began further broadening the scope of their influence. One notable way this was achieved was through Bible institutes. In the 1930s, Bible institutes gained traction amongst college-age Americans, facilitating the recapture of the youth population that had slipped through the Evangelist grasp in the decade prior. Functioning at a basic level as "a teaching center for lay Christian workers," Bible institutes first appeared within the Evangelist community of Chicago and quickly spread across the country as they gained popularity among younger Americans.⁵³ Even more influential was the rise of radio gospel. Radio broadcasts allowed Evangelists to reach wider audiences than ever before, giving them the ability to spread their message nationally. "More than any other medium, radio kept revivalistic religion before the American public."⁵⁴

⁵² Handy 5.

⁵³ Joel A. Carpenter, 'Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942', *Church History* 49, no. 1 (1980): 66, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3164640>.

⁵⁴ Joel A. Carpenter, 'Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942', *Church History* 49, no. 1 (1980): 72, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3164640>.

After radio gospel came gospel television. The advances of new technology meant that Americans could not only hear the word of God, they could now see it professed before them in the comfort of their own home. Prominent figures like Billy Graham used this reach to embark on a mission of conversion across the country. Graham's crusades, for example, not only skyrocketed him into a household name but managed to bring countless Americans back into the open and waiting arms of Evangelical churches. "By the 1950s, this building phase [in reference to the efforts of Evangelists to rebuild their numbers and influence] had paid off and Billy Graham, a fundamentalist favorite son, became the symbol of evangelism's new prominence."⁵⁵ The exciting new world of television preaching coupled with the successes of reaching the younger generation brought Evangelism back into the American spotlight, proving a shining success for the creative efforts of these churches to revitalize their relevance in a postwar society.

Notable here is the use of trust, influence and persuasion to increase numbers and retain relevance. All of these factors contribute to what Nye describes as "pull," also known as soft power. While Evangelists as a group are non-state actors and thus cannot be held to standards of international governance, their "pull" tactics during this period somewhat mirror those used in international affairs. In interactions between governments, it is common to use positive attraction as a facet of diplomacy; a manner of "pulling" through persuasion and influence rather than "pushing" an individual or government to take actions they would not otherwise take. The end goal of these sorts of diplomatic relations is to have a middleman who can represent the views and wants of a larger actor while still maintaining individualized connection and integrity. Also common is the establishment of universities and other such educational institutes by one country within another. These institutions are able to provide cultural and educational conceptions of a foreign country to people within their homeland, fostering connection and mutual understanding

⁵⁵ Carpenter, 'Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942' 63.

and thereby increasing influence and trust; strengthening the “pull.” The implementation of Bible institutes can be equated to the establishment of foreign universities in other countries, and Billy Graham acting as a bridge to the populace works in a similar manner to states sending celebrities to foreign countries so as to utilize their individual influence. These tactics worked in tandem to bring Evangelists into a position of credibility and attractiveness to the general public.

These successes were short-lived. The Evangelical era of prominence would soon face yet another adversary: political movements towards equality for marginalized groups in America. Traditionalist values such as the ones associated with the church would begin to conflict with “modern day” values once again, but this time it was not due to something as easily overcome as a general lack of modernization and a decline in youth participation. Instead, values that were fundamental to the Evangelical Christian faith began to chafe against ideologies such as women’s equality and reproductive rights.

Progressive Perversion and Moral Preservation

The 1970s were a notable time of turmoil for the traditional values exalted within the Evangelical faith. The previous decade had seen the high point of a fierce fight for reproductive rights, culminating in the 1973 Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade*. *Roe* legalized abortion on a federal level prior to the 24-week viability line, a decision quite controversial among the American people.⁵⁶ The conflict of opinions persisted so much so that fifty years later, *Roe* and its 1992 reaffirming case *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* were overturned by the 2022 *Dobbs v. Jackson* decision and abortion legislation was returned to state governments.⁵⁷ The right to

⁵⁶ *Roe v. Wade*, No. 70-18 (Burger Court 22 January 1973).

⁵⁷ ‘*Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey*’, Oyez, accessed 27 February 2024, <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-744>; *Dobbs v. Jackson*, No. 19-1392 (Roberts Court 24 June 2022).

abortion is one that most Evangelists strongly oppose. The primary belief in the Evangelist church is that life begins at conception, and thus abortion is equivalent to taking a life. As M. V. Naidu puts it, “[t]he anti-abortionists start with a religious belief that the fetus has the soul and it is a human-being, and then derive from that belief a legal-political conclusion on the crime of murder.”⁵⁸ According to a 2014 Pew Research Study, only 33% of Evangelists surveyed believe that abortion should be legal in most or all cases.⁵⁹ The belief that abortion should be federally prohibited was prevalent among Evangelists during the 1970s as much if not more than it is today. During that time, Evangelists “viewed the availability of abortion as indicative of the erosion of modern America's moral consensus over the traditional role of the family. Likewise, federal protection of abortion rights was evidence of the depraved influence of secular humanism in Washington.”⁶⁰ Reproductive rights taking such a prominent place in the political spotlight pushed moral issues into the realm of politics, forcing Evangelists to follow.

While abortion was a prominent and divisive issue in the 1970s, it was not the sole conflict that American Evangelists faced. There were several other factors that stood in opposition to their traditional moral values. One key factor was the Equal Rights Amendment, which stated:

Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.⁶¹

⁵⁸ M.V. Naidu, ‘ABORTION, THEOCRACY AND SECULARITY: CONFLICT BETWEEN IRRATIONAL RELIGIONISM AND RATIONAL DEMOCRATISM’, *Peace Research* 26, no. 4 (1994): 8

⁵⁹ ‘Religious Landscape Study’, *Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), accessed 27 February 2024, <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/>.

⁶⁰ Andrew R. Flint and Joy Porter, ‘Jimmy Carter: The Re-Emergence of Faith-Based Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2005): 38.

⁶¹ ‘National Archives NextGen Catalog’, accessed 28 February 2024, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7455549?objectPage=3>.

The Equal Rights Amendment was first drafted in 1923 and introduced in every session of Congress, but gained little to no traction until the 1970s. With new female representatives pushing for the Amendment, it finally passed both chambers of Congress in 1972.⁶²

To this day the proposed Amendment has not been ratified by the states. However, the waves it made in the political sphere in 1972 were undeniable. The Equal Rights Amendment was significant to Evangelists in large part because it threatened the traditional family values and gender roles prized within the church. By advocating for the equality of women in the social, political, and economic spheres, this Amendment ran contrary to the Evangelist beliefs that women are meant to be homemakers and childbearers. In doing so it directly opposed the Evangelist notion of overall male superiority that is believed to be the will of God. “The dominant view is a hierarchical one, informed by the Apostle Paul’s teachings that women should submit to their husbands and should not have authority over men.”⁶³ Here, as in *Roe*, the outcomes of a changing political climate were feared to threaten the moral lives of Evangelists.

The *Roe v. Wade* decision and the campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment alone were enough to ensure that Evangelists felt threatened. But these two factors, while possibly the most significant, were not the only sources of tumult for 1970s Evangelists. Traditional family values, which even today are upheld and praised by Evangelists as central to their faith and essential to a moral life, were under attack. The gay rights movement was gaining traction, pushing back against traditionalist views that homosexuality is sinful and hedonistic. The topic of teaching evolution as opposed to the religious belief of creationism was also prevalent. In addition, the changing gender dynamics that the Equal Rights Amendment represented were a threat to

⁶² 159 and 139, ‘The Equal Rights Amendment Explained | Brennan Center for Justice’, 9 October 2019, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/equal-rights-amendment-explained>.

⁶³ Livia Gershon, ‘Whatever Happened to Evangelical Feminism?’, JSTOR Daily, 16 February 2022, <https://daily.jstor.org/whatever-happened-to-evangelical-feminism/>.

traditional family values in which the father is the provider and the mother's focus is solely on child-rearing. All in all, "Evangelical Christians were at the forefront of the anti-abortion movement, and of the anti-feminist movement that rallied to defeat the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, as well as the anti-gay movement."⁶⁴ All of these issues relate in some way to the idea of family, which was and is an integral part of an Evangelist lifestyle.

To this day, an overall negative view of homosexuality persists in Evangelist thinking. The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association website's "What We Believe" section states their views:

We believe God's plan for human sexuality is to be expressed only within the context of marriage, that God created man and woman as unique biological persons made to complete each other. God instituted monogamous marriage between male and female as the foundation of the family and the basic structure of human society. For this reason, we believe that marriage is exclusively the union of one genetic male and one genetic female.⁶⁵

This viewpoint is not new. Evangelists have historically opposed same-sex relationships, believing that they contradict the will of God and anyone who engages in them is living a life outside of Christ. Thus in the 1960s when homosexuals were stepping into the spotlight, Evangelists identified a threat to the preservation of their moral codes. The 1966 Compton's Cafeteria Riot in the Tenderloin district of Chicago and the New York City Stonewall Riots of 1969 represented a group that was no longer tolerating harassment and discrimination from the world at large.⁶⁶ Homosexual political activism was gaining traction. "In August 1964 the

⁶⁴ Tina Fetner, 'The Conflict Emerges in the 1970s', in *How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism*, NED-New edition, vol. 31 (University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 23–43, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttvb8d.6>.

⁶⁵ 'The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association - What We Believe'.

⁶⁶ Nicole Pasulka, 'Ladies In The Streets: Before Stonewall, Transgender Uprising Changed Lives', *NPR*, 5 May 2015, sec. Code Switch, <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/05/05/404459634/ladies-in-the-streets-before-stonewall-transgender-uprising-changed-lives>; '1969 Stonewall Riots - Origins, Timeline & Leaders', *HISTORY*, 23 June 2023, <https://www.history.com/topics/gay-rights/the-stonewall-riots>.

ACLU/NCA issued a report calling upon the federal government to "end its policy of rejection of all homosexuals on that ground alone."⁶⁷ Groups like the Mattachine Society of Washington began publicly protesting for equal employment rights for homosexuals in government, a reaction to the countless men and women fired for the intimate details of their private lives during the deeply impactful multi-decade Lavender Scare which paralleled and often overlapped with the Red Scare.⁶⁸ Evangelists reacted by doubling down on their "defense of the family" standpoint, but it was insufficient to quell the rise of public homosexual activism that led to the gay rights movement permeating the next several decades.⁶⁹

Regarding creationism in schools, there is a commonly held belief among many Evangelists that a child separated from God is no longer privy to salvation.⁷⁰ As evolution became more commonly accepted, concern among Evangelists grew as they sent their children to schools where they would have to learn a story about the beginnings of humanity that did not align with their beliefs of the word of God. Although legislation surrounding evolution and creationism first appeared in a significant manner during the Scopes Evolution trial of 1925, when Tennessee teacher John Scopes was tried for a violation of a law prohibiting evolutionary teachings in schools, it would not become such a pressing issue until decades later.⁷¹ In 1968, the Supreme Court struck down the laws that Scopes was tried for breaking. Their overturn was concurrent with the work and monetary support of Congress towards reforming the country's curriculum, an initiative which included the work of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study and their 1959 production of a high school biology textbook taking a staunch evolutionary

⁶⁷ Johnson 190.

⁶⁸ Johnson.

⁶⁹ Seth Dowland, "'Family Values' and the Formation of a Christian Right Agenda', *Church History* 78, no. 3 (September 2009): 606–31, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009640709990448>.

⁷⁰ Eugenie C. Scott, 'Antievolution and Creationism in the United States', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26 (1997): 264.

⁷¹ Scott, 'Antievolution and Creationism in the United States', 272.

stance.⁷² Responses from religious figures were swift, with anyone from publication companies to Yale law students printing and distributing written opinions urging the dangers of teaching evolution to children.⁷³ Despite pushback, it became clear that there was no longer any scientific way to disprove evolution and discredit teaching the subject. The influence of these religious figures and the simple credibility of their faith was no longer sufficient to combat scientific findings. The creationism-evolution debate thus began to encroach on the beliefs in which Evangelists raised their children, making it a factor in their conceptions of the overarching issue of family values in America.

All in all, the Evangelical reign was imperiled by these various social and political movements. Prior to this time, their continuous efforts to swell their ranks and spread their message had allowed them to exist comfortably unchallenged. Even if they themselves did not make up the majority of the American population, their moral codes permeated the nation. The monopolizing influence they had enjoyed over the American public was slipping away as countless factors challenged their “strict moral code and conservative positions on religious-cultural “family” issues.”⁷⁴ Up until this time Evangelists had not had much need to be involved in the politics of their nation. Because their beliefs aligned with the dominant moral and social ideologies of the general public, they had nothing that posed an opposition to their traditionalist lifestyles. Yet as the changing political climate of America and those who perpetrated the activism behind it began to rear its head in what Evangelists considered to be personal moral and familial issues - abortion, homosexual rights, public education, and other such matters - it was glaringly obvious that the strength enjoyed by this religious and moral

⁷² Scott, ‘Antievolution and Creationism in the United States’, 272.

⁷³ Scott, ‘Antievolution and Creationism in the United States’, 273.

⁷⁴ Andrew R. Flint and Joy Porter, ‘Jimmy Carter: The Re-Emergence of Faith-Based Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2005): 30.

alignment was diminishing. No longer could Evangelists maintain a secure niche supported by the views of the many. Majority opinions were changing, necessitating a previously unheard-of Evangelist step into the political sphere so as to protect their own interests. Furthermore, the government was beginning to take action on many of these issues, meaning that Evangelists were facing a looming threat of legislation anathema to them being codified.

Here one can observe the decrease in soft power's effectiveness and the necessity to resist aligning with modern ideologies which were posited in Chapter One. Evangelist morals and values were being attacked on all sides. The influence of the church on overall societal beliefs and legislative wants were ineffective to slow the rise in progressive liberal activism. Unlike the first instance of the religious depression, Evangelists had no way to regain their soft power "pull" through modernizing themselves, to do so would be in opposition to Evangelist doctrine. Counter-protests may reflect an attempt to adapt to modern activism and turn the tide, but as these movements continued to accelerate this attempt proved unsuitable in its ends.

Entering the Political Stage

The Evangelist panic came at an opportune time for one Jimmy Carter, who was beginning to embark on his campaign for the American presidency. Carter was running as a Democrat, and given the way that new and dangerous ideologies were cropping up in the liberal sector, Evangelists were loath to find themselves left-leaning. However, Carter's proud pronouncement of his Southern Baptist faith and his opposition to many of the issues discussed above made him a prime candidate. As Flint et. al phrased it, "a vote for Carter was not a vote for the agenda of the Democratic Party; it was a vote for who Carter was and what he personally

represented. What he was, was a man of Christian faith whose public pronouncements reverberated with Biblical undertones”⁷⁵ As a reminder, Southern Baptists fall under the definition of Evangelists as established in this paper’s introduction.

It would be untrue, however, to say that Evangelists ran immediately into Carter’s open polling booth. The future president took great pains to attract the subset of the American electorate that would ultimately win him the election. Chief among his attractive qualities was his vehement opposition to abortion. He spoke publicly against *Roe* and supported the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited Medicaid from covering abortion in all instances except in situations where it was necessary to save the life of the mother or prevent severe health effects, or in cases where the fetus was conceived through rape or incest.⁷⁶ Perhaps even more important was his use of his religious faith as a sort of reference to communicate to American citizens that he was the best man for the job. Carter’s speeches were rife with religious rhetoric, and he maintained throughout the duration of his campaign a sort of biblical ideology that blurred the line separating church and state. “During the campaign Carter’s religion was used to suggest to the people that Carter’s godliness could help him be a good president, that because of the God-Carter relationship the Carter-people relationship would be close.”⁷⁷ At the time, no other president had ever used their personal religion as a basis for their qualifications to hold the presidential office. As an example, former President John F. Kennedy, who faced opposition from Southern Baptists for his Catholic faith, reinforced his belief in the strict divide between religion and politics. At the time, Southern Baptists were frontrunners in protecting religious freedom and the separation of church and state. Kennedy’s strong Catholicism posed a problem to the group. Southern Baptists are Evangelists but Catholics are not, and while they are both

⁷⁵ Flint and Porter, 31.

⁷⁶ Flint and Porter, 39.

⁷⁷ Dan F. Hahn, ‘The Rhetoric of Jimmy Carter, 1976-1980’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1984): 281.

subsections of the Christian faith, Catholics answer to the Vatican above all else. As such in the eyes of Southern Baptists there was potential for his religion to seep into his policy or for his loyalties to lie with the Pope rather than the people. Not only was the sanctity of a separate church and state being threatened, but it was being endangered by an opposing denomination. However, Kennedy refused to allow his relationship with religion to enter into his position in the Oval Office. “By invoking the separation of church and state, Kennedy deflected the deadliest weapon aimed at him.”⁷⁸ This both maintained the norm of keeping one’s personal faith out of one’s presidential career and reassured the Southern Baptists and those who supported their crusade against him. Carter blew that particular norm apart, and with great success. Not only did he invoke his own religious beliefs in a political environment, but he did it as a Southern Baptist, a group which had up until now advocated for separating church and state. There is perhaps an argument to be made that what distinguished Carter from Kennedy is that the beliefs that would seep into his policy aligned with Southern Baptist and overall Evangelist beliefs, nullifying the threat that Southern Baptists had identified previously. Thus in 1976 Jimmy Carter was elected president, in no small part because of the large number of Evangelical voters who turned out in support of him.

Yet much like the successes of the 1930s religious revival, Evangelist successes through the Carter presidency would not last. Once in office it became apparent that when it came to the marriage of church and state, Carter was not the great religious figure but intrinsically the politician. He began to shy away from his campaign promises of bringing the Christian faith to his policymaking at the White House, backing down from his former convicted sentiments. He advocated for the Equal Rights Amendment and promoted pro-gay rights ideologies. He stripped

⁷⁸ Frank Lambert, ‘Review Essay: Religion and the American Presidency’, *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 20, no. 2 (2010): 259–69, <https://doi.org/10.1525/rac.2010.20.2.259>.

segregated religious schools of their tax-exempt status.⁷⁹ Furthermore, he did not throw his weight behind mandatory school prayer, and despite being vocally anti-abortion he made no move to completely ban it or otherwise contradict the *Roe* decision.⁸⁰ In the eyes of the Evangelist electorate, these were deep betrayals from a man they had helped to elect. They had supported Carter on the basis of his faith and on the belief that he would save them from what was, in their view, a rapidly deteriorating American society. Carter's perceived backstabbing behavior once elected lost him the support of Evangelicals. This left the group once again open for another candidate to step in, with one key difference. Prior to Carter, Evangelists had little impactful involvement in American politics. They certainly did not mobilize as a group to elect a president. Post-Carter, Evangelists realized that they held some level of power to sway the results of an election by throwing their support behind a potential candidate. "The more the Carter administration had refused to reverse the liberal advances of the previous decade, the more the Christian Right as an organized force mustered political strength."⁸¹ It was clear that they were a helpful group to have as a backer, and would continue to be so as long as their political desires were attended to.

This fact did not escape presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, who challenged the incumbent Carter in the 1980 presidential election. Running as a Republican bolstered his appeal to Evangelists who had been snubbed by a Democratic president the previous four years. Reagan also employed a successful strategy of presenting himself as an anti-Carter. While Carter had spent much of his campaign scolding voters about their loss of religious faith, Reagan made an effort to rekindle faith-based optimism in a time of moral panic. He was vehement in his support

⁷⁹ M. McKeegan, 'The Politics of Abortion: A Historical Perspective', *Women's Health Issues: Official Publication of the Jacobs Institute of Women's Health* 3, no. 3 (1993): 127–31, [https://doi.org/10.1016/s1049-3867\(05\)80245-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/s1049-3867(05)80245-2).

⁸⁰ Flint and Porter 35.

⁸¹ Flint and Porter 46.

for the traditional family values so sought after in an Evangelical candidate, openly professing his opposition to gay rights and abortion access. He supported the idea of school prayer and opposed the prevalence of pornography.⁸² In short, Reagan portrayed himself as the poster candidate for the Evangelist vote. This portrayal would prove to be quite successful. Reagan served two consecutive terms as president, beating out Carter by a large margin in 1980 and winning again against Democratic candidate Walter Mondale in 1984. Reagan had learned from Carter's mistakes. Once in office, he upheld much of the same rhetoric that had landed him the election. "Candidate Reagan repeatedly affirmed his support for traditional family values and school prayer, and opposition to abortion, homosexual rights, and pornography."⁸³ Furthermore, his presidency marked the start of a long-standing connection between the Republican Party and the Evangelist electorate. "The year 1980 inaugurated four decades of Republicans affirming white evangelicals' priorities, such as school prayer or the pro-life cause."⁸⁴ Reagan represented both an outcome and a catalyst, acting as a capstone for a years-long Evangelist struggle to gain political power and setting in motion the ever-tightening entanglement between Evangelists and the Republican Party that still persists today.

Reagan's implementation and support of conservative legislation and policy demonstrates a successful Evangelist application of hard power. Through their support, Evangelists had helped to elect a candidate that would follow through on campaign promises to preserve moral conservatism and combat the progressive ideologies permeating society at large. They now had the most powerful man in the country as an ally to their goals, allowing them to push these goals onto the population in a manner which could not be easily countered. For the duration of

⁸² Eric Woodrum, 'Moral Conservatism and the 1984 Presidential Election', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27, no. 2 (1988): 192–210, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1386715>.

⁸³ Woodrum, 'Moral Conservatism and the 1984 Presidential Election', 193.

⁸⁴ THOMAS S. KIDD, 'Evangelicalism from Reagan to Obama', in *Who Is an Evangelical?*, The History of a Movement in Crisis (Yale University Press, 2019), 121–43, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvnwbxrh.9>.

Reagan's presidency, Evangelists could rest assured that the executive branch would not present an obstacle to their doctrinal beliefs and in fact would support those beliefs through legislation and policy.

Same Values, Same Votes

All of this is not to say that Carter and Reagan as individuals caused Evangelists to enter into the Republican party. Given the direction that America's political climate was trending towards, it is not unreasonable to argue that the two groups would have connected regardless of either man. Jimmy Carter was simply a politician who happened to be the right man at the right time, in an era when any candidate could have stepped up and taken his place provided they aligned themselves with the views Evangelists were so desperately trying to protect. Like Carter, Reagan was an individual in the right position at the most opportune time. Evangelists had already entered into politics, but had not yet found what they were seeking. Reagan's campaign was aided by Carter's betrayals. Still, had he not been where he was, Evangelists would have been forced into politics by the host of progressive movements alone.

As such, Reagan may have been a catalyst, but he was not the sole reason for the connection between the two coalitions. The fact that this connection persevered even after the Reagan administration ended proves this further. The after effects can be seen in a relatively recent norm for politicians in which professing - or at the very least identifying - their Christian faith has become almost a prerequisite for holding public office, a tactic which gained popularity following the Carter and Reagan administrations. This norm is not unique to Republicans and is pervasive within the Democratic party as well. "For example, in 2000, George W. Bush

unabashedly declared his favorite political philosopher to be Jesus Christ, while his Democratic opponent Al Gore confided that he decided important policy questions by asking himself W. W. J. D?, shorthand for "What would Jesus do?"⁸⁵ It is clear that there is an understanding among hopeful politicians that appealing to the American Evangelist electorate bolsters their chances for election.

Another aspect of this connection worth mentioning is the sheer number of Evangelist viewpoints that mirror those within the GOP. These similarities provide further evidence of the intertwining of Evangelist and Republican worldviews. Already mentioned are views on homosexuality, abortion, and traditional gender roles. While arguably the most significant, these are not the only topics on which Evangelists and Republicans agree. Other notable shared ideological stances include federal support - or lack thereof - for social security programs, beliefs about the creation and protection of the state of Israel, and military and defense spending. Sociologist Philip Schwadel explored these factors in a 2017 study entitled "The Republicanization of Evangelical Protestants in the United States: An Examination of the Sources of Political Realignment."⁸⁶ Schwadel notes that the correlation between Evangelists and Republicans is a relatively new phenomenon, appearing around the 1980s. This observation is consistent with this paper's earlier evaluation citing Reagan's presidency as a catalyst for this situation.

Schwadel proposes that the factors relating to Israel and military spending are related, stating that "Evangelical Protestant support for military and defense spending was spurred on by Christian Right organizations that gained prominence beginning in the 1980s, and the increasing

⁸⁵ Flint and Porter, 48.

⁸⁶ Philip Schwadel, 'The Republicanization of Evangelical Protestants in the United States: An Examination of the Sources of Political Realignment.', *Social Science Research* 62 (February 2017): 238–54.

emphasis those organizations placed on the importance of protecting Israel.”⁸⁷ Evangelists are widely believed to be Israel’s strongest American supporters, something which may stem from two factors.⁸⁸ The first of these two is purely theological. Evangelists hold the belief that the return of the Jews to their purported homeland fulfills a Biblical prophecy which signals the nearing of end times, and subsequently the return of Christ. “When the people of Israel returned to a homeland that had been “trampled on by the gentiles” (Lk. 21:24) for near two thousand years, it provided affirmation that history was moving towards its fulfillment and, furthermore, that the Bible was a reliable source for the interpretation of the present.”⁸⁹ The second factor is rooted in ideological beliefs towards both Palestinians and Muslims in general. Both Evangelists and conservatives generally view Muslims as a threat. Conservatives fear challenges to established authority and social order, while Evangelists are concerned that Islam poses a danger to Christianity.⁹⁰ “From this conservative perspective, the Israelis are on the front line of a battle to keep the Palestinians and other Muslims from upsetting the global pecking order.”⁹¹ Both reasons tie into the alignment of Republicans and Evangelists in their views on certain aspects of military and defense spending. If one subscribes to these beliefs, it naturally follows that America needs to allot significant funding towards Israeli defense. “If the Israelis need to rule the occupied territories with an iron fist to maintain law and order, so be it.”⁹² An additional factor mentioned in Schwadel’s study is the support of welfare programs. This may appear contradictory at first given how much emphasis the Christian church places on aiding those in

⁸⁷ Schwadel.

⁸⁸ PETER HAYS GRIES, ‘How Ideology Divides American Liberals and Conservatives over Israel’, *Political Science Quarterly* 130, no. 1 (2015): 51–78.

⁸⁹ Aron Engberg, ‘Walking on the Pages of the Word of God’, in *Walking on the Pages of the Word of God*, vol. 59, Self, Land, and Text Among Evangelical Volunteers in Jerusalem (Brill, 2020), 185, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvrk3g6.10>.

⁹⁰ GRIES, ‘How Ideology Divides American Liberals and Conservatives over Israel’.

⁹¹ GRIES, 72.

⁹² GRIES, 72.

poverty. However, scholars such as Axel R. Schäfer argue that Evangelists oppose government spending on welfare because these programs threaten the church in their own efforts to facilitate such initiatives.⁹³ There is also a belief among some Evangelists that welfare programs encourage immorality and deviant behavior.⁹⁴ The Republican party feels similarly, specifically in regards to the latter point. The most recent GOP party platform emphasizes the belief that current welfare programs actually contribute to continuing poverty. They refer to government assistance as “hand-outs” and advocate for “greater state and local responsibility for, and control over, public assistance programs.”⁹⁵ Ultimately, Schwadel’s study concludes that views on homosexuality and abortion are the primary sources of connection between Evangelists and Republicans. This is reflected and supported by the previous chapters’ explanation of these two particular elements. However, he does not dispute the relevance of these other factors, which makes their consideration in addition to the primary two pertinent to this paper’s exploration.

Part One of this paper has been intended to propose a conclusive answer to the thesis question and provide supporting evidence for this analysis. Chapter One explained the framework of Joseph Nye’s conceptions of hard and soft power as a lens through which to view the Evangelist entrance into the political sphere. It further provided an explanation for Evangelist resistance to modernization to support why the group entered not only the political sphere but specifically the Republican party. Chapter Two supported Chapter One’s analysis by detailing a chronological history of Evangelist influence and action throughout the 1900s. By first exploring Robert Handy’s depiction of a religious depression and the ways in which Evangelists revived

⁹³ AXEL R. SCHÄFER, ‘EVANGELICALS, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE WELFARE STATE’, in *Piety and Public Funding*, Evangelicals and the State in Modern America (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 123–62, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhzqs.7>.

⁹⁴ SCHÄFER

⁹⁵ ‘About Our Party’, GOP, accessed 3 December 2023, <https://gop.com/about-our-party/>; <https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf> page 32

themselves during that time, Chapter Two proved that there had been a previous instance in which Evangelists experienced a decrease in applicable soft power and were able to overcome it. Following this establishment, Chapter Two offered a comprehensive showing of each specific progressive movement that Evangelists opposed as well as the reasons for why they were unable to combat their rise. Chapter Two concludes with a brief demonstration of the ways in which this political-religious alignment has permeated American politics following its creation.

Part Two will provide further support for Chapter One's analysis using data collected from archived Billy Graham sermons. After explaining the methodology of this case study and displaying the data, Part Two will analyze the ways in which Graham's changing messages to the general public reflect the history and explanations of Part One.

Part Two

CHAPTER THREE

Televangelist preacher Billy Graham was an essential part of the evangelist religious revival. An ordained Southern Baptist minister, he prayed with “every U.S. president from Harry S. Truman to Barack Obama” and was praised extensively by Ronald Reagan.⁹⁶ Reagan is quoted as saying “Billy Graham’s contribution to the well-being of mankind is literally immeasurable. Millions of lives across the globe have been enriched because of his good work.”⁹⁷ Graham committed his life to Christ at fifteen years old after attending a revival by Mordecai Fowler Ham. He preached on an international scale beginning in 1949 and remained in the public eye until his death in 2018, although his appearances decreased in the last eighteen years of his life. To this day, his family continues his work through the Billy Graham Evangelistic Organization, which produces media discussing the Evangelist faith in the form of podcasts and news articles. In his lifetime, Billy Graham’s message reached an innumerable number of people. “From the time he was thrust into the national limelight with his 1949 Los Angeles crusades, Graham did more than anyone in the nation to spark interest in and debate over revivalism and conversion-centered evangelism.”⁹⁸ Clearly, Graham was a wildly influential figure for the Evangelist coalition. His widespread power and impact, in addition to the well-preserved records of his life’s work, make him the perfect candidate to examine.

In order to add further depth to the analyses described in Part One of this paper, Graham’s archived sermons were used to conduct a case study. The purpose of this study was to examine

⁹⁶ ‘The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association - What We Believe’, Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 28 October 2023, <https://billygraham.org/about/what-we-believe/>.

⁹⁷ ‘Remembering Billy Graham (1918 – 2018)’, Billy Graham Memorial, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://memorial.billygraham.org/>.

⁹⁸ Thomas C. Berg, “‘Proclaiming Together’? Convergence and Divergence in Mainline and Evangelical Evangelism, 1945-1967”, *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 5, no. 1 (1995): 53, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1123965>.

the ways in which an influential Evangelist figure was addressing the general population and what sentiments he was attempting to convey. By isolating the data collected from these archived sermons into three distinct categories and observing frequency of occurrence over time, it is possible to find empirical evidence supporting this paper's theories.

Methodology, Categories, and Data

To perform this case study, it was necessary to isolate a period of time in which there were a sufficient number of archived sermons available. The availability of such sermons increased as the dates they were broadcasted grew closer to the present day and technological advances allowed for quality recordings to be preserved and published. For this reason, although Graham began preaching in 1949, the timeline of this case study begins in 1965 and ends in 2005 when Graham's public appearances began to decrease, likely due to his advancing age. To survey such a lengthy period of time effectively, the range of years is broken up into five-year increments. Within each increment, two archived sermons were chosen at random. The only factor considered in selecting these sermons was the year in which they were given. This serves as an attempt to eliminate conscious or unconscious bias within the data collected.

To collect this data, each archive was watched or listened to closely and a note was made of each specific point or instance Graham emphasized throughout the sermon. These notes were then considered and broken into three specific categories, which will be explained shortly. The number of points or instances in each category were then counted, averaged, and graphed.

Given that Part One has identified a particular time period within the range of sermons analyzed as noteworthy, the study isolated a period of twenty years within which further data would be collected: 1975 - 1994. One additional sermon was analyzed for the period between

1975 - 1979 and the period between 1990 - 1994. Because the 1980s are of particular importance to this study, two additional sermons were analyzed for the period between 1980 - 1984 and the period between 1985 - 1989. This data was combined with the existing data from the preliminary iteration of this study. The total number of points from each category were then divided by the total number of sermons watched for each category; by two for 1965 - 1974 and 1995 - 2004, by three for 1975 - 1979 and 1990 - 1994, and by four for 1980 - 1989.

By using averages instead of total data, the hope is that a more in-depth view of the most significant period of time is created. This in-depth view gives increased accuracy to the results through a wider pool of information input and allows the study to determine a precise insight into the topics being preached during those years. All of the data collected comes from publicly available archives of Billy Graham's work. These archives are available on the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association website. This study primarily uses video sermons, although audio recordings were substituted in instances where there was difficulty finding sufficient video archives for a given five-year increment.

Year Range	Sermon 1	Sermon 2
1965 - 1969	Is There Life After Death? ⁹⁹	The Second Coming of Christ ¹⁰⁰
1970 - 1974	A Nation at the Crossroads ¹⁰¹	America, is the Handwriting ¹⁰² on the Wall?
1975 - 1979	Hopeless, Yet There is Hope ¹⁰³	Jaws ¹⁰⁴
1980 - 1984	Is There a Hell? ¹⁰⁵	Rebellion and Youth ¹⁰⁶
1985 - 1989	What is the World Coming To? ¹⁰⁷	Billy Graham Explains the Reason for Today's Tragedies ¹⁰⁸
1990 - 1994	Is the End of the World Close? ¹⁰⁹	How to Get to Heaven ¹¹⁰
1995 - 2000	Things That Never Change ¹¹¹	Unchanging Love ¹¹²
2000 - 2005	Jesus, Hope of the World ¹¹³	The End of the World ¹¹⁴

Fig. 1, Chart of All Sermons Analyzed

⁹⁹ '[VIDEO] Is There Life After Death?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/is-there-life-after-death/>.

¹⁰⁰ 'VIDEO: The Second Coming of Christ', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/the-second-coming-of-christ-2/>.

¹⁰¹ 'A Nation at the Crossroads: A Billy Graham Classic Message', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/a-nation-at-the-crossroads/>.

¹⁰² '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: America, Is the Handwriting on the Wall?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/america-is-the-handwriting-on-the-wall/>.

¹⁰³ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Hopeless, Yet There Is Hope', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/hopeless-yet-there-is-hope/>.

¹⁰⁴ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: You Are Called to Minister', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/jaws/>.

¹⁰⁵ '(WATCH) Is There a Hell? Billy Graham Explains', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/is-there-a-hell-2/>.

¹⁰⁶ *Rebellion and Youth | Billy Graham Classic Sermon*, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kt8GCbKTiUU>.

¹⁰⁷ 'VIDEO: What Is the World Coming To?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/what-is-the-world-coming-to/>.

¹⁰⁸ 'VIDEO: Billy Graham Explains the Reason for Today's Tragedies', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/billy-graham-explains-the-reason-for-todays-tragedies/>.

¹⁰⁹ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Is the End of the World Close?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/is-the-end-of-the-world-close/>.

¹¹⁰ '(VIDEO) How to Get to Heaven', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/how-to-get-to-heaven-3/>.

¹¹¹ 'Things That Never Change Pt. 1', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/audio/things-that-never-change-pt-1/>; 'Things That Never Change Pt. 2', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/audio/things-that-never-change-pt-2/>.

¹¹² '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: God's Unchanging Love', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/unchanging-love-2/>.

¹¹³ '[WATCH] Who Is Jesus to You Personally?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/jesus-hope-of-the-world/>.

¹¹⁴ 'The End of the World (Part 1)', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/audio/the-end-of-the-world-part-1-2/>; 'The End of the World (Part 2)', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 14 February 2024, <https://billygraham.org/audio/the-end-of-the-world-part-2-2/>.

Year Range	Sermon 1	Sermon 2
1975 - 1979	Conscience ¹¹⁵	
1980 - 1984	Are You Offended by the Cross? ¹¹⁶	Building Relationships ¹¹⁷
1985 - 1989	The Danger of Waiting to Make a Decision for Christ ¹¹⁸	What's Your Excuse for Ignoring Christ? ¹¹⁹
1990 - 1994	Starting Life Over Again ¹²⁰	

Fig. 2, Chart of Additional Sermons Analyzed

As explained above, the data from each sermon was isolated into three distinct categories. These categories were determined during the study as clear distinctions began to appear within the data. Each category represents some form of power application, which will be expanded upon in later sections. It is worth noting that these three categories do not encompass every part of every sermon. However, the data that remains outside of these categories is primarily Biblical quotes and paraphrasing of public figures that Graham uses to support his personal words. For the purpose of this study, the categories are meant to examine only the points and ideas of Graham himself and therefore are not inclusive of gospel verses or statements from figures other than Graham.

¹¹⁵ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Conscience', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 25 March 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/conscience/>.

¹¹⁶ '(Video) Billy Graham: Are You Offended by the Cross?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 25 March 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/are-you-offended-by-the-cross-2/>.

¹¹⁷ '(VIDEO) Billy Graham on Building Relationships', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 25 March 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/building-relationships-3/>.

¹¹⁸ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Will You Miss Out on Eternity?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 25 March 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/billy-graham-the-danger-of-waiting-to-make-a-decision-for-christ/>.

¹¹⁹ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: What's Your Excuse for Ignoring Christ?', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 25 March 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/billy-graham-whats-your-excuse-for-ignoring-christ/>.

¹²⁰ '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Starting Life Over Again', Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, accessed 25 March 2024, <https://billygraham.org/video/starting-life-over-again/>.

Category One: Love Thyself and Thy Neighbor

The first category is referred to in this paper as “Love Thyself and Thy Neighbor.” The overall connotation of this category is positive, emphasizing such things as the care God has for His people and the rewards promised to His devoted followers. Statements Graham makes that fall within this category advocate for such things as love for oneself, for the people around oneself, and for God and Jesus. Here, Graham advises his audience to practice ethical living. He calls for kindness and open hearts. While the topic of sin is prevalent here as it is throughout all three categories, “Love Thyself and Thy Neighbor ” contains only positive reinforcement against sin. There are no fear tactics employed, rather Graham praises the rewards of salvation and the ascent of God’s most faithful subjects into the Kingdom of Heaven. He also places an emphasis on the beneficial impact of leading a sin-free life towards the happiness of those around you. This category has an overarching message of hope for the future of the world. Common and repeated points within this category include: God’s love is everlasting, Jesus loved you enough that he died on the cross for you, God will solve all problems in the world, and glorification of the Kingdom of Heaven. This category employs tactics of attraction and influence, using positive reinforcement techniques to draw new congregants into the church and to retain existing members. Within the framework of the hard and soft power analysis, this category can be likened to an application of soft power. Graham is using positive reinforcement tactics to influence and attract potential converts and to maintain relationships with individuals already participating in the congregation. He is “pulling” his audience into the church with promises of the rewards they might reap, using the power of incentive to draw them towards his will and the will of God.




Fig. 3.1, “Love Thyself and Thy Neighbor” Individual Data Graph

Category Two: Save Thyself and Thy Neighbor

This second category, referred to as “Save Thyself and Thy Neighbor,” is a sort of in-between point between the first and third categories. It retains in some aspects the message of hope found within the “Love Thyself and Thy Neighbor” category, but this hope seems to be a sort of weapon in the battle against corruption that is prevalent in the world. Statements from Graham in this category preach subjects surrounding the state of the world and how fear of it is warranted, warning against the draw of sin from both internal and external sources. There is an overarching message of one’s personal ability as a follower of Christ to achieve salvation not only for oneself but for others. With this comes the implication that others want to be saved or at the very least are not against the notion. As with the first category, there is the continued reminder that Jesus is Lord. Distinct from the first category’s usage of this ideal, however, is that

this reminder serves as a threat rather than an uplifting statement. The threats exemplified here are of Hell, of Judgment Day, and of the perils of sin in general. This category gets its name from the aforementioned descriptions of striving for salvation for both oneself and others, along with its message of unity and togetherness. Repeated points throughout this category include: as long as Christ exists in this world there will be salvation, you must devote yourself to God immediately, humanity is dependent on hope, the world is corrupt but it is not yet too late, and the overall idea that Judgment Day is near but there is still time to save us all. This category still uses some elements of attraction and other such methods of positive reinforcement, but supports it with an underlying caution for what might happen should an individual choose to ignore the teachings of Christ. This category represents a median point between pure hard power and pure soft power, but is different from Nye's concept of smart power. While Nye understands smart power as an equal combination of hard and soft power, this category represents the shifting point between the application of one and the application of the other. It uses the incentive of salvation rather than reward, meaning that there is less of an attractive "pull" aspect. However, it does not rely entirely on fear, meaning it is not an outright "push" and therefore not an application of hard power. One could argue that this category represents the beginning stages of Evangelists moving into hard power usage prior to its full implementation. It further supports the idea presented in Part One that Evangelists did attempt to modernize through counterprotesting, which proved unsuccessful. In sum, Category Two is representative of Evangelist attempts to use fear as a motivating force, but not in such a way as to push voters towards their preferred candidate. Instead, this category relies on both the soft power of any remaining influence combined with the incentive of fear to mobilize activism against progressive policy.




Fig 3.2, “Save Thyself and Thy Neighbor” Individual Graph

Category Three: Save Thyself from Thy Neighbor

This third category, “Save Thyself from Thy Neighbor,” is the sole category in which there is no sense of overall unity regardless of faith. Instead, Graham’s preaching focuses on what he describes as the rampant perversion of society that surrounds us all and on warning against the danger this poses to leading a Christian life. While the second category cautioned against both internal and external factors which may lead to sin, “Save Thyself from Thy Neighbor” is explicit in that the danger is entirely external. The people around you and their actions should serve as both a source of concern and a cautionary tale. Like the second category, this category contains calls to follow Christ not out of love, but as a method to inspire fear. It is

isolating in nature, permeated with the conception that the sins of those yet unsaved may drag one down into their wicked and deceitful lifestyle. Further distinct from the second category, this third category posits that others *do not* want to be saved, or in fact may even actively hope and take steps to prevent your salvation. It contains the strong attitude of “what is this world coming to?” and maintains that God’s judgment will be harsh if you do not save yourself not only from sin but from the others in society. Overall, this category is the most negative of the three. Its name is derived from the general idea that those around you are something to be feared rather than saved, that it is too late for them and you must focus on your salvation alone. Common statements in this category include such things as: others will bully you for your faith but you must remain strong, most people will not enter the Kingdom of God, God is distraught at the state of America, and once again, the end of the world is nigh and judgment day is nearly upon us.

This final category is representative of decreasing confidence in the Evangelist ability to influence. It is not a direct application of hard power, but rather a call for hard power implementation. Graham is not just pushing Evangelists towards the polls by remarking on the pitfalls of today’s political sphere, he is also pushing them towards the promise of salvation offered by the church. In doing so he is maintaining the core practice of conversion. In this paper’s analysis, the use of legislative and overall political support as a means to codify Evangelist morals and ideals is likened to hard power. As a non-political figure, Graham cannot implement legislation. However, by inspiring fear about the state of the world in the minds of his audience, Graham very well could have spurred Evangelists into voting booths. The urgency which he imparts upon his congregants stresses the necessity of using one’s individual power to ensure society does not continue down a path of ruin.




Fig 3.3, "Save Thyself From Thy Neighbor" Individual Graph




Fig 3.4, "All Categories" Graph

Empirical Support for Analysis

This paper's overall analysis uses the framework of soft and hard power as a way to understand Evangelist actions and the motivations behind them. Within the descriptions of each category are explanations for how each one fits within this view. Category One, *Love Thyself as Thy Neighbor*, aligns best with the underlying ideals of soft power. Category Three, *Save Thyself from Thy Neighbor*, could be considered in some respects as an attempt to harness individual votes and encourage collective action to support the application of hard power. Between Category One and Category Three is Category Two, *Save Thyself and Thy Neighbor*. Category Two can be likened to somewhat of a median point between the soft power and hard power application, relying on neither solely attraction or solely fear. In Category Two there is both a consequence and a reward, while Category One contains only rewarding ends and Category Three serves solely as a damning warning. Category One is perhaps the most open and inviting; Evangelists have not taken up arms against any sort of enemy force. Category Two indicates a level of concern among Evangelists but still shows them as open and accepting towards external individuals, offering an olive branch for the church to work with those outside of it to achieve a common God-fearing goal. Category Three is the most exclusionary, adopting a "with us or against us" point of view. In Category Two there is still a sense of unity, but Category Three emphasizes that you are either wholly on the side of the church or you are outside of it completely. These categories function as a reflection of the church's attitudes towards the outside world, providing further context to different power applications over time. Category One shows a willingness to work together despite differing viewpoints. Category Two demonstrates a continuation of such openness, but also shows concern within the church that these methods may

no longer be functional. Category Three represents a full commitment to encouraging Evangelists and outsiders alike to use their votes in a manner that will uphold Evangelist views in government and strengthen their hard power, employing fear as motivation.

In the analysis, the use of legislation to uphold traditional moral values is likened to hard power. Evangelists used legislative power to push their policies onto the population. In addition, fear was used to push the electorate towards their policies, effectively shoving individuals from either side to ensure their ending position is exactly where Evangelists want them, like it or not. Through soft power, Evangelists are appealing to the people. They are using attraction and allure in a positive sense to pull those external to the church towards or into it.

In examining the graphs, the above conceptions of power can be applied to make sense of what the data signifies. Increases and decreases in the number of times each category appears can be considered as increases or decreases in the application or encouragement towards different types of power to achieve an end. Take first the increment between 1965 and 1970. The sharp drop in Category One may indicate a lack of safety for Evangelists among those external to the church, meaning that they are no longer able to solely employ soft power to convert those people to align with their views. This is reflected as well by the decrease in Category Two. While nowhere near as sharp as that of Category One, the two decreases combined could signal a lessening use of soft power. In contrast, Category Three rises slightly, which supports the drop in soft power and shows an increase in the application of fear. This aligns with the timeline of Part One, which explained that the late 1960s marked the beginning of the end for Evangelist's reign of unassisted influence.

The period between 1970 and 1975 is particularly interesting because Category Two and Category Three meet, indicating an equal application of both tactics. This is consistent with the

counterprotest measures Evangelists employed during this time as well as their hopes for the Carter administration. Part One established that counterprotests were used as an attempt to meet the general public within their modern social activities, which subsequently failed. Category Two's representation of shifting tactics can be indicative of these attempts, with the rise in its implementation representing Evangelist efforts to retain influence through fear but not yet pushing for congregants' involvement in politics. Category One remains far below the other categories, which could mean that, while being used slightly more than in the previous time period, soft power is less necessary. This could stem from Carter's successful election. During this time, Evangelists still had some level of belief that Carter would deliver the policies he had promised. That belief would provide them with security in their morals, meaning that it was no longer necessary to use soft power alone to convince the population to align with them. The rise in Category Two may also be from a need to garner acceptance for the unpopular policies Evangelists believed would be implemented by the Carter administration using fear of damnation, bolstered by the slight rise in Category One that, while still low, shows an attempt to continue motivation through the promise of reward. Category Three does decrease marginally, indicating a lesser need for fear tactics brought about by political support which lent security to the Evangelist platform.

From 1975 to 1980, there is a noticeably large spike in Category Three. Category Two and Category One remain on a somewhat steady rise, with Category One still much lower than either of its counterparts. In the period of time between 1975 and 1980 Evangelists suffered a political betrayal on behalf of Carter, who backed down from his campaign promises and earned Evangelists' ire. The rise in all three categories demonstrates an increased usage of all forms of power to regain some sense of security, using both positive and negative reinforcement to ensure

their goals were being achieved despite the failures of the Carter administration to protect them. The differences between Category One and Categories Two and Three may be attributed to panic. After losing their first attempt to enter the political sphere, Evangelists turned primarily to the push of hard power, supported by Category Three being higher than Category Two, which in turn is higher than Category One. Category One's smaller spike may be a last-ditch attempt to pull. Given the disastrous outcomes of their first foray into American politics, it would follow that Evangelists would combine their older tactics with their newer political aims in a frantic move to ensure their moral values would survive the remainder of Carter's term.

In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president. Following this election there is a sharp decrease in all three categories, indicating a newfound level of security. The hard power approach of legislation and political support was now in effect, rendering unnecessary the need for Evangelists to continue courting votes. Neither pure allure nor pure fear were needed to protect Evangelist interests, meaning that both Category Three and Category One dropped sharply. Category Two, while decreased, does not change as dramatically as its counterparts. This may be because Reagan still needed majority support to remain in office for a second term, meaning that Evangelists still had to employ some measure of incentive. The element of unity in the face of fear that Category Two entails shows that Evangelists still needed to implement some form of power to sustain public support for Reagan, but did not have need for exclusionary threats or wholly inclusionary attraction and kindness.

From 1985 to 1990 there is a sharp increase in Category One, while Categories Two and Three remain relatively steady. The increased application of soft power may be indicative of further attempts to ensure acceptance of the Reagan administration's policy. More likely, however, is the use of allure to ensure a Republican candidate won the presidency following

Reagan's last term. Evangelists had found a secure home within the Republican party, but to keep that security they needed Republicans to remain in power. As such, the approach of an election would necessitate their implementation of soft power to aid Republican candidate George H. W. Bush in his bid for office, a bid which would ultimately succeed. Bush Sr. winning the presidency gave Evangelists another four years of political security.

The period of time between 1990 and 1995 was one of political concern for Evangelists. The last two years of Bush's presidency may have maintained security, but the election of Democratic president Bill Clinton in 1992 put Evangelists in a perilous position. No longer were their interests being supported by the most powerful man in the country. Action was necessary. This explains the dramatic increase in Category Two and Category One, both of which involve appealing to the general public through attraction. However, the enormous spike in Category Two indicates usage of fear alongside promises of rewards. Category Three remains much unchanged, although the small increase is consistent with the proposed attitude of the time.

In the 1990s, Christian public figure Ralph Reed stepped into the spotlight, picking up where an aging Billy Graham was beginning to leave off. Reed was the executive director of the Christian Coalition, an organization founded in 1989 with the goal of giving all Christians a voice in government. In a 1993 interview with C-SPAN, Reed describes the Christian Coalition as "a grassroots, pro-family, citizen organization that works on behalf of family-friendly policy at the federal level, state level, and local level, all the way down to school board and city council level."¹²¹ This type of work needs community to succeed, something that cannot be achieved without friendly outreach to opposition. Furthermore, community was necessary to ensure a Republican candidate won the presidency following Clinton. Both of these needs support the

¹²¹ 'Life and Career of Ralph Reed | C-SPAN.Org'. Accessed 3 April 2024.
<https://www.c-span.org/video/?49974-1/life-career-ralph-reed>.

increase in Category Two, which uses fear and allure combined to attract outsiders. They also both support the increase in Category One, which would be used here to paint Evangelists in a positive light and garner support for their ends.

Bill Clinton was reelected in 1996, culminating a failure by Evangelists to secure the support necessary to further their political aims. From 1996 to 2000 there is a dramatic drop in both Category One and Category Two, while Category Three continues to rise. This may mark the beginning of an approach that is exclusively based in fear and political push, something which continues today as Evangelists strive to codify their values into law. Progressive values at this point have taken full effect, meaning that Evangelists could no longer afford to appeal to those outside of their coalition. Use of attraction and pull may have now been written off as ineffectual. In these modern times, when rights to abortion remained secure and the legalization of same-sex marriage was looming, it was now necessary to turn entirely to tactics of hard power. Furthermore, Evangelists were now absolutely secure in their alignment with the conservative Republican party. One could infer that had further data been available for collection, one might see a continued increase in Category Three while Categories One and Two would continue to decline in their usage.

Part Two has tried to explain how the work of Billy Graham can be used as a method to support Evangelist usage of soft and hard power to gain influence within the political sphere. It has explained the methodology and categorization of data within the case study conducted. Furthermore, it has analyzed the data collected from Graham alongside the contexts and analysis provided in Part One.

CONCLUSION

This paper asks the question: what drew American Evangelists into the Republican coalition? Below is a brief summary of its claims. Firstly, the paper's introduction defines "Evangelist" as the practice of preaching the gospel and attempting to convert a person to Christianity and explains that the term encompasses Evangelicals, Southern Baptists, United Methodists, and Lutheran Missouri Synods. It then provides an overview of the group's views and ideals, including opposition to same-sex marriage, pro-life views on abortion, and resistance to teachings of evolution and sexual education in public schools. It gives present-day contexts for why this question is relevant alongside the implications of such a union, citing current Republican figures' use of Evangelist rhetoric to support their campaigns.

Part One posits an answer to the paper's thesis and supplies supportive historical context surrounding the actions and experiences of Evangelists beginning in the 1920s. Chapter One provides an analysis for why Evangelists ultimately made their way into the political sphere. The first part of this analysis relates to understandings of hard and soft power based on the work of Joseph Nye. This conception answers the question of why Evangelists entered into politics overall, but does not explain their specific alignment with the Republican party. The second part posits that Evangelists had to align themselves with the more conservative of the two major political parties due to an inability to modernize. Taken together, these two explanations provide a conclusive answer to what drew Evangelists into the Republican party.

The first section of Chapter Two traces the history of the Evangelist movement in light of the framing of hard and soft power offered in Part One. Beginning with Robert Handy's concept of the "religious depression" which occurred alongside the Great Depression and stemmed in

large part from a post-World War I attitude, Chapter Two explores the methods employed by Evangelists to raise themselves from the depths of said depression. Radio and television gospel were prominent tactics, supported by Bible institutes and other forms of youth outreach. The second section of the chapter looked at the various progressive movements that posed an even larger threat to Evangelist influence. These topics include abortion, homosexuality, evolution versus creationism, sex education in public schools, and the feminist movement. The beginnings of these movements and Evangelists' reactions to them were both examined. This section also details the campaigns, policies, and presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, two men who happened to run for office at the most opportune time to capture the Evangelist vote. Carter's failures and Reagan's successes entrenched Evangelists firmly within the Republican party. Chapter Two's third section looks at two other less obvious factors on which Evangelists and Republicans align. Using the work of sociologist Philip Schwadel, this section compares Evangelist and Republican ideals relating to support for the state of Israel and governmental welfare programs. It also touches on the ways in which the Evangelist-Republican alliance has affected campaigns for public office following Reagan's election.

Part Two uses data from a case study to support the argument made in Part One. Chapter Three's first section explains the case study's methodology and provides biographical information on the study's subject, televangelist preacher Billy Graham. This chapter also gives a thorough explanation of each categorization of data and displays said data in graphical form. The chapter's second section relates the data back to Chapter One's analysis, further explaining Nye's concepts of power and the manner in which the organized data supports them as a final answer.

In sum, this paper concludes that Evangelists entered the political sphere out of necessity to preserve traditional moral values. In previous instances of loss of influence, Evangelists had

been able to modernize themselves sufficiently to be able to utilize a form of soft power to establish themselves as powerful figures in society. However, when progressive movements antithetical to Evangelist values began to gain traction, Evangelists were forced to adapt their strategy to preserve family values and God's will overall. They were unable to embrace modern ideologies without undermining their doctrines and beliefs, necessitating an entirely new application of power. This power was ultimately found in American politics. Evangelists mobilized to support religious candidate Jimmy Carter who had used his own Evangelist faith to attract their vote. This represents a tactic of hard power, using push rather than pull to ensure their ideology was being supported, if not by society at large, than by the President of the United States. Presidential support of a coalition whose values do not align with the majority has high stakes, opening up the potential for policy to be implemented which favors only that group. Once in office, however, Carter failed to uphold the promises he had made while campaigning. This betrayal, alongside the resistance to modernization that in time led them to align specifically with the more conservative of the two major political parties, drew their support to presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. Reagan's successes solidified the alliance between the two groups, leading to their continued support of one another that persists to this day.

Epilogue: Hard Power Manifestations in the Present

The conceptions of power introduced in this paper are extraordinarily relevant today. In a post-Trump world, the alignment between Evangelists and Republicans has only increased in strength. While there are countless examples of this involvement today, including the aforementioned use of personal faith as a tactic to garner votes while campaigning, for the sake of brevity this epilogue will be limited to two instances within the Supreme Court. Perhaps the most glaring example of the effects of the Republican-Evangelist alliance is the 2022 decision in *Dobbs v. Jackson*, a case which overturned the reproductive protections in *Roe v. Wade* and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* and returned the decision of whether or not to legalize abortion access back to state governments.¹²² By removing the power to protect legal abortions from the hands of the federal government, this decision gave Republican-led States the ability to significantly restrict or entirely revoke access to abortions within their borders. Evangelists have been fighting the *Roe* decision since 1973, and in fact it was a significant motivating factor behind their entrance into the political sphere. President Donald Trump's efforts to pack the Supreme Court with conservative justices whose views align with Evangelists on the subject of abortion demonstrates that Evangelist's use of electoral support as hard power is still working effectively.

Dobbs is not the only piece of evidence proving that Evangelists are being supported politically and thus effectively wielding hard power. The June 2023 Supreme Court decision in *303 Creative v. Elenis* overturned precedent set by the 2018 case *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission*. In essence, *Masterpiece* prevented businesses from

¹²² *Dobbs v. Jackson*, No. 19-1392 (Roberts Court 24 June 2022).

discriminating against queer Americans or denying them service.¹²³ *303 Creative*'s decision was based upon an argument citing the Compelled Speech Doctrine, a provision within the First Amendment that specifies that freedom of speech also requires that the government cannot compel speech from its citizens any more than it can restrict it.¹²⁴ This argument was sufficient enough to overturn *Masterpiece*, meaning that religious owners of any business that produces "art" can turn queer people away based upon a religious belief that homosexuality is a sin. It is not explicitly clear what the case considers to be art, leaving space for any business owner who can successfully argue that their wares are creative expressions and therefore forms of speech to take advantage of this ruling. Though *Masterpiece* was decided by a reasonably moderate court and perhaps does not hold the same weight as the decision in *Dobbs*, its overturn is significant largely due to the precedent it sets.

The implications of these cases are dire with regards to the future of equal rights for marginalized groups in America. While the focus of *303 Creative* was the right of religious owners to turn away members of the LGBTQ+ community, its reach has the potential to impact any American. As mentioned above, the precedent set by *303 Creative* opens the door to the potential overturn of other landmark cases regarding equal rights. The case's winning argument was not based on religious freedom but rather on freedom of speech. This means that if a business owner can make a case that serving a member of a marginalized group is compelling their speech, they now have the right to deny that individual service. Justices Kagan, Jackson, and Sotomayor all propose in *303*'s oral argument various hypotheticals in a world where compelled speech supports discrimination. One such proposed example describes a business that

¹²³ *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission*, No. 16-111 (Roberts Court 4 June 2018), *303 Creative LLC v. Elenis*, No. 21-476 (Roberts Court 30 June 2023).

¹²⁴ 'Overview of Compelled Speech | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress'. Accessed 25 April 2024. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-12-1/ALDE_00000769/.

takes corporate headshots denying women access to their business based on the personal belief of the business owner that women do not belong in the workplace. This is not an unfounded hypothetical, in fact it parallels the Evangelist belief that women should remain homemakers and men should provide for the family unit.

Furthermore, the overturn of *Roe* throws into question the decisions of several other landmark cases which rely upon the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court upheld in *Roe* that the Due Process Clause's assertion that states cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" implies a right to privacy.¹²⁵ Thus, *Roe* was based upon the right to private medical procedures including abortion. Since *Dobbs* overturned *Roe*, the interpretation of Due Process as encompassing a right to privacy has the potential to be undone. Other cases that rely on the right to privacy interpretation include *Obergefell v. Hodges*, which legalized same-sex marriage on a federal level, and *Lawrence v. Texas*, which overturned state laws criminalizing homosexual acts of sexual intimacy.¹²⁶ Should these cases be overturned and the decision of legislation surrounding queer rights be returned to the states, a similar fate may befall queer Americans as has befallen anyone with the capacity to someday need access to abortion. It is not unreasonable to assume that Republican-led States would then enact strict anti-gay legislation in the same manner as they have restricted reproductive rights.

Essentially, the Evangelist entrance into the Republican party as a method to apply hard power and preserve conservative values is thoroughly effective today. The group has a powerful ally in the Republican party, whose representatives are ensuring that moral conservatism takes

¹²⁵ 'Roe v. Wade and Supreme Court Abortion Cases | Brennan Center for Justice', 6 October 2022. <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/roe-v-wade-and-supreme-court-abortion-cases>.

¹²⁶ Oyez. 'Obergefell v. Hodges'. Accessed 25 April 2024. <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556>, Oyez. 'Lawrence v. Texas'. Accessed 25 April 2024. <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102>.

center stage. Despite vocal opposition from the American public, it seems as though the Republican party alongside a packed conservative Supreme Court is determined to undo decades of progressive policy and return America to the state it was in prior to the 1960s, before Evangelist morals and ideologies were challenged. As such, it is evident that Evangelist's attempts to harness legislative support as hard power were a definitive and continuing success. This success also reiterates the claim made at the beginning of this paper that understanding the alliance between Evangelists and Republicans is of paramount importance. If such an alliance continues, the rights of any marginalized group whose existence or expression the Evangelist faith opposes may be stripped from them. It is therefore imperative that the effects of born-again governance be at minimum understood, if not addressed, for the sake of liberty and justice for all.

WORKS CITED

‘5 Applause Lines From Tim Scott at the Iowa State Fair - The New York Times’. Accessed 14 November 2023.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/16/us/politics/tim-scott-stump-speech-iowa.html>.

159, and 139. ‘The Equal Rights Amendment Explained | Brennan Center for Justice’, 9 October 2019.

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/equal-rights-amendment-explained>.

303 Creative LLC. v Elenis, No. 21-476 (Roberts Court 30 June 2023).

Berg, Thomas C. “‘Proclaiming Together’? Convergence and Divergence in Mainline and Evangelical Evangelism, 1945-1967’. *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 5, no. 1 (1995): 49–76. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1123965>.

Billy Graham - Who Is Jesus? - Chicago 1971, 2016.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U89zkUZPd5w>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘A Nation at the Crossroads: A Billy Graham Classic Message’. Accessed 14 February 2024.

<https://billygraham.org/video/a-nation-at-the-crossroads/>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association - What We Believe’. Accessed 28 October 2023.

<https://billygraham.org/about/what-we-believe/>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘The End of the World (Part 1)’. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/audio/the-end-of-the-world-part-1-2/>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘The End of the World (Part 2)’. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/audio/the-end-of-the-world-part-2-2/>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘Things That Never Change Pt. 2’. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/audio/things-that-never-change-pt-2/>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘[VIDEO] Billy Graham: America, Is the Handwriting on the Wall?’ Accessed 14 February 2024.

<https://billygraham.org/video/america-is-the-handwriting-on-the-wall/>.

Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘(Video) Billy Graham: Are You Offended by the Cross?’ Accessed 25 March 2024.

<https://billygraham.org/video/are-you-offended-by-the-cross-2/>.

- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Conscience'. Accessed 25 March 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/conscience/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. 'VIDEO: Billy Graham Explains the Reason for Today's Tragedies'. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/billy-graham-explains-the-reason-for-todays-tragedies/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: God's Unchanging Love'. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/unchanging-love-2/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Hopeless, Yet There Is Hope'. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/hopeless-yet-there-is-hope/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Is the End of the World Close?' Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/is-the-end-of-the-world-close/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '(VIDEO) Billy Graham on Building Relationships'. Accessed 25 March 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/building-relationships-3/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Starting Life Over Again'. Accessed 25 March 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/starting-life-over-again/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: What's Your Excuse for Ignoring Christ?' Accessed 25 March 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/billy-graham-whats-your-excuse-for-ignoring-christ/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: Will You Miss Out on Eternity?' Accessed 25 March 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/billy-graham-the-danger-of-waiting-to-make-a-decision-for-or-christ/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Billy Graham: You Are Called to Minister'. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/jaws/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '(VIDEO) How to Get to Heaven'. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/how-to-get-to-heaven-3/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. '[VIDEO] Is There Life After Death?' Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/is-there-life-after-death/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. 'VIDEO: The Second Coming of Christ'. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/the-second-coming-of-christ-2/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. 'VIDEO: What Is the World Coming To?' Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/what-is-the-world-coming-to/>.

- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘(WATCH) Is There a Hell? Billy Graham Explains’. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/is-there-a-hell-2/>.
- Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. ‘[WATCH] Who Is Jesus to You Personally?’ Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://billygraham.org/video/jesus-hope-of-the-world/>.
- Billy Graham Memorial. ‘Remembering Billy Graham (1918 – 2018)’. Accessed 14 February 2024. <https://memorial.billygraham.org/>.
- Brant, Irving. ‘Madison: On the Separation of Church and State’. *The William and Mary Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (January 1951): 3. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1920731>.
- Campbell, David E. ‘The Perils of Politicized Religion’. *Daedalus* 149, no. 3 (2020): 87–104.
- Carpenter, Joel A. ‘Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942’. *Church History* 49, no. 1 (1980): 62–75. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3164640>.
- Carwana, Brian. ‘Evangelicals, Democracy and Values in America’. Edited by Steven Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie* 35, no. 2 (2010): 316–23.
- Center, Pew Research. ‘1. How U.S. Religious Composition Has Changed in Recent Decades’. *Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), 13 September 2022. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2022/09/13/how-u-s-religious-composition-has-changed-in-recent-decades/>.
- . ‘1. The Republican Coalition’. *Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy* (blog), 9 November 2021. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/11/09/the-republican-coalition/>.
- . ‘3. Views of the U.S. as a “Christian Nation” and Opinions about “Christian Nationalism”’. *Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), 27 October 2022. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2022/10/27/views-of-the-u-s-as-a-christian-nation-and-opinions-about-christian-nationalism/>.
- . ‘Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Same-Sex Marriage’. *Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), 7 December 2012. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/12/07/religious-groups-official-positions-on-same-sex-marriage/>.
- Dobbs v. Jackson, No. 19-1392 (Roberts Court 24 June 2022).

- Dowland, Seth. 'Family Values' and the Formation of a Christian Right Agenda'. *Church History* 78, no. 3 (September 2009): 606–31.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009640709990448>.
- 'Due Process Generally | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress'. Accessed 3 December 2023.
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14-S1-3/ALDE_00013743/.
- Engberg, Aron. 'Walking on the Pages of the Word of God'. In *Walking on the Pages of the Word of God*, 59:185–94. Self, Land, and Text Among Evangelical Volunteers in Jerusalem. Brill, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvrk3g6.10>.
- 'EVANGELIZE Definition & Usage Examples | Dictionary.Com'. Accessed 3 December 2023. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/evangelize>.
- Fahmy, Dalia. '7 Facts about Southern Baptists'. *Pew Research Center* (blog). Accessed 3 December 2023.
<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/06/07/7-facts-about-southern-baptists/>.
- Fetner, Tina. 'The Conflict Emerges in the 1970s'. In *How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism*, NED-New edition., 31:23–43. University of Minnesota Press, 2008. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttvb8d.6>.
- Flint, Andrew R., and Joy Porter. 'Jimmy Carter: The Re-Emergence of Faith-Based Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue'. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2005): 28–51. *Full Video: Watch the Third GOP Presidential Primary Debate in Miami*, 2023.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dmXJ99oC4k>.
- Gershon, Livia. 'Whatever Happened to Evangelical Feminism?' JSTOR Daily, 16 February 2022. <https://daily.jstor.org/whatever-happened-to-evangelical-feminism/>.
- GOP. 'About Our Party'. Accessed 3 December 2023. <https://gop.com/about-our-party/>.
- Greenhouse. 'Separation of Church and State in the United States: Lost in Translation?' *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 13, no. 2 (2006): 493.
<https://doi.org/10.2979/gls.2006.13.2.493>.
- GRIES, PETER HAYS. 'How Ideology Divides American Liberals and Conservatives over Israel'. *Political Science Quarterly* 130, no. 1 (2015): 51–78.
- Hahn, Dan F. 'The Rhetoric of Jimmy Carter, 1976-1980'. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1984): 265–88.
- Handy, Robert T. 'The American Religious Depression, 1925-1935'. *Church History* 29, no. 1 (1960): 3–16. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3161613>.
- HISTORY. '1969 Stonewall Riots - Origins, Timeline & Leaders', 23 June 2023.
<https://www.history.com/topics/gay-rights/the-stonewall-riots>.

- Human Rights Campaign. 'Stances of Faiths on LGBTQ Issues: Episcopal Church'. Accessed 3 December 2023.
<https://www.hrc.org/resources/stances-of-faiths-on-lgbt-issues-episcopal-church>.
- Johnson, David K. *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government*. Paperb. ed. Chicago, Ill.: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006.
- KIDD, THOMAS S. 'Evangelicalism from Reagan to Obama'. In *Who Is an Evangelical?*, 121–43. The History of a Movement in Crisis. Yale University Press, 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvnwbxrh.9>.
- King, Maya, and Shane Goldmacher. 'For Tim Scott, the Debate Was the Moment That Wasn't'. *The New York Times*, 25 August 2023, sec. U.S.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/25/us/politics/tim-scott-debate-performance.html>.
- Kurtzleben, Danielle. 'Are You An Evangelical? Are You Sure?' *NPR*, 19 December 2015, sec. Politics.
<https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/458058251/are-you-an-evangelical-are-you-sure>.
- Lambert, Frank. 'Review Essay: Religion and the American Presidency'. *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 20, no. 2 (2010): 259–69.
<https://doi.org/10.1525/rac.2010.20.2.259>.
- Leppert, Rebecca, and Dalia Fahmy. '10 Facts about Religion and Government in the United States'. *Pew Research Center* (blog). Accessed 3 December 2023.
<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/07/05/10-facts-about-religion-and-government-in-the-united-states/>.
- 'Life and Career of Ralph Reed | C-SPAN.Org'. Accessed 3 April 2024.
<https://www.c-span.org/video/?49974-1/life-career-ralph-reed>.
- LII / Legal Information Institute. 'Establishment Clause'. Accessed 5 November 2023.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause.
- Marsh, Wayne Z.C. 'Putting US First: How Outgroup Hostilities and Defense of the Status Quo Motivate White Evangelical Affect Toward Candidates in U.S. Elections 2004 to 2016'. *American Politics Research* 49, no. 5 (September 2021): 534–47.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211021852>.
- Masci, David, and Michael Lipka. 'Where Christian Churches, Other Religions Stand on Gay Marriage'. *Pew Research Center* (blog). Accessed 3 December 2023.
<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/12/21/where-christian-churches-stand-on-gay-marriage/>.
- Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111 (Roberts Court 4 June 2018).

- McKeegan, M. 'The Politics of Abortion: A Historical Perspective'. *Women's Health Issues: Official Publication of the Jacobs Institute of Women's Health* 3, no. 3 (1993): 127–31. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s1049-3867\(05\)80245-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/s1049-3867(05)80245-2).
- Naidu, M.V. 'ABORTION, THEOCRACY AND SECULARITY: CONFLICT BETWEEN IRRATIONAL RELIGIONISM AND RATIONAL DEMOCRATISM'. *Peace Research* 26, no. 4 (1994): 1–12.
- National Archives. 'Articles of Confederation (1777)', 9 April 2021. <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/articles-of-confederation>.
- 'National Archives NextGen Catalog'. Accessed 28 February 2024. <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7455549?objectPage=3>.
- NW, 1615 L. St, Suite 800 Washington, and DC 20036 USA 202-419-4300 | Main 202-857-8562 | Fax 202-419-4372 | Media Inquiries. 'Religious Landscape Study'. *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project* (blog). Accessed 27 February 2024. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/>.
- Nye, Joseph S. *The Future of Power*. 1. ed. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.
- 'Overview of Compelled Speech | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress'. Accessed 25 April 2024. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-12-1/ALDE_00000769/.
- Oyez. 'Lawrence v. Texas'. Accessed 25 April 2024. <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102>.
- Oyez. 'Obergefell v. Hodges'. Accessed 25 April 2024. <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556>.
- Oyez. 'Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey'. Accessed 27 February 2024. <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-744>.
- Pasulka, Nicole. 'Ladies In The Streets: Before Stonewall, Transgender Uprising Changed Lives'. *NPR*, 5 May 2015, sec. Code Switch. <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/05/05/404459634/ladies-in-the-streets-before-stonewall-transgender-uprising-changed-lives>.
- Rebellion and Youth* | Billy Graham Classic Sermon, 2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kt8GCbKTiUU>.
- 'Republican Party | Definition, History, & Beliefs | Britannica', 30 March 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Republican-Party>.
- Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18 (Burger Court 22 January 1973).
- 'Roe v. Wade and Supreme Court Abortion Cases | Brennan Center for Justice', 6 October 2022.

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/roe-v-wade-and-supreme-court-abortion-cases>.

SCHÄFER, AXEL R. 'EVANGELICALS, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE WELFARE STATE'. In *Piety and Public Funding*, 123–62. Evangelicals and the State in Modern America. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhzqs.7>.

Schwadel, Philip. 'The Republicanization of Evangelical Protestants in the United States: An Examination of the Sources of Political Realignment.' *Social Science Research* 62 (February 2017): 238–54.

Scott, Eugenie C. 'Anti Evolution and Creationism in the United States'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26 (1997): 263–89.

The Episcopal Church. 'LGBTQ+'. Accessed 9 April 2024.

<https://www.episcopalchurch.org/organizations-affiliations/lgbtq/>.

'U.S. Constitution - First Amendment | Resources | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress'. Accessed 5 November 2023.

<https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/>.

U.S. Department of State. 'BIOGRAPHY: Joseph S. Nye'. Accessed 27 March 2024.

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/p/fapb/185594.htm>.

'What Is U.S. Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? | Council on Foreign Relations'. Accessed 21 September 2023.

<https://www.cfr.org/background/what-us-policy-israeli-palestinian-conflict#chapter-title-0-3>.

Woodrum, Eric. 'Moral Conservatism and the 1984 Presidential Election'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27, no. 2 (1988): 192–210. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1386715>.

N.d.