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No Crime by Design? Crime Deterrence and Urban Design Reform in the USA after World War II

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No Crime by Design?
Crime Deterrence and Urban Design Reform in the USA after World War II

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
Cason Leafe Hall

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To my parents, your love and support have been the greatest constant anyone could ask for. Thank you for always pushing me to be the best person I can be, and for being by my side every step of the way. Put simply, you are my idols.

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**Introduction:**

In *Defining Urban Design: CIAM Architects and the Formation of a Discipline, 1937-69*, Eric Mumford boldly states that the “modernist pursuit of social ends by formal means” was “a complete failure,” a declaration that he justifies with the example of the demolition of the Pruitt Igoe housing complex in St. Louis, MO. Following its large-scale and widely publicized decline, theories surrounding design of public low-income housing began to change. Boasting eleven story buildings with open first floors for communal activities, double-loaded corridors, and amenities such as laundry on every third floor, the complex represented the modernist ideals largely outlined by Le Corbusier and the Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM). (Fig. 1) Viewed as a marvel of architecture and public housing at the time of its completion, the complex quickly fell into complete disrepair with high levels of crime and delinquency. Theorists and historians such as the architect Oscar Newman, historian Peter Hall, and postmodernist critic Charles Jencks show Pruitt-Igoe as a symbol of the failure of public housing in the postwar context. Across the street from Pruitt-Igoe was a community called Carr Square Village, an older and smaller collection of row houses that remained completely intact throughout the construction, occupancy, and decline of Pruitt-Igoe. These theorists claimed that given that social and income variables were consistent between the two, other factors such as the use of space and building typology, must have played the central role in the decline of one of the two. (Fig. 2-3)

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1 Eric Mumford, *Defining Urban Design: CIAM Architects and the Formation of a Discipline, 1937-69* (New Haven,
The Pruitt-Igoe case exemplifies a larger debate over the potential of architecture and urban design to resolve and respond to crime. The phenomenon seen in St. Louis is not exclusive to its specific context. In many large cities across the US, the post-World War II era brought the construction of high-rise buildings similar to Pruitt-Igoe, such as the Techwood Houses in Atlanta, Cabrini-Green Houses in Chicago, and the simultaneous destruction of four high-density projects in Baltimore. With the movement of many urban dwellers to the suburbs in the postwar era, these high-rise buildings became obsolete, leading to a surplus of residential building types that were no longer in the best interests of a new order of urban dwellers. What’s more, large cities intended many of these buildings for use by the newly formed Housing Authorities. Established with the intention to house largely low-income and disadvantaged urban populations, Housing Authorities were a part of the nationwide effort to help working-class urban citizens sustain proper housing.²

As history unfolded, it became evident that the populations that were supposed to be helped by the construction of these types of buildings were not. Public housing often disintegrated into toxic spaces of racial and social segregation. This segregation was often discussed in terms of crime, reinforcing urban racism and classism.³ Although structural problems, such as economic disparity, racial segregation, and classism had attributed to their decline and the rise of crime, authorities chose to overlook them and instead focus on the potential influence of urban design. Urban theorists and architects, in hopes of a larger involvement, proposed theories that tried to address crime through design. What came to be known as the hallmark of the neoliberal state, the Broken

Windows Theory, was only the successful epiphenomenon of a larger and longer process that seemingly removed responsibility away from society and into design.

My thesis will investigate how architects, sociologists, and urban theorists address the issue of crime with design and what kind of role they attribute to architecture and the built environment. Starting with the earliest approaches of initial conception and policy-making following the Great Depression in the 1940s, development of the Defensible Space theory in the 1970s, and finally the Broken Windows theory in the 1990s, I will be looking at the most influential theories and theorists from each distinct time in order to form a full view of the field and conceptual development within it. Though at times the scope of this project may seem expansive, spanning three schools of thought situated in three decades, pointing to three distinct episodes in the articulation of urban design and crime prevention. Engaging with architecture, sociology, theory, policy-making, and economics, the discipline of urban planning necessitates the incorporation of a wide array of backgrounds in order to properly understand and contour lived urban space.

The concept of public housing predates the discussions and debates on the appropriate form of the city proposed by Le Corbusier and his associates. In fact, public housing as a concept emerged in Europe as a response to the dramatic increase in urban dwellers following the industrial revolution, particularly in England. At this time many city officials reported squalor, sickness, and high levels of mortality that arose in the slums of the inner cities. Posing an issue to general well being of the working class, philanthropists began to offer tenement housing and factory owners got involved by building entire villages to ensure housing for their workers⁴. In England, this resulted in

⁴ Ibid., 331.
the Housing of the Working Class Act of 1885 that encouraged municipalities to get involved with the improvement of housing in their districts, so that it was no longer the burden of generous philanthropists and private business owners to house city-dwellers. Hence, housing became an issue of administrative and public attention, resulting in the first series of federally funded public housing developments in England, setting the general framework for other subsequent low-income housing developments.

In the United States, the first official public housing project was erected in 1936 in New York City. First Houses, as was the project called, consisted of low-rise rows of houses primarily for the white working class. As the initial demographic gradually moved to the suburbs, and concentrations of low-income residents conglomerated in inner-cities, the need for adequate low-income housing emerged. From this need stemmed the transition of demographics within public housing. Limited to low-income dwellers public housing determines who is allowed residence through review of annual gross income, whether the applicants are elderly or disabled, and immigration and citizenship status. These criteria for acceptance remain intact today, taking into account factors not exclusive to income such as review of age, disability, and citizenship, the residents of public housing are mostly identified as working class and “low-income.” I will be referring to this system of publicly funded residences as both “public housing” and “projects” interchangeably for the remainder of this thesis.

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The importance of the situation of public housing in the inner city is illustrated in a detailed historical study outlined by Thomas Reppetto in “Residential Crime.” Repetto focuses his research on burglary and claims that it “encompasses all the elements that the public tends to associate with crime.” Examining social factors such as income and race, as well as physical vulnerability factors such as visibility and occupancy, Reppetto concluded that burglary rates are “generally inversely proportional to distance from the metropolitan core.” In doing so, Repetto concretely turns to the environmental factors of residential areas that contribute to crime, legitimizing the need for further examination of design and crime. Continually, Repetto concludes that the inner city high crime areas have a more complex statistical relationship with the interplay of environmental factors. The vulnerability measurements proved to be the most influential factor in differentiating crime rates within inner city areas. In Repetto’s analysis of inner city and outer city areas as they relate to crime rates, the influence of physically built-in criminal vulnerability appears to be more determinant of crime rates than social factors. Because of this, I will focus my study on low-income inner cities, with only brief mention to middle-income communities and suburbs.

Most of the urban theories addressing the question of crime are typically associated with New York City, Chicago, and, more recently, Detroit. Specifically, my study will begin with a brief mention of Elizabeth Wood in Chicago, and continue with an extensive study of New York City as it influenced Oscar Newman’s Defensible Space.

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8 Ibid., 16
9 Ibid., 34.
theory and the implementation of the Broken Windows theory, paying special attention to public housing throughout.

Since its conception in 1939, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) has employed almost every conceivable housing type and general development site plan. At the time the Defensible Space theory was formalized in 1973 there were 196 public housing projects within the city. Since then, there have been almost two hundred more developed, a number unparalleled by any other single municipality in the United States. High-density projects can be found in outer boroughs of predominantly single-family dwellings, while low-density projects are located in the dense inner areas of Manhattan. Because of this, New York City has historically offered to urban theorists a useful context in which to view the spread of project development over the greater New York City area, atypical of the pyramidal pattern often employed in American Cities. The NYCHA keeps extensive records of the residents, their ages, incomes, years of residence, background, and history of family pathology. In addition, the NYCHA has their own force of approximately 1,600 police officers that are required to file detailed reports of all criminal activity and resident complaints. The vastly varied building style, unique pattern of development, and good record keeping make New York City a site of unique comparative analysis and the site of much of the literature surrounding public housing.

Crime has been traditionally attributed exclusively to the person committing the offence, with no attention paid to the situations leading up to the crime being committed. By traditionally viewing crime as attributable to the person not the situation, this

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11 Ibid., 18.
approach assumes that people who habitually commit crimes differ from the rest of society in some way that makes them predisposed to becoming a criminal. Under this assumption, if the causes of predisposition can be identified, including hereditary or genetic factors, or factors related to upbringing and education, then police should be able to effectively eliminate crime.

This emergence and failure of crime prevention methods in the mid 20th century speaks to the urgency of the subject matter. Along with the question of urban form and the environmental conditioning of crime, theorists at the same time researched the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of police forces nationwide. Newman boldly stated that “one fact is clear: law enforcement agencies cannot [eliminate crime] alone,” suggesting that design instead could take the place of police. In “The police, research, and crime control” Kevin Heal asserts that while it is likely true that police help deter crime on a small-scale, an increase in police is unlikely to deter crime regionally. The problematic nature of police enforced crime prevention resulted in developments of other forms of temporary citizen-based forms of surveillance typically referred to as “block-watch.”

“Block-watches” often consist of a group of neighbors organizing to take turns watching sections of the neighborhood, improving hardware such as locks, and property identification. And in some extreme cases involved mowing unoccupied houses’ lawns and tagging valuables with stickers or decals and notifying the public that they have been marked. These formal community-based protocols often prove effective but short-lived, becoming the focus of Elizabeth Wood’s critiques of traditional forms of street safety in

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historically mixed socio-economic areas and their potentials in quickly changing urban forms. Continually, failures of processes such as “block-watch” spurred greater interest and at times necessity of the theories outlined by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space* when it was published in 1972. Finally resulting in the implementation of the most prominent ideology surrounding urban form and crime, the Broken Windows theory, which insisted that deterioration of physical environment would lead to criminal acts.

Chapter One will situate the reader in the 1940s at the beginning of the discourse surrounding design and crime, introducing readers to the influence of Elizabeth Wood on the construction of a series of public housing projects in Chicago. With a past as a social worker, Wood had been exposed to the disadvantages of surrounding public housing, and was an advocate for their change. She argued that urban design influenced resident behavior, and ultimately crime rates, to the forefront. Her work influenced and informed the ideas and policies that shaped design of public housing at the time.

Starting in the Family Service Bureau of Chicago, Elizabeth Wood took a decidedly personal approach to her subsequent job as the founding director of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Acting as director from 1937-1954, closely following the Great Depression, Wood found herself at a pivotal moment in the housing of Chicago’s new lower-class. Though she advocated for mixing of race, class, and family size in small, dispersed developments throughout the city. The reality of the CHA’s construction at this time was the creation of high-rise buildings that encouraged segregation and fostered riots. She brought a new order of housing development to Chicago and urged planners to include commercial spaces and limit unused public gathering areas, allowing just enough room to encourage loitering and minimize potential
Facing opposition from government and community members, Wood was able to in part execute her vision of public housing as an integrated and socially responsible form of housing in Chicago, but not without alienating the municipal government, instigating racial unrest, and installing more damaging high-rise buildings. Later in her career, Wood addressed her shortcomings as executive director of the CHA in her writings for The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in which she proposed that public housing should reflect the shorter story buildings that surround them in order to maintain the traditional street and dwelling relationship, and that if this relationship became a reality there would be an overall reduction in crime in public housing.

Chapter two will outline Oscar Newman’s response to these theories by looking at the formation of the Defensible Space theory. With nearly two decades in between him and Wood, Newman used the intervening years to formulate an architectural approach to the principles implemented in Chicago, which he titled *Defensible Space*. A registered architect and city planner, Newman was known internationally for his work in community planning, assisted housing, crime prevention, and racial integration. Known most notably for his work in the area of Defensible Space, authoring an influential book of the same name, Newman was most prolific in his conceptions of crime prevention through design. Though his research methods often leave something to be desired, his book acted as evidence that the modern form of building has an influence on the increase of crime.

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17 *CSC Oral History Research Program: Elizabeth Wood, Chicago Housing Authority Executive* (Chicago, IL: Chicago State University Archives and Special Collections, 1954).

Defensible Space is an approach to solving the problem of designing multi-unit public housing projects that discourage rather than foster criminal behavior. HUD has subsequently adopted Defensible Space principles for all new projects as well as in its decisions on which projects to tear down. Newman proposes that architectural changes to public housing would encourage residents to gain control over their immediate space. He believes that an increase in territorialism and natural surveillance would cause greater accountability for personal space.

The theory is a reflection of growing interest in the field of architecture as an agent and shaper of public behavior. Newman’s emphasis on the use of subtle changes to space seemed more attractive to planners than the inhumane policing strategies and panoptic surveillance being installed in public housing across the nation at the time. The emergence of a discourse surrounding the relationship between urban design and resident behavior grew in the following years, leading to the implementation of the Broken Windows theory during Rudy Giuliani’s administration.

Chapter three will chart the emergence of the Broken Windows theory and its application in New York City. Initially proposed by criminologists James Wilson and George Kelling in their Atlantic Monthly piece by the same name, the theory is a socially based extension of many of the same ideas proposed by Oscar Newman, namely that the cues of your environment will effect how you act within it. The theory articulates that setting standards of disorder in an urban environment will encourage further break down of respectable social norms, in to a high crime low accountability community. To combat this, the article calls for the increase of policing on minor offences, specifically in New York City. This resulted in the vast increase in NYPD police numbers and rates of
incarceration. The theory gets its name from the most basic of its encompassed theories, that if there is a broken window in an urban space a standard of disorder is set and will escalate. This basic concept, though focused on the physicality of a neighborhood, can also be adapted to thinking about the person in the urban space. As a person acts with a level of disorder, a similar standard is set and causes other people to act in similarly disorderly ways. This theory marks the distinct shift in the narrative from an architectural viewpoint, to one that is decidedly social, where the story began.

Overall with this project I seek to analyze the discourse surrounding design against crime and demonstrate how these debates influenced and informed policy-making and urban design.
Chapter 1:

Public Housing Emerges: The Role of Elizabeth Wood and the Chicago Housing Authority

I. Introduction

High unemployment, low home-ownership, and a need for quick and total reorganization of economy and federal practices was the overwhelming state of America in the years following the Great Depression. But what was in shortest supply was safe and secure housing for all strata of US citizens. In attempts to rectify this, the government subsidized the establishment of the housing division of the Public Works Administration (PWA). Consolidated two years later to be the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the organization began construction on a string of public housing developments across the nation, providing homes and jobs for many unemployed workers. Innovative in its simplicity, the often high-density and low-cost houses became host to a variety of social and administrative issues. Because of this, the need for a federal agency to manage such practices became evident. Formalized with the Housing Act of 1937, local municipalities around the nation were given federal funds to establish Housing Authorities and assemble administrative bodies in order to handle the problems arising in this new landscape of public housing.\(^{19}\)

With one of the first official Housing Authorities established in 1938, Chicago was on the forefront of federally funded housing, not out of choice, but out of necessity.

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The alarming amount of rural residents moving into the city from the surrounding Midwest to work in the many new factories left Chicago with a housing shortage unlike anywhere else in the country. This placed the city in a complicated position of forced growth with inadequate government resources.\textsuperscript{20} When combined with the implementation of low-cost shortsighted housing from the CHA, the problematic social climate proved to be too much for the already fragile state of the Chicago government, and stability became necessary. Attempting to curb the problem from getting worse, the CHA needed to quickly appoint an executive director in order to solidify the agency’s control. Elizabeth Wood, who at the time was acting as a social worker for the State Housing Board and Housing Council simultaneously, came to the rescue.

Wood was the first public housing administrator that attempted to articulate the influence of physical form on social behavior. With a background in social work, Wood was able to address the issues plaguing Chicago at this time with an eye toward the resident. However, with no architectural background, Wood was ill-equipped to effectively rectify the many ills of the CHA housing typologies, during her time as executive director.

In the context of the CHA, crime is important because it is absent. Because of the overall newness of the public housing typology, crime was not yet viewed as an alarming downfall of its implementation. Without ever explicitly addressing the issue of crime, Wood, and the rest of the CHA, unwittingly paved the way for a string of predecessors who elaborated on the initial findings of the CHA. Refocusing them on the issue of crime in public housing, which grew in concern over the later half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 20.
This chapter will examine the urgent nature of the housing shortage in Chicago, and the failures of the CHA in addressing the needs of the city’s residents. By not addressing the direct needs of the residents, these failed buildings led to social unrest. Elizabeth Wood and the CHA never address “crime” outright, because it is not yet perceived a problem by the government. It emerged as a discourse following riots on the part of white, as well as black residents, in public housing following attempted integration. What is at stake here is the efficiency of the building typologies in the years following the riots of the 1940s, as there was no eye towards the future. Seemingly paving the way for subsequent theorists, including Elizabeth Wood herself in the three later publications I will examine, how this problem was addressed.

Wood remains an unsung heroine of public housing implementation in the United States. Because she was the first executive director of one of the first public housing authorities in the country, she had a certain agency in developing the form of the housing authority that came to inform later attempts and theories. Wood viewed her position as executive director of the CHA, and the role of public housing in general, as decidedly social ventures. However, Wood did not have the practical abilities to make her social ideals become a reality within the framework of the building typologies she implemented. Reflected in the written work she produced after leaving the CHA, Wood acknowledged the overwhelming influence of ill-suited building typologies in the ultimate riots and social unrest that ensued following her time in the CHA. When examining Wood’s entire time as a public housing executive and advocate a clear trend emerges; she started her career as a proponent of high-density buildings providing housing for all sects of
residents, and ended her career skeptical of the ability for such buildings to facilitate productive and safe living environments.

I will be examining her career trajectory as an insight into her decision-making process in attempts to discern her as an early actor in the development of public housing and the later problematic understanding of the relationship between crime and the urban fabric. Using her oral history as the blueprint for her early life I will evaluate her initial interest in the academic study of American literature and switch to the world of housing administration as a lens to view her position as an administrator. After leaving the CHA, Wood was critical of her role as executive director, and dedicated many of her later writings to the attempted rectification of her downfalls. I will look at a pamphlet commissioned by Pratt Institute entitled Social Planning, and two essays written for the Citizens housing and Planning Council of New York City entitled A New Look at… The Balanced Neighborhood and Housing Design: A Social Theory in order to study Wood’s own view and criticisms of her time in the CHA.

II. Chicago’s Unique Place in the Story

The end of the 1920s brought an almost complete standstill in housing construction due to the Depression. The mass migration to Chicago during and after World War I had left the city with a severe shortage of housing, especially for low-income residents. The Housing Act of 1937 was a welcome change in the housing functions of the time and helped aid the housing shortage which was inflamed in Chicago by two main factors, poverty and already depressed slums. About one third of families
were earning below $1,000 a year, which made it so they could not secure decent housing for themselves from the private sector. Additionally, dilapidated wooden shack houses occupied much of Chicago’s inner city, which had fallen into extreme disrepair in many cases, with the working class being priced out of the few such houses that were improved through renovations.  

Public housing was formally launched in Chicago in 1933, though not in the same form as it is today. The WPA built three of their fifty-one nationwide projects in Chicago, the Jane Addams House, Julia C. Lathrop Homes, and Trumbell Park Homes. These WPA houses were part of the first wave of governmentally subsidized homes in the United States, representing the realization that private enterprises could no longer solely assist in housing the poor.

With a long lineage of comprehensive restructuring of residential order, Chicago proved to be a dynamic locality in which public housing emerged as a prominent social, economic, and, above all, administrative operation. The CHA was not the first organization to offer public housing in Chicago. In fact, Chicago has a long history of innovative social housing practices, beginning with the Hull House. As a response to a series of settlement houses in London that were branded “communit[ies] for university men,” in 1889 Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr established a “community for university women” called Hull House located in the near West Side of Chicago and opening its doors to newly arrived European immigrants.

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At its core, Hull House provided social and educational opportunities for working class women, offering nurseries, libraries, post offices and other amenities to its residents. Its functions fostered a community of both innovative housing policy, and female involvement in traditionally male dominated industry. At its largest point Hull House occupied a 13-building complex that spanned nearly one city block and became a model for the nearly 500 settlement houses that would open their doors following Hull House. Not taking the form of the government funded public housing we know today, Hull house got its money primarily from wealthy philanthropists who were interested in the building’s mission and wanted to see its success. Still considered a public housing settlement because of its general aim and affordability for its residents, Hull House constituted the first public housing in the United States. As an integrated community that offered a variety of amenities resulting in a satisfied, and safe, residential population, Hull House represented a desired state of public housing that proved to be too ideal to recreate with the CHA.

A main advocate for the development of public housing in Chicago, Edith Abbott, who lived at the hull house for eighteen years, authored the book *The Tenements of Chicago: 1908-1935*. In her book, she, along with a team of researchers from the School of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago, selected twenty-four tenements from different areas of the city in which they did field studies by doing house-to-house surveys. From the completed surveys information on racial composition, lot and dwelling congestion, rentals, sanitation, light, ventilation, and home ownership, she concluded that the primary issue plaguing the city is sanitation and the years of

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23 Ibid., 15.
negligence that is insoluble by any standard method. She looked hopefully towards the influence that the federal government could have in the rectification of these issues, but asserted that the amount of social and economic disarray existing in Chicago’s poverty-stricken areas would take too long to fix. Meanwhile, the development of public housing opened up a gap in which such changes could be fostered from the ground up, though many were never brought to fruition.

III. Public Housing and the New Deal

Following the Great Depression of the early 1930s, America found itself in a unique position in which the political and social climates were both fertile for change, open to any potential improvement. A direct product of the New Deal, Housing Authorities sprang from the need to effectively house the masses of people moving in to the city in search of jobs and resources. To complicate matters, in the years directly leading up to the Great Depression, cost of building dramatically increased fifty percent between 1900 and 1914, making it difficult for builders to continue producing housing at the rate they had in previous years. To efficiently respond to rising land values, private residential building companies focused exclusively on multi-unit housing in unused periphery land, pushing out low-income rural occupants and welcoming middle-income suburbanites.²⁵ Setting a grim scene for the status of housing in the post-civil war era, by allowing for the efflux affordable housing from the city to the suburbs due to lack of funding, the Great Depression made the housing problem worse. With many people out

²⁵ Ibid., 11.
of work and out of their homes, the government set out to address such issues with the New Deal and the introduction of federally subsidized housing.26

Heralded as a revolution of US federal policy, the New Deal was a series of economic and social policies that were administered by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and hoped to bring the nation out of the deep economic and social depression it was in. A product of the period’s key figure, FDR, the policies created a hopeful atmosphere and united vision for the American people.27 Elected in the midst of the Great Depression in 1932, FDR attempted to institute public works as a means for generating jobs and reviving industrial output, guarding against future depressions and helping to secure better lives for the unemployed bottom third of American society. Creating policies that aimed at reviving the American economy, the New Deal obtained relevant retirement pension by instating social security, supplied jobs with the Works Progress Administration (WPA), and instituted the Housing Act of 1937 which led to the installation of public housing in select municipalities nationwide.28

The Housing Act of 1937 formed the United States Housing Authority (USHA), which still remains the main institutional framework for public housing nationwide. The act also did away with previous efforts to reform private sector programs like the Homeowners Loan Corporation and Federal Housing Administration, refocusing energy to the public sector. Finally recognizing the hardships of many of the United States’ inner city minorities, the Housing Act proposed that federal money be lent to states and communities for low-cost construction of public housing to be managed by city-based

26 Ibid., 45.
27 Ibid., 10.
Housing Authorities. Influenced by two key politicians of the day, Henry Steagall, Democrat of Alabama, and Robert Wagner, Democrat of New York, the bill is occasionally referred to as the Wagner-Steagall Act. The act was most influential in its focus on dedicating federal funds to subsidize housing, an entirely new function of the federal government. Without an eye toward crime, the act set in motion practices such as slum clearance, urban renewal, and public housing implementation, but they were not the focus of the act. These factors were all elaborated on in later iterations of the Housing Act, leaving the Housing Act of 1937’s with the main legacy of federally subsidized housing.

Proponents of the Housing Act of 1937 envisioned good housing, socio-economically coherent neighborhoods with social services, and recreation within close proximity to their homes. Representing a shift in official housing provision, the government transitioned from being a peripheral player, to a central figure in the supply of housing. This led to a long term policy for federal housing that resulted in a two tiered approach, the first being of institutional arrangements between business and federal subsidies creating market produced housing, and the second tier being “stingy, physically alienating, and means-tested” housing implemented by the Housing Act of 1937.

Fulfilling an important need within the framework of national antipoverty initiatives, the Housing act of 1937 was amended multiple times, most notably in 1949 when President Truman expanded federal funding for slum clearance and public housing construction, all the while being criticized for oversight, regulation, and subsidization of

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29 Ibid., 45.
31 Ibid., 198.
local housing authorities by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Despite such criticisms the Housing Act of 1937 was implemented in many American cities, most notably, Chicago.

IV. Elizabeth Wood: Early Life and the Chicago Housing Authority

Taking her post as the first Executive Director of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), Elizabeth Wood played a central role in the development of public housing. She oversaw a series of high-rise and high-density public housing projects throughout the city that mixed economic classes and races in often cramped and unregulated quarters. Though necessary in response to the extreme housing shortage due to the Great Depression, these buildings quickly revealed themselves to be breeding grounds for racial tension and social unrest, leading to her ultimate resignation from Chicago politics after nearly a decade and a string of failed housing projects.

Born in Japan to parents who were missionaries for the Episcopal Church, Wood’s younger years were formed by constant travel and the rigidity of devout religion. After leaving their posts as missionaries, Wood’s parents moved to Bloomington, Illinois where Wood spent her adolescent years. Not far from Chicago, Bloomington represented a traditional pre-Depression boomtown, with high agricultural output and growth of industry in the early part of the 20th century. Attending college in the heart of downtown Bloomington at Illinois Wesleyan University, Wood studied Biology. Although Wood’s father encouraged her to stay in Bloomington and study the living sciences, she managed

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to raise enough money to send herself to the University of Michigan for her final year. Interestingly enough her degree was not in planning or architecture, but rhetoric. Wood described the program as “an opportunity to write, (which [she] wanted above all else to do) and reading courses in esthetics. [She] had some English literature too.”33 This brought her to Vassar College as a creative writing instructor.

With seemingly no indication of a future in housing at this time, Wood’s early life was occupied by literature and writing, a far cry from her fate as an influential administrator and policy maker for the Chicago municipal government. Despite dedicating nearly the entirety of her education and early years to writing, she quickly realized that a future in writing was not for her and did not return to her roots of writing until the latter half of her career.34 Her disinterest in the field of writing became apparent after only four years as a teacher. Wood left Vassar to pursue a nonacademic career, priming her for her future in government. She worked at first selling books and writing journal stories for furniture stores. Soon moving to Chicago where she began working for the Home Modernizing Bureau.35 Her first official job in housing, this began Wood’s professional departure from writing to which she never returned.

The Home Modernizing Bureau (HMB) was founded as a response to the lack of construction of new houses due to insufficient funding in the wake of the Great Depression. Its goal was to help existing homeowners bring their homes up to livable standards through repairs and implementation of up-to-date technology. At the HMB, Wood was a caseworker who acted as a mediator between the homeowners and

33 CSC Oral History Research Program: Elizabeth Wood, Chicago Housing Authority Executive (Chicago, IL: Chicago State University Archives and Special Collections, 1954), 1.
34 Ibid., 2.
35 Ibid., 3.
contractors doing repairs. Wood used her background in writing as an asset at the HMB, and she was commissioned to produce a series of articles on home modernization, though they were never distributed. Without access to these documents it is difficult to say what Wood viewed as “home modernization,” a decidedly unclear term, leaving much of her first years in housing as vague as they are intriguing.

From the HMB, she moved to the United Charities, a predecessor to Family Service Bureau. The United Charities sought to help families through devastating life events such as poverty, natural disasters, and epidemics. Wood acted as a caseworker, dealing with families affected by the Great Depression where she was able to give financial aid, counseling, and educational and legal services to the families she supervised in attempts to keep them housed.

Despite her efforts at the United Charities, Wood felt unfulfilled in her position as a caseworker and believed that larger structural changes were necessary for the improvement of living standards for working class families, and at some points, this took the form of controversial separation of races which led to riots. However, Wood makes no mention of the role of social unrest in the degradation of lower-class housing, pointing to her overt lack of attention towards the problems that would soon define her career.

Eventually, the head of the Metropolitan Housing Council asked her to be the Secretary of the Housing Committee of the Council of Social Agencies.

In her first role as an executive, Wood was able to develop and hone her skills in policy-making and bureaucratic processes. This practice in housing policy initiatives served Wood well when she became Executive Director of the first housing authority

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36 Ibid., 4.
approved by the State Housing Board in 1937. As head of the CHA, Wood undertook the lease of three housing projects that had been built by the Federal Public Works Administration. Between 1938-39, the majority of the families that moved in were “middle-class families hit by the depression,” and approximately “50-60% of the families had some kind of public support.” Wood recalls when “[they] had [their] first change in Negro occupancy… [they] put [their] 30, 40, or 60 Negro families on separate stairwells, and only on the Roosevelt Street frontage.” Not calling it segregation outright, Wood attempted to separate people based on race in attempts to curb what she perceived to be an inevitable racial tension of public housing, which was fueled by the general racial unrest of the time. Despite her best efforts, the exercise was unsuccessful in creating a safe space for residents of all backgrounds, and in time many of the white families left the housing development, citing the influx of minorities as their reason for leaving.

The building typologies that Wood oversaw were primarily high-rise and high-density. The last of the pre-war public housing projects that Wood managed was the Ida B. Wells Homes. Applied to the homes and called the Neighborhood Composition Rule, racial segregation was a federal policy at this time. The policy implied that public housing should not alter the racial makeup of the neighborhoods that surround it, and in compliance with this policy, the Ida B. Wells homes were exclusively for African American tenants. Though construction began before the housing Act of 1937, with it’s drafting, responsibility for the project was shifted from the federal government to the newly created CHA. With this came a new set of architects tasked with the planning of the site. Their first business was a limiting of the number of streets running through the

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38 CSC Oral History Research Program: Elizabeth Wood, Chicago Housing Authority Executive (Chicago, IL: Chicago State University Archives and Special Collections, 1954), 9.
39 Ibid., 9.
projects and increasing open spaces. Proving in the future to be primary sources of crime, at this time, these changes were viewed as beneficial to the social fabric of public housing. However, positively, the architects cut down the number of apartment buildings and increased row houses. Though still standing at four or five stories high, the buildings encouraged high-density social norms, and contributed to the feeling anonymity that became ubiquitous of Chicago’s public housing.

In 1941 the Ida B. Wells Homes saw the first division of people based on income. In this division, the residents who entered public housing under the monetary threshold, but had since exceeded it were evicted. Coming as an order for the office of the mayor, Wood took great offence to this system and adamantly opposed its implementation. Wood put herself in the crosshairs of the municipal government who viewed it as necessary; her vocal opposition signaled her eminent dismissal from her role as Executive Director.

Hounded by the press, Wood prepared a statement in which she addressed the current situation of the CHA. Refusing to let the speech be screened by the Chicago Commissioners, Wood was fired. But she made her speech anyway, claiming that the housing authority wanted to “become the puppets of the City Council,” and “to use public housing money to keep the Negros happy where they were.” Wood ended her time in the CHA with a profound declaration of inadequacy on part of the government in facilitating meaningful social and racial relations.

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40 Ibid., 46.
41 Ibid., 28.
V. Elizabeth Wood: Post-CHA and the Development of Social Planning

After leaving the CHA, Wood became an advocate for the potentially positive influence of building typology on social behavior within public housing, reflecting the lessons she learned from her time in Chicago. She was able to develop the sentiments she carried from the social work she started out doing, into an unwitting denouncement of her own implemented policies during her time at the CHA. Finally recognizing the role that the physicality of buildings have on their ability to facilitate social controls, Wood’s published works reflect the importance of integrating architecture and social controls to create secure spaces, and initiate the overall design against crime discourse.

After leaving the CHA, Wood authored *A New Look At… A Balanced Neighborhood* \(^{42}\) and *Housing Design: A Social Theory* \(^{43}\) for the citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York City, as well as *Social Planning* \(^{44}\) for Pratt Institute. All published after she left the CHA, Wood’s attitude towards public housing changed dramatically in these years. Echoed in her recounted oral history, Wood’s motive while working in Chicago was to house as many people as quickly as possible. This led to the overwhelming implementation of high-rise typologies and ill-planned public housing within the city. After leaving, Wood gained a somewhat critical distance, calling in to question many of the policies she herself enacted in Chicago for their shortsightedness and lack of social awareness. What the three publications she created after her departure

from the CHA articulate is the necessity to remedy such issues and place the human at the center of the narrative of public housing.

With the development of a conversation around urban planning in the mid-20th century, emerged a struggle between heterogeneous development of cities and neighborhoods, and homogenous development. Wood claims that the natural progression of the city favors homogeneous development, meaning that people of similar backgrounds settle in similar places while amenities and infrastructure develop around them to cater to their specific needs, what this results in is no mixture of race, class, or economic level. Many emerging urban critics viewed this as shortsighted and detrimental to the overall urban fabric, but Wood wasn’t so sure. In her first distributed pamphlet, *A New Look At… The Balanced Neighborhood*, published nearly six years after she left the CHA in 1960, Wood took on the broad topic of the advantages or potential disadvantages of heterogeneity. Wood points out that heterogeneity could potentially solve the ills of city life at the time including “racial segregation, economic segregation, and the segregation of old or socially maladjusted persons.” Note, that nowhere in this list is the imperative for the homogeneity or heterogeneity of particular building typology or style, solidifying her stance as a social planner, not a physical one. Evidently still clarifying her opinion about the debate between heterogeneous and homogeneous neighborhoods, Wood never fully articulates any absolutes. She claims:

> Should urban renewal follow the neighborhood-unit concept and seek to make the projects not only homogenous communities but social communities, self contained because all the community facilities requires for day-to day living are within their physical boundaries? Or should heterogeneity be the goal of urban

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46 Ibid., 10.
renewal? If so, what kind of heterogeneity? And how can heterogeneous neighborhoods be made to succeed? 47

Characterizing homogeneous neighborhoods in an almost positive light by claiming that all functions for living would be contained within, Wood in essence is creating a narrative that favors the homogeneous neighborhood. As the majority of Wood’s involvement in CHA development had been implementations of high-density homogenous developments, it seems Wood is holding on to a fading hope that the racial divisive buildings that she helped install, can be seen as beneficial to the residents it serves. She claims that the ills that homogenous development caused the city of Chicago, resulted in riots and unrest, seemingly conclusively problematizing homogeniety. Offering no further clarification in the remaining pages of the pamphlet or in any subsequent publications, Wood leaves the reader wondering about what the ‘balanced neighborhood’ looks like, and how it can be achieved.

One year later, published by the same organization as her first pamphlet (the Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York City), Wood authored an article entitled Housing Design: A Social Theory.48 A departure from her abstract first publication, Wood refocused on the physical aspects of public housing, and how they can be modified to help aid the social rehabilitation of the residents of CHA properties. Her most architecturally focused publication critiques high-rise public housing for limiting social interaction, discussing the potential of design for social control. Clearly distancing herself from her previous theory, Wood is beginning to cement herself as a physical

planner, with her social tendencies consistently shining through. In a particularly rich
description, Wood shows an image of the semipublic space of the lobby, and adjacent
outdoor living space, noting the design elements installed to facilitate loitering, rooting
back to her focus on the individual. (Fig. 4) With an open plan and full-length windows
to the outside, the lobby provides benches, chessboards, custodian’s closets, and a
bathroom for children. The image depicts three background groupings of people using the
amenities that Wood is proposing, one group of “teenagers” at benches, another of men
using the chessboard and women waiting for the elevator, and lastly, a group of women
waiting for the mail. In the foreground of the image is a mother with two young children
approaching the building. Representing a variety of social characteristics and ages, all of
the figures are using the space in specific ways, speaking to Wood’s claims that as long
as buildings have usable semipublic space, the need for individual territory is
unnecessary.

Placing a special emphasis on gender, Wood claims that the inability for mothers
to facilitate children while playing creates an insular environment within the home,
containing not only the children from creating meaningful bonds outside the house, but
mothers as well. Continually, the adult male is limited in public housing because “he
cannot paint his apartment walls, or repair things around his house; he cannot garden; he
has no place to make wine or to tinker with tools.” These social constraints create a
damaged social fabric, to which Wood proposes that design should help repair by making
the collection of strangers in public housing, less strange.

49 Ibid., 13.
Written for use by Pratt Institute, her third publication entitled *Social Planning* had the purpose of being explicitly academic. Departing from the architectural tone she took in *Housing Design: A Social Theory*, Wood attempts to rectify her implementation of poorly planned high-rise buildings in Chicago in this publication. The formation of the social planning format takes into account social interaction of residents as a decisive factor influencing the physicality of the buildings. This practice, in which the honest communal functions of living environments must be considered in order to make a functioning residential community, attempts to clarify her stance that communities have a natural tendency to aid upward mobility, and this needs to be acknowledged and facilitated by the planner. Revolutionary in its simplicity, the theory outlines conceptual, rather than concrete, proposals for how cities can implement “resources and institutions” which “enable people to meet their personal goals.”

Although Wood’s writing foreshadows Newman’s ultimate conclusions about the role that architecture plays in the limiting of residential crime in public housing, she herself is not an expert on architecture or crime, nor would she claim to be. Her accomplishments are in the realm of administration. While crime is left out of the narratives she explores, its implicit role in the ensuing debates over public housing are important and her voice becomes necessary in the overall narrative. What can be gleaned from this is the articulated importance of public housing administration, not crime, at this time, and how crimes negligence will affect public housing negatively in the following years.

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VI. Conclusions

The social aspects of public housing cannot be understood without addressing the problematic physical and aesthetic tendencies of the building typologies employed. Starting her career as a social worker, working with Chicago’s poverty-stricken masses, Wood was able to imbue much of her time as the first executive director of the CHA with a considerable amount of thought towards the social aspects of public housing. Without an eye towards crime specifically, Wood touched on many of the aspects of crime riddled public housing that became prominent over the next few decades, and were appropriated by a myriad of other theorists without credit or attention given to Wood for her contributions. What she was unable to do was effectively provide good short-term housing for the masses of new low-income Chicago residents flooding the city at this time. Adapting what she learned in Chicago about the necessities of long-term planning for the safety and efficiency of housing, Wood later worked for HUD in drafting changes to federal housing policy nationwide. This time, Wood took in to consideration crime, design, and their joint role in the degradation of Chicago’s public housing communities and how the faults could be fixed to provide good public housing for a nation struggling in the era following the Great Depression.

What is evident throughout Wood’s time in the housing sector on the municipal level in the CHA, and the federal level at HUD, is her ability to adjust her views to reflect the imperatives of time and place, evidently not always the best in the long run. In a period wrought with social and economic issues stemming from the degradation of the American economy due to the Great Depression, what became necessary was the swift
housing of a nation of underpaid individuals. Though the government recognized this
necessity and provided what they saw as an appropriate answer to the needs of the
people, the administrational reach of housing authority’s were not in the best interest of
the people, and a new approach became necessary.
Chapter 2:
An Architectural Approach to Crime Prevention: The Defensible Space Theory

I. Introduction

In 1973 Oscar Newman published *Defensible Space*, a formalization of his provocative theories about the relationship between urban design and crime in public housing in New York City. Almost forgotten today, *Defensible Space* shaped and informed the basic principles of any effort to eradicate crime through design in the United States in the years that preceded it, catalyzing a number of administrative, policy based, and social transformations that eventually led to the formation of the Broken Windows theory. These outcomes prove to be a side effect of a larger discourse initiated by Oscar Newman’s *Defensible Space*. Distributed as a popular book, the text reads as a pamphlet articulating narrow and specific strategies for a handful of selected cases, creating a disconnect between its aim and reality, influencing administration and the publics of the book. This disconnect is at the crux of the lack of legitimacy exhibited in the book. In this chapter I will focus on Newman’s theory and his argument that high-rise and high-density buildings, unusable open space, and lack of surveillance in public housing result in elevated levels of crime.

The Defensible Space model is set against the backdrop of the deterioration of Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, Missouri, which had already started by the late 1960’s. A member of the second wave of CIAM, Newman viewed Pruitt-Igoe as a complete failure,
representing the philosophy of the first wave that advocated for the conceptual possibilities of the urban structure, not the imperative realities.\textsuperscript{51}

Newman claims that he has “chosen to direct this work at a rather wide readership.”\textsuperscript{52} Although he initially intended the book for housing developers, police, and architects, Newman decided to “make it more universally available.”\textsuperscript{53} Newman was not interested in an academic readership. His choice of a publishing house is telling of his intention. At the time, Collier Publishers distributed a large range of fiction and non-fiction publications to a wide readership, promising to popularize his argument for the public.\textsuperscript{54}

Newman attempted to perpetuate \textit{Defensible Space} as a prominent cultural ideology. The result was a manual for urban design that influenced administrative policies. Its implementation proved trivial because Newman’s ideas were lost in the mix between popular ideology and practical implementation because of the ambiguity of his communication. The \textit{Defensible Space} book generally offered a new urban theory that connected typological and social control imperatives in the creation of crime-free public housing in New York City, while marginalizing debates over the structural problem that crime constituted.

In his book, Newman outlines a narrative of mandates. Newman structures the book around the four main defensible space proposals that he has synthesized: territoriality, natural surveillance, image, and milieu. In doing this, he reduces his

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., xiii.
argument about the relationship between the city and crime to broad arguments about form and typology, attacking the presence of empty lots and high-rise typologies. Throughout the book, Newman offers a series of isolated vignettes of public housing projects in the New York City metropolitan area, without ever going in depth to unearth the structural questions at hand. Newman’s argument is as much textual as it is visual. There is nearly no page without an illustration or photo on it. Newman fills the book with pictorial evidence that reinforce his main argument. Bird-eye views, master plans and floorplans come to argue that form is actually the problem when the question is crime. With Defensible Space Newman articulates the profound struggle between the public and private sphere. Whether Newman’s proposed remedies are fully coherent or not, they hold weight in understanding the drive behind design theories against crime.

Defensible Space has been implemented in select municipalities nation-wide, including Dayton, OH, various projects in New York City, and has been adapted by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as a framework for analyzing the effectiveness of public housing projects in general. Defensible Space programs that were developed in the aftermath of the book’s publication have a direct purpose to “restructure the physical layout of communities to allow residents to control the areas around their homes,” including the public spaces outside of the buildings such as streets and grounds as well as within the buildings including lobbies and corridors. Newman claims that community involvement can allow people of different races, incomes, and social backgrounds to come together to fight for a common cause to eliminate crime and criminals in their communities, but the realities of these claims remain unseen.

56 Ibid., 11.
I will be focusing first on Newman’s articulation of the failures of high-rise and high-density building typologies in public housing. Influenced by the fall of Pruitt Igoe, Newman argues against earlier CIAM models of urban development. A decrease in height and density, he claims, would result in an increase of personal sense of propriety and decrease in crime. Newman continues by walking the reader through two examples of high and low rise building typologies in the same geographical areas, at Sarah Lawrence College and Brownsville, NY, to demonstrate the comparative advantages of low rise housing in the decrease of crime. From here, I will study Newman’s discussion of public and open space in the same two projects in Brownsville, NY, and a new project on the outskirts of Los Angeles. Newman claims that with usable and defined public space comes an increase in connection between residents and results in less crime. Finally, Newman advocates for an increase in both natural and electronic surveillance of project semipublic areas, using the Riverdale houses in New York as a key case study for both of these. Through all of this, Newman oscillates between an affirmative and questioning tone, but never a critical one, leaving space for a wide range of criticism on the part of the reader which I will explore here.

II. High Rise and High Density

The perceived benefits of high-rise housing was a main trope in architectural discourse at the beginning of the 20th century, particularly in the meetings of the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Modern (CIAM). Noting the ability for high-rise typologies to provide urban spaces with more public space, citywide amenities, and their lower
economic burden, high-rise housing was heralded as a cure to the burdens of city life in this period. Spearheaded by Le Corbusier, the CIAM brought together European, Asian, and American architects and planners to shape the future of the city. The CIAM took the form of eleven official meetings spanning the years of 1928-1959 in which architects discussed and lectured on new innovations in the architectural world.\(^57\)

Newman took an active role at the CIAM during its dissolution, in 1959. After graduating from university, Newman went to the Netherlands to work alongside CIAM members in what he thought was the reformation of the CIAM to reflect current architectural trends and update their modernist vision of the city. Although not intended, Newman’s subsequent published monograph outlined the beginning of the end for the CIAM. The hope was to breathe new life to the slowly decaying organization, which at that point seemed “so vast that it had become cumbersome.”\(^58\) Many of Newman’s own biases become apparent in these writings where he questions the creation of communal “core” in modernist landscapes.\(^59\) Instead advocating for a spread of buildings and public space, Newman’s ensuing contradictions of the CIAM ideals in *Defensible Space* are foreshadowed.

Newman later synthesized many of these provocative claims in *Defensible Space*, with the issue of high-rise housing being one of his main points of departure from the earlier modes of CIAM. These views are evidenced in Newman’s claims that “as one moves to denser and denser agglomerations—to row houses, walk-up flats, and high-rise apartments—opportunity for individual and collective efforts at defining territory become

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 15.
increasingly difficult.” In essence claiming that individual property in necessary in order to obtain a sense of territoriality over an apartment or house. Newman disagrees with Wood’s claim that usable semipublic space provides the residents with a sense of territoriality. Instead he argues that in order for a resident to feel territorially, they most directly own the piece of property; everything else will result in ambiguity of ownership and ultimate crime.

To elucidate his point, Newman compares two housing projects: Pruitt Igoe and Sarah Lawrence College. He credits Pruitt Igoe as the catalyzer for his defensible space theory. Newman starts with a birds eye illustration of the overall project site plan (Fig. 5), though it is interesting to note that he chooses to represent the site plan in a three dimensional manner. Newman adds dimensionality, by illustrating the height of the buildings along with the width and the depth, in order to emphasize the role of high-rise in Pruitt-Igoe’s downfall. To make his point, Newman shows the project in complete disrepair, in the middle of empty streets, emptied of people, visually connecting the open space with its failed state (Fig. 6). Newman claims that the demise of the complex results directly from the existence of open space, clearly connecting open void space with the lack of territorial claims.61

At the opposite end, Newman locates the design of housing for the Sarah Lawrence College. A historically all girls liberal arts school on the outskirts of New York City, Sarah Lawrence has a variety of dormitory typologies and Newman chose to outline the varied social differences that arise in each dorm. In comparing Pruitt-Igoe with Sarah Lawrence, Newman radically overlooks the social and class differences between the two

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61 Ibid., 53.
spaces. In a way he argues that those differences do not matter when the discussion comes to urban design. Rather, he proposes that urban form and urban form alone determine the conditions and future lives of housing.

Newman believes that the high-rise dorms are detrimental to its residents and the campus culture as a whole, stating that its residents “almost universally” have “adopted a loner’s attitude, conducting their lives within the confines of their individual rooms, and seeming unconcerned with the other residents of the building.” While the smaller dorms are credited as encouraging “strong social entities which define norms or orders of behavior” that result in common areas being “meticulously cared for by the students.”

The image of the high-rise dorms that Newman uses is visually similar to the image of Pruitt Igoe he constructs with photographs and text in his book. Both feature the buildings from across a sea of open space with no people in sight. (Fig. 7) To drive his point home, he contrasts the project with a photograph of the shorter dorms, taken from an eye-level viewpoint presumably to make the buildings seem more personable, focusing on the abundance of unmaintained foliage and the L-shaped wrap around of the buildings (Fig. 8). Though notably it still does not show any people in the frame and the inclusion of the masses of shrubs and trees leaves the reader with the impression that this area is similarly unmaintained, and does not in fact embody any defensible space properties.

Both Pruitt-Igoe and Sarah Lawrence are depicted in a distanced and almost barren way. Photographed from a far off, across large open spaces, with no humans in sight, the buildings take an abandoned tone, exactly as Newman wants them to appear.

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62 Ibid., 75.
Newman purposefully dehumanizes their pictorial existence. In line with his main criticism of the building typologies as a whole, that they facilitate little to no human engagement and thus are left to deteriorate and encourage crime. What is not clear is why Newman’s depictions of spaces that he considers imbued with defensible space properties are depicted in a similar manner.

Just as Newman compares the two building typologies at Sarah Lawrence College, he compares the Van Dyke and Brownsville houses in Brooklyn, NY, this time focusing on the difference between high and low density housing. Throughout the chapter Newman constructs a narrative of extreme contrast between these two projects that are situated directly across the street from each other. He discusses that the projects have decidedly different designs while still housing the same size and social substratum, and that the Brownsville houses utilize more Defensible Space properties than Van Dyke. Employing a series of images to depict their successes and failures, Newman is able to illuminate the problematic nature of the Van Dyke houses due to its higher density.

However, high-rise does not necessarily mean high-density. In fact, Newman seems to focus primarily on high-rise/low-density fabrics. He believes that high-rise is detrimental, but high density can be beneficial. First, it is important to distinctly define the differences between high-density and high-rise. As I have previously outlined, Newman distinctly opposes high-rise buildings due to their lack of territoriality, embodied in his discussion of Pruitt Igoe and Sarah Lawrence College. Though inexorably linked, high-rise solely refers to the typology of the building, not of the surrounding area and production of lived space. In his analysis of the two projects, Newman states that the main differences between the two projects “arise in the
composition of buildings and the percentage of ground-level space they occupy.” This clearly defines Newman’s point of view in studying the use of high and low density typologies as being a conceptual discussion of the relationship between exterior and interior spaces, and primes the reader for a difference in manner of discussion from that of high-rise.

Specifically, each project houses roughly 288 people per acre, but they differ immensely in the amount of land they cover. The Brownsville buildings “cover 23 percent of the available land, where as Van Dyke buildings cover only 16.6 percent of the total land area,” arguing that the Van Dyke project boasts significantly more public open space. The image he uses shows a vast open space of clear fields, relatively few people, and the street taking up almost the entire bottom half of the frame. (Fig. 9) In the citation he uses language such as “anonymous” and “distant” to further allude to the connections between the relationship of the buildings and the public space, these words are easily justifiable when Newman himself is across the street from the projects, adding extra physical distance from the site. By beginning with a photo of the Van Dyke building, the first image that the reader sees is of a failed high-density public housing project.

Newman adds an additional image of the Van Dyke project accompanied by a detailed description of its downfall. Both of these images show a striking resemblance to the image of Le Corbusier’s L’Unite d’Habitation in Marseilles (Fig. 1), though Newman himself does not make this connection explicit. The visual similarities draw reference to

63 Idib., 39.
64 Ibid., xiii.
65 Idib., 41.
Newman’s background with the CIAM and ultimate rejection of its main principles, in his rejection of the Van Dyke buildings.

III. Public Space

For Newman, the question of public space was central in his theory of design driven crime prevention. He argued for the integration of exterior small in scale public space in housing complexes. In doing so, he distinguished between the, what he thought to be, qualitative differences between public space and open space. Newman states that “the towers [the architects] built to create open space would prove too dangerous to send children through alone,” criticizing the implementation of “open space” as unusable.66 Newman claims that an overabundance of open space comes a lack of purpose and definition, which leads to the possibility for crime and delinquency. In most of the cases that Newman focuses on, this possibility becomes a reality.

While in reference to public space Newman concludes that if “the residents, feeling that an area is secure, will make more frequent use of it and so further improve its security by providing the safety which comes with intensive use.” 67 Because of this, for the remainder of this section I will be using the term public space to refer to the usable space outside project housing typical of shorter and less dense buildings, while open space will herein refer to the problematic spaces outside high-rise buildings with little defensible space properties.

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66 Ibid., 24.
67 Ibid., 78.
Newman offers a view of two opposite forms of public space in his refocusing of the Van Dyke and Brownsville example on its use of large open spaces, as well as discussing the imperatives of any public space at all in The Californian. It is understandable that Newman uses the Van Dyke and Brownsville projects as a case study or a myriad of defensible space principles, because both projects offer ample lessons in the four main factors of defensible space. In The Californian, Newman focuses on the juxtaposition between public spaces within and outside public housing project, which often manifest in different manners and result in a problematic relationship. In using these two examples Newman is able to offer a comprehensive view of the advantages of usable and monitorable public space in a variety of public housing typologies.

Newman’s bias towards the low-density properties of Brownsville has already been discussed, and from this comes a more effective use of public space. As buildings get smaller and proportionate amount of ground is dedicated to buildings rather than unusable open space, public space improves. In comparing his representation of Van Dyke (Fig. 9) and Brownsville (Fig. 11), it is apparent that Brownsville allows for the creation of usable public space wrapped by buildings, with ample windows and watching eyes, and welcoming foliage peeking out over the building tops. While in Van Dyke, a large grass field with no discernable purpose takes up the majority of the frame, a space that no one would conceivably ever want to spend time. Newman synthesizes this when he says that “at the center of [Van Dyke] is a single, large open area,” and by virtue of its design and use it “has been distinctly separated from and is unrelated to the surrounding buildings.”

\[68 \text{Ibid., 41.}\]
Newman uses the form of open space in each project as a basis for his subsequent
analysis of the two, speaking to its importance in both his argument and their differences.

Despite being explicit about focusing the majority of his case studies on New
York City, as he does with Van Dyke and Brownsville, the chapter entitled “Current
Practitioners of Defensible Space” outlines four communities in California, two in
Missouri, one in New York City, and one in Chicago. It is interesting to note that the
majority of the projects that are currently practicing the theories designed by Newman are
in California, and the complete lack of mention of Californian public housing in the
previous five chapters.

Historically, California has had much more leniency in its building typologies
than New York City simply because of the abundance of space, relative newness, and
climate. With warmer weather many of Newman’s proposals become exponentially more
plausible. Meaning that with openness of public and private eminently more available,
many of the Defensible Space design aspects become possible. In examining the images
used to illustrate the relationship between public and private spaces in The Californian,
many similar themes arise as in the Van Dyke and Brownsville images, such as the lack
of people in the photos and the importance of the chronology of the photos arranged by
Newman.

Primarily, Newman focuses on The Californian in Tustin, CA on the outskirts of
Los Angeles, which is almost the complete inverse of the image Newman portrays of
public housing in New York City. The only middle-high income public housing
discussed in the book, the project boasts no higher than two-story town houses with a
distinct white stucco finish and high walls separating it completely from the public streets that surround it.

The white stucco aesthetic of the buildings and lack of people in the photographs and drawings gives the project a vacant and almost sterile look. (Fig. 12) Newman asserts that The Californian is “dangerously insecure” and that “the equivalent of the dangerous, anonymous public streets surrounding high-rise developments of New York are found in the internal pedestrian walls of this California project.” A marked failure by Newman, depiction of this project in the book reflects Newman’s sentiments that lack of natural surveillance and abundance of usable public space lead to the deterioration of public housing.

Due to the different typologies available in California, such as wide open space and availability of year-round outdoor recreation, it seems unavoidable that the project would exhibit more Defensible Space properties in the realm of public space, though evidently this is not true. Newman remarks that The Californian is equivalent to “the fortress-style high-rise, upper-income apartment buildings common to Eastern cities,” and that there is “no attempt at extending territorial responsibility.” Newman blames the use of physical barriers separating the interior pedestrian areas from the surrounding streets and private homes for the failures of The Californian. The walls separate the streets and private homes around the project, and separate private dwelling unit from public spaces within the project, eliminating territorial responsibility and natural surveillance, two of Newman’s most important principles. (Fig. 13) Additionally, though the walls might appear imposing and hard to penetrate, Newman claims that they are in

69 Ibid., 155.
70 Ibid., 155.
fact easy to scale and once inside a criminal could have complete access and privacy to enter any unit. These differences are so great that they must be made explicit in the entirety of the book, or not discussed at all.

Newman contradicts these claims when he installs barriers similar to the ones he define in Dayton, OH, where he was commissioned to increase safety by installing defensible space properties. Despite explicitly stating his distaste for the use of barriers for territorial segregation, he returns to them in his first commissioned Defensible Space project.\(^{71}\) Facing criticisms for his evident hypocrisy, Newman disregarded many assertions made about barriers in *Defensible Space*, especially in the discussion of The Californian, and opted for their installation in many of his subsequent projects.

The addition of barriers on top of existing housing typologies, with no alteration to the buildings underneath, speaks to the main criticism of Newman’s work as a whole, that it is essentially taking free spaces and turning them in to “fortresses,” though Newman views this as essential in creating public rather than open spaces.\(^{72}\) All of the interventions embodied by Dayton, and Newman’s work in Clason Point and Yonkers resulted in roughly a decade of reduced crime, followed by a reversal of the neighborhoods to their original high crime patterns. Because the alterations did not address the underlying problems of the communities, they simply acted as a band-aid of short-sighted technological alteration, the alterations proved unhelpful.\(^{73}\) Barry Poyner asserts that “the attractiveness of Newman’s ideas was that, although he did not rule out the use of fences or even electronic surveillance, his main aim was to find ways of

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\(^{72}\) Ibid., 44.

changing the underlying structure of the environment so that it would not attract criminal behavior,” enabling residents to “control access to their homes and the use of surrounding areas.” However, this is just the “attractiveness of his ideas”, not the reality of his interventions. Embodied by Dayton, Newman’s physical application of the Defensible Space theory often resulted in “an agglomeration of Defensible Spaces and militarily encysted suburbs,” and “an outer layer of welfare cages and humane prisons on some gradient from Pruitt-Igoe to Attica where all ‘crime’, ‘intruders’ and ‘hardened targets’ retreat to be collected.”

In his discussion of open and public space, Newman is able to emphasize the important role of function in the creation of safe spaces within public housing. In other words, he believes that open spaces should already include and bring forth a program of functions to avoid the presence of vacant lots deprived of life. Emphasized by the cases of Van Dyke and Brownsville, Newman piggybacks on his claims about high-density by saying that because Brownsville has comparatively lower-rises and less density than Van Dyke as well as lower crime rates; the public space is usable and acts as a model for defensible space principles. Additionally, discussion of The Californian confirms that the lack of any usable public space within, and a complete disconnect by walls from outside, creates an image of a disconnected and unsafe residential population.

IV. Surveillance and the Call for Increased Visibility

Perhaps the most divisive of Newman’s proposals was his encouragement of a series of surveillance tactics to be enacted by the residents of the projects themselves and relevant authorities in each place. He proposed semipublic spaces such as lobbies and stairwells to be fortified with electronic surveillance controlled by police and security guards. Newman claimed that such interventions would “have a pronounced effect in securing the environment for peaceful activities.”\[76\] This point is controversial because it would require the constant monitoring of all public housing residents by each other and authorities, resulting in lack of perceived privacy. This proposal proved to have little support from the general populous and had little effect on crime rates in general.

Newman himself recognizes the potential shortcomings of his proposals. In his chapter on Natural Surveillance he recognizes that “the ability to observe criminal activity will not, in and of itself, impel the observer to respond with assistance to the person or property being victimized.”\[77\] Citing the Kitty Genovse incident in Queens, NY, in which a girl was brutally murdered while thirty seven people looked on and no one did anything to help her, all assuming that someone else would come to Kitty’s aid. Playing off of his ideas surrounding territoriality in the discussion of high-density living, to remedy this problem Newman concluded that as long as an area was perceived as under the realm of responsibility of the surveyor they would be more likely to keep it safe, seemingly answering his own criticism. Predictably, as quickly as Newman raises a potential problem with his theory, he shuts it down, ensuring the reader that his theories

\[76\] Ibid., 78.
\[77\] Ibid., 78.
offer comprehensive answers to the problem of safety and security. Nowhere else in the
book does Newman as explicitly criticize his own work, or recognize the criticism of
others, making his views on surveillance in this section as notable as they are
questionable.

Important in the study of Newman’s views on the surveillance and the image of
public housing is an understanding of his term semipublic. Newman repeatedly uses the
term in his description of the spaces that crime most often occurs in public housing,
articulating it as project paths, lobbies, halls, elevators, and fire stairs, and Newman says
that with the securing of these spaces frees its residents from crime. Because these spaces
are not only essential to the every day lives of the public housing residents, their public
nature also make them important in the overall image and representation of the project as
a whole. Neman claims that not only is this important for the overall creation of a safe
environment, “this image is also perceived by the potential criminal, who is deterred from
initial consideration of this area as an easy hit.”78 Focusing the remainder of his proposed
interventions in these semipublic spaces, Newman focuses on natural as well as installed
surveillance tactics in such spaces.

Newman points to the residents’ interviews where they described the lack of
visibility both inside and outside public housing as unsettling. Appropriating these
empirical remarks, Newman launches a problematic narrative of danger and mystery
consistent in all aspects of public housing. Newman says that because of the positioning
of high-rise buildings in a sea of open space, the paths that connect each building take the
form of winding webs of sharp turns and blind corners. The lack of visibility that this

78 Ibid., 80.
format produces on these paths is a recurring complaint of many residents, specifically in projects such as Pruitt Igoe where building access points face inward to project interiors, rather than outward to public streets, giving residents no other option than to use the dimly lit and poorly designed interior project paths to reach the entrances to their homes, with no alternative.79

The remainder of Newman’s articulated options for natural surveillance is focused on interior semipublic spaces, specifically lobbies and fire stairs. Newman outlines that lobbies should have an open floor plan necessitating no turns between entering and getting on to the elevator as to not create “blind spots.” And because of the nature of their use, all fire stairs in public housing must be enclosed in fire-proof wells, which creates for a typology of narrow scissor stairs that are virtually sealed of visually and editorially from all other parts of the building. What is consistent between Newman’s articulation of exterior semipublic project paths, internal lobbies, and isolated fire stairs, is the necessity for “designing apartments so that people within them will naturally view the communally used paths, entries, play, and seating areas of a project during their normal household activities.”80 This type of visual connection between exterior and the interior creates a link between what is seen and what is not seen in public housing projects in general, though still leaves a gaping hole in the understanding of how standard living typologies surrounding public housing can influence this type of perceived safety.

In his chapter conclusions, Newman muses that “perhaps even more critical than functional ambiguities of building design are those ambiguities which were a consequence of the superblock concept common to large-scale government-supported

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79 Ibid., 81.
80 Ibid., 91.
low- and middle-income housing design.” He continues, articulating that possibly just as disadvantageous as the internal labyrinth of unsafe semipublic spaces, is the general typology of large superblocks of slab housing that can not be distinguished from each other. This broad similarity between all buildings results in an anonymity of building and often residents of such public housing do not know the number of other buildings, let alone their own. Because of this, it is often very difficult for residents to give distinct directions, forcing them to “revert to primitive terms” such as “down that way” or “at the other side of the project,” forcing a disassociation between building and individual. This dissociation is not true however in regular street and building associations in which street names and logical numerical sequences are used to identify housing, because of this Newman suggests that public housing should take this form, though many of the examples he subsequently gives do exactly the opposite.

As his first, and longest, example of a “Current Practitioner of Defensible Space,” Newman discusses the Riverbend houses, which is the only project, discussed in this section located in New York City. Just north of Puerto Rican Harlem, this area in general suffers a felony rate nearly three times as high as the rest of Manhattan and its residents are nearly entirely African American. Despite not fitting Newman’s proposal that it mirror its surroundings in both racial make up and building typology, this project has suffered only six burglaries and muggings in the seven years it was open before Newman studied it for Defensible Space. Newman ignores this divergence from his theories, choosing to focus on the aspects of Defensible Space that it adopts. Attributing its relative

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81 Ibid., 99.
82 Ibid., 100.
83 Ibid., 127.
safety to the ability for individual residents to monitor general project paths and public spaces from within their homes and semipublic elevator waiting areas and hallways from outside paths, Newman heralds Riverbend as a profound proof of his proposals surrounding the benefits of Natural Surveillance in public housing.

What’s more, without any previous discussion or introduction, Newman advocates for the use of closed circuit TV’s in the Riverbend elevators. He explains that in each elevator there is a camera placed in the top corner and can be monitored from outside the elevator before entering and that once cable TV comes in to use at Riverbend empty channels will be reserved on home sets to monitor elevators from private residences. However, Newman claims that the camera does not screen the entire internal area and “it is possible for as many as two discreetly placed people to be standing in the elevator without registering in camera.”84 Without assurance that the entire area is being screened, Newman still claims that the cameras are effective for a casual screening by tenants. Continually, he claims that there has been no attempted camera vandalism in the six years since they were installed.

Occupying a mere half page amongst the six that discuss the Riverbend Houses in general, discussion of the use of electronic surveillance is limited and does not appear again until the end of the second to last chapter entitled “Modifying Existing Environments.” Here, Newman says that “where extensive physical redesign is not possible, use of electronic equipment is the only recourse open,” reserving it as a back up plan for projects with no other options, this still comes as a shock to the reader because

84 Ibid., 126.
electronic implementation has only been mentioned once before.\textsuperscript{85} Accompanying these claims Newman uses two drawings, one of a woman exiting a public housing building with an inset of a figure examining the act from her home (Fig. 15), and another of the exterior of public housing buildings with the inset of a security worker watching the scene in a control room (Fig. 16), both with additional writing on top of the image indicating where cameras and intercom systems are located.

V. The Afterlives of Defensible Space

In the years to follow the publication of \textit{Defensible Space}, Newman capitalized on the apparent success of the book in a growing number of publications. In 1974 Newman authored the \textit{Model Security Code for Residential Areas}, which was published by the government-funded urban planning organization, The Institute for Community Design Analysis. This publication was a guidebook for the specific changes that could be made to the physicality of buildings, isolating parts of the built environment such as entrances, locks, police involvement as integral to his model of security provisions that planners and administrators nationwide should follow.\textsuperscript{86} Quickly following this guidebook came the \textit{Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space} in 1975, this time distributed by The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the publication focuses far more on the social and criminological factors influencing the theory.\textsuperscript{87} Continually, the National Institute for Justice published the \textit{Factors Influencing Crime and Instability}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 182.
in Urban Housing Developments: Executive Summary in 1980, which echoed the social emphasis embodied in Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space. The evolution of institutional support, from primarily urban planning based to criminological, helps trace the evolution of the theory as a whole. From the strictly architectural approach taken by Newman in the beginning of the 1970’s, mirroring Newman’s architectural background, to its social emphasis at the end of the 1970’s, the change in institutional support helps explain the evolution of the theory between each publication by Oscar Newman and foreshadows the social emphasis that surrounded design against crime theories at the end of the 20th century.

In response to Newman’s proposals, a large-scale study was conducted by Alice Coleman to examine questions of safety and criminal activity in British housing developments. Head of the Land Use Research Unit at King’s College London, Coleman embarked on an intensive research investigation that was later published in the book Utopias on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing.88 The Land Use Research Unit traditionally uses realizations about the realities of the British Environment to point to mistaken public policies. Since its conception in 1960, the Land Use Research Unit has examined public policy issues such as dereliction and disuse, farmland loss, recreational use, and supply of building land, always working under the model that large-scale surveys will yield more accurate information than small-scale. This proved no different when they turned their sights to problem housing, undertaking a sample area of 4,099 city blocks nationwide containing 106,520 dwellings and accommodating a quarter of a million people.

The committee located nearly fifteen design features that attributed to deterioration of apartments and blocks. Starting with discussions over the mechanisms and processes that led to the state of housing in the 1980s, the book literally sets up a trial where Newman’s principles of anonymity, surveillance, and used space are put to the test within the UK context.

At the same time, many scholars discredited Newman’s position as a uniquely American phenomenon. They argued that the influence of socio-economic causes were greater than the physicality and form of urban space, essentially calling in to question the strength of the American economy and its ability to bounce back in opposition to the growing levels of crime in its largest cities.\(^89\) Because of the holes found in Newman’s hypotheses, the sights of public housing administrators and government officials in subsequent years were refocused on the controlling of individual’s actions. This is nowhere as prevalent as in New York City in the production of the Broken Windows theory and the strengthening of the NYPD.

\(^{89}\) Ronald V. Clarke, *Situational Crime Prevention* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1995), 91.
Chapter 3:  
Hardening of Police Protocols in New York City: The Broken Windows Theory

I. Introduction

In the early 1990s, New York City began the implementation of what was referred to as the “quality-of-life initiative,” which put in place protocols that attempted to subdue the increasingly violent nature of the city’s streets. Called the ‘Broken Windows theory’, ‘order-maintenance protocols’, and ‘quality-of-life policing’ interchangeably, this form of on-the-ground street management was most prevalent in New York City following the election of Rudolph Giuliani in 1994. Running under the assumption that the eradication of petty crimes would lead to an overall decrease in all forms of crime, the theory stood for the systematic change in policing protocols and negligence of environmental factors in New York City, with as many positive improvements as negative outcomes.

The initiatives placed minor misdemeanors such as turnstile jumping, panhandling, and public drunkenness as punishable acts. After its implementation, the city saw an indisputable decrease in crime and it was met with widespread acceptance and praise among public officials, policymakers, sociologists, and criminologists. However, the policy changes resulted in a series of indirect social pitfalls stemming from the newly involved police force that now had the agency to make quick and executive decisions on how offenders should be treated. Resulting in widespread police brutality

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and racial profiling, the Broken Windows theory remains a problematic idea that reinforced spatial racism and classism.91

This chapter will examine the emergence of the Broken Window theory and the development of particular practices of policing associated with it. The Broken Window theory signals the beginning of a new era, where the built environment is reduced to a surface treatment with the hope that this superficial treatment, the image of tidiness, will actually result in reduced crime rates. This form of policing remains unrivaled, still in use nationwide, as opposed to Wood’s or Newman’s theory, which became absorbed within the general discourse. Of the three eras of design against crime I have explored, the Broken Windows theory most explicitly addresses crime and leaves design out of the narrative. This means that I will take the approach of social history, rather than architectural history, in order to examine its influence overall.

Premised on the same principles that Wood and Newman developed their environmental control responses to the rise in crime in major cities, the Broken Windows theory extends beyond the basic principle that a damaged physical space can lead to crime, placing the individual directly at fault for their actions. The theory points to the larger social controls that must be in place for there to be accountability in neighborhoods, social controls that are facilitated by the maintenance of orderly streets through control of residents. The Broken Windows theory necessitates the strengthening of police forces to maintain such an order. This marks a distinct shift in the design against crime narrative, signaling the refocusing of energy on to the efficiency of police, and away from architectural controls. This point of view marks the inadequacy of the design

91 Ibid., 344-346.
control paradigm, and brings us back to the importance of the individual in the process of committing a crime, a focus that remains today.

II. The Theory and its Evolution

The theory came out of the work of two social scientists and authors, James Wilson and George Kelling. Coming from remarkably different backgrounds, the authors foregrounded the appearance of order as foundational factor in the production of a crime-free city. James Wilson was an accomplished criminologist before the publication of the article, holding posts as professor at UCLA and Harvard in their government and public policy programs, serving politically in the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and President’s Council on Bioethics, and member of the American Political science Association, American Philosophical Society, and Human Rights Foundation.  

Though involved in a plethora of organizations and positions, Wilson is still mostly known for his introduction of the Broken Windows theory in association with George Kelling. Less customarily accomplished than Wilson, George Kelling studied theology and social work in his academic career, leading him to be a child-care counselor and probation officer in his early career, before dedicating his life to the academic study of criminology as a professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, and Rutgers University-Newark.  

The varied combination of backgrounds and skills allowed for Wilson and Kelling to have a unique view of the


issues and potential solutions for the failing state of New York City’s crime aversion tactics. However, what it does not allow for is the incorporation of design principles, something that Newman claims every effective urban crime reduction theorist must possess.

Their theory appeared initially as an article in the March 1982 edition of *The Atlantic*. Entitled “Broken Windows,” the essay outlined a theory for the reduction of crime in major cities nationwide, though offered no specific policies to do so, only a general framework. The essay was premised on the idea that “at the community level, disorder and crime and usually inexorably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence… if a window in a building is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken.” The Broken Windows theory is premised on the simple claim that visible disorder attracts crime, and order diminishes it. The basic hypothesis is that abandoned properties and buildings themselves create a culture of neglect. In addition to the neglect of buildings, the authors cite minor disorders as being littering, loitering, public drinking, panhandling, and prostitution as being equally attributable for disorder. These offences, when left untreated, signal to potential offenders that delinquent behavior is tolerated and will not be reported, fostering more crime. Focusing clearly on the influence of minor crimes in the production of an unsafe space, Wilson and Kelling dismiss the influence of environment on behavior and attribute disorder to the damaging social influence of delinquency.

Though not fully recognized in the article, the theory shares many connections to the perspective articulated by Oscar Newman nearly a decade prior. Articulating the

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damaging effects of having empty lots, Wilson and Kelling explore Newman’s theme of territoriality in a different light. They say:

A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers rather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move out; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter Accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers. 95

Starting with a simple empty lot, Wilson and Kelling are able to set a very grim scene of the neglect and delinquency that it causes. Newman claimed that unused open space within public housing projects would ultimately become unregulated and foster crime. However, he also attributed many of the successes of defensible space imbued public housing projects to their incorporation of stores, much like the ones described by Wilson and Kelling. The discrepancy between the hypothetical positives of stores by Newman, and the negative analysis of their actuality by Wilson and Kelling, seem to point to the overarching problems in Newman’s proposals and Wilson and Kelling’s attempted rectification of them. The association, albeit conflicting, allows Wilson and Kelling to situate their claims within a larger framework of previous criminological thought. Even though they do not make direct reference to Newman, the parallels help ground their claims in the previous chronology of design against crime ideologies, even though they themselves have no background in design. Seemingly contributing to Newman’s other claims that, whether intended or not, design will be a part of crime-reduction strategies.

At this point, it is important to take note of Wilson and Kellings methodology. Basing much of their study on anecdotal evidence, the essay takes a very casual tone.

95 Ibid., 6.
Instead of basing their assumptions within the framework of statistics, the authors choose to ground their theories in examples. The article traces an at times confusing narrative, starting with a discussion of the influence of foot patrol policing in the state of New Jersey, the article states that even though the foot-patrolled areas did not have statistically diminished crime, they increase a colloquial feeling of safety. At this point Wilson and Kelling introduce their most profound example, and the name of the article. Claiming “that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken… one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.” A striking statement of the influence of social controls on neighborhood safety over the control of law enforcement, Kelling and Wilson use a psychological study done by Philip Zimbardo over a decade earlier as their main source of empirical evidence.

Turning their sights away from physical form, Wilson and Kelling looked into psychology and the influential study conducted by Philip Zimbardo in 1969 as a test of the Broken Windows theory. In the study, Zimbardo arranged to have an automobile placed with its hood up on the street in the Bronx and in Palo Alto, California. In the Bronx, the car was looted and destroyed within 24 hours, while in Palo Alto it was left entirely untouched for more than one week. Zimbardo then smashed part of it with a sledgehammer, and within a few hours passersbys contributed to the destruction and the car was destroyed by the end of the day. Zimbardo concluded that because of the previous culture of neglect and past experience of “no one caring” in the Bronx, vandalism begins much more quickly than in Palo Alto where there is a norm of

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96 Ibid., 2.
97 Ibid., 4.
respecting private property and delinquency being punished. However, the authors claim
that vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers and a sense of obligatory
civility are lowered by actions signaling, “no one cares.” Wilson and Kelling use this
study as a justification for the Broken Windows theory, echoing the sentiments of the
study repeatedly in the remainder of the text. However, this study is decidedly
psychological, drawing their focus away from physical urban space, to the individual
psyche, a confusing transition.

Continuing by defining the role of the police, the article describes an ideal
behavioral pattern that is almost impossible. In Wilson and Kelling’s framework, the
perception of a disorderly act is left entirely to the policing officer, and the lack of
objective outlines as to what specifically disorder looks like, makes equity difficult.
Addressed head on, Wilson and Kelling wonder how to “ensure that age or skin color or
national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing
the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the police do not
become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?” Useful only in its straightforwardness, the
answers to these questions are unsatisfying. In short, Wilson and Kelling do not know
how to prevent this phenomenon, concluding, “the police exist to help regulate behavior,
not to maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood.” Clearly dismissing the
overall importance of individual police agency in their ability to effectively evaluate and
respond to situations, the theory does not offer comprehensive views of the practicalities
that are necessary in order to implement this series of systematic changes. The lack of
specific protocols outlined in the article call into question the ability for it to be

98 Ibid., 5.
99 Ibid., 14.
effectively implemented and point to the ultimate issues that arise in its application to the urban form.

Proponents for the continued implementation of the Broken Windows theory cite the successes of New York City as their main evidential support. They argue that in the years following the implementation of the Broken Windows theory inspired order-maintenance protocols in, crime have plummeted, dropping nearly twice the national average in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{100} Understandably, these positive changes have been overwhelmingly attributed to the policing style changes that took place, but the devil is in the details. Experienced criminologists have proposed a variety of alternatives to the decline in crime rates in New York City. Including, the overall increase in the New York police force, a general shift in drug use from crack cocaine to heroine, favorable economic issues in the 1990s, new computerized tracking systems that speed up police response to crime, a decrease in number of eighteen to twenty-two year old males, the arrest of several big drug gangs in New York City, and possible changes in adolescent behavior. Though none of these factors are likely to be fully responsible for the decrease in crime in this period, a full view of the political and social situation of New York City becomes integral to the development of the discourse. Chiefly responsible for the climate of New York City in this period was Rudolph Giuliani.

\textsuperscript{100} Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, \textit{Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment} (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Law Review, 2006), 343.
III. Giuliani’s Vision for New York City

A native New Yorker, Giuliani was an understandable choice for the position of mayor following the widespread job loss and economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s. Representing the hope of returning New York City to the grandeur and stable metropolis it embodied in the earlier part of the 20th century, Giuliani faced a seemingly impossible task of urban restoration and social revitalization. Structured around the production of goods and distribution of resources, it came as no surprise that following the end of WWII the process of deindustrialization hit New York City hard. While plants and factories were closing, the city’s middle-to-upper class white residents moved out from the inner city.\textsuperscript{101} This initiated the process of white flight and resource redistribution away from the city, to the suburbs. Because of this, the city’s racial and economic position changed rapidly, initiating the transformation of New York’s inner city from working class immigrants, to unemployed minorities.\textsuperscript{102} Amidst this climate of citywide change, an increasing level of disorder hit New York City, and the Broken Windows theory finds a relevant application.

Born in Brooklyn in 1944, Giuliani attended a large public high school in the Bronx, and later graduated from the New York University School of Law in 1968. Growing up in a highly insular Irish Catholic community in the Bronx, and attending almost entirely white populated schools, Giuliani was denied a diversity of racial experience that could have potentially smoothed the edges of his racially controversial later mayoral initiatives, such as the Broken Windows theory. After serving on the Regan


\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 12.
Justice Department in the early 1980’s, Giuliani became a crusading United States attorney in New York, prosecuting corrupt politicians and grabbing headlines nationwide. Off the heels of his success as an attorney, he ran for mayor of New York City in 1989, losing narrowly to African American candidate David Dinkins. Four years later, in 1993, he tried again. This time Giuliani won the election, however, he only obtained five percent of the African American vote, and unseated the city’s first black mayor in the process.103

Giuliani premised his entire 1993 campaign on the eradication of crime through implementation of the Broken Windows theory. Dedicated to shutting down petty crimes and nuisances as a way of restoring quality of life in the city, Giuliani’s vision of a disorder-free New York City was enforced by Police Commissioner William Bratton, who Giuliani himself appointed months after his own election as mayor. The two combined forces and began a controversial implementation of the Broken Windows theory in New York City. Included in this implementation was the controversial removal of housing authority police from their stations, and their reassignment to the New York Police Department (NYPD).104 The goal of this was to boost the NYPD's numbers and increase citywide crime prevention tactics, but what resulted was the neglect of public housing residents and deterioration of its buildings.

The housing problem is perennial in New York City. Although Giuliani made a few strides in this area during his time as mayor, it was never a top priority of his office; instead he focused on crime reduction. Not seeing the two as inexorably linked, as Wilson and Kelling did, and all of the other design against crime theorists I have studied,

103 Ibid., 103.
Giuliani missed the mark in the possibility of using housing as a tool to help eliminate crime in the city. Among his failures in the housing sector, Giuliani was not able to reform outdated zoning and building codes, he also did not capitalize on converting areas zoned for manufacturing into areas where apartment buildings could be built. Just a year before the end of his term, Giuliani introduced a bill to renovate nearly 10,000 outdated apartments. For some critics, “the plan came too late in his term,” and for others “it seemed to emphasize new units for middle-income families, not for low-income families.”

Additionally, during Giuliani’s time in office, the number of homeless people raised to 30,000, contributing to unease surrounding what Giuliani considers one of its greatest achievements, the reduction of people on welfare. Rooted in the philosophy of the social contract, Giuliani began a program to have the able-bodied work in exchange for their welfare payments, raking leaves or cleaning subway cars, for example. While some credit his for reducing welfare spending overall, the executive director of the Community food Resource Center claimed, “Giuliani will cover himself in glory, but they didn’t really take people out of poverty, they just shoved people off assistance.”

One of Giuliani’s biggest failures comes with his inability to use housing a tool for social change in New York City. Without taking the opportunity to use housing as an anchor for other systemic changes, Giuliani left the city in turmoil in the recession following the September eleventh attacks on the World Trade Center.

It is naïve to discuss Giuliani without making note of the profound role the 9/11 attacks had on his legacy as a mayor. For weeks after, Giuliani was more than just a mayor. Offering comfort to the city’s rattled masses. For a brief period considering

106 Ibid., 6.
himself indispensable, Giuliani petitioned to have his term as mayor extended after its end on December 31, 2001. This failed plan served as a reminder that Guilin was not an icon; he was simply an elected official serving his duty to the city. The attacks of September eleventh left a new and heartbreaking New York City skyline, and along with it, saw the return of fear. Fear is something Giuliani had hoped to eliminate with the reform of the NYPD and implementation of Broken Windows theory, however, it is important to recognize that his last act as mayor, and what he is widely remembered for, is one of the biggest crimes the city has ever seen.

IV. Crime Tracking and Post-9/11 New York City

Along with the application of the Broken Window theory, Giuliani and Bratton introduced novel computerized crime-tracking system known as Compstat. The New York City transit police first used the Compstat to assess the locations were crimes were committed on a physical map hung on the wall of the transit police headquarters. Compstat collected and mapped data regarding crime, permitting authorities to discern crime patterns throughout the city and shift resources accordingly. Compstat contributed to the arresting or issuing summonses to any individual engaging in minor violations or quality-of-life offenses.

By capturing enforcement data as reflected in arrest activity, the protocols resulted in an initial downturn in crime rates, accredited with bringing down crime by 60

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107 Ibid., 1.
percent one year after its implementation.\textsuperscript{109} However, after a short while, it developed into a system in which police productivity was measurable and individual officers were held directly accountable for their arrest rates and productivity, resulting in manipulation of data. Additionally, Compstat contributed to the racial tensions mounting in the city. African American residents, especially males, were stopped and frisked at rates disproportionality higher than whites. Igniting the black community against the use of racial profiling, a particular target of its wrath was the Street Crime Unit that had the highest proportion of African American arrest and lowest number of African American officers, at only 3 percent. It remains controversial whether the Compstat system was itself directly responsible for the downturn in crime, because it was accompanied by so many other systematic changes in the NYPD by Giuliani and Bratton, making the problematic racial implications of the system illegitimate at best. Despite the myriad of claims against the usefulness of Compstat, soon before leaving office in 2001, Giuliani asserted, “the city is managed.”\textsuperscript{110} Seemingly giving legitimacy to both the role of Compstat in its successful crime reduction citywide, as well as his own term as mayor of New York City.

Given his extremely white background, and his unseating of the first black mayor of New York City, David Dinkins, Giuliani’s time in office was inherently fraught with racial unrest, illuminating the validity of criticisms surrounding racial profiling and police brutality in the NYPD during this time. In his time as mayor, Dinkins implemented a series of affirmative action protocols for minorities seeking city contracts, as well as offices created to serve as racial and ethnic liaisons. Arguing that offering services to

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 211.
African-Americans or European-Americans on a separate basis promoted inequality, 
Giuliani believed that “America is built on equal treatment” and that “people in this city 
don’t need special things. They need more general things—safety, jobs, education.” By 
blinding himself to the evident disparities between races as they inhabit the city, Giuliani 
was able to implement the Broken Windows theory with a clean consciousness, despite 
overwhelming opposition from minorities. Wondering whether the burden of strict equal 
law enforcement would fall unequally on African Americans, Dinkins criticized 
Giuliani’s proposals on the basis of racial profiling and unnecessary police violence 
against people of color.

V. NYPDPolice and the Implementation of the Broken Windows Theory

Implementation of the Broken Windows theory resulted in an initial downturn in 
crime, but an ultimate increase in police brutality and social unrest.112 These unforeseen 
consequences of the theory signaled the potential problems with it overall. The principle 
architect for Broken Windows theory policies, Police Commissioner William Bratton, 
contends that “[the successes of crime reduction] didn’t just happen… they were 
achieved by embracing the concept of community policing.”113 It is understandable that 
Bratton would praise his own strategies, and not long after a political scientist by the 
name of Wesley Skogan tested the theory. Hailing from Northwestern University, Skogan 
conducted a high profile empirical study of the theory, in which he concluded that the

111 Ibid., 209.
112 Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order(Hampshire, UK: MacMillan Press, 
1978), 186.
113 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the 
presence of visible disorder does in fact lead to crime. George Kelling, in his book *Fixing Broken Windows*, which followed the Broken Windows article, but was not co-authored with Wilson, contends that Skogan “established the causal links between disorder and serious crime—empirically verifying the ‘Broken Windows’ hypothesis.” 114

Skogan’s study consolidated data from separate studies between 1977 and 1983 in order to do, what he claimed, was an empirical and objective study of the Broken Windows theory. Selected at random, nearly 13,000 personal and telephone interviews were conducted in order to gain material for this study and the participants hailed from nearly forty different neighborhoods in six major American cities: Chicago, Newark, Houston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Atlanta. Notably, New York City is not one of the studied cities. First, Skogan regressed the rate of robbery victimization on the level of disorder. Second, he regressed the rate of robbery victimization on level of disorder taking in to account the level of poverty, residential stability, and the racial composition off the neighborhoods. From this, Skogan concluded that “the data from the 40 neighborhoods cannot shed a great deal of light on the details of the relationship between disorder and crime,” detecting no causal link. But, Skogan ultimately concludes, “these data support the proposition that disorder needs to be taken seriously in research on neighborhood crime… broken windows do need to be repaired quickly.” 115 Not surprisingly, order-maintenance proponents have adopted the latter statements, attempting to establish a disorder crime nexus.

Upon second look, Bernard Harcourt discovered that the data did not support Skogan’s claim that crime is related to disorder. The data, in fact, suggested that certain crimes such as purse snatching, pocket picking, and rape are not related to disorder at all. While physical assault and burglary, are significantly related to disorder; however, the statistical relationship vanishes when neighborhood poverty, stability, and race are taken into account, questioning the validity of Skogan’s study.116

Social norm proponents also site other evidence in support of the quality-of-life initiative. Primary of which is the single fact that crime rates in New York City have plummeted in recent years—years that have coincided with Broken Windows theory. New York City’s crime reduction numbers can be tallied as follows: the murder rate has come down nearly 40 percent, the robbery rate more than 30 percent, and the burglary rate more than 25 percent.117 New York City has also increased its investment in law enforcement over the course of a decade. Close inspection of the number of police officers per capita in New York City reveal that, whereas New York City was at the top for the decades previous to Giuliani’s election, after he took office, it was number one.118 In conclusion, it is important to take in to account the overall increased influence of the NYPD following Giuliani’s election, not just the change in their policing protocols following the measures of Broken Windows policing.

116 Ibid., 312.
VI. Conclusions

The successes of the theory and resulting aesthetic of order in New York City overshadowed the sharp increase in complaints of police brutality, which viewed in conjunction with the “Broken Windows” essay, is not surprising. The “Broken Windows” essay reveals a struggle between the two competing sources of power, the police and the criminal. The police view, according to Wilson and Kelling, is that “the cops and the gangs are the two rival sources of power in the area, and that the gangs are not going to win.” Increasing from 5,983 complaints between 1990 and 1993, to 8,316 between 1994 and 1996, claims of police brutality reflect the explicit struggle between police and offender, which led to an overall increase in violence. In many cases these complaints had racial implications and need to be re-examined as to encourage equality.

Police officials suggest that the increase in complaints can be attributed to the overall increase in number of arrests due to the implementation of Broken Windows theory, which necessitated simply more arrests than ever before. Commissioner Bratton minimized the significance of the numbers when he concluded, “complaints always rise after there is a large influx of new police officers.” Perhaps valid as a short-term justification, the reality of the situation is that although rookie officers can account for some of the complaints, the increase in complaints is rising at a faster rate than the incoming of police officers, signaling a larger systematic shift within the NYPD.

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120 Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Law Review, 2006), 379.
121 Ibid., 379.
In addition, the increase in quantitative arrests was exacerbated by the hostile method of arrests encouraged by the Broken Windows theory. Inspiring more aggressive arresting can be one reason why the implementation of order-maintenance protocols caused an increase in cases of police brutality. A serious ordeal, arrests consisted of handcuffing, fingerprinting, strip searches, and almost a day in jail before seeing a judge who often ruled the punishment enough. According to the New York Times in November of 1996, “some people were held in cells more than 60 hours waiting to see a judge for crimes like farebeating, sleeping on park benches, and drinking public.”122 In addition, arrests created a criminal record, which haunted people on future job or school applications. Heightened by the addition of aggressive arresting tactics, order-maintenance protocols were highly subjective and could be interpreted by the arresting officer, often at the expense of un-expecting minorities.

Enforcing the overwhelming claims of racial profiling on the part of the NYPD, the aggressive style of misdemeanor arresting had a disproportionate impact on minorities. The demographic breakdown of arrestees reflects that an unequal number of minorities were arrested for misdemeanors—unequal in relation to the percentage of minorities in the population, not in relation to number of minorities committing misdemeanor crimes. The point is not that police is targeting minorities; it is that more minorities are arrested for misdemeanors than whites, given their proportion in society. Furthermore, the majority of these arrests were in the most economically disadvantaged areas of the city, including many public housing developments.123 In a nationwide survey done in 1995, 58.7 percent of arrests for “suspicion” were black, while they represented

122 Ibid., 381.
123 Ibid., 345
only 13 percent of the population in major metropolitan cities. In light of the Broken Windows theory, which is a policing strategy that targets misdemeanors and uses a majority white police force, it is understandable that it has a disproportionate effect on minorities.

An article published by the New York Times, authored by Clyde Haberman, asked a “humble question” on the quality-of life-initiative: “whose life is it, anyway, that we’re talking about?” Slightly facetious, Haberman’s comments raise the question of why exactly the minor disorder that Giuliani and Bratton have targeted are that of the lower class. Clearly, the Broken Windows theory is not targeting those who pay their housekeeper in cash to avoid IRS underreporting, or who pay their nannies under the table. The quality-of-life initiatives adopted by the NYPD focus on loitering, farebeating, and panhandling—crimes that affect the poorer members of society, many of which are minority. By handing over the ability to define disorder to the police and elite community members, racial, cultural, and sexual outsiders are removed from the equation, an overtly antidemocratic act.

Both placed in a position of equal power, the police able to definitively arrest and the disorderly able to disrupt the civility of the city, the two are placed in direct combat. Touted as an alternative to the severe punishments that dominated criminal thought in the 1980s, the Broken Windows theory ironically falls back on law enforcement strategy that relies principally on arrest and incarceration of disorderly people, evidently at a much higher rate than before. The Broken Windows style of crime deterrence interprets the

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124 Ibid., 382.
aesthetic of an orderly population, and, at the same time empowers the police as the only opposition to disorder. The theory’s explicit purpose is to maintain an aesthetic of order, which has the intended result of lowering crime rates. The hardships caused by the detrimental effects of quality-of-life initiatives often times do not outweigh the positives.
Conclusions:

Starting with Elizabeth Wood, I examined the emergence of public housing from the Great Depression. It is important to root back to this point because it emphasizes the extreme necessity and urgency to which the public housing model developed from. Crime at this time came in the form of large-scale riots, to which administrators, including Wood, attributed to the social ailments of the overall population, not the harmful effects of public housing typologies. However, crime was never a central concern in Wood’s formation of public housing for Chicago. Quickly realizing its role, Wood published a series of publications following her dismissal from the CHA about the potential influence of building type of individual behavior and promotion of crime, hinting at the body of work to follow, conceptualized by Oscar Newman.

Newman is the most directly adamant that urban design of public housing has a direct affect on crime levels. However, his analysis of specific public housing in his publication of *Defensible Space* leaves much to be desired. The most successful in weaving together crime, public housing, urban design, Newman’s failure to effectively convey his ideas resulted in his theory’s lack of application on a large scale. Viewed as a piece of urban history, the book is effective in conveying a prominent ideology of the time, and proves useful in the formation of the narrative for this thesis, but was ineffectual in the actual implementation of any meaningful physical changes to public housing, and was quickly forgotten as a relic of a bygone period; unusable by any housing authority.

The failure of both of these crime reduction tactics left the nation, and especially the most urbanized zone within it, New York City, in a continued state of crime and
urban degradation. From this was borne the Broken Windows theory. Rooting itself in the notion that the individual is directly affected by the orderliness of their environment, not the physical absolutes of its buildings, the Broken Windows theory was as harsh as it was effective in its implementation. Not addressing public housing outright, the theory targets low-income residents, who by design dwell in public housing. Adopted by Rudy Giuliani shortly after taking office as mayor of New York City, the Broken Windows theory demanded the conviction of all minor crimes, as to decrease disorder in the city and improve aesthetics. The theory is still in effect in New York City, and is the only one of the three theories I have studied that was met with any considerable success.

In studying the design and crime narrative, I attempted to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable relationship between crime reduction, urban design, and socially conscious federally funded housing. What I found was that the integration of all three has never been done and, at times, appears impossible. Elizabeth Wood views public housing as supremely important in the urban fabric, while the Broken Window theory negates the influence of public housing and places crime and order as the most important, and Newman is the only theorist joining the two. This shows that the chronological progression traces the path of public housing with Wood, both public housing and crime with Newman, and ultimately only crime with the Broken Windows theory.

This narrative however is not linear; it is circuitous. Starting and ending with a social lens, Newman, the only theorist strongly advocating for a change in architectural and design features, emerges as a caveat in the development of the theory despite his seemingly more holistic approach. Additionally, Wood and the Broken Windows theory both have profound racial implications. Wood saw the increase in social unrest due to
racial migration in Chicago, while the Broken Windows theory arguably encouraged
racial profiling. The ideological similarities between the first and last story in the
narrative isolate Newman as the standout, even more than the mere fact that he was the
only theorist to integrate both crime and urban design.

Important facts about the relationship between design and crime can be gleaned
from the connection of these three theories, however, the scope of this project can be
broadened in the future. I have been able to isolate three important times for the
development of design against crime in public housing, all building on one another and
connected in their own ways. Through this, I have demonstrated that crime and public
housing are inexorably linked, though are often times not viewed in conjunction with one
another. This, for now, reigns true, but there is always more to the story. According to a
December 31, 2014 Atlantic article entitled “The Benefits of Fewer NYPD Arrests,”
many New York City police officers began a “virtual work stoppage” following the
murder of Eric Garner at the hands of an NYPD police officer. By making fewer low-
level arrests and issuing fewer citations, NYPD officers attempted to remove themselves
from the narrative of crime prevention, fearing that Mayor Bill de Blasio and City Hall
would not support them if something were to happen.127 This is in direct opposition to the
tenets of the Broken Windows theory, which insists that police make ample arrests of
minor crimes in order to instill order. If NYPD police officers are not following the
Broken Windows theory now, does that mean that there is a new theory on the horizon, or
perhaps a space for the reapplication of Newman’s Defensible Space theory? Only time

will tell, but the understanding of the previous ideologies can shed light on possible answers, which I have done in this thesis.
Figures:

**Fig. 1** Le Corbusier’s L ‘Unite d’Habitation in Marseilles, a prime example of the radiant city model of housing advocated by the first CIAM meetings.

**Fig. 2** The Pruitt-Igoe housing complex in 1971 shortly before its destruction, echoing the influence of Le Corbusier and the L ‘Unite d’Habitation typology.
Fig. 3 The widely broadcast destruction of Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, MO in April of 1972.

Fig. 4 An Illustration from Elizabeth Wood’s 1977 “Housing Design: A Social Theory,” depicting a chessboard for ‘evening loiterers (B), waiting for the mailman or elevator (C), custodian’s door (D), and toilet for children (E). Reflecting the orderly social controls advocated by Oscar Newman and the Broken Windows theory.
Fig. 5 Illustration of Pruitt Igoe floor plan from *Defensible Space*.

Fig. 6 Image of Pruitt-Igoe in disrepair taken by Oscar Newman featured in *Defensible Space*. 
Fig. 7 The large Sarah Lawrence College dorm taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*.

Fig. 8 The small Sarah Lawrence College dorm taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*. 
Fig. 9 The Van Dyke houses from a distance taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*.

Fig. 10 The Van Dyke houses from above taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*.
Fig. 11 Aerial image of Brownsville Houses taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*.

Fig. 12 Interior image of The Californian taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*. 
**Fig. 13** Exterior image of The Californian taken by Oscar Newman in *Defensible Space*.

**Fig. 14** Illustration of Riverbend Houses elevator surveillance in *Defensible Space*. 
Fig. 15 Illustration of in-home electronic surveillance functions proposed by Newman in *Defensible Space*.

Fig. 16 Illustration of security guard monitored electronic surveillance functions proposed by Newman in *Defensible Space*. 
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Illustration Credits:

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

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Fig. 15

Fig. 16