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Psychoepistemology and Subjective Determinism

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Psychoepistemology and Subjective Determinism

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
Kenneth Park

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

December 2022

Dedication:

This is dedicated to many people. Most importantly to President Leon Botstein and Professor Daniel Berthold, both of whom were there for me when no one else was. The rest of my Senior Project Board: Professor Garry Hagberg, Dean David Shein, and (at least for my mid-way Board) Professor Jay Elliott. More thanks to UMass-Lowell Professor Fletcher Smith (my unofficial board member). All the staff at Worcester Recovery, especially Dr. Eric Huttenbach, Jeremy Weiland, Dr. Ariel Ingber, Jamie Klugiewicz, and Dr. Miriam Stoll. My friends Stuart Angus, Dr. Helene Day, Tom Day, Dr. William Cohen, Ernest Henderson, Rachel Johnson, Tamara Barney, Dr. Burke, and Dr. Robert Welch. Special thanks to Bard College in general (including the technical help of Jeremy Hall, and help by Peter Gadsby and Alyson Harte), and to UMass-Lowell in general.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

FULL CITATIONS ARE IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A Findlay, "Analysis," in Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*
- AK Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*
- AOC Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*
- BB Rand, "America's Persecuted Minority, Big Business," in Rand, *Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal*.
- BD McCloskey, *Bourgeois Dignity*
- BE McCloskey, *Bourgeois Equality*
- BGE Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*
- BN Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*
- BV McCloskey, *The Bourgeois Virtues*
- CC Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*
- CC? Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," in *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition*
- CG Rorty, "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," in Rorty, *Objectivism, Relativity, and Truth*
- DD Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence," In *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition*
- DM Beiner, *Dangerous Minds*
- DP Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*
- EA Berthold, *The Ethics of Authorship*
- ET Rorty, *An Ethics for Today*
- EWU Rorty, "Ethics Without Universal Obligations," in Rorty, *Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism*
- FA *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition*

FNS Gemes, "Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation"

GM Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*

GS Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*

GSH Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*

HD Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic*

HGS Berthold, *Hegel's Grand Synthesis*

HTM Berthold, *Hegel's Theory of Madness*

INC Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" in *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition*

IRH Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*

JE Elliott, *Character*

JLL Rorty, "Justice As A Larger Loyalty," in Rorty, *Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism*

JN Gomichon, "Joseph Nye On Soft Power"

KN Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*

MS Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*

NFP Patton, *Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory*

NNR Pearson, "Nietzsche on the Necessity of Repression"

O Said, *Orientalism*

ORT Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*

PAA Rorty, *Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism*

PBL Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism," in Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*

PDP Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," in Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*

PHN Patton, "Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche," in Patton, *Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory*.

PNS Berges, "Plato, Nietzsche and Sublimation"

PS Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*

- SAN Swenson, "Sublimation and Affirmation in Nietzsche's Psychology"
- SO Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," in Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*
- SU Phillips, "Sublimation and the Ubermensch"
- TCF Rorty, *Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself*
- TI Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*
- UP Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*
- WP Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*
- WW Huntington, *Who Are We?*

Introduction: Psychoepistemology and Subjective Determinism

The world exists in a state of turmoil. The purpose of this Senior Project is to define the parameters of the current historical epoch, and to come up with a provisional formula for solving the problems of the current historical epoch (from my perspective, the perspective of an American troubled by the inability of America to live up to many of the ideals of America; and also troubled by the rising power of nations and cultures that do not live up to the ideals of America, either). I believe that Samuel Huntington's analysis of the current historical epoch, in his *The Clash of Civilizations*, successfully defines the parameters of our epoch. He defines it as being the conflict between the West and rising non-Western powers, especially China, India, and the Muslim world. This conflict, according to Huntington, is the result of the increasing economic and military power of the rising non-Western powers combined with their lack of modernization in cultural and normative terms. This means, in essence, that societies with cultural values that reject the cultural values of the West are becoming increasingly able (due to their increasing economic and military power) to assert their values on a Global scale. (I recognize that we, in America, don't live up to our own stated ideals, either.) My solution to this situation is to develop, in both theory and practice, a methodology that will realize what I consider the essence of the positive aspects of the ideals of Western Civilization. My formula contains five instruments of power that will lead to universal human liberation (or, at least to the next historical epoch). The five instruments of power are: (1) psychoepistemology, which has two components: the psychological "respect for other beings" or respect for being in general, and second, epistemology, derived from Hegel's dialectic, which is enforcing the reciprocal interaction of subject and object (including other subjectivities and nature) in society. Instrument (2) is the creation of ideal subjectivities in both the West's and the rising non-West's cognitive elites (what I will call overmen/innovative bourgeois subjectivities). Instrument (3) is the use of

utilitarian mass culture to seduce¹ the masses of both the West and the rising non-West.

Instrument (4) is the use of smart power to change the values of both the West and non-West, to make them more in line with psychoepistemology and less determinist (both subjective and objective determinist) Instrument (5) is the use of “brain drain” to seduce the cognitive elites of the non-West to have them come to the West and to have them become more in line with our values (especially as they relate to instrument (1) psychoepistemology). Some degree of cultural assimilation will have to occur for (5) “brain drain” to be effective.

Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations*, though written in 1996, remains prescient and valid, in many ways, today. In this project, I am going to augment his analysis with the thought of some of the greatest thinkers of the West. I will attempt to conceptualize and execute a philosophical reading of Huntington’s and Deirdre McCloskey’s (related to her magnum opus *Bourgeois* trilogy) works in order to augment their analysis. In particular, I am going to introduce two concepts that I have adapted from the Western canon. These two concepts are: (1) psychoepistemology, and (2) subjective determinism. (There will be many other concepts that I will employ along the way, but the two aforementioned ones are the most critical to my analysis.) I will argue that Huntington’s analysis, though brilliant, winds up in what I call “the quietism of despair” in his views on U.S. foreign policy. I will argue that the two concepts that I introduce above, psychoepistemology, and subjective determinism, will enable a solution to *The Clash of Civilizations* that allows for the spread of the positive aspects of our culture to the cultures of the rising non-Western powers and will, as well, enable our own culture to achieve the actualization of our values that we haven’t succeeded in so doing yet. One aspect of Huntington’s analysis that I feel requires augmentation is the degree to which we haven’t yet succeeded in the realization of our own values in our own country. America is in a state of turmoil, with an ethical-normative state that does not yet live up to the ideals of our

¹ I use the term seduce because it relates to the potential affinities of mass culture, with mass culture being superior to religious and secular fanaticism.

culture. As Rorty discusses, what we mean when we say “we” in American culture is different depending upon who is saying “we.” Deirdre McCloskey writes that the original American Equality only involved “...male, straight, white, Anglo, middle aged, high income, non-immigrant, New England mainline Protestants.”² Huntington does acknowledge this, but he asserts that there is nothing wrong with American values; there is only a gap between the ideal and the real that must be corrected by humans in history through praxis.³ This gap, or negativity, between the ideal and the real is, for Hegel, the motor of human history.

Now, I will briefly outline my conceptions of psychoepistemology and subjective determinism as they relate to this gap between the ideal and the real. Human experience can be divided up into the relations between the individual subject and objective reality (which also includes other subjects and nature). Objective reality is always mediated through subjective conditions, via the conceptual schemes acquired by the perceiving subject through his/her education. These conceptual schemes, including language and the concepts that are formed by language, are the dimension in which knowledge occurs. Ideally, at least in how I interpret Hegel, this relationship between subject and object is dialectical, with a reciprocal interaction between subject and object. This involves what I call the “relative freedom” of the subject and the “relative autonomy” of the object. By the “relative freedom” of the subject, I mean that every individual possesses reason, senses, drives, and a limited degree of agency (all of which are the properties of the individual, and which are not completely determined by factors beyond the individual’s control). These properties all vary in degree from one subject to another, but they are universal in that every individual possesses them to some degree. By “relative autonomy” of the objective, I mean that external reality exists independently of how the subject constitutes it, although the subject does constitute it to some degree. Conceptual distortions occur when this reciprocal interaction isn’t allowed to function (this reciprocal interaction being the dialectic,

² Deirdre McCloskey, *Bourgeois Equality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 91, Kindle Version.

³ Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 146-151.

which is the epistemological aspect of psychoepistemology). These distortions can be categorized by the concepts of “subjective determinism” and “objective determinism.” Subjective determinism is when the perceiving (or acting) subject imposes its conceptual schemes on objective reality without allowing the objective reality to speak back to the subject. I will give empirical examples of this distortion later on in this project. If the dialectic is allowed to function, knowledge is the result of a process of negotiation and compromise, rather than by conceptual (or actual) violence. Objective determinism, which is more commonly used in society, occurs when the “relative freedom” of the subject is denied; it leads to the inability to conceptualize any degree of self-determination of the subject. Philosophical examples of objective determinism include: Marx’s economic-class determinism, Nietzsche’s theory of biological drives, and Foucault’s analysis of the role of discursive formations/power forming subjectivities. I am using a provisional (incomplete) universal ontology to formulate these concepts. By provisional universal ontology, I mean understanding the fundamental concepts of what makes experience possible for all humans. (It could be compared to understanding all the organs of the body that every human possesses, with concepts used in the philosophical case, in place of the organs. This also relates to the Enlightenment project in general. By this, I mean that philosophy is trying to come up with a scientific understanding of the fundamental structures of human being. During the Enlightenment, scientists dissected human bodies in order to understand what makes up humanity. Philosophers are trying to discover what it means, in terms of consciousness, to be human. This is especially true of the Phenomenological Ontology of the Phenomenologists and Existentialists, as well as the project of cognitive neuroscience.) I am just starting with these fundamental concepts: psychoepistemology, objective determinism, and subjective determinism. At some point, I am going to try to evaluate whether this universal ontology is merely another Eurocentric discourse that seeks to impose itself on a non-Western objective realm. (Other cultures don’t always define the objective realm as being the equal of the subjective discourse, especially with respect to women in Muslim cultures, other oppressed

groups, etc.) Psychoepistemology presumes that the objective realm is the equal of the perceiving subject. Silencing the objective (other people, nature, etc.) is part of the violation of psychoepistemology that I call subjective determinism. Another example of universal ontology being derided as just another Eurocentric discourse would be viewing the concept of individual freedom as being culturally contingent, not actually universal to all humanity.⁴ Even if, however, my discourse is a Eurocentric one, we must still assert it in history and reality, as Nietzsche's concept of "virile skepticism" entails. "Virile skepticism" is a form of skepticism that recognizes the necessity of asserting one's values in reality regardless of whether or not you can prove their objective and universal reality (more on "virile skepticism" later on in this project).

I am also trying to integrate my adapted concept of psychoepistemology with political science's concepts of "hard power," "soft power," and "smart power." As defined by Maxime Gomichon, hard power is "...the ability to coerce, through threats and inducements..."⁵ In other words, hard power is more of the classical definition of power, such as military force and economic sanctions. Soft power involves cultural exchanges including reason, movies, and literature among other things. Gomichon writes, "...soft power enables a change of behaviour in others, without competition or conflict, by using persuasion and attraction."⁶ Much of soft power can be described as being the effect of civil society, although it is used in conjunction with official government programs. Rorty discusses the effects of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* on the anti-slavery movements of the 19th Century⁷; this is an example of soft power. "Humanizing" the dehumanized or oppressed other through soft power can be used to overcome "subjective determinism" by creating a dialectical dialogue between different cultures and different groups

⁴ Jay Elliott briefly discusses the cultural contingencies which confront supposedly universal concepts in psychological studies in his book *Character*. See Jay Elliott, *Character* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 157, Kindle Version.

⁵ Maxime Gomichon, "Joseph Nye on Soft Power," March 8, 2013, 1: <https://www.e-1r.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/> accessed 4/28/22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷ Chantal Mouffe, as quoted by Jeffrey W. Robbins, "Foreword: Richard Rorty: A Philosophical Guide to Talking About Religion," in Richard Rorty, *An Ethics for Today* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 8, Kindle Version.

within cultures. For example, studying how oppressed groups are dehumanized can increase empathy for these groups. This would include women in Muslim cultures, Dalits in India, and the victims of political, economic, and religious repression in China, undocumented immigrants in the U.S., among other examples. This also brings up the use of both hard power and soft power to achieve your political goals; this is called, by several scholars, “smart power.”

In order to achieve our goal of spreading dialectical theory and practice both within the West and within the non-West, we must make use of smart power, not just hard power or soft power. This is due to the rise in power of destructive military technologies that could wind up destroying the whole world. If we do use hard power, the hard power must be used in a dialectical manner, not in a subjective determinist manner. Militarily speaking, we could adapt some of the principles of Low-Intensity Conflict Theory (LICT). LICIT states that you should use repression to silence the elites of your opponent, while using economic and social co-optation to seduce the popular base of your opponent. This would be similar to my formulation of the class-based solution to the problems of both the West and the rising non-West. LICIT was created in order to solve the problem of Communist insurgency and Third-World nationalist insurgencies during the Cold War, but I believe that it holds promise in answering the problems created by the rise of the non-West in Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis. The “clash of civilizations” thesis holds that the cultural conflict between the West and the rising non-West has replaced the ideological conflict of the Cold War as the central conflict confronting humanity. (I am adapting the LICIT notion of using military repression to deal with the social elites of insurgent groups to the notion of smart power. We should not militarily repress the elites of the rising non-West. We should use economic means and soft power means (a combination that includes elements of both hard power and soft power, smart power, in other words) to assert our values on a global scale. As I will discuss below, this will also involve “brain drain.”)

The cognitive elite classes of both the West and the non-West should be educated in a Nietzschean-overman/McCloskey-innovative bourgeois manner, with the cosmopolitan

tolerance inherent to both. (Both McCloskey and Nietzsche will be dealt with more comprehensively later on in this project.) The masses of the West and non-West should be supplied with a utilitarian mass culture. Mass culture is utilitarian in that it spreads and maximizes the happiness of the greatest number (lumping together the Benthamite conception of happiness with J.S. Mill's division of happiness into higher and lower qualities of pleasure). This would correspond to Nietzsche's analysis of utilitarian mass culture as being a type of "herd mentality." Following Nietzsche, the great mass of humankind can't be expected to harbor non-ressentiment tolerance of other cultures and other individuals (and categories of individuals, including women, homosexuals, otherness in general). But, at least, we can make them happy and give them something to lose, so they will be more conservative in the traditional sense, i.e., not wanting drastic change. (Perhaps we can even educate them in the dialectic, so that they are more rational.) The cognitive elites and masses often have different interests, values, and psychologies.⁸

If we do use hard power, we must differentiate between hard power in the service of subjective determinism and hard power in the service of psychoepistemology. The former is using hard power to silence others, so they can't take part in the process of identity formation. The latter is using hard power to restore the equality necessary to have a dialectical relationship, to establish a situation where the reciprocal interaction of subject and object can occur (again, with "the objective" including other people). One is the use of hard power to empower discourses, the other the use of hard power to repress discourses.

Another method of achieving normative change is through what is called "brain drain." Brain drain is where the hegemonic cultures lure the cognitive elites from the developing world to study in the hegemonic cultures' universities and, hopefully, to seduce the cognitive elites to live in and work in the hegemonic cultures after completing their studies. This could

⁸ My analysis of Nietzsche draws a distinction between his liberatory psychology contrasted with his reactionary politics. (More on this distinction later.)

achieve the linkage of economic rewards to normative behaviors in that the seduced workers would have to adopt many (or at least some) of the hegemonic culture's values. The hegemonic cultures would, in the current historical situation, be the West, the seduced workers in this historical situation would be the workers of the rising non-Western powers. There are different classes of workers that are attracted to move from the non-West to the West. Some are elite, as in software engineers and technological work in general. Some are those with less skilled occupations, as in agricultural workers, nannies, and industrial laborers. It is especially important to drain the cognitive elites from the rising non-West so that they don't work in the military industries of the rising non-West. This has increasing importance as the process of the indigenization of the elites in the non-West develops (as Huntington notes, more on this later on in the project).

Another aspect of this project is that humanity should revise or replace the Bretton Woods system that was created at the end of WW2 by the victorious Allied Powers. The problems anticipated by the 1944 Bretton Woods meeting were initially to manage the rise of the USSR, the process of the decolonization of the victims of Western Imperialism, and the rebuilding of the world after WW2. Bretton Woods also was instrumental in the creation of the U.N., the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. One of the failures of the Bretton Woods system was that it didn't come up with a method of subject formation that would lead to the cosmopolitanization of the social elites of nations across the globe. I will attempt to address this failure by my class based formula: the creation of overman/innovative bourgeois subjectivities in the cognitive (and social elites in general) elites of both the West and rising non-Western powers, with the use of utilitarian consumer culture to address the desires of the masses of both the West and the rising non-Western powers. (Utilitarian mass culture is a form of culture that Nietzsche called "the herd mentality." Although I do support what is called meritocratic democratic capitalism, I recognize that Nietzsche understood some of the drawbacks of the democratization and herd mentality of the Western Enlightenment.

Nietzsche's overman is still too dependent on Pre-Enlightenment Aristocracy. That is one of the reasons why I make use of McCloskey's concept of the "innovative bourgeois" to correct some of what I consider to be the drawbacks of Nietzsche.)

I maintain that subject formation is critical to solving many problems of life on Earth. This was apparent during the Cold War, when the West (especially with the "Cowboy Capitalism" of the U.S.) produced more of the "Steve Jobs" types of individual, as opposed to the "Homer Simpson" individual. By "Steve Jobs" individual, I mean those individuals who are creative geniuses, who leave a lasting mark in the fields they choose to specialize in. The East Bloc failed to keep up with the West due to the fact that the East Bloc produced more individuals of the "Homer Simpson" variety. McCloskey referred to the "Steve Jobs" subjectivity as being the "innovative bourgeois." Nietzsche's ideal type was referred to as the "overman" (or "Dionysius," "Zarathustra"). The similarities and differences between McCloskey's and Nietzsche's ideal types will be discussed later on in this project. Suffice it to say, Nietzsche's and McCloskey's ideal types were both more accurate than Marx's conception of the proletariat being the "universal class" improvers of life on Earth. I still see some value in Marx, however, but only in the revisionist Marxists of the 20th Century, especially the Frankfurt School. Following Rorty, I think that Hegel (as appropriated from Dewey) is superior to Hegel (as appropriated from Marx)⁹ Elsewhere, Rorty talks about how Marxism was a disaster in practice.¹⁰ I think that Hegel's ontological subject, especially in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is of more enduring historical value than Marx's "science" of Dialectical Materialism centered on the collective subject of the proletariat. Hegel's *Phenomenology* is simultaneously synchronic and diachronic in its study of the consciousness of the subject. It is diachronic in that it is the history of philosophy. It is synchronic in that it analyzes the immanent structures of consciousness, with Hegel's contribution being the dialectic and Absolute Knowledge. Absolute

⁹ Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 37.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

Knowledge is the concept and process of how to think. I view my own thought as being a variation on Hegel, as I have discussed and will discuss further later on. Gadamer writes:

Just as the Greeks had taught that *logos* or *nous* was the essence and ground of the universe in spite of the disorder and irrationality of the sublunar world, Hegel now teaches us that reason can be discovered in history in spite of the frightful contradictoriness which the chaos of human fate and history displays.¹¹

(There is an old Soviet joke: “We pretend to work and the Party pretends to pay us.”)

I view Huntington’s definition of the Clash of Civilizations as being the new Hegelian historical epoch, after the victory of the West in the Cold War. It might be said that this is another example of overgeneralization, but I think that we can establish some areas of agreement within the West (commonalities between U.S. “Cowboy Capitalism” and European Social Democracy) and areas of agreement within the rising non-Western powers. There are also some differences between the West and non-West, as well as differences within both the West and non-West. Although there are some degrees of commonality, there is no one homogenous West or non-West completely identical to itself. In *Orientalism*, Edward Said overgeneralizes about Huntington’s overgeneralizations concerning these issues. Said claims that Huntington doesn’t recognize the interrelatedness of global culture.¹² I think that you can talk about the distinctions between cultures in many ways that are useful both theoretically and practically. This will not get in the way of asserting a common humanity. As it relates to this project, this common humanity will be created by means of my psychoepistemology and smart power in service of it. In a subsequent footnote in this project,¹³ Said does acknowledge the distinctions between cultures, apparently in contradiction to the common humanity he asserts above in this project.

We have more in common with European Social Democracy than with the non-Western powers. Said is right to say that nations are a hybrid phenomenon, but there are some common

¹¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel’s Dialectic*, translated by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 105.

¹² Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 348, Kindle Version.

¹³ Footnote 14.

characteristics that make it possible to generalize without doing too much conceptual violence. (To put it in military terms, if we had a third world war, we would be on the side of the E.U., not on the side of China or India or the other non-Western powers. India is a special case, however, because it is more democratic and capitalist than the other rising non-Western powers.)

Any discussion of Huntington's thesis about the clash of civilizations must come to terms with the history of Western Imperialism, especially as it relates to the rising non-Western powers. One of the most critical texts that needs to be studied in these areas is Edward Said's *Orientalism*. In *Orientalism*, Said analyzes how Western discourses on "the Orient" did not just passively observe and report on the West's experience of "the Orient," but did also literarily, in the sense of literature, formed and created "the Orient" in the minds of Westerners. Said drew heavily from Foucault in his methodology, and they both assert that there is an aesthetic aspect to truth. This is in the sense of assigning a concept to the empirical reality, and this is aesthetic in that it involves an activity, not just the passive perception of empirical reality. It is a creative, aesthetic, and at least initially, arbitrary act. The aesthetic aspect of truth means that the author can take liberties with their description of empirical reality in certain instances, which is a form of subjective determinism. This means that sometimes the author doesn't just describe reality passively, but also creates reality, in line with their intentions and desires. This type of subjective determinism doesn't allow the perceived to speak back to the perceiver, it is an aesthetic, creative act. Said writes:

My aim, as I said earlier, was not so much to dissipate difference itself-for who can deny the constitutive role of national as well as cultural differences in the relations between human beings-but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences, and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things. What I called for in *Orientalism* was a new way of conceiving the separations and conflicts that had stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control.¹⁴

Although I agree with most of Said's analysis, I feel that Said glosses over the atrocities of the victims of imperialism towards members of their own cultures, as well as understating the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 352.

Muslim world's anti-Semitism. For example, Said doesn't discuss Muslim atrocities toward their women, as well as the Muslim use of ex-Nazis like Otto Skorzeny to train their militaries, or the desire of some Muslim leaders "to push the Jews into the sea." (On a positive note, he does criticize terrorism and the P.L.O.)¹⁵ In addition, he doesn't talk about the status of Dalits in India. Said also doesn't differentiate between different types of Orientalist discourse. I view the Imperialist Orientalist discourses as being atrocious rationalizations of domination, but I view them as being different from contemporary discourses (including that of the neo-conservatives, for example, Condoleezza Rice and Richard Perle), with the contemporary discourses being more liberatory. To put this into philosophical terms, the imperialist Orientalist discourses denied the Oriental the ontological, universal freedom to become other than what they are. (The subjects of Oriental discourses, in the imperialist phase, are more like objects than human subjects.) The more recent Orientalist discourses recognize the fundamental freedom of the Oriental to become like us normatively. I draw this distinction because the contemporary anti-imperial Orientalist discourses see no reason why the non-Western world should be considered normatively inferior to the West. They think that the non-Western world should have majority rule with minority rights, and separation of church and state. I'm sure that many women and most Dalits would support me on these issues. I would ask Said today: "Who speaks for those who are denied a voice in the cultures of the non-Western powers?" I think that we can achieve positive global normative changes using the dialectic, smart power, and brain drain. (I must emphasize that this positive global normative change must occur both in the West and in the non-West.)

This project will be divided into chapters. The first chapter will be a discussion of the thought of Samuel Huntington. It will involve a discussion of the following works: his *The Clash of Civilizations*, his *Who Are We?*, and multiple commentators in *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition*. This will situate my discourse in the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 339.

contemporary historical situation. Chapter two will be a discussion of Deirdre McCloskey's magnum opus, the *Bourgeois* trilogy. This chapter will further situate my discourse historically. In particular, I will analyze her concepts of the "innovative bourgeoisie," the "Great Enrichment," and the "Clerisy", and how these concepts interact with Huntington's thought, and the state of capitalism up to the present day. Chapter three will analyze my theoretical debt to Nietzsche. The concepts of Nietzsche that I will deal with here are the following: the selfishness of the overman (and use of violence by the overman); the Ascetic Priest; Aristocracy and Democracy; Good and Evil versus good and bad; Nietzsche's analysis of different forms of skepticism; an analysis of Patton's reading of Nietzsche's concept of power; and, finally, a discussion and analysis of Nietzsche's concept of sublimation (and how it relates to Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* and the construction of a new Bretton Woods agreement). A persistent theme of the Nietzsche chapter will be the conflict between his psychological ideas and his politics. Chapter four will introduce the two concepts that I have adapted from various thinkers. These concepts are (1) psychoepistemology (especially the dialectical aspect), and (2) subjective determinism. Chapter five will be an analysis of the thought of Richard Rorty. Chapter six, the conclusion, will discuss the possibilities of human liberation based upon the theoretical formulas that I have come up with in this project. (These formulas are the five instruments of power I defined earlier in this Introduction.)

Chapter 1: The Thought of Samuel Huntington

The works of Samuel Huntington's that I am concerned with here relate to his conception of the problems confronting the United States in the late 20th and early 21st Centuries. The specific works discussed here are *The Clash of Civilizations*, *Who Are We?*, and *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition*. Broadly speaking, Huntington's analysis can be divided up into (1) the foreign policy of the West (especially the U.S.) regarding the rising non-Western powers during this time period, and (2) the domestic situation and policy of the U.S. especially regarding immigration and U.S. national identity during this time period. (*The Clash of Civilizations* was originally published in 1996; *Who Are We?* in 2005.) Again, broadly speaking, Huntington's policy prescriptions for the U.S. in these

two areas are (1) multiculturalism in foreign policy, and (2) a reinvigoration of the American Creed based upon the religious heritage of the U.S.¹⁶ (Huntington outlines three other possibilities for U.S. domestic policy and identity, but he appears to favor the one I have stated here.) For the purposes of this project, I will arrange my discussion (generally) around (1) the discussion of foreign policy centered upon *The Clash of Civilizations*, and (2) domestic U.S. policy and identity centered around *Who Are We?*. At the end of this chapter, and again in the conclusion to this project, I will outline my alternative solution to the problems for the U.S. created by the rise of the non-Western powers and the fragmentation of U.S. national identity. My solution, as already mentioned, consists in (1) the theoretical and practical use of psychoepistemology in regulating relationships between humans and nature, (2) the use of smart power in creating this psychoepistemology, (3) the creation of overman/innovative bourgeois elite subjectivities in the elites of both the West (especially the U.S.) and the rising non-Western powers, (4) the use of mass consumer culture to increase the happiness of the masses in both the West and the rising non-Western powers, and (5) practically resolving the problems created by the tension between “brain drain” and indigenization among the cognitive elites of the rising non-Western powers.

First, I will discuss foreign policy (*The Clash of Civilizations*). In this work, Huntington proposes what he thinks will be the new paradigm of world conflict that followed the end of the Cold War. In opposition to Fukuyama, Huntington thinks that the end of the Cold War, with the victory of what he and Fukuyama (and others) call “liberal democratic capitalism,” has not ushered in an “End of History,” with the “End of History” culminating in the spread and universalization of “liberal democratic capitalism” by the whole world.¹⁷ Instead, Huntington proposes that the new world order will consist in the conflict between what he terms “the West” and what he terms “the rising non-Western powers” (especially China, India, and the Muslim

¹⁶ Huntington, *WW*, 20.

¹⁷ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 31.

World). The central premise is that these rising non-Western powers are modernizing in terms of economic and military power without undergoing a period of modernization in normative terms (like the West has, to some extent).¹⁸ Indeed, Huntington asserts that the decolonization efforts of the rising non-Western powers, which largely made use of Western concepts, have now gone in reverse (at least for the elites of the rising non-Western powers):

...when non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, they invoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism, democracy, and independence to justify their opposition to Western domination. Now that they are no longer weak but increasingly powerful, they do not hesitate to attack those same values which they previously used to promote their interests. The revolt against the West was originally legitimated by asserting the universality of Western values; it is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values...As Western influence recedes, young aspiring leaders cannot look to the West to provide them with power and wealth... Indigenization has been the order of the day throughout the non-Western world in the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁹

Now, the rising non-Western powers' elites are becoming indigenous, not Western, in values: "A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles, and habits become more popular among the mass of the people."²⁰ (Huntington does note, however, that the West will still be hegemonic for a long time, possibly for centuries, despite its decline.²¹) At the same time, apparently in contradiction to the earlier quote (footnote 20), Huntington writes:

"Democratization conflicts with Westernization, and democracy is inherently a parochialization, not a cosmopolitanizing process."²² In other words, in the later quote, Huntington thinks that the masses of the rising non-West might ultimately be more (or equally) traditional than the elites of the rising non-West (in opposition to being modern normatively). This is a critical point. For my formula to work, the masses of the rising non-Western powers must be able to be "bought off"

¹⁸ In other parts of this project, I will show that this modernization of the West has only been partially achieved, in many areas, the West is still "un-Dialectical," to use the concept proposed in this project.

¹⁹ Huntington, CC, 93-94.

²⁰ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition* (U.S.A.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), 7, Kindle Version.

²¹ Huntington, CC, 29.

²² *Ibid.*, 94.

by Western mass consumer culture; if they are fanatically traditional in values, or fundamentalist, this process won't be able to function. In addition, in order to have brain drain function to change the normative makeup of non-Western elites, they have to have economic reasons to change their values, and to make them more modern. If this process is damaged because of the increasing economic power of the non-West, combined with the indigenization/traditionalization of the values of the elites of the non-West, reactionary values will become more prevalent globally. We either have to find a way to decrease the increasing economic power of the non-West, and thereby increase the attractiveness of brain drain to the elites of the non-West, or to change the values of the non-West by smart power and psychoepistemology, or both. In addition, we must make use of smart power and psychoepistemology to improve our own normative make-up in the West. This is because we don't live up to our own ideals.

Elsewhere, in *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington discusses the various non-Western responses to the West and modernization. The first, rejectionism, is where the non-Western cultures refuse to modernize or Westernize in any way (for example, Japan from 1542 to the mid-nineteenth century). The second, Kemalism, is where the elite wants a tradition-bound culture to modernize both technologically and normatively (for example, Turkey from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk until recently). Third, reformism, is the modernization of technology and economy while maintaining traditional cultures (for example, Muslim elites from the 1870s to the 1920s). The last, and the most recently ascendant in the rising non-Western powers, is fundamentalism, maintaining revolutionary but traditional values while modernizing technologically and economically (similar to reformism, but more fundamentalist than traditional in culture/values, for example, contemporary Iran).²³ Huntington writes:

At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, constitutionalism, human

²³ *Ibid.*, 72-78.

rights, equality, separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, or Orthodox cultures.²⁴

In *Who Are We?*, Huntington writes: “Americans identified their enemies with tyranny, monarchy, aristocracy, and the suppression of liberty and individual rights.”²⁵ It must be noted, however, that the West hasn’t always, and still doesn’t completely, live up to its ideals. (As a side note, Huntington notes that some of the rising non-Western powers, particularly Asian, are already starting to propose that their traditional cultures’ values are universal, and in opposition to the West’s values.²⁶ And this was in 1996!)

Huntington’s solution is to have a tolerant, multicultural foreign policy that recognizes the difficulties of transforming other cultures, while reinvigorating our own culture by religion and assimilation of immigrants to the American Creed. I think that his multicultural foreign policy borders on the “quietism of despair.” Huntington doesn’t have enough faith in our ability to use smart power to make other cultures more in line with psychoepistemology. The West, when it has the political will to do so, has successfully nation-built other cultures, notably Germany and Japan after WW2, to make them more like us and Western Europe. In addition, traditional societies such as South Korea and Taiwan have also become more modern in the Western sense of the term. This relates to the debate with the neo-conservatives over the issue of the 2003 Iraq war. Although I do agree with the neo-conservatives over the goals of the 2003 Iraq war, I think their violence bordered on the type of subjective determinism, rather than in the service of psychoepistemology. They should have used more smart power, rather than solely hard power, in Iraq. Our violence in Iraq and Afghanistan contained elements of being both in service of psychoepistemology and in the service of subjective determinism. In addition, as Huntington wisely observed, it is human to hate and make war; this must be remembered when dealing with other cultures who have different values from your own.²⁷ I am hoping that world

²⁴ Huntington, *CC?*, 19.

²⁵ Huntington, *WW*, 48.

²⁶ Huntington, *CC*, 109.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 130.

leaders will come to the conclusion of the Bretton Woods leaders, that hate and war are becoming obsolete due to the rise of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Unfortunately, the experience of poison gas in WW1 shows that the global powers can come up with restrictions on the types of weapons that are considered fit to be used in warfare. No one used poison gas in WW2. It will be interesting to see what happens with the contemporary Russia/Ukraine situation. In addition, we needed more political will to commit to the goal of making Iraq less authoritarian and theocratic (in many ways, however, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was more secular than other Muslim nations.) History might smile on the neo-conservatives, however; look at the results of the Korean War in the 1950's. In the 1950's, look at how much President Truman was vilified for the war at the time. Now, look at how favorably the war is looked at. (Imagine if North Korea had been allowed to conquer South Korea. I'm sure most South Koreans would agree with me, that a dark age would have descended upon Korea with the victory of North Korea in the war.) Truman was prescient. In some parts of his writing, Huntington seems to recognize the potential of the rising non-Western powers to modernize and Westernize. Huntington writes:

China under the T'Ang, Sung, and Ming dynasties, the Islamic world from the eighth to the twelfth centuries, and Byzantium from the eighth to the eleventh centuries far surpassed Europe in wealth, territory, military power, and artistic, literary, and scientific achievement.²⁸

If such things are possible, perhaps we can have an "Enlightenment" for the rising non- Western powers in the present historical context. Huntington is aware of the difficulties of spreading "Davos culture" (his term for the culture of the West) and of making it universal:

The Davos culture...is tremendously important. Worldwide, however, how many people share this culture? Outside the West, it is probably shared by less than 50 million people or 1 percent of the world's population and perhaps by as few as one-tenth of 1 percent of the world's population. It is far from a universal culture, and the leaders who share in the Davos Culture do not necessarily have a secure grip on power in their own societies.²⁹

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 57-58.

Huntington is anticipating the rise of the Alt-Right in the West, which is traditionalist in the populist sense. Broadly speaking, you can group many members of the Republican Party (U.S.) as being this type of traditionalist/populist mentality.³⁰

Now, I will turn to Huntington's analysis of the U.S. domestic situation. In *Who Are We?*, Huntington analyzes how the U.S. national identity and culture is decaying into fragmentation and "Balkanization." This decay is a process with stimuli both from within U.S. culture and from without, by immigration. According to Huntington, there are two broad areas as to why the sense of national identity is disintegrating in the U.S. The first is the rise of multiculturalism in the U.S. The second broad area is the non-assimilation of the post-1960 waves of immigrants to the U.S. The area of multiculturalism, in turn, is composed of two subprocesses. The first subprocess is the rise of multicultural education on the part of U.S. academia. The second subprocess is the increasing empowerment of previously oppressed groups. The former subprocess has occurred because of the rise of an academia that has become anti-patriotic in its essence. Richard Rorty has dealt with this in his *Achieving Our Country*. In *Achieving Our Country*, Rorty analyzes the decay of the academic American Left due to its transformation from a "reform America" type discourse into a "hate America" discourse. Rorty writes:

National pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement. Too much national pride can produce bellicosity and imperialism, just as excessive self-respect can produce arrogance. But just as too little self-respect makes it difficult for a person to display moral courage, so insufficient national pride makes energetic and effective debate about national policy unlikely. Emotional involvement with one's country- feelings of intense shame or glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and by various present-day national policies-is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive. Such deliberation will probably not occur unless pride outweighs shame.³¹

³⁰ I'm not going to demonize these politicians; they represent an important and valuable part of our society, with a great deal to offer both the U.S. and the world. As long as they support the democratic process, they should be allowed to speak. This latter observation relates to this project in that they should be treated dialectically as long as they recognize the validity of the dialectic, as explicated in this project.

³¹ Rorty, AOC, 3.

Many contemporary U.S. academics find that past U.S. crimes such as Native American genocide, slavery, imperialism, misogyny, homophobia, Jim Crow, and Vietnam, among other things, are unforgivable. Although I do empathize with many of the emotions of these academics, I find them to be irrational to a destructive degree. Rorty writes on politics:

To take pride in being black or gay is an entirely reasonable response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has been subjected. But insofar as this pride prevents someone from also taking pride in being an American citizen, from thinking of his or her country as capable of reform, or from being able to join with straights or whites in reformist initiatives, it is a political disaster.³²

Pride in one's own nation must be present, to some degree, in order to have hope for expanding the scope of what is meant when people say "we." But it is true that criticism is also necessary for the process of reform.

We must compare our crimes to other crimes by both Western and non-Western nations and cultures. We must not just have empathy for the victims of the world, which include both the victims of our un-dialectical practices and the victims of the rising non-Western powers. We must take into account having empathy concerning how subjectivities are formed by the oppressors. These oppressors are trying to fit in with their cultures, and must provide for their families. An example of this is the conflict over school integration, or what in the Boston area was called "Southie Busing." Although I do agree with the goals of desegregation, I think that the Democrats "shot themselves in the foot" by the manner in which they tried to do this. The Democrats didn't anticipate the degree to which their white constituents would fear for their children's safety when their children were forced to integrate with allegedly high-crime minority culture. This, I do recognize, was the result of a lack of empathy on the part of the poor and middle class whites. Their fear for their children's safety was sincere, however. It is ironic that many of the white Democrats' children, the children of those making the desegregation policies, attended expensive private sector schools that weren't a part of their desegregation policies.

³² *Ibid.*, 100.

There is a reason why Agnew's rhetoric over "limousine liberals" found such resonance among poor whites, poor whites who would otherwise support the Democrats.

Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, the European Imperialists, all, each by each, had more dead bodies to their name than the U.S. (Some of the "hate America" academics might object to classifying the Communist genocides as negative; they might say but "they were altruistic mass murderers" doing it for a noble cause.) In addition, the rising non-Western powers engage in repressive practices towards specific social sub-groups, and are, to use the term proposed in this project, un-dialectical. (This is in a manner similar to the effects of slavery and Jim Crow in the U.S., as well as the continuing effects of racism in contemporary America.) On the practical effects of this "hate America" discourse by contemporary U.S. leftist intellectuals during and following the Vietnam War, Rorty writes:

One consequence of that disastrous war was a generation of Americans who suspected that our country was un-achievable—that that war not only could never be forgiven, but had shown us to be a nation conceived in sin, and irredeemable. This suspicion lingers. As long as it does, and as long as the American Left remains incapable of national pride, our country will have only a cultural Left, not a political one.³³

This fragmentation of American identity caused by the "hate America" academic discourses could be radically transformed by establishing empirically the degree to which most cultures have "skeletons in their closet," and by showing how non-violent, constructive change can happen. This guilt over the Vietnam War metastasizes into the hate of oppressed domestic cultural groups (racial, ethnic, religious minorities, and women and homosexuals) a hatred for the U.S. which is justified, but destructive.

The latter subprocess of the decline of U.S. national identity, the rise of multiculturalism due to the empowerment of previously oppressed groups is part positive and part negative. It is positive in that previously silenced groups now have the ability to speak back and to engage in the (hopefully, and ideally) dialectical process of identity formation. It is negative in that many of these groups are anti-American, sometimes violently so. Rorty:

³³ *Ibid.*, 38.

The Black Muslims say that white people started out as homunculi created by a diabolical scientist. This hypothesis seems to them the best explanation for the inhuman cruelty of the slave auctions and the lynchings...I do not think there is any point in arguing that Elijah Muhammad made the right decision and Baldwin the wrong one, or vice versa. Neither forgave, but one turned away from the project of achieving the country and the other did not. Both decisions are intelligible.³⁴

Rorty is describing the difference between the African-American leaders the reformist James Baldwin, and the Muslim revolutionary Elijah Muhammad. Rorty favors Baldwin because Baldwin's discourse was more constructive to U.S. national identity. Muhammad wanted the violent overthrow of white culture. It is ironic that David Duke, the former KKK leader, used to support Black nationalist and revolutionary organizations in the U.S. during the 1970's because Duke thought black violence would lead most white Americans to become racist in response to the violence. Duke thought black violence would lead to a resurgence of White Power in America.

The negative aspect could be cured by helping these oppressed groups realize that they are making use of Western Values in their revolt against their oppression. It is not a revolutionary overthrow of our values that they are acting in service of, but in service of the realization of previously unrealized values. Huntington writes, "The essence of the American Creed has been equal rights for the individual, and historically immigrant and outcast groups have invoked and thereby reinvigorated the principles of the Creed in their struggles for equal treatment in American society."³⁵ (Huntington goes on to attack Affirmative Action as being a violation of the American Creed. I, however, feel that some type of Affirmative Action is necessary due to the historical nature of some types of discrimination and oppression.)³⁶ I think that Huntington understates the degree to which multiculturalism in the U.S. is a positive thing, because it is the realization of some of the dreams of oppressed groups. I do agree with Huntington, however, that multiculturalism should be realized by a dialectical process of

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

³⁵ Samuel Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?" in *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition* (U.S.A.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), 62, Kindle Version.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

dialogue, not by increasing the alienation of already alienated social groups, an alienation that sometimes manifests itself violently. To put it in blunt terms, there are some aspects of multiculturalism that are pro-social, and there are some aspects that are anti-social. In addition, as will be discussed below, I think that most of the American Creed is positive, especially the Anglo-Protestant work ethic (which is, in many cases, also present in non-Anglo-Protestant social groups).

Kishore Mahbubani cites some disturbing statistics: since 1960, the U.S. population has increased 41%, while violent crime has increased 560%, divorce rates have increased 300%, single-mother births 419%, children living in single parent homes 300%.³⁷ To be fair, some of the statistics, including the increase in divorce rates, are probably the result of the increasing ability of women to flee abusive relationships. In addition, he doesn't cite how much of the increase in violent crime is done by new immigrants or social decay on the part of people already living in the U.S. Mahbubani also writes that the West's low savings and investment rates have led to declining competitiveness in relation to East Asia (and the West's work ethic is also eroding).³⁸ As mentioned, Huntington associates much of the decay with two processes: the rise of multicultural education on the part of liberal social elites in the U.S., and the lack of assimilation to the American Creed by post-1960 waves of immigrants to America. The end result is the same: the decay of U.S. national identity. Although I do support multicultural education in America, I think that we must not just give rights to citizens, but we must also expect things in return, namely patriotism and an understanding of why America is an attractive place compared with other countries. I believe that criticism is necessary in many regards as a part of being a good citizen of this country. Immigrants and citizens who don't understand economics might not understand that capitalism and the American Creed are two of the reasons

³⁷ Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West," in *Foreign Affairs: The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: 20th Anniversary Edition* (U.S.A.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), 41, Kindle Version.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.

why America is such an attractive place. We must not become an authoritarian culture with high inflation, low economic growth, a lack of separation of church and state, and majority rule without minority rights. On the last part, I recognize that many minorities in America do not have their rights respected. Look at the Black Lives Matter situation. In other parts of this project, I will provide empirical evidence as to how America is un-dialectical in certain regards.

Now, I will discuss the second broad area that Huntington associates with the disintegration of U.S. national identity: the lack of assimilation of the post-1960 immigrants to the American Creed. Being a synthesis of left-liberal, neo-conservative, and Libertarian ideas, I think that we must utilize both subjective and objective factors in improving the lot of the disadvantaged. By subjective, I mean those factors related to virtue and personality; by objective, I mean those factors related to economics and sociology. The subjective and objective reciprocally interact. The subjective aspects of the American Creed would improve the work ethic of outcast groups and the new waves of immigrants to America. The objective aspect would involve some form of capitalism (whether U.S. "Cowboy Capitalism" or European Social Democracy, or a hybrid. This would increase support for either public sector or private sector social welfare programs, or both, out of Nietzschean exuberance rather than duty.). One of the most important aspects of social policy is achieving a high level of economic growth; this would increase the number of high-paying jobs available to everyone. As I stated above, this would create more support for Affirmative Action programs (the programs would be done out of exuberance rather than duty). Huntington argues that the waves of post 1960 immigrants to America aren't assimilating to the American Creed. He writes:

America's core culture has been, and, at the moment, is still primarily the culture of the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century settlers who founded American society. The central elements of that culture can be defined in a variety of ways but include the Christian religion, Protestant values and moralism, a work ethic, the English language, British traditions of law, justice, and the limits of government power, and a legacy of European art, literature, philosophy, and music. Out of this culture the settlers developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the American Creed with its principles of liberty, equality, individualism, representative government, and private property. Subsequent generations of immigrants were assimilated into the culture of the founding settlers and

contributed to and modified it. But they did not change it fundamentally. This is because, at least until the late twentieth century, it was Anglo-Protestant culture and the political liberties and economic opportunities it produced that attracted them to America.³⁹

Huntington elsewhere asserts that the pre-1960 waves of immigrants to America, at least many of them, were more American than many of those already in America: "Having made a momentous, decisive, and, for many, irrevocable decision, immigrants had to validate and reinforce that decision by wholeheartedly embracing the culture and values of their new homeland."⁴⁰ Elsewhere, Huntington writes: "Throughout American history, people who were not white Anglo-Saxon Protestants have become Americans by adopting America's Anglo-Protestant culture and political values. This benefited them and the country."⁴¹ Although I do think we are far from being perfectly dialectical, I think that the American Creed is still what attracts people to America. Despite the validity of many of the criticisms of U.S. "Cowboy Capitalism," immigrants want to come to America because this is where the jobs are (as well as a stable currency). If they remained in their home countries, they would experience the adversities of low wages, less jobs, high inflation, increased corruption, and less economic opportunity. If we became culturally like the rest of the world (with the possible exception of the European Union and/or Canada), no one would want to come here, because the economic opportunities presented by capitalism would not exist. If America is so bad, why do so many people want to come here? Huntington, citing Lipset on the American Creed, writes that "Seymour Martin Lipset identified five key principles at its core: liberty, egalitarianism (of opportunity and respect, not result or condition), individualism, populism, and laissez-faire."⁴²

Central to Huntington's analysis is his extreme valuing of religion. Although I am a religious skeptic, my skepticism cuts both ways; due to the limitations of my subjective perspective, I have no possibility, short of a religious revelation, of proving whether God exists

³⁹ Huntington, *WW*, 40-41.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 67.

or not. That being said, I adhere to much of the American Creed in terms of behavior on Earth, but for secular reasons. I find that I have more in common with Western Christians than with members of other faiths. Huntington writes: "By every indicator, Americans are far more religious than the people of other industrialized countries. Overwhelming majorities of white Americans, of black Americans, and of Hispanic Americans are Christian."⁴³ In other parts of *Who Are We?*, Huntington documents the anti-atheist nature of American society.⁴⁴ Huntington's analysis (and other experts that he references in support of his thesis) shows that non-W.A.S.P. cultures, if they assimilate, can successfully adopt the W.A.S.P. work ethic without adhering to W.A.S.P. dogma (I am using the terms "W.A.S.P." and "dogma" in the descriptive and analytical senses, not normative; for the most part there is nothing wrong with "W.A.S.P. dogma," aside from the xenophobia and racism of "Archie Bunker" types. Not all W.A.S.P.'s are Archie Bunker types). He associates this process with bourgeois civilization, not just W.A.S.P. culture:

The work ethic is a central feature of Protestant culture, and from the beginning America's religion has been the religion of work. In other societies, heredity, class, social status, ethnicity, and family are the principal sources of status and legitimacy. In America, work is. In different ways both aristocratic and socialist societies tend to demean and discourage work. Bourgeois societies promote work.⁴⁵

This work ethic is central to Huntington's thought, and for him it is directly related to religious culture. (I assume that Huntington thinks that is why the East Bloc and Social Democracy had/have lower productivity work forces. I am a proud workaholic and non-religious at the same time. I am living proof that you can be atheist and a workaholic at the same time.) Nonetheless, this association, by Huntington (and others), of religiosity and a work ethic, is especially important in this age of "the Return of God".⁴⁶

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 87-88.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁴⁶ Huntington, CC, 95-101. Huntington, *WW*, 15, 336-366.

These are some of the processes that are creating challenges to the U.S. (and the West in general). Other challenges include: systemic racism, persistent poverty, and schisms related to U.S. and Western culture. The rise of the non-Western powers (especially China, India, and the Muslim World) materially, is happening, without their modernizing ideologically. This is combined with the continuing inability of the U.S. to fully realize its goals domestically. In addition, domestically, there is the rise of multiculturalism in the U.S. combined with the lack of assimilation of the post-1960 immigrants to the U.S., the two broad processes that Huntington believes are leading to the fragmentation of U.S. identity. Huntington suggests four possible resolutions of this situation of America-in-conflict: (1) we could lose our core culture but retain the U.S. Constitution and Creed as social cement (liberals favor this, what Huntington calls the ideological resolution), (2) we could become bifurcated, with a Hispanic culture increasing in power, (3) we could become exclusivist: a racially intolerant U.S. that tries to repress or expel other cultures who pose a challenge to the traditional American Creed, an America with high levels of social conflict (the non-”Big Tent” Republicans), and (4) an attempt to ”reinvigorate” U.S. culture by use of religion (including the American Creed) and a commitment to the English language.⁴⁷ I will be proposing a fifth alternative: as I have mentioned earlier, the following formula: (1) the theoretical and practical use of psychoepistemology in regulating human interaction with other humans, as well as with nature; (2) the use of smart power in creating psychoepistemology; (3) the creation of overman/innovative bourgeois subjectivities in the elites of both the Western and rising non-Western cultures; (4) the utilization of mass consumer culture to increase the happiness of both the Western and non-Western masses; and (5) resolving the tensions between ”brain drain” and indigenization in the elites of the rising non-Western cultures.

Although Huntington describes and laments the national disintegration due to the devaluing of the American Creed, he cites the continuing support for the American Creed by the

⁴⁷ Huntington, *WW*, 19-20.

great mass of Americans. But he thinks that the faith in the Creed isn't sufficient enough on its own to make a nation whole. Huntington writes:

As a result, at the end of the twentieth century the Creed was the principal source of national identity for most Americans. Two factors enhanced its importance. First, as ethnicity and race lost salience and Anglo-Protestant culture came under serious attack, the Creed was left as the only unchallenged survivor of the four major components of American identity. Second, the Creed had acquired renewed status, comparable to what it had in the Revolution, as the defining characteristic distinguishing America from the ideologies of its German, Japanese, and Soviet enemies. Hence many Americans came to believe that America could be multiracial, multiethnic, and lack any cultural core, and yet still be a coherent nation with its identity defined solely by the Creed...A creed alone does not a nation make.⁴⁸

I think that this is an unresolved tension in Huntington's thought. On the one hand, he seems to recognize the ability of the American Creed to welcome new immigrants of different religions and cultures (as long as they adopt certain elements of the Creed, like the Anglo-Protestant work ethic). On the other hand, at the end of *Who Are We?*, he assigns religion a central role in his formula for regaining a national identity. At the end of *Who Are We?*, he outlines three possible roles for America in the contemporary world. The first is cosmopolitan, with the U.S. becoming more like the rest of the world in terms of culture; in other words, adopting multinational values in line with MultiNational Corporations (MNC's), the remains of the current Bretton Woods system, and the Social Democracies of the E.U. and elsewhere. The second is the imperialism of the neo-conservatives, with America exporting meritocratic democratic capitalism to the areas of the world where it doesn't yet exist. The third, which Huntington appears to favor, is what the majority of Americans choose (at least according to the polls Huntington cites), which is the national. The national is that of the English language, American religiosity, economic protectionism, neo-isolationism (although this might be too strong a term for it), and general national self-concern (all of which distinguish America from other countries, whereas the first two alternatives emphasize similarity).⁴⁹ Based upon my reading of Huntington, I would suspect that, if he were alive today, Huntington would have sympathy for

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 337.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 362-366.

much of the Trump doctrine, hopefully distancing himself from Trump's insurrectionary tendencies. Although I think that being an anti-religious bigot is just as bad as being a religious bigot, I think that America should welcome those of other religions, as long as they assimilate to most of the American Creed. In addition, I would stress that we have to make these immigrants more psychoepistemological in their thinking than they were in their traditional societies, in the definition of psychoepistemology that I am developing in this project.

Once again, I must emphasize that, for the most part, I agree with Huntington. My differences I have already outlined in my own formula for the interaction of the U.S. with itself and with the world (my five-point formula). To put it in Huntington's terms, it would be a dialectic between cosmopolitanism and imperialism. In the cosmopolitan area, I would support the creation of a new global system to correct the faults of the institutions of the Bretton Woods system. (Especially the U.N.; look at how Orwellian the U.N. can get, having Qaddafi's Libya be the head of its Human Rights Commission. In addition, many of the nations in the U.N. aren't democratic and have no private property rights. Many of the nations of the U.N. would do good to study the American Creed.) We must remake the world in terms of our stated values (which we only partially have realized in our own country). This remaking of the world must be dialectical, not the surrendering to what values exist now, and not the use of violence to restrict other discourses (unless the discourses repress other discourses). It is cosmopolitan in that we will recognize the validity of other cultures' discourses (as long as they aspire to psychoepistemology, at least in good faith). It is imperialist in that it is the assertion of our values (which we haven't yet fully realized in our own culture). By this, I mean that both the West and rising non-West already possess some values that are dialectical, but they both also possess some values that are subjective determinist. We must make use of the already existing dialectical values in order to expand their scope and make both the West and the rising non-West's values more dialectical. This will involve elements of both cosmopolitanism and imperialism. In other words, there are some good aspects of traditional values in the world, and

there are some good aspects of modernity in the world. The good aspects of both traditional and modern values are those values of both that are psychoepistemological (as explicated in this project). Attempting to realize psychoepistemology involves a process that can function simultaneously in the U.S., through domestic policy, as well as globally, through foreign policy. I think that using my five-point formula would solve, proactively in many instances, many of the problems of the world. My five point formula would be in the service of meritocratic democratic capitalism. I think that being proactive in terms of global conflict is necessary in the current historical epoch because of the rise and spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the globalization of economic crises, and the ease of having contagions become global pandemics, among other things, in other words, globalization in general.

Another area of Huntington's thought which I think is insufficiently specific is over the issue of what is to be tolerated by the modern American Creed. This, in terms of U.S. domestic policy, revolves around the issue of what I call centralism-Federalism and what is called State's rights. Centralism-Federalism is the use of social policy to create a national identity by enforcing a centralist-Federalist conception of individual civil rights. State's rights recognizes the rights of different states to conceive of and enforce their own conception of civil rights over the "dictatorship" of the Federal Government. State's rights' advantages are that it allows state governments the liberty to create their own social policy by democracy at the state level (as opposed to the national level). This would reduce the amount of social conflict by reinforcing the legitimacy of the status-quo. Change, when not accomplished dialectically, often involves the violent empowerment of previously silenced groups. State's rights' drawbacks are that if state's rights' doctrines had been enforced, the 1965 Voting Rights legislation would never have been enforced, in other words, America would still be only part democratic. This relates to the current Senior Project in that multiculturalism could be resolved in different ways, depending upon whether or not you adopt the centralist-Federalist approach, or the State's rights approach. If you adopt the centralist-Federalist approach, you would have one Federal level policy that

would be dictated to all the states, with each state being forced to follow Federal guidelines over their own State produced guidelines. I think in most cases, this would be in service of, and would be supportive of, psychoepistemology (as formulated in this Senior Project). It would be in support of psychoepistemology because it would be force in the service of empowering discourses, rather than being force in the service of repressing discourses (which would be subjective determinist force). This brings up some of the problems between majority rule with minority rights. If it is conceived at the state's rights level, this would mean that the states would have the right to repress discourses at the state level, independent of the Federal Government's rulings. I think that this should be invalidated by reference to majority rule with minority rights in that one minority would not have the right to repress the rights of other minorities (including the minorities within the states, independent of the federal government). It gets tricky when you involve religious liberty. The French have a ban on Muslim headscarves in school because the French think that religious headscarves violate the rights of women. The Muslims think that this is a violation of their religious liberty. Similarly, religious people in the U.S. often have problems with doing things in support of gay marriage, because they think it violates their religious belief that marriage is between a man and a woman. This violates the minority rights of homosexuals. This could be viewed differently in that many Christians, prior to the Civil War, thought that African-Americans weren't fully human (this was reinforced by the then racist theological beliefs of the time), so that African-Americans didn't possess the same rights as "humans." By asserting the rights of African-Americans, we were violating the religious liberties of the Confederacy, at least in the eyes of the Confederates.

To pose a similar question in another manner, what does the American Creed (including Anglo-Protestant Culture) tolerate, and what doesn't it tolerate? The American Creed is a universal creed. But it is also a tolerant universal (is this a paradox? Is paradox truth in some regards?). Some things should be tolerated, but other things, not. (I will deal with this issue in more detail when I discuss Nietzsche's "virile skepticism.") I think that the American Creed can

be interpreted in a way that allows for some degree of secularism. But, as Huntington notes, it is freedom for religion, not freedom from religion.⁵⁰ Some of Huntington's conception of Christianity conforms to Nietzsche's conception of Christianity being a religion of "ressentiment"; some does not. I think that this relative tolerance in the American Creed is why immigration has worked in America, at least up to the 1960's (as Huntington notes). The issue, however, is whether a business (either big or small) should be allowed to hire whomever they want, or should they be forced by the government to hire someone? On my Libertarian side, I think that we should maximize economic growth so that there are more high-paying jobs for everyone, regardless of their socio-cultural types. That way we can have an Affirmative Action out of Nietzschean exuberance rather than duty. Are gender and sexuality issues different in kind from racial issues? (As was noted above, Huntington supported African-American rights issues, but not Affirmative Action issues.)

I will conclude this chapter with a brief biographical note. People are not only determined by the following aspects that they're born into: family, historical time period, religion, nation, language, phase of the economy, among other things. They are also what they read. I was born into a family that valued education above all, so I was exposed to philosophy at an early age. This made me more receptive to human difference than people exposed to religious dogma in their upbringing. This receptivity to human difference made me more dialectical than others, without realizing the philosophic term until my later, more advanced, study of philosophy. I was raised to be cosmopolitan, and this cosmopolitanism colored all of my subsequent life. (I don't know how much of this cosmopolitanism was due to brain structure; some scientists argue that people have different brain structures and this leads to different normative content for each individual.) We must educate our citizens to have an appreciation of human difference (as long as the difference tolerates other difference in turn). This would create more cross-cultural tolerance and commerce (and, hopefully, expand the scope of human acceptance of

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 85.

psychoepistemology - as formulated in this project - thereby decreasing violence and oppression). “You are what you eat,” goes a common folk expression. But, you are also what you read! Hopefully this Project will encourage people to aspire to be overmen/innovative bourgeois.

Chapter 2: Deirdre McCloskey's *Bourgeois* Trilogy

There are several purposes of this chapter. One is to introduce McCloskey's concept of the “innovative bourgeoisie,” which occupies a critical role in my formula for resolving the present historical epoch's problems. In doing so, I will further utilize my adapted concept of psychoepistemology in order to remedy what I consider to be distortions in subject/object relations in various forms of ethical and economic thinking. This chapter will also display my affinity for various forms of capitalism in providing for the exponential increase in the standard of living for most humans on Earth over the last few centuries. This increase in the standard of living includes that of the rising non-Western powers in the current historical situation. This also relates to the formula of this project in that McCloskey's “innovative bourgeoisie” acts in service of both the Western and rising non-Western masses' increasing utilitarian happiness in terms of mass consumer culture. Psychoepistemology, and its distortions in both subjective determinism and objective determinism, will all be persistent themes in this Project. The innovative bourgeoisie will continue to resurface in this project as one of the elite classes that will improve life on Earth for everyone (including the poor). One of my critiques of McCloskey is that she tends to understate the degree to which the success of America was due to the extermination of the indigenous peoples.

Deirdre McCloskey's *Bourgeois* trilogy (*The Bourgeois Virtues*, *Bourgeois Dignity*, and *Bourgeois Equality*) endeavors to show both the advantages of capitalism, and the reasons why capitalism came into being in the West. As she put it concisely:

What was crucial in Europe and its offshoots was the new economic liberty and social dignity for the swelling bourgeois segment of commoners, encouraged after 1700 in England and especially after 1800 on a wider scale to perform massive betterments, the discovery of new ways of doing things tested by increasingly free trade.⁵¹

McCloskey associates the future of mankind with this liberation of her elite class, the innovative bourgeoisie. As opposed to the work of the peasantry and industrial proletariat, whose work was commodified by nature, the work of the innovative bourgeoisie was creative and led to increased productivity and reduced cost for their products. This reduced cost of their products was a reduced cost for all consumers.

This economic revolution was due to a political revolution: "A government of a more popular nature, and political liberty, and above all the energy and the vigor that a new deal brought forth from England's bourgeoisie, were what mattered."⁵² Increased technology available to all was one of the results of this revolution. A further quote:

The change was not genetic (as Clark argues) or psychological (as Weber argued), or economic (as Marx argued) or legal (as North argues) but sociological and political. Literally, printing, a free press, made technology available. It became, as we now say, open source... Open source software is not inherited biologically from one's parents but socially from one's geeky and voluble friends.⁵³

She goes on: "What was unique about the Enlightenment was precisely the elevation of ordinary peaceful people in ordinary peaceful life, an elevation of trade over the monopoly of violence."⁵⁴ Another way of putting this is by saying that the West, through the related processes of Modernity and the Enlightenment came to value people based upon their economic and social merit as opposed to their inherited class status (which was emphasized by Feudal Aristocracy).

⁵¹ McCloskey, *BE*, 473.

⁵² Deirdre McCloskey, *Bourgeois Dignity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), location 4278, Kindle Version.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, location 3979.

⁵⁴ McCloskey, *BE*, 484.

McCloskey asserts that this rise of commercialism and innovation in what she calls the “Great Enrichment” are the reasons why the standard of living of everyone (including the poor) improved exponentially in the time periods under consideration here.⁵⁵ McCloskey contrasts this new sociological phenomenon of the valuing of the innovative bourgeois with the past:

Merchants in Japan and China were ranked for three millenia close to night-soil men. In Christian Europe they were considered for two millennia enemies of God. Innovations were long viewed as threats to employment. And so the best minds went into war, or politics or religion or bureaucracy or poetry.⁵⁶

She also does mention the supplementing of innovation and commerce with economies of scale. She notes that to buy a refrigerator, one had to use 116 hours of work in the 1950’s, by 2013, the purchase only required 15 hours of work.⁵⁷

With capitalism, people are valued more for what they do, as opposed to who they are. With capitalism you are less likely to be entitled or dis-entitled by virtue of what status you are born into. Because of this meritocracy, McCloskey asserts that the rise of capitalism wound up improving human values, not debasing them, as many critics of capitalism assert.⁵⁸ This contrasts with Nietzsche’s conception of Modernity and the Enlightenment as corrupting and debasing human morality. In this section of *The Bourgeois Virtues*, I assume McCloskey is targeting Heidegger:

The century-and-a-half-old premise among anticapitalists is that we have through capitalism lost a good world worth keeping. But evidence has in fact been assembled by generations of social historians since 1900 against the German Romantic idea of a Black Forest homeland for a noble peasantry—a peasantry which allegedly benefited from more densely textured structures of meaning than we moderns can muster...The evidence is overwhelming. The historians have found that the *Gemeinschaft* of olden times was defective. The murder rate in villages in the thirteenth century, to take the English case, was higher than comparable places now. Medieval English peasants were in fact very mobile geographically ‘fragmenting’ their lives...the sweetness of the old-fashioned American family has been greatly exaggerated. The Russian *mir* was neither ancient nor egalitarian, but a figment of the German Romantic imagination.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ McCloskey, *BD*, locations 739-741.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, location 5360.

⁵⁷ McCloskey, *BE*, 81.

⁵⁸ Deirdre McCloskey, *The Bourgeois Virtues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 22-32.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 141.

Don't get me wrong, I am still a big fan of Heidegger (and certain elements of Romanticism). I think that Heidegger's thought still has a great deal of value regardless of how much he devalued empirical evidence. A flaw in McCloskey's analysis is that McCloskey doesn't effectively compare the precapitalist German peasant with the precapitalist English peasant, perhaps German peasants had a superior sense of community than the English peasants. But, in line with the purpose of this project, we must recognize, as well, that the German peasantry were most likely non-dialectical, and especially Anti-Semitic. Well developed narratives, like Heidegger's, have a value in the sense of literary construction, regardless of whether or not (or to what degree), they correspond to empirical reality. This devaluing of empirical reality, however, does make Heidegger's Nazism more understandable, but just as repulsive. The anti-Semitism of the West reached its apex in the anti-capitalist frenzy of Nazi Germany (the Austrian School Libertarians, including, most prominently, Ludwig von Mises, were forced to flee, first to Switzerland, then to the U.S., after Hitler annexed Austria.)

McCloskey states that the valuing of government action, both good and bad, has been overstated by what she terms the anti-capitalist Clerisy. By "good," I mean aid to third world nations, pro-labor legislation, and government aid programs in general. By "bad," I mean imperialism, war and acts of aggression in general. McCloskey writes:

Germany's economic Lebensraum was obtained in the end by the private arts of peace, not by the public arts of war. The lasting East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was built by Japanese men in business suits, not in dive bombers. Europe recovered after its two twentieth-century hot wars mainly through its own efforts of labor and investment, not mainly through government-to-government charity such as Herbert Hoover's Commission or George Marshall's Plan. Government-to-government foreign aid to the third world has enriched tyrants, not helped the poor.⁶⁰

I think that there must be some degree of laissez-faire to the ideal subjectivity types proposed in this project. (This would involve the valuing of remittances from developing world workers who work in the West but send most of their income home to their families that live in the developing world.) On pro-labor and welfare legislation (for those capable of work), McCloskey

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 51-52.

notes that the redistributive acts of the state "...corresponded with the big rise in real wages, and gave the impression of causing it-when it was in fact caused by rising productivity from trade-tested betterment."⁶¹

McCloskey asserts that, following approximately 1848, the Clerisy (the intellectual elite) of the West wound up abandoning capitalism for the horrors of nationalism and socialism.⁶² After 1848, the Clerisy no longer advocated creating the better product for the consumer on the free market, but supported the creation of goods for the warfare state, regardless of its rhetorical assertions (that the warfare state acted on behalf of the volk, or proletariat). This endorsement and valorization of warfare was un-dialectical in the extreme. Rather than recognizing human difference and asserting the rights of the different to speak back to others, through commerce, with commerce being more psychoepistemological than subjective determinist violence, the Clerisies (I use the plural, because the intellectual classes of each nation/culture of significance in the 20th Century had different, though in some ways similar ideological interests to advocate for) devalued innovation for the consumer in favor of innovation for the warfare state. Nietzsche predicted this lack of overman subjectivities in the 20th Century (this will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this Project). The Clerisies of the 20th Century were hostile to both the Nietzschean overman and McCloskey's innovative bourgeoisie (this will also be discussed in greater detail when I arrive at discussing the solutions to Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis, suffice it to say warfare and subjective determinist violence were valued more than psychoepistemology and smart power, especially as it related to commerce). If we increase the number and power of the overmen and the innovative bourgeoisie in the current historical epoch, we will decrease the amount of subjective determinist violence in the world. The Clerisy wound up providing the ideological rationalizations for the wars and totalitarianism of the 20th Century. Today, Putin claims to be acting on behalf of the Russian people, making war, when he

⁶¹ McCloskey, *BE*, 675.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 669-677; 678-688.

could achieve more for the Russian people by creating superior quality consumer goods for the consumer, by engaging in free trade, and by integrating Russia with the global economy (rather than by disintegrating it as the war with Ukraine does).

McCloskey's history is one of epochs, but with no overarching telos to human history. This means that there is nothing inevitable to capitalism. Indeed, she notes that other, non-Western Civilizations possessed superiorities over Western Civilization during other historical epochs. For example, McCloskey writes that until the 17th century, the Chinese and Arabs had "...a science more sophisticated than the European one."⁶³ Due to a variety of reasons, including religious fundamentalism and isolationism, the Chinese and Arabs wound up destroying their technological superiority (at least until Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" epoch). McCloskey terms the epoch of the West's rise through capitalism "The Great Enrichment," and this occurred after 1300 and before the late 19th century (when the anti-capitalist Clerisy first began to take hold of many of the academic aspects of Western culture). The rise of commercialism and innovation during the "Great Enrichment" are the reasons why the standard of living of the masses increased exponentially in the time periods under consideration here.⁶⁴ The rise of the anti-capitalist Clerisy in the West used their status and types of sophistry to convince the masses that supporting capitalism wasn't in their best interest. The use of the solidarity of their activists - especially in the October Revolution in Russia, and the Nazi Revolution in Germany - convinced the Russian and German masses that economics is a class-based phenomenon, with success being determined by political power. For them economics was not an objective science. This wound up being disproved by Lenin himself. After forced collectivization wound up being a total disaster, Lenin wound up rehabilitating many of the Kulaks - the Russian agricultural bourgeoisie - that he had expropriated and restored them to power with his 1921 New Economic Policy. For McCloskey,

⁶³ McCloskey, *BD*, location 559. See also footnote 28 (on Huntington).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, locations 739-741.

economics is a class-based phenomenon, but it is the classes of the merchants and innovators that matter—the “innovative bourgeoisie,” not the peasants and proletarians!

There is a Nietzschean component to McCloskey’s argument concerning the rise of the innovative bourgeoisie under capitalism. This lies in her analysis of the changing meaning of the word “honest.” Prior to capitalism, “honest” meant that you were of the nobility; it revolved around entitlement rather than merit. On the precapitalist definition of honest, McCloskey writes: “But the meaning of honorable by virtue of high social standing is still dominant in Shakespeare’s time and quite lively until the eighteenth century.”⁶⁵ In *The Bourgeois Virtues*, McCloskey writes:

The *OED* notes that in English ‘honest’...meaning ‘held in honor’ or ‘respectable,’ from *honestas* by way of French, was obsolete after 1692. This is just about the time that England became as bourgeois as the Dutch Republic...The meaning of ‘honesty’ as our usage of ‘sincere,’ says the *OED*, is ‘the prevailing modern sense’...In *Othello* the two senses of it, honorable and sincere, mingle.⁶⁶

On the capitalist transformation of the meaning of “honest,” McCloskey writes:

The idea of ‘honest’ dealing in trade comes from merchants and tradesmen (such as Quakers, the first merchants to post fixed prices instead of continuing the bargaining, which they viewed as violating the commandment that thou shalt not lie), never from the gentry or the aristocrats. Adam Smith admired honesty, sincerity, truth, candor in a fashion foreign to Shakespearean England. In Smith’s books of 1759 and 1776 ‘honest’ means ‘upright’ or ‘sincere’ or ‘truth-telling,’ never ‘aristocratic.’⁶⁷

Nietzsche, in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, writes on the conscience of the sovereign individual:

This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this master of a free will, this sovereign man—how should he not be aware of his superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises and stand as their own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how much reverence he arouses...he is bound to reserve a kick for the feeble windbags who promise without the right to do so, and a rod for the liar who breaks his word even at the moment he utters it.⁶⁸

It must be said, however, that the similarities do, in some ways, cover up a major distinction.

Nietzsche, in some areas, associates this Sovereign Individual with feudal aristocracy, whereas

⁶⁵ McCloskey, *BE*, 297.

⁶⁶ McCloskey, *BV*, 295.

⁶⁷ McCloskey, *BE*, 302.

⁶⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 59-60.

McCloskey associates it with the innovative bourgeois of “the Enlightenment” and “the Great Enrichment.” (This will be dealt with more comprehensively later on in this project).

Another linguistic example of the rise of bourgeois civilization in history is the linguistic and power relationships in the 1946 MacArthur Japanese constitution. McCloskey notes some of the dramatic changes forced upon the defeated Japanese fascists, which often involved a linguistic dimension. Initially, there was the translation of the Western phrase “individual dignity” into Japanese as *jinkaku*. *Jinkaku*, McCloskey asserts, was a transformation of a word more commonly associated with, in traditional Japanese society, the status of upper-classmen, as opposed to what it meant in Western civilizations. In Western Civilization, rank was subordinated to humanity in general, and not to status, as it was in pre-1946 Japan.⁶⁹ Later versions of the Japanese constitution emphasized “human” over *jinkaku*, especially in the 1970’s. I mention this here to emphasize the linguistic dimension necessary to successfully transform the constitutions of both the West and the rising non-West in the current historical epoch. The reciprocal interaction of subject and object must be linguistically and legally codified, so that the subject respects difference and otherness and shows this respect in economic transactions and legal dealings. This can also be described as “sublimating” the traditional societies’ focus on warfare into economic transactions. (This “sublimation” will be more comprehensively discussed in the section of this Project dedicated to Nietzsche).

McCloskey discusses this transformation from warfare to commerce:

In an aristocratic and hierarchical society of status and shame, the four pagan virtues lead up to honor = the courage, justice, and faith to take the front rank in the line of battle. In our bourgeois and egalitarian society of contract and guilt, they lead up to honesty = the courage, justice, and faith to be reliable in making a deal.⁷⁰

Nietzsche would disapprove of the equality of bourgeois civilization, at least in some areas. I do, however, recommend a dialectical reading of Nietzsche, which would draw distinctions between areas where he is liberatory and areas where he is reactionary. (I don’t think that

⁶⁹ McCloskey, *BV*, 296-297.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 297.

Nietzsche should be eliminated from the Western Canon just because some of his ideas are reactionary.)

I think that McCloskey's analysis of the historical situation is good in most regards, but I think that it is dialectical implicitly without being fully conscious of it. For her "innovative bourgeois," she emphasizes virtue as being paramount. Although I do agree with her that it is easier to control your subjective reactions to objective reality than objective reality itself, I think that part of "virtue" is beyond the control of the subject concerned (due to the "relative autonomy" of the objective). This "relative autonomy" means that what you read and how you are educated are partially dependent upon things partially beyond your control. "Virtue" does not just come out of nowhere; as Aristotle argued, in order to have "virtue," you must be educated in it. In other words, how you are raised affects your conception of right and wrong. The child born into a mafia family will generally have a different definition of right and wrong than a child raised in a family that affirms the standard values of the society. An example of "relative autonomy of the objective" is the Velvet Revolutions occurring around 1989, which were not the result of the masses' appropriation of capitalist economic discourses, but were the result of the East Bloc masses' increasing awareness of the positive features of the West's mass consumer culture, which were absent in the East Bloc (except for the lifestyles of the Communist Party bureaucrats and their children). The masses of the East Bloc learned about Western mass consumer culture from the illegal (but still present) propaganda organs of the West (Radio Free Europe, etc.). This is a variant on my overman/innovative bourgeois strategy for the cognitive elites of a society, with the utilitarian maximization of happiness through mass consumer culture for the masses.

Another example is that McCloskey's own discourse would have no effect in areas (and time periods) of the world where her discourse wasn't published due to censorship or lack of appeal due to market-based reasons. It is ironic that her acknowledgement that censorship would have adverse economic effects would have no effect in areas (and times) where such

censorship led to the absence of her discourse in the first place, the masses of China aren't aware of how capitalism in China has led to their increase in their standard of living due to censorship. In order to be a successful bourgeois in contemporary China, you have to submit to Communist Party political control. But there is more "relative autonomy" of the objective in China since the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping. Prior to Deng, economics was based upon which class held political power, and it was the proletariat/CCP bureaucrat/police class that held power, not the innovative bourgeoisie. The proletariat/CCP bureaucrat/police class imposed their own conceptual schemas onto reality by violence (both conceptual and physical); it was a type of "subjective determinism" even while it spoke of objective determinism! This "subjective determinism" reached its apex in "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Nonetheless, China is still more dialectical today than before Deng's reforms; economic-objective reality is more "relatively autonomous" than the (collective) subjective determinism that preceded it. By "collective subjective determinist," I mean the collective subject was the proletariat/CCP bureaucrat/police class.

The main focus of McCloskey's *The Bourgeois Virtues* is the synthesis of the pagan virtues (Courage, Temperance, Justice, and Prudence) with the Christian virtues (Faith, Hope, and Love).⁷¹ Elsewhere in that work, McCloskey refers to herself as a "pragmatic Libertarian."⁷² An example of what I call her "unconscious" advocacy of the dialectic⁷³ (as espoused in this project): "But if I had to be principled I would reach back before the French Enlightenment, or back into the Scottish Enlightenment, and offer a fourth justification for the free society, namely, that it leads to and depends on flourishing human lives of virtue."⁷⁴ I specifically chose this quote because of her using the phrase "leads to and depends on." This phrasing is inherently dialectical, with virtue "leading to" itself subjectively while "depending on" the virtue of others

⁷¹ McCloskey, *BV*, 67.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 499.

⁷³ With the dialectic being the epistemological aspect of psychoepistemology.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 499.

objectively. It is a self-reinforcing cycle of virtue, that once successfully introduced, hopefully reproduces itself in new historical situations. On the failure of contemporary American politics, McCloskey writes:

The conservative program of handing things over to a class of pseudoaristocrats trained at Andover and Yale or the radical program of handing things over to a proletariat-friendly party of bourgeois-born young men has not worked out very well. We need an ethical bourgeoisie.⁷⁵

McCloskey recognizes that some workers will be hurt by technological advancement:

Understand: I advocate ample provision for those hurt by change. But I advocate, too, change. If the Internet replaces professorial lectures, I will retire gracefully, on a pension income earned from the great productivity of the American economy...The change is making proletarian occupations fewer and the enlarged bourgeoisie richer. The Creative Class edges ever upward in size, to the *benefit* of the remaining poor.⁷⁶

My critique of McCloskey's virtue ethics is that I think the virtue ethicists must become self-consciously dialectical, by understanding that there is a dialectic between subjective virtue and objective possibility. As a (partially hypothetical) example, look at the possibilities for virtuous action in a totalitarian society. Due to the existence of ontological freedom combined with a totalitarian restriction of that freedom in a social contract, a totalitarian society sharply limits the possibility of subjective virtuous action. In other words, to some extent, you do have to "live within your time and place." Another aspect of this is that virtue is partially a social construction, whether by official state discourses or by unofficial mafia or insurgent discourses (more on the official/unofficial distinction later on in this project). This social construction aspect dialectically interacts with your subjective freedom aspect. (To put this in Ayn Randian terms, I hope it is more like *Atlas Shrugged* than *We the Living!*)

A critical aspect of my five point formula is the creation of overman/innovative bourgeois elite subjectivities in both the West and rising non-Western powers. These elite subjectivities will have to have both an instrumental characteristic as well as a normative one. The

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 502.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 504.

instrumental characteristic will lie in successfully creating a good for consumption. The normative will lie in the use of the dialectic to maintain a reciprocal interaction between subject and object (with the object including other subjectivities and nature). This will involve having respect for the object, again regardless of whether the object is human or not. This will make it difficult for the other subject to be dehumanized, since the respect will be given to the object whether or not it is another human being.

I feel that introducing my adapted concepts of psychoepistemology and subjective determinism to McCloskey's *Bourgeois* trilogy enhances, without discarding any of her analysis, her analysis. Psychoepistemology makes the reader more aware of the nature of the relationship of subject to object in a way that, I feel, McCloskey neglected. Rather than discarding metaphysics altogether, or relativizing it by emphasizing its similarities in a skeptical way - as McCloskey does - especially in *The Bourgeois Virtues*, I think you must maintain a metaphysics, in the sense of "what makes experience possible." I feel that this provides for the possibility of a collapse of ethics into ontology that (at least psychologically) provides for a universal ethics that is non-totalitarian. Collapsing ethics into ontology means that every human possesses fundamental structures of being; this is the ontological aspect. The ethical aspect lies in the fact that questions of virtue, the rightness or wrongness of actions, should be determined by these ontological structures of being. If ethics is built on a foundation of fundamental structures of being, this means that the foundation is stronger than if the ethics were simply based upon behavior. Rorty would base his ethics on behavior. Subject/object relations can't be avoided or falsified in the same way as conventional morality can be. Kant's Categorical Imperative, as an example of a non-ontological ethics, can be used to justify all kinds of crimes. For example, if you consider Jews to be evil and subhuman, you can utilize the Categorical Imperative to justify your actions by saying: "If everyone killed a Jew, the world would be a better place, so you can universalize my act of killing a Jew." By using my subject/object relations in ethics, you must grant respect and dignity to the object (including

other humans and nature) regardless of whether the object is considered human or not. You can't get around, at least not honestly, subject/object relations in the same way as you can other foundations for ethics.

My formulation of the dialectic⁷⁷ is non-totalitarian in that, if the dialectic is recognized as being actual and universal, the reciprocal interaction of subject and object results in a respect for both (with the object including other subjects and nature). McCloskey writes (quoting Rabbi Sacks):

But Rabbi Sacks gets it right when he tells us 'It is the market-the least overtly spiritual of contexts-that delivers a profoundly spiritual message.' What message? 'It is through exchange that difference becomes a blessing, not a curse.' This from a man who has given some thought to the costs and benefits of difference. Sacks understands that 'the free market is the best means we have yet discovered for alleviating poverty,' yes, but also for 'creating a human environment of independence, dignity and creativity.'⁷⁸

This is a dialectical message, that difference and otherness must be valued, not demonized and made the object of conceptual or physical violence. (It is more complicated than this, of course: some market transactions are made under duress - through force - where the facade of a transaction covers up asymmetries of power.)

In summary, McCloskey's *Bourgeois* trilogy provides for a sophisticated, virtue ethicist defense of capitalism. She successfully defends capitalism from its critics who claim it enriches the powerful over the needs of the poor. Capitalism is a positive sum enterprise, where, for the most part, all benefit, although there are still elements of the poor whose standard of living must be drastically improved. (But the rich still require people to buy their products, including the poor.) Nonetheless, as I have stated above, I feel that her analysis can be further developed by a more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between subject and object. In keeping with this project, I think that the relationship between subject and object, when properly scientific, is a dialectical one, with subject and object reciprocally interacting. This means that: (1) the subject doesn't completely constitute reality without input (or speaking back) from the object; and (2) the

⁷⁷ With the dialectic being the epistemological aspect of my psychoepistemology.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 30

object doesn't completely remove the ontological freedom of the subject from efficacy in the objective realm (there is some aspect of reality that is partially determined by the subject).

In a sense, I think that McCloskey's analysis (though for the most part, correct) commits the fallacy common to many virtue ethicists where she devalues the social, objective component to virtuous behavior. As I have stated above, virtue doesn't just come out of nowhere; people are what they read and what they are taught by multiple social institutions. In my analysis of Jay Elliott's *Character*, I think that Elliott is correct in his analysis of virtue ethics. Elliott's version of virtue ethics recognizes that situation does play a role in behavior. He doesn't think, however, that the objective situation completely determines behavior, as the strong reading of the situationists suggests. In keeping with my thinking about McCloskey, I think that Elliott's analysis is more dialectical than he realizes (as I formulate the concept of the dialectic in this project). Elliott values both the subjective component of virtue as well as the objective component of virtue. Virtue has both a subjective component (which includes how your understanding of virtue is colored by psychological factors (which Elliott does recognize), and objective components - including the sociological factors. The subjective component of virtue is both the reasoning you employ yourself as well as the part of reasoning that you absorb from your own psychological makeup. This further blurs the distinction between subject and object (your psychological makeup is part the result of your free choice, not just brain makeup or drives - my apologies to Nietzsche - but it is also the result of your brain chemistry and how you are socialized by various inputs, including primary groups among other things). In this analysis, I am trying to create a dialectic that enables one to preserve the correct aspects of virtue ethics as well as preserving the correct aspects of situationism. Elliott is right to say that character does have an objective component to it, but I think that he understates how virtue is reliant upon what family you're born into, as well as what you read and where you go to school and what time period you're born into.

To give an empirical example, my choice of Bard as an undergraduate over Tulane was almost a coin toss. (I was heavily impressed by President Botstein's presentation on tour day.) If I had gone to Tulane, would I have read different philosophies and would I have subsequently been attracted to be a "Son of the South" (if they would have allowed me in!)? If my Mom-the librarian-had brought me home Alasdair MacIntyre instead of Sartre and Camus-how would I have turned out? Another, related concern is "What are the practical implications of psychoepistemology? (As the Pragmatists would ask.)" "Is it purely a theoretical issue?" Many people lead virtuous lives without being schooled in virtue ethics.

Chapter 3: Nietzsche

I have already stated my ambivalence towards Nietzsche. Now I will analyze the debt I owe to him. I will draw clear distinctions between where I support him and where I do not support him. The concepts of Nietzsche's that I will deal with are: the selfishness of the overman (and the use of violence by the overman); the Ascetic Priest; Aristocracy vs. Democracy; Good and Evil vs. good and bad; Nietzsche's analysis of different forms of skepticism; an analysis of Patton's analysis of Nietzsche's concept of power; and, finally, a discussion of Nietzsche's concept of sublimation (and how it relates to this Senior Project, which is partially the construction of a new Bretton Woods system). A common theme is present throughout this chapter, which is the distinction between Nietzsche's liberatory psychology and his reactionary politics. Understanding this distinction is critical in being able to regard the value of Nietzsche's work as a whole. In broad terms, Nietzsche's work relates to this project in that I feel that his conception of the overman provides for a subjective foundation for the cognitive elites of both the West and rising non-Western powers in the current historical epoch (as Huntington defines it). In order to maximize the liberatory effects of Nietzsche's thought, we must read him critically, since his view of modernity and the Enlightenment was distorted by his lack of understanding of the significance of what I call the meritocratic aspect of the Enlightenment's meritocratic democratic capitalism. I think that this conceptual distortion is the consequence of Nietzsche's theory of biological drives, which is a form of objective determinism. This can be compared to forms of religious predeterminism. Nietzsche is too into feudal entitlement, and he doesn't realize that overman subjectivities can come from classes other

than the nobility (especially after the liberation of the “innovative bourgeoisie” in the Enlightenment, or “Great Enrichment,” which McCloskey writes about, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this project).

Despite all these disagreements, some of them fundamental to Nietzsche’s thought, I owe a great deal to Nietzsche. One comparison that I regard favorably with Nietzsche is with Tom Wolfe. Tom Wolfe, in *I Am Charlotte Simmons*, describes the U.S. as being an “aristocrat-meritocracy,” combining the positive features of aristocracy with the positive features of meritocracy. The positive features of aristocracy are that, often, the high-I.Q. genes of successful people are passed onto their offspring (as well as inherited wealth). The positive features of meritocracy are that, if the subject concerned has the merit required, they may become part of the cognitive elite despite their humble origins.⁷⁹ If both the West and the rising non-Western powers created more overman subjectivities, there would be more achievement in science, culture, and economics (as long as their achievements were properly sublimated). Not all of noble blood have merit; not all who have merit are of noble blood. (Look at the profligate spending of some playboys who are born into wealth, on the one hand, and on the other hand look at the restricted objective possibilities of someone of humble origin who, nevertheless, possesses what is needed subjectively for success.) As I have written elsewhere in this project, both Huntington and McCloskey discuss this valorization of work in bourgeois societies (as opposed to socialist or aristocratic societies). Prior to capitalism, work was considered a lower-class phenomenon.

1. The Selfishness of the Overman

Central to Nietzsche’s overman is his sophisticated and intellectual conception of selfishness. The selfishness of the Nietzschean overman is drastically different from the selfishness of the everyday person. Nietzsche asserts that the value of a culture lies, not in its telos, but in its ability to produce overman subjectivities: “the destiny of humanity depends upon

⁷⁹ Tom Wolfe, *I Am Charlotte Simmons* (New York: Picador, 2004).

the attainment of its highest type.”⁸⁰ Another contrast to be drawn here is between the selfishness of the overman and the selfishness of the Communist bureaucrat, fascist thug, and common mafiosi. One of the main reasons that the fascists and Communists failed lay in the fact that they valued not work, but the ability to use violence in order to extract submission and obedience from the producing classes (workers and entrepreneurs). This valorization of violence meant that people who didn’t produce wound up getting rewarded for their use of violence. This is why so many of the ex-KGB agents wound up in the Russian mob. Because of the work they did for the KGB, they had no marketable skills except for the use of violence. They were “big men,” “too good” for normal work. Their egos were distorted in this way. Thugs don’t produce, they make their living off of those who do produce. All dogmatists require thugs to enforce their faulty ideologies.

This relates to the current project in that it contradicts some of the misinterpretations of Nietzsche concerning his valorization of violence. Although Nietzsche in some places does valorize exploitation and the ancient Greek practice of slavery,⁸¹ the forms of exploitation that are celebrated by the overman are not done in order to satisfy the overman’s base desires and/or his desire not to do honest work. Nietzsche writes on the different types of violence:

The desire for destruction, change, becoming can be an expression of an overflowing energy that is pregnant with the future (my term for this is, as is known, ‘Dionysian’). But it also can be the hatred of the ill-constituted, disinherited, and underprivileged, who destroy, must destroy, because what exists, indeed all existence, all being, outrages and provokes them.⁸²

(Nietzsche associates the latter with anarchists.) The overman exploits in order to advance and overcome his base desires and the desires of others not to do honest work. (And to

⁸⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 460-462, 515-516, 458, 504, 513. The quote itself is from p.516. See also Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche* with a new foreword by Alexander Nehamas (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), 173 and 312-315, Kindle Version.

⁸¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), section 259.

⁸² Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 329.

overcome the “Human, All-Too-Human.”) Patton notes that, for Nietzsche, higher culture is the product of cruelty, but not just cruelty towards others, but mainly the overman’s cruelty towards himself.⁸³ Although Nietzsche is in opposition to the sexual repression of Christianity, he is in favor of the sublimation of biological drives into works of higher culture. This resembles Adam Smith’s concept of prudence, which consists in the union of his concepts of understanding and self-command. Smith writes,

The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reason and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions, and of foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to result from them; and secondly, self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some future time. In the union of those two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues that which is most useful to the individual.⁸⁴

These greater pleasures that Smith is talking about include works of higher culture. Nietzsche’s overman must make use of Smithian prudence in a selfish way that winds up benefiting everyone. Smith’s virtue of prudence is not possessed by everyone; it is extraordinarily demanding. To paraphrase Nietzsche: “All things rare to the rare.” This distinguishing of different categories of man, to Nietzsche, is revealed in the following quote concerning selfishness: “Selfishness is worth only as much as the physiological value of the one who possesses it: it can have great value or it can be worthless and despicable... . The person representing an ascending line is indeed of enormous value.”⁸⁵ If someone who contributes to humanity and society is selfish, it is one thing; if a parasite (like a Communist Party bureaucrat or common mafiosi) is selfish, it is another. The parasite would fill up his/her time with satisfying base pleasures, like sex, drugs, alcohol, and fast food. The overman creates works of technology and/or high culture. That is how he/she is selfish.

⁸³ Paul Patton, “Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche,” in *Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory*, edited by Paul Patton (New York: Routledge), 156.

⁸⁴ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 1976), 310.

⁸⁵ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* vol. 9, translated by Adrian Del Caro, Duncan Large, and Alan D. Schrift (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021), 105.

This is the main difference between thugs in general (mafiosi, Communists, fascists, etc.) and the Nietzschean overman. This is also Nietzsche's valorization of aristocracy and the creations of higher types of man.⁸⁶ One provisional definition of an overman might be: a high-I.Q. workaholic with a secular orientation who is socially tolerant in certain regards - not a man of resentment - (though I do think some forms of religion would not disqualify the subject from being classified as an overman, as long as the religion values life on Earth). I suspect, but I haven't yet proven, that these types of overmen are more prevalent in the rising non-Western powers (especially India and China) than they were in the old East Bloc. The old East Bloc, I suspect, created elites who were more like thugs. It is a question of forming Steve Jobs types, as opposed to Homer Simpson types. As many people used to say in the Soviet Union: "we pretend to work and the Party pretends to pay us." In the West, especially in the U.S., we created more overmen who were constantly trying to outdo themselves in technology, and to contribute to a Hegelian World History, rather than just satisfying base desires. I suspect that this was especially due to our educating our young with an advanced sense of individual freedom and responsibility. The East Bloc educated their young to believe that they were objectively determined and that their ethics were due to that objective determinism, which included their work ethic. Once again, it was due to a sense of entitlement, rather than achieved merit. My reading of Sartre's *The Words* and *Being and Nothingness* as a teenager forced me to recognize that I possessed the freedom and responsibility to create myself. I highly recommend this experience to all teenagers.

2. The Ascetic Priest

Now, I will discuss Nietzsche's concept of the Ascetic Priest. The Ascetic Priest, according to Nietzsche, is the chief opponent of the overman on Earth. The Ascetic Priest acts and legislates on behalf of the Judeo-Christian slave morality. This morality is centered upon the ideals of religion, which are in part arbitrary. By arbitrary, I mean that certain beliefs, such as

⁸⁶ Nietzsche, *BGE*, sections 197 (on Borgia), 257 and 258.

cows being holy in Hinduism, or saying “bless you” after someone sneezes in Christianity, seem to not be based on anything scientific or rational. When asked why you should or should not do something, the religious leader would respond in the arbitrary case by saying, “Because God willed it, end of discussion.” Some religious beliefs, however, are rational because they are based upon how the beliefs might affect life on Earth. For the more rational aspects of religious beliefs, I cite Max Weber’s work on religion. Nietzsche states that due to the Ascetic Priest’s devaluation of life on Earth, the Ascetic Priest is the most extreme hater of people who are successful on Earth (for Nietzsche, the most successful in life on Earth are what he called the “knightly-aristocratic” in his historical context).⁸⁷ The Ascetic Priest’s hatred is the most profound due to the Ascetic Priests’ lack of power on Earth. Nietzsche writes:

The root of all evil: that the slavish morality of meekness, chastity, selflessness, absolute obedience, has triumphed—ruling natures were thus condemned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to torments of conscience—creative natures felt like rebels against God, uncertain and inhibited by eternal values.⁸⁸

The appropriate response to the Ascetic Priest is to worship success on Earth over religious dogma. Here is Nietzsche in *The Gay Science*:

The European disguises himself with morality because he has become a sick, sickly, crippled animal that has good reasons for being ‘tame’; for he is almost an abortion, scarce half made up, weak, awkward...it is not the ferocity of the beast of prey that requires a moral disguise, but the herd animal with its profound mediocrity, timidity, and boredom with itself.⁸⁹

And here is Kaufmann quoting Nietzsche: “Remain faithful to the Earth and do not believe those who speak to you of other-worldly hopes.”⁹⁰ Elsewhere, Nietzsche refers to moralists by saying that “Truly, you are masters of alchemy in reverse: the devaluation of what is most valuable.”⁹¹ And on the task of the philosopher, Nietzsche remarks: “Thus nobody up to now has examined the value of that most famous of all medicines which is called morality; and the

⁸⁷ Nietzsche, *GM*, Essay 1, section 7.

⁸⁸ Nietzsche, *WP*, 465. I corrected a typo in the book.

⁸⁹ Nietzsche, *GS*, 295.

⁹⁰ Kaufmann, *KN*, 321.

⁹¹ Nietzsche, *GS*, 235.

first step would be-for once to question it.”⁹² To be fair to Nietzsche, Kaufmann points out that Christianity only became a religion of resentment with Paul. In addition, Nietzsche is more concerned with the psychology of Christianity than with its metaphysics (Nietzsche thinks that the metaphysics of Christianity can’t be proven).⁹³

This bears an uncanny resemblance to those who ran the re-education camps of the Communists in the 20th century. (Although the Chinese have found a more successful way of combining capitalism with communism with their Confucian-Marxian state capitalism.) The earlier forms of Communism were straightforwardly hostile to those elements of their societies who had made something of themselves; it was a manifestation of what Nietzsche calls “resentment,” put simply, envy of those who were successful. Today, in China, if you are a successful businessman who doesn’t pay tribute to and submit to the political power of the CCP, they seize your assets and/or put you in a re-education camp. (Apparently, Jack Ma has wound up in this situation.) The CCP’s dogma doesn’t relate to reality except through its use of state power to enforce its ideology. This Marxist dogma is the mortal enemy of spontaneous human ontological freedom. The CCP perpetrates its crimes on behalf of the “proletariat,” instead of the Christian God. The proletariat exists only in the minds and rhetoric of the police state bureaucrats; it is an abstraction from individual humans and political pressure groups. For the Chinese, the real Gods are the police and bureaucrats of the totalitarian state, not the proletariat. Nietzsche’s overmen, in the present historical situation, must oppose this secular manifestation of the Ascetic Priest.

3. Aristocracy vs. Democracy

I will begin my discussion of Nietzsche’s attitudes towards aristocracy and democracy with a quote of his: “Every enhancement of the type ‘man’ has so far been the work of an aristocratic society-and it will be so again and again-a society that believes in the long ladder of

⁹² *Ibid.*, 285.

⁹³ Kaufmann, *KN*, 342-349.

an order of rank and differences in value between man and man... ."⁹⁴ Once again, I must emphasize that I love Nietzsche, but that I am not uncritical of him. I think that his theory of the overman overemphasizes the relationship of blood and drives to the detriment of freedom in creating the overman. Nietzsche writes:

In the age of *suffrage universel*, i.e. when everyone may sit in judgment on everyone and everything, I feel impelled to re-establish order of rank...A declaration of war on the masses by higher men is needed! Everywhere the mediocre are combining in order to make themselves master! Everything that is soft and effeminate, that serves the ends of the 'people' or the 'feminine,' works in favor of *suffrage universel*, i.e., the dominion of inferior men...A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing and destructive for the world-weary.⁹⁵

Ronald Beiner's excellent book discusses this opposition of Nietzsche to democracy, but to put it into one word, it is: *harshola*. In some ways, it is fair, in some ways, not so fair. Early in the book,⁹⁶ Beiner does accurately note Nietzsche's opposition to the French Revolution, an opposition that is potentially defensible by any rational being, but Beiner doesn't draw distinctions between different types of meritocracy (as opposed to, or used in conjunction with, aristocracy). Due to my support for meritocratic democratic capitalism, I assert that it is good in some ways to be a little opposed to democracy. The history of democracy is filled with examples of political parties promising things to get elected that they can't deliver on once in office. This is true of all governments, of course, not just democracies. Democracies do allow for the peaceful transition of power, but this still does mean that politicians lie, or not scientifically understand some issues, to get the votes sometimes. You can look at the history of Latin America, where political parties increase the wages of their constituents by printing massive amounts of paper money, while allowing that money to lose its value through inflation, thus canceling out the value of the increase in wages. In addition, on p.12 (and elsewhere), Beiner writes approvingly of Lukacs, who toed the Stalinist party line in Hungary to keep his job

⁹⁴ Nietzsche, *BGE*, section 257.

⁹⁵ Nietzsche, *WP*, 457-458.

⁹⁶ Ronald Beiner, *Dangerous Minds* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 8, Kindle Version.

(after the 1956 Nagy revolt, Stalin had more bodies than Hitler). Beiner sees Nietzsche's goal as being a Godless religion which is a rank-enforcing mythology in service of the ruling class, where the "...repudiation of Christianity constitutes the necessary condition of a return to an aristocracy-centered culture."⁹⁷ Beiner also writes of Nietzsche that

His beef against modern post-Christian civilization was not that it was illiberal and insufficiently inclusive but rather that it was too egalitarian and too weak in legislating definite horizons within which the mediocre majority could find a clear purpose in life.⁹⁸

I cite Kaufmann's and Patton's interpretations of Nietzsche as revealing the more accurate ambivalence of Nietzsche towards aristocracy (I think the French slide too much into the opposite extreme of interpreting Nietzsche as a left-wing anarchist). My writings in this project tend to reflect the influence of Kaufmann and Patton regarding these matters. I think that Nietzsche was more sophisticated than the caricature image of Nietzsche as a classic reactionary that Beiner conceives of him as being.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, Beiner is right to say that Nietzsche wanted to encourage "greater strength and robustness of will for the few capable of refashioning themselves..."¹⁰⁰ Beiner also cites Nietzsche's admiration for the Indian caste system, a view of Nietzsche's that I find repulsive, if it is true, Kaufmann asserts that Nietzsche doesn't approve of the Indian caste system.¹⁰¹ My main critique of Beiner, which relates to the thesis of this project, is: do we want the type of egalitarianism that creates Homer Simpson type subjectivities, or an egalitarianism that creates Steve Jobs/overman type subjectivities (with the latter including those of humble origin)?

Once again, I see the solution as being some form of my adaptation of Hegel's dialectic, the dialectic being the reciprocal interactions between subjective virtue and objective possibility. Part of objective possibility is the objectified subject, which are the parts of the subject that aren't in the control of the subject, genes and brain chemistry, for example. I endorse

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26-27.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰¹ Beiner, *DM*, 49; Kaufmann, *KN*, 297.

Nietzsche's "pathos of distance" of the overman, but I combine it with the Libertarian economic concepts of "social cooperation" and "division of labor." These concepts imply that every human has a value, a value that isn't ended if the individual concerned isn't capable of being a creative genius. The average person participates in the economy in a commodified way, with a specific role in a specific part of the economy. The overman creates; he/she doesn't just fit in like a cog in a machine. This is why my formula for the Earth in the current historical context is to be: the overman/innovative bourgeois elite subjectivity for the cognitive elites of both the West and the rising non-Western powers; and the utilitarian maximization of happiness through consumer culture for the masses of both the West and the rising non-Western powers. I don't believe in the "survival of the fittest."

Nietzsche associates the democratic spirit of his age to be a "blind faith" in democracy, a type of dogma that corrupts our values.¹⁰² This "blind faith" calls to mind the predicament of the hero in Ibsen's *An Enemy of the People*. In that play, the man who is willing to stand up to the lies of the government bureaucrats (who claim to act in the name of "the People") is labeled "an enemy of the People" because of his virtue and courage. Nietzsche, as well, anticipates the paradox of "the will of the People" being mediated through government bureaucracy, whereas that government bureaucracy has its own interests which aren't always aligned with "the will of the people" (the bureaucracy often has its own interests). These Orwellian situations, in the contemporary historical situation, often involve the U.N., look at Qaddafi's Libya being in charge of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in the late 20th century!

Another aspect of this democratic spirit of modernity, to Nietzsche, is that the average, mediocre man is worshiped over the exceptional. This is also associated with the rise of statistics, the spirit of the times in modernity. Opposing this, Nietzsche asserts that the overman must have the courage to stand up for the few.¹⁰³ The few, the overman types, are the ones who

¹⁰² Nietzsche, *BGE*, section 202.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, section 203.

choose not to conform to the democratic spirit of the age. The overman type never becomes complacent or tries to merely fit in. The overman engages in cruelty towards himself and his base desires.¹⁰⁴ Patton notes that, for Nietzsche, higher culture is the product of cruelty, but that this cruelty is not just cruelty towards others, but mainly the overman's cruelty towards himself.¹⁰⁵ If we existed merely to satisfy our animal nature, we would not be able to advance ourselves or humanity. As J.S. Mill writes, "It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." And as Parmenides writes, "One Plato is worth hundreds of average men." In our present historical context, our mass culture glorifies the average, just look at Bart/Homer Simpson vs. Steve Jobs. But Nietzsche never writes this (at least not from what I have read of his work): that the rise of the overman is linked essentially with the rise of the meritocratic democratic capitalist form of government that came into being during the Western Enlightenment. With a meritocracy, anyone with merit can become an overman, regardless of their origins.

4. Good vs. Evil and Good and Bad

Nietzsche identifies the central dilemma of 19th-20th century man (the European, to Nietzsche, because of the power of Europe at the time) as being nihilism. Kaufmann writes, analyzing Nietzsche's views on this nihilism:

To escape nihilism-which seems involved both in asserting the existence of God and thus robbing this world of ultimate significance, and also in denying God and thus robbing everything of meaning and value-that is Nietzsche's greatest and most persistent problem.¹⁰⁶

Thus, the central philosophical project in this time period, for Nietzsche, is the redefinition of Good and Evil in a way that worships life on Earth, not in the hereafter. This, in my provisional formulation, would be: all that increases your health and power on this Earth is good; all that decreases your health and power on this Earth is evil. First, Nietzsche asserts that there was a

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, section 229.

¹⁰⁵ Patton, *PHN*, 156.

¹⁰⁶ Kaufmann, *KN*, 101.

redefinition of morality which was along the lines of world-weariness. Nietzsche analyzes this redefinition of morality as being related to the transition from ancient Greece to Christianity. Nietzsche believes that Christianity has come up with an ethics that revolves around Good and Evil; whereas the Greeks defined it in terms of good and bad. Good and Evil, according to Nietzsche, relates to Christianity's partially arbitrary conception of right and wrong based upon religious dogma. Good and bad is based upon the ancient Greeks' assigning of right and wrong based upon whether the act concerned serves the interests of life on Earth. This is in opposition to religious dogma that doesn't serve the interests of life on Earth, but rather, as Nietzsche asserts, merely serves the interests of the Christian Ascetic Priest class. In a similar vein, Nietzsche relates the question of truth and falsehood to its ability to serve the interests of life on Earth:

The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating... To recognize untruth as a condition of life-that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil.¹⁰⁷

The conception of Good and Evil must be redefined in order to serve the interests of life on Earth.

This distinction, according to Nietzsche, has a class basis. He associates Good and Evil with the slave class revolt of Judeo-Christianity (the ethics of Judeo-Christianity were literally created by a slave class in revolt); he associates the master morality of good and bad with different cultures in opposition to the slave morality of Judeo-Christianity. I want to emphasize at this point that Nietzsche's relationship to what he calls "master morality," is an ambivalent one, he is not saying that we should all use violence to put down our competition. Kaufmann cites a passage from Nietzsche where Nietzsche writes "rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared."¹⁰⁸ These aspects I have dealt with in

¹⁰⁷ Nietzsche, *BGE*, section 4.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Kaufmann, *KN*, 187.

an earlier section of this project, where I analyzed what I consider distortions of Nietzsche perpetrated by Beiner and others. I do, however, find value in certain aspects of Beiner's commentary. In sections 260 and 261 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche develops his ideas of master morality and slave morality. For Nietzsche, the values of the powerful on Earth aren't counter-intuitive; they worship power on Earth as being good, whereas the slave moralists counter-intuitively worship weakness on Earth. The master moralists realize that their power on Earth is the result of their values, which are the result of their instinct for command, their blood, drives and strong/free will. The overmen desire to be happy on Earth, and they derive this happiness by having values that worship this happiness on Earth (from the perspective of the powerful, not the weak). "This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this master of a free will...how should he not be aware of his superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises... ." ¹⁰⁹ Keeping one's promises means that you are of the overman type; the slave is unable to be reliable to Nietzsche. The slave is incapable of making/keeping promises. The nobleman speaks the truth, the common man lies. ¹¹⁰ The slave counter-intuitively thinks they will gain power in the hereafter by being weak on Earth.

Nietzsche's attitude towards master moralities especially shows its ambivalent nature in his writings on Cesare Borgia. Although Borgia is an example of a master morality, Kaufmann refers to him as actually being condemned by Nietzsche, without Nietzsche denying that Borgia was a healthy type in some ways. ¹¹¹ I think that this must be emphasized, especially when considering the project of a new Bretton Woods global system. I assert that capitalism offers a way out of the raw assertion of power on the international scene by recognizing that capitalism offers a way to have "a rising tide that lifts all boats." Economic growth, combined with social cooperation and the division of labor creates the possibility where the growing of the economic

¹⁰⁹ Nietzsche, *GM*, 58-60.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 28-30.

¹¹¹ Nietzsche, *BGE*, section 197 (and note 12 on the same page). See also, Kaufmann, *KN*, 223-225 and 415-416.

pie could potentially defuse situations of zero-sum conflict (where the gain of one necessarily results in the loss of another). Economic growth means there is the possibility that everyone gains (although some do gain more than others). I must emphasize that I'm not a "drink the Kool-Aid capitalist"; I still see some value to European Social Democracy.

Here, I will engage in a discussion of the relationships between Hegel's conceptions of masters and slaves and how they are similar and different from Nietzsche's conceptions. This discussion will revolve around their conception of sublimation, and their conception of self-mastery. Even though they don't use the term "meritocracy," I maintain that their conceptions of master and slave revolve around this term implicitly. In addition, I will maintain, following the analysis of Kaufmann and Findlay,¹¹² that a key point to keep in mind while reading them is that both Nietzsche and Hegel are talking about psychological states, not metaphors for actual historical reality (although the psychological states, in some ways, can be viewed historically). Kojève, in addition, shares this view. On the psychological necessity of Hegelian slavery, Kojève writes:

Man achieves his true autonomy, his authentic freedom, only after passing through Slavery, after surmounting fear of death by work performed in the service of another (who, for him, is the incarnation of that fear). Work that frees man is hence necessarily, in the beginning, the forced work of a Slave who serves an all-powerful Master, the holder of all real power.¹¹³

Hegel's slave, therefore, is not a slave for all time; he is only passing through a necessary phase on the way to autonomy.

Nietzsche's slave, in contrast to Hegel's, is a no good, unreliable slave of his own weak will and drives. Central to their conceptions is how the classes relate to sublimation. For Nietzsche, the overman undergoes repression that leads to sublimation.¹¹⁴ As I have written

¹¹² Findlay's analysis of the *Phenomenology* at the end of the Miller translation.

¹¹³ Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, translated by James H. Nichols, jr. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 27.

¹¹⁴ More on this later in this project, when I discuss Nietzsche and Sublimation. Suffice it to say, the Nietzschean Overman undergoes a more liberatory sublimation than the Nietzschean master. This sublimation marks the difference between Borgia (see the above discussion in this section of this chapter). Borgia, as master, has some aspects of the Overman, to Nietzsche, but Nietzsche contrasts Borgia with creative geniuses like Goethe and Leonardo Da Vinci, for example.

elsewhere in this project, for Nietzsche, the selfishness of the overman is different in nature than the selfishness of ordinary people. (As I wrote in chapter 2, Deirdre McCloskey understands how meritocratic democratic capitalism, which is a form of meritocratic egalitarianism, led to the exponential increase in the standard of living of everyone, not just the elites. Nietzsche's focus on drives makes him blind to this aspect of the Enlightenment.)

Hegel's slave, on the contrary, is the class that undergoes repression and sublimation, not the master. On the repression and sublimation of the Hegelian slave, Kojève writes:

...the Slave has another advantage, conditioned by the fact that he works and that he works in the service...of another, that he serves another by working. To work for another is to act contrary to the instincts that drive man to satisfy his own needs. There is no instinct that forces the Slave to work for the Master. If he does it, it is from fear of the Master...In other words, the Slave who works for the Master represses his instincts in relation to an idea, a concept...By acting, he negates, he transforms the given, Nature, his Nature; and he does it in relation to an idea, which does not exist in the biological sense of the word, in relation to the idea of a Master...¹¹⁵

The master for Nietzsche, therefore, is the embodiment of precapitalist feudal entitlement, although Nietzsche doesn't view it this way. Hegel views the master in this way, which is why, for Hegel, the slave undergoes repression and sublimation and the master, for Hegel, doesn't. Another difference between Hegel and Nietzsche is that for Hegel, another person is necessary (or at least an idea of another person) for sublimation. For Nietzsche, it is a question of the overman's ability to repress himself, which leads to auto-sublimation. For Nietzsche, "How to become what one is" is the result of drives, not social existence (as it is for Hegel).

Now, I will engage in a close reading of the "Lordship and Bondage" section of the *Phenomenology*. Hegel describes the initial situation of master and slave as being one where two self-consciousnesses only exist when they are recognized by each other. Consciousness' center of being, therefore lies outside of itself; it is "alien."¹¹⁶ (The Miller translation uses the terms "Lord" for master, and "Bondsman" for slave). This initial situation is marked by the

¹¹⁵ Kojève, *IRH*, 48.

¹¹⁶ J.N. Findlay, "Analysis," in Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 520.

mutual action of each consciousness on the other in a desire for this recognition. Hegel writes: “Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation.”¹¹⁷ (The “middle term” and “mediation” refer to self-consciousness.) This involves, at first, an unequal situation where one consciousness recognizes and the other is recognized. These self-consciousnesses are solipsistic in that “Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth.”¹¹⁸ (This is because one self-consciousness must be recognized by another in order to exist, to fully be a self.) Next, one self-consciousness, in order to obtain prestige, enters into a life and death contest with the other self-consciousness “to sacrifice everything concrete for its own self-respect and the similar respect of all others.”¹¹⁹ Kojève writes on this situation:

What is this man, what does he *want* to be, if not a Master? It was to become *Master*, to be *Master* that he risked his life, and not to live a life of pleasure. Now, what he wanted by engaging in the fight was to be recognized by *another*—that is, by someone *other* than himself but who is like *him*, by *another man*. But in fact, at the end of the Fight, he is recognized only by a *Slave*...In short, the Master never succeeds in realizing his end, the end for which he risks his very life.¹²⁰

This is the contradiction of the master’s situation, in the process of establishing himself as master, he dehumanizes the other, who becomes his slave. This dehumanization of the other, however, means that the slave is not the equal of the master. In other words, the master is recognized by a subhuman. The master would have to recognize himself in this situation, which is another contradiction.

Hegel writes: “In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness.”¹²¹ The aforementioned inequality translates into the recognizing

¹¹⁷ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 112.

¹¹⁸ Hegel, *PS*, 113.

¹¹⁹ Findlay, *A*, 521.

¹²⁰ Kojève, *IRH*, 46.

¹²¹ Hegel, *PS*, 115.

(slave) consciousness and the recognized (master) consciousness. Both consciousnesses must live in this situation, since if one of them dies in the contest, there would be no possibility of recognition. (In addition, the recognizing consciousness realizes that it wants to live, so the recognizing consciousness decides to accept enslavement by the recognized, in order for the recognizing consciousness to remain alive.) The master (recognized) consciousness enjoys the fruits of being recognized without acting. Since he doesn't act, the object that he consumes must be prepared by the slave consciousness. The slave consciousness, therefore, acts, and prepares the object for the consumption of the master consciousness. The master consciousness, therefore, is entitled; the slave consciousness is meritocratic. In a related point, the master consciousness isn't satisfied with the recognition of the slave consciousness, since the master isn't being recognized by an equal.

The master then interposes the slave between the master and the object. By "object," I mean the objective realm, or external reality. External reality is composed of objects which are potentially capable of being consumed. The master desires to be able to enjoy the object, but the object is not yet capable of being consumed by the master. The slave intervenes, and works on the object in order to prepare it for consumption by the master. Hyppolite writes on this situation:

Servile labor is the lot of the slave, who in that way arranges the world so that the master can negate it purely and simply, that is, enjoy it...The master values negation, which grants him immediate self-certainty; the slave values production, that is, the transformation of the world-which is 'a delayed enjoyment'...But the master's self certainty in his dominance and his enjoyment is in fact mediated by the being of life, or by the slave...The truth of the master's consciousness thus lies in the inessential consciousness of the slave.¹²²

The slave, therefore, makes the master capable of acting on the master's desire by making the object ready for consumption.

¹²² Jean Hyppolite. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 173-174.

The master, therefore, obtains the recognition of the slave, but this has little value for the master, since the slave is not the equal of the master. Initially, the master is the essential relationship and the slave is the inessential. This situation, however, reverses itself over the course of time. As Hegel puts it:

The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman. This, it is true, appears at first outside of itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness.¹²³

In other words, the slave, through work, achieves true independence, in contrast to the initial situation of the slave, where the slave is inessential and the master essential. This occurs with the slave because the slave has experienced the "trial by fire" of the fear of death, not just any trivial fear.

The next few paragraphs relate to sublimation. On the slave, Hegel writes: "Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it."¹²⁴ The slave subjugates himself in the course of serving the master, and thereby overcomes his "natural existence." Through work: "It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence."¹²⁵

The slave, as the embodiment of humanity, conquers death and the fear of death by means of work on objective reality. This happens because the work of the slave makes objective reality a familiar place for the slave, not an alien reality that inspires fear. Hegel writes: "Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own."¹²⁶

¹²³ Hegel, *PS*, 117.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 118-119.

I do take some issues with Findlay's analysis, because, in some ways, it contradicts his notion that Hegel is talking about psychological states in "Lordship and Bondage." Following the analysis of the early Frankfurt School, I would say that the worker, prior to the industrial revolution, could see herself in the product of the work that she did. With Taylor/ Fordism (as well as Marx), the worker engages in routine, mind-deadening work that is the equivalent of being a "cog in a machine." She doesn't see herself in the work she does, since it is a commodity, each produced thing is the same as the last. Findlay's analysis of Hegel doesn't recognize this distinction (Hegel was writing prior to the routine work of the industrial revolution):

The bondsman, in overcoming the mere existence of material thinghood also rises above the quaking fear which was his first reaction to absolute otherness as embodied in the lord. Then he achieved self-consciousness in opposition to such otherness, now he achieves a self-consciousness not opposed to otherness, but which discovers itself in otherness. In shaping the thing creatively, he becomes aware of his own boundless originality. Hegel thinks that the discipline of service and obedience is essential to self-consciousness: mere mastery of things alone would not yield it. Only the discipline of service enables the conscious being to master himself...Without this discipline formative ability would degenerate into a narrow cleverness placed at the service of personal self-will. ¹²⁷

It would seem that Findlay is describing the activity of the creative genius (McCloskey's "innovative bourgeois"), not the average industrial age proletarian. The average industrial age proletarian fits in like a "cog in a machine," he doesn't "become aware of his own boundless originality." The difference in the psychological states between the proletarian and the innovative bourgeois is significant. The Hegelian ideal would be to have every member of society undergo the experience of the bondsman in "Lordship and Bondage," and to achieve authentic independence through work. Part of the liberation of the proletariat would involve having the proletarians undergo this experience. I support industrialization, of course, and I think all mechanical work, in the future, will be done exclusively by machines, with all humans becoming part of McCloskey's "innovative bourgeoisie."

5. Nietzsche and Skepticism

¹²⁷ Findlay, A, 522.

Now, I will discuss Nietzsche's different conceptions of skepticism. Critical to understanding Nietzsche's (potential) politics is understanding his ambivalent relationship with skepticism. I tend to have two ways of viewing the implications of skepticism in the contemporary historical situation. The first is to say that we can't prove the objective validity of our beliefs, so we shouldn't try to impose them on other cultures (a form of despair, see my analysis of Huntington's foreign policy earlier in this project). The second is to say that we can't prove the objective validity of our metaphysical beliefs, so we should try to make ourselves as materially powerful as possible, since might makes right. (They have a saying in the military, "God always sides with the bigger battalions.") Nietzsche's attitudes towards skepticism involve aspects of both of these ideas of skepticism. At first, Nietzsche compares skepticism with a narcotic symptom of decadence. This, his negative view of some forms of skepticism, calls skepticism as the inability to say "Yes or No." This type of skepticism is "frightened too easily." Nietzsche writes:

Thus a skeptic consoles himself; and it is true that he stands in need of some consolation. For skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological condition that, in ordinary language is called nervous exhaustion and sickliness...But what becomes sickest and degenerates most in such hybrids is the will...¹²⁸

(By "hybrids" Nietzsche is referring to race and class mixture, to him, one of the diseases of modernity.) Then, in section 209¹²⁹ of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche gives praise to what he calls "virile skepticism," which he associates with the German ability to advocate for their will-to-power, despite their inability to prove the objective reality of their beliefs (one of the very few places where Nietzsche praises Germany). On this form of skepticism, Nietzsche writes:

This skepticism despises and nevertheless seizes; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe but does not lose itself in the process; it gives the spirit dangerous freedom, but it is severe on the heart; it is the *German* form of skepticism...the tough will to undertake dangerous journeys of exploration...¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Nietzsche, *BGE*, section 208.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, section 209.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, section 209.

Virile skepticism never surrenders to self-doubt; it is merely a type of metaphysical doubt that retains the necessity of advocating one's will-to-power, regardless of whether or not you can prove the objective validity of one's metaphysics. This virile skepticism is superior to the others by its being more in contact with the will-to-power.¹³¹ This virile skepticism is, to some degree, enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. The Founding Fathers wanted to create a document that would lead to religious tolerance, because they differed over the types of religion they were. Although they were, for the most part, various types of Christian, they still believed in the separation of Church and state. This was for the purpose of religious liberty and private conscience. If the Founding Fathers hadn't created a document that would result in the peaceful resolution of disputes, including the resolution of religious disputes (by separating Church and State), we would still be killing each other over religious differences. This is the paradox of "universal tolerance," i.e., enforcing tolerance universally through force (including the social contract), "virile skepticism" to use Nietzsche's terminology. I also refer to it as "sublimating the will to power" by means of social contract. It is "virile skepticism" in the sense that we are asserting our tolerance concerning metaphysical beliefs rather than just passively saying that we can't prove the objective validity of our metaphysical beliefs.¹³²

I assert that a variation of this "virile skepticism" will be useful to the West in its project of affirming its values in the face of the rising non-Western powers. Broadly speaking, the rising non-Western powers have different metaphysical systems than the West. By "metaphysical," here I mean religious beliefs and the foundations for normative systems. Elsewhere in this project, I use the term "metaphysical" to mean "what makes experience possible." I will alert the reader as to what definition I am using when I do so. For example, here I mean that the Chinese use Confucian-Marxian metaphysics, the Indians use Hindi, and the Muslims use

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, sections 208-209.

¹³² Once again, I must assert that this is an ideal that hasn't always worked out in practice in the U.S. We have had religious intolerance through various phases of our history. We, however, are still less violent than other (secular or religious) dogmatic cultures. This would include the periodic episodes of religious violence in India, and the anti-religious violence in China.

Islam. We might not be able to prove the objective validity of all our beliefs, but this does not mean that we have to give in to self-hatred or doubt regarding the usefulness of asserting our values. If we feel guilty about the West's success and power on Earth, and become proponents of a value system that devalues life on Earth, we will leave the political field open to other cultures who do value power and life on Earth. Nietzsche's conception of "Christian slave morality" describes how that morality "tames" humanity, it doesn't improve man. That morality makes it impossible for its subjects to assert their will to power in reality, on Earth (except in an inverted way). The tame man is a victim under Christianity (and is proud of being a victim). The master morality celebrates power on Earth.¹³³ Nietzsche describes his definition of the overman (here referred to as Dionysus) as being embodied in Goethe: "...the human of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength, because he knows how to turn to advantage what would destroy the average nature; the human for whom nothing else is forbidden than weakness...".¹³⁴ This type of tolerance is from the perspective of the strong, rather than the weak. Rather than asserting dogmatic beliefs using force, we should use force to assert tolerance. Of course, it would be preferable if this were done by dialectic and smart power, not just hard power.

I must here draw a distinction between my ethics and Nietzsche's ethics. I assert that Nietzsche's ethics devalue the notion of a social contract in a way that is destructive. This is especially so in the current historical context. The current historical context is one in which both military and consumer technologies have developed to such a degree that one or the other (or both) could result in the destruction of the world. That being said, all ethics are part subjective, in the sense that all objective reality is mediated through subjective conditions. I do, however, believe that a universal system of ethics is necessary due to the above rise in destructive technologies as well as the globalization of commerce. This universal system of ethics will be created in the documents that will result from the new Bretton Woods system that I hope to help

¹³³ Nietzsche, *GM*, essay 1, section 11.

¹³⁴ Nietzsche, *TI*, 122-123.

create. It will focus on creating processes for dispute resolution that will involve the use of commerce, smart power, and the dialectic, as they are provisionally defined in this project. Reason will be a major soft power instrument in this endeavor. I feel that Nietzsche's subjectivism neglects the objective aspects of human ethics in a way that makes them underappreciated in the current historical situation. To use the language of this project, Nietzsche's thought is un-dialectical in its over-emphasis on subjective drives. As in most of life, there is a reciprocal interaction between subject and object in ethics. This includes a reciprocal interaction with objective conditions that include other philosophies, and the Constitutions and legal systems which you are a part of.

I am not asserting that the West has been perfect in its history, merely that the West's ideals are more tolerant than other cultures and empires in history. We don't stone women to death for not wearing the veil. We don't imprison people for religious reasons or for speaking their minds. Over the centuries, the West has become less bloodthirsty. We must assert this relative tolerance in relation to the rising non-Western powers so that they don't achieve the material power and/or ideological power to dominate us. As I have written elsewhere in this project, we must come up with a universal system of ethics to resolve disputes on a global scale. In other words, a new Bretton Woods system. The world is inescapably global in nature in our age. Technology, both military and consumer, possesses the capability of destroying humanity and the ecology of the world. This new Bretton Woods system will, hopefully, be proactive in nature, due to a new philosophical conception of health. By forming subjectivities using the dialectic and smart power, we will solve problems before they require radical surgery, whether material or ideological.

6. Nietzsche and Power

Now, I will discuss Nietzsche's politics and concept of power. I will draw heavily from Paul Patton, but I think that he doesn't successfully draw a clear distinction between Nietzsche's

psychology and Nietzsche's politics.¹³⁵ Patton, in the article under consideration here, challenges the twin notions of many Nietzsche commentators: (1) that Nietzsche worships power over others, and (2) the view that Nietzsche's political theory cannot be construed in a liberatory manner.¹³⁶ Patton asserts that Nietzsche's conception of power can lead to a liberatory politics.¹³⁷ (I'm going to mostly skip over the sections of the article concerning Hobbes.) Patton interprets Nietzsche as having a multi-dimensional conception of power. This means that Nietzsche conceives of power not just as power over others, but also as power over oneself and power as the feeling of the powerful.¹³⁸ Patton also asserts that Nietzsche conceives of power, as well as lying not in the satisfaction of desire, but in the expenditure of energy and the will-to-power.¹³⁹ In this sense, according to Patton, self-preservation is, for Nietzsche, an indirect result of the will-to-power. Power, therefore, is the result of a feeling of exuberance, for Nietzsche, not of a repressive function, or from the lack of something.¹⁴⁰ Kaufmann, similarly, recognizes this: Nietzsche's overman creating out of exuberance, rather than resentment (he also describes it as what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian, the fusion of creative passion with form-giving self-control).¹⁴¹ (Once again, Nietzsche associates this with Goethe.) In Patton's interpretation of Nietzsche, the slave intends to harm others, whereas the master only harms others as a by-product of their exuberance (it is an un-intentional event).¹⁴² Patton sees Nietzsche's vision as of a community of sovereign individuals, with progress happening as a collective self-overcoming of humanity by these sovereign individuals.¹⁴³ Patton asserts that Nietzsche imagines a political community founded upon the capacity for autonomous action by its members (with its members being capable of keeping their promises

¹³⁵ Patton, *PHN*, 144-161.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 144-146.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 144-146; 159.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 144-146; 155; 158.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 152-153.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 152-153.

¹⁴¹ Kaufmann, *KN*, 280-283.

¹⁴² Patton, *PHN*, 157-158.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 144-146; 157-158.

and taking responsibility for their actions).¹⁴⁴ Patton contrasts this with Hobbes. He views Hobbes as envisioning a community of slaves who require a strong state to regulate their behavior.¹⁴⁵ Nietzsche defeats the stereotype of him being a solipsist by relating part of his “Amor Fati” to the idea that sometimes the greatest pleasure is experienced by making others happy.¹⁴⁶

In this section of this project, I will supplement my reading of Nietzsche with a method of reading that I have derived from a close reading of Berthold’s *The Ethics of Authorship*. This also involves an “ethics of readership.” Reading is a type of praxis for the overman/innovative bourgeois. In keeping with one of the central themes of this project, I will argue/describe reading as having a dialectical format. In the case of reading, the dialectic is between what I call the subjective conditions of the reader and the objective existence of the text. What you read and how you read are both affected by the subjective conditions that you bring to the text in the process of reading. These subjective conditions include what you have read in the past (or, at least, what you remember of what you have read), and the socio-psychological-historical situation that you bring to the text under consideration in the process of reading it. This does recognize (as Berthold notes) that Barthes was correct in his declaration of the 1968 “Death of the Author”¹⁴⁷ that the texts being read have a meaning that is assigned to them by the reader, which may deviate from the author’s intent.¹⁴⁸ This means, to Berthold, that the reader controls the text, by reading it; the text doesn’t control the reader. I assert that this reading is a dialectical process, not subjectively determined by the reader; not objectively determined by the text. If the reader, by himself/herself, determines the meaning of the text without input from the text, this is a form of rape, raping the inanimate object of the text as if the text were a corpse.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 157-158.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 153-154.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 156.

¹⁴⁷ Quoted in Daniel Berthold, *The Ethics of Authorship* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 128-129.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

There must be some input from the text in the praxis of reading it. The subjective conditions of the reader affect the experience of reading it, without determining the experience completely. There must be a clear distinction made between what the text says and what the reader brings to the experience. (In the case of Nietzsche, I cite two examples of rape being Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche's and Gilles Deleuze's readings of Nietzsche. With the case of Deleuze, I realize this might be hyperbole, but I do think interpreting Nietzsche as some form of anarcho-socialist is an example of very "creative interpretation.") This means that Ken Park reading Nietzsche in 2022 in the U.S. is a different experience from others reading Nietzsche in their own particular individual-social-historical situation. The reader must fully and accurately acknowledge what the reader is taking from the text, and what they are adding to the text. Berthold, commenting on the epistemology of Kant as it relates to reading: "The virtuous reader must, then, restrain herself from altering the text by imposing her own interpretations - every interpretation is a mere appearance and disfiguration of the text - and must demonstrate fidelity by deferring to the authority of the author...".¹⁴⁹ Berthold goes on to propose a Hegelian manner of reading, where appearances matter, not the text as a Kantian thing-in-itself. Berthold writes that the "text" is a product of the reader. Here, I am going once again to propose a sexual metaphor. The text, when dialectically related to the reader's praxis, is an experience of consensual sex. If the reading of the text is purely a product of the reader's desires or "creative interpretation," this constitutes a form of rape.

My reading of Berthold relates to this project in that we must educate people in how to read dialectically. Nietzsche writes: "I want no 'believers'...I think I am too ironic to believe in myself, I never speak to masses. I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced holy."¹⁵⁰ Nietzsche wants his readers to think for themselves, not to blindly obey Nietzsche as if he were God. Berthold notes that Nietzsche wants his readers to escape seduction.¹⁵¹ In order

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 168.

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 139.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 153-157.

for the cognitive elites to escape being blinded by any dogmatic ideology (religious or secular), they must be educated to read dialectically. In this sense, dialectics is a form of psychoepistemology, which colors every aspect of life, including reading. By having an appropriate respect for the object (including other people, nature, and other texts), one becomes less likely to use violence (whether conceptual or actual) to try to remake reality according to your dreams (or the dreams of the culture which you are part of). Making everybody capable of dialectical reading (and thinking) might make a Libertarian society possible; they would be less likely to blindly follow any form of dogma.

Berthold's analysis in *The Ethics of Authorship* also brings to mind the Communist project in the 20th Century. Berthold analyzes in the above work, the fact that for Hegel "language is more honest than intention."¹⁵² The Communists tried to create an egalitarian society where the proletariat's dictatorship would usher in a classless society. Lenin's experiments with forced collectivization in agriculture in the USSR during its early years wound up being a total fiasco. This caused Lenin, in his New Economic Policy of 1921, to reinstate many of the Kulaks back into leadership roles in agriculture, reversing his earlier expropriation of those Kulaks. Lenin rationalized this by saying that capitalism had not yet been superseded by socialism or communism in the historical context of 1921 in the USSR. The changing language of the Constitution of the USSR recognized the necessity of classes despite the original intent of the Communists to create a classless society. This situation is what caused Orwell to write his famous dictum about the USSR: "All animals are equal. Some animals are more equal than others." This situation also calls to mind the analysis of freedom, intentionality, and facticity by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre asserts "The intention can no more be separated from the action than thought from the language that expresses it and as it can happen...our actions can teach us our intentions..."¹⁵³ Sartre, elsewhere, states that

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 16-21.

¹⁵³ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Sarah Richmond (New York: Washington Square Press, 2018), 632.

“...success makes no difference to freedom.”¹⁵⁴ Earlier, however, Sartre concedes that “...Can I choose to be tall if I am short?...objections that are concerned...with the ‘limits’ that my factual situation might be thought to place on my free choice of myself.”¹⁵⁵ This clearly shows that despite freedom’s value of intent in relation to its actualization, facticity (reality) does impose limits on that freedom. Although Sartre tries to defend the value of intent (despite whether or not it is actualized), I still think Sartre is conceding the point of the Stoics that it is easier to control yourself than objective reality. (That being said, and my aspiring to be a Hegelian, I think facticity will change depending upon technological development. The scope of the existentially possible will increase as technology progresses.) I still think the point about actuality (including the actuality concerning language) being more honest than intent is a valid point. People, in reality, have different abilities and desires based upon both things in their control and things not in their control. Things in their control are based upon ontological freedom, things not in their control are based upon objective conditions, this includes objective-subjective conditions like I.Q. and physical and psychological makeup. The intent to make all people equal winds up confronting the facticity of human difference. The later Sartre tries to resolve this “crypto-stoicism” by reference to a Marxist theory of history. I think the earlier Sartre’s emphasis on subjectivity and freedom was more accurate than his later Marxist turn. I suspect that his Marxism filled his religious psychological needs, but they turned out to be inaccurate. Any philosophical system that relies on a transcendent notion of humanity, or any eschatology, runs the risk of distorting reality. This includes atheistic Marxism, with its goal of a classless society achievable at some indeterminate point in the future. Perhaps classes will always exist, as they always have in every human society up to this point. The classless society might be just as imaginary as religious beliefs are, which are imaginary at least most probably. The hope for an eternal life in Heaven might be just as delusional as the belief in a classless society. Sartre

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 631.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 628.

should have just accepted individualism and alienation as facts of life, present, more or less, in every human society.

7. Nietzsche and Sublimation

Now, I will discuss Nietzsche's concept of sublimation and how it relates to my formula for humanity in the present historical epoch (Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis). For the time being, I am omitting a discussion of whether repression is a necessary precursor of sublimation, as some Nietzsche commentators insist. Some Nietzsche commentators say that repression, at first, is necessary, then it becomes either sublimation or symptom formation. This will involve not just a discussion of sublimation, but also how sublimation relates to Nietzsche's conceptions of reason, will-to-power, the social contract, and the Ascetic Priest. All of these concepts will be reflected upon by me, especially as they are influenced by the present historical context.

Prior to the mid-20th century, warfare existed in a way that was more legitimate than other forms of socio-historical change. One of our human drives is aggression/desire for power, which frequently manifests itself in wars and civil wars. Nietzsche referred to this drive as being a manifestation of will-to-power. In the 20th century, humanity's development of technology wound up exponentially increasing our ability to destroy. This increased ability to destroy has forced us to find non-military solutions to the question of manifesting our will-to-power in reality. In my understanding of Nietzsche, this involves the use of his concept of "sublimation."

Sublimation's "sister-concept" is repression. Both sublimation and repression relate to our relationship with our biological drives, which are manifestations of our will-to-power. Berges writes (on sublimation and repression): "Both exist as a means of dealing with problematic impulses, i.e., impulses that we cannot live with in society, that we are ashamed of, that would be disapproved of by others... ." ¹⁵⁶ For Gemes, in his interpretation of Nietzsche, sublimation enables the stronger drive to co-opt the weaker drive "as an ally," and allows the weaker drive to

¹⁵⁶ Sandrine Berges, "Plato, Nietzsche, and Sublimation," *Phronimon*, 3, no. 1 (2001): 25.

express itself (but in a way transformed from its original aim). Gemes, on repression's opposition to sublimation, says that repression is where the stronger drive completely stifles any expression of the weaker drive.¹⁵⁷ Phillips concisely defines sublimation: "Nietzsche doesn't understand sublimation as a softening, moralizing, or defanging of the 'evil' instincts; he understands it as their refinement and development into healthier and more profound and more potent expressions."¹⁵⁸ Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche as saying that Christianity doesn't sublimate human drives, but represses them. This is a form of the castration of the spirit.¹⁵⁹

Shame and taboo are both historical in nature. For example, we were, in prior times, in different cultures, ashamed of sexuality (especially homosexuality). Today, we are much more tolerant. Warfare can be looked at in a similar way. Prior to the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction, warfare was considered a legitimate form of the resolution of differences and desires for power. (As it was noted in the chapter of this project on McCloskey, the Germans and Japanese wound up achieving many of their goals of WW2 after WW2 by peaceful means. I consider the sublimation of the instinct to dominate cultures different from our own through economic means rather than military means to be one of the greatest accomplishments of humanity in the late 20th century. We must sublimate our desire to dominate into creating a superior product for global consumers. Both warfare and capitalism require a high degree of self-mastery.) Swenson writes:

In particular, his (Nietzsche's) account of sublimation begins to focus more narrowly on the various ways that the redirection and refinement of basic drives (particularly sexual and aggressive drives) offers a plausible naturalistic account of the origins of our highest values-perhaps even the origin of culture itself.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Ken Gemes, "Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 38 (Fall 2009): 48, JSTOR.

¹⁵⁸ Luke Phillips, "Sublimation and the Übermensch," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 358, JSTOR.

¹⁵⁹ Kaufmann, *KN*, 216-223.

¹⁶⁰ Joseph Swenson, "Sublimation and Affirmation in Nietzsche's Psychology," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 45, issue 2 (Summer 2014): 203.

Only time will tell if humanity will retain its rationality concerning the destructive potential of warfare in the present historical context. Not only Russia/Ukraine, but also China/Taiwan will be test cases. Phillips notes that sublimation "...is the imaginative refinement, development, and enhancement of our most deeply rooted drives...; it is the source of all higher culture in both the individual and the society... ." ¹⁶¹ An empirical example of this is if China decides that it wants to possess Taiwan's semiconductor factories, and invades Taiwan, those semiconductor factories that it desires would be destroyed in the war. This means that warfare is an irrational manifestation of China's desire to dominate Taiwan. A rational manifestation of China's desire for power would be in producing products that it could use in trading with Taiwan, rather than invading Taiwan. An aspect of sublimating the desire to dominate will be translating the desire to dominate into technology and works of culture that don't destroy capital.

The relationship of reason to drives in sublimation remains a critical feature of Nietzsche commentators. Now, I will discuss the differences on these Nietzsche issues by Gemes and Kaufmann. Kaufmann has more of a "rational" reading of Nietzsche, as opposed to Gemes' "drives" reading of Nietzsche. Kaufmann's reading of Nietzsche asserts that, for Nietzsche, reason is the highest manifestation of the will-to-power. ¹⁶² The overman, in Kaufmann's reading, must act "rationally on instinct," and not to be either the slave of one's passions or to be castrated. ¹⁶³ For Kaufmann, then, the will-to-power is neither inherently rational nor opposed to reason, but is "potentially rational." ¹⁶⁴ In Kaufmann's reading, reason allows for the manifestation of self-mastery and self-overcoming; ¹⁶⁵ this is the type of cruelty towards oneself that the overman exhibits. ¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ Phillips, *SU*, 362.

¹⁶² Kaufmann, *KN*, 229.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 233.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 234.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 229.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 244-246.

Gemes appears to think that Nietzsche doesn't have a concept of rationality; for Gemes, Nietzsche is all about strong drives and weak drives. Gemes writes:

Ressentiment is directly connected to repression, in that where there is resentment, there is some drive we have been forced to stifle...To affirm all of one's life, to overcome resentment, would be to affirm all of one's drives-life, for Nietzsche, being nothing but a collection of drives.¹⁶⁷

Although I do agree with Gemes that Nietzsche focuses on aristocracy and drives too much, I do *hope* that Kaufmann is right. I hope that Nietzsche does have some concept of reason; this would make him less aristocratic. Gemes also focuses on how Nietzsche devalues consciousness¹⁶⁸, a devaluation that also has an aristocratic aspect to it. If we aren't aware of how our drives determine us, that means we have no rational control of them. This, to me, seems to invalidate the very notion of sublimation: if we aren't rational we would be like animals, and just act purely spontaneously, without reflection or consciousness. There would be no possible intervention; we would be totally determined by unconscious drives. Sublimation implies choosing a successful course of action among other possibilities. If we didn't possess reason, we wouldn't be aware of being able to judge the correct course of action. We would blindly follow our drives, weak or not. You have to choose to sublimate or to repress, this would, inescapably, involve reason. Psychotherapy itself would be impossible if we didn't possess reason.

This discussion of the relationship between reason and sublimation raises the issue of whether or not it is possible to have a non-repressive social contract. Sublimation would provide for a healthy manifestation of the drive to dominate, as opposed to castrating ourselves through the worship of weakness on Earth (Nietzsche's understanding of Christianity). Nietzsche associates Christianity and the social contract with the values of the herd man. The herd man's virtues are "...attributes, which make him tame, easy to get along with, and useful to

¹⁶⁷ Gemes, *FNS*, 49.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

the herd...public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, indulgence, and pity.”¹⁶⁹ (It must be noted that some of these virtues are necessary to have a functioning society.) Pearson asserts that Nietzsche says that the weak unreflectively resort to elimination over sublimation.¹⁷⁰ In support of the notion that you can have a social contract that is successfully in touch with the will-to-power, Pearson writes: “All values are formulated as power augmenting strategies, they are all expressions of the will-to-power.”¹⁷¹ Similarly, Gemes writes:

Thus Nietzsche claims that the Christian value of brotherly love was originally in fact a transformed expression of hostile drives to dominate one’s fellow man. By successfully preaching brotherly love the weak get their oppressors to voluntarily disarm themselves and become subservient to the values of the weak. In doing so they, both the weak and the strong who have been converted to the values of the weak, split off their contrary aggressive drives from conscious apprehension, so that at the same time they harbor both unacknowledged aggressive drives and acknowledged beneficent drives.¹⁷²

It must be noted that the above Gemes quote is one of Nietzsche’s examples of repression and resentment. An example of sublimation would be producing a superior product for the consumer, rather than dominating them through force. On Nietzsche’s idea of sublimation, Pearson writes: “...rather than trying to repress such impulses, Nietzsche wants us to master and exploit them in such a way as to press them into the service of our higher objectives.”¹⁷³ The social contract is a concrete manifestation of reason in language. I think that Nietzsche’s devaluing of the social contract¹⁷⁴ is due to his less than ideal understanding of subject/object relations. I feel that my understanding of the mediation between subject and object as occurring on the level of ideas/language/documents is superior to Nietzsche’s. This last aspect - that of documents - reveals the influence of Foucault on my thought. The social contract is a type of document with implications for practice (in terms of social practices). The social contract

¹⁶⁹ Nietzsche, *BGE*, section 199.

¹⁷⁰ James Pearson, “Nietzsche on the Necessity of Repression,” *Inquiry*, (09 Oct. 2018): section 3.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, section 4.

¹⁷² Gemes, *FNS*, 46.

¹⁷³ Pearson, *NNR*, abstract.

¹⁷⁴ Nietzsche, *TI*, 109-111.

mediates between subject and object (with the object including other subjects as well as nature), and regulates acceptable behavior between subject and object. It is essential to understand that the dialectic involves practice on the level of the document (when considered both official and/or unofficial-more on this distinction later when I discuss various concepts of power by Nietzsche, Foucault, and political science), as well as non-linguistic practices that have the potential of being considered dialectical (when they involve respect for difference in the reciprocal interaction between subject and object). I view this type of respect as being different from Nietzsche's "taming." To Nietzsche, the social contract is considered a form of taming. This is a tension in Nietzsche's thought: should regulation and the social contract be considered as always being taming? Or should it, when pursued in certain ways, be considered positively as a form of sublimation of the drive to dominate? (As I have stated elsewhere, I wish that Nietzsche had been more of a student of economics than he was. If he had understood economics more, he might have taken a more positive view of meritocratic democratic capitalism.) The social document we are concerned with in this project is the Bretton Woods system. This is a document global in nature; it is necessarily global due to the globalization of humanity. Phillips concludes his article on sublimation by writing:

As Nietzsche sees it, sublimation is a fundamentally creative enterprise, and it is the source of all higher culture...Nietzsche hints that it is because of the stifling and subsequent sublimation of our animal instincts that we first developed our mental powers to such a high plane of psychological sophistication...The harnessing and intelligent use of this psychological technique in cultivating our own character and culture is the key to bringing about our own flourishing as both individuals and societies and for creating something 'for whose sake it is worthwhile to live on Earth'.¹⁷⁵

We must expand our intellectual discussion of sublimation to include a discussion of relations between nations and cultures, so that it doesn't just involve the isolated instances of Leonardo Da Vinci and others.

Both military action and capitalist competition involve a high degree of self-mastery. In the current historical epoch, warfare and consumer culture have developed to the point where

¹⁷⁵ Phillips, *SU*, 361-362.

either, or both, could destroy humanity and the ecology of the world. An Ascetic Priest solution (whether Christian or otherwise) would involve us regressing back to the level of culture that existed prior to the Industrial Revolution, when people expanded their numbers and consumption until the ecology of the world couldn't support their existence. (Some of the features of the Ascetic Priest are the devaluation of life on Earth, self-abnegation, and weakness on Earth; the Ascetic Priest is inherently anti-technological.) A solution that involves sublimation would involve using reason and technology to find ways to make humanity and the ecology of the world support an increased standard of living, potentially for all humans. Sublimating the will-to-power rationally would enable us to choose the best way of maximizing our life possibilities in a way that wouldn't destroy humanity and the world. Repressing our will-to-power would make us stifle our Earthly desires and our ability to enjoy life on Earth. Central to actualizing sublimation is the creation of a new Bretton Woods international system that would create a social contract that transforms the desire to dominate from a military desire into an economic desire. Following Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche, this would involve reasoning on instinct (the will-to-power), as opposed to the unconscious surrendering to drives, strong or not. We must use reason to understand the destructive nature of warfare. Putin and Xi should heed this advice.

8. Conclusion

This concludes my chapter on Nietzsche. Nietzsche must be read (with reading being a form of praxis) dialectically within the present historical context (of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis). Nietzsche contributes to my five point formula for the present historical context in the following ways (in summary). Nietzsche successfully redefines selfishness along class lines, with the selfishness of the overman being superior to the selfishness of thugs and "Homer Simpson" type individuals. This corresponds to my formula of overman/innovative bourgeois subjectivities for the cognitive elites of the West and rising non-Western powers, with utilitarian mass culture for the masses of the West and rising non-Western powers. Nietzsche

recognizes that democracy has drawbacks to it, but they must be solved not by aristocracy, but by meritocratic democratic capitalism. Nietzsche's revaluation of values must be oriented on the following basic premises: all that increases your health and power on this Earth is good; all that decreases your health and power on Earth is evil, as opposed to the arbitrary aspects of religious dogma (but some religious principles aren't arbitrary). Nietzsche's liberatory psychology must be separated from his reactionary politics. As was noted in my discussion of Patton's article on Nietzsche and power, Nietzsche's conception of power as part psychological - and Nietzsche's overcoming of resentment psychologies - lends itself to a non-authoritarian potential politics. This conflicts with his focus on drives and aristocracy as leading to the rule of overman subjectivities. Nietzsche's concept of "virile skepticism," which, as I noted, has some similarities with the U.S. Constitution, further develops this liberatory psychology. The West and the rising non-Western Powers must create a global social contract that will allow humanity to sublimate its will-to-power into economic means, rather than military. This new global social contract will revise or replace the Bretton Woods system that was set up in the wake of WW2.

Chapter 4: Subjective Determinism and Psychoepistemology (especially the Dialectic)

This chapter will deal with two concepts that I have adapted from various philosophers. These concepts are (1) psychoepistemology (especially as it relates to the epistemological aspect, the dialectic), and (2) subjective determinism. Subjective determinism is the result of my readings of Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Ayn Rand. The dialectic I have adapted from Hegel. (As a prefatory note, my reading of Hegel has been especially influenced by the epochal reading of Hegel by Daniel Berthold, as put forth in Berthold's *Hegel's Grand Synthesis*.)

1. Psychoepistemology (Especially as it relates to the Dialectic)

My main adaptations of the dialectic have been inspired by Hegel's understanding of the dialectic as being, in knowledge, the reconciliation of thought and being in the never ending process of becoming.¹⁷⁶ I have a limited understanding of Hegel, which is based upon my readings of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the related commentaries of Berthold, Hyppolite, and Kojève. My understanding of the dialectic as being "subjectivist" relates to this project in that I'm trying to provide a subjective foundation for ethics that owes a great deal to Hegel and the aforementioned commentators.¹⁷⁷ Most of the debate in Hegel commentary focuses on the difference between the "epochal" reading of Hegel as contrasted with the "absolutist" reading of Hegel (according to Berthold, there are also some attempts at a synthetic interpretation of Hegel that combine both). The "epochal" reading of Hegel argues that there is no final, absolute end of history for Hegel and his dialectic, there are only fleeting moments of reconciliation that lead to further contradictions, and so on. The "absolutist" reading of Hegel, most often religious, says that there is a literal end to history for Hegel. My more "subjectivist" reading of Hegel, which also contains elements of the "epochal" reading, focuses on how the dialectic relates to the individual subject as opposed to the other two readings of Hegel. Berthold writes: "the eternal life [of spirit] consists in the very process of continually producing the opposition' of consciousness and object, it also consists in the process of 'continually reconciling it.'"¹⁷⁸ This reconciliation is, however, fleeting for Hegel.

Berthold analyzes Hegel as having a more scientific and accurate understanding of the relationship between subject and object than the forms of idealism that preceded him. This will

¹⁷⁶ Daniel Berthold, *Hegel's Grand Synthesis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 37.

¹⁷⁷ I have been informed by Berthold that my understanding of Hegel's dialectic anticipates views of Hegel, which I haven't read yet, rather than critiques them. I am not enough of a Hegel scholar to be able to defend myself, or to adjust my views. I'm keeping this section of this project due to its necessary relationship to my metaphysical foundations for an ethics. My appreciation of Hegel is not yet fully scientific or dialectical, to use a term that I introduced earlier in this project related to reading. In a similar manner, I have been inspired by the existentialists' and phenomenologists' attempts at creating a "phenomenological ontology." My main issue with Hegel is trying to account for the different ways the subject experiences time, with a distinction between more subjective forms of time as opposed to the making of history.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 157.

especially involve a discussion of Kant's phenomenal/noumenal distinction and Hegel's interpretation of the correspondence theory of truth. My adaptation of Hegel's dialectic emphasizes the subjective aspects of his dialectic, with a distinction between the dialectic as the property of individual ontology and the dialectic as the property of World History. I will assert that this distinction between the dialectic as the property of the subject in ontology is different from the dialectic as the property of World History and the World Spirit. There is a difference between the individual subject's experience of time and the collective experience of World History. In my more "subjectivist" interpretation of the dialectic, the reconciliation between subject and object is not only epochal, not absolutist, but also at each moment in the subject's life. Another way of looking at the subjective time/history distinction is to ask the question: what types of events are considered objectively significant enough to record their taking place in a document? What events are not considered objectively significant enough to record their passing? The former are historical events; the latter are subjective time events. In keeping with this project, subjective time and objective history dialectically interact (and there is a certain degree of overlap between the two. Having sex for pleasure while trying to make a baby shows one type of overlap.)

I am not denying that Hegel has a conception of the subject, indeed his dialectical relation between subject and object is not just an improvement over older forms of idealism, but also, in an anticipatory way, is superior to Marx's objective determinism. In addition, as was illustrated in Berthold's *Hegel's Theory of Madness*, Hegel does have a theory of the unconscious on the part of the subject, which would be impossible if Hegel didn't acknowledge the importance of the subject. Hegel, as it is famously described by many commentators, reintroduces the body (through desire) to the disembodied Cartesian Cogito, which would be impossible if he didn't have a theory of the subject. My main critique of Hegel is that there is a qualitative difference between the time (and timelessness of the unconscious) of the subject, and history. History, in my understanding of Hegel, has both a subjective aspect and an

objective aspect. These aspects of time reciprocally interact in a dialectic. I assert that there is a type of subjective existence of timelessness. This type of timelessness is of the sort found in children and older forms of humanity. Cavemen had a much more subjective understanding of history, by this, I mean that their ability to form abstract thoughts, and to construct narratives, was much more limited than our ability to do so. Our ability to use language has improved over the course of human history. In addition, humanity has become more rational over the course of our history. Berthold writes:

...we may see Hegel's anticipation of Freud's insistence on the 'timelessness' of unconscious mental processes in his conception of historical existence as as beginning in the form of "nature, as an innermost, unconscious instinct" and progressing through a process of "bringing [this unconscious instinct] into consciousness" by the transformative character of labor. Such a conception directly prepares the way for the explanation of madness-the reversion of mind into nature, the return to the darkness of our origins-as effecting an abandonment of history, a paralysis of our ability to transform nature through labor...a substitute for the social character of history and labor which characterizes the enterprise of rationality.¹⁷⁹

The unconscious, therefore, has a distorted relationship to history, when it manifests itself in madness. It is radically subjective in the sense of its not being communicable in a normal way to other people. I maintain that there are other forms of the manifestation of "subjective time" in individuals that represent a deviation from "objective historical" time, which is collective and shared socially. This social sharedness involves mythologies and documents. There are degrees of subjectivity that are transcended by their combining to become collective. That means that there are multiple levels of time. These levels of time begin at the level of the individual, with their degree of communicability beginning at the level of the individual and leading up to the collective. The collective experience of time in history is created by enduring media, such as documents and other forms of media, which transcend the subjective experience of time by the individual. This transcendence of the subjective forms of time is what is created by the historical. This experience of time travels up from the level of the individual, up

¹⁷⁹ Daniel Berthold, *Hegel's Theory of Madness* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 156.

to Hegelian World History. Hegel equates the private life of feeling, which is part of the unconscious, as involving a different conception of time. On feeling in Hegel, Berthold writes:

And for Hegel too there are certainly universal features of feeling. The point is that these features express our private interests, the laws of the individual heart: feeling is the terrain of seclusion, subjectivity, isolation. As such, feeling precludes community and communication; it speaks a private, pre-rational language. The life of feeling is in this way a sort of pre-historical way of being...¹⁸⁰

This life of subjective feeling can be compared to subjective time, which is different from social history. Most people exist in a restricted sense in relation to history. History is created by experts and social elites, not by the masses. The documents of history are created by elites; the masses create history, but only when they are well led by elites and supplied with superior technology.

There is a social aspect to the distinction between subjective time and history. This relates to the difference between official discourses and unofficial discourses. I have adapted this distinction from my readings of Foucault and Hegel. This distinction has an epistemological aspect and a material power aspect. The epistemological aspect is the dialectic, as I have discussed in this chapter. Official discourses are those discourses that are recognized as being valid by social power structures that have more legitimacy due to their being states. As Foucault analyzes, there is a value to being labeled “official” by the authorities. A related aspect is the question of whether there can be un-historical being in the subject. I would answer “Yes,” because our biological drives are more timeless than our social lives. Our biological drives exist throughout history, regardless of how they’re manifested in history. Therefore, there is an un-historical aspect to our being. Unofficial discourses are discourses that are created by power structures that are criminal or insurgent. Subjective time more relates to unofficial discourses in that they are not directly related to state structures that have official legitimacy. (We make space for the timeless in our lives, to have sex, make children, get drunk, etc.)

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 109.

“History” to Hegel has a material power aspect in that the creation of history is done by publishing apparatuses that have more legitimacy to more people due to their connections to official states. Unofficial discourses still do have legitimacy to many people. (Look at how some people view the social code of the mafia as being more legitimate than the official laws of the state in which they live.) Official discourses have more of a legitimacy due to their being connected to objective social constructs, rather than a “quasi-historical” subjective time which is only partially connected to history. These are also social constructs, in that the narratives created by both official discourses and unofficial discourses help form identities in the normative sense of the identity.

There are potential consequences to this distinction between subjective time and objective history. Part of the dialectic is the ability to speak back to power. Traditionally excluded groups are often allowed to manifest their biological drives in history, while being denied the ability to make history themselves. This means that they’re allowed to reproduce themselves, and to maintain some minimal level of culture, without being able to create official discourses. This relates to the issue of whether Hegel’s dialectic is just another Eurocentric discourse with pretensions to universality. I believe that it is universal, due to its ability to found an ethics on the basis of universal characteristics of human consciousness. (As I have written elsewhere in this project, everyone possesses, metaphysically, a dialectical relationship to objective reality with the objective containing other subjectivities. This is the same as possessing organs; they are both universal to humanity. Phenomenology is as universal as biology.) Hegel’s dialectic will provide a metaphysical foundation for the liberation of repressed cultures, repressed cultures that are repressed by the non-dialectical aspects of the West, as well as by the non-dialectical aspects of the non-West. This liberation will involve liberating both subjective time and the ability to make objective history.

Hegel formulates the culmination of his dialectic in Absolute Knowledge. Absolute knowledge is the education of consciousness to the scientific method: how to think. It isn’t a

final product, but the creation of a process of how to know. There is a sort of relativity to Absolute Knowledge, in that Absolute Knowledge always comes from the perspective of an individual actor (although it is systematic), not from some Godlike objectivity. In keeping with Hegel's programme, Absolute Knowledge is the education of self-consciousness to the dialectic, in the form of thinking.¹⁸¹ Knowledge is the synthesis of the a priori characteristics of the subject, characteristics that make experience possible and are a part of every human being, with the a posteriori characteristics that the subject perceives in empirical reality.¹⁸²

In a "big picture" scheme of things, my adaptation of the dialectic relates to some of the central problems of post-Enlightenment Western thought. Prior to the Enlightenment, people focused on human difference and why that meant that difference was bad. During the Enlightenment, people focused on human similarities, or universals. This is why Foucault cites that the human being didn't exist until we began to conceptualize humanity in those terms in official discourses. In postmodern thought, we are focusing on human difference, but now in order to celebrate it. With my adaptation of the dialectic, we are celebrating both humanity in general, as well as particular human individuals and cultures. This is why I think that my adaptation of the dialectic provides a more stable foundation for ethics than postmodernism. It makes for the possibility of universals. I compare my dialectic and other ontological concepts with the organs of the human body, in the sense that everyone has an ontology like they have a body. Hyppolite writes: "We thus experience a certain interpenetration of the universal and the specific, a certain unity of the diverse and unity."¹⁸³ This relates to this project in that psychoepistemology, when realized through smart power, leads to the liberation of discourses in the process of identity formation. This liberation is opposed to both subjective determinism and objective determinism.

¹⁸¹ Hyppolite, *GSH*, 194-196.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 231.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 99.

Now, I will engage in a brief discussion of Hegel's critique of Kant. Hegel's project is an attempt to find solutions to the relationship of epistemology to being, as that relationship was described by Kant. Kant's project was to solve the question of skepticism, in order to find a more solid foundation for epistemology. This preliminary foundation for knowledge is what is called the "correspondence theory" of truth. This is where truth is the identity of what is cognitively perceived by the subject with what exists in empirical reality (this is called "realism"). In non-dialectical thinking, there is no mediation between subject and object; it is an immediate relationship. This immediacy is an oversimplification and distortion of reality. Kant, in his attempt at reconceptualizing the relationship between subject and object, concedes defeat. Kant says that there is a barrier between our cognition and the empirical reality that that cognition attempts to represent. Kant, in essence, is saying that we can only know objects as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. Berthold asserts that Kant, because of this inability to bridge the gap created by this (non) correspondence theory of Kant's, is "intimidated by being."¹⁸⁴ ("Being" being the object outside of thought, what Kant calls "the thing in itself.")

Hegel describes Kant's distinction of his own thought from the thought of skepticism as a form of surrender.¹⁸⁵ Hegel's solution is to create a transition of the relation of subject to object. This transition is the concept of work. Work enables the subject to transform objective reality. I regard this as a Hegelian truth about objective reality and truth. Objective reality and truth are proven to be real through the use of technology to initiate predictable cause/effect relationships in empirical reality. Berthold describes the central issue of work to Hegel: work on objective reality is the means to human liberation.¹⁸⁶ We externalize our reason into objective reality through work and technology. Kojève, likewise, analyzes Hegel's synthesis of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* in a concept that is related to work: that of the project. Kojève writes: "...the concept of the *a priori* in Kant is a 'notion,' which allows man to conform to given being; whereas

¹⁸⁴ Berthold, *HGS*, 29.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 42-48.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

in Hegel, the a priori concept is a project, which allows man to transform given being and make it conform...¹⁸⁷ The concept of the project to Hegel is one of the constitutive features of his a priori ontology, but it also manifests itself in empirical history through deeds, which give the a priori content.

Hegel's solution is to have a more optimistic assessment of the relationship of subject to object, according to Berthold:

We need, Hegel believes, to return to a less pessimistic point of view as regards the accessibility of objects to consciousness, to a pre-Kantian conception of the criterion of truth, where thought and thing correspond...Against the alien object, being-in-itself cut off from being-for-consciousness, Hegel reiterates the basic proposition of all idealism that 'what is, or the in-itself, only is in so far as it is for consciousness'...The truth of things, in short, is the 'thing thought.'¹⁸⁸

This recognition of the centrality of thought means, in an improvement on the "correspondence theory," that the perception of objective reality is *mediated* by thought; it isn't an immediate relationship. This preserves the positive aspects of both empiricism and idealism. Hyppolite writes:

The impenetrable thing-in-itself and the subjective solitude of the I are both superseded. But these two routes—that of consciousness seeing the phantom of being-in-itself vanish before it, and that of self-consciousness which in the course of its harsh and lengthy formation sees the disappearance of an essence that exists only for it, for it qua specific consciousness—are prerequisites for the positing of a truth which is both in-itself and for consciousness, a truth such as only idealism can conceive.¹⁸⁹

The object is penetrable by thought, and the self-enclosed "I" isn't self-enclosed, but exists in relation to the external world. Hegel isn't saying that you shouldn't trust your senses; he is merely saying that there is a conceptual aspect to experience. This conceptual aspect to experience is unavoidable. Berthold goes on to describe this mediated nature of Hegel's improvement on the correspondence theory of truth (which represents an improvement on Kant's phenomenal/noumenal distinction):

¹⁸⁷ Kojève, *IRH*, 142.

¹⁸⁸ Berthold, *HGS*, 29.

¹⁸⁹ Hyppolite, *GSH*, 228.

This is not the comparison of 'my cognition of the object with my cognition of the object,' as Kant says it would have to be, but the comparison of my immediate conception of the object with the content or 'essence' of the 'thing thought,' which content is progressively uncovered through consciousness' thinking through its experience of the object.¹⁹⁰

This quote fully reveals how Hegel synthesizes the subjectivism of earlier forms of idealism with the objectivism of the realists (and empiricists). Another valid point of Berthold's is his saying that Hegel views spirit as being the space between consciousness (realism) and self-consciousness (idealism).¹⁹¹ Hegel's thought is something new; it isn't either simply realist or simply idealist.

Part of the essence of Hegel's dialectic is the interpenetration of thought and being.

Berthold writes:

The dialectical development of concepts of thought is at the same time-as one and the same process of development- the dynamic unfolding of the shapes of being in the world of human experience. And philosophic method is the internal structure of this intermediated evolution of thought and being, itself developing and transforming as the structure it traces out develops and transforms.¹⁹²

The dialectic is not just the interpenetration of thought and being, but also the interpenetration of the subject's thought with the thought of other subjects, in other words, the linguistic-cognitive relations between subjectivities, which includes the relations between the linguistic relations and power relations-following Foucault's power/knowledge couple.

Now, I will provide a hypothetical-empirical example of my adaptation of the dialectic set in the current historical context. There is a young woman in a Muslim country which is controlled by Islamic Fundamentalists. She wishes to develop her intellect and to have a life of her own, autonomous from the men in her life. She wishes to construct a discourse and to leave a lasting mark in her field of choice. The men in her life don't approve and threaten her with violence. This violence is in the service of subjective determinism by the males; they wish to repress her desires based upon their values of forcing women into submissive roles. The

¹⁹⁰ Berthold, *HGS*, 35.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 104.

woman wishes to speak back to power and to liberate her wishes. The subjective determinist violence restricts her objective historical possibilities. In order to create a dialectical relationship between her subjective desires and objective reality, she has to choose to resist the males' attempted constriction of her existential possibilities (unless she chooses submission). Her desires relate to her own sense of her own potential; in Hegelian terms, they are a source of negativity. This negativity is historical, both in the subjective sense of time and in the sense of history. Her desires are oriented towards the future; they were not and are not, but they may be. This negativity, resulting from the relationship of her desires and potential to existing historical possibilities, is the motor of historical action, which is her own making of history. If she chooses to resist, her resistance could be either pacific or violent. If it is violent, this violence is different in nature from the violence being used to limit her historical possibilities. It is violence in the service of the expansion of objective historical possibilities. If the men in her life had the appropriate respect for her subjectivity (her subjectivity being a type of object to the men), they would be behaving dialectically, in the definition of the dialectic in this project. My adaptation of the dialectic is psychoepistemological; it is psychological in the sense of requiring an appropriate respect for the object, which includes other subjectivities and nature; it is epistemological in the sense of how we understand knowledge.

Hegel's dialectic involves the perpetual forming of opposition between the subject and object in becoming in history combined with their perpetual reconciliation in history, though this reconciliation is fleeting. History itself is the process of our externalization of our reason in empirical reality through work (including technology). In the dialectic, there is an intersection between subjective life-choices, which include how the desire of the subject is manifested in history, and possible objective historical possibilities. These choices are made in the face of limited numbers of objective historical possibilities, which form the subject's objective situation. This can be favorably compared with the debates between virtue ethicists and situationists in the field of ethics. Virtue ethicists maintain that cultivating the subjective conditions for right and

wrong behavior should take priority in advancing the cause of ethical behavior. The situationists emphasize creating the objective conditions for ethical conduct over the cultivation of subjective virtues. My thought is a synthesis of the virtue ethicists and the situationists, where we both cultivate good character as well as creating objective conditions amenable to ethical behavior. The subjective conditions involve educating people in the dialectic. This is in recognizing the need for the proper respect of the object, which includes other subjectivities and nature, in determining appropriate conduct. The objective conditions include increasing the scope of the existentially possible by technological development and economic growth.

The dialectic functions by uncovering sources of negativity in both the West and the rising non-Western powers in the current historical epoch, which is Huntington's "clash of civilizations" epoch. This negativity occurs where there is resistance to subjectivist determinist repression of the desires of the victims of traditionally hegemonic groups. These victims reside both in the West and in the rising non-Western powers. The liberation talked about here must not be confused with the liberation promised by the totalitarian Communist powers in the 20th century. Indeed, some of the victims of traditionally hegemonic groups include those repressed by the Communists. The Communists claimed to be acting on behalf of universal human liberation. Many powers who repress are those who make such claims. The Communists were as un-dialectical as many of the traditional powers of the world. The dictatorship of the proletariat is completely different from smart power in the service of the dialectic. A related topic is whether democracy is a cosmopolitanizing process or not (as Huntington discusses). In other words, should we support dictatorships that act on behalf of liberating traditionally oppressed groups despite the fact that they repress certain discourses (discourses that repress other discourses)? Is violence always wrong? I maintain that violence in the service of the dialectic is different in nature than violence in the service of subjective determinism. I must remind you that I believe in many of the goals of the neo-conservatives, although I think their violence, in certain

respects, was still in service of subjective determinism. Truth and identity should be created by a process of negotiation and compromise, not by violence.

Some philosophers question whether will is prior to reason and/or ontology. This relates to this project in that we must examine our values using what I call psychoepistemology. We must question why we value and desire certain things as opposed to others. Nietzsche understood this in his questioning of the value of values, and when he stated that there is nothing impersonal in philosophy. Why do some people value subjective determinism over the dialectic? How do we get more people to value the dialectic? These questions are psychological ones, not just philosophical ones. My dialectic examines subject/ object relations as being psychological ones, not just epistemological/ontological ones. They are psychological in the sense of having respect for the object. These issues will become more scientific, rather than ideological, as our understanding of the brain advances. Some scientists assert that liberals and conservatives have different brain structures, after putting test subjects into functional MRI's. In other words, their normative make up is partially determined by psychological factors beyond the control of the subject. In other words, how free are we to be rational?

2. Subjective Determinism

Now, I will discuss my adapted concept of subjective determinism. In addition to a discussion of theory, I will utilize a discussion of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars of this century. This discussion of subjective determinism will also include a critique of the work of Foucault based upon my understanding of Hegel's dialectic (as I have established it in this project).

Subjective determinism basically means that the perceiving subject (an "agent" in a general sense) is imposing concepts on objective reality in a non-dialectical manner. This means that the perceived object isn't permitted to "speak back" to the perceiver, or agent. To use a philosophic example, this is what happens when, as both Foucault and Said write, the discourse forms the object that it speaks about. Both Foucault and Said analyze some of the

discursive formations of various sciences of the West, and how those discursive formations define (or more strongly, determine) the various types of subjectivities that the sciences refer to. Perceiving reality is not just a passive endeavor, it has an active element. You perceive reality passively, but you also assign a signifier (or concept) to the reality that you perceive. That means that there is an aesthetic element to truth, although truth is not completely aesthetic. I would say that the reality of the objective is proven by our ability to initiate predictable and successful cause/effect relations by technology and our agency. Following my discussion of Hegel's dialectic, the objective is still the "thing thought," or mediated truth, not an immediate relation between subject and object, although Hegel is still asserting that empirical reality has a great deal of value.

Describing this process in dialectical terms, as I have done partially in the above paragraph, contradicts, at least in some regards, the intentions of the works of Foucault.¹⁹³ The reasons for my using the dialectic in this project are that I think Hegel's metaphysics are a good metaphysics, as opposed to a "bad" metaphysics. Foucault and Rorty both devalue metaphysics, to a degree that I would say is destructive and pessimistic. As I have discussed above, all people are subject to a phenomenological ontology in the same way that they all have the same bodily organs as other people. Once you factor in the existence of the objective world, including the parts of the subjective that are beyond the control of the subject¹⁹⁴, this makes the distortion of being present in subjective determinism harder to manifest. The dialectic makes manifest the existence of the outside world as a precondition of experience itself. How could we experience anything at all if it weren't for the dialectic as one of the cornerstones of experience (including the experience of other people and discourses)? If we didn't exist in relation to the objective world, we wouldn't exist at all. This situation illustrates the dialectical relationship between a priori and a posteriori aspects. We are born into a particular

¹⁹³ And the works of Richard Rorty, which I will discuss in the chapter dedicated to him in this project.

¹⁹⁴ This includes brain structure, I.Q., hormones, and genetics in general.

situation which existed prior to our existence, in that sense it is a priori, but not universal. We have to have a language, a society, a nation, a family, etc. all of which are a priori categories of being that are filled with a posteriori empirical content. Human being is a synthesis of universals and particulars.

The a priori has aspects that don't change and are universal, but the a priori also has aspects that change over the course of the historical development of humanity. I use the term a priori in two senses. The first sense is as Kant intended, prior to all experience of all humans universally; it is ahistorical. The second sense is in terms of what the particular individual human is born into. The second sense is historical, but it exists prior to the existence of the individual. Before the nation-state existed, there were tribes and other social units of humanity. Now practically everyone belongs to a state. Prior to the Bretton Woods system, there were only more deficient forms of globalized humanity. Now, the Bretton Woods system, and its incomplete successors, form part of the a priori horizon of being of most humans. I am trying to create conceptual space that would allow for a synthesis of Kant's insights with the insights of the historicists, existentialists, and phenomenologists. Rather than saying that everything is historically determined, I am saying that some aspects of human being are universal and ahistorical, and others are prior to the existence of the individual, but are still historical. I believe that Kant's insights are true, but they aren't the whole picture.¹⁹⁵

Foucault makes use of the dialectic in his discursive practices without him being able to account for his use of it theoretically.¹⁹⁶ Resistance to the tyrannical aspects of social control discourses is only possible if the dialectic exists both ontologically and historically. By ontologically, I mean it is a priori. By historically, I mean that it is an a posteriori concept. I think that my distinction between official and unofficial discourses, when combined with the dialectic, allows for the existence of the discourse of Foucault. If the defined subjectivity couldn't speak

¹⁹⁵ I am indebted to Rorty, the historicists, existentialists, and phenomenologists for this insight.

¹⁹⁶ I will discuss this in greater detail later on in this chapter.

back to the discourse that forms it, Foucault's discourse itself wouldn't be possible. The Foucault discourse is a form of quasi-official discourse that counters the official discourses. Countering the discourse that forms the categories of subjectivity that Foucault analyzes proves that there is a dialectical relationship between subject and object; it isn't subjective determinist or objective determinist. If the dialectic didn't exist, resistance wouldn't be possible. The ideal of the free society is that people can speak back to others, including the powerful. Kojève writes about the historical projects of Hegel as being a priori, but also historical.¹⁹⁷ (See my above discussion of the different senses of a priori.)

Now, I want to analyze why I used the term "agency" in describing the process of the activity aspect of perception, as opposed to the passive recording of sense-perception. When we choose to read a work of philosophy, as opposed to having sex or eating at McDonald's or watching football, who is making us act? Is it our own subjective freedom manifesting itself in choosing one of our objective possibilities over others? Or is our choice the result of brainwave manipulation done to us in our present by superhumans in some type of future dystopia? Is the anxiety associated with our free choice, as the existentialists write of, merely an illusion? As I have analyzed earlier in this project, reading is a type of praxis, a form of resistance. The ability to read Foucault appears to me to be some type of manifestation of our agency/freedom, which Foucault can't account for in his theories.¹⁹⁸

"Subjective determinism" also relates to the argument of this paper in a way that illustrates clearly the difference, in political science, between Huntington's "realism" and the neo-conservative project. I especially relate this difference as applying to the neo-conservative project in the 2003 Iraq war, and to how that played out in the subsequent occupation of Iraq. The neo-conservatives were engaged in a type of violence which combined elements of the dialectic with elements of subjective determinism. The neo-conservative project was dialectical

¹⁹⁷ Kojève, *IRH*, 142.

¹⁹⁸ I am not yet familiar with all of Foucault's and Said's works; this analysis is based upon what I have read so far. I have read most of Foucault's works.

in the sense that we were trying to create a Western liberal democracy in a society that was traditionally theocratic and statist. It was subjective determinist in that we were imposing our view of the world on a society that wasn't yet willing to be that way. Nonetheless, we successfully nation built in societies that weren't willing to be more dialectical voluntarily, in the post WW2 Axis Powers. This might have just been due to our inability to achieve a consensus in the West over the desirability of creating more dialectical societies in Iraq and Afghanistan. We did have that consensus in the post WW2 Axis Powers. It may have also been due to the threat to world peace that would have potentially existed if we hadn't remade the Axis powers in our own image after WW2. Germany and Japan possessed the industrial base to create another threat to peace if we hadn't changed their culture. Iraq and Afghanistan were backward economically and militarily, and couldn't dominate the world in the way that a remilitarized Germany and Japan could have. This led to a crisis of will in the West. In addition, the West has become more squeamish in the half-century after WW2, and was not willing to make the sacrifices of blood and treasure that would have been required to totally remake Iraq and Afghanistan in our own image. The will to totally transform Iraq and Afghanistan was lacking; the will to totally transform was present in the post-WW2 Axis powers. Violence in the service of the dialectic is qualitatively different from violence in the service of subjective determinism. This doesn't automatically mean that violence in the service of the dialectic will be successful. Non-dialectical, traditional societies were much more entrenched in Iraq and Afghanistan than the neo-conservatives anticipated. That being said, I do agree with the goals of the neo-conservatives. As I have written earlier in this project, perhaps history will smile on the neo-conservatives, like history has smiled on Truman over the Korean War. Part of the goal of the neo-conservatives in Iraq was to create a dialectical process by which disputes could be resolved (by democracy with private property rights), not to create some type of ideal society as a finished product. Whether we have succeeded in doing so remains in question. South Korea and Taiwan all had phases of their history that were far from being dialectical, but they have

become more dialectical over the decades of their existence. This has partially been the result of our efforts.

Now, I will go into greater detail about how I think Foucault's anti-metaphysics has both positive and negative aspects. I think that you can integrate Foucault's belief that reality is primarily a social construction with a metaphysical view about the nature of subject/object relations. I will argue that this involves the use of my adaptation of the dialectic towards ethical ends. Berthold, in *Hegel's Theory of Madness*, analyzes how Foucault devalues the ontological nature of madness in favor of it being a socio-political construct. This is a tendency in most, if not all, of Foucault's works. I will argue that Foucault doesn't invalidate experience in a way that is reminiscent of the pre-Hegelian idealists, but that he doesn't recognize the dialectical nature of reality. I would say that Foucault is an implicit dialectical thinker without being explicitly dialectical. In what I have read of Foucault, he doesn't account for the speaking back of the formed subjects which constitutes resistance. In a Hegelian theoretical move, I assert that there is a source of negativity regarding Foucault's social constructionism and the object of experience that exists outside of the official discourses that Foucault describes. This negativity, following Hegel, is the motor source of knowledge. If reality was completely socially constructed, you would be unable to have the historical progress of knowledge, and humanity would still be living until around thirty years old, among other things. I don't deny that science is imperfect, but this is due to the incomplete nature of our knowledge. I believe, with Hegel, that everything happens for a reason, we just don't know all the reasons yet. We know that grass grows for a reason, although we might not know exactly why yet, but we understand it more than we did in the past. Foucault tends to downplay the notion of progress in the West; he seems to just make note of historical change. I view the development of science in the West as progress, albeit incomplete. The standard of living of practically everyone today is better than it was a century ago. In this sense, I am a materialist.

Following Berthold once again, the persistence of narratives concerning madness throughout history tends to validate the existence of a real object outside of discourse. I think that this also validates Berthold's position that the insights of Hegel and Foucault on mental illness can be integrated.¹⁹⁹ Following Berthold's analysis of Hegel and Kant (Berthold analyzes Kant as being intimidated by being), I think Foucault, like Hegel, has a "respect for being." This respect is implicitly dialectical, even though Foucault himself would no doubt object to this metaphysical characterization. Foucault writes:

It was intended to be neither a history of sexual behaviors nor a history of representations, but a history of 'sexuality'-the quotation marks have a certain importance...In short, it was a matter of seeing how an 'experience' came to be constituted in modern Western societies, an experience that caused individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of a 'sexuality,' which was accessible to very diverse fields of knowledge and linked to a system of rules and constraints. What I planned therefore was a history of the experiences of sexuality, where experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture.²⁰⁰

I would say, therefore, that Foucault draws a distinction between experience and ontology. In my understanding of Foucault, he views ontology as being a metaphysics, but there are different definitions of metaphysics. I am against conceptions of metaphysics that are dogmatic (secular or religious) views about historically transcendent principles. I am in favor of a Hegelian metaphysics that shows that there are a priori concepts, some universal throughout human history, some valid for specific time periods. By the a priori historical concepts, I mean the empirical realities that exist that we are born into, like nation-states, "the Bretton Woods system," your family, these exist prior to your existence. By ahistorical universals, I mean the human body and structures of consciousness that all humans have, regardless of when you are born. In this sense, metaphysics is what makes experience possible. Experience, for Foucault, is sense experience, with the categories of subjectivity and others in the above quote. Foucault

¹⁹⁹ Berthold, *HTM*, 213-216.

²⁰⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure (Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality)*, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 3-4, Kindle Version.

is a “discursive empiricist,” with empirical reality being determined by discourses which are experienced as types of experience, rather than being forms of metaphysics.

Foucault analyzes what I call subjective determinism accurately, but he also does it in a subjective determinist manner. Foucault also believes the subject is formed by objective determinism. Foucault analyzes how subjectivities are formed by power/knowledge relations. I say that he does it in a subjective determinist manner because he doesn’t recognize the “relative autonomy of the object” (which includes other subjectivities). Foucault writes:

The unity of discourses on madness would not be based upon the existence of the object ‘madness,’ or the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time: objects that are shaped by measures of discrimination and repression, objects that are differentiated in daily practice, in law, in religious casuistry, in medical diagnosis, objects that are manifested in pathological descriptions, objects that are circumscribed by medical codes, practices, treatment, and care.²⁰¹

I suppose it could be said that Foucault is merely saying that there is a normative aspect to knowledge, rather than him saying knowledge and norms are totally inseparable. I tend to analyze Foucault as saying the latter. (Perhaps I’m wrong, in another form of philosophical hope, if Foucault is merely saying that there is a normative aspect to knowledge that can be separated from power, he would allow for some form of knowledge separate from repressive practices. Some forms of practice are pre-discursive or the product of what I call unofficial discourses.) In support of my reading of Foucault, Foucault writes in *Discipline and Punish*:

We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.²⁰²

He seems to think that power forms subjectivities without input from the subjectivity being formed. Experience can result, in a Hegelian manner, in resistance (or negativity). This

²⁰¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 32-34, Kindle Version.

²⁰² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 27, Kindle Version.

resistance can be discursive and/or pre-discursive. Ontology, as a type of metaphysics, can account for this in a way that the social construction of reality can't. Not all discourses are official, especially in a pluralist society. Some people resist by practices which are not necessarily also discursive. This necessarily involves a metaphysics, because not all forms of resistance involve discourses (whether official or unofficial). Having gay sex as a form of resistance doesn't necessarily involve "putting it into discourse."²⁰³ Foucault is un-dialectical in that he only focuses on one part of identity formation. Foucault discusses how the body is formed by power relations:

...but the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination...the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.²⁰⁴

This, indirectly, reveals Foucault's pessimism about Western Civilization. Foucault seems to believe that power forms subjectivities, that there is no push back from the dominated subject. I feel that this doesn't fully appreciate the potential of meritocratic democratic capitalism. I use the empirical example of the Bard Prison Initiative. In other, more authoritarian and totalitarian societies, there would be a much more limited scope of the existentially possible; things like BPI would be frowned upon at minimum, and outright banned legally at the max. Another example is what they call Environmental, Social, and Governance in the corporate sphere. ESG fights for the interests of non-conformist groups in our society, enabling the non-conformists to be able to work, including in white-collar jobs. In our society, if someone disagrees with you, you take your business elsewhere. (Although some groups are considered beyond the pale, including Nazis and Communists.) In an authoritarian or totalitarian society, you are denied work and/or put in jail. I view Foucault's labeling of the subject as not just being productive, in the economic

²⁰³ As I have said, however, many groups that are repressed involve a type of repression which denies their ability to make history, instead of just being able to experience subjective time. This is a type of violation of the dialectical nature of reality.

²⁰⁴ Foucault, *DP*, 25.

sense, but also subjected, in the normative sense, as being potentially inaccurate. With ESG, it doesn't matter what many of your normative conditions are, as long as you can do the work required. It must be noted that this improvement of the conditions of the non-conformists in the West has been the result of struggles on the part of the repressed over centuries; it has not come about spontaneously. (It also must be noted that there is a type of materialism here: there has to be capital assigned to the purpose of normative change-non-conformists have to have a sponsor in order to be able to produce jobs and products for the non-conformists; that is, it requires material inputs, not just ideological ones.)

This also relates to my earlier discussion of the distinction between official discourses and unofficial discourses. My distinction between the two types of discourse is superior to having just the one discourse as Foucault does, once again, due to the use of the dialectic. The dialectic, in this situation, is between official discourses and unofficial discourses. With the dialectic, non-conformists are allowed to speak back to the power of official discourses, and, at least in part, to take part in the process of identity formation. The overall project of *Discipline and Punish* is to understand how the punishment of criminals in the modern West has become an issue of controlling subjectivities through ideas as compared with earlier forms of social control which were more physically repressive. Foucault writes "...they reassure it [the law] that the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive action."²⁰⁵ Foucault questions whether or not this is progress. The Western "science of subjectivity" claims to understand why people do things, both illegal and legal, and to have a more scientific understanding of the will.

In a work later than *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault appears to have some conceptual room for human agency. In *The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault writes of the somewhat different conception of discourse compared to his earlier works:

To speak of 'sexuality' as a historically singular experience also presupposed the availability of tools capable of analyzing the peculiar characteristics and interrelations of the three axes that constitute it: (1) the formation of sciences that refer to it, (2) the

²⁰⁵ Foucault, *DP*, 11.

systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of this sexuality.²⁰⁶

The use of the terms “able” and “obliged,” appear to have some consequences for how you understand practice. If Foucault had used a stronger term, for example “determined,” in the last sentence of the above quote, he would appear to have a much more restricted sense of human agency. Indeed, Foucault goes on to say that his works before *The Use of Pleasure* focused more on the first two points of the above quote, whereas *The Use of Pleasure* involved the whole three. (Perhaps this anticipated his Libertarian turn at the end of his life.)

Foucault’s entire intellectual career can be broadly viewed as embodying the Western left’s ideological and practical disillusionment with Communism and “actually existing socialism.” This disillusionment was widespread. This is why Foucault focused on analyzing “local discourses,” rather than systematic ones that related everything, in the end, to class relations (Marxism). I wonder if Foucault understood Marxism as being another form of tyrannical metaphysics, as Rorty did.²⁰⁷ This is one of my ambitions in this project, to try to come up with a liberatory metaphysics that is integrated with the insights of the anti-metaphysicians of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This is a combination of left-liberalism, neo-conservatism, and Libertarianism.

Ayn Rand also has contributed to my formulation of the concept of subjective determinism. This came about with my reading Rand’s analysis of anti-capitalist propaganda by the mainstream U.S. press. The mainstream U.S. press often takes the side of government bureaucrats trying to profit from the desires of companies to “equalize” the playing field by enlisting the support of government regulation when their companies can’t compete with more successful firms on the free market. Companies that are successful (by serving the needs of the consumer more cheaply and efficiently) are targeted by opportunistic government bureaucrats and their allies in the mass media on behalf of the firms that can’t compete. If this

²⁰⁶ Foucault, *UP*, 4.

²⁰⁷ Rorty, *AOC*.

process is successful, it will lead to more government regulation and taxation of the successful companies, thereby “equalizing” the playing field. Not only are the successful firms harmed by this process, but also the consumer, since the consumer is forced to pay more for the products of both the successful and less successful companies. The mainstream media thereby engages in subjective determinism by silencing the successful companies, and by distorting the perception of the successful firms in the mainstream media’s discourses. The mainstream media imposes its narratives in a non-dialectical manner, and doesn’t allow the successful companies to speak back to the public. The result is a form of political propaganda.²⁰⁸ Both sides of the issue resort to name-calling, and each calls the other “lackeys for their special interests.” In “The Aviator,” Howard Hughes says to the Senator trying to regulate his airline company, “Juan Trippe refers to you as if you were one of his employees.” (Trippe being the owner of an airline company unsuccessfully trying to compete with Hughes’ airline company. Trippe was trying to use government regulation to “equalize” the playing field with Hughes’ company.)

3. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed two of the foundational concepts of this project. Psychoepistemology (especially concerning its epistemological aspect, the dialectic) refers to the reciprocal interaction of the subject and object in terms of both knowledge and identity formation. Subjective determinism refers to the imposition of the subject’s “truth” onto an objective reality without allowing the objective reality to speak back to the subject (in the process of knowledge and identity formation). Two critical aspects of the dialectic involve: the distinction between subjective time and history, and the distinction between official and unofficial discourses.

²⁰⁸ Ayn Rand, “America’s Persecuted Minority: Big Business,” in *Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal* (New York: Signet, 1967), 40-62.

The distinction between subjective time and history has practical implications. Subjective time is my effort to integrate the perspectival aspects of knowledge with the Hegelian process of knowing. I argue that Hegel is right, but time is more sophisticated than the creation of history. History is more related to the creation of documents and intersubjective agreements. Subjective time relates to the unconscious in that all humans possess interests throughout history, interests which do not change (except with their particular manifestation in history). This basically includes biological drives, including sex and the desire for intoxication. The practical implications of this are that many oppressed groups are allowed to have actions that relate more to the unconscious aspects of their existence. These groups are allowed to have children, get drunk, etc. They are not allowed to make history in the same way as hegemonic groups. These oppressed groups exist both in the West and in the rising non-Western powers.²⁰⁹ We must allow all groups to make history. History is the recorded part of time, which is recorded in documents. Following my critique of Foucault, I would say that there is a real object, “history,” outside of discourse, that must be analyzed, not just using documents, but also “empirical reality.”

The dialectic (as formulated in this project) is psychoepistemological in nature. It is psychological in that it implies a respect for the object (or being in general). This means that there is a “relative autonomy of the object,” the object isn’t completely determined by the perceiving (and judging) subject-this would constitute a form of subjective determinism. The dialectic is epistemological in the sense of being the Hegelian reconciliation of the subject and object, a reconciliation that is fleeting, and a reconciliation that is both subjective and epochal.²¹⁰ This reconciliation happens at every moment for the subject, a moment that is sometimes the property of history (which creates documents), and sometimes the property of subjective time

²⁰⁹ Some of these groups include: African-Americans in the U.S., Dalits in India, women in many Muslim countries, various groups in China, for example.

²¹⁰ Like Berthold, I am an opponent of the absolutist readings of Hegel.

(which does not necessarily create documents). Sometimes it is the property of both, as in having sex both for pleasure as well as for making babies.

Another aspect of the different forms of time relate to the distinction between official discourses and unofficial discourses. The different forms of discourses manifest themselves in what is termed “multiple sovereignty” in political science. Multiple sovereignty occurs where an official state structure competes with other governing structures in a given area (or areas) within a given population (or populations). The official discourses are the discourses formed by the official state structure in this situation. The unofficial discourses are the discourses created by insurgent, mafia, or other groups of people, people who don’t have the label of “the authorities” assigned to them. Examples of insurgent groups in history include the IRA in Northern Ireland in the 20th and 21st centuries, and the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War. This relates to this project in that oppressed groups must be allowed to take part in the (hopefully) dialectical process of identity formation by unofficial discourses (when they aren’t allowed to create official discourses). An example of this is Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, as well as in some of his other works. Foucault analyzes the process of subject formation by the authorities, who label non-conformist groups using both words and power structures. In prisons, the inmates have their own social codes (including by the mafia, and gangs) that compete with the social codes of the authorities for legitimacy. The mafia and gangs often have taxation powers, as well as rules of status and occupations. Sometimes the unofficial codes have more legitimacy for the inmates than the official ones. Foucault ignores the power of these unofficial codes. The unofficial codes allow oppressed groups to make history, or, at least, just subjective time, or both. The unofficial codes sometimes are more dialectical than the official ones. The unofficial discourses allow the object (including other people and nature) to speak back to the subject. The unofficial codes are not always dialectical, in that the mafia and insurgent groups sometimes silence people and groups of people. Look at the persistence of misogyny in Turkey

despite the many decades of pro-Western values of the official dictatorship that was more feminist than the insurgent Islamists.

Subjective determinism is the conceptual and material distortion that results from the subject (and collectivities of subjects) that determine the object (including groups of subjectivities-otherness) concerned, without allowing the object to speak back to the subject and take part in the process of knowledge and identity formation. Subjective determinism must be overcome by means of the dialectic and smart power. I would say that, in this age of the “return of god,” this must involve a “return of metaphysics.” Metaphysics often involves realities that occur outside of discourses, in other words, there are real objects that exist either pre-discursively or non-discursively. You can’t account for them within the literary construction of reality. At the most fundamental level, this involves the speech of the subject, which is not necessarily recorded in a document. This situation is not just theoretical, it involves a materialist aspect. We have already discussed the theoretical aspect. The material aspect is the financial capital and publishing apparatuses that are necessary in order to create discourses and history.

One of the most refreshing aspects of studying Foucault and Hegel is their valuing of the subject. I think that Marx’s focus on classes and systematic thinking is too abstract compared with Foucault and Hegel. Foucault’s local discourses are more practical in the sense that they study how more particular subjectivities are formed by power/knowledge relations. Marx’s class consciousness is much more difficult to make manifest, and it is compounded by Marx not clearly articulating what a Communist society would look like. In addition, how do you have a class perceive reality, as opposed to individual subjects? Another aspect is how do you factor in that some workers are better than others? This raises the tricky issue of meritocracy: do you value the work of an entire class more than individual workers who are more efficient than other workers? Foucault is less abstract than Marx because Foucault analyzes how individual categories of subjects are formed directly by discourses, rather than the overly abstract and general formation of the “proletariat.” Marx’s metaphors of “dictatorship of the proletariat” and

“class warfare” automatically create an adversarial relationship between classes. Why would the rich create products that no one could afford to buy? Relying on the state, as Marxists do, might make the entire project more reliant on warfare. (This is an observation of both Rand and Huntington. Both reflect on the necessity of external threats to create national identities. If people were more focused on creating a better product for the consumer than making war on other people-nations, I think the world would be better off.)

In this chapter, I will discuss some of the thought of Richard Rorty and how it relates to my formula for U.S. policy in the current historical epoch. First, I must state that I have goals similar to Rorty's. These similar goals are creating a more cohesive and unified America within the framework of liberal democratic capitalism, although I think my term "meritocratic democratic capitalism" is more fitting. In addition, Rorty is trying to make the world a more tolerant, less homophobic, less misogynistic, more religiously tolerant, more free, more peaceful, and more technologically adept place. The areas I disagree with Rorty relate to his Pragmatist abandonment of metaphysics, epistemology, and universals. A good introductory quote, by Rorty, which summarizes his thought:

So the Pragmatist suggestion that we substitute a 'merely' ethical foundation for our sense of community-or, better, that we think of our sense of community as having no foundation except shared hope and the trust created by such sharing-is put forward on practical grounds. It is not put forward as a corollary of a metaphysical claim that the objects in the world contain no intrinsically action-guiding properties, nor of an epistemological claim that we lack a faculty of moral sense, nor of a semantical claim that truth is reducible to justification.²¹¹

For Rorty, therefore, it is not a question of challenging metaphysics using metaphysical terms. For Rorty, there are no metaphysical realities. It is completely practice, whether in the traditional sense of the term, or in the sense of discursive practice. That is how radical Rorty is, metaphysics are irrelevant "in-itself", metaphysics, for Rorty, are solely judged in terms of actual human behavior.

Rorty is not completely un-ambiguous in his use of the term reason. I understand him as drawing a distinction between "metaphysical reason," and Rorty's own use of reason, which I call "concrete reason." (Rorty himself doesn't often clearly draw a distinction between the two, but I think that it is essential to understanding his ethics. Sometimes, Rorty uses the term "local reason" to refer to what I call "concrete reason.") Metaphysical reason is the type of reason that makes use of ahistorical universals, and that deny the historical aspect of truth and morality.

²¹¹ Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," in Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 33, Kindle Version.

Concrete reason is the type of reason that relates to the analysis of the historical nature of truth, and the type of reason that Rorty employs when analyzing sentiment in the way that leads to ethics from loyalty. Rorty approvingly refers to Walzer's conceptions of morality:

Walzer's contrast between thick and thin morality is, among other things, a contrast between the detailed and concrete stories you can tell about yourself as a member of a smaller group and the relatively abstract and sketchy story you can tell about yourself as a citizen of the world.²¹²

For Rorty, therefore, the linkage between reason and sentiment (thick morality) is superior to metaphysical reasoning in ethics and more abstract types of group-identification (thin morality).

The Kantians, who believe that metaphysical reason is the only firm foundation for ethics, object:

Kantians typically insist that justice springs from reason, and loyalty from sentiment. Only reason, they say, can impose universal and unconditional moral obligations, and our obligation to be just is of this sort. It is on another level from the sort of affectional relations which create loyalty.²¹³

"Affectional relations," therefore, to Kantians, are an unstable foundation for ethics. Rorty takes the opposite view: that concrete reason, the linkage of reason with sentiment and custom, provides for a more enduring ethical behavior. To Rorty, the Kantians have it backwards, the Kantians say that metaphysical reasoning provides for a stronger ethics - justice from metaphysical reason - rather than loyalty from sentiment²¹⁴. For Rorty, loyalty from the linkage of reason and sentiment, is actually stronger than justice from metaphysical reason. On the most "local" level, that of the family and clan, Rorty writes on morality:

To behave morally is to do what comes naturally in one's dealing with your parents and children, or your fellow clan members. It amounts to respecting the trust they place in you.²¹⁵

As it will be discussed later on in this chapter, for Rorty, objective historical conditions do affect the way we conceptualize ourselves. Objective historical conditions can lead to a "thickening" of

²¹² Richard Rorty, "Justice As A Larger Loyalty," in Richard Rorty, *Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2021), location 3719, Kindle Version.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, location 3686.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, location 3723.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, location 3700.

previously “thin” moral obligations. An example of this is the British Empire’s desire to keep the colonies as part of the British Empire, which led us to conceive of ourselves as a nation, rather than as a collection of regions and religions. Initially, however, the “thickest” obligations are at the most local level, as the last quote above reveals. On the linkage between reason and sentiment, Rorty writes: “For, on this account of rationality, being rational and acquiring a larger loyalty are two descriptions of the same activity.”²¹⁶

I will propose as complementary concepts my psychoepistemology and the political science concept of smart power. I say “complimentary” because I don’t think my proposed concepts should replace Rorty’s, but that they should be used in conjunction with Rorty’s. (I am validating Rorty’s idea that universal concepts have a totalitarian tendency which must be held in check both theoretically and practically by tolerating other world views, as long as the other world views aren’t totalitarian themselves.) I think that my universal concept “psychoepistemology” is what I call “good metaphysics,” as opposed to “bad metaphysics.” By bad metaphysics, I mean those types of metaphysics that don’t correspond to empirical reality in a constructive way, or are inaccurate, or totalitarian, as orthodox Marxism wound up being.²¹⁷ The Marxists set up an imaginary ideal of a classless society, which, I believe, is just as delusional as the religious belief in the reality of heaven which exists following death. In this sense, I believe that Marxists are basically metaphysical thinkers masquerading as being materialist, empirical, and concrete. By “good metaphysics,” I mean an accurate and constructive foundation for experience in general. This includes my previous discussion, in this project, of the dialectic and other concepts which have both an a priori and an a posteriori aspect to them.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, location 3864.

²¹⁷ Marx famously predicted the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat. Instead, in the 20th century, we got the welfare state, and exponential increases in technology and the standard of living of the proletariat. (At least in the West.)

My psychoepistemology can be divided up into a psychological aspect and an epistemological aspect. I hold both parts of the term to be universal, without being totalitarian. The psychological aspect can be defined as “respect for the object,” or “respect for other beings in general.” This will consist in a relation to otherness that isn’t violent in the subjective determinist sense. The epistemological aspect of the term is the aforementioned discussion of Hegel’s dialectical epistemology which is the (fleeting) reconciliation of subject and object in the process of becoming (which is both from the standpoint of the subject and the epoch). Both aspects are dialectical, in the sense of the term that I have already developed in this project. I will supplement the concepts of psychoepistemology and dialectic with the political science concept of smart power, when the smart power is used in a dialectical sense, as opposed to the subjective determinist sense. I think that these are universal because all people have a metaphysics implicitly, even when they deny that they have a metaphysics. I think that this is true even of Rorty, because, for example, he uses the term “ethnocentrism” in a universal sense, in that every culture has an “ethnocentric” perspective that forms their culture as a culture.

Now, I will engage in a discussion of what Rorty means when he uses the term “ethnocentric.” Rorty argues that increased intimacy, or to stress communitarian-kinship ties makes for a stronger sense of moral obligation than metaphysical reason.²¹⁸ This also operates along the distinction between morality and prudence. Rorty writes on Dewey’s Pragmatism:

On Dewey’s view, philosophers who have sharply distinguished reason from experience, or morality from prudence, have tried to turn an important difference of degree into a difference of metaphysical kind. They have thereby constructed problems for themselves which are as insoluble as they are artificial.²¹⁹

Ethnocentrism, to Rorty, therefore, means that cultural traditions and experience are more important to ethics than abstract obligations which result from the use of universal reason. On

²¹⁸Rorty, *JLL*, locations 3639-3641.

²¹⁹ Richard Rorty, “Ethics Without Universal Obligations,” in Richard Rorty, *Pragmatism As Anti-Authoritarianism* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021), location 3328, Kindle Version.

the goal of the West to globalize its ideology, Rorty writes: “I think it is better not to say that the liberal West is better informed about rationality and justice, and instead to say that, in making demands on non-liberal societies, it is simply being true to itself.”²²⁰ Rorty writes on Dewey and Baier on morality “...moral obligation does not have a nature, or a source, different from tradition, habit and custom.”²²¹

There is a way that I agree with Rorty, that metaphysical reason, in certain situations, can allow for the dehumanization of humans when the moral agent plays with definitions of fundamental terms. For example, when Nazis dehumanize Jews, this enables the Nazis to rationalize the killing of Jews by saying that they aren’t killing human beings. (This would be in line with Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This is in the sense that the Nazis could claim that they could universalize their action of killing Jews because they believe all Jews are evil and subhuman.) In this sense, having concrete reason and sentiment, rather than metaphysical reason, as the foundation of morality is superior. In other words, Rorty approvingly characterizes Baier and Dewey as describing the metaphysical rational moral agent as being cold, and calculating.²²² I would say that my psychoepistemology would integrate sentiment with reason in the formation of ethics, which would be an improvement on sentiment alone. Rorty defines moral progress: “So it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety of people and things.”²²³ This would be the result of the West’s Pragmatist ethnocentrism regarding the combination of concrete reason with sentiment over metaphysical rationality, with the linkage of concrete reason with sentiment being its tradition (in opposition to the realist and Kantian traditions). Rorty:

²²⁰ Rorty, JLL, location 3751.

²²¹ Rorty, *EWU*, location 3359.

²²² *Ibid.*, location 3373.

²²³ *Ibid.*, locations 3452-3456.

For now to say that we must work by our own lights, that we must be ethnocentric, is merely to say that beliefs suggested by another culture must be tested by trying to weave them together with beliefs we already have.²²⁴

(Rorty does have a more ethnocentric definition of reason: "...somewhere among their shared beliefs and desires, there may be enough resources to permit agreement on how to co-exist without violence."²²⁵ And:

For, on this account of rationality, being rational and acquiring a larger loyalty are two descriptions of the same activity. This is because any unforced agreement between individuals and groups about what to do creates a form of community, and will, with luck, be the initial stage in expanding the circles of those whom each party to the agreement had previously taken to be 'peoples like ourselves.' The opposition between rational argument and fellow feeling thus begins to dissolve.²²⁶

In the next quote, Rorty draws a distinction between the rational and the fanatical in Pragmatism: "According to this view, what counts as rational or as fanatical is relative to the group to which we think it necessary to justify ourselves-to the body of shared belief that determines the reference of the word 'we.'²²⁷ I would say, however, that smart power is sometimes necessary to resolve disputes, not just soft power, which, apparently to Rorty, is sufficient. Sometimes smart power is necessary to create a larger loyalty.)

Elsewhere, on ethnocentrism, Rorty writes: "We would rather die than be ethnocentric, but ethnocentrism is precisely the conviction that one would rather die than share certain beliefs."²²⁸ This raises what is a specter to universalists: is liberal democracy just another cultural bias? This is in reference to the fact that many liberals claim to hate ethnocentrism.

(Rorty affirms ethnocentrism without shame, Rorty writes that bourgeois liberalism "...is a culture which prides itself on constantly adding on more windows, constantly enlarging its sympathies."²²⁹ Rorty acknowledges, however, that this might wind up creating sympathy for the

²²⁴ Rorty, *SO*, 26.

²²⁵ Rorty, *JLL*, location 3882.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, location 3864.

²²⁷ Richard Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," in Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 176, Kindle Version.

²²⁸ Richard Rorty, "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," in Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 203, Kindle Version.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 204.

psychopath and war criminal, if we have empathy for the reasons why the psychopath and war criminal are the way they are.²³⁰) On the universal aspect of ethnocentrism, Rorty writes:

To be ethnocentric is to divide the human race into the people to whom one must justify one's beliefs and the others. The first group—one's ethnos—comprises those who share enough of one's beliefs to make fruitful conversation possible. In this sense, everybody is ethnocentric when engaged in actual debate, no matter how much realist rhetoric about objectivity he produces in his study.²³¹

This shows the nature of what I call Rorty's concrete reason. Concrete reason refers to the employment of reason in a way that acknowledges the historical reality of one's own community. Being a part of a community is inescapable, and the concept of community is universal. In this sense, Rorty does employ metaphysics in his thought, but it is metaphysics in the sense of "what makes experience possible." Rorty's thought is anti-metaphysical in the definition of metaphysics as belief in a transcendental reality. Rorty's thought doesn't mean that he believes in a transcendental reality. Some of his concepts are universal, but they are also manifested in history. I agree, with Rorty, that most universals that are divorced from historical and empirical reality are imaginary or erroneous. Religious believers would disagree with Rorty and myself. My religious skepticism, however, cuts both ways. I recognize that since my awareness of reality is limited by my subjective perspective, I can't be certain that there is no God in the universe.

This, also, creates a problem, however, when you begin to try to account for change within the framework of a tradition. African-Americans and indigenous people were initially not considered as being human, at some point in time, most Americans wound up thinking that these groups were human. Rorty ascribes the ultimate success of Abolitionism as being the result of the proliferation of religious discourses and literature that increased empathy for African-Americans. There were, however, religious and literary figures that believed slavery was acceptable. Why did one discourse triumph over the other? I guess that Rorty would say that

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 205.

²³¹ Rorty, *SO*, 30.

most people are empathetic, so as awareness of the concrete horrors of slavery proliferated, so did empathy for slaves. Perhaps, as cognitive neuroscience progresses, we will eventually be able to determine levels of empathy scientifically, by analyzing individual people's brain structure and biochemical makeup. (Would this lead to thought control practices?)

I tend to define metaphysics as either sanctioning a belief in a transcendent reality or as "what makes experience possible," or both. I tend to favor the latter definition. (Both, however, are used by philosophers, and it must be distinguished when they use one or the other.) An example of the latter definition is the "phenomenological ontology" project in general, as well as cognitive neuroscience. Nonetheless, I agree that Rorty is right to propose pluralism in cultures, but I think that my psychoepistemology can accommodate that part of Rorty's discourse. In addition, as I have argued elsewhere, I think that every human possesses an ontology in the same way that they possess body organs that are common to all humans. (I think that this will be further developed scientifically by cognitive neuroscience as that discipline develops.) My psychoepistemology creates a dialectic between reason (the dialectical epistemological aspect) and sentiment (the psychological "respect for other beings" aspect). I think that Rorty would agree with me in terms of practice, even if he disagreed with my theory. (Indeed, Rorty would emphasize the practical aspect over the metaphysical aspect, Rorty being a Pragmatist.)

Rorty defines morality in terms of solidarity and ethnocentrism as opposed to objectivity. The Pragmatist defines moral progress: "...they see moral progress as a matter of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups of people."²³² Elsewhere, Rorty discusses the opposition of "realists" to "Pragmatists" in epistemological terms. The realists define truth in the classic correspondence theory. This means that the perceiving subject has an ahistorical, universal belief in their ability to observe an ahistorical, universal objective truth. Rorty contrasts

²³² Rorty, *EWU*, location 3456.

this with the Pragmatist (indeed Rorty says that Pragmatists have no epistemology or metaphysics, not different ones):

For Pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one's community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire to extend the reference of 'us' as far as we can. Insofar as Pragmatists make a distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is simply the distinction between topics on which such agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which agreement is relatively hard to get.²³³

Knowledge is the type of discourse that relates to the natural sciences; opinion is more the social and cultural types of discourses. An example of the latter is the debate over abortion, the pro-choice side emphasizes the right of women over their own body. The pro-life side equates abortion with the murder of a human. Rorty analyzes the failure of rationality in situations like abortion: "...she does not seem to share enough relevant beliefs and desires with us to make possible fruitful conversation about the issue in dispute."²³⁴ Rorty doesn't use the specific example of abortion in this part of the essay, but it is easy to apply it to this discussion. Elsewhere, Rorty says that the Pragmatist thinks "...that we should drop the traditional distinction between knowledge and opinion."²³⁵

Rorty implicitly discusses situations that result in the failure of ethnocentrism and dialogue, but in what I've read of Rorty²³⁶, he doesn't have a robust idea of dispute resolution. If we were purely ethnocentric about the issue of slavery, would we have used smart power, in the Civil War, to end slavery? The issue of abortion reveals not just the failure of Rorty's discourse, but also the failure of my own. Should we have respect for the fetus and thereby ban abortion, or should we have respect for the woman's right over their own body and make it legal? Should we allow Islamic Fundamentalist countries to oppress women and do horrible things to them? Or should we have the moral equivalent of the Civil War to liberate women who are oppressed

²³³ Rorty, *SO*, 23.

²³⁴ Rorty, *JLL*, location 3882.

²³⁵ Rorty, *SO*, 23.

²³⁶ I'm not yet an expert on Rorty, but, if I'm lucky and good enough to teach, I will teach him. The only reason I haven't done an exhaustive study of Rorty is time and material constraints.

in Islamic Fundamentalist countries? Rorty writes: “The trouble in all such cases is just the difficulty of explaining why other people disagree with us, of reweaving our beliefs so as to fit the fact of disagreement together with the other beliefs we hold.”²³⁷ Perhaps the issue should be framed in terms of the process of dispute resolution. If we can resolve contentious issues by peaceful means, that would be preferable. Perhaps it should just be: majority rule with minority rights. As with my earlier critique of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, I think Rorty’s ethnocentrism results in potential failures of rationality when fundamental definitions of fundamental terms are taken into account. Anti-Semites don’t consider Jews to be part of the human community; racists don’t consider African-Americans to be part of the human community. These beliefs wind up restricting the scope of the definitions of “we” that we hold in the relevant society. That’s why I think my psychoepistemology provides a more solid foundation for ethics than Rorty’s ethnocentrism. This psychoepistemology must be backed up by smart power in the service of the dialectic.

Another issue I have with Rorty is that he considers Hegel to be in opposition to the correspondence theory of truth. My reading of Hegel has been influenced, I feel in positive ways, by the reading of Hegel by Berthold, in Berthold’s *Hegel’s Grand Synthesis*. I will refer the reader to my discussions of this in earlier parts of this project. Suffice it to summarize, I say Hegel accepts the correspondence theory of truth, but Hegel combines it with an idealist concept of the thing thought, which is used in conjunction with the correspondence theory of truth. Berthold writes on this situation:

Again, Hegel provisionally accepts the traditional criterion of correspondence, but reconstructs it in such a way that the object is defined as the ‘thing thought,’ so that both sides of the comparison are internal to consciousness. This is not the comparison of ‘my cognition of the object with my cognition of the object,’ as Kant says it would have to be, but the comparison of my immediate conception of the object with the content or ‘essence’ of the ‘thing thought,’ which content is progressively uncovered through consciousnesses’ thinking through its experience of the object...the Hegelian grand synthesis may be described as the project of bringing being ‘inside’ the compass of

²³⁷ Rorty, *SO*, 26.

thought as it reflects on its experience, or of thought 'penetrating' the external appearance of being so as to reconcile the opposition and discord of mind and world.²³⁸

Hegel, therefore, accepts the formulation of knowledge being the correspondence of subject to object, but he combines it with the idealists' assigning of a universal concept to the immediate reality (there, for Hegel, is no immediate reality to knowledge; it is always mediated by consciousnesses' thinking through of the immediate reality). In addition, our understanding of the relationship of subject to object changes over time, as knowledge progresses (for Hegel).

I think Hegel definitely does emphasize the social aspect of knowledge, but I don't think it is as simple as Rorty makes it. Kojève actually goes so far as to label Hegel a "realist," but I think that this is another oversimplification. I think, again, in agreement with Berthold, that Hegel is engaged in something completely new. Hegel's dialectic emphasizes the unity of the correspondence theory of truth with the historical, social aspect of truth. Hegel's dialectic is a synthesis of the universal aspect of truth with the particular aspect of truth, with this process leading to changes over time as knowledge progresses. The particular empirical experience becomes universal when a concept is assigned to it. The question is whether you can identify Rorty's use of the term "intersubjective" with "universal."

In "Solidarity or Objectivity," Rorty defends Pragmatism from the charge of relativism. In this essay, Rorty argues that there are two types of thinking that give meaning to humanity: "The first is by telling the story of their contribution to a community...The second way is to describe themselves as standing in immediate relation to a nonhuman reality."²³⁹ The first way is "solidarity," which is the Pragmatist way. The second is "objectivity," which is the way of Enlightenment Rationalism and realism. Rorty analyzes much of the discourse of realists on the relationship between relativism and Pragmatism as being a "straw man." In "Solidarity or Objectivity," Rorty summarizes what he sees as the three main forms of relativism, as the realists label it. The first form of relativism is where every belief is as good as every other. The

²³⁸ Berthold, *HGS*, 35.

²³⁹ Rorty, *SO*, 20.

second form of relativism is that the true takes as many forms as there are “procedures of justification.” The last is “the view that there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from the descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society-ours-uses in one or another area of inquiry.”²⁴⁰ This last form is the true definition of Pragmatism, which Rorty calls “ethnocentrism,” not “relativism.”

I find constructive, as well, the utilization of Nietzsche’s concept of “virile skepticism” in conjunction with Rorty’s “ethnocentrism.” Virile skepticism recognizes the inability of proving the objective reality of many of our metaphysical beliefs, but also that you must assert tolerance in reality, so others aren’t capable of forcing their metaphysical beliefs on you. With virile skepticism, you don’t allow yourself to be the passive victim of other people’s aggressive dogmatism. This should be done in conjunction with both soft power and hard power (both, in conjunction, being smart power). In certain situations, there is a failure of rationality, where certain discourses are so profoundly different that it makes constructive dialogue impossible. In these types of situations (slavery, the Cold War, the two world wars, for example), it becomes necessary to use smart power in order to advance the goals of tolerance. Nietzsche’s concept of “virile skepticism,” and Rorty’s concept of “ethnocentrism,” can be used in conjunction with one another in these types of situations. Rorty seems to think that soft power alone is necessary. I think that this is a combination of wishful thinking and/or squeamishness.

Is it a paradox that Rorty devalues the use of universalist labels in realizing Pragmatist goals that emphasize behavior over rhetoric? Rorty writes: “But I think that the rhetoric we Westerners use in trying to get everybody to be more like us would be improved if we were more frankly ethnocentric, and less professedly universalist.”²⁴¹ I might be wrong, but I think that my concept of psychoepistemology combines two universal aspects of human being. The two universal aspects are psychological respect for other beings as well as the Hegelian

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁴¹ Rorty, *JLL*, location 3906.

dialectic in epistemology. This, as well as the existentialists' and phenomenologists' project of creating a phenomenological ontology, winds up describing the consciousness-existence of all human beings in a universal way. This, I feel, is similar to the organs and various constituent parts of the human body. If someone denied the existence of organs, would you believe them? I believe that the project of "phenomenological ontology" has ethical implications in the same way that we want a healthy body. That being said, I do think that you have to make use of Hegel's dialectic, which would involve having a reciprocal relationship between universal humanity and particular humans. (I think Rorty's concept of "ethnocentrism" is a paradox, asserting a universal concept to humanity while denying the existence of universals.) On the West trying to spread its values, Rorty:

If we Westerners could get rid of the notion of universal moral obligations created by membership in the species, and substitute the idea of building a community of trust between ourselves and others, we might be in a better position to persuade non-Westerners of the advantages of joining in that community, we might be able to construct the sort of global moral community which Rawls describes in 'The Law of Peoples.'²⁴²

Again, I am not trying to devalue Rorty's discourse (I do not want my universalisms to be totalitarian in nature), I am merely trying to present an alternate theoretical view that can contribute to practice. I recognize that theory often divides, an observation that Rorty makes himself. (Perhaps my valuing of practice over theory makes me a Pragmatist in some areas!) Rorty writes on this preference of practice over theory:

One practical reason is that getting rid of rationalistic rhetoric would permit the West to approach the non-West in the role of someone with an instructive story to tell, rather than in the role of someone purporting to be making better use of a universal human capacity.²⁴³

(One of the reasons I value Foucault and Hegel over Marx is that I think Foucault's and Hegel's focusing on the subject is more concrete and adequately related to empirical reality than Marx's focus on classes. This is a topic of discussion for another day. Nonetheless, this also makes

²⁴² *Ibid.*, location 3915.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, locations 3919-3924.

me sympathetic to the project of a phenomenological ontology for the same reason, the focus on the individual subject.) Elsewhere, Rorty writes:

The Pragmatists' justification of toleration, free inquiry, and the quest for undistorted communication can only take the form of a comparison between societies which exemplify these habits and those who do not, leading up to the suggestion that nobody who has experienced both would prefer the latter.²⁴⁴

Again, I think Rorty underestimates the necessity of smart power. He seems to think soft power (including philosophical discourse) is enough. We had to invade the South in the Civil War. We had to have the “Warfare/Welfare State” in the Cold War. We had to send the 101st Airborne into Little Rock to desegregate the public school system there. As they say in the military: “God always sides with the bigger battalions.” Neither the Antebellum South nor the Soviet Union, at least not until the passage of seventy-plus years, recognized the attractiveness of liberal democracy.

In an area that directly relates to the thesis of this project, I would take issue with Rorty's claims that (1) we shouldn't take into account the types of subjectivities that are created by liberal democratic capitalism and (2) his acceptance of the critics of liberal democratic capitalism who say that the types of subjectivities created by liberal democratic capitalism are less than ideal. I think that the fact that we triumphed over the East Bloc in the Cold War was due to the fact that we created more “Steve Jobs” types of subjectivities, and less “Homer Simpson” types of subjectivities than the East Bloc. I think that this was due to our various forms of metaphysics that emphasized individual performance over entitlements due to class status, race, family ties, etc. This is the “meritocratic” aspect of my “meritocratic democratic capitalism.” Rorty writes on subject formation:

It is no more evident that democratic institutions are to be measured by the sort of person they create than that they are to be measured against divine commands...the liberal response to the communitarians' second claim [that liberal democracies produce inferior subjects] must be, therefore, that even if the typical character types of liberal

²⁴⁴ Rorty, *SO*, 28-29.

democracies are bland, calculating, petty, and unheroic, the prevalence of such people may be a reasonable price to pay for political freedom.²⁴⁵

This, I think, is partially the result of his devaluing and misunderstanding of Nietzsche's concept of the overman. On this, Rorty writes: "...stuff about the overman can safely be neglected, as can what Heidegger called 'the metaphysics of the will to power.'"²⁴⁶ As I have discussed in the chapter of this project on Nietzsche, Nietzsche's concept of the overman is psychologically liberatory, and must be separated from his reactionary politics. Rorty doesn't, at least not in his writings under consideration here, make this distinction. In addition, I feel that Deirdre McCloskey's analysis has shown, discussed in the present project's chapter two, capitalism wound up liberating the "innovative bourgeois," and this class being liberated led to the exponential increase of the standard of living of all humans under capitalism.

In another difference between my discourse and Rorty's, I would say that we can create a "species consciousness" that is concrete. Rorty's "ethnocentrism" seems to stop at the level of the nation. He admits that the Founding Fathers had to teach Americans to think in terms of Americans, not as being solely the part of regions, religions, and ethnicities.²⁴⁷ Although he doesn't state this, our national consciousness was created in response to Britain's desires to keep the Colonies part of their Empire. I think that we can obtain a "species-consciousness" by having Weapons of Mass Destruction and Climate Change force us to conceptualize ourselves as a "species" in the same way as Britain contributed to our "national consciousness." If our survival becomes dependent upon dealing with WMD and Climate Change as a species rather than nations, we will conceptualize ourselves as a species. Then, "humanity" will be concrete, not abstract. This will involve the creation of a new Bretton Woods system for humanity, in a manner similar to how WMD's, decolonization, World War 2, and the rise of the Soviet Union caused the first Bretton Woods. On the abstract type of universalism, Rorty: "These are the

²⁴⁵ Rorty, *PDP*, 190.

²⁴⁶ Richard Rorty, *Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 93.

²⁴⁷ Rorty, *EWU*, location 3584.

people who think there are such things as intrinsic human dignity, intrinsic human rights, and an ahistorical distinction between the demands of morality and those of prudence.”²⁴⁸ Perhaps Rorty would agree to my analysis, since my analysis involves historical conditions in creating a “supercommunity,” or “species consciousness,” rather than abstract universalisms.

There is an ambivalence of Rorty to general principles. On the one hand, Rorty thinks that solidarity is a sufficient social cement to make manifest liberalism in reality: “I hope thereby to suggest how such liberals might convince our society that loyalty to itself is morality enough, and that such loyalty no longer needs an ahistorical backup.”²⁴⁹ On the other hand, Rorty accepts the fact that general principles are sometimes necessary:

The moral deliberations of the postmodernist bourgeois liberal consists largely in this same sort of discourse, avoiding the formulation of general principles except where the situation may require this particular tactic-as when one writes a constitution, or rules for young children to memorize.²⁵⁰

In keeping with the narrative of this project, it would seem that a dialectic between universal principles and their particular manifestation in empirical reality would be more effective in analysis than focusing either on realism or Pragmatism. I think that this is especially true, since Rorty himself admits that general principles are sometimes necessary. As I wrote above in my analysis of global warming, perhaps Rorty himself would agree in some regards to my proposals, since my proposals admit of the necessary aspect of historical conditions, not ahistorical universals. In my analysis, general principles are connected to history. They are not ahistorical. (But they are universal, at least in the sense of being communicable within and between cultures.)

In addition, I think that Rorty’s observation that the philosopher is always operating from within a tradition is a valid one. I just think that there is a dialectic involved here, as well. Due to our reliance on law, we necessarily have general principles. These general principles, however,

²⁴⁸ Richard Rorty, “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” in Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 197, Kindle Version.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 199.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 201.

are always manifested in particular cases. Following Elliott's analysis of virtue ethics, sometimes particular individuals in particular situations behave out of character (even virtuous individuals) due to mitigating circumstances. These circumstances include: intoxication, mental illness, and "tragic dilemmas." Tragic dilemmas involve the situation offering the agent no good alternative actions, just a choice between bad options. War situations legitimize the use of violence. Elliott analyzes other objective conditions that are necessary for virtuous action by the virtuous:

Virtue Ethicists have traditionally assumed that the operation of the virtues requires certain 'external goods,' whether as instruments in the performance of virtuous actions, or as the characteristic context in which the virtues are to be displayed...So the virtuous person cannot exercise his virtues adequately unless he has instruments such as 'friends, wealth, and political power.'²⁵¹

Power, therefore, is necessary in order to realize your values in reality. If you don't possess power, all the good intentions in the world are in vain. Rorty would agree, because Rorty has no metaphysical belief system to give him comfort about the inevitability of his potential utopias. If you don't have power, you can do nothing.

To summarize this chapter, I must first emphasize that I am sympathetic to Rorty's goals. I think that "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism" is a desirable endeavor. I do think, however, that there are universals that can be employed in realizing this project. The concept I use, in a universal sense, is psychoepistemology. Psychoepistemology creates a dialectic between rationality and sentiment in formulating an ethics. Psychoepistemology can be divided up into two component concepts: psychology and epistemology. The psychological aspect is having the subject have "respect for the object," or "respect for other beings in general." This respect consists in not using violence to impose one's subjective ideological schema onto objective reality (which includes other people). The epistemological aspect is the rationality of the Hegelian dialectic. The rationality of the Hegelian dialectic is that there is a reconciliation of subject with the object in the historical process of becoming (this process occurs both on the

²⁵¹ Jay Elliott, *Character* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 33, Kindle Version.

level of the subject and on the level of the historical epoch). This psychoepistemology must be made concrete through smart power. Smart power is a combination of hard power and soft power. Hard power is the classic definition of power: material force. Soft power is cultural, including philosophy, literature, and other forms of mass culture.

This situation also reflects my belief, in opposition to Rorty, that we can have a concrete “species consciousness.” This species consciousness will be created by the historical conditions of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Ecological Crisis. This will operate in the same way as the violence of the British Empire helped create a national consciousness leading to the creation of our country. We came to recognize ourselves as a nation, rather than a collection of different regions and religions. This species consciousness will be constitutionalized in a new Bretton Woods system. I hope that this new Bretton Woods system will either create, or be created by the universalization of what Rorty calls liberal democracy, and what I call meritocratic democratic capitalism. Unlike the UN, it will create and/or be created by democracies, not by authoritarian/totalitarian states. (Although some authoritarian states might be required if what I call the dialectic does not initially exist in certain countries. The violence of these authoritarian states must be in the service of realizing the dialectic, not in the service of what I call subjective determinism.)

Conclusion:

In summary, I will briefly outline some of the points I wish to make about U.S. policy, both foreign and domestic. These points will involve my five instruments of power that policy makers and individuals can use to deal with the problems confronting the U.S. in the current historical epoch. I believe that Huntington was right about the new historical epoch being the rise of conflicts between the West and the rising non-Western powers. This epoch has followed the victory of the West in the Cold War against the Communists in the last historical epoch. Huntington has analyzed the rising non-Western powers as modernizing and developing economically and militarily without having an equivalent of the Western Enlightenment in terms

of culture. As the rising non-Western cultures develop their power in relation to the West, they will increasingly be able to aggressively impose their values on the West (as I have noted in the chapter of this project on Huntington, Huntington realizes that this historical process might wind up taking centuries to displace the hegemony of the West). The five instruments of power are: (1) Psychoepistemology, which is the combination of psychological “respect for other beings in general” (including other humans and nature), and the epistemological Hegelian dialectic between subject and object (which results in the fleeting reconciliation of subject and object, which occurs both at the level of the subject and at the level of the epoch); (2) the creation of ideal subjectivities in both the West’s and the rising non-West’s cognitive elites (the creation of Overmen/Innovative Bourgeois subjectivities); (3) the use of utilitarian mass culture to seduce the masses of both the West and the non-West; (4) the use of smart power to change the values of both the West and the non-West in order to make them more in line with my psychoepistemology (to make them more dialectical and less subjective determinist); and (5) the use of “brain drain” to seduce the cognitive elites of the non-West to have them come to the West and, hopefully, to have them become more in line with our values (especially as they relate to my psychoepistemology). Some degree of assimilation will have to occur in order to have (5) brain drain be effective. It must be recognized that we, in the U.S., don’t always live up to our ideals, including my psychoepistemology. These five instruments of power must be used both in the West and rising non-West. We are not perfect. (I agree with Rorty’s project of Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism in many regards, more on this in Chapter 5 and later on in this conclusion.) Now, I will briefly summarize the individual chapters of this project.

Chapter 1 deals with the thought of Samuel Huntington. As we have seen, Huntington’s work can be summarized in two broad ways: (1) the foreign policy of the U.S. regarding the rising non-Western powers in his “clash of civilizations” epoch; and (2) U.S. domestic policy, especially as it relates to national identity and immigration issues. Huntington’s own policy prescriptions should be summarized as (1) multiculturalism in U.S. foreign policy; and (2) a

reinvigoration of the American Creed based upon U.S. religious identity as domestic policy. I tend to think my five instruments of power offer a better way of relating to both U.S. domestic policy and foreign policy. I feel that Huntington's foreign policy is a form of "quietism of despair," in thinking that we can't change the cultural and normative makeup of the rising non-Western powers. I think that Huntington's domestic policy prescriptions are too religious, and that they don't emphasize the non-religious and multicultural aspects of the American Creed. I have an ambivalent relationship with multiculturalism, I don't think that we should make concessions to other cultures that don't have as robust an aspect of what Huntington calls the "Anglo-Protestant work ethic" (though I think other cultures sometimes have a strong work ethic without being Anglo-Protestant). My thought, however, involves philosophical ideals that aren't present in the common discourses of the masses of both the West and the rising non-West (my ideas aren't mass cultural). That is where the utilitarian mass cultural aspect comes in. (Most people want fast food, American music and TV, and other such things, but I think mass culture is superior to either religiously bigoted ideas or secularly bigoted ideas, which are forms of fanaticism.) I think, however, that we can't solely use hard power, as many neo-conservatives thought in the Iraq/Afghanistan issues earlier this century, I think we should use a combination of my concept of psychoepistemology and smart power to change the rising non-Western powers' cultures. (This might take a longer period of time, as in Taiwan and South Korea, as well as a greater degree of consensus in the West, which was present in the post-WW2 situation. This consensus was not present in the Iraq/Afghanistan situation.) Our Founding Fathers read a great deal of philosophy, and it affected the U.S. Constitution mostly in positive ways. They didn't spend their time with the 18th Century versions of mass culture.

Chapter 2 deals with the *Bourgeois* trilogy of Deirdre McCloskey. In these works, McCloskey successfully, I feel, defends capitalism from its critics. She attributes the exponential increase in the standard of living of practically everyone in the world since the advent of capitalism, to capitalism, not to socialism or nationalism. To McCloskey, the essential feature of

capitalism is the liberation and empowerment of the class she calls “the innovative bourgeoisie.” One critical aspect of this liberation was the meritocratic aspect of capitalism, as opposed to the entitlements of feudalism (and the 20th century’s entitlements of the proletariat/bureaucratic/police class of the Communists and the racialism of the various fascists). People were judged on the basis of what they created, not by blood, class, or other ties. The innovative bourgeoisie’s work was the development of mass culture innovations and their achievement of “economies of scale,” which made the innovations financially accessible to all members of society, not just the rich. The 20th century’s abandonment of capitalism led to the horrors of nationalism and socialism. This analysis relates to the present project in that I think we must make use of my psychoepistemology and political science’s idea of smart power in order to liberate the innovative bourgeoisie of both the West and the rising non-Western powers in the current historical epoch. This will involve the proliferation of capitalist ideas. (Look at the astronomical economic growth of China since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms.) This also relates to the current project in that we must create societies that produce innovative bourgeois subjectivities (Steve Jobs types), not “Homer Simpson” types. This will involve the creation and maintenance of meritocratic democratic capitalism, or, what I call, as well, “meritocratic egalitarianism.” Meritocratic egalitarianism means everybody has the opportunity, both subjectively and objectively, to be overman/innovative bourgeois subjects.

Chapter 3 deals with Nietzsche. One of the persistent themes of this chapter is that the reader of Nietzsche must draw a distinction between his liberatory psychological views and his reactionary political views. A common misperception of Nietzsche is that he considers the social type of Cesare Borgia to be the example of the overman. This is actually a misreading; Borgia, though an example of master morality, is not an example of the overman. Some examples of the overman are Leonardo da Vinci and Goethe, who are creative geniuses, not

thugs like Borgia.²⁵² This relates to the current project in that we must cultivate creative genius overmen/overwomen in both the rising non-Western powers and in the West, not thugs, like Xi and Putin. I think that if Nietzsche had been more of a student of economics, he might have been more supportive of meritocratic democratic capitalism, rather than aristocracy, which Beiner attributes to Nietzsche. Nietzsche should have attributed the title of “lazy slobs” to much of the feudal aristocracy, not just the middle and working classes. As with McCloskey’s innovative bourgeoisie, the Nietzschean overman must be held up as an ideal of the cognitive elites of both the West and the rising non-West in the current epoch. This is especially true to Nietzsche’s thought, because of Nietzsche’s cosmopolitanism, which will tear down the barriers to cooperation between the cultures of the world, barriers created by metaphysical (including secular metaphysics like Marxism) dogmatism. This will create a global climate of tolerance. My discussion of Nietzsche’s “virile skepticism” comes in here: we must use force to create tolerance of diverse metaphysical systems. We must not let the reactionary metaphysics of much of the rising non-Western powers (in Huntington’s analysis) be forced upon us as the rising non-Western powers rise. The cognitive elites must be educated with Nietzsche, in order to increase constructive cross-cultural exchanges. Nietzsche correctly notes that democracy has drawbacks, but the solution isn’t aristocracy, but meritocratic democratic capitalism, or a related “meritocratic egalitarianism.” Meritocratic egalitarianism means that everyone has the possibility of becoming an overman/innovative bourgeois type of subjectivity.

Some of the liberatory aspects of Nietzsche’s psychology are as follows. Nietzsche defines the selfishness of the overman as being different from the selfishness of the average person, or of thugs in general. The selfishness of the overman leads to works of art or technology. The overman doesn’t indulge in the satisfaction of base desires. The Nietzschean overman sublimates his sexual desires and his desire for power. This is true in the cases of da

²⁵² I am indebted to Kaufmann, Patton, and the other Nietzsche commentators I cite in chapter 3 of this project for this observation.

Vinci and Goethe. The overman doesn't repress his desires, or, as some Nietzsche commentators assert, when the Nietzschean overman represses his drives, this leads to the overman sublimating them, rather than having the repression lead to symptom formation. Nietzsche's overman redefines the Christian Good and Evil in line with worshiping life on Earth. All that increases my health and power on Earth is good; all that decreases my health and power on Earth is evil. Another aspect of Nietzsche that I like is that he allows for the fact that compassion for the poor (and, I would say, concern for the ecology) doesn't have to be an ascetic exercise. In addition, following Patton's analysis of Nietzsche's conceptualization of power, Nietzsche analyzes power as being multidimensional, and not being concerned with power over other humans. To Patton, it is multidimensional in the sense that it is concerned with the overman's power over himself (sublimation), and with the overman's feeling of power (which leads to compassion from exuberance, not from Christian duty).²⁵³

This also relates to the current project's proposal to create a new Bretton Woods system. The old Bretton Woods system increased global cooperation at an institutional level. It did not extend to the process of subject formation of elites and masses by cultures. This means that cultures could cultivate non-dialectical subjectivities in both the cognitive elites and masses. This wound up propagating intolerance in general. This intolerance wound up defeating the whole purpose of the Bretton Woods system. In the chapter of this project dedicated to Huntington, Huntington notes that a de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in the rising non-Western powers, which will wind up re-enforcing the reactionary beliefs of the cognitive elites in those cultures. As these rising cultures rise, they will increasingly be able to assert their intolerant values on other cultures. In other words, the Nietzscheanization of subject formation in all cultures could lead to the propagation of my psychoepistemology using smart power. The new Bretton Woods system will lead to the sublimation of the human will-to-power into economic means, not military.

²⁵³ See my discussion of Patton on Nietzsche in chapter 3 of this project.

Chapter 4 further develops my concepts of dialectic and subjective determinism. The concept of dialectic has been enhanced and has metamorphosed into the concept of “psychoepistemology.” Psychoepistemology consists of two aspects. The first is the psychological “respect for being in general,” or “respect for other beings.” The second aspect is the epistemological Hegelian dialectic of knowledge, between subject and object in the process of becoming (with a fleeting reconciliation both at the subjective level of time and at the historical level of the epoch). Subjective determinism is the concept which is where the perceiving subject imposes itself onto the objective reality. The subjective determinist doesn’t allow objective reality (which includes other subjectivities and nature, etc.) to speak back to it, and denies the ability of the objective to take part in the process of identity formation. This chapter also involves three different dialectics. The first dialectic is that between the historical and unhistorical. The historical is the aspect of time which is related both to the creation of documents and the empirical experience of things which are considered significant enough to record in documents. The unhistorical are the aspects of human being which are present throughout all time as universal. This includes the timelessness of sexuality, intoxication, and other aspects. I also use the term “subjective time” to refer to the unhistorical, in that it is related to the time of the individual (as opposed to objective historical time). There is some degree of overlap between the two types of time. The second dialectic is related to official discourses and unofficial discourses. Official discourses are those created by official state structures and which have the legitimacy traditionally associated with their being state structures. Unofficial discourses are those which are produced by insurgent or mafia organizations, and by other marginalized and oppressed groups. These groups don’t have the legitimacy traditionally given to those discourses produced by official states. (In some instances, some unofficial discourses have more legitimacy to their adherents than the official state structures which the adherents also belong to. An example of this is where mafia organizations’ discourses inspire more obedience and fear from their members than that of the official discourses which their members

are also part of at the same time. This situation of dual allegiance is called “multiple sovereignty.” In multiple sovereignty, there are often dual systems of status and taxation that the members of both the official and unofficial discourses are subject to at the same time. Both the official discourses and the unofficial discourses can have taxation powers over the same constituents at the same time.) The last dialectic of this chapter is the one between the literary construction of reality and empirical reality. The literary aspect of reality is the aspect that concerns the discourse on reality which is formed, at least partially, independent from the reality outside of discourse. The empirical reality is the reality which is perceived by the senses. The conflict (and Hegelian reconciliation of the conflict) between the two results in knowledge. All three of these binarisms dialectically interact, at least ideally. If they don’t interact dialectically, distorted situations result, either subjective determinist or objective determinist.

Chapter 5 deals with some of the thought of Richard Rorty. Although I do agree with much of his program of “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” I think that his attacks on metaphysics ignore the crucial role of metaphysics in the West. This includes the triumph of the West in the Cold War. One major reason that we won the Cold War was because of our metaphysical systems that emphasized freedom and responsibility (merit) over class entitlement (the East Bloc). In this sense, I side with Deirdre McCloskey, because her thought emphasizes how capitalism liberated the innovative bourgeois types. Rorty seems to think, in conjunction with critics of democratic capitalism from both the political right and left, that democratic capitalism produces inferior subjects. This, as well, is enhanced by his misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s overman as being the worshiping of Aristocracy. Although I think that Rorty, being a Pragmatist, correctly valorizes behavior over metaphysics, I think that much of the West’s behavior was due to metaphysics. I draw a distinction between two types of metaphysics. The first, most commonly used, relates to having a belief in a transcendental realm. This includes both religious transcendentalism as well as the Marxist belief in the achievability of a classless society. The second definition is the one most commonly described by the existentialists and

phenomenologists as being “what makes experience possible.” This is an Enlightenment project in the sense of being an examination of the fundamental structures of consciousness common to all humans. Another way of phrasing this is: if we don’t have a universal concept of humanity, why do we treat other humans in a different way than we treat nature or other living beings? I think that Rorty is engaged in something similar to the second definition of metaphysics without attributing it to metaphysics.

Closely linked to this is what I call Rorty’s use of what I call concrete reason, as opposed to metaphysical reason. Concrete reason is the type of reason that doesn’t involve the desire to escape from history. Metaphysical reason attempts to devise ahistorical universals. I think that both are un-dialectical, in the sense of the term that I have developed in this project. This relates to the fact that I do think that Rorty makes use of universal concepts without fully recognizing them as universal. These include: concrete reason vs. metaphysical reason, justice vs. loyalty, and ethnocentrism-solidarity vs. objectivity. I think that Rorty’s concepts do have a universal aspect to them. For example, describing the ethnocentric view of culture involves a universal aspect of all cultures. This means that Rorty is making use of the definition of metaphysics as being what makes experience possible.

I think that it is possible to utilize my concept of psychoepistemology in conjunction with Rorty’s concept of ethnocentrism. I also believe that Rorty himself would agree with this formula. This is because he tolerates different metaphysical views, as long as the metaphysics don’t lead to fanatical behavior. This is in the sense of Western Liberalism as being the expanding definition of group identity resulting in the expansion of what we mean when we say “we.” I, however, do think that this should be recognized, in my case, as being a form of “good metaphysics” (as opposed to “bad metaphysics”). Good metaphysics results from the scientific examination of subject/object relations. These relations make for a more stable foundation for morality. I think that this integrates Rorty’s narrative with the narrative of the tradition that Rorty calls the Kantian/realist tradition. Dialectics integrates the universal aspect of the Enlightenment

with its particular manifestation in historical/empirical reality. I am not denying Rorty's ethnocentrism, I am merely saying that the West is superior because of metaphysical reasons linked to ethnocentrism. This would facilitate the creation of general rules in a new Bretton Woods system. Rorty himself recognizes the creation of general rules in certain situations (see chapter 5 of this project). These metaphysical rules (my psychoepistemology) will provide a more stable foundation for ethics as embodied in the new Bretton Woods system. Our metaphysics did have a positive effect during the Cold War, but our tolerance of different metaphysical systems contributed, as well. We were intolerant of laziness and reliance on connections and entitlement. This, as was discussed in the chapter of this project on Huntington, was the result of what Huntington called "the American Creed." The American Creed was a type of document that was, in some regards, the concretization of a skeptical metaphysics that emphasized life on Earth over the transcendental form of metaphysics. My psychoepistemology is a universal that doesn't devalue particular cultures, as long as they are tolerant of other cultures (and as long as the other cultures aren't intolerant themselves).

I would prefer to not need metaphysics, but, if necessary, I would propose my psychoepistemology. This is because my psychoepistemology is a more tolerant metaphysics. It is a universal which makes room for particularity. Another way of putting this is by saying we have to formulate an ethics based upon universal subject/object relations, not the mere integration of particular narratives (which is what Rorty would require). I am similar to Rorty, however, in that there is an historical/experience aspect to morality. This means that morality is part the product of reason and part experience. I don't think that Rorty's Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism is a complete accident, as the Kantians would say. I do, however, think that some people are more reason responsive than simply believing in the narratives they were born into. This reason responsiveness, on the part of some people, leads to the necessity of a universal metaphysics, at least in some cases. Some people became abolitionist due to philosophy; some due to literature. (With the advances in cognitive neuroscience, perhaps

abolitionists had brain structures different from the brain structures of the slave owners.) Being able to utilize both perspectives is one of the advantages of Hegelian dialectical rationality. Hegelian reason is universal reason reflecting on experience, and from that experience, coming up with general rules. This is different from Kantianism in that Kantianism devalues history theoretically in favor of abstract ahistorical universals. Valuing history means that you view ethics as being a process of expanding empathy, due in some cases to metaphysics, and in other cases ethnocentric empathy (philosophy vs. literature).

Rorty is right to say that the masses are more responsive to empathy, like literature. The cognitive elites are more responsive to high culture, like philosophy. (The Founding Fathers, for the most part, were students of philosophy.) Mill famously writes: "It is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." This is where my psychoepistemology comes into focus. It is another way of expressing two aspects of my five instruments of power. They are: overman and innovative bourgeois ideal subjectivities for the cognitive elites of the West and rising non-Western powers; and utilitarian mass culture for the masses of the West and rising non-Western powers. Making people happy is a major way of reducing violence and oppression. (Some people, however, are made happy by being able to be violent and being able to oppress without fear of retribution or justice.)

Another aspect of Rorty that I at least partially disagree with is that he appears to think that having a "species consciousness" is way too rational and abstract in being able to use for the creation of an ethics. I say "partially" because I think that our species consciousness will be created by historical conditions, not by metaphysical reason. Because of this last point, Rorty might agree with me. The historical conditions that will create a species consciousness are: Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Climate Change. In a similar manner, Britain's desire to keep the colonies as part of its empire caused the colonies to view themselves as a nation. We will learn to think of ourselves as a species if this will contribute to our survival, especially relating to WMD and Climate Change.

In summary, I think using the following will enable the U.S. to deal with both its foreign policy problems and domestic policy problems in the current Huntingtonian historical epoch. This will involve educating my concept of psychoepistemology into the cognitive elites of both the West and the rising non-Western powers. The masses of the Western powers and rising non-Western powers will be made happy by mass culture. Both of these aspects will be created by the use of smart power, not solely by hard power or soft power. A related process will be that of “brain drain,” luring the cognitive elites of the rising non-Western powers to stay in the U.S. after school and, hopefully, to adopt the values associated with psychoepistemology.

Afterword:

One last thought. Following Nietzsche, I recognize that there is nothing impersonal about philosophy. Being a psychiatric patient, I hope to at least get a Rawlsian “Veil of Ignorance,” if not compassion and/or sympathy. But I recognize that some oppressed groups require the latter, compassion and/or sympathy (in the form of Affirmative Action). For example, women reduced to the level of “baby-making machines,” dalits in India, Jews harmed by the resurgence of anti-Semitism, religious people oppressed in China because of China’s secular dogmatism, among other groups, all have individuals who might need and deserve some form of Affirmative Action. For some individuals of these groups, the Rawlsian “Veil of Ignorance” will be enough. I am lucky to be an American, in “the land of opportunity” on Earth. There is less of a history of oppression in America than in many other cultures. Hopefully, I will just require, and get, the “Veil of Ignorance.” If I get compassion, empathy, and sympathy, I will, of course, not refuse it. When I’m on my medications, I’m a high-I.Q. workaholic with a sense of community.

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