Investigating Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

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Investigating Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
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Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
May 2020
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to my project advisor, Garry Hagberg, who helped me realize my love for the philosophy of aesthetics and my love for the work of Wittgenstein. Thank you for always encouraging me to think independently and to question everything, especially if my stance is contrary to the work of great thinkers. Thank you for always asking how my musical life was going and embodying the spirit of the double-degree program from the College. Your guidance and support through this process has been absolutely invaluable.

My thanks also goes to Jay Elliott, for teaching me how to write an effective philosophy paper, for always pushing for more clarity in my writing, as well as always finding positions I had not considered before to strengthen my works in progress.

To Robert Martin, for encouraging me to take that Introduction to Philosophy course my first semester at Bard, and for your belief in a liberal arts education for musicians; for creating the Bard College and Conservatory double-degree program.

To Professors Matthew Deady and Whitney Slaten, for teaching some of my favorite classes outside of my direct areas of study, for providing me with new ways to think about old concepts, and for being so enthusiastic about sharing your areas of expertise with your students.

To Dorothy Albertini, for providing support and encouragement to many of us seniors who ended up finishing our projects away from campus.

To my friends Gabby Hartman, Gigi Hsueh, Helli Fang, Rowan Puig-Davis, and Hector Prud’homme for being a constant source of joy, even when life got stressful.

To my husband Luis Gutierrez, for your constant and unwavering love and encouragement.

And to my parents. Mom, Dad, thank you for giving me the opportunity to study at Bard, and thank you for always believing in me.
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Introduction

In Section xi of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* (formerly known as *Part II of the Philosophical Investigations*), the last section as per the chronology of the *Investigations* investigated here, section 245, actually provides a good place to begin. For as readers of Wittgenstein know, it is impossible to condense his philosophy into any concise, bite-sized pieces. One must get to know his works as wholes, as only this kind of study will allow for the best understandings and comprehensions.

Section 245 reads, “Is being struck looking + thinking? No. Many of our concepts *cross* here.” While in order to understand this section, we must start at the beginning of section xi, at the same time, section 245 will be ultimately important to keep in the backs of our minds as we travel through the rest of the sections that come before it. For not only does section 245 ask a question that will require us to walk through and deal with our types of perception due to the way we utilize the grammar of certain words, we will also need to explore aspect perception, and everything that becomes problematic in attempting to best describe what happens there including thinking about what looking is and what thinking is in relation to being struck by an aspect, section 245 also includes Wittgenstein’s answer. This answer: “No. Many of our concepts *cross* here” first denies that being struck is “looking + thinking.” Then, the statement, “Many of our concepts *cross* here” hints at the massive amount of work that must be done in order to be able to understand what exactly he means by this; essentially, the entirety of sections 111-244 of section xi must be examined to find his meaning, for Wittgenstein does not elaborate on this statement by laying out for us which concepts “*cross* here.” We as the readers must take part in our own
philosophical work from his statements in order to find the full meaning, and to figure out which
concepts do indeed, “cross here.”

In addition to the work I will do here to examine sections of section xi to find the non-
explicit meaning of section 245, I will also be working to engage in my own investigations in the
style of Wittgenstein, translating his *Investigations* that center around seeing and sighted
perceptions to instead center around hearing and heard perceptions. The *Investigations* will
allow me to do this because though they may seem to be centered around the perceptions
themselves, the focus is really placed on the grammar of the way we speak about and experience
these perceptions through our use of language. Because of this distinction, I will be able to
translate passages from utilizing the words related to seeing and sight perceptions to instead
utilize words related to hearing and heard perceptions. This process will not only allow for the
exploration of hearing and heard experiences, but will also allow for a greater exploration of how
the grammar of our language influences and gives weight to different facets of our perceptions.

With my explorations of hearing and heard experiences, I will begin to deal with the
ways that we categorize sound from music. It may seem like I want to attempt to answer the
question “What is music?” but this is not my aim. Though I will be attempting to give
distinctions between sound and music, through the exploration of the concepts that Wittgenstein
introduces, it is not my aim to find a definition that works either in a more universal manner than
any other theory proposed before, or to add another theory to the list. For just as Wittgenstein is
able to discuss figures and pictures without delving deeply into aesthetic theory, this too is my
aim with the introduction of sound and music. Features of sound or music may be discussed
with more of an aesthetic leaning than may seem necessary, but the artistry (or lack thereof) of
these sounds or musics is an integral feature that must be noted accordingly when appropriate.
It is also possible for me to engage in this kind of work because of the work done by Roger Scruton. The treatment of sounds and music in this manner is influenced by Scruton’s essay “Understanding Art” which utilizes the language “hearing as” which is a translation of Wittgenstein’s “seeing as” that is presented first in section 116. Ultimately, however, my work will be influenced most by Wittgenstein, as I will not only be directly working with his text of section xi, but I will also be presenting my work as my own investigations into the *Investigations*. I will not examine the sections in chronological order, but will instead begin with the sections I find most interesting or important to address. I will also not remark on all the sections contained within section xi. I will remark on selections from sections 111-245 here, and will include my notes on the sections I don’t formally remark on in the Appendix. The work in whole will not address anything before the first section of section xi, 111, and will not address anything following section 245. With each section I examine, I will first present expository work, intended to clarify and find meaning that is not or may not be explicit. Then, I will move into interpretive work, relating and translating the section to focus on hearing and heard experiences to find a larger picture of what Wittgenstein’s grammar of language means for the way we understand and interact with the experiences we have in this world.

Though I did state that I would not be addressing the sections of section xi in the chronological order that Wittgenstein presents them in, we must begin with the first section he addresses to build a foundation with the concepts needed to better understand the rest of section xi.

This project is comprised of two main sections and an appendix. The first section is an exploration of Wittgenstein’s section 111, the first section of section xi. Here, I address Wittgenstein’s two uses of the word “see” and show how the two uses remain congruent when
the word “hear” is substituted. The second section is an exploration of Scruton’s understanding of art. Here I utilize Scruton’s understanding of art as a link between Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing as’ and my own ‘hearing as’ that becomes more nuanced than Scruton’s conception of that concept. As mentioned before, the appendix includes all of my notes on Wittgenstein’s section xi to showcase the breadth of context from which this project emerges. My aim of the project as a whole is to work through the understanding of musical hearing as it relates to many of our sighted perceptions, and to show that our understandings of both types of perceptions can be enhanced by the conversation found when these concepts are analyzed side-by-side.
Section 1: Exploring Section 111 of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*

Section 111, the first section of section xi, of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* already highlights the kinds of complexities that we will encounter throughout the examination of this work. It reads:

Two uses of the word “see”.

The one: “What do you see there?” – “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” – let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.

What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

The first sentence, “Two uses of the word ‘see’” appears to be quite simple at first, as it refers to the usage of the word “see,” and that it can be used in two distinct ways (this and subsequent quotations from Wittgenstein Section 111). However, it becomes rather complicated quite quickly, once the two different usages of the word “see” are elaborated upon.

In the first example where the word “see” is used, Wittgenstein describes a situation where one person is asked about what they see, and in answering, they are able to give a concrete answer that corresponds to the response, “‘I see this.’” The response that they give is concrete, because those around them would be able to look at the thing represented by the word “this” and agree on some level about the way that “this” was described. For example, if someone was shown a box containing an object, say a red apple, and they were asked to describe the object within the box with the question, “‘What do you see there?’” the response would replace the use
of the word “this” with a description. Possible responses could include: “I see an apple,” “I see a red apple,” “I see an apple inside the box,” “I see a red apple inside the box,” etc. All of these responses would be accurate as they are describing the same object in the same situation, even though the responses are phrased differently than one another. In this situation, even if responses are worded differently, this is not a concern, as the external object of perception here is always the same, even though it can be described in different ways. It is important to note that there is no underlying fundamental impression of any sight perception – just a first impression.

By ‘object of perception’ I am referring to the object or thing that is being seen in a particular situation; the object or thing that a person’s perception is paying attention to; what they are perceiving; what they are experiencing.

With the qualification that there is no underlying fundamental impression of any sight perception and that there is only a “first impression,” I mean that though building blocks of perception can appear to explain how we may understand certain experiences from a “ground up” perspective, we do not actually experience perceptions in this way. After being exposed to the aspects that would make up the “building blocks” of a certain perception, we may be able to see the perception as being built by these layers, but we do not see these layers immediately with each new perception or experience we encounter. This relates very much to the work of Scruton that I introduce in my second section. There I will explore how the way we perceive music to be music can be described by components that appear to build upon one another to give the final perception of music to the individual, but I will argue that though music can be described in this way, it is ultimately not the way we perceive heard experiences.

Noting the complexities of the terms ‘object of perception,’ and ‘first impression,’ the complexity of the word “see” and the way we utilize it in our language and our language-game is
also brought to light. For as this complexity is shown, it leads into the second usage of the word “see” that Wittgenstein refers to: When the question “‘What do you see there?’” is asked, the response in this case is “‘I see a likeness in these two faces.’” Here, two different faces are being looked at and are then compared by two individuals. Wittgenstein says of the other individual, “let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.” This kind of seeing is pointed out to be different from the first type of seeing, as the object of perception has changed forms. Before, with the apple, the apple; a physical object, was the object of perception, yet here, the likeness of the two faces becomes the object of perception. This is strange, as a likeness is not a physical object, and yet it is taking the place of an object in this context. It is also important to note that though “a likeness” is taking the place of an object within the second use of the word “see,” essentially, the object of perception that is “a likeness between two faces” is only a more specific “this” that is outlined in the first use of the word “see.” While “a likeness” could be described as the following: “I see this; a likeness between two faces,” this example would still be categorized within the second use of the word “see” as the likeness is the ultimate object of perception. Wittgenstein notes that this difference in grammar is of utmost importance in the last sentence of section 111.

To conclude section 111, Wittgenstein remarks on “objects” of sight, which provides further explanation about the distinctions of the types of ‘objects’ we see with each use of the word see. This provides a starting place to begin to discuss the grammar of the word “see” within our language:

What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight (Wittgenstein Section 111).
With this statement, Wittgenstein is drawing the reader’s attention to the grammatical differences that categorically separate the two discussed uses of the word “see” based upon the ‘objects’ that the sight sees in the two different cases. Objects of sight are not always objects as we usually think of them; possessing a kind of physicality. A common or usual use of the word “object” suggests that there is a physical thing, something that could be held or touched, or is perceivable in a concrete manner. However, when delving into the grammar of the word “see” this is shown to not always be the case. Objects of sight do not necessarily possess the qualities that make them a physical object intrinsically. For here, objectivity does not come with the object itself, but is instead found within those who are doing the seeing. For when someone is seeing something, they are perceiving what they see to be the ‘object’ of their sight. In the case of the apple in a box, it is quite easy to see that the apple is not only the object of sight, but it is also just an object intrinsically. Yet, when someone is seeing a likeness between two faces, they are still perceiving an ‘object’ though this ‘object’ is not a physical thing that would traditionally carry the label of object. The ‘object’ of sight here has become the likeness of the faces. This ‘object’ of sight does not intrinsically carry with it its object-ness – it is only an object when or once it is seen. The grammar of the language here unpacks the differences between the two uses of the word “see.” These differences may not be obvious at first, but it is critical to understand them before progressing further into Wittgenstein’s work.

Further, it is important to note how the object of perception functions within the two usages of the word, “see.” With the first use of the word “see,” Wittgenstein showcases the usage with the example, “‘What do you see there?’ – ‘I see this’ (and then a description, a drawing, a copy)” (this and subsequent quotations Wittgenstein Section 111). With the denotation of the object of perception as being “this,” this “this,” then holds the object-ness that
the perception latches on to. As above, within the first use of the word “see,” the object of perception is a physical object, and in the second use of the word, “see,” the object of perception is not a physical object. However, some may argue that not all things that become objects of perception when the first use of the word “see” is used are physical objects: One could tell of their experience seeing the color of an apple. Yet, the redness of a red apple, the color of the apple, is not itself a physical object. The color, here, is only part of what makes the apple that specific apple, and is only attached to the apple as a descriptor. Here, the color’s function as a descriptor of the apple shows that the word “see” is still being used in the context that Wittgenstein lays out within his first use of the word.

To show how this is the case, I present the following situation. Two people enter an empty room that only contains one red apple sitting in the middle of the floor. One asks the other, “What do you see there?” and the other responds by saying, “I see this” while gesturing to the red apple that is sitting on the floor in the middle of the empty room. The person who was asked “What do you see there?” can then give any description of what they are perceiving, appropriately based upon their experience. While this person may note that they notice the color; the redness of the apple, the redness does not intrinsically contain its own object-ness. Even if a person entered this empty room and exclaimed that they saw the color red, clarifying questions about what object that the color red was attached to would be asked by that person’s companion. This all feeds into Wittgenstein’s remark that what follows the statement, “‘I see this’” is “a description, a drawing, a copy.” The clarifying language that is used after the apple is specified as the object that replaces the “this” describing it, is still within usual use in the first sense of the word, “see.”
Just with the apple’s color only being a descriptor of the object of perception, the subject or subjects of an artwork or photograph would also only be classed as descriptors to the object of perception. If, for instance, there was a painting of a parrot hung on a blank wall, and someone chose to describe what they saw in the painting, they would still only be utilizing the first use of the word, “see” that Wittgenstein presents. This situation is more complicated than the last with the red apple, but yet the object of perception will be shown to still be a physical object. Here, with the painting, potential confusion lies within the grammar and the preliminary language that is used to describe the object. For if someone was to say, “I see this” where the “this” they are referring to is not the object of perception that is the painting, but an “object” the painting is presenting a representation of, in this example, the parrot, the descriptive language would hide the true grammar. For if someone were to say, “I see a parrot,” without giving any other context, their companion could become quite confused after a cursory glance around the room would reveal no living bird. Only once further clarification was provided; noting that the parrot they originally saw was the subject of a painting on the wall, would the true grammar of the first statement (“I see a parrot”) be revealed. While the parrot is the subject of this painting, and the statement, “I see a parrot” is true, it ultimately functions as a description to the unsaid statement, “I see a painting.” The statement, “I see a painting” where the “this” of the first usage of the word “see” is replaced by the word “painting,” shows the true grammar of the situation. The painting is not only shown to be the object of perception, but also a physical object. All other statements that refer to the painting contain descriptions of it; the physical object of perception. Whether or not it is immediately obvious that a statement refers to the painting is not of importance, as the statement ultimately serves as a descriptor of the painting; the physical object of perception.
While it may be tempting to push back against the idea that the non-physicality of the object of perception in the case where the likeness between two faces is the object, I have shown how easy it is to mistake descriptors of physical objects as objects themselves. The descriptors that are mistaken for physical objects at first glance, are then shown to not be physical objects themselves; the parrot in the painting or the redness of the apple. Because of this immediate willingness to accept non-physical “objects” that turn out to be descriptors of actual physical objects, the non-physicality of “a likeness between two faces” cannot be a concern.

To begin to explore how this first section can be translated to allow us to discuss hearing and heard perceptions, the simplest way to begin to build our vocabulary is to substitute the word see for the word hear in Wittgenstein’s original work in the eleventh section of Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment. The original wording of section 111 is as follows:

Two uses of the word “see”.

The one: “What do you see there?” – “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” – let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.

What is important is the categorical difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

Now, to begin finding the parallels, replacing the word “see” with the word, “hear:”

Two uses of the word “hear”.

The one: “What do you hear there?” – “I hear this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I hear a likeness in these two
faces” – let the man to whom I tell this be hearing the faces as clearly as I do myself.

What is important is the categorical difference between the two ‘objects’ of hearing.

And finally, to replace the language that specifically relates to our sight experiences to language that relates to our heard experiences:

Two uses of the word “hear”.

The one: “What do you hear there?” – “I hear this” (and then a description, a dictation, a replication). The other: “I hear a likeness in these two sounds, notes, or melodies” – let the man to whom I tell this be hearing the sounds, notes, or melodies as clearly as I do myself.

What is important is the categorical difference between the two ‘objects’ of hearing.

With this translation, we can now explore the parallels directly.

Yet, before I begin to explore the parallels, explanation about the translation must be given. For I want to make the reasoning behind the translation as explicit as possible. When I moved from the original text that utilized the word “see,” and replaced it with the word “hear,” this to me was the only logical first step. For this not only begins the work of translating the original text from addressing sight to hearing, but it also then allows for the words and phrases that deal only with sight to stand out clearly when hearing is first introduced. The words and phrases that would still require translation, are then laid out clearly, as when the first swap of words takes place, the words and phrases that do not fit or do not make sense then need to be updated appropriately.
The first place where this was required came from the sentence, “The one: ‘What do you hear there?’ – ‘I hear this’ (and then a description, a drawing, a copy).” The words, “a drawing, a copy,” that came from the original text are not usually utilized to describe heard experiences. (One could argue that “a drawing” could still legitimately be used to describe a heard experience for an individual possessing synesthesia, yet for most contexts, this is not a useful descriptor.) Therefore, “a drawing” must be translated to a word that expresses the same kind of relationship that a drawing has to sighted experiences to one that is logical for heard experiences. I chose the word “dictation” to replace the word “drawing.” For this seems to come the closest to what the activity of drawing a sighted experience aims to do but for a heard experience. In the drawing of a sighted experience, the individual is attempting to put down on paper (or into a computer program) what they see by means of creating a different kind of description; one that is visual.

For though “a description” is one of the word choices utilized in both the original passage, and my translated passage, the following two terms also are in essence descriptions, though they are not verbal descriptions. For Wittgenstein’s original passage in Section 111 indicates the assumption that the first description, “a description” will be a verbal or written description; one contained within language, allowing the conversation between the two individuals to continue further than he writes out. The second two forms of description utilized for sighted experiences, “a drawing” and “a copy” still work to describe the sighted experience of an individual, and do still carry on the conversation between the two individuals, but here, instead of only being able to communicated in pure language, visual aids are introduced to allow the individual to hopefully express more clearly what it is exactly that they are seeing. With the example of “a drawing,” the individual would be able to create another visual experience that relates to and attempts to describe the original visual experience. It is important to note that this
drawing may not appear to look like the original visual experience exactly; it may seem to appear quite different, but just as I have shown earlier, in the case of an apple being described with language in different ways, multiple perspectives can be had of the same experience, even if they do not seem to fit together coherently, or even if they may seem to contradict one another.

Moving back to my translation of “a drawing” to the heard experience descriptor “a dictation,” I can show that many of the same properties are congruent between both cases, leading to the most successful translation possible. For it is important to remember the nuance required in finding the best translation; something is always lost, and it will never be exact. I have done the best I can here, utilizing careful and purposeful decision making. A dictation of a heard experience allows an individual to write down on paper (or in a computer program) what they are hearing. This is an exercise most often found in ear training music classes, where just like in most math, there is a correct answer, and everything else deviating from this correct answer is wrong in some capacity. However, once an individual has the skills needed to produce dictations from heard experiences, this can be applied to any heard experience just as drawing can be applied to any seen experience. There are instances where for each of these descriptions they are more successful and there are places where they are not nearly as successful, which is why different kinds of descriptors can be utilized in different situations. But also, the finished dictation or drawing of an experience may not really seem to match the object of perception. However, it will be shown that variation in these instances is not usually a concern. For while in the context of an ear training exam there would be a right answer and a multitude of wrong answers, dictation of heard experiences not in this kind of context are heavily dependent upon the experience the individual is having and the aspects they are specifically noticing. While this
may lead to “incorrect” portrayals of what they are hearing, if they have accurately put down on paper what they have heard, the exercise in dictation would be accurate for what they heard.

The next term translated, “a copy” to “a replication” feels to be more obscure than the last translation, because I find the original text in Section 111 to be not completely clear here either. For “a copy” is said to be able to replace, or help clarify the statement of “I see this.” Yet I want to ask the question, a copy of what exactly? While it is clear that it is a copy of “this,” and it is also clear that “this” is a sight perception, this is the only information we have to go on. In the other cases utilizing description and drawing, there seem to be numerous cases that fall neatly into these descriptive tactics. For I would argue that any sight experience can be described through a description utilizing words and language, even if the language used turns out to be someone saying that they really do not have the words or the language necessary to describe what they just witnessed. They may attempt to use words to help clarify this situation, but ultimately, we will understand that the conception of what they experienced is one of those that cannot be accurately expressed in words, and we are able to rely on our prior experience and knowledge with the kinds of sighted experiences we have had where we have felt the same way. Even if the sight perception itself cannot be “accurately described,” at the same time, it is the most accurately described by this kind of language; the language that notes that it cannot be described by words alone, or that you had to be there in order to really understand, etc. The same exact situation goes for heard experiences as well, though it may seem that the general public may have less vocabulary available to them that would allow them to speak accurately about heard experiences than they do about sighted experiences. But in any case, description is still quite useful and relevant when discussing any heard perception, even if the description
begins with language thought to clarify, but trails off into the kinds of statements I addressed earlier, “you had to be there,” “it’s beyond words,” etc.

In cases where the perception had was either sighted or heard, individuals who have a larger vocabulary in general, or of terms that relate specifically to a sighted or heard perception may feel that they are able to more accurately describe their experiences. These are not cases where the descriptions of “you had to be there,” or “it’s beyond words” would not be applicable, but are dependent on the individual, and the level of knowledge, experience, or learning they possess. If one has a large vocabulary that is filled with many technical terms that allow for very specific descriptions to be given, they are more likely to utilize these words in an attempt to accurately portray what they experienced through language. If one does not have access to this kind of language or vocabulary, they may resort to phrases like “I don’t know how to describe it” sooner. For example, someone who enjoys experiencing visual art and music but does not know much about either subject may rely more heavily on descriptions that may seem “less accurate,” in that they are less specific, generalize, or tend toward statements that tell of their inability to describe accurately what they experienced. Visual artists or musicians on the other hand, may be instead able to give a much more nuanced description of what they happened to perceive, utilizing applicable technical terms, alongside more generalized claims. It is important to note however, that no matter the kind or level of education, knowledge, or experience an individual has, whether or not they are able to put into words some kind of description that really does attempt to describe the experience in some kind of term whether general or more specific; the descriptions of “I really don’t know how to describe it,” or “I can’t put it into words” are equally valid descriptions of their experiences.
Continuing on; drawings of sighted perceptions and dictations of heard perceptions also have a myriad of cases that neatly fall into these ways of describing an individual’s perception. For example, if words are failing to accurately describe how an object was related to other objects spatially, an individual may make a quick sketch on a piece of paper to further clarify and describe what they saw. A musician who is attempting to learn a new tune may choose to take a dictation of what they are hearing so that the statement, “I hear this” feels more concrete, in that they actually figure out what is happening in the melody and synthesize the information in a new and more tactile way to further the learning process.

However, once we reach, “I see this” where “this” is “a copy,” examples or instances that fall neatly into this category do not appear right away, and this seems to bring confusion rather than clarity to the work. For what is a copy of a sight perception? Since it has been shown that though we utilize language to talk about our experiences in a manner that assumes that we all experience things in the same, or at least similar ways due to our surroundings and culture, we really cannot make this claim, as it does not seem to follow that there could be a copy of a sighted perception. For how are we to know that we are seeing this “copy” from the perception it was copied from? It really seems that we cannot know this, no matter the kind of language used to attempt to find experiences that would be truly considered to be shared.

In light of this issue, “a copy” must relate not to a larger metaphysical truth about our perceptions and experiences, but instead to mediums that are able to create copies of objects present in a sighted perception, e.g. photography, videography, scans, copies made by a copy machine, etc, or even the object of perception itself. Addressing the object of perception itself first, if an individual has been reading Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and someone asks “What do you see there?” the response of “I see this” could be accompanied by the
individual sliding the book over to be in front of the questioner, perhaps even pointing to the
lines they have just read. This same situation could play out slightly differently if the individual
reading the *Investigations* also had made a copy of the page they were currently reading, in that
they could give a copy of the page to the questioner, and then further clarify about where exactly
they were looking at the page. Though in the cases where an actual copy has physically been
made (even if this physically made copy is only contained within a phone or computer), the new
object of perception is a copy and therefore not identical to the original object of perception, this
kind of descriptor is only sensical to use in situations where it is less about, or not at all about the
sighted perception as an experience, but instead about the object of perception as an object. For
the information contained on a specific page of the *Investigations* will be exactly the same even
if it is photocopied, but the photocopy may have marks that do not appear in the original text.
Comparing the two objects leads to the assertion that they are not identical, but the relevant
information that is needed from either *is* identical, and this is what is important here. In all cases
like this we have created extensive vocabulary and criterion for distinguishing what information
in these kinds of copies is and is not important. This is learned over time and through
experience, and in every new situation, we relate back to what has often been the case before to
do our best at attempting to ascertain what is to our interest and what is not to our interest.

Now that further meaning and clarification has been brought to the original text’s use of
“a copy” I can now move to discuss the translation to “a replication.” It is first important to note
that in some cases, it would be accurate to have “a copy” of a heard experience. For if the object
of heard perception was recorded as an audio file or as the audio of a video file, this is analogous
to a photo, photocopy, or video taken of a sighted experience. Copies of heard experiences can
also be made if one copies an audio file on their computer so that there are two identical files,
perhaps stored in different places, or one is being used as backup for the other in case anything happens to the original. Yet, once we move into the world where technology is not being utilized in these ways, to produce “a copy” of a heard perception in real time no longer makes sense. This is largely in part because of the temporal nature of any heard experience that is ultimately fundamentally different from the way that we engage with and think about sighted perceptions. It is said that music allows us to experience time in a different manner than any other way we experience it otherwise.¹ In order to reflect this important distinction, we move to the translation, “a replication.” This language does still compute with the examples of heard experiences that would still make sense with the original language of “a copy,” for a replication is the action of copying. It may seem that this is not the most important distinction to make, but to counter this, I present the following example: An aspiring artist may practice different skills and techniques by copying famous paintings. Though during the creation process they are producing a copy of the painting; replicating it, the finished product is a copy, and not a replication. The object of sight, the finished painting, is only a copy of the original, though one could say that it was produced through replication – because replication is the action of copying. Here I have used the words replication and copying interchangeably to describe the action of copying, for the word “copying” in and of itself implies action. However, in order to recreate a heard experience, it must be replicated in time. The way that a heard experience must be replicated interacts with the temporal plane in a way that sighted experiences do not. For the “copy” of the experience, can only be experienced through time. Because the action of the copying is the integral part of this experience, the word “replication” is more accurate when discussing “copies” of heard experiences. For while a music instructor may tell one of their

¹ Paraphrasing Leon Botstein from 03/31/2020 Bard Conservatory Orchestra Virtual Discussion on Richard Strauss
students to copy the way they play a specific note or passage, the student will have to copy the
performance of their instructor by replicating as best as they can what the instructor did. It is
only through the action of the student that the copy is found; where the replication is built. It is
also important to take note of the language used within this example. I said that the student,
when asked to copy what their instructor did will strive to replicate what they did *as best as they
can*. Replication allows for the copy to not turn out exactly like the original in the sense that it
could possibly seem quite different from the original. If the music student is endeavoring to
replicate their instructor’s vibrato, the instructor may demonstrate this technique on a different
pitch than the student. While the pitch may not be replicated, the vibrato is the aspect that is
being attempted to be replicated. Aspect perception is integral here to this discussion because it
is the focus on a specific aspect that allows the concept of replication to be understood. If focus
could not be narrowed to a specific aspect, replication would ultimately be an impossible task.
Furthermore, the student, though striving *to the best of their ability* may fail to copy accurately
what was asked of them. Yet what they produced was still their replication of the original. So
here, with the word “replication,” and the action that is intrinsic to this word, we find a way to
more accurately attempt to describe how the temporal plane affects heard experiences.

One could also argue that the work that I am doing here (or attempting to do here) is most
accurately described by language like “words cannot do the concepts justice,” or “it is beyond
language.” And I agree with both of these statements, in that I do not believe that any work
could ever get close to what we really mean. But, by utilizing the inherently flawed and limited
language that we do have, which is still quite expansive, we are able to reach new understanding
of more concepts, even if the conclusion ends up being that we can only get so far with the tools
we currently have, and how people so far in time have utilized these tools.
Finally, to move to the last change between the original wording of Wittgenstein’s Section 111 to my translation is the replacement of “faces” with “sounds, notes, or melodies” in the following passage, “I hear a likeness in these two sounds, notes, or melodies” – let the man to whom I tell this be hearing the sounds, notes, or melodies as clearly as I do myself.” While Wittgenstein only utilizes one word here, referring to the object of perception as being a pair of faces, here I exchange this with three words, “sounds, notes, or melodies.” This exchange of one for three is to help show the different kinds of objects of perception that may be possible with a heard experience. For when examining two faces, though the understanding of the likeness between the two as being an object may be confusing, the understanding of the faces themselves retaining objectivity is not as much of an issue. However, because of the way that any and all heard experiences exist within the temporal plane that may feel less objective to some, I felt it was important to acknowledge three words that may be used to objectify heard perceptions, especially as I am exploring musical perception specifically, and it is important to note that all three of these terms relate to just three of the possible objects of perception. As elaborated upon in my Section 2, “sound,” “note,” and “melody” do not only exist in heard experiences, but they also exist within heard as experiences, increasing their complexity.

While there are a number of direct parallels between seeing and hearing, there are others that are not as clear. Answering the question, “What do you hear there?” is remarkably similar to answering the question, “What do you see there?” as it can still be answered with descriptors. But the kind of descriptors utilized may seem more abstract than the descriptors that are used when talking about visual experiences. Where a red apple in a box is probably going to be described as a red apple by many people who have the sight experience of the red apple, those who have the same heard experience can provide radically different descriptors to the same
event. Though this may seem like it could be a problem, it is not. For when different individuals use different descriptive language to describe the same sight experience, the external object of perception remains the same. This also occurs with a heard experience. When different individuals have the same heard experience, the external object of perception is objective – the same no matter how each individual perceives the experience.

To make the above even more clear, I present the following: While a red apple in a box is likely going to be described as a red apple by most whom encounter that particular sight experience, if someone who is red/green colorblind also encountered this particular sight experience, they may provide words like brown or yellow to describe the red apple. These radically different descriptors that would be provided to describe the same sight experience remain credible, as the object of perception; the apple, has not changed in its appearance. Though the perception of the apple is markedly different, the apple itself has not undergone any physical changes. This also happens when individuals have heard experiences. For if an individual with perfect hearing and an individual with impaired hearing were both asked to describe their heard experience of a sitting quietly in an empty room together for a minute or so, the individual with perfect hearing may describe hearing their breathing, the other person’s breathing, any creaking the room made, the rustle of fabric as breathing or slight movement occurs etc. The individual with impaired hearing may describe their experience as one where they heard nothing. Both of these descriptions about the shared heard experience are valid and true to their individual perceptions even though the descriptors about this external object of perception are very different. Even in a case where two people with identical levels of hearing were asked to do the same thing, they may provide different answers because one individual noticed aspects of the temporal experience that the other individual did not. This still does not
invalidate anything about either of their perceptions or of the experience itself, for the
descriptions will still remain true and valid for each individual.

When beginning to discuss “A likeness in these two sounds, notes, or melodies,”
complexities begin to emerge due to the temporal nature of any and all heard experiences.
For while a sight experience that remains stagnant for even a very short time could
ostensibly be condensed into a single snapshot, this just is not possible for any heard
experience. Heard experiences by their nature exist within time; they take up space in a
way a snapshot does not. One could argue that taking a snapshot of an object, though it
may be quick is not by definition instantaneous, and would still take up a very short
period of time. This is a valid point, but is not the focus of my argument: Though the
action of creating a snapshot is not able to be accomplished instantaneously, the resulting
snapshot provides a copy of that particular sight experience in a very particular temporal
space. The occupation of a sight experience at a very particular temporal space provides
the concept of the snapshot.

Pushing aside the perceived issues of temporality not affecting sight experiences
the same way it affects heard experiences for the moment, where there is “a likeness in
these two sounds, notes, or melodies,” this likeness still retains a “categorical difference”
from the first use of the word “hear” (Wittgenstein Section 111). Just as I have shown
the likeness between two faces to be an object of sight above, the likeness between two
sounds, notes, or melodies also becomes the object of hearing even though this likeness is
not a physical object. Just as one is able to look at the faces of two siblings and notice
likenesses in their face structure and features, one is also able to hear likenesses between
two sounds made by the same object, between two notes played by the same instrument,
or between two melodies that are almost identical. Because the “categorical difference[s] between the two ‘objects’ of” both sight and hearing are equivalent, these parallels enforce the similarities of our sight and heard experiences.

Before moving to Section 2 and the work of Roger Scruton, the ground that has been covered so far is as follows: The two usages of the word “see” outlined by Wittgenstein have been discussed, and it has been shown that the external object of perception retains its object-ness, even if said object (e.g. a likeness) is not a “concrete” thing. It has also been shown that there is no fundamental impression of any sight perception as there is only a first impression. From these conclusions, a translation of Wittgenstein’s original text of Section 111 was completed, allowing discussion to move from sighted perceptions to heard perceptions. Explanation of the translation was given to further clarify how the two uses of the word “see” are congruent to the two uses of the word “hear;” the external object of heard perception retains its object-ness, and for heard perceptions there are also no fundamental impressions, only first impressions.
Section 2: Exploring Scruton’s Understanding of Art

Now turning to Roger Scruton’s essay, “Understanding Art,” not only does this work provide a link between Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing as’ and my ‘hearing as,’ by utilizing this very translation, but further insights on ‘hearing as’ provide more for the original ‘seeing as’ as well. Though Scruton is the helpful link between Wittgenstein’s work and the work I am doing here, I find the way in which Scruton presents the concept of ‘hearing as’ to be simplistic; not acknowledging all of the nuance and complexity that this translation inherently brings. While his essay addresses the concepts of ‘hearing as’ and ‘seeing as,’ the fundamental point of interest to him here is reflected in the title, “Understanding Art.” Though I am essentially working to tackle a similar issue here, it is not my main goal. For I am not attempting to even begin to answer the question, “What is music?” even though the work here does give background that would be useful when thinking about this question, it is not the focus. Because of this, I will be focusing on the passages from “Understanding Art” that speak more to the specifics (the concepts of ‘hearing as’ and ‘seeing as’) and less to the general (finding understanding of art, or utilizing the more specific concepts to answer the question “What is music?” once and for all) though these general concepts will be addressed to best facilitate conversation about the specifics.

To delve into the work that Scruton does with hearing and ‘hearing as,’ I want to first start with the following passage found on pages 173 and 174 in Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind:

Associated with musical understanding on this very basic level are such phenomena as hearing a sequence of notes as a melody, or as an
accompaniment, hearing a melody in a sequence of chords, hearing one theme as a variation of another, or hearing two simultaneous melodies in a sequence of chords (as one hears the two melodies of Ex. 7 in the chords of Ex. 6), and so on. In common to all these cases is the close relation of ‘understanding’ to something that we would unreflectingly call an experience. Indeed, if it were not for the connection with the activity of understanding music generally, it would be unnecessarily pedantic.

Ex. 6  Mozart, Quartet from Don Giovanni

Ex. 7

For Scruton, ‘hearing as’ involves something more than what is required to simply have a heard experience. This musical understanding that he is exploring is part of what is required for an individual to be able to have the experience of ‘hearing as’ in a certain situation instead of only being able to have the experience of hearing. While this does seem to make a certain amount of sense, I do not believe that this ‘musical understanding’ needs to be quantified in order to be able
to explain and work with the concepts of hearing and ‘hearing as.’ For Scruton, earlier in this essay states,

it might be argued that once we have acquired the complex body of knowledge involved in understanding art it will no longer be possible to treat art simply as the object of a particular experience – certainly not as the object of an experience that might equally be occasioned by a landscape or a flower. On the contrary, art is more like a language, a mode of presentation of human ideas, and it is significant only on account of the ideas or experiences which it expresses. Appreciation of art involves understanding a system of signs, and this understanding is a cognitive capacity, rather than a capacity for any kind of feeling or experience (“Understanding Art” 168).

While I am interested in discussing cases of seeing, ‘seeing as,’ hearing, and ‘hearing as’ that do engage with art, these concepts are not bound to only be experienced in conjunction with some kind of art. With this clarification, it leads us dangerously close to the question, “What is art?”

Like I have stated previously however, it is not my intention here to explore this directly, or to attempt to answer this or its close relation, “What is music?” Yet it seems like this is the only path we can continue on from Scruton’s assertions. For what about the case where that landscape or flower, though seeming to be just part of the natural world, is actually part of a “presentation of human ideas,” because the landscape has been created by human thought and hands, or the flower was genetically modified to create a more fragrant smell or more vibrant petals, and then replanted in an area that seems like it was untouched by human ideas? Is not the
assumption that a landscape that appears to have not been meddled with by human hands and/or human ideas is a certain kind of seeing as that is only apparent when this situation is discussed?

Because musical understanding is something that most humans have some kind of relationship with, this comparison between the understanding of art to some kind of pure experience only really sheds light on a type of experience that we may not think about as often. For in today’s world, though there are still places that have not directly been impacted by the “presentation of human ideas,” with the presentation of human ideas in some areas, this would cause indirect presentation of human ideas from the changes the original human idea presented. Further, in many places where we may be able to go to find a beautiful landscape, or a beautiful flower to experience, our journey to or through this experience is heavily shaped by the presentation of human ideas. A road may have been paved to allow humans the access to see a beautiful landscape, parking areas have been created at scenic overlook sites on major highways, an individual after seeing a beautiful flower that is not very common may endeavor to plant more or encourage their growth. In all of these situations where we may think we are experiencing something only of a “particular experience,” we are really experiencing something influenced by the “presentation of human ideas.”

Scruton’s argument, that the experience of art requires a kind of understanding where the experience of “natural beauty” does not, that ties in the concepts of ‘seeing as’ and ‘hearing as’ to this understanding does not take into account of what some individuals may be able to understand from an experience of “natural beauty.” He states, “A man may understand, or fail to understand, the *Four Quartets*, or Rodin’s *Danaë* but he can scarcely understand or fail to understand the hills of Catalonia, even when he finds them beautiful or ugly” (“Understanding Art” 168). Though the artworks Scruton references have been created by a specific “presentation
of human ideas” this does not inherently give these kinds of work a better capacity to be understood than experiences of “natural beauty.” For though a scholar on poetry or sculpture may have a great understanding of the *Four Quartets* or Rodin’s *Danaë*, this understanding is limited. For once an artwork is introduced into the larger world that is not just the artist’s mind and studio, it takes on so much more meaning dependent on the context into which it is placed or the kind of context it is given. We as individuals can attempt to find understanding in these kinds of artworks, but ultimately, though we may be able to present certain facts about it (it was created in May of this year, by this artist, because of information the artist has given in a statement), or certain opinions or thoughts (I like it, it’s too asymmetrical, etc.), we cannot know or even begin to comprehend or understand the whole of what this artwork meant before, during, and after its creation, and what it will mean when presented to the world not just now, but for the future.

The reason we cannot know or even begin to comprehend or understand the whole of what an artwork meant before, during, and after its creation, and what it will mean when it is presented to the world now but also in the future is because we cannot know or have a full understanding of the implications this artwork may or may not possess. To further clarify this, if we think about our language, there is meaning held within the words we use, in that we are able to define them in a consistent way and therefore are able to have tools like dictionaries that provide these definitions. Yet, dependent on the time and place in history, certain words may mean more than what their dictionary definition presents. A family or a certain group of people may share an inside joke whose meaning and implication does not at all relate to the dictionary definitions of the words used to share the joke.
This is also exemplified by the transformation of everyday language to have further meaning when it is utilized in a meme. For example, the words, “This is fine.” on one level convey that the situation or context that “This” refers to is going well enough that it will be okay; it will be fine. However, once placed into the context of KC Green’s comic that became a meme, “This is fine.” does not mean that this is fine at all. In fact, it means that things are probably quite catastrophic, as one can see based upon the first two panels of the comic:

Yet without the context of this comic, the implication created by someone referencing the comic is lost completely. Further, because this comic integrates both art and text, the implication created by the comic is twofold. Not only are individuals able to reference the feeling created by these panels by utilizing the words, This is fine.” but artwork that takes inspiration from the fire depicted here also would link back to the meme. And this is when the inability to comprehend how language or artworks may present meaning throughout time is really uncovered. For when Green created the comic, it was not at first the meme that it is today, no one could have known how this piece of art would interact with works that came before it, or how it will continue to shape our understanding of work that continues to be created after it. Therefore, it is impossible
to even begin to understand how newly created works will be in dialogue with works of the past, or with work done in the present or future, mainly because the implications about what these works mean may drastically change over time as they react to and are in conversation with the current time period and all the extra content that comes with it.

Returning to Scruton, likewise, scientists may be able to tell us a great deal about what we may see during an experience of “natural beauty.” They could explain why we are seeing certain types of flowers in one area, and a type of vine in another because of the preferences of each plant for light during the day. They may explain how hills or mountains were formed from geological events. They could provide explanations of any number of things that would give us a greater understanding of what we were looking at and seeing when we have an experience of “natural beauty.” However, just as Scruton states, we cannot ultimately really understand an experience of “natural beauty” because there is something inherently unknowable and beyond our best efforts of comprehension. This, I argue, is also present when we interact with artworks.

Therefore, while a certain kind of knowledge is needed to experience certain aspects of our perceptions, the understanding of Scruton’s artistic understanding is not what is necessary to experience or understand the concepts of ‘seeing as’ or ‘hearing as.’ However, some kind of prior experience or knowledge is necessary, and so the word “understanding” could be utilized. But what I want to make clear is that Scruton’s definition and emphasis on artistic understanding is not what I find to be necessary. While the experiences of seeing vs. ‘seeing as’ and hearing vs. ‘hearing as’ do rely on our knowledge and the information that we currently have access to, we do not have to be privy to some large, overarching theory of art to be able to understand how these concepts not only appear, but also work in our day-to-day lives. For these concepts do appear in our day-to-day lives, even if we are not aware of their presence.
Moving to Scruton’s conception of the concept ‘hearing as,’ he bases ‘hearing as’ on how we are able to conceive of a melody; arguing that it is really ‘hearing as’ that allows us to identify any melody we may happen to perceive. For he says that we cannot just hear a melody, and instead when we hear a melody, we are actually “hearing as,” because we are hearing a “sequence of notes as a melody” (“Understanding Art” 174). We cannot simply hear a melody, as any kind of experience of this sort is really ‘hearing as’ instead. Once we conceive of hearing a melody in a series of notes that are connected to rhythm, we are no longer just hearing the things we are experiencing aurally. We are instead hearing this series of notes as a melody – thereby going from hearing to “hearing as.” Scruton notes:

if it were not for the connection with the activity of understanding music generally, it would be unnecessarily pedantic to speak of understanding a sequence of notes as a melody, rather than of hearing the sequence as a melody. But it must be noted immediately that when we speak of hearing in this context, we mean not hearing but ‘hearing as’, and there are grounds for saying that ‘hearing as’ is not simply an experience, in the way that hearing may be (“Understanding Art” 174).

This not only cements how our understanding of a heard experience can change the way we experience it, but also brings light to how even our most “simple” heard experiences are quite complex.

(Further, with the inclusion of the same quote from Scruton here as was included earlier, but now that work has been done to show Scruton’s understanding of art, and the elaboration on the complexity of what implication can mean for art, the meaning of this passage may take on a
new light, as different aspects are brought to the forefront, allowing you, the reader, to see this passage as something new, as something not found during your first impression.)

However, with this assertion, Scruton is arguing for the perspective that all experiences or perceptions of anything that would be described as a melody would therefore have to be part of experiences or perceptions of ‘hearing as,’ and this is simply not the case. For in order to describe something as a melody, we do not always have to first hear the sequence of notes that make up the melody as a melody. While it could be argued that Scruton is merely following a pattern that Wittgenstein first addresses, that some experiences and perceptions that really are “seeing as” are described and talked about in terms of just seeing, like in the case where two or more individuals are cloud watching. One may say to the other, “I see a lion over there,” accompanied by pointing to the particular cloud formation that is giving them this sight impression. Their companion may agree or disagree, or provide or ask for further clarifying information to best understand this situation. However, both individuals know that they are engaging in a kind of game; that they are playing with seeing an object of perception not as what it is but what it is seen as, even if they may not be able to describe their actions in this way. Further, it is not necessary to build the lion out of particular clouds, by remarking about which part of each cloud or of the cloud formation is each bit of the represented lion to reach the experience and perception of “seeing as.” A kind of wholeness is presented as the object of perception that lends itself to the experience of seeing as.

Just as visual perceptions that can be described as ‘seeing as’ are presented as a kind of whole object, this is also what we must consider and take into account for the case that Scruton puts before us here. For while it is possible to experience and hear a passage of music note by note, and it is also possible to hear a melody as a sequence of notes, notice the language that I am
using. For it is not that in order to hear a melody, you are ‘hearing as’ a sequence of notes that then becomes a melody; hearing a sequence of notes as a melody, but that you hear a melody. It is possible to hear different aspects of components that make up a melody, and it is also possible for the perception of a melody to emerge from what at the beginning appeared to be elements that had simply been placed alongside one another with no internal drive or structure. I will present a myriad of cases to explore and explain my view further, but first, it is necessary to present my definitions of the vocabulary I will be utilizing to discuss the concepts of hearing and ‘hearing as.’

While Scruton begins his discussion of hearing and hearing as by delving into music, and arguing that to hear a melody is to hear a sequence of notes as a melody, I would argue that we must begin from an even analytically more basic place. For what really constitutes a note? Though he begins at the level of notes and melodies, how do words like “frequency,” “pitch,” “noise,” “sound,” “note,” and “melody” relate to one another and relate to what is being discussed here? I propose the following definitions for these words for my discussions here:

The word “sound” can be used to describe any heard experience. All heard experiences are made up of sounds, in that all heard experiences are made up of something that we are able to hear; whatever this means in each particular case. Sound here is the colloquial term that we can utilize to describe any type and any kind of heard experience, no matter what that heard experience is comprised of. Other words that I will introduce here are more limited descriptors of some kind of sound, in that they have more restrictions placed upon them within our language game in terms of what kinds of sounds they can describe when attempting for accurate description.
“Noise” here is a kind of sound that generally has a negative connotation attached to it. The sound described as being noise may be noisy, irritating, grating, or constant. Here though, now that I have introduced a second term, the big issue is how noise relates back to sound. For while I here am giving noise the job of a descriptor, if noise is contained completely within the sound circle of a Venn diagram, how can we best speak about how we hear noise or hear sound as noise? Scruton would argue that if all noise is also sound, we must then have to hear sound as noise, in that all perceptions of noise are not just hearing, but are instead hearing sound as noise. However, this does not seem to be the case. For there are some cases where we would ask someone, “Hey, what was that sound?” or “Did you hear that sound?” and other, different cases where the questions we would ask are instead, “Hey, what was that noise?” and “Did you hear that noise?” And the imagined scenarios could be wildly different, merely because of the connotations that the words “sound” and “noise” have for us in our language game. Yet, in the situations where the word “sound” is used, hearing is the only way we would talk about the heard experience. We would say that we heard a sound, not that we heard a sound as a sound. In the situations where the word “noise” was used, however, it could be used in the expression “I heard a noise” or in the expression “I heard that sound as a noise,” especially if there was another individual who asked whether anyone else had heard a sound, and the reply was that they had not heard a sound, but that they had heard a noise. This begins to bring up the issues of how experiences are qualified and quantified by different individuals. I will address this below, when discussing music, and will attempt to account for all the variables that may be of interest.

“Frequency” is a descriptive term that also is a quantitative method of obtaining a numerical value for the kind of sound any sounded event may produce. For frequency is not only utilized to describe events that would produce a certain kind of sound, it also describes any
event where there are multiple events occurring over a period of time. The number of these events over such a time period indicates the frequency. All sounds can be measured or described by their frequency, and people may talk about the way they perceive frequencies, but this language still remains to be the language of hearing, and not ‘hearing as’ in most cases. Further, events or experiences that certain individuals may not even be able to perceive still retain a particular frequency. A common way to see this experience is shown through the experiment where a device that is able to produce a very wide range of frequencies measured using Hertz is swept through all of the frequencies it is capable of producing. Generally, the younger the age of an individual, the wider range of frequencies they will be able to hear, due to the larger amount of inner ear hairs they have. As people age, these hairs die off, though they can also be damaged by prolonged exposure to loud sounds as well. The first hairs that are damaged in either of these scenarios are the ones that detect the highest frequencies. Therefore, it is easily shown how the same events may be perceived to be heard by some individuals, and not at all by other individuals, though the event in question retains a frequency, no matter how it is perceived.

“Pitch” is another way that sound can be described in a quantitative manner. Unlike frequency however, pitch describes where there is some kind of musical content or context inherent to an experience, or prescribed upon an experience. For while a certain sound could be described by the frequency label of 440H, this same sound could be described by the pitch label of A (which signifies the note A as well, but more on this later). While certain frequencies are quite important in musicians’ lives, most of the time, utilizing the descriptors of pitch, along with the words “sharp” meaning too high, or “flat” meaning too low, are detailed enough. However, the starting frequency that a musician tunes to may be very important, as evidenced not only with historical tellings: how different towns in Europe would each tune to a different starting
frequency, but also today: where orchestral musicians may have very strong opinions about whether A440 is better or worse than A441 or A442. In these designations, it is important to note that these sounds are not only being described using a marker of pitch, but also by a marker of frequency. While the frequency might change between two examples of a sound, the pitch may stay the same. This is especially true of the smallest intervals between frequencies, of only a few Hertz. Here it is also important to note that I am only referring to instruments that are reading or playing in C, in concert pitch, and not about any instruments that are transposed in any way, for in these cases the pitch used to describe a certain frequency would not match the “usual,” concert pitch describing the very same frequency.

A “note” is a sound that cannot only be described by the words frequency and pitch, but it is utilized in situations where there is some kind of musical context. But this musical context does not mean that notes are only heard in what we think of as music. For there are instances where a sound could be described as a note, in which there is not any observable musical context, yet the individual who hears the sound, like a squeaky door closing, and says that they heard an Eb; “The squeak of that door is an Eb.” Yet it is exactly in these kinds of cases or situations where the real ambiguity appears between whether a heard experience is simply hearing, or whether a heard experience really is ‘hearing as.’

For Scruton, in my more elaborate case that includes sound, noise, pitch, frequency, and now notes, he would advocate for the hearing of sound, but then the hearing as of noise, pitch, frequency, and notes of sound. Or, it could become more complex, with the hearing of a sound being heard not just as noise, but also as a pitch. Or that a sound is heard as a pitch, and also as a note. Or that a sound must be heard as a note before it can then be heard as a note in a sequence of notes, that only then allows the sequence of notes to be heard as a melody. While this kind of
building-block theory seems nice, it does not allow for or draw the proper attention to the complexities that are discovered in this kind of work.

For a note to be heard, in essence, an individual must have a heard experience where they hear a sound as a note. But, though I say here that they must have an experience where they hear a sound as a note, this does not mean that they are hearing a sound as a note. This might appear to be a contradiction but it is not. For instance, take the following example: A friend of yours invites you to go with them to an experimental music concert, and you accept. You both arrive, take your seats, and converse about how you have each been since you have last seen each other. Some people enter the stage and begin to make noise with the instruments, perhaps bowing a string here or there and tapping some of the percussion instruments. You, under the assumption that the concert has not yet started yet and that the musicians on stage are merely warming up, continue to talk about the day you have had to your companion. Yet, they turn to you quite suddenly, and say, “Shhh! They’ve started,” indicating that what you are hearing is not the musicians warming up, but the beginning of the concert. At first, when you were assuming that what you were hearing from the musicians on stage was only them warming up, the heard perception was of the sound of the musicians warming up. Yet, once the aspect of perception shifted as your attention was drawn to the fact that the performance had actually started, the sounds that constituted “warming up” are then recognized instead as being the sounds that constitute music, e.g. notes. With this distinction, the apparent contradiction can be clarified. In order for you to hear the sounds produced on the stage to be notes, the perception of what was occurring onstage had to be clarified as notes. So at first, the individual here hears sound, and then this sound is clarified to be musical sound which promotes a shift from hearing the sound as the musicians merely warming up to hearing the sound as musical notes. Yet, though the
language of “hearing as” is utilized here to help describe the situation, the individual in this example does not experience the sound as being part of ‘hearing as’ at any point other than when the aspect perception is changed. They were experiencing simple hearing at the beginning related to the context they had assumed to be in place, and once that context is shifted, simple hearing is again what they experience. While in order to hear a note, a sound must be heard as a note, the cognitive processes that the individual experiencing the perception are unlikely to follow the way that language is utilized to attempt to show the way that these processes occur, unless, the individual is fully ensconced in the kind of work that we are doing here. The individual may have simply had an experience that they would describe by saying that they heard a particular note, which is not ‘hearing as’ but simple hearing. This line of argumentation may seem like it is impossible; for how is it possible to reject Scruton’s argument that all hearing of melody or related phenomena is not simple hearing and instead is ‘hearing as’ while simultaneously advocating for the experiences of hearing vs hearing as to rely on the individual who is perceiving the heard experience. Yet, I can show how this is not the whole case. The differences between hearing and ‘hearing as’ may remain less concrete than certain cases of seeing and ‘seeing as,’ but this flexibility is one of the great qualities of the way we perceive heard experiences, especially when it comes to musical expression.

To illustrate how the experience of hearing a sound as a note can still retain a simple hearing of the note, think of the following case. Think of observing or noticing (seeing) a brick wall. Though a brick wall is made up of components (building blocks), we see the wall as a wall, and not as its components (building blocks). In expressing what an individual sees when looking at this wall, they may say, “I see a wall,” or “I see a brick wall.” This is not a situation where they would say, “I see those bricks as a wall,” or “I am seeing those bricks as a wall.” The
brick wall is able to be analyzed in terms of the aspects that it may present to individuals, as the brick wall can be said to be made out of bricks and mortar, and qualifications about what color, size, or type of brick used can also be given. However, these bricks and mortar are not aspects that can be separated from the whole of the object they create. Even just the obtaining of the aspect perceptions of these different elements is not necessary for the object of the wall itself. For the brick wall is seen to be a wall, it is not seen as a wall.

This is what I want to illustrate with the more “complex” objects of hearing. For Scruton argues that the more “complex” objects of hearing are not simply objects of hearing, but are instead objects only found through ‘hearing as.’ While there are cases where a sound can be heard as a sound through aspect perception, and perhaps even the directing of one’s attention to a specific aspect the heard object possesses, this kind of attention to the building blocks of perception are firstly not mandatory, and are secondly not accurate. It may seem, especially as we are thinking so much here about what constitutes a sound versus what constitutes a note, that in order to hear any note, we are really hearing a sound first, and then we are hearing that sound as a note based on the context or the information the sound is providing us with. Yet this is really backwards. For just as with the brick wall, it just does not make sense to say, “I am seeing this brick wall as a brick wall.” Particularly, because if someone were to say this, my next question to them would be, “Well, if you are seeing this brick wall as a wall currently, what does it usually look like? Or what do you generally see when you are not seeing it as?” Here, when noting the aspects of the wall; the bricks and the mortar, they are noticed and perceived as building blocks, which are useful in explaining how this wall was built. But it is very clear that the object of perception is in fact the wall as its whole. And this is what I want to bring to the sound versus note debate.
For while we may notice that after we have a heard experience that we would describe as a note that it is “made up” of sound, in that it is a kind of sound, it is possible to see the building block structure that has emerged through my work above; going from a sound to a frequency to a pitch, or going from a sound to a note to a pitch, etc. Yet, the first impression of this specific heard experience, of this note (that can be qualified and quantified in different ways with different descriptors and measurements as I have already begun to outline), is just that: a heard experience of a note. Just like the first sight experience of an individual seeing the wall in my example would be a simple sight experience: they see the brick wall.

With all of this vocabulary now available to us, and now that it is clear that we are able to not just hear sounds or notes, but we can hear a sound as a noise or as a sound or as a note, giving us clarification on the different ways we may experience a heard perception, so far, we have only explored how hearing as might operate in one direction. Instead of having an experience that appears to begin with the building block of sound and then be heard as something on a “higher” level than sound, e.g. a pitch or a note, it is also possible to hear a pitch or a note as a sound or as a noise; reversing the apparent direction of these building blocks. For while it is easy to imagine a musician hearing a squeaky door and hearing the squeak produced as a specific pitch or note, is it not just as easy to imagine an individual entering a friend’s home and exclaiming, “What is that noise?!?” after perceiving what to them can only sound like noise, but is in fact a child practicing a new instrument? For while a beginning recorder player may be producing sound that could be heard as specific pitches or notes, it could also very easily be heard as noise, especially if the beginner’s practicing has become increasingly squawky or seems to be sounding worse as time continues to pass.
Continuing on with further language that is used to describe our heard experiences, after our work on showing that it is possible to simply hear a note, we must turn to a sequence of notes and the other types of ‘hearing as’ Scruton describes, attending to the same passage as referenced earlier (and here again may new aspects be brought to light for the reader):

such phenomena as hearing a sequence of notes as a melody, or as an accompaniment, hearing a melody in a sequence of chords, hearing one theme as a variation of another, or hearing two simultaneous melodies in a sequence of chords (as one hears the two melodies of Ex. 7 in the chords of Ex. 6), and so on ... Indeed, if it were not for the connection with the activity of understanding music generally, it would be unnecessarily pedantic

\[ \text{Ex. 6  Mozart, Quartet from Don Giovanni} \]

\[ \text{Ex. 7} \]

to speak of understanding a sequence of notes as a melody, rather than of hearing the sequence as a melody. But it must be noted immediately that when we speak of hearing in this context, we mean not hearing but ‘hearing as’, and there are grounds for saying that ‘hearing as’ is not simply an experience, in the way that hearing may be (“Understanding Art” 173-174).
With Scruton’s nuanced system relating sounds, notes, and melodies, as not just cases of simple hearing, but cases of ‘hearing as’ there does seem to be a kind of complexity here that is not present in my take on this issue; in that the hearing of a melody cannot just be a heard experience, and instead is resting upon necessary building blocks that do not allow the experience of this kind of perception to be just simple hearing. Yet, Scruton does find that the heard object of perception remains the same and does not change no matter how we may utilize our language to describe such an experience, and even if our experience once described in language does not seem to match other individuals’ experiences. He remarks that the object of perception retains a kind of concreteness; a stableness:

we find that we cannot analyse ‘hearing as’ in terms of hearing: the difference between a man who hears a sequence as a melody (or as containing a melody), and the man who simply hears it as a sequence of notes is not a difference in what the two men separately hear. They may each hear the same notes, and for the sake of argument we can imagine that they each are able to tell us what those notes are. It may seem at first sight that this is very far-fetched. For how could someone discriminate sounds so completely and yet be unaware of melodies? But, in fact, we need suppose no such general incapacity. We know of many particular cases where even the most sophisticated listener may fail to hear a sequence as a melody while knowing exactly what he hears (“Understanding Art” 174).

While the statement, “[there] is not a difference in what the two men separately hear. They may each hear the same notes ...” is approaching the issue in a slightly different manner than I am,
Scruton is still arguing for a conclusion that is equivalent to mine, though the language he uses may be confusing (174). For Scruton, he advocates that there would be no difference between the two men in terms of what they hear, but depending on their personal background and past experiences, they are picking out aspects of the same heard experience that have them experiencing this perception differently; one hearing it “as a melody (or as containing a melody),” and the other hearing it as “a sequence of notes” (174). Here the building block theory that he relies on shows that though the object of perception is heard by both men, they each interpret it differently, leading to their separate experiences of hearing as. What is most important here is that even for Scruton, the object of perception that then leads to these hearings that are not hearings but are instead hearings as, still remains to be the same, and would be an instance that could arguably be quantified in some kind of way (though this way would only be one expression of the hearing as experience put down, say, on paper).

I also advocate for a stable object of perception, but in the case presented in this example, the two men would not necessarily be hearing the same thing. They would be hearing the same object of perception; having the same external heard experience, but for as what they are actually hearing, what they are actually perceiving, may be quite different. Possibilities of how they may quantify their experiences through language may include that they simply heard a melody, that they simply heard a sequence of notes (this sequence of notes could have varying degrees of perceived continuity), that they heard a phrase, or that they heard something beautiful. Depending on the context in which this object of heard perception was presented in, or what these individuals were thinking about recently, etc., they also might have an experience where they hear this sequence of notes or melody as something else, or even just as a sequence of notes, or as a melody. The individuals in this example could have had a simple heard experience, or
they could have also had a kind of heard as experience. In all cases, the object of perception remains stable but the specifics of how language is used to describe exactly what is going on, what was perceived, remains different.

In the above passage, Scruton also goes on to elaborate about how even a skilled listener may fail to be able to hear “a sequence as a melody while knowing exactly what he hears” ("Understanding Art" 174). In these instances, the aspect or aspects that would allow the sequence to be heard as a melody to that listener would not be lighting up, much like in the case of the duck-rabbit figure (see Appendix below) if someone were unable to see the duck and were only able to see the image as a rabbit. With the exploration of hearing as, aspect perception once again comes into play. For it is impossible to hear something as something else without a particular aspect lighting up for the listener that then makes the heard experience be an example of hearing as.

To help show how aspects may or may not light up for a listener, Scruton introduces and references a piece of music that has the form of theme and variations. Music in the Western classical tradition that has this form begins with a simple theme that with each variation is given a twist, and is presented in a new manner, yet always retains hints of the original theme. Some variations may very obviously still contain the theme, yet the theme may be more hidden in other variations. A simpler example of the theme and variation form is found in Mozart’s “Twelve Variations on ‘Ah vous dirai-je, Maman’” where Mozart takes the theme to what is commonly known as “Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star” and introduces ornamentation of the original theme’s melody and makes changes to the tempo or time signature, to present the original theme in new ways. Scruton specifically references a passage from Brahms’ Variations on a theme by Robert Schumann:
In the passage from Brahms in Ex. 8 it is impossible not to be fully aware of the powerful bass line, with its emphatic octaves counteracting the melting treble part. But how many listeners are able to hear the melody of the treble repeated in these muttering octaves? It may require considerable effort to hear these notes as a melody even though, from the very nature of the case, one knows already what the melody is. The difference between hearing this sequence as a melody and hearing it as a jumble of disconnected notes is a difference in the experience, and not in its (material) object. What is this difference? It is not that, in the mind of one man, the notes linger so that he hears them conjointly with the notes that follow.
To hear the melody in this way would be to hear it as a chord. Nor is the difference one of memory: the two subjects may each remember what has gone before as they hear the new notes played (“Understanding Art” 174-175).

Here, Scruton again holds that the differences between the experiences of the individuals who either hear this passage as a melody or as “a jumble of disconnected notes” do not have any bearing on the “(material) object” of the object of perception. Yet, the language he uses to talk about the kind of experience an individual may have is not completely clear. For asks, “how many listeners are able to hear the melody” found within the octaves first, before qualifying that this kind of experience is still a “hearing as” experience, when he compares two possibilities of the way this object of perception could be perceived; hearing it “as a melody” or hearing it as “a jumble of disconnected notes” (174-175).

Further on, Scruton also gives this following example to contrast how hearing as differs from seeing as:

The case of hearing notes as a melody is unlike the case of seeing a group of coloured patches as a man, in that we do not have independent access to the concept of a melody. All we know of melodies is derived from our capacity to have this kind of experience (if ‘experience’ is the proper word). Hearing a sequence as a melody is more like seeing a group of lines as a pattern or figure than it is like seeing a pattern of lines as a face. Here the ‘organisation’ of experience cannot be described in terms of the application of some independently specifiable concept (“Understanding Art” 176).
The conception of how individuals perceive their heard experiences will vary from person to person depending on a multitude of factors. The amount of knowledge they possess about music, and what sounds they have been taught to hear as notes due to cultural and societal norms are only two factors that can influence this hearing as. For while a trained musician may hear the sound of water dripping onto a pipe as a note that has a pitch, someone who does not have this training may just hear the water dripping onto a pipe just as the sound of water dripping onto a pipe. The genres of music a person enjoys or is surrounded by in their culture also forms what kinds of sounds are heard as notes that then become melodies and music. The sounds that are made by instruments from some African or Asian countries may not sound like notes to someone who grew up with Western instruments and the sounds they typically make. This then influences what kinds of sounds a person may hear as notes rather than just sounds. A note produced from an instrument that person is unfamiliar with may only present to them as a sound.

It is because of all of these variables especially that it is very important to recognize that the first impression of a heard experience for an individual may vary quite widely when compared to other individual’s first impressions of the same heard experience. It may present to them as a case of simple hearing for however they conceptualize of the perception, or it may also present to them as a case of hearing as, where they recognize that what they are perceiving is one thing, and yet they are perceiving it as another. This is all dependent on the complex context that each individual brings to the table for any heard experience, especially once it is in the context of music or music-making, as the analogies and language used within the music world only lend more complexity and detail to the way an individual perceives the experience, or the aspects that they are specifically attempting to pay attention to.
Scruton’s position in “Understanding Art” here provides a connection between the work of Wittgenstein, and my own position. In this essay, Scruton endeavors not only to bring clarity to the way that ‘hearing as’ and hearing work, and what these concepts mean for our understanding of our perceptions, but also that an understanding of art is not only necessary, but is a different kind of understanding than we encounter in other areas of life, e.g. in instances where we encounter natural beauty. Yet, I have shown that though we could utilize the word “understanding” to reference what we mean when we find explanations of art or the natural world, art does not require the kind of understanding that Scruton pushes for. Further, Scruton’s understanding of art is inaccessible for both the natural world and for art, for the knowledge we are able to garner about both of these things does not give an underlying understanding of implication. Because it is impossible to comprehend a work’s implication now, in the past, or in the future, this further pushes against Scruton’s advocacy for a necessary understanding of art. Since this understanding is shown to be unnecessary, it is also shown that an individual does not need to be privy to an overarching theory of art to be able to understand and utilize the concepts of ‘seeing as’ and ‘hearing as.’ While Scruton believes that all hearing is a kind of hearing as in some capacity, I disagree, and argue that heard perceptions, though they may appear to be constructed of smaller “building blocks” contain an objective wholeness; a melody is not always heard as a melody, but instead can be heard to be a melody. Vocabulary utilized often in musical settings is defined here to find more nuance in the argument overall, and to provide clarity about what meaning each word (“sound,” “noise,” “frequency,” “pitch”) may carry with it. Further, the language we utilize within our language game to talk about and attempt to bring clarity to these kinds of issues may not always seem clear, and may at times even seem contradictory. Yet, it is through these apparent contradictions that we can find further clarification about how even
in our attempts to be the most precise in discussions like these, our language may still fail us in accurately portraying the larger and overarching concept. Scruton does find that the object of perception remains stable for the individuals perceiving their experiences, though the language he uses is different to the language I use to emphasize this same point. Scruton also points to how a “skilled listener” still may not be able to accurately hear what he hears, even though he knows what he hears. And this is so important, for it showcases how it is impossible to be able to hear something as something else without a particular aspect lighting up for a listener; the key to transforming a perception from hearing to hearing as.
Conclusion

The only section from Wittgenstein discussed here at length and in detail is Section 111. Yet, other concepts from his work inevitably make appearances, as it is impossible to accurately examine the breadth of the context explored here, though small, without them. Scruton’s position, though ultimately serving here as a link between Wittgenstein’s work and my own, still provides new light to analyze the concepts of seeing, hearing, ‘seeing as,’ and ‘hearing as,’ allowing for my further clarifications and disagreements. As a whole, here, I have discussed Wittgenstein’s two usages of the word “see” and have shown that when the word “see” is translated to the word “hear” in order to begin a discussion about heard perceptions, that the two usages remain consistent. Further, the object of both sight and heard perceptions have been shown to not only be stable and unchanging, even if its descriptors vary, but also that this object does not need to contain the kind of concreteness that we may often ascribe to an object. Additionally, I have shown how there is not a fundamental impression of sight or heard perceptions and just that there is an initial or first impression; though a “fundamental impression” may appear to be an individual’s fundamental impression merely because it was the first one they experienced.

A “translation” of the original text of Wittgenstein’s Section 111 was completed, moving from the original “see” to “hear,” allowing for more direct work with the original text, though dealing now with heard perceptions. Explanation of this translation and of the musical terms Scruton utilizes allows for us to proceed on firm footing through the rest of the work. Scruton’s understanding of art provides a new avenue to explore, and allows for a broader conception of the ways our perceptions are influenced and then how these perceptions influence what we put
back into the world. His building block theory is shown to fail, as cases of simple hearing may remain just simple hearing even if the object of perception is or becomes very complex. This point remains analogous to cases of simple seeing as well. The language we use to talk about these issues may appear to be contradictory, but that is simply a limit of our current language game, and what we are currently able to express coherently through the tools we have. Issues around implication are dissected, and it is shown that the ultimate implication of anything is beyond comprehension. With this, it is shown that an overarching theory of art is not necessary to find further meaning and understanding of the concepts ‘seeing as’ and ‘hearing as.’ The perception of a new aspect lighting up is ultimately shown to be necessary to transform a simple hearing or seeing perception into a perception of ‘hearing as’ or ‘seeing as.’ This necessity highlights the kind of work that must be done to find further understanding of musical hearing as it relates to sighted perceptions. It also shows that a willingness to see things differently provides just the starting place for great inquiry and discussion of these very topics.
Appendix

Here, I have included my notes on sections 112 through 245 of Section xi of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*. These notes were taken as I began my project, and are included here to show my response to the larger context from where my project emerges.

The complete text of Wittgenstein is beside the numerals denoting the section number, and my thoughts, questions, and further thoughts are contained within the bullet points underneath each section. Some sections have multiple bullet points, and some bullet points refer to more than one section. I have skipped a line between each grouping of original text and bullet points that are meant to be read as a unit. For some sections, I did not include the original text, this is generally when these sections were of less interest to me, and when the section is skipped entirely, the same is also true. A few sections also do not have any remarks from me, but I still felt they were important to pull out for context of the surrounding sections.

**Notes on Wittgenstein Section xi**

112. The one man might make an accurate drawing of the two faces, and the other notice in the drawing the likeness which the former did not see.

- May be interesting – not quite sure how this would translate to music yet, as a drawing is being made of physical objects

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I *see* that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing an aspect”.

- Here is the beginning of aspect perception, with noticing an aspect. Seeing something differently translates to hearing something differently once more information is given to a person, with this being able to be expounded upon more after further sections have been addressed.

115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience.

- Referring to the concept of seeing? Which is different than ‘just’ seeing – perhaps here he is attempting to make reference to the whole of seeing and all things he will later discuss, whereas ‘just’ seeing is more of the ‘general’ usage of the word.

116. One could imagine the illustration

![Diagram of a cube](image)

appearing in several places in a book, a textbook for instance. In the accompanying text, something different is in question every time: here a glass cube, there an upturned open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there three boards forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies the interpretation of the illustration.
But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another. – So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

- So here obviously we have the introduction of a visual perception being presented with accompanying textual descriptions that then change the way the image may be perceived by an individual who is looking at or thinking about the image with the text.
- I address this same concept with the two notes Eb and C, a descending minor third. Depending on the context + the textual description that may accompany those notes, you could say that it is different every time, etc. etc.
- IMPORTANT to pull apart “we interpret it and see it as we interpret it” and the transformed “we interpret it and hear it as we interpret it”
  - What exactly does this mean?

117. Here perhaps one would like to respond: The description of immediate, visual experience by means of an interpretation is an indirect description. “I see the figure as a box” amounts to: I have a particular visual experience which is empirically found to accompany interpreting the figure as a box, or looking at a box. But if it amounted to this, I ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, and not only indirectly. (As I can speak of red without necessarily calling it the colour of blood.)

- Clarifying statement of 116 – may be useful for strengthening my arguments made in favor of 116
- But is it really a clarifying statement of 116, or is it his interlocuter? – and if it is his interlocuter, what does this mean for not only this passage but what has been established in earlier passages? Or is this not relevant, and I can take it at face value.
  - If it is interlocuter, must determine what he is pushing against, why is this a counterargument to what was previously stated? And what does this then mean for me and my arguments?
- This is NOT an indirect description – this simply is a description, based upon one particular visual experience. Interlocuter is countering against Wittgenstein.
  - Use this section to push back against proposed interlocuter and strengthen Wittgensteinian argument

118. In my remarks, the following figure, derived from Jastrow, will be called “the duck-rabbit”. It can be seen as a rabbit’s head or as a duck’s.

And I must distinguish between the ‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect and an aspect’s ‘lighting up’.

The picture might have been shown me, without my ever seeing in it anything but a rabbit.
Here the concept of aspect perception is introduced. Utilize this through visual perceptions first and then move this to musical. For aspect perception is useful through hearing as well.
  
  - This essentially describes any time you hear something in a new way or whatnot, etc etc

119. Here it is useful to introduce the concept of a picture-object. For instance, the figure

![Picture Object](image)

would be a ‘picture-face’.

In some respects, I engage with it as with a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face. A child can talk to a picture-man or picture-animal, can treat them as it treats dolls.

- In relating this to music, perhaps the written music that one can visually see would be similar to this ‘picture-face’. As one can interact with written music the “same” as you engage with hearing music to a certain degree
  
  - This is also engaging with western-normative thinkings about music and how it does exist within a written format
    
    - Will need to address the issue of western permeated thinkings at some point – here do I want to only engage with western thought practices about music? Agh.

120. I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit from the first. That is to say, if asked “What’s that?” or “What do you see there?”, I would have replied: “A picture-rabbit.” If I had further been asked what that was, I would have explained by pointing to all sorts of picture of rabbits, would perhaps have pointed to real rabbits, talked about their kind of life, or given an imitation of them.

- What does he mean by “given an imitation of them” here? Would this be the mimicking of a rabbit’s actions?
- This can be transformed onto music in the way that someone could be presented with sheet music and asked “What’s that?” or “What do you see/hear there?”
  
  - This presents an interesting dichotomy (is that the right word?) between hearing and seeing music, and the way that western music is present in more than one form.

121. I would not have answered the question “What do you see here?” by saying: “Now I see it as a picture-rabbit.” I would simply have described my perception, just as if I had said “I see a red circle over there”.

Nevertheless, someone else could have said of me: “He sees the figure as a picture-rabbit.”

- This continues to play into the differences between performed music and written music – explore this here and in continuing sections.
• You wouldn’t say of sheet music, “Oh, now I see this as music” there could still be debates about whether the content of the sheet music would be heard as music, but this is a bit of a different issue than the one that’s being discussed here
  o Here and before perhaps introduce a visual perception of music, when visual examples are given as pictures in the original Wittgenstienian text.

122. It would have made as little sense for me to say “Now I see it as ...” as to say at the sight of a knife and fork “Now I see this as a knife and fork”. This utterance would not be understood. Any more than “Now it is a fork for me” or “It can be a fork too”.
• This passage engages with a learned and normative culture, one in which knives and forks are common objects that are what they are (whatever this means!)
• Here could engage with the above noted statement in thinking and engaging in the discourse about the western normative nature of this work.
• For when examining the proposed statements here but translating them to be talking about music, there is new/enhanced meaning that actually may make more sense than in this visual perception example
  o But this may make more sense when the individual has a broader understanding and conception of music in general – in that I’ve been introduced to other sounded practices through my ethnomusicology course, and this has impacted the way I think about music as a sounded practice.
  o What does this all mean?

123. One doesn’t ‘take’ what one knows to be the cutlery at a meal for cutlery, any more than one ordinarily tries to move one’s mouth as one eats, or strives to move it.
• Normative objects contain an inherent “being” about themselves. E.g. this is a knife.
• What we normatively label as music also contains this same property.
  o This seems to then be leading into a conversation about what we normatively label as containing this inherent “is” as being “is music”

124. If someone says “Now it’s a face for me”, then one can ask him: “What change are you alluding to?”
• This is the same for music, “Now it’s music for me” – would lead into a discussion of hearing as – now I hear this as a melody, harmony, etc or something.

125. I see two pictures, with the duck-rabbit surrounded by rabbits in one, by ducks in the other. I don’t notice that they are the same. Does it follow from this that I see something different in the two cases? – It gives us a reason for using this expression here.
126. “I saw it quite differently, I’d never have recognized it!” Now, that is an exclamation. And there is also a justification for it.
127. I’d never have thought of superimposing the heads in this way, of comparing them in this way. For they suggest a different mode of comparison.
  The head seen in this way hasn’t even the slightest similarity to the head seen in that way – although they are congruent.
• These sections are all thinking about the context in which something is presented, and in a heard experience, or in music this can be explored too
  o The same chord could be included in two different chord progressions
What about the same sounding chord that is spelled differently because of the musical context

- This would present an interesting twist on the visual/heard perceptions that I seem to be beginning to get into from earlier sections

128. I’m shown a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say “It’s a rabbit”. Not “Now it’s a rabbit”. I’m reporting my perception. – I’m shown the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I may say “It’s a duck-rabbit”. But I may also react to the question quite differently. – The answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a perception; the answer “Now it’s a rabbit” is not. Had I replied “It’s a rabbit”, the ambiguity would have escaped me, and I would have been reporting my perception.
- Here the difference between “the report of a perception” is made in opposition with the noticing of an aspect.
- This is a melody vs. Now I hear this as a melody

129. The change of aspect. “But surely you’d say that the picture has changed altogether now!”
But what is different: my impression? my attitude? – Can I say? I describe the change like a perception; just as if the object had changed before my eyes. |196|
130. “Ah, now I see this”, I might say (pointing to another picture, for example). This has the form of a report of a new perception.

The expression of a change of aspect is an expression of a new perception and, at the same time, an expression of an unchanged perception.

131. I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Where there were previously branches, now there is a human figure. My visual impression has changed, and now I recognize that it has not only shape and colour, but also a quite particular ‘organization’. – My visual impression has changed – what was it like before; what is it like now? - If I represent it by means of an exact copy – and isn’t that a good representation of it? - no change shows up.
132. And above all do not say “Surely, my visual impression isn’t the drawing; it is this – which I can’t show to anyone.” Of course it is not the drawing; but neither is it something of the same category, which I carry within myself.
- Distinguishing that with the noticing of a new aspect, there is a different perception, but yet the perception is still the same.
- “Visual impression has changed” – the “‘organization’” of the visual impression
- With the discovery of seeing something in a new way, there isn’t a way to communicate this information to another human – image cannot be copied to show the new aspect
- 132 says that the visual impression is not the seen image or the unique perception that gives the viewer the unique impression that is within themselves
- This all translates to music too – noticing a new aspect garners a different perception but also the same perception, the ‘organization’ of the hearing of the music,
  - What may be different between visual and heard experiences in the context of a rehearsal or lesson is when the performer is asked to play a certain passage in a certain way – in that what they played first was not “incorrect” but by playing it in a different manner, it will change the heard perception of whatever they are playing, the emphasis is placed differently.
What does emphasis mean or do here; how does it function? Does it function differently between visual and heard perceptions?

For visual could use emphasis in a drawing when attempting to give a description to another individual by making a copy but with emphasis. What does this mean?

But with a changing aspect, the case is altered. What before perhaps seemed, or even was, a useless specification once there was a copy, now becomes the only possible expression of the experience.

And this suffices to dispose of the comparison of ‘organization’ with colour and shape in the visual impression.

If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw such-and-such shapes and colours (I reproduce them in detail) – and, in addition, I saw something like this: [197] and here I point to a great variety of pictures of rabbits. – This shows the difference between the concepts.

‘Seeing as...’ is not part of perception. And therefore it is like seeing, and again not like seeing.

From this it would follow that ‘hearing as...’ is not part of perception, and that it is like hearing, and again not like hearing.

I look at an animal; someone asks me: “What do you see?” I answer: “A rabbit.” – I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim: “A rabbit!”

Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of perception and of visual experience. But the exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it is forced from us. – It stands to the experience somewhat as a cry to pain.

But since the exclamation is the description of a perception, one can also call it the expression of thought. – Someone who looks at an object need not think of it; but whoever has the visual experience expressed by the exclamation is also thinking of what he sees.

And that’s why the lighting up of an aspect seems half visual experience, half thought.

When seeing or hearing, one does not need to think of or about what they are seeing or hearing. However, once an exclamation is made about what someone hears or sees, thinking has gone into the equation. This is why aspect perception is both a visual or heard experience as well as being within thought.

Relating to the contexts in which visual experiences are had, which leads to the experience of seeing “different things”

Perhaps the having of different visual experiences, though the objects in the visual field are the same.

I meet someone whom I have not seen for years; I see him clearly, but fail to recognize him. Suddenly I recognize him, I see his former face in the altered one. I believe that I would portray him differently now if I could paint.
144. Now, when I recognize my acquaintance in a crowd, perhaps after looking in his direction for quite a while – is this a special sort of seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? Or a fusion of the two – as I would almost like to say?

   The question is: why does one want to say this? |198|

145. The very expression which is also a report of what is seen is here a cry of recognition.
   • Examples that are related to hearing and music would be of a song or tune that one hasn’t heard in many years, and may not recognize at first, until it gets to a certain place in the song, or it just clicks in their mind.
   • What does this mean for music that there is a temporal aspect to it? What does the inherent temporal aspect of music mean for the consumption of music vs. visual experiences that don’t rely as heavily on moving through time?

146. What is the criterion of the visual experience? – What should the criterion be?
   A representation of ‘what is seen’.

147. The concept of a representation of what is seen, like that of a copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen. The two are intimately connected. (Which is not to say that they are alike.)
   • Criterion for heard experience – being a representation of ‘what is heard’?
   • Need to figure out the differences between representation and copy, though they are “intimately connected”
     o What does this mean for heard experiences? As representations vs copies of heard experience may blend together more than in visual experiences/perceptions??

149. If someone sees a smile and does not recognize it as a smile, does not understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone who understands it? – He mimics it differently, for instance.
   • If someone hears a chord progression and does not recognize it as a chord progression, does not understand it as such, does he hear it differently from someone who understands it? - He mimics it differently, for instance.
     o Does this kind of translation work here? Best example? For someone to understand a chord progression, there’s a lot that must be done to get there..

150. Hold the drawing of a face upside down and you can’t recognize the expression of the face. Perhaps you can see that it is smiling, but not exactly what kind of smile it is. You cannot imitate the smile or describe its character more exactly.
   And yet the picture which you have turned round may be a most exact representation of a person’s face.
   • When looking at a musical score upside down, same effect may occur, is this based in visual experience or heard experience?
   • What about when an individual can look at a piece of music and hear what it is in their head without having to be at an instrument?

152. Imagine the duck-rabbit hidden in a tangle of lines. Now I suddenly notice it in the picture, and notice it simply as the head of a rabbit. At some later time, I look at the same picture and notice the same outline, but see it as a duck, without necessarily realizing that it was the same
outline both times. If I later see the aspect change—can I say that the duck and rabbit aspects are now seen quite differently from when I recognized the separately in the tangle of lines? No.

But the change produces a surprise not produced by the recognition.

- Is this same kind of thing possible with a heard experience? That there is a part of a piece that has the same format or properties as the duck-rabbit, three distinct impressions, being the duck, the rabbit, and the duck rabbit
  - There are opportunities where more than those 3 impressions are found in many musical examples... would this be a problem here? Or is the main focus here just on the changing aspect perception dependent on what the individual picks out?

153. If someone searches in a certain figure (call it Figure 1) for another figure (call it Figure 2), and then finds it, he sees Figure 1 in a new way. Not only can he give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure was a new visual experience.

- Imagine students engaged in a music theory course learning about chords. Before the Neapolitan 6 chord is introduced, and a chord progression is played that includes that chord, the student may just feel like it is a nice progression.
- In this same chord progression, once the students have learned about the N6 chord, and go searching for it, they then see the original chord progression in a new way, and they would also be able to give a new kind of description of the chord progression.
  - This example feels complicated and nuanced, because I’m imagining it not purely as a heard experience, but with the students also having a visual experience that correlates to what they’re hearing in the western tradition
  - Does having this heard and written example for music strengthen or detract from my argument?

154. But he wouldn’t necessarily want to say: “Figure 1 looks quite different now; there isn’t even any similarity to the figure I saw before, though they are congruent!”

- This would hold true in my proposed musical example above as well.

156. Then is the copy of the figure an incomplete description of my visual experience? No. – After all, whether, and what, more detailed specifications are necessary depends on the circumstances. – It may be an incomplete description – if some question still remains.

- Here is noted that the circumstance then creates whether or not more detailed specifications are necessary, not that the copy of the figure garners an incomplete description of the individual’s visual experience.

157. (excerpt) an impression is not simultaneously of a picture-duck and a picture-rabbit.

- What can be simultaneous is the recognition of the duality of the picture duck-rabbit figure
- In music, the recognition of the duality (or even more complex) role that a particular chord, note, or sequence of notes may have can be the thing that becomes simultaneous—I think...
  - I can see how this would be the case in the event that an individual was presented with sheet music, but would this also be the case if an individual was solely presented with a heard example? I feel like this is still true, but it seems like the temporal element of music is reappearing here.
The concept of seeing makes a tangled impression. Well that’s how it is. – I look at the landscape; my gaze wanders over it, I see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movements; this impresses itself sharply on me, that very hazily. How completely piecemeal what we see can appear! And now look at all that can be meant by “description of what is seen”! - But this just is what is called “description of what is seen”. There is not one genuine, proper case of such description – the rest just being unclear, awaiting clarification, or simply to be swept aside as rubbish.

Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions. – It is similar when one tries to explain the concept of a physical object in terms of ‘what is really seen’. – Rather, the everyday language-game is to be accepted, and false accounts of it characterized as false.

The primitive language-game which children are instructed in needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected.

- In these sections noted here, once it gets to a certain point, the foundation of the exploration we are doing here cannot be explored even further without making fine distinctions, which is characterized as being enormously dangerous by Wittgenstein. He argues that instead of doing that, everything simply rests upon the language games we have and participate in on an everyday basis in our society.
  - This feels a little like an excuse or cop out- however, what more could be done where that would not end up with this being the answer? Also, within all of the exploration we’ve done so far and up until this point, language games have not come into the equation yet, though they do play a large role in how we discuss seeing and seeing as, and hearing and hearing as.

- Presents aspects of a triangle

- Presents how one may be able to see such a triangle accompanied by the textual descriptions, the interpretations?

- But how is it possible to see an object according to an interpretation? - The question presents it as a strange fact; as if something had been pressed into a mould it did not really fit into. But no squeezing, no pressing, took place here.
  - Does interpretation lead into intent? Or is it simply ‘another’ word or the ‘improper’ word for seeing as?

A triangle can really be standing up in one picture, hanging in another, and in a third represent something fallen over – in such a way that I, who am looking at it, say, not “it may also represent something fallen over”, but “That glass has fallen over and is lying there in fragments”. This is how we react to the picture.

Could I say what a picture must be like to produce this effect? No. There are, for example, styles of painting which do not convey anything to me in this immediate way, but do to other people. I think custom and upbringing have a hand in this.

What does it mean to say that I ‘see the sphere floating in the air’ in a picture?

Is it enough that for me this description is the most suggestive, natural one? No; for it might be so for various reasons. It might, for instance, simply be the conventional description.
• These sections showcase how one’s environment/culture will influence how one may see or experience certain visual inputs
• This could be a good place to insert talking points about western/tonal music and how I’m primarily not(?) discussing musics of other cultures or traditions

172. “And is it really a different impression?” - In order to answer this, I’d like to ask myself whether there is really something different there in me. But how can I ascertain this? - I describe what I see differently.
• How one describes an experience helps to determine whether one is experiencing the same impression or a different impression.

174. And then it is strange that with some drawings our impression should be something flat, and with others something three-dimensional. One wonders, “Where is this going to end?”
• There is a certain amount of context and knowledge needed to garner the impressions we do from the things we experience.
• This does not necessarily mean that one with knowledge will have a ‘correct’ impression, or that someone without this knowledge will have an ‘incorrect’ impression
• Also, while there could be correct or incorrect impressions of a visual or auditory experience, at the same time, there really wouldn’t be correct or incorrect impressions or descriptions of what an individual experienced.
  o While an individual’s experience may not match other people’s experiences, or the general consensus of what something is like, this does not necessarily mean that is incorrect, it’s more that it just doesn’t match what is usually perceived, and is the norm.
• However, we in a society or culture would be able to say that an impression or description of a visual or auditory experience could be ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ – but this seems to be playing more into the constructs of beauty and whatnot
  o But would this thought play into 173.? In that it relates to drawings we see as 2D vs 3D, and how 3D drawings are still always going to be presented in a flat manner

175. When I see the picture of a galloping horse – do I only know that this is the kind of movement meant? Is it superstition to think I see the horse galloping in the picture? – And does my visual impression gallop too?
• This seems to be asking if there is a kind of furthering of a perception we have with prior knowledge about what it may be representing
• For music, I feel like a similar thing could be if one was listening to a familiar chord progression, and knew how it was going to move, or guessed how it was going to move before it did, or even just had an understanding of how it played out

176. What does anyone tell me by saying “Now I see it as...”? What consequences has this information? What can I do with it?
• Important? Does Wittgenstein answer this question later?
178. Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we use the words “You have to see it like this, this is how it is meant”; “When you see it like this, you see where it goes wrong”; “You have to hear these bars as an introduction”; “You must listen out for this key”; “You must phrase it like this” (which can refer to hearing as well as to playing).
- Hearing as and auditory experiences are directly referenced here!
- Interesting that he says “this is how it is meant” in one of the exchanges, as this begins to scratch the surface of intention

180. What does it amount to if I look at a drawing in descriptive geometry and say: “I know that this line appears again here, but I can’t see it like that”? Does it simply amount to a lack of facility in operating with the drawing, that I don’t ‘know my way about’ all that well? – Such facility is certainly one of our criteria. What convinces us that someone is seeing the drawing three-dimensionally is a certain kind of ‘knowing one’s way about’: certain gesture, for instance, which indicate the three-dimensional relations – fine shades of behavior.

I see that an animal in a picture is transfixed by an arrow. It has struck it in the throat, and sticks out at the back of the neck. Let the picture be a silhouette. – Do you see the arrow – or do you merely know that these two bits are supposed to represent part of an arrow?

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
- All feel important, but need to know what the interpenetrating hexagon figure is, what does this look like?
  - Hopefully that will help with my understanding of more of the underlying meaning here.

187. The best description I can give of what was shown me for a moment is this: ...

“The impression was that of a rearing animal.” So a perfectly specific description was given. – Was it seeing, or was it a thought?
- These sections also though tie back into the point/questions I was asking earlier about how knowledge may play into a person’s description/s of their experiences. For even if a person has knowledge, wouldn’t they still need to utilize thought to access this knowledge?
- Relevant for both visual experiences and auditory experiences
- May also play into discourse about a skilled listener or a trained listener of music vs an untrained listener
  - How is the same experience perceived by an untrained ear vs a trained or highly trained ear, and what does this mean and how does it relate to the knowledge and thought process brought up here

188. Don’t try to analyse the experience within yourself.
- This seems to be relating back to the earlier passage where Wittgenstein rested everything on the language games that are a part of our culture and society, in that here it
feels like there is a point where one must just take their perceived experiences for what they perceived them as?

189. Of course, I might also have seen the picture first as something different, and then have said to myself “Oh, it’s two hexagons!” So the aspect would have altered. And does this prove that I in fact saw it as something specific?

- Not sure how to answer the question posed here.
- But, the same situation as described here can also happen in music, hear a piece of music as first something different, and then realize, and say to oneself, Oh it’s (insert name of piece here).

190. “Is it a genuine visual experience?” The question is: in what way is it one?

- Relates to 188.

191. Here it is difficult to see that what is at issue is determination of concepts. What forces itself on one is a concept. (You must not forget that.)

- Determination of concepts here gives a phrase/name to ideas explored earlier of the seeing/thinking dilemma.
- Could relate here to recognition of patterns which would play heavily into music, and how we tend to like to hear things, the way music is organized, etc.

192. When should I call it just knowing, not seeing? - Perhaps when someone treats the picture as a working drawing, reads it like a blueprint. (Fine shades of behavior. – Why are they important? They have important consequences.)

- This provides more answers and insight about how to engage and treat sheet music. For one does not necessarily see sheet music, other than in the recognition of seeing that an object is sheet music, or seeing something as music.
- The distinction between seeing and reading is noted here.
  - For music, one does not see music usually (synesthesia being outlier, acknowledge, but don’t engage – not my point). One is able to read music, but this is then not seeing, but reading. However with this reading of music, there still may be a auditory component. In that for me, when I read music, I can hear what it sounds like without needing to produce any sound. I’m hearing what the written music represents all in my head.
- Important to keep this passage in mind – and the fine shades of behavior, with the words used to describe activities.

193. “To me it is an animal transfixed by an arrow.” That is what I treat it as; this is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it a case of ‘seeing’.

- The attitude towards a perception.
- Attitude representing grounded opinion (?) truth? about what was perceived.

194. I don’t understand this section
195. You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as opposed to working drawings) play in our lives. This role is by no means a uniform one.

A comparison: proverbs are sometimes hung on a wall. But not theorems of mechanics. (Our attitude to these two things.)
- Music presented at a concert vs. music heard in rehearsal spaces? Or elevator music or something similar, that is not intended to be the main focus of a person’s perceptions.

196. From someone who sees the drawing as such-and-such an animal, what I expect will be rather different from what I expect from someone who merely knows what it is meant to represent.
- Levels of education or knowledge again referenced here. Would play into the trained listener/ear vs untrained listener/ear.
- Here also expectations are thrown into the mix – expectations of other individual’s perceptions based upon what they do or do not possess in knowledge.

197. Perhaps the following expression would have been better: we *view* the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the very object (the man, landscape, and so on) represented in it.
- A new word being used instead of seeing: viewing.
- Referencing 192 – the fine shades of behavior; how we approach an experience, how we would categorize our approach.
- Differences between hear and listen?
  - This distinction gives shades of behavior to auditory experiences.

198. 199. 200. 201.
- All provide clarification, of 197. May not be necessary to include in discussion.

203. “Now I see it as a ...” goes with “I am trying to see it as a ...”, or “I still can’t see it as a ...”. But I cannot try to see a conventional picture of a lion *as* a lion, any more than an F as that letter (though I may well try to see it as a gallows, for example).
- Reiterating and clarifying that an object cannot be seen as itself, for it already is itself inherently. Can see the object as other things, however.
- This could be argued to be less clear in music, depending on the viewpoint and perspective of whom you’re talking to, and what auditory experience you are discussing.
- At the same time, when considering the western tradition, there are unarguable objects of melody, harmony, and note that when taken in the customary tradition of music cannot be anything but their objects
  - Yet one could still hear a note as a frequency, or hear a diminished fifth as an augmented fourth – though it was written as a dim5.

204. Do not ask yourself: “How does it work with *me*?” - Ask: “What do I know about someone else?”
- Elaborates on 188.
209. But the expression in one’s voice and gestures is the same as if the object had altered and had ended by becoming this or that.

I have a theme played to me several times and each time in a slower tempo. Eventually I say “Now it’s right”, or “Now at last it’s a march”, “Now at last it’s a dance”. – In this tone of voice the lighting up of an aspect is also expressed. [207]

- Here shows how aspects can light up in a musical example – during a lesson.
- I had not yet considered this kind of aspect in a musical context, didn’t think it was an aspect.
- Need to remember to consider this for work that’s previous? to this section

210. ‘Fine shades of behavior.’ – When my understanding of a theme is expressed by my whistling it with the correct expression, this is an example of such fine shades.

- Reiteration about fine shades of behavior focused on a musical example
- “correct expression” could also use this as a jumping off point into intent? For what really is “correct expression” when one goes further than the usual thought process

211. The aspects of the triangle: it is as if an idea came into contact, and for a time remained in contact, with the visual impression.

- Note here the use of the word “idea.” How will this be further explored, and what will this be shown to mean in our contexts?

214. (The temptation to say “I see it like this”, pointing to the same thing for “it” and “this”). Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you don’t notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.

- I’m following that one must get rid of the idea of a private object, but why must we be rid of the private object in this way?
  - Is this at all relevant to my discussion? Maybe not.

215. Those two aspects of the double cross (I shall call them A aspects) might be reported simply by pointing alternately to a free-standing white and a free-standing black cross.

- Indeed, one could imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child, even before he could talk.
  (So in reporting A aspects, a part of the double cross is indicated. – The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an analogous way.)

- Want to pull from here that the double cross image is fundamentally different from the duck-rabbit figure. Yet for both images, the image can be seen as one thing and then seen as another thing, but the seeing as functions differently(?) because of the nature of the object of sight.
- Find a relevant musical example, what would be most congruent even with translating to music; harmony vs melody?

216. Only someone conversant with the shapes of the two animals can ‘see the duck-rabbit aspects’. There is no analogous conditions for seeing A aspects.

217. Someone can take the duck-rabbit simply for the picture of a rabbit, the double cross simply for the picture of a black cross, but not the bare triangular figure for the picture of an object that has fallen over. To see this aspect of the triangle demands imagination. \[208\]

- Introduction of the concept of imagination in seeing as cases.
- Hinting that a certain amount of creativity is required in seeing things in certain ways?
- Can discuss here that hearing as in music may require or demand a certain level of imagination and (creativity?) because of the nature of some sounds in music (barking dog in Vivaldi – doesn’t sound very much like a barking dog to me vs. birdsong or Sleigh Ride neigh by trumpet vs. sampling sounds in music)

218.

- Illusion? Does this do anything in music? Worth discussing?

219. I can see the schematic cube as a box – but can I also see it now as a paper, now as a tin box? - What ought I to say, if someone assured me he could? - I can draw a conceptual boundary here.

Yet think of the expression “felt” in connection with looking at a picture. (“One feels the softness of that material.”) (Knowing in dreams. “And I knew that ... was in the room.”)

- I’m not understanding the first bit of the section, or I may just not agree with Wittgenstein here
- “I can draw a conceptual boundary here” I’m not understanding what this boundary is, am skeptical that it exists. For while we can only know how we perceive things, and can never know how others perceive anything except through how they tell us.
- I’m following with what the second part of this section says.

220. One kind of aspect might be called ‘organizational aspects’. When the aspect changes, parts of the picture belong together which before did not.

- This in a way is how I’ve always conceptualized aspect perception as a whole and in general.
- Also applies to music, especially if you are looking to pick out or listen carefully to different parts (aspects) of a piece, hearing (a certain instrument) as being in the forefront; you are organizing your perception of the music in a different way.

221.

- Important? Not sure

222. In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base – now this as apex, that as base. – Clearly the words “Now I am seeing this as the apex” cannot so far have any significance for a learner who has only just met the concepts of apex, base, and so on. – But I do not mean this as an empirical proposition.

Only of someone capable of making certain applications of the figure with facility would one say that he saw it now this way, now that way.

The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique.

- Notes here that in order for some seeing as perceptions, the individual must have a baseline “mastery of a technique” in that they must have knowledge or experience in the field or situation they are being asked to perform the seeing as.
This plays into earlier thoughts about the untrained vs trained ear (untrained vs trained eye). The need for a kind of necessary background before ‘higher-level’ cognitions about the subject can be created.

223. But how odd for this to be the logical condition of someone’s having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don’t say that one ‘has toothache’ only if one is capable of doing such-and-such. – From this it follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different concept, even though related. [209]

Then there are experiences that people are capable of having even if they are not capable of creating them

The toothache is someone anyone is capable of having under the right circumstances, but is not one that is generally created by the person

Seeing aspects, or hearing aspects are experiences that only people who are capable of creating them can have

- What is this reliant on? Is it only based upon knowledge and the background that would create ‘higher-level’ cognitions to be possible?

224. Only of someone who can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, does it makes sense to say that he has had this experience.

And if this sounds silly, you need to remember that the concept of seeing is modified here. (A similar consideration is often needed to dispel a feeling of dizziness in mathematics.)

We talk, we produce utterances, and only later get a picture of their life.

So within this section Wittgenstein is pointing back to the fact that he is really exploring language and the language-games of society. While the focus may seem like it is on the experiences that the language is describing, the discussion is really on the language and the way that it’s used to describe those experiences.

This applies to both the discussions on visual experiences and auditory experiences, as the connection that allows them to be so interconnected and related here, ultimately is the language.

225. How could I see that this posture was hesitant before I know that it was a posture, and not the anatomy of the creature?

But doesn’t that mean only that I couldn’t then use this concept, which doesn’t refer solely to what is visual, to describe what is seen? – Couldn’t I, for all that, have a purely visual concept of that hesitant posture, that timid face?

Here (and I’m not sure exactly how to explain it) is the direction of focus to extra-perceptual content; what feels like that could maybe be extra-musical content, but of a visual perception

It’s all about the meaning that’s given to it because the image or object (not right words) being perceived contains more than just what is visible at face value. There is this context that only those who are in on it, and have insider knowledge, are a part of the language game, can recognize and fully understand.

But being able to explain how or why they are able to know this is something that is impossible? Until one has become a part of this language game or insider circle or what have you.
Like the way that people communicate through text today on the internet- at a certain point you must be a part of the community to understand how to communicate “properly”
  - You can’t read an article that would explain how people communicate to fully understand how it works in the way that it would be describe if such an article was written, you’d have to become an insider to understand

In music, this seems like it could be linked to how a musician approaches their instrument? Like how their posture may or may not affect their playing before they’ve made any sound vs. not being a part of this world and having no clue what’s going on when a person holding an instrument is seen

Such a concept would then be comparable to the musical concepts of ‘major’ and ‘minor’, which certainly have emotive value, but can also be used solely to describe a perceived structure.

- What does he mean here by “perceived structure”? Does this refer to the “structure” of the emotive content of a musical piece? This doesn’t seem quite right/to make complete sense.
- But this is a great example. For when we teach children about major and minor (or really anyone who’s new to analyzing or learning about music for the first time), we quantify major as happy and minor as sad. Examples of music are presented that are in major keys, and the students are taught to associate these kinds of heard experiences to the emotion of (state of being) of happy. And they are also taught to associate minor heard experiences with the emotions or feelings of sadness? On the surface this may seem to make sense, but as you think about it more, and quantify more musical examples, it gets very complicated, and it actually turns out to not be true. This truth is emphasized in the next section.

The epithet “sad”, as applied, for example, to the face of a stick-figure, characterizes the grouping of lines in an oval. Applied to a human being, it has a different (though related) meaning. (But this does not mean that a sad facial expression is similar to the feeling of sadness!)

- For just as sad may be applied to a frowning face and happy be applied to a smiling face (and as there are the musical equivalents of major/minor) it does not mean that the sad facial expression denotes sadness.
- A stick figure with relevant happy/sad expressions as expressed here is like the simple major=happy, minor=sad equivalencies in music. For soon after the basic concept has been learned that allow the student to identify minor from major by utilizing the happy/sad distinction, the next step would to continue the analysis of why things sound “sad” or “happy” which would lead to whether the third in the scale was lowered or not. Eventually, the goal would be that the individual would not identify whether a key was major or minor based upon whether or not it sounded sad or it sounded happy, but based upon what chords/scale degrees were used in whatever they were listening to.
- Then if a piece or melody in a minor key doesn’t sound sad, what does it sound like? For there can be many moods expressed by minor, but at the same time, one could argue that for each different key or mode there could be different associations. But in response to this, I would also argue that it would also depend on the type of content presented in the key or mode. For there is a bigger difference between Db minor and A major than there is between A major and E major- thinking here not only about relative majors and
minors, but also keys that are close together in their tonal range. Not to mention also the horrific way that Db minor would be written on the page; if the same thing was written in C# minor, it would still be not fun to read, but would not have a double sharp the way Db minor has a double flat. But thinking about these keys enharmonically, on the written page and on some (most?) instruments, playing/reading in either of these keys may be very uncomfortable, especially when the playing is heavily, if not completely influenced by the read music. But singing in either of these keys is not a problem at all, and on some instruments may be a breeze if one does not have to think about the key in which they are playing, and are only thinking about the relationships between the notes they are playing or the overarching melodic or harmonic arc.

- In my personal opinion, beginning in the context of Irish reel dance tunes, I often prefer the ones in minor keys, and don’t like the ones that are in major keys nearly as much. Yet, just as Wittgenstein notes that a “sad” facial expression as applied to a human face is not limited to mean that the feeling of the person is sad, these tunes in minor I don’t find to be sad at all. In fact, I find some of them more interesting and “better” than tunes of similar or equivalent complexity that are in major keys.
  - If including this bit about tunes, need to insert examples here to further the argument.

- In thinking about this further, as I’ve already noted above, it’s not about the complexity of the tune itself that makes the difference. In many of the minor tunes I like, the tune is not only in a minor key, which allows for the use of the leading tone in interesting and leading ways (excuse the pun) but the key also allows for harmonies that sound more interesting than just the major I IV V that are most often utilized in major keys for many tunes. In minor, these chords become i iv and V, which already provides more interest because it’s not all major all the time.
  - Does this have something to do with the way that conflict is more “interesting” to us than not? It may not be the conflict itself that is more interesting, but the resolution of this conflict creates more interest than when there is no conflict at all. In that all stories end when the conflict has been resolved – the presentation of a conflict with then a resolution provide the baseline for how most stories, novels, movies, etc are plotted out.
  - Music doesn’t inherently have this same structure, but in musics that tell a story, like operas, etc, this formula also is utilized. However, in music more in general, it is smaller chunks that make up a more complex view of this conflict/resolution. It is the measures that get grouped into phrases that give the baseline of how the melodic and harmonic shape form tensions that usually resolve.

228. Think of this too: I can only see, not hear, red and green – but to the extent to which I can see sadness, I can also hear it.

- What about those with synesthesia? What does that bring to this argument? For some can hear color. Or at least relate color to heard experiences.
  - It would be good to clarify the differences between these kinds of experiences, and try to quantify what actually happens in some capacity?

- “to the extent to which I can see sadness, I can also hear it.”
  - Is this comparison really accurate? How do we see sadness? For we see actions and movements that we have learned over time to often correlate to feelings of
sadness. We also learn how to read people of these emotions by getting to know them better, and by also getting to know more people to see the commonalities between people in general – the social norms of how/why/when people express sadness.

- In some of the same ways is how we learn to hear sadness. In the case of a song with lyrics, the sadness more prominent? For the lyrics convey more? Meaning than just instrumentals would. But the kind of accompaniment and the kind of melody those lyrics are put to would create a correlation between the emotive content of a song and what the song actually sounds like. Once one has heard a number of songs with similar emotional content, a norm is come up with and can be applied to other songs even if one would not be able to understand the lyrics. Yet this doesn’t help to explain the wide variety of genres that have styles that don’t have lyrics in them. But many of the characteristics that a sad or melancholy pop song may utilize can be found in styles that don’t have lyrics. Something being slow and minor often conveys some kind of sadness whether the music has lyrics or not.

229. Just think of the expression “I heard a plaintive melody”! And now the question is: “Does he hear the plaint?”

- But if the melody is a “plaintive melody” how does the grammar of this work? Is the plaintiveness somehow a feature that can be taken away from a melody? It seems like this is not the case, that the plaintiveness of a given melody is an integral part of the melody; a piece that cannot be taken away to examine it further and then be returned; it’s all a package deal. With this in mind, the question, “Does he hear the plaint?” seems to be misleading, as a better question would be “Does he hear the plaintive quality that the melody possesses?” For the “plaint” that a melody may possess feels like an element that can only describe the melody, and not something that could be directly identified or be pulled out from to be examined like its own element.

230. And if I reply: “No, he doesn’t hear it, he merely senses it” – where does that get us? One cannot even specify a sense-organ for this ‘sensing’.

- Some would now like to reply: “Of course I hear it!” – Others: ‘I don’t really hear it.” However, it is possible here to discern conceptual differences.

- What does Wittgenstein mean here by “conceptual differences”?

- One cannot specify a sense-organ for this ‘sensing’ because the information that we would take in from this kind of experience feels to me like it has more to do with how we internally process the information that we garner from our senses, as opposed to coming directly to us from our senses.

- For in the case where someone is only experiencing auditory stimulation, and has their other senses blocked, (e.g. smells of nothing, there’s nothing to feel to enhance the experience, eyes closed, not eating or drinking anything) one can still relate this experience to others that they have had previously and use what they know by contextualizing this new information as best they can with what they have already gathered.

- One could also argue against this situation by saying that depriving the other senses also creates a distinct impression and experience, perhaps they’d remember
having their eyes closed/not being able to see anything and that creates a wholly new experience, or that whatever taste in their mouth that is that moment’s “neutral” also makes something of the experience.

- I would then say that this is all true. However, it is the combination of all the sense-organs experiences that create the multi-faceted sensing that provides so much for each experience. It is not that there isn’t a sense-organ to provide data for this ‘sensing,’ it’s that they all work together to create the ‘sensing’ that the individual experiences at that specific and particular time.

231. We react to a facial expression differently from someone who does not recognize it as timid (in the full sense of the word). – But I do not want to say here that we feel this reaction in our muscles and joints, and that this is the ‘sensing’. – No, what we have here is a modified concept of sensing.

- In the full sense of what word? Timid?
- “modified concept of sensing”

232. One might say of someone that he was blind to the expression of a face. Would his eyesight on that account be defective?

But this, of course, is not simply a question for physiology. Here the physiological is a symbol of the logical.

- “the physiological is a symbol of the logical”
  - What exactly does this mean?
- If someone was blind to the expression of a face, this really has less to do with defective eyesight, and more to do with how the expression is seen (is interpreted) is seen as. If one possesses the knowledge has experience with reading people, and knowing what facial expressions often correlate to which emotions that would be described of the person who’s making the face, one would likely be better at reading faces, being less blind to the expression of the face. However, being able to read people like this is also similar to the case of what distinguishes noise from music, in that different cultures and even just different places there may be differences that could confuse the reader of the face. For cultural customs and traditions vary throughout the world, and while most baseline emotions and the reactions may be similar in an internal manner, the way that people have been conditioned to express them in society may be completely different, and could be misleading as an outsider looks on.

233. What does someone who senses the solemnity of a melody perceive? Nothing that could be conveyed by repetition of what was heard.

- Here, Wittgenstein is attempting to note that the solemnity of a melody is not something that could be conveyed to a listener just by a repeat of the music. Instead, the solemnity of a piece is in a way contained within the listener, in that that was the way they heard the melody as. If someone is not hearing the solemnity of a piece or melody, a repetition of what was heard to have the solemnity will not help this listener. Like with aspect perception, here another individual could attempt to explain how one could listen to the melody to perceive the solemnity that they themselves are hearing, but it is more likely that this would be a situation where some may be and feel very impacted by the
solemnity of the melody, while others may not notice this aspect of it at all, and won’t be able to hear it either.

- It feels here as if I’m getting into a much more difficult place, as I am wanting to argue for the personal preference and life experience that does not allow for the same things to be felt or experienced in the exact same way.
- Yet this is also a problem as it refutes some of my earlier statements that are in fact attempting to show that we can perceive certain objects in the same ways or ways that are similar enough to allow for individuals to bond over how they feel that they are able to see or hear or experience something as someone else does.
  - This reminds me of a passage from Ann Patchett’s *This is a Story of a Happy Marriage* where she remarks that as a writer, even though she has not experienced many of the things she hears about or may write about, it is likely that she has experienced different events that give way to similar emotional content. And in remembering this, she feels that she can better empathize and better write about a variety of stories that may appear vastly different from one another, when really the heart of the emotionally felt content is rather similar.

234. I can imagine some arbitrary cipher – this, for instance, to be a strictly correct letter of some foreign alphabet. Or again, to be a faultily written one, and faulty in this way or that: for example, it might be slapdash, or typical childish awkwardness, or, like the flourishes in an official document. It could deviate from the correctly written letter in a variety of ways. – And according to the fiction with which I surround it, I can see it in various aspects. And here there is a close kinship with ‘experiencing the meaning of a word’.
  - “experiencing the meaning of a word”? I’m confused by this statement. Does he mean that you can experience the meaning of a word in various aspects, thereby giving more nuance and specificity to the word in that context and to the word itself, but this “extra” knowledge is needed to see these fine shades of grammar?

235. It is almost as if ‘seeing the sign in this context’ were an echo of a thought.
  “The echo of a thought in sight” – one would like to say.
  - “an echo of a thought”
  - This feels misleading? For if you’re taking an experience just how it is with only your current knowledge and perception of the world and therefore the experience is just that, your experience what is this? As it seems that the “echo of a though in sight” is describing when you are consciously seeing the sign in a context that was introduced to you and was not part of that individual’s repertoire so to speak.

236. Imagine a physiological explanation of the experience. Let it be this: When we look at the figure, our eyes scan it repeatedly, always following a particular path. The path corresponds to a particular pattern of oscillation of the eyeballs in looking. It can happen that one such pattern switches to another, and that the two alternate (A aspects). Certain patterns of movement are physiologically impossible; so, for example, I cannot see the schematic cube as two interpenetrating prisms. And so on. Let this be the explanation. – “Yes, now I realize that it is a kind of seeing.” – You have now introduced a new, a physiological, criterion for seeing. And this can conceal the old problem, but not solve it. – The purpose of this remark, however, was to
bring out what happens when a physiological explanation is offered. The psychological concept hangs out of reach of this explanation. And this makes the nature of the problem clearer.

• What was the “old problem”?

237. I’d like to say that what lights up here lasts only as long as I am occupied with the observed object in a particular way. (“See how it’s looking!”) – ‘I’d like to say’ – and is it so? - Ask yourself, “How long am I struck by a thing?” - How long is it new to me?

238. There is a physiognomy in the aspect, which then fades away. It is almost as if there were a face there which at first I imitate, and then accept without imitating it. – And isn’t this really explanation enough? - But isn’t it too much?

239. “I noticed the likeness between him and his father for a few minutes, and then no longer.” - One might say this if his face were changing, and only looked like his father’s for a short time. But it can also mean that, after a few minutes, I stopped being struck by the likeness.

• Noting that how a new experience strikes the observer, yet this “new” experience is only “new” for so long, before it becomes part of the normalcy that just is.

240. “Once the likeness had struck you, how long were you conscious of it?” How might one answer this question? - “I soon stopped thinking about it”, or “It struck me again from time to time”, or “‘I several times had the thought, how like they are!'”, or “I marveled at the likeness for at least a minute.” – This is more or less what the answers would look like.

• Yes, this feels right.

241. I’d like to put the question: “Am I conscious of the three-dimensionality, the depth of an object (of this cupboard, for instance), the whole time I see it?” Do I, so to speak, feel it the whole time? [211] - But put the question in the third person. – When would you say of someone that he was conscious of it the whole time? And when the opposite? - Of course, one could ask him – but how did he learn how to answer such a question? - He knows what it means “to feel pain continuously”. But that will only confuse him here (as it confuses me).

If he now says that he is continuously conscious of the depth – do I believe him? And if he says that he is conscious of it only from time to time (for example, when talking about it) - do I believe that? These answers will strike me as resting on a false foundation. – It will be different if he says that the object sometimes seems to him flat, sometimes three-dimensional.

• Perhaps there’s an element of being conscious of what we need to know based on when we need to know it or utilize the information? For while I understand that my closet is a three-dimensional space, and while I’m aware that I can put things into my closet with it being a three-dimensional space, I also am presented with a different visual impression when my closet it closed. When my closet is closed, I am aware more that I have utilized hooks on the door to store more things by hanging. I still know that there is space within that is being utilized by my clothes and shoes, but I am also not aware of exactly how bit it is/how small it is in that I can be fooled with how many things I am able to actually fit neatly inside vs how many things then have to be shoved in as space is running out.

• It seems like this passage is referencing what we experience with sighted experiences where we think an object will fit in a space, and it either does with tons of room to spare, or it doesn’t fit after all – showing that we don’t always have the best spatial judgement of objects and whether or not they will fit into other spaces.
On one hand, an individual could legitimately be bad at guessing/estimating distance/space, but on the other, with reasoning I find more interesting, is that we don’t judge objects to be the size they really are, but instead place other subjective factors onto them that make them seem in our heads to be larger/smaller than they actually are. Familiarity with objects and also correlating their sizes to a standardized measurement or other objects makes this process less subjective with the experience of what fits where, or what object correlates with what measurement on a ruler.

242. Someone tells me: “I looked at the flower, but was thinking of something else and was not conscious of its colour.” Do I understand this? - I can imagine a significant context, say his going on: “Then I suddenly saw it, and realized it was the colour which ... “
Or again: “If I had turned away then, I could not have said what colour it was.”
“He looked at it without seeing it.” - There is such a thing. But what is the criterion for it? - Well, there is a variety of cases here.

• All of these examples seem reasonable and valid. It is also important to note that it is noted that there are a “variety of cases” for there are so many possibilities for this kind of thing to happen in a myriad of contexts and situations. In the sighted experiences that are described above, and in musical cases that I can also think of, it seems to me that there is an acute focus or lack of focus on the subject of the experience the individual is having. For when the individual looks at the flower, even though they may be experiencing and seeing the flower’s color, they are not actively thinking about it, and therefore this information is not making it into the brain. If one does not

• If information is not acquired by the brain, it is impossible for the brain to then be able to remember it. We/our brains ignore so much of what we see every day, because we are simply concentrating on the more important things. What the brain values to be important though, may not actually be important depending on what information you’re being asked to recall. The brain also picks up on what to pay attention to from past experiences, instead of actively constantly trying to figure out what is most important in every situation.

243. “Just now I looked at the shape rather than at the colour.” Do not let such turns of phrase confuse you. Above all, don’t wonder “What might be going on in the eyes or brain here?”

• Why shouldn’t we wonder about what might/would be going on in the eyes or the brain?

244. The likeness strikes me, and its striking me fades.

The likeness only struck me for a few minutes, and then no longer did.

What happened here? – What can I recall? My own facial expression comes to mind; I could reproduce it. If someone who knew me had seen my face, he would have said, “Something about his face struck you just now”. – There further occurs to me what I say on such an occasion out loud or just to myself. And that is all. – And is this what being struck is? No. These are the manifestations of being struck; but they are ‘what happens’.

245. Is being struck looking + thinking? No. Many of our concepts cross here.

• This at first seems like a very simple section, but it actually is very complex.

Wittgenstein is refuting the claim that “being struck” is just the addition of looking plus
thinking. It may at first seem like that’s what being struck is, but it is so much more than that, plus it has so much more nuance and complexity as well. This is sort of elaborated on in previous sections, but it would be good here to sum up and create argument for what this really means, and how “many of our concepts cross here.”
Works Cited

