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## A Study of National Unification: What Factors Led to the Divergent Post-Unification Histories of Yemen, Germany, and Vietnam and in What Ways Were They Successful?

Wilson Franklin Brehmer  
*Bard College*

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*A Study of National Unification: What Factors Led to the Divergent  
Post-Unification Histories of Yemen, Germany, and Vietnam and in  
What Ways Were They Successful?*

Senior Project submitted to  
The Division of Social Studies  
of Bard College

by

Wilson Brehmer

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

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*This project is dedicated to my family for encouraging me and believing in me during every step of my education*

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In the 20th century, the nations of Yemen, Vietnam, and Germany have all experienced unification or re-unification. Although these three states are located on separate continents and came together through different means, there are many features in common regarding their decisions to unify and the motives behind them. The post-unification histories of these states have been extremely varied. The old borders between the formerly separate states may not be physically present but there are divides between the two sides in each case that did not evaporate after the unifications. Yemen and Germany, unified both in 1990 through a purely political process highlighting the thawing of Cold War hostilities. Previously in Vietnam, these Cold War political divisions tore the state apart until the victorious North was able to unify the nation through war in 1976. The experiences of each of these states since unification are impacted by the way they came together and how they dealt with creating one state out of two. The immediate aftermath of unification in Vietnam saw mass injustices perpetrated by the victorious North over the defeated South. Since unification, Yemen has suffered a civil war, loss of territory to AQAP and the Houthis, a revolution ousting the President, and most recently a coup d'état that has turned into another civil war and an international crisis. Germany has had a relatively peaceful post-unification experience. The success of unification is dependent on many variables and while it may be impossible to create an all-encompassing rule for how and when to unify, we can look back at these cases and make claims about why certain regional divisions remain relevant decades after unification.

The goal of this project is to determine, from the contexts of the unifying states, their goals, degree of homogeneity, and unification process, what factors have the greatest impact on the “success of a unification.” Why do some national unifications succeed while others fail?



## **Methodology**

This paper will use a comparative case-study approach to investigate what aspects of the unification process are most important to a nation's success. The case-study method is more desirable in this study than other methods for a variety of reasons. This is an observational study so the other prominent option for carrying out this paper is a large-n study. A large-n study is less useful considering how few national unifications have occurred in the past century. There are simply not enough recent unifications to justify the use of a large-n study. This is one constraint that makes studying national unifications difficult. There have not been a large amount of unifications in modern history so the lessons learned may rely too heavily on the few cases that exist. The recentness is necessary for creating a theory that has applications now and in the future. The temporal proximity of the cases chosen eliminates many unmeasurable variables that would come out of comparing the 1990 unification of Yemen with the late 19th century unifications of Italy or Germany. The unification of the three nations chosen occurred within the same 14 years and so lessens the impact of difficult-to-quantify variables such as the state of the international community at the time of unification, military technological advances, and emergence of new crucial and valuable resources (oil). Therefore, a case study of three temporally clustered unifications all under the shadow of the Cold War is a useful for isolating the most important indicators of a successful unification. The decision to use three cases will allow for more analysis of patterns of unification that one case would not be able to provide. Widening the amount of cases would require using unifications that occurred in a vastly different world context. This would create a whole host of issues when analyzing the cases together due to the contextual disconnect. While three cases are not an impressive number when trying to find patterns of unification, many political phenomena lack a plethora of examples; revolutions and nuclear weapons acquisitions to name a few.

Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen have been chosen because all three experienced unification around the same time but went about it in different ways and with varying degrees of success. Additionally, all three nations were subject to the pressures of the Cold War, which defined each half of the state by its relationship with the Western powers or the Soviet Bloc. There are not many other cases, if any, that fit the guidelines of occurring in the recent past and having experienced a national unification.

The majority of the information gathering will be secondary sources analyzing the unifications and theoretical papers on unification and integration theory. There will also be some primary sources in the form of the constitutions of the new unified states and government documents dictating the process. Additionally there will be interviews, speeches and correspondence from the leaders involved in the unification process and media reports covering the nations before and after unification occurs.

### Literature Review

#### *Political Unification/Integration Theories*

There is a vast literature that studies national unification and political integration that I will use to coherently map out these processes of national unification. The varying theories separate the unification/integration process differently and value certain aspects over others. Amitai Etzioni's *A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification*, is one of the more often referenced works in this field and provides an organizational framework of unification in which the variables of each case can be input. Etzioni sees political unification as happening in four distinct stages; 1. The Pre-Unification State, 2. The Unification Process: Integrating Forces, 3. The Unification Process: Integrating Sectors, and 4. The Termination State. These main stages have sub-stages that allow for many variables relevant to any specific unification to be placed. A work by Etzioni a few years later (1965) writes on how to measure the degree of integration within a newly unified state. This later work by Etzioni claims there are three dimensions of political integration available to a political community.

(a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (though it may 'delegate' some of this control to member units); (b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens<sup>1</sup>

These three dimensions are useful for determining the extent to which two states have unified or integrated. Independent from the overall *success* of unification, this approach lets us know if a state is less integrated than we understand it to be and could help in locating the origin of some post-unification phenomena. For instance, if a major issue in a unified state is the failure of part of its population to submit to and acknowledge the authority of the government, this could be traced back to either a specific feature of the unification process or simply the failure to fully unify all dimensions of the states.

*Divided Nations and Reunification Strategies* (Jo and Walker) focuses on the level of integration across multiple levels of the newly unified state. Published in 1972 it makes many predictions regarding the process of reunifying Germany and the prospect of creating one Korea. Using Etzioni's work as well as Elder and Cobb's review of integration theory Jo and Walker put forth their view of integration;

the greater the frequency of interaction the more likely the levels of integration will increase, i. e. the more likely a political community will evolve, with its characteristics of centralized monopoly of force, centralized resource allocation, and supporting attitudes from the population.<sup>2</sup>

This perspective prioritizes having numerous interactions between the two prospective unifying states

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1 Etzioni, Amitai. *Political Unification, a Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965: 4

2 Jo, Y.-H., and S. Walker. "Divided Nations and Reunification Strategies." *Journal of Peace Research* 9.3 (1972): 252

even if the interactions aren't always in good faith. Elder and Cobb's data suggests that certain features of the two unifying states have more of an impact on the level of integration. They find that homogeneity across social welfare policies and socio-economic development aid greater interaction between states which eases unification. Jo and Walker use their findings to confront the potential unification of Germany and Korea. The political and cultural differences between the two states are not seen to affect the beginning of the unification process which is very relevant to all three of this paper's cases where the Cold War political dichotomy is very present. They also insist that the relative gap of socio-economic growth between the two unifying states should remain as small as possible. The ability of either side to veto unification details is believed to be a key component of a successful unification. This balance of power may be desirable from an outsider's perspective but an imbalance of power shouldn't automatically be understood as a failure of the unification process unless it is an explicit goal of unification or leads to internal strife and conflict.

Michael Haas describes many methods for investigating unification and his work *Paradigms of Political Integration and Unification: Applications to Korea* attempts to clarify the numerous disparate opinions on integration theory. He divides the dominant theories into categories based on their metaphysical assumptions including some of the above authors discussed as well as his own theory. Haas makes these distinctions depending on how the theory understands two factors of unification.

One of these types of factors...is attitudinal: it is argued that either elite opinion or public opinion, or both, must favor integration if there is to be any progress. The second type of factor consists of material conditions, such as trade or the Bismarckian pursuit of power.<sup>3</sup>

The various theories are then categorized based on their weighing of the importance of these two factors. Etzioni is classified as a parallelist because he “[feels] that the two elements of reality [matter

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<sup>3</sup> Haas, M. "Paradigms of Political Integration and Unification: Applications to Korea." *Journal of Peace Research* 21.1 (1984): 48

and ideas] are correlated but unconnected.”<sup>4</sup> Cobb and Elder only concern themselves with the material while other theorists adopt almost every weighting system in between. Haas's own theory states that there are four types of interaction that can facilitate or harm integration; Political, Economic, Cultural, and Social.

In each state's chapter analyzing their unification experience it seems most prudent to primarily use Etzioni's theory to organize the unification process into the Pre-Unification State, The Unification Process, and the Termination State. In each of these stages, Haas's four interactions, political, economic, cultural, and social, will be studied in the states' relationships with its other half. In the pre-unification stage the homogeneity of the two states will be examined across various institutions as well as the motivations for unification. The unification process will include the constitution, goals, and whether any parts of the state will not be integrated. In the post-unification stage the achievement of a successful unification will be determined by comparing the unified state with the goals of unification and its stability. This last section will also identify the most impactful aspects of the entire unification process on the post-unification history of each state.

#### *State-Specific Literature*

Each case will require sources dealing not only with the unification but the states as a whole. These backgrounds and analyses of each case will focus on the history of the states as well as the important societal and cultural features present. In the Yemen chapter, the useful literature regarding its unification includes, *Yemen in the 1990's: From Unification to Economic Reform*<sup>5</sup>, *The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects*<sup>6</sup>, *Football in Newly United Yemen: Rituals of Equity, Identity,*

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4 Haas, M. "Paradigms of Political Integration and Unification: Applications to Korea." *Journal of Peace Research* 21.1 (1984): 49

5 Choueiri, Nada, Klaus-Stefan Enders, Yuri Sobolev, Jan Walliser, and Sherwyn Williams. "Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform." *Occasional Papers* (2002)

6 Dunbar, Charles "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects." *Middle East Journal*. 46.03 (1992)

and State Formation<sup>7</sup>, and *The Economic Dimension of Yemeni Unity*<sup>8</sup>. Sheila Carapico is found twice within the used literature focusing on the societal and economic aspects of Yemen. Stephen Day is focused on the regional divides in Yemen and the issues that have resulted from it. The book *Civil Society in Yemen*<sup>9</sup> describes key features of Yemeni society from long before unification to after it. The book *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen*<sup>10</sup> deals with the two Yemeni states, their eventual union, and the aftermath. It is especially concerned with the regional divides present within the North and South and the state as a whole. This book will be used very extensively to create a coherent time-line of the events. Some of the literature focused on other aspects of Yemen before and after unification include *Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990*<sup>11</sup>, *Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions Bring down the Regime?*<sup>12</sup>, *The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen*<sup>13</sup>, *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*<sup>14</sup>, and news reports of important events and crises.

James McAdams, Henry Turner, and Edwina Moreton all write extensively on the post-WWII partition of Germany and the evolution of the two states under the Cold War. Ernest Plock's book, *The Basic Treaty and the Evolution of East-West German Relations* focuses on the diplomatic headway made by West Germany and the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Harris and Kaiser both wrote articles immediately after unification giving their take on it. The identities of East and West

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7 Stevenson, Thomas B., and Abdul Karim Alaug. "Football in Newly United Yemen: Rituals of Equity, Identity, and State Formation." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 56.4 (2000)

8 Carapico, Sheila. "The Economic Dimension of Yemeni Unity." *Middle East Report* 184 (1993)

9 Carapico, Sheila. *Civil Society in Yemen The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998

10 Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012

11 Burrowes, Robert D. "Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990." *International Journal of Middle East Studies Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 23.04 (1991)

12 Day, Stephen. "Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions Bring Down the Regime?" *The Middle East Journal Middle East J* 62.3 (2008)

13 Chase, Anthony Tirado. "The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 17.2 (2003)

14 *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, Edited by B. R. Pridham. St. Martin's Press, New York 1984. *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin Middle East Stud. Assoc. Bull.* 19.01 (1985)

Germany are investigated in pieces by Moltman, Froese, Pfaff, and Kuechler.

For Vietnam the useful literature includes writings on the unification, the states as they existed prior to unification, and their post-unification experience. The first decade of the Vietnam War is laid out efficiently in *Chronology of Events Relative to Vietnam, 1954-1965*.<sup>15</sup> The economy of North Vietnam is the focus of William Kaye's *A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam*<sup>16</sup> and Theodore Shabad's *Economic Developments in North Vietnam*.<sup>17</sup> These both help with understanding North Vietnam's most pressing economic concerns, weaknesses, strengths, and possible motivations for unification. Douglas Pike has two articles focusing on two specific years near the end of the Vietnam War; *North Vietnam in the Year 1972*<sup>18</sup> and *North Vietnam in the Year 1971*.<sup>19</sup> These writings along with Jean Lacouture's *North Vietnam Faces Peace*<sup>20</sup> focus on North Vietnam's situation prior to victory and unification. *South Vietnam's Economy: A Note*<sup>21</sup> gives a picture of economic trends in South Vietnam from 1955-1960 during the first years of the Vietnam War. *South Vietnam: Detente and Reconciliation*<sup>22</sup> shows the effect of shifting global pressures and the easing of Cold War tensions on South Vietnam's chances of victory. Regarding the end of the war and unification process, Phillippe Devillers and Melanie Beresford have useful writings. Harish Chandola has two pieces on the aftermath of the Paris Agreement which was intended to end the Vietnam War and American involvement. Adam Fforde deals with the economic situation of Vietnam post-unification. John Bryant writes about the more recent experiences of North Vietnam. Lastly, Allan Goodman's writing on Vietnam provides a picture of Vietnam's interactions with the international community and

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15 "Chronology of Events Relative to Vietnam, 1954-1965." *Vietnam Perspectives* 1.1 (1965)

16 Kaye, William. "A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam." *The China Quarterly* CQY 9 (1962)

17 Shabad, Theodore. "Economic Developments in North Vietnam." *Pacific Affairs* 31.1 (1958)

18 Pike, Douglas. "North Vietnam in the Year 1972." *Asian Survey* 13.1 (1973)

19 Pike, Douglas. "North Vietnam in the Year 1971." *Asian Survey* 12.1 (1972)

20 Lacouture, Jean. "North Vietnam Faces Peace." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 49.4 (1973)

21 Crawford, Curtis. "South Vietnam's Economy: A Note." *Vietnam Perspectives* 1.4 (1966)

22 Duncanson, Dennis J. "South Vietnam: Detente and Reconciliation." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 49.4 (1973)

specifically the United States post-war.

### Key Concepts

#### *What is Success?*

Perhaps the most important definitional question for this study is: “What defines a successful national unification?” The three cases are extremely different in their contexts and their capabilities before and after unification. It is impossible to say that the unifications as they happened were undoubtedly better or worse than an alternative method but we can find some useful links between the way unification occurred that explain certain events and issues since then. Yemen has not become one of the most powerful nations in the world, like Germany, but that was never a possibility regardless of how the unification process went. The tools used to measure a successful unification must be able to be applied across all three cases without being influenced too strongly by factors outside the realm of unification. Some events like sectarian conflict, inequality, or unrest can be looked at across the board. Others should be analyzed relative to the specific context of the state. The three unifications happened for varying reasons and with different motives in mind. If one reason Yemen unified was to increase its economic power through oil, the achievement of that goal would be seen as a successful aspect of their unification. Germany and Vietnam exist in different contexts and their prowess in the oil industry does not reflect the degree of success of their unifications. Additionally, in Vietnam's case, the nation was unified through war and the process of creating one state was overwhelmingly in the hands of the North and in pursuit of the North's interests.

The measures of success that I will apply to *all* of the cases are ones based on successfully integrating two political communities and creating a stable state. A political community is predominantly a state however it could also include a group of people living autonomously that are not recognized as a state or members of a former state that no longer exists. So both the United States and the Southern region of the United States can be looked at as political communities.



The absence of violence and limited societal issues arising from pre-unification political identities is a sign of a well thought out and well executed integration. Any issues in the nation's history that can be attributed to the unification process will also be analyzed as a possible symptom of a flawed aspect of the unification process. Factors such as balance of political and economic power across the pre-unification borders can be applied to Yemen and Germany but in Vietnam this may have not been a goal. The success of a unified nation cannot be defined by its failure to accomplish goals that were of little to no concern to the major powers in the unification process.

All three cases' success will be measured by their stability post-unification. Instability is never desirable for any state and is a major concern when merging divergent political communities into a unified state. Some events of instability are more relevant to the unification process than others. The emergence of Al-Qaeda in North Eastern Yemen is a sectarian conflict that breeds instability but is not as strongly tied to the North/South divide and unification as protests for secession in Aden are. However if it is found that AQAP was only able to achieve territorial gains because of the North/South divide then AQAP's gains are a blemish on the unification case of Yemen. The rest of the measures of success will be based on the achievement of the specific goals of the nations in unifying. These criteria will occasionally be identical across cases but the means of each nation must be taken into account independently for a fair analysis of success. Germany may be in a better position during every stage of unification to achieve goals that are shared with Vietnam and Yemen so success must be understood relative to the nation's capabilities.

The independent variables that will be compared across the cases are:

- the states' stability
- fulfillment of nation-specific unification goals
- any issues or accomplishments occurring post unification that can be attributed to the unification process.

One state may be successful in the fulfillment of many of its goals because of certain aspects of

unification but may lack stability due to others. Creating a narrow single-faceted definition of a successful state is an unreasonable way to judge the merits of a unification process. This method will allow for a more complete assessment of what entails a *successful* unification while taking into account the state-specific nuances.

### *Stability*

The analysis of the nations' post-unification stability will draw on papers that attempt to define stability and create a method for measuring it. Leon Hurwitz's review essay *Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability* (1973) discusses some popular competing definitions of stability in a nation.

The differing views and approaches to political stability are seen to be: (a) the absence of violence; (b) governmental longevity/duration; (c) the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime; (d) the absence of structural change; and (e) a multifaceted societal attribute.<sup>23</sup>

Hurwitz points out the difficulties associated with each approach but approaches b and c seem to be the most flawed. Governmental longevity/endurance focuses on the average duration of time in office for each administration. It is an easy approach to quantify by simply calculating the average time spent in office for the nations' administrations. An obvious error in this approach is that it compares disparate political systems but treats them as identical systems where the turnover rate of the administration is independent of many impactful political system variances. Using this method solely would paint a picture of the international system where the United States due to its frequent elections with an almost evenly split voter-base is a less stable state than Yemen which had experienced one President for 23 years even through a civil war which is undoubtedly a sign of instability. The existence of a legitimate constitutional regime creates another enormous definitional demand; legitimacy. It may look like an attractive way to analyze stability but the methods of measurement used by its adherents are

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<sup>23</sup> Hurwitz, Leon. "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability." *Comparative Politics* 5.3 (1973): 449

incompatible with each other and Lipset's method relies on arbitrary borders between stability and instability. Hurwitz acknowledges that approaches *a* through *d* are flawed for similar reasons; their failure to focus on more than one attribute of the nation. Using the absence of violence as an indicator of stability is sensible but cannot be considered the lone deciding factor for the stability of a country. The last approach, a multifaceted societal attribute, is the most accommodating and encompassing. It takes parts from many of the other methods and can be more easily adapted to nation-specific contexts that account for the systemic differences across the cases. This method suffers from its inability to provide “neat and precise measurement,” as Hurwitz puts it, but the benefits are numerous and allows us to account for the intricacies of different political systems and contexts. Edmund Aunger views constitutional durability as the primary component of stability with secondary components; “political legitimacy, governmental efficacy, and civil order.”<sup>24</sup> Aunger situates this theory amongst similar conceptions of stability put forth by Eckstein and Gurr and McClelland who see the same components. Claude Ake understands political stability as “the regularity of the flow of political exchanges” and defines political exchange as “the transactions and communications between political actors.”<sup>25</sup> While his mode of measurement is difficult to quantify, Ake brings up some important points regarding political stability and the issues with the assumptions made in other theories. “Political change becomes destabilizing only when it violates the pattern of political exchanges.”<sup>26</sup> This point highlights the inherent value judgments that Western political scientists make when defining stability using certain political systems as the model. This paper will measure stability using the multifaceted societal approach that Hurwitz identifies while paying extra attention to the absence or presence of violence in the unified states.

### *State-specific Unification Goals*

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24 Aunger, Edmund A. In *Search of Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1981: 40

25 Ake, Claude. "A Definition of Political Stability." *Comparative Politics* 7.2 (1975): 273

26 Ake, Claude. "A Definition of Political Stability." *Comparative Politics* 7.2 (1975): 280

At every stage of the unification process, the actors goals are revealed either through their own statements or through analysis of the issues that they are forced to respond to. Each case needs to be understood independently to be able to tag it with the success label. A state that unifies solely to increase oil revenue should not be deemed a failure because crop conditions worsened. These three cases all have a variety of motivations and goals of unification so they will be studied to provide the scale with which to analyze the efficacy of the unification. Many of these goals are self-apparent because of pre-unification agreements and statements made on the benefits and desires of unifying. Some goals are not explicitly mentioned but can be reasonably inferred from context. For example, we can infer that no state desires to unify with the intention of experiencing a civil war attempting to rollback the unification. The constitutions of each unified state and surrounding agreements give a breadth of knowledge on the states' motivations. This makes it possible to create a list of goals and decide whether or not they were achieved.

#### *Post-Unification Events and Crises*

This last variable focuses on what important events transpired after the unification and how they may be related to how the unification process or the pre-unification regional split. This will include both crises and positive developments in the state. Some of the crucial events of the unified states will reflect on the success of the unification and others may be found to be isolated from the phenomenon of unification. Successful developments and solutions to long-standing problems may or may not be relevant to the unification but almost any major event can be argued to be somewhat related to an event as formative as unification. Unlike stability and goal achievement, this variable isn't as easy to measure so its main function is to show in what way the unification process opened up weaknesses or advantages in these major events. The actors involved in the unification could not have predicted every issue they may encounter

## **Chapter 1: Yemen**

The two states that would later unify into the Republic of Yemen were The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY (South) and the Yemen Arab Republic, YAR (North). The land that now makes up Yemen has traded hands many times over the centuries due to its strategic location on the coast and its proximity to Mecca and Medina. In 1962 the YAR was officially born out of the North Yemen Civil War in which the USSR supported the YAR's creation over the maintaining of the monarchy that had existed since 1918. Five years later the South Yemeni people overthrew British colonization in 1967 formally establishing the PDRY. For the next 23 years, the two states would exist in relative peace with occasional border disputes and conflicts. The few major conflicts they did have would reveal their shared desire to work towards unification.

In the 16th-17th centuries the land of North Yemen was controlled first by the Mamluks, then the Ottomans. Ottoman interest and involvement in the area persisted and led to the inclusion of North Yemen as a vilayet (province) of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire kept this arrangement until World War I when an Arab revolt led to the weakening of the Ottoman's power projection capabilities abroad. As a result, the independence of the Kingdom of Yemen (North Yemen) was established. This monarchy would come into conflict with Saudi Arabia on the Northern border and the British at the border of South Yemen during its existence. The growing Arab nationalism in the 1950's fed a desire to end the long-standing monarchy and in 1962, a civil war between Royalists in favor of the monarchy and Republicans ended with the Royalists' defeat and the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic.

The United Kingdom's colonial efforts reached the Southern port city of Aden in the early 19th century and held control over the area until the protectorate merged into The Federation of South Arabia. This federation lasted from 1963 until it won independence from the United Kingdom in 1967

and was established as the People's Republic of Southern Yemen. After three years, socialists took control of the state and the People's Republic of Southern Yemen became the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

### Pre-Unification

#### *Homogeneity*

In the decades leading up to unification these states were defined, politically, by their relationship with the Cold War. The PDRY was a socialist state with strong ties to the USSR while the YAR found itself forced into the Western bloc. Although Yemen had not existed as one entity for centuries, the idea of unification was present and the interactions, negative and positive, between the two states strengthened the prospects for the creation of one Yemen.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen received support and backing from the USSR and their constitution highlighted this bond. “The 1970 PDRY constitution, with traces of Islamic and British as well as Marxist legal principles, enshrined a unified, Arab Muslim, Socialist Yemen where sovereignty rested with the 'working people.’”<sup>27</sup> The PDRY's relationship with marxism and socialism would greatly influence its dealings with its Northern neighbor. This aspect of South Yemen identity is still present today with the most popular Southern political party being socialist. Unlike the relatively secular PDRY, religion was a major political factor in the YAR, partly due to its large tribal population.

Cold War politics helped to create two states with very divergent political systems. This lack of political homogeneity and the resulting political disconnect between the two states has persisted and provides another binary across the North/South border.

Aden extended education, medical care, and other social services to most of its population, and made notable progress toward liberating women from patriarchal constraints. By contrast, the

YAR, though neither democratic nor a military ally of the West, exemplified a free market for

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<sup>27</sup> Carapico, Sheila. *Civil Society in Yemen The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998: 31

investment, trade, and consumption, and eschewed policies of social reform.<sup>28</sup>

The difference in political identities created two distinct societies that would have to merge under one entity should unification occur. The former leader of the socialist PDRY, Ali Salem al Beidh, now heads the southern secessionist movement, al-Hirak, which has been a source of instability and discontent in the South. The political identities of the North and South regions of unified Yemen still echo their pre-unification political identities which haven't fully disappeared under one flag. Prior to unification, the economic growths of the two states were also not comparable.

During the run up to national unity in the late 1980's, the governments of north and south Yemen were heading in opposite directions. The north Yemeni state was expanding with new sources of revenue, and a policy of centralization in Sanaa. The south Yemeni state was contracting with fewer sources of revenue, and a fractured central government.<sup>29</sup>

By the time of unification, both states were in similarly poor economic conditions creating at least some economic homogeneity. On the societal front, In 1985, the PDRY's focus on education yielded a 59% illiteracy rate contrasting the YAR's 80%.<sup>30</sup> Immediately prior to unification the two states lacked political homogeneity, societal homogeneity, and military homogeneity. The military strength of the two states were far from balanced after the PDRY's devastating 1986 civil-war drained its leadership and military capacity. Any conflict fought in its direct aftermath would be greatly in favor of the YAR armed forces. The economic systems of the two states were very different but there was homogeneity by the time of unification in the sense that both systems were floundering.

### *Interactions*

A 1972 border dispute between the two Yemen's resulted in the first major step towards

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28 Carapico, Sheila. *Civil Society in Yemen The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998: 35

29 Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012: 80

30 Dunbar, Charles "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects." *Middle East Journal*. 46.03 (1992): 465

unification; the Cairo Agreement. Subsequent declarations and agreements would reference the Cairo Agreement as a precedent for unification talks.

Article 1: Unity will be established between the two states of the Yemen Arab Republic and the Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen in which the international personality of both of them will be merged in one international personality and the existence of a unified Yemeni state.<sup>31</sup>

About a month later, another meeting was held, this time in Tripoli, to re-stress the states' desires to unify. The President of the YAR, Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani and Salim Rubai Ali, the Head of State of the PDRY traveled to Tripoli and “signed a formal agreement providing for the immediate drafting of a constitution and a timetable which could lead to the creation of a unified state within a year.”<sup>32</sup> This agreement was not executed for various reasons including the concerns of the two states' respective international backers; Saudi Arabia (YAR) and the USSR (PDRY) but it laid more groundwork for future agreements and declarations.

The PDRY and the Soviet Union backed a rebellion in the Yemen Arab Republic carried out by the socialist-leaning National Democratic Front (NDF). This rebellion occurred primarily along their border and led to a war between the two states when the PDRY was rightfully accused of supplying the NDF rebels. This conflict strengthened the Cold War divide in Yemen with the YAR fighting with the support of the United States and the PDRY being supported by the Soviet Union. Again this conflict culminated in a declaration on the prospects of unification in 1979, this time in Kuwait. The motives for unification in this declaration not only focused on the plight of the Yemeni people but framed unification in the context of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. The meeting was held primarily to create a cease-fire between the NDF and the YAR but also refreshed the unification dialogue.

In fulfillment of the sacrifices of our Yemeni people and the fruits of their struggle throughout

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31 The Cairo Agreement, 28 October, 1972

32 Bidwell, Robin Leonard. *Dictionary of Modern Arab History: An A to Z of over 2000 Entries from 1798 to the Present Day*. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998: 417



history to achieve the noble goal of unity and because Yemeni unity is a major national imperative, particularly in the current Arab circumstances through which our national cause and the entire Arab nation are passing after the signing of the conspiratorial Camp David Accords...in support of the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people...to recover its homeland and establish an independent, national State; in full and unshakable support for the sister Arab countries in liberating their occupied lands, dislodging the Zionist occupation and restoring their Arab national sovereignty<sup>33</sup>

This declaration reveals many of the important motives in achieving unification and shows the influence of the Pan-Arab movement on these motivations. The prospect of unification framed this way was less focused on the desires and concerns of the two Yemen's and more on the message that the unification would send to the world at large. Had unification occurred during this era, the unification itself would have been a successful fulfillment of at least the goal of Arab unity regardless of the long term outcomes. While not much progress was achieved in turning these declarations into the beginning of a unification process, the early 80's were relatively peaceful and led to a stronger relationship between the leaders of each state.

Evidence of the strength and value of their working relationship came in January 1985, when the two leaders stepped in and promptly defused an armed confrontation along the undemarcated border between the Marib and Shabwa regions, the respective areas where the YAR had just discovered oil and the PDRY was actively search for the same.<sup>34</sup>

This border dispute, unlike the previous ones, was de-escalated and showed the growing trust and possibility of cooperation between the two states.

The 1986 power struggle in the southern capital of Aden ended with the ousting of the president

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33 Kuwait Agreement 1979

34 Burrowes, Robert D. "Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990." *International Journal of Middle East Studies Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 23.04 (1991): 489

of the PDRY, Ali Nasser Muhammad. He had been in power during the PDRY's funding of the NDF rebels in the YAR and was less open to unification than his successors. This civil-war took a heavy toll on the South with thousands dead as well as the death of the defense minister, vice-president and other leaders as they were gunned down in their governing hall by the president's men. The devastation of the PDRY's military also meant that they were no longer perceived as a serious threat by the YAR which may have smoothed the road to unification. Ali Nasser Muhammad and thousands of those loyal to him fled the PDRY and took refuge in the YAR. This influx of Southerners created a refugee crisis in the YAR in 1987 as the PDRY refused to allow Ali Nasser Muhammad's men return to take their positions back. Only a year later some of the most significant steps in the unification process occurred in the form of two meetings which yielded three important agreements. This happened when their shared border became the subject of yet another dispute over the oil deposits being discovered on either side. This led to the important 1988 meetings in Taiz and Sanaa.

In Taiz, the two leaders' preoccupation with tensions led them to agree to a series of measures for military disengagement in the border area as well as a revival of unity discussions. At the [Sanaa] meeting, they agreed to establish a 2,200-square kilometer demilitarized area for a joint investment project...the same day, agreement was reached to replace northern and southern frontier posts with joint posts and within two months to permit citizens to begin traveling across the frontier using only identification cards.<sup>35</sup>

Unlike other declarations and agreements made in the past, these came to fruition and were achieved on schedule. In 1988 the promised joint investment area was created on the land around their shared border and a joint-company was created to manage it. This was the first meaningful economic interaction that could be linked to the unification process.

Up until the years immediately prior to unification, the majority of important interactions

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35 Dunbar, Charles "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects." *Middle East Journal*. 46.03 (1992): 459

between the two states were political and borne out of violence. The agreements and declarations that made up the groundwork for the unification process were almost solely inspired by conflict and border tensions. These violent political interactions led to the agreements that would dictate the unification process and get the process back on track after multiple de-railings. The Yemen case could provide support for Jo and Walker's theory of integration where the amount of interactions is more supportive to unification than the nature of the interactions. Cultural interactions between the states were non-existent and their sports teams did not compete against each other in international competition. Almost the entirety of their interactions were conflicts and the meetings that resolved them. The economic and societal interactions resulting from the joint-investment project and the loosening of border restrictions were vital to unification. These integrative events were owed to the various conflicts between the both Yemen's.

### *Motivations*

Yemen unification was brought about by a variety of pressures and desires. “In short, everything – global transformations, economic factors, popular sentiments, and their own self-interests – propelled Sana'a's military command and Aden's politbureau toward unity.”<sup>36</sup> The PDRY, under Ali Nasser Muhammad, was in favor of unification on the PDRY's terms and this was one reason for their support of the NDF Marxist rebels in the North. After Ali Nasser Muhammad's unsuccessful power-grab and overthrow, the PDRY was too weak and splintered to expect to dominate the unification process and implement their political system on the North. This also left the PDRY's military very weak and relaxed YAR fears of a PDRY threat. Around the same time, the Cold War was winding down and unfortunately for the PDRY “Soviet military and economic aid that had been vital to the Aden government's survival was to be drastically reduced.”<sup>37</sup> The USSR had been a crucial provider of

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<sup>36</sup> Carapico, Sheila. *Civil Society in Yemen The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998: 52

<sup>37</sup> Dunbar, Charles “The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects.” *Middle East Journal*. 46.03 (1992): 465

aid to the PDRY and had supported it with military equipment and supplies during the 1979 war with the YAR. This made the PDRY more open to any options that could revitalize their economy, including economic liberalization and unification. The PDRY's oil endeavors had proven fruitless and inefficient as they could not attract outside powers to help develop their oil fields. The oil fields between the YAR and PDRY were a significant catalyst for unification as they could not afford conflicts along the border where this valuable resource was contained and could improve capital and efficiency by combining their efforts.

Unity also offered other potential economic benefits. International development banks, anticipating economies of scale, had already approved loans for unification of the electrical grid, and for joint projects in the fields of agricultural export, port facilities, and tourism. Unity favored the interests of Yemen's traders, financiers, and manufacturers in much the same way as Germany unity, for it heralded new private investment opportunities.<sup>38</sup>

By the end of the 1980's the two Yemen's, although experiencing separate issues, were in favorable positions for attempting unification. The PDRY was adjusting to its lack of Soviet aid, recovering from a civil-war, and attempting to turn its oil fields into a profitable industry. The YAR was growing but the oil fields on their side of the border were less valuable than previously thought. Both states were in dire economic condition. A CIA report from January 19, 1990, just months before unification, was entitled *North and South Yemen: In Search of Unity* and contained the Directorate of Intelligence's views on how the PDRY and YAR were proceeding with unification talks. "Mutually severe economic hardships appear to be driving the renewed unity process and are likely to lead to cooperative oil production and other joint economic ventures during the next year."<sup>39</sup> During the same time the tribes of the YAR had stopped opposing Yemen unification which made Salih more confident in a successful

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<sup>38</sup> Carapico, Sheila. *Civil Society in Yemen The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998: 49

<sup>39</sup> 1990 CIA Directorate of Intelligence "North and South Yemen: In Search of Unity." <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/north-and-south-yemen-search-unity> (1990): 1

unification.

Salih...had at least three major personal interests in actively seeking unification in 1989. The first was to reap the political benefit of being the architect of an agreement that enabled Yemenis to achieve a long-sought goal...Second, Salih badly needed a political and economic success in the fall of 1989...Finally, it can be argued that Salih needed unity to consolidate the government's position in relation to the northern tribes.<sup>40</sup>

In addition to these motivations, Iraq was a proponent of Yemeni unity while Saudi Arabia was against it. Salih may have been encouraged by Saddam to pursue unity speedily in order to split Saudi Arabia's attention between its Northern and Southern borders which would, in turn, make Saddam's invasion of Kuwait more likely to succeed. In the South, popular opinion was in favor of unification as the PDRY started to shed some of its Marxist identity after failed economic liberalization attempts and embraced the option of unification as the most viable solution to their economic woes. "Their decision...to respond favorably to Salih's unity initiative almost certainly stemmed from a calculation that popular feeling in the PDRY both against them and in favor of unity was too strong to permit them to stay in power."<sup>41</sup>

Timing certainly played a large part in the decision to unify but the motivations for unification were numerous. These motives were shared at times by both states, one state at others, and were at least minimally influenced by the personal aspirations of President Salih. The possibility of escaping economic stagnation, mainly solely through oil ventures, seemed to be the most crucial motivator for both sides.

Many of the arguments advanced for unity stressed the economic advantages. Such as combining Aden port facilities with the North's private transport network, utilizing both the South's professional cadres and Northern-based entrepreneurs, taking advantage of larger

40 Dunbar, Charles "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects." Middle East Journal. 46.03 (1992): 469

41 Dunbar, Charles "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects." Middle East Journal. 46.03 (1992): 466

markets and economies of scale and maintaining all foreign trade and aid relationships.<sup>42</sup>

These declarations and building blocks of the unification process were all due to the peace talks that concluded YAR and PDRY conflicts. The 1979 joint-declaration in Kuwait cites the constant on-again off-again conflicts as a reason for Yemeni unification.

Desiring to concretize the higher national patriotic interest of the Yemeni people by solving the various problems that exist, eliminating them and resolving them comprehensively once and for all, putting an end finally to the spectre of war and its causes and eliminating the reasons and factors behind the lack of stability, peace and progress in Yemen and our region as a whole by achieving the cherished goal of the Yemeni people of Yemeni unity<sup>43</sup>

The biggest force in starting the unification process was the interaction between the two states as a product of conflict. The possibility of a conflict breaking out on the border was almost always present and produced a major incentive for unification. The desire to end this limbo of conflict was not enough to complete the unification process as the plans laid out in these agreements were not carried out. The final step of unification required another impetus. The shared economic struggles of the YAR and PDRY in the late 1980's provided the push needed to take the declarations and agreements of the past decades and turn them into concrete integration plans. Chief among the economic motivations was the untapped potential of the oil located between the two states. This coupled with popular support for unification in both states and easing of border restrictions meant that unification was politically attractive to the leaders who would become permanent historical figures of Yemen should they accomplish what had been stated as a desired goal of both states since 1972.

To determine the success of Yemen's unification, the goals of the process will be measured against Yemen's post-unification experience. Like the other two cases, the stability of post-unification

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42 Carapico, Sheila. *The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ, 2013: 135

43 Joint Declaration Issued By the Presidents of the Two Parts of Yemen at the Bilateral Summit Held in the State of Kuwait. 1979

Yemen will be assessed as well as the avoidance of any major crises related to integration issues. The state-specific goals of unification in Yemen's case are: the end of North-South violence, increased oil revenue, balanced political power across old border, and overall economic improvement. The decisions made during the 1990-1993 unification process have impacted the achievement or failure of all of these goals.

### Unification Process

#### *Interactions and Integration*

In 1989, the organs of unification that were prescribed in 1972 were finally put together. “A torrent of unification activities began at the end of October with the first-ever meetings of the joint committee for a 'unified political organization,' a committee first called for in the original unification agreement in 1972.”<sup>44</sup> The constitution of the Republic of Yemen was agreed on by both states and put into effect on May 21, 1990 after decades of slow but steady moves towards unification. The merging of two disparate political systems into one cohesive government was a serious undertaking and would require concessions from one or both sides. The PDRY's political system was, for the most part, not a major feature of the new state but they still had a relatively equal voice in the construction of the new state. “The unity accords unveiled in November 1989 and signed on May 22 1990 provided for a complex transitional power-sharing arrangement that balanced GPC and YSP influence rather equally despite the fact that three-quarters of the population resided in the North.”<sup>45</sup> From the constitution we can see the desire to create a balanced government along North-South lines. The splitting of major government positions by pre-unification identity is one example of this desire. While the presidency was given to Salih of the YAR, the vice-president was the former head of the PDRY.

Many of the major facets of the government were merged but other important ones were not

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44 Burrowes, Robert D. "Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Int. J. Middle East Stud. 23.04 (1991): 500

45 Carapico, Sheila. *Civil Society in Yemen The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998: 137

integrated; most notably, the army remained divided. The only attempt at integrating the two armies was by redeploying brigades from the South to the North and vice-versa. Although the South, theoretically, possessed half of the political power during the transition, President Salih was able to assert his control over the new state at the expense of the South. “Northerners objected to the bloated post-unity government bureaucracy created by the need to provide employment both to southern bureaucrat and party functionaries. For their part, Southerners complained that growing corruption in the southern bureaucracy was the result of northern influence.”<sup>46</sup> These issues and tensions would contribute to the rising animosity across the old borders. This process upset actors on both sides of the border as both thought they were receiving the short end of the stick. To add to these issues, late in the unification process, “a campaign of assassinations in the country was underway, killing or injuring approximately 100 southern officials.”<sup>47</sup> While this campaign turned out to be done by anti-Soviet mujahidin, during the assassinations it was believed the northern government and President Salih were involved and this bred even more distrust and suspicion. During 1990 the process of unifying the organs of state was made severely more difficult by the influx of around 800,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia and the gulf states returning home. The Yemen government's decision to stand with Iraq and speak against the intervention led to Saudi Arabia sending Yemenis on work visas and the like back to Yemen. This put an unnecessary strain on the newly unified government and created a refuge crisis with around 60,000 Yemenis returning to no home and no family to live with.

Thomas Stevenson and Abdul Alaug write on how sports and spectacles can be important in cultivating a shared national identity and how the two football leagues were consolidated into one league with a national team composed of both North and South athletes. “Football captures the notion of an imagined community perfectly. It is much easier to imagine the nation and confirm national

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46 Dunbar, Charles “The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects.” *Middle East Journal*. 46.03 (1992): 472-3

47 Day, Stephen. "Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions Bring Down the Regime?" *The Middle East Journal* Middle East J 62.3 (2008): 421



identity, when eleven player are representing the nation in a match against another nation.”<sup>48</sup> The first Yemen national football team was created primarily out of the desire to represent equally the two parts of Yemen. “Competing as a truly unified team was the central concern; at best, winning the matches was a secondary matter. Symbols were clearly more important than substance.”<sup>49</sup> This meant that the national team of 32 players was divided evenly with 16 each from North and South Yemen. Football was an effective symbol of unification with the new flag of unified Yemen being touted and with both states' intense interest in the sport. The logistical nightmare of merging the two football leagues through a year long competition with more teams involved than before was enthusiastically carried out and showed the governments' willingness to unify but while this facet of society became integrated, other important ones did not. After existing as separate entities for so long, the cultures of both regions had evolved independently and created more complications in successful integration.

Many southerners were concerned about certain aspects of traditional YAR society such as the strong tribal influence and the greater circumscription of the role of women; many northerners had similar misgivings about what was perceived as non-Islamic behavior in the south. As a result, the leadership remained largely divided among north-south lines, with southern representatives often abstaining from joint cabinet meetings.<sup>50</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the north came out on top at the end of the unification process. The South's socialist philosophies took a back seat to the North's free-trade desires. In the first parliamentary election in 1993 the North's most powerful party, the GPC, won more than double the seats of the leading south Yemeni political party. To further strengthen the North's share of political influence, the GPC formed a coalition with other northern political parties. Additionally, because most of the

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48 Stevenson, Thomas B., and Abdul Karim Alaug. "Football in Newly United Yemen: Rituals of Equity, Identity, and State Formation." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 56.4 (2000): 468

49 Stevenson, Thomas B., and Abdul Karim Alaug. "Football in Newly United Yemen: Rituals of Equity, Identity, and State Formation." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 56.4 (2000): 466

50 Choueiri, Nada, Klaus-Stefan Enders, Yuri Sobolev, Jan Walliser, and Sherwyn Williams. "Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform." *Occasional Papers* (2002): 4

Ministry of Finance was under the control of northerners, the South felt its oil and resources were being exploited for the benefit of the North. This imbalance of power, as well as the other problems mentioned, would provide the South with a greater desire to wrest control back from the North. President Salih's framing of the new state as a competition between North and South will be analyzed as a decision made during unification that has consequences for the success of the state.

In the unification of Yemen, the two sides came together in name but became competitors over the same political power. The new government was created with the intent to equally represent the population of both Yemen's but as president, Salih's goal was to strengthen his control over the new state. Even after the 1994 civil war, these unification complications remain relevant and impact the politics of Yemen today.

### Post-Unification

#### *Events/Crises*

The parliamentary elections in 1993 can be considered the end of the unification process and the beginning of Yemen's history as one state. The new state would be tested by various serious crises frequently. While some of these are unrelated to the North/South divide, some of the most serious and disastrous events were directly tied to unresolved problems during unification.

Within a year after unification the state was split apart in a civil war. The vice-president of the newly unified Yemen was from the South and became increasingly upset with the North's frequent power grabs. A last ditch effort to resolve some of the unification issues was a meeting in Amman between President Salih and vice-President al-Bid. They both signed a “document of pledge and accord” which was based on the YSP's unification demands but this failed to dilute the tension across the North-South border.<sup>51</sup> With the two armies still not integrated and deployed in closer proximity to each other skirmishing broke out the day after the signing between northern and southern brigades. It

<sup>51</sup> Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 126-127

is believed that the conflict was started when northern brigades surrounded a southern brigade deployed near Sanaa, the capital. By summer the entire state was engulfed in war. The war was costly with “general estimates of those killed ranged between five thousand and seven thousand, including soldiers and civilians. Financial estimates of the war's costs ran anywhere from U.S. \$2 billion to \$8 billion.”<sup>52</sup> This event, alone, speaks to almost all of the criteria of a successful Yemeni unification. A civil-war is undoubtedly a de-stabilizing event and a major national crisis. This war showed that the unification was unsuccessful at ending the conflict between North and South while taking a heavy economic toll on the young state. There were major issues in the unification process that can be directly traced to the origins of this conflict. The two states failed to integrate their armies leaving two armed forces with two allegiances. Additionally, the decision to deploy these armies in close proximity to each other on both sides of the old border made it easy for the initial skirmishes to escalate. The causes of the initial skirmishes were also a symptom of integration issues. The South's political power after the parliamentary election was insignificant relative to the North's majority in parliament, presidency, and control over key government positions; especially in the economy. The lack of desire to work together inside the government led to the tensions that would culminate in this civil war.

The next major crisis in Yemen occurred in 1996, two years after the civil war. In the southern city of al-Mukalla, “two women, one married and one single, were arrested by a northern policeman.”<sup>53</sup> After their arrest they claimed they had been assaulted and one of them raped. When they attempted to return to the police station to press charges they were again thrown in prison. Because some local governmental positions were exchanged along North-South lines during integration, similar to the armed forces, a northerner was the director of the criminal prosecutor's office. Even after a local judge declared that they had been wrongfully imprisoned, the northern director refused to release them for

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52 Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 129

53 Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 169

around a month. The eventual trial was an ugly scene and resulted in protests, arrests, and clashes between northern security forces and the citizens of al-Mukalla. The roots of this crisis were again a result of decisions made during the unification. The citizens of al-Mukalla felt that they were deprived of local political control and this unrest highlighted this issue. The government's decision to implement an exchange of politicians between North and South simply put two disparate parties in close proximity with each other. This exchange had the added side-effect of giving northern administrators power over southern citizens. Two years later the same city would be the site of more North-South violence.

In al-Mukalla in 1998, opponents of President Salih's party (GPC) held a protest commemorating those lost in the civil war in al-Mukalla. Again, the North's military presence in the South allowed for an easy escalation to violence. "Northern troops entered the city, and responded to protestors with gunfire. Two citizens were shot and killed, while dozens of others were injured and arrested."<sup>54</sup> In that same year President Salih continued to increase the power of the North through strategic forced retirements of both northerners and southerners. The southern politicians who were forced into retirement were disproportionately supporters of Ali Nasser, the PDRY president who was ousted in the 1986 South Yemeni civil war.

Around the same time, President Salih decided to put forward a plan to split two southern provinces in half to further weaken the South's political power. In one of the provinces, there was enough backlash against the proposal to convince the government to let it remain whole. The new province made up of land from a South and North province along the border was created but not received well. Northern soldiers near a city in the new province were attacked with artillery from the town after the Northern brigades implemented a curfew. The northern forces fired their artillery back at the town starting a series of clashes that would persist through 2000.

There was consistent unrest and conflict in Yemen between 2000 and 2007, including a

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<sup>54</sup> Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 179-180

rebellion in the northernmost provinces, but these were not directly tied to unification. In 2007 the southern secessionist movement, named al-Hirak, was founded by former military officers that had been forced into retirement over the past decade. The movement organized sit-ins and peaceful protests and in October, “President Salih's security forces clashed with activists in al-Habilayn [southern city], opening fire with live ammunition and killing four young residents of the town.”<sup>55</sup> The movement grew with these martyrs becoming symbols of the North's oppression of the southern regions. As al-Hirak grew and started uniting longstanding rivals in the South, Salih did what he could to halt their progress through disrupting rallies with military force and mass-arrests. In 2008, Salih's northern forces were deployed to end al-Hirak protests and proceeded to kill and arrest many southerners present at the protests.

The South's desire to regain political power was influential during the 2011 Arab spring protests in Yemen. The protests in other parts of the Arab world swiftly spread to Yemen where most of the country was suffering from Salih's political hegemony and abundant unemployment. The protests began in the capital, Sanaa, and then reached the South. Al-Hirak joined the other opposition parties in the protests and helped bring about Salih's ouster. Many of the demands of the opposition parties were related to the economic woes that continued after the civil war and Salih's monopolizing of political power which were both partly factors of unification decisions.

Over the first decades post-unification, Salih had successfully limited the political power of the South while greatly centralizing political control in Sanaa. Salih's control over the economy extended to controlling oil resources in southern Yemen. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, the most popular political party in the South received 8 seats to the GPC's 238 seats and Islah's<sup>56</sup> 46 seats. At every opportunity, Salih expanded his role and the strength of his party at the expense of the South.

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55 Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 230

56 A northern religious political party with close tribal ties

### *Success of Unification*

The goals of unification were not met on almost every level. The economic condition of Yemen remained dire and unemployment soared. Oil revenue initially provided the regime with more income but as the supply lessened, so did the profits which weren't enough to make up for the numerous other economic issues. The goal of ending North-South political violence was not at all achieved. Within a year of unification, a full-scale civil war occurred, killing many and decimating the economy of the young state. Violence and protests based on North-South tensions have continued since unification and still persist today. Yemen has been reliant on aid from foreign states and loans from international institutions. The goal of creating a balanced state where neither region (North or South) dominates the political climate was also not achieved. The North has undoubtedly possessed more political power than the South since unification. The monopolizing of power and corruption perpetuated by Salih created a situation where there was no way the incumbent, Salih, would lose a presidential election or parliamentary power to the South.

The stability of post-unification Yemen has been consistently challenged since its inception. Yemen has experienced many rebellions in different regions, an early civil war, and an ongoing rebellion during the time of this writing. Yemen took part in the 2011 Arab spring protests which resulted in the ousting of its president since unification. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has a strong presence in Eastern Yemen and even controls some cities. They have been a source of terrorist attacks for decades now and with the Yemeni government focusing on more pressing concerns, AQAP has been able to operate relatively freely during times of unrest. During the most recent Houthi rebellion, President Hadi lost the capital and had to flee with his government to the southern city of Aden before being forced to govern from abroad until conditions improved. President Saleh managed to stay in power for decades, perhaps giving an illusion of stability, but the state as a whole has been subject to majorly de-stabilizing events since its inception and has still struggled to solve the issues that

were present in 1990.

Many of the most serious crises following unification are in some way related to mistakes made during unification. Other problems also plague Yemen (unemployment) but don't seem to be primarily caused by the unification process. The 1994 civil war and some other conflicts were obviously rooted in the North-South divide. The 1994 civil war was made more possible by the failure to integrate the armed forces of both Yemen's. The long reach of Northern political power over southern towns and citizens has been the root of many protests turned violent and general unrest. Al-Hirak in the South has gained steady support since its inception and has been a target of northern violence.

Based on the criteria given for a successful unification<sup>57</sup> Yemen can not be considered a story of successful unification. The goals of unification have not been met and some of the problems that provided impetus for unification still persist (North-South violence, economic woes). Most of the biggest crises Yemen has faced are related to an oversight or problem during unification. The decision to not fully integrate the armed forces and then put some of the northern/southern brigades in the other half's territory was a mistake that helped precipitate the disastrous 1994 civil war and other conflicts like the violent response to the al-Mukalla protests in '96 and '98. Lastly, the stability of Yemen has been a constant concern with many rebellions, protest movements, and lack of government control over certain territories.

### *Yemen Case Implications*

Yemen's failed unification has many implications for understanding unification as a phenomenon. The two states were not very homogenous and certainly the differing identities provided issues and were partly to blame for the '96 al-Mukalla event. The YAR's views on women (and many other issues) were considerably more conservative than the PDRY's more secular approach to politics.

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57 1. Accomplishment of state-specific unification goals  
2. Avoidance of major crises stemming from unification process  
3. Achieving stability as a state

This lack of homogeneity may not have been enough to be problematic except for the fact that some northerners in the government were placed in positions of power over southern citizens which allowed these divergent views to come to the forefront and build tensions.

The exchange of politicians across the North/South border is more to blame for the al-Mukalla crises than the lack of homogeneity. The North's trumping of southern local political power was enabled by this exchange of politicians which caused unrest, like in al-Mukalla. The unification's armed forces policy was even more harmful to the success of unification. The armies were not integrated so the two armed forces that had been fighting and skirmishing with each other over the past decades were mostly left as they were. The troop exchange where brigades would be deployed in their former enemy's territory proved to be disastrous. Armed forces integration seems to be very important in Yemen's case.

The way in which President Salih approached the new state has had a lasting impact on Yemen. Salih desired to increase the North's power over the South and so the new state was based on competition between North and South instead of cooperation. This splintered the ministries where both northerners and southerners worked and the North's resource exploitations provided more motivation for the South to reconsider the desirability of a unified Yemen. Al-Hirak, a major source of unrest in the South, has grown popular partly due to the framing of Yemen as a competition for political hegemony. While the North has certainly gained power relative to the South, the country as a whole has suffered from the imbalance of power and constant attempts to alter it.

From Yemen's unification experience we can see the importance of integrating the armed forces, or at least not placing them in close proximity to their former opponents. Politicians being placed in control of citizens from the other state only serves a symbolic purpose and allows any societal difference across the pre-unification border to become a battleground. In Yemen's case, framing the new state as just another front in the North/South struggle for superiority led to a number of crises and



impeded the achievement of the goals of unification. The other two cases may highlight other aspects of a successful unification or build on the aspects present in Yemen's case. Understanding the divergent contexts of the other two states is important for avoiding comparing incomparable variables.

## **Chapter 2: Germany**

Germany had existed as one entity since the 1871 unification under Otto Von Bismarck. Quickly, Germany became one of the great powers of the world which lasted until their defeat at the hands of the Allies during World War II. At the Potsdam Conference in 1945 the United Kingdom, United States, and USSR divided Germany into East and West Germany with Berlin being split as well. East Germany was controlled by a socialist government for most of its existence and was occupied by Soviet forces. Along with other Soviet satellites, East Germany was a member of the Warsaw pact. West Germany was occupied by the allies with France, the U.K. And the U.S. each controlling a zone of occupation. Eventually West Germany would become a member of NATO in 1955. Berlin, although fully engulfed by East Germany, was divided into West and East Germany. All four involved powers (U.S., U.K., France, and the USSR) controlled a portion of Berlin. Divided Germany was one of the most significant and most well-known features of the Cold War. Like Vietnam and Yemen, the two halves of former Germany were defined by their relationship to Cold War political ideologies. The Western zones which had been controlled by the three Western allied powers was eventually merged into one state; The Federal Republic of Germany. Reunification was still a distant thought after the partition. World War II had a devastating effect on the economy and industrial capacity of both East and West Germany. West Germany embarked on a mission to rebuild the economy under Chancellor Adenauer. As West Germany continued to improve its economic standing and East Germany faltered, unification became more likely. The road to reunification was paved by the thawing of Cold War tensions and the collapsing of the Soviet Union. After reunification, Germany was able to regain its position as one of the most powerful states in the world.

## Pre-Unification

### *Homogeneity*

While at the time of partition the two Germany's had never been split along these lines, over time the imposed division created societal differences between East and West Germany. As in all three cases, the difference in political ideology was a source of identity. It is difficult to know how much of the political identity of East Germany was created by the East Germans themselves and how much was just a feature of Soviet involvement. In 1945, “The USSR was the first occupying power to permit the formation of political parties in its zone, beginning with the Communist Party.”<sup>58</sup> Tensions between the East Germans and its Soviet occupiers were high from the war and the following rape of hundreds of thousands of German women by occupying Soviet forces. The Soviet Union attempted to distance itself from its favored political parties but at the same time worked behind the scenes to ensure the anti-communist parties were at a disadvantage by strategic merging of political parties. Even amongst the marxist and socialist parties, there was a split between those who favored Soviet communist principles and those who were forming a unique German socialist identity. Because non-communist parties were not allowed to compete, there was no real opportunity for an alternate political identity. “As the division of Europe deepened in the 1950s and 1960s, the two German states and their societies appeared to further and further apart.”<sup>59</sup>

When both states regained an army, the West had a great advantage in military strength. It included hundreds of thousands more men and was extremely well supported by NATO. West Germany's form of government allowed the populace to have free elections and its efficiency and stability was embraced by the people. In the East, “A Soviet-style 'democratic centralism' prevailed, in

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58 Turner, Henry Ashby., and Henry Ashby. Turner. *Germany from Partition to Reunification*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1992. Print. 16

59 Kaiser, Karl. "Germany's Unification." *Foreign Affairs* 70.1 (1990/91). 181

which all authority flowed downward from the top leadership. Within that leadership the principle of equal representation for Social Democrats and Communists in all party organs was abandoned.”<sup>60</sup> The quick transition to public support for unification as the Soviet Union began to collapse suggests that Cold War influences and pressures were major causes of this lack of political homogeneity.

The interesting fact about the behavior of both German governments well into the 1960s and 1970s is that each, while professing absolute loyalty to its superpower partner, still acted in ways that defied the international consensus that was taking shape around them. The problem was that, for fear of precluding all chances of eventual reunification or inadvertently granting their opponents any advantages in the contest over the nation's future, neither state was prepared to recognize the legitimacy of the other.<sup>61</sup>

Although both states were forced to be dependent on their respective backers, they also attempted to carve out space for their own autonomy independent of the Cold War context. Culturally, homogeneity decreased in East and West Germany under the rule of their respective backers. The different political ideologies led to divergent religious experiences in the two states. “Because atheistic Marxism-Leninism serves as the national ideology of the Democratic Republic [East Germany], the division of church and state is nearly perfect.”<sup>62</sup> Atheism grew in popularity in East Germany and the region still possesses one of the most atheistic populations in the world. By the time of unification in 1990, 36.3% of East Germans believed in God compared to 77.6% in West Germany.<sup>63</sup> “In contrast to the churches in socialist East Germany, the churches in West Germany have extensively integrated themselves into the democratic society.”<sup>64</sup> The East German policies regarding social-welfare were better than West

60 Turner, Henry Ashby., and Henry Ashby. Turner. *Germany from Partition to Reunification*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1992. Print. 47

61 McAdams, A. James. *Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1993. Print. 6

62 Moltmann, J. "Religion and State in Germany: West and East." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 483.1 (1986): 114

63 Froese, Paul, and Steven Pfaff. "Explaining a Religious Anomaly: A Historical Analysis of Secularization in Eastern Germany." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 44.4 (2005): 400

64 Moltmann, J. "Religion and State in Germany: West and East." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 483.1 (1986): 116

Germany's. Music during the divided period became another battleground for Soviet and western influence. The Soviet Union attempted to stave off the influence of western music but its popularity proved too much to contain leading to Soviet concessions on music in East Germany.

Communist regimes...have shown a distinct preference for music falling into one of two categories – either triumphant, 'progressive,' programmatic music, or mindless, nonevocatory, 'harmless' music. As a musical form, rock has been generally considered *harmful* by East European communist elites.<sup>65</sup>

Overall the societal homogeneity seems to have persisted despite the Cold War influences attempting to polarize each side. To some degree, the East and West German populations were molded by their respective bloc but these differences were tempered by a variety of connections to their neighbor state. “Indeed, in the GDR [East Germany] a society has emerged in which many of the structural elements of West German society are missing: it has no traditional upper class, social stratification has been blurred and social differences are comparatively small.”<sup>66</sup> The same author goes on to mention other shared features between the two states; family and friends living in the other state, a shared history, and a sense of German identity.

Economically, the two states were in completely different situations by 1990. The East German economy had struggled since its inception. The Soviet Union struggled to restructure the state to fit its communist ideology. Reparations were especially hard on East Germany.

The Russians...felt justified in seizing as much German industrial equipment as they could.

They therefore dismantled and shipped to the Soviet Union from their occupation zone entire factories as well as sizable quantities of motor vehicles, railroad rolling stock, and even rails.

The amount of productive capacity removed in this fashion has been estimated at as high as a

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65 Ramet, Pedro. "Disaffection and Dissent in East Germany." *World Pol. World Politics* 37.01 (1984): 91

66 Moreton, N. Edwina. *Germany between East and West*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987. Print. 143

quarter of the total in their zone.<sup>67</sup>

West German economic policy had been so successful that it had earned the name “economic miracle.” “In 1936 the GNP per capita of the Western part of Germany was on average the same as that of the Eastern part...but by 1980 it was...2.3 times that of the Eastern state.”<sup>68</sup> The quality of life of West Germans was significantly better than their eastern neighbors and led to mass emigrations from East to West until the building of the Berlin Wall slowed down the movement of population. East Germans worked harder and longer for less which may have contributed to a desire for unification with the more attractive West German state.

### *Interactions*

More so than the other two cases, the major interactions of the pre-unification stage were almost always connected to the outside forces occupying and controlling Germany. Both states had to maneuver carefully in the international system to avoid granting legitimacy or recognition to the other. “It is difficult to make much progress in improving the situation of the citizens of East Germany – ‘safeguarding the substance of the German nation’ – without giving increased recognition to East Germany as a regime, and thus deepening rather than overcoming the gap which divides the nation.”<sup>69</sup>

The first major interaction between the two states came in 1948 when the Soviet Union stopped allowing travel through East Germany to West Berlin. In response, the western allies were able to airlift the needed food and supplies to West Berlin leading to the end of the travel restrictions in 1949. In 1953, East German workers went on strike in protest of new work laws. A West German radio station broadcast the news to other parts of East Germany resulting in millions of workers striking and deadly clashes with Soviet forces. These first interactions were not on positive terms with East Germany attempting to starve West Berlin and West Germany attempting to cause unrest and rebellion

<sup>67</sup> Turner, Henry Ashby., and Henry Ashby. Turner. *Germany from Partition to Reunification*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1992. Print. 13

<sup>68</sup> Moreton, N. Edwina. *Germany between East and West*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987. Print. 123

<sup>69</sup> Moreton, N. Edwina. *Germany between East and West*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987. Print. 98

in East Germany. Two years later, in 1955, East Germany joined the newly formed Warsaw Pact while West Germany joined NATO. After having been deprived of a military since their defeat in World War II, by 1956 both states possessed militaries as Cold War tensions escalated. In the late 50's thousands of East Germans began fleeing to West Germany providing the motivation for building the Berlin Wall.

Willy Brandt became Chancellor of West Germany in 1969 and his policy of Ostpolitik began with the intention to normalize relations with East Germany. Up until then, most of the interactions between the two states were hostile in nature. A year later the Treaty of Moscow was signed by the USSR and West Germany. This treaty's goals were to normalize relations between East and West Germany and also granted limited recognition to East Germany as a state. The four WWII allies (France, UK, U.S., and USSR), in the same year, signed the Berlin Agreement which allowed for transit and communication between East and West Germany. The 1972 Basic Treaty, signed by East and West Germany, fully recognized both states and led to their acceptance into the UN. The 1974 World Cup saw East and West Germany play against each other in the first group stage. East Germany won the match but West Germany would go on to win the World Cup. The U.S. recognized East Germany in this year as well. With Gorbachev in power, the Cold War tensions that had been so prevalent in post-WWII Germany began to thaw. In 1989, both Hungary and Czechoslovakia's borders were loosened leading to more mass migration to West Germany from East. Attempts to prevent the escape of East Germans failed and before the end of the year, the Berlin Wall was being torn down. As this was happening, the East German regime collapsed leading to a general election where the winning party was in favor of immediate reunification. In 1990, with Gorbachev's blessing and a pro-unification East German government, Germany was unified. The reunified state remained a part of NATO and inherited most of its structure from West Germany.

### *Motivations*

Unification was the goal of West German foreign policy since the first days of the Federal

Republic. Chancellor Adenauer argued that German and Western policy should first concentrate on the rebuilding of German democracy, the revival of the economy and the full integration of Germany into structure of European and Atlantic cooperation. In the end, he claimed, success of this policy would produce the unification of Germany.<sup>70</sup>

East and West Germany came out of World War II as competitors for the Cold War powers but over time and despite early tensions, public opinion moved towards reunification. Since the 50's East Germans had been fleeing their state to live in West Germany. The quality of life of West Germans was more attractive and its economy was booming relative to the East. Through 1989-1990, the East and West German people heavily favored unification.<sup>71</sup> Because the German people had experienced great success (until WWII) as one state, they understood the potential benefits of unification. East Germany especially desired unification after decades of suffering on the front line of the iron curtain. "Above all, the East Germans wanted their share of the 'good life,' not just material affluence but also adventure, excitement, personal freedom."<sup>72</sup>

### Unification Process

#### *Interactions and Integration*

The unification process can be considered to have started when the East German general election resulted in a majority win for the pro-unification party. West Germany dominated the unification process but this was understood when the states entered into it. The East German army was disbanded leaving just the West Germany army. The East German currency was replaced by the West German Deutschemark. The judicial system of West Germany was used by the new state. The road to reunification finally ended in October, 1990. The integration process in Germany resembled more of a

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70 Kaiser, Karl. "Germany's Unification." *Foreign Affairs* 70.1 (1990/91). 181

71 Kuechler, Manfred. "The Road to German Unity: Mass Sentiment in East and West Germany." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56.1 (1992): 57

72 Kuechler, Manfred. "The Road to German Unity: Mass Sentiment in East and West Germany." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56.1 (1992): 68



mutually acceptable annexation. “The dominant partner in the [reunification] was the Federal Republic [West Germany], which had a population of 61 million, compared with less than 17 million for the Democratic Republic [East Germany], a much greater national product in convertible currency, and a well-established, freely elected government.”<sup>73</sup> The unification left Germany in NATO and soon after, granted full sovereignty to the state, ending the occupation by the Allies. Some issues occurred as a result of merging the two states after having existed under completely different political ideologies. “With economic union, better-graded and better-packaged West German products displaced many East German items in the markets.”<sup>74</sup> This issue was countered with subsidies to East Germans whose work had been made more difficult or less rewarding. The redistribution of state owned property was also a logistical complication. In unification, “West Germany agreed to continue pensions and social-welfare obligations of East Germany.”<sup>75</sup> German reunification was achieved with no bloodshed and pro-unification sentiments on both sides of the border. The East willingly submitted most of their institutions to the more stable and successful West German state.

### Post-Unification

#### *Events/Crises*

In the 26 years since unification, Germany has continued the trends of West Germany's success. There have been no major crises to speak of and Germany seems to have regained its standing as one of the great powers of the world, perhaps better than before considering the international community's relationship with Germany now compared to pre-World War II. This is not to say that unification has been perfect. The regions that make up the former East Germany have been disillusioned with the outcomes of unification. “By spring 1991,...a vast majority of the East Germans showed marked signs of disappointment with the unification process and its economic benefits and displayed considerable

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73 Harris, Chauncy D. "Unification of Germany in 1990." *Geographical Review* 81.2 (1991): 171

74 Harris, Chauncy D. "Unification of Germany in 1990." *Geographical Review* 81.2 (1991): 175

75 Harris, Chauncy D. "Unification of Germany in 1990." *Geographical Review* 81.2 (1991): 179

dissatisfaction with the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany to which they now belonged.”<sup>76</sup> This disappointment, however, would never manifest itself into something threatening to the cohesion of Germany.

### *Success of Unification*

Germany is a case of an extremely successful unification. The unification was desired by both states' populations in 1990 and since, it has been proven a great decision. The economy has been stable and in 2015 the IMF ranked Germany 4th in GDP. There have been no rebellions or sources of major unrest or violence which suggests a very stable state. No major crises or problems have had a significant impact on the state and the government has functioned as intended since unification. There have been no secessionist movements in Germany and its role in the international community has expanded greatly, especially in the EU.

### *Germany Case Implications*

Germany seemed to be in very ideal conditions for unification. The populations of both states desired unification and with the thawing of cold war tensions were able to achieve this goal. The difficulties of merging of two divergent political ideologies was avoided by the collapse of East Germany and West Germany's domination of the unification process. For the most part, the new state was a continuation of the state of West Germany with inclusion of East Germany's one advantage; its social-welfare stance. The homogeneity of the Germany people was eroded over their existence in the context of the Cold War but this didn't negatively effect the unification.

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76 Kuechler, Manfred. "The Road to German Unity: Mass Sentiment in East and West Germany." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56.1 (1992): 75

### **Chapter 3: Vietnam**

The context of Vietnam's unification was significantly different from Yemen's but still there are many parallels in their pre-unification history. In the late 1800's, France's colonial efforts in Southeast Asia resulted in the creation of French Indochina. This colony was primarily an economic endeavor with relatively few French civilians moving to reside there. Present-day Vietnam was divided into three provinces; Tonkin in the North, Annam in the middle, and Cochinchina in the South. There were occasional uprisings by the Vietnamese leading up to the First Indochina War but they failed to erode France's control over the colony. Bao Dai who had been emperor prior to colonization was given control of Annam in French Indochina. During World War II, Japan became heavily involved in Vietnam when France fell to the Axis. France's Indochina colony became controlled by puppet governments of Japan. After the end of World War II France wanted to regain control over Vietnam setting the stage for the end of colonial Vietnam. It was out of the First Indochina War that North Vietnam and South Vietnam were first created.

The First Indochina War began in 1945 when French colonial forces and the Northern Viet Minh began fighting. The French were fought alongside by the Vietnamese National Army (VNA), who were loyal to Emperor Bao Dai against the communist Viet Minh, and supported by the United States. The Viet Minh were supported by communist states like the Soviet Union, China, and East Germany. This conflict escalated until 1954 when France decided that it was better served giving up its control over Vietnam and began cease-fire negotiations. The 1954 Geneva conference marked the end of the war and was the event that partitioned Vietnam into North and South. The partition of Vietnam along the 17th parallel was based strongly on Cold War concerns of the major powers. The North became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) while the South became the Republic of Vietnam. The partition was meant to be only temporary and elections were planned for 1956 when the states

would be unified again. The hope of the United States and France was that by delaying the unification long enough, the South would have a chance to build up its base of support and infrastructure to prevent the North from dominating the unification process and creating a state on their terms. From the creation of the 17th parallel partition til the end of the Vietnam War,

During this period of separation both North and South Vietnam hustled to consolidate power over their respective regions to be in the best possible position should unification occur. Bao Dai's rule in independent South Vietnam lasted only a year when he was ousted and Diem became the head of state. In the mid 1950's the seeds of the Vietnam War were planted with uprisings against the Diem regime and by 1960 the National Liberation Front was created and began its campaign against the Southern government with the support of the North.

The influx of Catholic refugees became the backbone of Diem's government and were favored over the Buddhist majority for important positions in the government and military. During the course of the Vietnam War, Diem began religious persecution of the Buddhist majority over which he ruled. The deaths of nine Buddhists who had gathered to hear a prominent Buddhist speak sparked mass protests and several self-immolations as Diem's government refused to apologize or take responsibility for the crisis. These crises led the U.S. to reconsider its support for Diem's administration and support a 1963 military coup in which a general took Diem's position. His rule only lasted 3 months before another coup and until 1965 there were multiple changes in the head of state of South Vietnam. From 1965 til 1975 Nguyen Van Thieu ruled as President. North Vietnam experienced more political stability with Ho Chi Minh as president until his death in 1969 after which Ton Duc Thang took over. Le Duan was General Secretary of the North Vietnamese communist party from 1960 until his death which was a position with arguably more influence and political power than the presidency.

## Pre-Unification

### *Homogeneity*

The partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel separated the state based on primarily political considerations. The communist North was supported by most communist states and the South was supported by the United States and its anti-communist agenda. The difference between a North Vietnamese citizen and a South Vietnamese citizen was not a significant cultural distinction. Although religious affiliation was present as an identifying force, with hundreds of thousands of Catholics fleeing the North to escape possible persecution, the main distinction was political ideology. The pressures of the Cold War, as in Yemen, contributed to the identities of the two states. The North was, as expected, supported by members of the communist bloc while the United States and other allies were in favor of preventing the North from blanketing the entire region in communism.

The disproportion between the monolithic power of the Viet-Minh, armed, and with the halo of victory, and the almost derisory weakness of the so-called nationalist Vietnam was such that, in the summer of 1954, almost no one thought that the two years' delay won by...France at Geneva could be anything but a respite in which to salvage as much as possible from the wreck. At the end of the period, unity would certainly be restored, this time to the benefit of the Viet-Minh<sup>77</sup>

The legitimacy of South Vietnam was originally built on nationalism and Bao Dai, the last dynastic connection to pre-colonial Vietnam. After Bao Dai's ousting in 1955 and Diem's ascension to President of the Republic of Vietnam, religious concerns became more accentuated than before. In a country dominated by Buddhism, Diem was a minority catholic and entrusted as many important positions as he could to members of his faith. Although the majority of Vietnamese under Diem's rule were Buddhist his government was not religiously representative. The mass of Catholic refugees from the North became major parts of Diem's government and a loyal base of support. "These people

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77 Devillers, Philippe. "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam." *The China Quarterly* CQY 9 (1962): 3

[Catholic refugees] would inevitably be hostile to reunification so long as it would seem that the Viet-Minh would profit by it.”<sup>78</sup> Another important base of support for the South came from landowners and the upper class which had suffered the least and profited the most from Vietnam's colonial history. This made it difficult for the Southern leaders to frame their cause in a favorable way to many less wealthy rural citizens. Diem's repressive policies and economic failures made him very unpopular and fomented the growth of the NLF in the South. By the time of unification, the differences between the two populations were minimal. Considering how short the two states existed independently, it is not surprising that the citizens of both states were so similar.

While the citizens themselves were relatively homogenous across the 17th parallel, the economies had some major differences resulting from the divergent political ideologies. In unification, these incompatible economic structures would have to be integrated somehow. “In spite of Communist preoccupation with industrialisation, North Vietnam, like other parts of South East Asia, is a predominantly agrarian society.”<sup>79</sup> That said, the North's industrial growth in the late 50's-early 60's was not matched by its southern neighbor. The South was reliant on American involvement in the economy and struggled to industrialize. The large American troop presence in South Vietnam contributed to this dependency which weakened the Southern economy as de-escalation and troop withdrawals began. In 1958 Theodore Shabad writes, “North Vietnam is still largely dependent on foreign economic aid granted by virtually all the Communist countries. In 1955 North Vietnam signed a series of foreign aid agreements with its communist partners to speed the rehabilitation of the war-damaged economy.”<sup>80</sup> The two Vietnams' dependence on their respective ideological bloc of states can be understood as a homogenizing feature as they both lacked complete control over their economies.

Around that same era in the mid 50's, the South had made significant agricultural progress.

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78 Devillers, Philippe. "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam." *The China Quarterly* CQY 9 (1962): 5

79 Kaye, William. "A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam." *The China Quarterly* CQY 9 (1962): 83

80 Shabad, Theodore. "Economic Developments in North Vietnam." *Pacific Affairs* 31.1 (1958): 51

“According to the two Department of State White Papers on Vietnam, *per capita* food production rose substantially during the period 1955-1960, and total production for most crops surpassed prewar [First Indochina War] levels.”<sup>81</sup> The effects of the Vietnam War on both economies make it difficult to determine their exact economic situations immediately prior to unification but the earlier economic trends suggest that neither side had a huge economic advantage going into unification. The South was succeeding in agriculture and struggling with industrializing while the North made progress in their industries and benefited from the natural industrial resources in their territory. Both states relied on their international backers for trade, weapons, and development.

### *Interactions*

The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina marked the end of the First Indochina War and the beginning of North Vietnam and South Vietnam's relationship. The majority of their existence as independent states would be defined by the Vietnam War but the years preceding it reveal the motivations and concerns of both parties. The Geneva Conference which partitioned Vietnam along the 17th parallel also set dates for elections for the intended reunification which North Vietnam wanted to proceed with as soon as possible. In 1955,

July 20 – Elections scheduled by Geneva Agreements for this date not held. Government of South Vietnam rejects invitation of the North Vietnam regime to discuss such elections observing that in North Vietnam, the people could not express themselves freely, and that falsified votes in the North could cancel out votes in South Vietnam.<sup>82</sup>

While there may have been some validity to this justification, it also was in line with the South's objective of postponing unification until it became advantageous to them.

The interactions that occurred between North and South Vietnam were not varied in nature.

From the inception of both states, almost all of their interactions were either maneuvering to

81 Crawford, Curtis. "South Vietnam's Economy: A Note." *Vietnam Perspectives* 1.4 (1966): 14

82 "Chronology of Events Relative to Vietnam, 1954-1965." *Vietnam Perspectives* 1.1 (1965): 18

consolidate and expand their power or violence by proxy and direct conflict. In the late 1950's communist attacks in South Vietnam increased in regularity. These attacks while perhaps not being orchestrated directly by the North can be considered a North-South interaction considering the motivations of the communist rebels and the North's implicit support. Around 1960 North Vietnam aided in the creation of the NLF, based in the South, with the objective of fighting the anti-communist government of South Vietnam to bring about unification. The NLF was primarily a communist organization but many non-communists would end up joining in opposition to Diem's crackdown on the Buddhist majority and other political failings. The NLF conflict would eventually lead to the full-scale Vietnam War.

Until the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, all interactions between the governments were related in some way to the war. From the Paris Peace Accords it was decided the U.S. would leave Vietnam and Vietnamese unification would be achieved through peaceful means. In 1975 after the U.S. military had almost completely withdrawn and the North had built up its military, the Northern army attacked the South and successfully took control of the entire state. The pre-unification interactions of North and South Vietnam were all hostile. From the moment the two states were created, they began maneuvering and competing with each other and didn't stop until the North emerged victorious.

#### *Motivations*

Unlike Yemen, Vietnamese unification was only supported by one side. The goal of South Vietnam was to either remain independent or to make enough gains so that unification would not leave them powerless at the mercy of the North. On the other side of the 17th parallel, North Vietnam wanted unification to occur rapidly so as to press their advantage and establish Vietnam as a communist state. Geographically, industry and agriculture were more suited to certain regions which left both states with weaknesses and strengths. The southernmost region of French colonial-Vietnam, Cochinchina, was fertile and possessed the most agricultural potential. Under French rule “the greatest



exporter of agricultural products was Cochin-China...[which] exported about 80 per cent of [the total rice exports of French Indochina].”<sup>83</sup> The North was rich with mines, especially coal, and echoed the South's agricultural domination with deposits of coal, “zinc, tin, wolfram, antimony, silver, lead, gold, and iron ore.”<sup>84</sup> Whichever state led the unification would benefit from the economic specializations of North and South.

The state-specific unification goals of Vietnam were greatly influenced by the destruction of the Vietnam War. The economy had suffered from decades of conflict and despite the amount of deaths during the war, overpopulation was an issue. The revival and growth of the economy as well as reducing dependence on foreign aid were major goals of Vietnam. Since the decision maker in the process was only North Vietnam, the establishment of a communist government over all of Vietnam was a goal as well. South Vietnam's unification goals are irrelevant to this case study because the goals of a group that resisted unification as long as they could don't reflect on the success of unification as a whole.

### Unification Process

#### *Interactions and Integration*

For the purposes of this paper, the unification process began with the fall of Saigon to the North in April 1975 and ended in 1986 when the newly unified state held their first National congress as a unified Vietnam. The decision to unify the state through violence would have a great impact on the future of Vietnam. Because the unification was unilateral, the North asserted its own desired form of government over the entire state. Unsurprisingly, the militaries of both states were not integrated and so the former Northern army became the army of unified Vietnam. The dominance of communism in newly unified Vietnam and its invasion and installation of a communist government in neighboring Cambodia isolated the state from much of the international community. This included an embargo

<sup>83</sup> Beresford, Melanie. *National Unification and Economic Development in Vietnam*. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 19-20

<sup>84</sup> Beresford, Melanie. *National Unification and Economic Development in Vietnam*. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 19

from the United States which would last up to the mid 90's. In 1976, the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party laid out the political aspirations of the new state as such;

The economic transformation and economic construction, the stepped-up socialist revolution in ideology and culture, the fostering of the new man has one purpose: to build a system of socialist collective mastership of the society. The exercise of collective mastery of a society by the working class whose nucleus is the worker-peasant alliance through the state under the leadership of the vanguard party of the working class is proletarian dictatorship. Our state, therefore, is a state of proletarian dictatorship.<sup>85</sup>

Many Southern Vietnamese were not included in these plans for a new Vietnam and there were mass executions and imprisonments of South Vietnamese under the new state's rule. Re-education camps were established to imbue the North's former enemies with its favored communist ideology. A South Vietnamese defector revealed that "there must be about 340,000 prisoners in the whole of South Vietnam, with 200,000 being the absolute minimum. And, based on the execution of 700 people in his province, and learning of similar events in other provinces, he also concluded that tens of thousands of people had been executed in South Vietnam between 1975 and 1977 alone."<sup>86</sup> So Vietnamese unification did not end the regional split along the 17th parallel and its history as one state began with mass injustice towards the defeated southerners. These actions led to tens of thousands of South Vietnamese fleeing oppression and creating a refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. While the peaceful reconciliation of the Vietnamese population by the North was not achieved, its decision to pursue these violent policies does not indicate a failure to achieve certain Northern goals. As these policies were being enacted, Vietnam continued to define itself as a new state through political means. In response to the struggling economy and seemingly flawed system, steps were taken in the direction of economic liberalization in 1979.

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85 Chandola, Harish. "First Steps in Unification." *Economic and Political Weekly* 11.28 (1976). 1029

86 Morris, Stephen. "Glasnost and the Gulag: The Numbers Game." *Vietnam Commentary* 2 (1988). 2

Despite the government's declared commitment to socialism, the outcome of the resolutions of the Sixth Plenum is to decelerate the process of state control of all sectors of the economy and to liberalize some economic activities. Most of these liberalization policies are again aimed at the south where resistance to socialist transformation is greatest.<sup>87</sup>

It is worth noting that the decision to ease the South into a socialist economy was not done out of a spirit of representative integration but out of the knowledge that its economic system was not attractive to the South. In 1980, the 1959 Constitution of North Vietnam was revised to address the new political context of a unified Vietnam. From this revision the structure of the government was slightly rearranged and rebalanced. The roles and responsibilities of some of the heads of state were redistributed and renamed.

In 1986, the Sixth National Congress was held in Hanoi. This was the first National Congress since unification and focused on the economic issues facing the young state. The southern regions which had been reliant on U.S. Aid were now reliant, as the rest of Vietnam, on the Soviet Union. This ceasing of aid along with the effects of sustained bombing and warfare throughout Vietnam had left their economy crippled.

Kiet's [Vice-Premier] report stressed three main areas: production of grain and food products, consumer goods, and exports. These three sectors constituted 'the core of the socio-economic tasks for the five year period 1986-90' and were listed first among the main guidelines and economic objectives to be attained.<sup>88</sup>

Vietnam's unification process was less about integration as it was about consolidation of Northern control over the South. The South Vietnamese army was no more and Southern politicians were not given the ability to aid in the creation of the new state. The priorities of unified Vietnam were established during this period, focusing on economic revival and the application of its communist

87 Meng, Ng Shui. "Vietnam in 1980: The Challenge of Isolation." *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1981 1981.1 (1981): 346

88 Thayer, Carlyle A. "Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 9.1 (1987): 15

policies to the South. Near the end of this process, the first steps towards economic liberalization were made. These economic reforms, named Doi Moi, would have a large impact on the Vietnamese economy and aided in the revival of the post-war economy. The North's repression of Southern citizens left thousands dead, imprisoned, and fleeing. The new constitution was not a joint project but a revision of North Vietnam's former constitution. The spread of communism to the South and the invasion of Cambodia led to a degree of international isolation and a U.S. embargo.

### Post-Unification

#### *Events/Crises*

After a turbulent unification process where the Vietnamese government embarked on a mission of reeducation and oppression of anti-communists, the post-unification history of Vietnam has been relatively peaceful. There have not been any major crises resulting from the unification process and the economy has slowly liberalized naturally overtime after the success of Doi Moi policies. Quickly, Vietnam was able to recover from its post-war economic situation. In the late 80's early 90's Vietnam experienced the “introduction of a Foreign Investment Law...reduction of state control over the production decisions of the State Economic Enterprises; legal rights for the 'family' economy and the private sector; encouragement of individual agricultural production”<sup>89</sup> among many other reforms. The Soviet Union continued to provide immense financial support to Vietnam through the 80's. Foreign investment became a valuable part of the Vietnamese economy and agricultural growth increased. In 1992, “Member of Parliament Nguyen Xuan Oanh, noted: 'We want market socialism. The winds of change have blown. I believe the direction is irreversible.’”<sup>90</sup> By the 90's the only major issue persisting from unification was with its relationship to the international community and especially the United States. In the early 90's the IMF was considering allowing a loan from France and Japan to Vietnam and “President Clinton finally announced that the United States would not oppose IMF

89 Schellhorn, Kai M. "Political and Economic Reforms in Vietnam." Contemporary Southeast Asia 14.3 (1992): 237-238

90 Schellhorn, Kai M. "Political and Economic Reforms in Vietnam." Contemporary Southeast Asia 14.3 (1992): 238

assistance to Hanoi.”<sup>91</sup> Relations continued to improve to the 2000's with embassies in both states being established and the normalization of trade relations. There have been human rights concerns surrounding the treatment of political dissidents but none have led to any major conflict or unrest.

### *Success of Unification*

Although its origins were bloody and filled with the oppression of Southerners, the Vietnamese unification seems to have been successful. The state-specific goals of revitalizing the economy, agricultural growth, and asserting control over the entire state were all met. Vietnam has been stable since unification and managed to avoid any real conflicts or insurrections. The government has not experienced any coups and has been able to evolve naturally through revisions to the constitution. Determining the stability of post-unification Vietnam is difficult because while there was mass violence in the South, it was purposeful on the government's part and a result of their goals of reeducation and domination over the South.

### *Vietnam Case Implications*

Vietnam's case has some interesting implications for questions of unification. From the criteria of success laid out in this paper, Vietnam was undoubtedly successful in its unification. The fact that one side was completely opposed to the unification and had to be defeated in war does not negatively impact this success. The suppression and reeducation of southerners was undeniably a tragedy and a clear human rights violation but this is outside the phenomenon of unification unless it led to a crisis, instability, or impeded other goals of unification. This may be a limit of this approach to political unification in that it does not value humane actions over suppression. The problem, faced by Yemen, of two opposed armed forces in one state was avoided by disbanding the southern military. Again, societal homogeneity didn't appear to be a major issue (even in terms of political ideology) with many non-communists joining the NLF in the fight against South Vietnam.

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91 Goodman, Allan E. "Vietnam's Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the U.S. Response." *Asian Survey* 33.8 (1993): 834

## **Conclusion**

From the parameters of success laid out in this paper, Yemen's unification was a failure while Germany and Vietnam were successful. In all three cases there were differing degrees of societal homogeneity across various facets of the states. Neither the Vietnam case nor Germany suggest that lack of societal homogeneity is a major detractor from the success of a unification. Their societies were greatly influenced by the partition and the Cold War which pulled them in different directions yet their unification resulted in success. Yemen's lack of cultural homogeneity only played into its unification failures because of other decisions made during unification. The societal differences were only relevant because of the exchange of politicians across the old partition line and the redeployment of North and South army brigades. Other types of homogeneity seem to have a negative effect on the unifications. The military advantage of North Vietnam and economic advantage of West Germany were major facilitators of unification. Economic incentives seem to be the strongest in motivating unification and economic cooperation in both Germany and Yemen sped up their unification process.

Allowing one state to dominate the unification process eliminates many complications that occurred during Yemen's unification. North and South Yemen were not extremely far apart in terms of economic power and so President Saleh's attempts to wrest control from the South were met with more resistance. In the unifications of both Germany and Vietnam, one state dominated the unification process. In Yemen, both sides worked together to create the new state through peaceful means and economic cooperation. In Germany, the East Germans agreed to submit to the type of unification envisioned by the West Germans; remaining in NATO, disbanding the East's military, and applying the West German political ideology to the rest of the state. This dominant state's regime type and military became the unified state's regime type and military. This allowed room for the desirable aspects of the submissive state's structure to be implemented if seen fit. In Vietnam, the defeat and annexation of

South Vietnam left all the political power in the hands of the North. The attempted equal integration of Yemen's military and government was the root of many of their issues and the decision that may be responsible for the escalations of tensions into the Civil War. Having only one military force post-unification is a useful way to limit the possibility of secession or rebellion. The success of Vietnamese and German unification where Yemen failed is very much rooted in Germany and Vietnam's lack of a balance of power. Counter intuitively unification seems to be more successful when one of the unifying states submits or is forcefully dominated by the other during the unification process. North and South Yemen went through the unification process as equal actors but suffered when in the post-unification period, North Yemen attempted to make the South subservient.

Should Korean unification be attempted, it will be interesting to see how the question is approached. More than the cases in this paper, homogeneity is not present in Korea; economically, militarily, politically, culturally. In addition, almost all of their interactions have been hostile. Korean unification would be a very good test of many of the ideas put forth in this paper. National unification is a rare event and has only occurred a few times in the current context of the international system so there is still much to be learned from studies of this phenomenon.

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