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The Government Facilitation of North Korea's Human Rights Abuses Eclipsed by the Threat of Nuclear War

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The Governmental Facilitation of North Korea's Human Rights Abuses
Eclipsed by the Threat of Nuclear War

Senior Project submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
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Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

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Dedication

It is with enormous gratitude that I acknowledge the support and help of Professor Thomas Keenan for his mentorship throughout the research and writing of this article. His invaluable feedback and suggestions for improvement spanned several drafts. It is with immense love that I thank my family. I would like to say thank you to Caitlynn, my daughter, for stepping in and helping in those late hours when my brain understood something did not sound right but could not figure out why. I would thank Ryan, my son, for coming in and keeping me company during my typing sessions. I would like to apologize for making him making him feel as if he were the adult in the house while I took on the role of traditional college student. Thank you to Melinda, my sister, Jon, my father, and my extended family who joined my children in standing by me with patience and understanding, while encouraging me to complete my studies.

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Acronyms

CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

COI – Commission of Inquiry

CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child

DMZ – Demilitarize Zone

DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

FAO – The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FDRC – Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

ICC – International Criminal Court

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

KWP – Korean Workers Party

KPA – Korean People’s Army

MPS – Ministry of People’s Security

NDC – National Defense Commission

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NKPPC – North Korean Provisional People’s Committees

PDS – Public Distribution System

PPPD – Per Person Per Day rations

PSB – People’s Security Bureau

SEZs – Special Economic Zones

SSD – State Security Department

U.N. – United Nations

UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights

WFP – World Food Program

WHO – World Health Organization

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

WRK – Worker's Party of Korea

Introduction

In 2014, The United Nations General Assembly made front-page news by endorsing a recent report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, which detailed crimes against humanity committed by North Korea. The General Assembly made a recommendation to the Security Council to discuss the report and consider referring it to the International Criminal Court.¹ Several questions came to mind after hearing this announcement; how has the North Korean regime been able to commit human rights violations for decades without interference? Why did it take the International community so long to recommend that North Korea face judgment for their human rights violations?

To try to understand “why,” this essay will look at North Korea’s historical experiences that took place before, during, and after Japanese colonialism through the Korean Civil War in an effort to identify how they influenced early policies. More so how these policies would allow Kim Il-sung reach the level of supreme leader and establish his family as hereditary authoritarian rulers. How these original policies would create a government that would allow human rights abuses to become daily violations and to become a country that appears to be in a state of chronic crisis. All in an effort to figure out if there is in fact anything the international community could do to convince North Korea to enact reforms that will stabilize their country and bring an end to their human rights abuses. This topic is an intricately woven conundrum that raises questions, while offering very few answers.

¹ "North Korea: UN Condemns Crimes Against Humanity," Human Rights Watch, last modified November 18, 2014, accessed October 22, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/18/north-korea-un-condemns-crimes-against-humanity>.

North Korea is not an old country, its creation occurred after World War II, following forty years of Japanese rule. When Kim Il-sung came to rule he understood the power a cult personality and used it as a politician to build up a nation that would eventually view him, and ultimately his descendents, as deities. He was willing to borrow political ideas from the past and then transformed these ideas to suit his own motives. He used his charisma to mobilize the masses around these new policies and push forth his agenda. Later he was able to use his cult persona and his political power to secure a hereditary authoritarianism for his son and grandson. He was able to complete this in less than sixty years.

North Korea closed its borders during the 1960s allowing very little information from within North Korea to reach the outside world. Official reports come directly from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, although, they only release the information they wish to share. Other paths of information come from escaped North Koreans, intelligence agencies in South Korea, Japan, and United States or from South Korean or Chinese import and export records. The majority of escapees come from the lowest class in society. They can only report on what the officials have disclosed through propaganda or policies that affect their daily lives, or what they have personally witnessed. The intelligence reports are questionable due to the possibility of being biased in their assessment of the country while the import and export records only include legally exchanged items.

North Korea's closed society policy means very little information is available to study the country. Writing this report was challenging as there is a lot written on North Korea using the same small amounts of data, frequently reiterating the same

testimonies and statistics. Most publications focused on one area, such as the country's history, economics problems, the nuclear program, agriculture, or a specific human rights violation. Very few publications cover all the issues unless they were quick summaries of the problems. Another challenge had to do with contradictions revolving around dates of events, when the policies were enacted and which regime leader was given credit for originating the policies. One such example is the "two-meal a day program," some authors credit Kim Il-sung as the creator of this policy, while other authors credit Kim Jong-il as the creator. Additional confusion concerns when the policy was first implemented, depending on the author, the policies enactment first occurred in 1991, 1993, 1994, or 1995. On other policies there was no information regarding the exact date or when the event happened, they are only credited to a particular decade. The contradictions that were found required verification from duplicate sources.

Chapter One

Colonialism and the Division of Korea

Pre - History

In the 14th century, the Chosŏn dynasty established a class-based system called the “Yangban.”² Yangban combined military and scholar officials into a small aristocratic elite group who ruled over the peasants, merchants, and laborers, and practiced slavery and indentured servitude.³ Initially the system awarded elite status to men who passed a rigorous civil service exam.⁴ Those who belonged to the Yangban class separated themselves from other classes.⁵ They did not live next to those who were not Yangban, nor did they marry outside their class, eventually creating a class and institution in which elite status “was passed down through the generations and no longer earned.”⁶ The Chosŏn dynasty “held limited power, and for the most part were not respected by the Yangban.”⁷ To garner favor the monarchy bestowed large gifts of nontaxable land, putting the economic tax burden onto the lower classes.⁸ In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the old social distinctions were breaking down, there was a counterfeit genealogy market where commoners could attach their names to Yangban genealogies and elevate their status. In the nineteenth century, during a Japanese invasion, the army destroyed many genealogical records, making it difficult to determine who was or was not a member of a Yangban family.⁹

² Chun-gil Kim, *The History of Korea* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), 75.

³ *Ibid*

⁴ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., "Traditional Social Structure," United States Library of Congress, last modified 1990, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/35.htm>.

⁵ Ki-baek Yi, *A New History of Korea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute by Harvard University Press, 1984), 174.

⁶ Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1963), 10.

⁷ Mary E. Connor, *The Koreas: A Global Studies Handbook* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC CLIO, 2002), 24.

⁸ *Ibid*

⁹ Savada and Shaw, "Traditional Social Structure," United States Library of Congress.

Prior to the eighteenth century, Korean foreign relations consisted of annual trips to China to pay tribute to the Emperor with limited contact with Japan. Korea's external problems began when Japanese warships invaded, in 1876, demanding diplomatic and commercial relations and forcing Korea to end its long established policy of isolation with the "Kanghwa Treaty."¹⁰ This treaty declared Korea a sovereign nation, allowing Japan to move aggressively toward Korea without interference from China. During the nineteenth century, Korea experienced internal problems between the Chosŏn dynasty King and Queen. The King supported Japan's influence and the Queen wished to expel Japan and follow in China's path. Eventually Japanese assassins executed the Queen in 1895.¹¹ Externally Korea found itself at the center of rivalries between England, Russia, Japan, and China, who all wanted its resources. Korea signed the "Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation,"¹² with the United States in 1882, and later signed similar treaties with Britain Germany, Italy, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungry, opening up further foreign relations. A United States diplomatic envoy arrived in 1883, in the wake of the treaty, and stayed until 1905, when Japan assumed total control of Korean foreign affairs.¹³

In 1904, Japan declared war on Russia for refusing to withdraw its troops from Manchuria, and quickly won. This was a major coup for Japan as they had taken on a world power and won. With negotiating help from the United States, Japan and Russia signed the "Portsmouth Treaty," in 1906, where Russia acknowledged Japan's right to

¹⁰ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 30.

¹¹ Henry Chung, *The Case of Korea: A Collection of Evidence on the Japanese Domination of Korea, and on the Development of the Korean Independence Movement* (London: Routledge, 2011), 25.

¹² "COREA Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," Department of State, accessed October 22, 2015, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/June_2012/1-1822%20Treaty.pdf.

¹³ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 31.

Korea.¹⁴ Previously Japan signed the “Taft-Katsura Treaty” with the United States, in 1905, which allowed Japan free reign in Korea in exchange for the promise from Japan not to interfere with the Philippines.¹⁵ As long as Japan directed its imperialism away from American and British possessions, it had the support of the Western powers.¹⁶ In 1905, Japan made Korea a protectorate. Initially the Korean government supported Japan’s imperialism, and the government signed over the peninsula in exchange for Japanese arranged pensions, payments, and honors for the leading Yangban noblemen. By 1910, Japan took total control of Korea, dissolving the Chosŏn dynasty, the monarchy as the government, and the Korean nation itself. This began the 35-year period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea, which lasted until 1945 when Japan surrendered at the end of the Second World War.¹⁷

Japanese Colonialism

The period between 1910 through 1945 is crucial in understanding the post Second World War attitudes towards the Japanese that played out in the creation of the two Korea states. During 1910 through 1919, the Japanese conducted the first phase of their colonial rule, which the military controlled.¹⁸ They establish a draconian police system that deprived Koreans of their basic freedoms: civil society was abolished, freedom of speech suspended, all the police became judge and jury. The Japanese

¹⁴ "The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905," United States Department of State Office of Historian, accessed October 22, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/portsmouth-treaty>.

¹⁵ "Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900–1922," United States Department of State Office of Historian, accessed October 22, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations>.

¹⁶ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 35.

¹⁷ Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief History*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 258.

¹⁸ "Korea as a Colony of Japan, 1910-1945," *Asia for Educators*, last modified 2009, accessed October 22, 2015, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm.

controlled civil service, education, and the government.¹⁹ Japan redesigned the Korean education system in order to condition Korean children to embody Japanese ideals, creating loyal subjects. The Japanese reformed Korean land laws by requiring proof of ownership. Most farmers did not have the proper papers, resulting in the loss of their land. The Japanese land development companies transferred the seized land to Japanese investors and bureaucrats, or Japanese collaborators appointed to government and administrative positions. The law reinforced class inequalities that had been in place for centuries by strengthening the positions of the wealthy and deteriorating the position of the small farm. This economic gap helped set the stage for the violent left-right wing confrontations that followed the liberation of Korea in 1945.²⁰ The post Second World War “attitudes toward the Japanese and the impact of foreign domination helped stimulated Korean nationalism and influenced their cultural development creating class and ideological conflicts that persist today.”²¹

The second phase took place between 1919 through 1931, and began with a nonviolent nationwide demonstration for independence from the Japanese. The demonstrations failed and Koreans realized that Japan met direct confrontation with force, but it did succeed in unifying Korean nationals against the Japanese, and resulted in some reforms of Japan’s policies. Japan enacted cultural policy reforms, hoping to improve world opinion concerning the occupation.²² Korean newspapers and magazines were to publish again, and civil society organizations became legalized. Koreans used this time of these reforms to preserve their culture and reeducate young

¹⁹ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 37.

²⁰ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 260.

²¹ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 36.

²² *Ibid* 37.

Koreans in an effort to work towards liberation.²³ It was during this phase that the split in ideals started to emerge into two factions: those who wished to preserve the Korean culture without overthrowing the Japanese regime, and those who violently wanted to overthrow the regime while restructuring Korean society to redistribute wealth.²⁴ The Korean communities who went into exile also developed into factions: one group embraced Western ideals and eventually formed the Republic of Korea, and the other group embraced communist ideals.²⁵ The class and ideological conflicts that developed during and after the period of Japanese occupation continue to influence both North and South Korea.

In 1931 in Japan, the military took control of the government and seized Manchuria, abandoning any pretense of democracy as they chose militarism and war in their “Asia for Asians” campaign to expel Western imperial powers and widen their control over Asia.”²⁶ Thus began the third phase of Japanese colonialism in Korea, where another round of reforms were enacted that lasted until Japan’s surrender in 1945. Japan reorganized the Korean infrastructure to supply resources for the Japanese military, and with this reorganization came a new phase of repression that amounted to the destruction of Korea cultural.²⁷ Japan forcefully started assimilating Koreans into Japanese culture and political life. They forced Koreans to worship the gods of imperial Japan.²⁸ Japanese teachers taught Korean children, Japanese

²³ Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 51.

²⁴ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 263.

²⁵ T. I. Han, *Lonesome Hero: Memoir of a Korea War POW* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011), 115.

²⁶ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 265.

²⁷ *Ibid*

²⁸ Donald N. Clark, *Culture and Customs of Korea* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), 49.

soldiers vandalized ancient temples.²⁹ Koreans were forced to abandon their literature and history, the national anthem was banned, and their flag could not be flown.³⁰ Koreans had to dig up their national flower and plant cherry trees.³¹ One act required Koreans to adopt Japanese names; by the end of the war, more than 80% had complied.³² In a society where reverence for their ancestors and family lineage was paramount, this policy created a deep and lasting resentment.³³ Many Koreans chose to collaborate with the Japanese, in an attempt to succeed within the colonial system. Rejection of the system was not a viable option as it resulted in poverty, or jail. A few profited enormously and justified their collaboration because they felt they were helping Korea to modernize.³⁴ Japan's attempt to remodel Koreans into loyal subjects failed, Japanese people continued to discriminate against Koreans based on their ethnicity.

Many recognizable modern aspects of Korean society emerged or grew considerably during Japanese colonial rule. "Industrial development and expansion of commerce were encouraged by Japan for the primary purpose of enriching Japan itself and helping to promote its expansion throughout the Asian Pacific rather than for the benefit of the Korean people."³⁵ During the period of wartime mobilization from 1937 to 1945, Japan reintroduced harsh measures to their colonial rule. They instituted labor drafts that shipped Koreans to Japan against their will to provide services for the Japanese. These services included serving in the Japanese armed forces as soldiers, working in military factories, and having the women serve as sex slaves for Japanese

²⁹ Joan Ferrante-Wallace, Study Guide for Sociology: A Global Perspective, 6th ed. (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Pub., 2006), 60.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

³² Korea as a Colony," Asia for Educators.

³³ Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 41.

³⁴ Ibid 42

³⁵ Korea as a Colony," Asia for Educators.

soldiers.³⁶ Resistance groups began emerging to fight to free Korea from the Japanese; the non-communist Korean resistance formed the Korean Restoration Army in 1940, they worked with Chinese nationalist and the United States military advisors, while communist Koreans worked with Chinese communist.³⁷ Japan displayed a lack of tolerance for communist ideals; they set about annihilating all factions of the Korean communist party. In an effort to survive, the Korean communist party split into groups; with some going into exile in China or the Soviet Union, while others remained in the Korea Mountains to carrying on a guerrilla war along the Korean-Manchuria border. It was in this last group that Kim Il-sung emerged as a military leader.³⁸

For the Korean people the legacy of Japanese colonialism revolves around “economic underdevelopment, social and psychological disruption, and the bitter fruits of collaboration.”³⁹ With economic underdevelopment, Japan modernized Korea’s infrastructure during its occupation, but Koreans take exception to assertions that they should be grateful to Japan for improvements made under Japanese rule. They argue that none of the improvements were implemented to benefit Korea but rather make to their colony more profitable for Japan. Once the modern improvements were in place few Koreans were allowed to utilize or participate in them. Those that were fortunate enough to do so were never allowed to advance beyond the lowest of positions, because they were not Japanese. The social and psychological disruption stemmed from the fact that the more a person retained his or her Korean identity, the less likely he or she was to advance into a position of responsibility, and even rarer, a position of

³⁶ "Korea as a Colony of Japan, 1910-1945," Asia for Educators, last modified 2009, accessed October 22, 2015, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm.

³⁷ Gi-Wook Shin, *Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014), 136.

³⁸ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 265.

³⁹ Ibid 267

authority.⁴⁰ When Korean students wished to obtain higher levels of education, they were required to go to Japan, discard their Korean identity, and become Japanese. The legacy of collaboration left behind an accumulation of social, economic, and institutional frictions.

After the liberation from Japan in 1945, Korean politics exploded as Koreans accused each other of collaboration and betrayal. Koreans who served in Japanese colonial bureaucracy and as police were condemned as national traitors. Many wealthy businessmen and landowners were accused of supporting Japan in order to save their fortunes. At the end of the Second World War, the Korean people were surprised by the sudden collapse of Japan, especially those who chose to support Japan. The collaboration issue became a point of contention, and instrumental to the separation of ideals in the North and South after liberation from Japan.⁴¹ The allies hoped the Koreans within Korea would follow the lead of the exiled Korean factions, as they did not have a “regime-in-waiting” to install in Korea after Japanese colonialists were removed.⁴²

The Division of Korea

As the war with Japan was still ongoing, the “Cairo Conference” happened in 1943.⁴³ During this conference the allies, the United States, China, and The United Kingdom, pledged to strip Japan of all the territories it had acquired since 1894.⁴⁴ They

⁴⁰ Ezra F. Vogel, *The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 49.

⁴¹ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 267.

⁴² Olsen, *Korea, the Divided Nation*, 55.

⁴³ "The Cairo Conference, 1943," United States Department of State Archive, accessed October 23, 2015, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/107184.htm>.

⁴⁴ Ibid

determined that Korea was to be free and independent after an Allied victory.⁴⁵ The strategic position of the Korean peninsula and its liberation from Japan became problematic between the two emerging super powers. As the war in Europe was finishing, the Allied powers met in February 1945 for the "Yalta Conference."⁴⁶ It was then that the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan, in the hopes of ending the Pacific war. They began an invasion into Manchuria and proceeded to conduct landings into the Korean Peninsula.⁴⁷ The United States understood that the Soviet Union had greater military power in Asia and could eventually control Korea outright, while the Soviet Union was concerned about the United States fully occupying Korea.

The partition of Korea took shape during the "Postdam Conference" in July 1945,⁴⁸ with the allies deciding on a temporary demarcation line in order to accept the surrender of Japanese military forces.⁴⁹ The Army Colonels Rusk and Bonesteel,⁵⁰ decided upon the 38th parallel on short notice, devised the idea to divide the Korean peninsula into two zones of control.⁵¹ They decided on the 38th parallel, as it left the capital Seoul within the American controlled area.⁵² When the United States suggested dividing Korea, the Soviet Union quickly agreed. The belief is that Stalin's quick

⁴⁵ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., "World War II and Korea," United States Library of Congress, last modified 1990, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/8.htm>.

⁴⁶ "The Yalta Conference, 1945," United States Department of State Office of Historian, accessed October 22, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf>.

⁴⁷ Martin Ira Glassner, *The United Nations at Work* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 270.

⁴⁸ Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China, and Korea, 1948-53* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 169.

⁴⁹ Ciment et al., *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since*, 622.

⁵⁰ Terence Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement: The United States Defense Commitment to South Korea* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 116.

⁵¹ James I. Matray, "Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel," *Pacific Historical Review* 50, no. 2 (May 1981): 148, accessed October 31, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638724>.

⁵² Olsen, *Korea, the Divided Nation*, 62.

response stemmed from not wishing to confront the United States by occupying the entire peninsula, and they hoped the United States would be willing to permit the Soviet Union to occupy the northern half of Japan.⁵³

During the December 1945 "Moscow Conference," the United States, Soviet Union, China and The United Kingdom, agreed to Korea falling under a 4-power trusteeship.⁵⁴ The United States felt that the Soviet Union's familiarity with Korea's history made them a practical candidate to share the occupational administrative duties of Korea during the five-year trusteeship.⁵⁵ The Soviet Union arrived in North Korea prior to the surrender of Japan and planned to construct the North Korean government in the same manner they used to install communist governments in Eastern Europe.⁵⁶ The United States did not arrive in South Korea until after Japan had officially surrendered, and they did not arrive with a clear plan of action on how to help Korea become an independent nation.⁵⁷ Once the two countries occupied Korea, the Soviet Union refused to work with the United States until an agreement was reached to establish a provisional government.⁵⁸

Once set up in South Korea the United States military government set about suppressing the newly formed localized governments fearing they were a part of a leftist movement conspiracy with the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ Instead, the United States proceeded to form a new government made up of well-educated and English speaking Koreans who

⁵³ Savada and Shaw, "World War II and Korea," United States Library of Congress.

⁵⁴ "Incoming Message to CINCAFPAC [MacArthur] from Washington (War), nr WCL 32355 [Communiqué of Moscow Conference, December 27, 1945]," National Diet Library, accessed October 23, 2015, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiry0/03/053/053tx.html>.

⁵⁵ Edward A. Olsen, *Korea, the Divided Nation* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2005), 61.

⁵⁶ James Ciment et al., *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1999), 624.

⁵⁷ Olsen, *Korea, the Divided Nation*, 63.

⁵⁸ Ciment et al., *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since*, 622.

⁵⁹ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 44.

held anticommunist ideals or were usually Japanese collaborators. Koreans saw that the United States elevated collaborators into positions of authority. Many of the northern wealthy Koreans moved south in an effort to retain the wealth they had maintained or obtained during the Japanese occupation. The United States policy assumed the role of protecting South Korea from communist control, which angered the Soviet Union and their Korean communist allies.

In the North, Korean Provisional People's Committees (NKPPC) removed all government administrators who were in place at the time of Japanese liberation under the NKPPC decree "Classification of Pro-Japan and Anti-Korean Elements."⁶⁰ The Soviet Union chose a different yet equally oppressive path in developing the localized governments into core institutions that reinforcement communist policy.⁶¹ One such organization was the "South Pyongyang Committee for the Preparation for Independence," located in the capital of North Korea, operated by Cho Man-sik, a popular politician.⁶² The Soviet Union imprisoned Cho Man-sik for refusing to sign the declaration of support of trusteeship,⁶³ and chose an interim ruler as his replacement: the 33-year-old Korean guerrilla hero Kim Il-sung.⁶⁴ Kim Il-sung had distinguished himself as a military leader in the Korean communist guerrilla army while fighting against Japan. The Soviet Union continued to push aside any political leader who did not hold left-wing ideals. In the north, official records show Kim Il-sung as the first

⁶⁰ Timeline," The Committee For Human Rights In North Korea, accessed October 23, 2015, <https://www.hrnk.org/publications/timeline.php>.
Located within the 1946 Tab

⁶¹ Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation, 63.

⁶² Christoph Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 57.

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid 58

leader of the North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party.⁶⁵ He created local communist parties throughout North Korea while eliminating “enemies of the people.” Enemies of the people included anyone who held non-communist ideals, and Japanese collaborators. Kim Il-sung stripped them of any assets they had managed to hang on to throughout Japanese rule.⁶⁶ Kim Il-sung reaped considerable propaganda value when the wealthy northern Koreans moved south, stating they were safe in the south and even protected by the United States military.⁶⁷

After the Second World War, throughout 1945 to 1948, the Soviet Union and the United States began to become suspicious of each other’s political ideals and foreign intentions.⁶⁸ It was during post-war reconstruction period that the United States and the Soviet Union went from being allies to Cold War adversaries.⁶⁹ Both countries were jockeying to promote their political visions of a post-war international order. It was their differing visions of extreme social, political, and economic ideals that play out in their handling of Korea. “The Soviet Union sought to expand its influence from Eastern Europe into North Korea, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The United States wished to expand its influence from Western Europe to Latin America, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.”⁷⁰ The Soviet Union moved in to occupy and rule North Korea with the same objectives they used in Europe to expand their ideals.⁷¹ They consolidated North Korea into a left-wing government that emphasized socialism,

⁶⁵ Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 71.

⁶⁶ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 267.

⁶⁷ *Ibid* 268

⁶⁸ "Soviet Union 1945-1985," Sam Houston State University, accessed October 23, 2015, http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Soviet2.html.

⁶⁹ Sean Sheehan, *The Cold War* (London: Hodder Wayland, 2003), 12.

⁷⁰ "Cold War," The Eleanor Roosevelt Paper Project, accessed October 23, 2015, <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/cold-war.cfm>.

⁷¹ Olsen, *Korea, the Divided Nation*, 63.

land reform, and independence from outside powers. This was in contrast to South Korea's transformation under the support of the United States, which promoted a capitalist government that was pro-Yangban class system, with largely Japanese-trained officials.

The Soviet Union's occupation of North Korea alarmed the United States as they realized a Soviet occupation of Korea put communist forces dangerously near Japan. This realization brought a halt to United States reforms within Japan in 1947 and 1948, to focus on Japan's economic recovery and political rehabilitation in order to build an allied country that would join forces against a communist threat.⁷² In this reversal, the United States turned from punishing Japanese leaders for their wartime atrocities to building a key cold war ally.⁷³ Because the two political ideals of each occupied zone were so extreme, the merging of the two became difficult if not impossible; these differences led to eventual hardening of the 38th parallel. Korea became an "unfortunate testing ground in the cold war."⁷⁴

These divisions peaked when the United States decided to end its occupation prior to the end of the five-year trusteeship, to focus on Japan's recovery. In 1948, the United States gave The United Nations the task of creating a "free" Korea. To accomplish this, The United Nations attempted to hold national elections throughout Korea. North Korea viewed this as an act of aggression as South Korea had a larger population than the north, which weighed the election toward the right-wing candidates making the left wing a disadvantaged minority. The northern government refused to

⁷² "Korean War and Japan's,"United States Department of State Office of Historian.

⁷³ "Korean War and Japan's Recovery,"United States Department of State Office of Historian, accessed October 22, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/korean-war>.

⁷⁴ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 312.

allow The United Nations to carry out elections in North Korea, and so the election went ahead only in the south. The south elected Syngman Rhee as the first president of the “Republic of Korea (ROK).” Rhee had ties with the United States, as he was educated there.⁷⁵ The north left-wing assembly answered the United Nations elections by creating the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” and appointing Kim Il-sung as Supreme Leader.⁷⁶ Once the DPRK was created, the Soviet Union withdrew from North Korea in December 1948, “leaving behind military advisors and a Soviet trained North Korean Army.”⁷⁷ The United States withdrew the remainder of its troops in June 1949, leaving behind a small contingent of military advisors and an ill-equipped and equally ill-trained South Korean Army.⁷⁸

The Korean Civil War

In North Korea, Kim Il-sung began planning to invade the south in an effort unify the country.⁷⁹ Kim Il-sung repeatedly asked to the Soviet Union for permission to invade South Korea, and the Soviet Union agreed in 1950 as long as China agreed to support the war with resources.⁸⁰ China did and “released 60,000 battle hardened Koreans from the People’s Liberation Army for duty in North Korea.”⁸¹ On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and opened fire on South Korean troops. Very quickly, North Korea troops captured most of South Korea except Pusan. At this point, the United States requested the United Nations support for the Republic of

⁷⁵ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 312.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*

⁷⁷ Jenel Virden, “The Korean War Beginning,” in *Americans and the Wars of the Twentieth Century* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 82.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*

⁷⁹ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 313.

⁸⁰ Lester H. Brune, *The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 213.

⁸¹ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 49.

Korea.⁸² The Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations and China was not yet a member at this point, so neither were present to veto the resolution to defend South Korea. The Korean War lasted three years with an estimate of three million military and civilian dead.⁸³ It created extensive economic and infrastructure damage, and both sides controlled the same amount of territory in the end.⁸⁴ The armistice talks began in 1951 but did not conclude until 1953. The issue of what to do with prisoners of war was the main point of contention that prevented the countries from reaching an agreement earlier. The United States wanted the prisoners to be able to choose whether they wished to go home, while China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union wanted the prisoners repatriated.⁸⁵ When Stalin died, China and North Korea conceded on the issue and allowed the fighting to end without the two sides of Korea signing a Peace Treaty.⁸⁶

One legacy of the war was the result of the air superiority the United States displayed during the war and the lasting effects it had on North Korea.⁸⁷ North Korea and Chinese air defenses were inadequate, and Stalin limited the Soviet Union's air battles with the United States as he feared all out war between the two countries.⁸⁸ North Koreans lived in fear of aerial attacks and the possibility of atomic bombs for three years. This fear left a deep and lasting psychological impact of weakness and

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Charles A. Corr, Clyde Nabe, and Donna M. Corr, *Death and Dying, Life and Living*, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1999), 88.

⁸⁴ Michael Burgan, *The Korean War* (Chicago, Ill.: Heinemann Library, 2003), 4.

⁸⁵ Avram Agov, "North Korea's Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (February 2013): 237, accessed October 23, 2015, http://www.history.ubc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/readings/agov_north_koreas_alliances_jks_18_no2_fall_2013.pdf.

⁸⁶ Ibid 238

⁸⁷ Charles K. Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 30.

⁸⁸ Ibid

defenselessness.⁸⁹ This fear of vulnerability to outside forces manifested into North Korea's need to build up their anti-aircraft defenses, underground installations, and nuclear weapons to ensure that they would not be defenseless again.⁹⁰

The other effect was the hardening of the divisional line between the north and the south. The line moved from the 38th parallel to the cease-fire line. South Korea took control of the eastern mountainous area north of the parallel, and North Korea claimed the western area south of the parallel line to include the city of Kaesŏng.⁹¹ The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was formed by "pulling back the respective forces 1.2 miles" along each side of the cease-fire line.⁹² The DMZ houses the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, where conferences between the two sides take place, as well as two villages that were allowed to stay in place after the Armistice Agreement; the North Korean Kijong-dong "Peace Village" remains vacant while the South Korea Daesung-dong "Freedom Village" remains populated.⁹³ The DMZ has become the most heavily fortified area on earth. North Korea and South Korea have more than 1.7 million active duty troops with another 16 million reserve troops stationed near the DMZ.⁹⁴ The DMZ was supposed to be a temporary boundary until the two Koreas could find a peaceful political solution for their unification; unfortunately, it has become a permanent division between two polarizing political ideals.

⁸⁹ Ibid 31

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Paul M. Edwards, *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 73.

⁹² William L. Hosch, *Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power* (New York, NY: Britannica Educational Pub. in association with Rosen Educational Services, 2010), 50.

⁹³ Dongsei Kim, *The Demilitarized Zone* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2012), 51, accessed October 23, 2015, http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1248052.files/2012.04_D_KIM_DMZ_Penny_White_Reduced_Spread_Secure.pdf.

⁹⁴ Ibid

Chapter Two

Policies Born from Colonialism and the Division of Korea

Legacies of Colonialism and the Civil War

After liberation from the Japanese and during the Soviet occupation, Kim Il-sung's pursuit for leadership of the DPRK took almost a decade. In 1948, he became the premier leader of the DPRK but he did not achieve the position of supreme leader of the DPRK until 1959.⁹⁵ North Korea's historical experiences and fears guided the formulation of Kim Il-sung's policies in his quest to achieve the top leadership position. As the premier leader Kim Il-sung reverted to the highly isolationist policies of pre-occupied Korea.⁹⁶ He expanded his ruling circle and eliminated potential opponents, in an effort to do this Kim Il-sung establish the Songbun social classification in the late 1940's as a measure to combat the old Confucian feudal system that existed before and Japanese colonialism and to eliminate out anyone who benefited from or collaborated with the Japanese rule . He created the Juch'e ideology policy, which arose from two desires that were present at the end of the Korean War. The first developed from North Korea's desire to form a unified Korea,⁹⁷ the second from their fear of foreigners as they were viewed as a threat, their pride in surviving the Korean War and a determination to "avenge the national damage caused by the perceived western imperialism during the war."⁹⁸ Kim Il-sung was able to enforce his ideals and policies onto the people with the help of the "Workers' Party of Korea."⁹⁹ The "Workers' Party of Korea" (WPK) was constructed between 1945 and 1949 by merging the North Korean Branch Bureau, the

⁹⁵ Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 71.

⁹⁶ Grace Lee, "The Political Philosophy of Juche," *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 108, accessed October 23, 2015, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Matthew Warner, *A Historical-critical Examination of North Korea's Juche Ideology Using Fantasy Theme Analysis: A Vision Transformed* (Ann Arbor, United States: ProQuest, 2008), 10.

⁹⁸ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 406.

⁹⁹ Jeroen Temperman, *State-religion Relationships and Human Rights Law: Towards a Right to Religiously Neutral Governance* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 144.

Korean Communist Party and the New Democratic Party,¹⁰⁰ in which Kim Il-sung was appointed chairman.¹⁰¹

The Role of Songbun

The creation of the Songbun system formed after the old Yangban system social classification was assigned based on a person's level of loyalty to Kim Il-sung regime.¹⁰² In 1945, this reclassification system turned the social ranking of individuals upside down; peasants occupied the top of the caste ladder while those who were aristocrats and landlords fell to the bottom of the ladder. This new classification allowed Kim Il-sung to conduct the first round of purges, which consisted of Japanese supporters, merchants and landlords who benefited from the occupation.¹⁰³ During the first year, the Songbun system was unofficial and only required background investigations for those seeking positions within the top ranks of the government.¹⁰⁴ The Songbun system did not become official for everyone until 1957, when the "May 30th Resolution" was issued.¹⁰⁵ This resolution allowed for the evaluation of the political background of every adult, which marked a turning point for the citizens of the DPRK. The Songbun system separated the citizens into three categories: the core, wavering, and hostile. The highest category was reserved for family members of guerrilla soldiers who fought

¹⁰⁰ Dae-Sook Suh, "North Korea in 1985: A New Era after Forty Years," *Asian Survey* 26, no. 1 (January 1986): 78, accessed October 27, 2015, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ezprox.bard.edu/eds/detail/detail?nobk=y&vid=6&sid=8cb83a03-9094-4aee-80de-3f43e6c2692a@sessionmgr4004&hid=4113&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ==#AN=edsjsr.2644095&db=edsjsr>.

¹⁰¹ Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 71.

¹⁰² Robert Willoughby, *North Korea*, 3rd ed. (Chalfont St Peter: Bradt Travel Guides, 2014), 63.

¹⁰³ Robert Collins, "Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea's Social Classification System," *THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA*, 11, accessed October 23, 2015, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*

¹⁰⁵ Seong-Chang Cheong, "S TALINISM AND KIMILSUNGISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY AND POWER*," *ASIAN PERSPECTIVE* 24, no. 1 (2000): 153, accessed October 23, 2015, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/240105-Cheong.pdf.

with Kim Il-sung, they were allowed to live in Pyongyang.¹⁰⁶ The lowest classification fell on the former wealthy industrialist, alleged spies, Catholics, and Buddhists. The “May 30th Resolution” resulted in a second wave of purges which were politically motivated, to include anyone that was viewed as a threat to Kim Il-sung’s government to include different political ideas, this purge lasted until 1958, and resulted in thousands of executions.¹⁰⁷ Following the May 30th Resolution the government issued Decree No. 149 dictating where members of the hostile class could reside, exiling thousands to the rural area of North Korea, where living conditions were difficult, far away from the capital Pyongyang, and the 38th parallel.¹⁰⁸ Special settlements, which became prison camps, were created just for the exiles.¹⁰⁹ In 1959, a German diplomat reported, “in recent times, the persecution of comrades who express a different opinion has been increased. They are being sent to rural areas, mines, hydropower dams and also into prison camps.”¹¹⁰ It was very hard for a person to raise their political status within the Songbun system, but very easy for a person to lose their political status. The only factor that determined movement within the Songbun system is loyalty to the Kim regime.¹¹¹ For

¹⁰⁶ Robert L. Worden, *North Korea: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2008), 79.

¹⁰⁷ Collins, “Marked for Life: SONGBUN,” *THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA*. 20

¹⁰⁸ Ken E. Gause, *Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State* (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 106, accessed October 23, 2015, http://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Ken-Gause_Translation_5_24_13.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, report no. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, Twenty-fifth Session (n.p.: Human Rights Council, 2014), 30, accessed October 25, 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ColDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx>.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid* 29

Originally Cited from a diplomatic cable sent in 1959 by the Ambassador of German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1957, the GDR Embassy already noted information according to which students who had returned from Poland had been sent to prison camps in Pyongyang that were guarded by soldiers. For a citation of the original German texts, which were found in GDR archives after reunification, see Liana Kang-Schmitz, “Nordkoreas Umgang mit Abhängigkeit und Sicherheitsrisiko”, pp. 225-226.

¹¹¹ Helen-Louise Hunter, *Kim Il-sung's North Korea* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 32.

over 60 years, the Songbun system has played a major role in determining the main victims of the human rights violations within North Korea.¹¹²

The Role of Juch'e in North Korean Policies

Juch'e emerged from Marxist-Leninism and adapted to North Korean conditions, and was influenced by Maoism and Stalinism, promoting self-reliance and extreme nationalism.¹¹³ Kim Il-sung created the Juch'e ideals during the 1950s as a way to limit the Soviet Union's influence over North Korea.¹¹⁴ In 1955 Kim Il-sung gave the "Juch'e speech,"¹¹⁵ officially declaring it as a policy and "by 1956 it had been adopted by the masses."¹¹⁶ Kim Il-sung mimicked the Confucian way of placing a high value on studying in order to master its teachings, to promote Juch'e ideals. Using this concept the DPRK government imposed rigorous and constant study sessions on all its citizens, young and old, of Kim Il-sung's works, particularly those policies dealing with Juch'e.¹¹⁷ Juch'e became part of North Korea's 1972 constitution in Article 3, which stipulates that the government "shall make the Juch'e ideology the guiding principle for all its actions."¹¹⁸ Kim Il-sung designed the Juch'e ideology to inspire the people to work hard to achieve true national independence from foreign aid and control. The policy has influenced the actions of the North Korean government since the "1960s when the

¹¹² Collins, "Marked for Life: SONGBUN," THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA.93

¹¹³ Warner, A Historical-critical Examination of North, 13.

¹¹⁴ Paul French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula--a Modern History, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 2007), 43.

¹¹⁵ Charles K. Armstrong, "Chapter 2. THE NATURE, ORIGINS, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN STATE," 20, last modified October 25, 2015, PDF.

¹¹⁶ Warner, A Historical-critical Examination of North, 11.

¹¹⁷ Report of the detailed, 33.

¹¹⁸ "Juche Ideology," Columbia Law School, accessed October 25, 2015, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/3.html.

ideology became a pillar of the North Korean State.”¹¹⁹ Kim Il-sung prohibited any other political ideologies, to be talk about or taught within North Korea. Kim Il-sung used Juch’e to conduct another round of purges were he proceeded to remove Koreans with Soviet political sympathies and anyone he felt was imitating Soviet techniques in education and propaganda.¹²⁰

There are three governing principles of Juch’e: “Chaju,” domestic and foreign independence, “Charip,” economic independence and “Chawi,” military independence.¹²¹ Under the Chaju principle, North Korea earned the nickname “Hermit Kingdom” because of its mistrust of foreign countries. This was in reference to the Korean Choson dynasty, which maintained a fifty-year history of keeping its distance from foreign nations.¹²² North Korea felt if they allowed foreign intervention, or pressure they could not maintain Chaju. Kim Il-sung felt that political independence was crucial to economic stability and military self-defense. The Charip principle promoted the need to build up a solid economic foundation to ensure political stability and maintaining a military defense. The Chawi principle meant increasing the country’s defense capabilities in order to counter any perceived or real threat from foreign countries. “Kim’s conception of political organization was virtually synonymous with military organization and his understanding of the primary purpose of political organization was to constitute the entire able-bodied population as a permanently battle-prepared

¹¹⁹ Louise Waldebstrom, "North Korea's Juche Ideology and its Implications on Pyongyang's Relations with Washinton 1994-2004,"9, last modified February 2005, PDF.

¹²⁰ French, North Korea: The Paranoid, 43.

¹²¹ "Juche Ideology." 106

¹²² Kong Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 148.

national militia.”¹²³ This belief ensured that the Chawi policy dominated the objectives of the government where in they put military defense programs first, at the expense of the North Korean citizens.

The Role of the Worker’s Party of Korea

At the time of the Worker’s Party of Korea creation in 1946, there were 170,000 members.¹²⁴ The Worker’s Party of Korea was responsible for leading the people in defending and carrying forward Kim Il-sung’s Juch’e policies. “The Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK), also known as the Korean Workers Party (KWP), is the only viable political party in North Korea.”¹²⁵ It is responsible for all national policies and functions as the core of the North Korean Political system, and commands, as of 2002 grew to three million members.¹²⁶ The original members of the party became the core of the North Korean Bureaucracy.¹²⁷ “The party came to control all areas of daily life such as rationing of food, relocation, or employment.”¹²⁸ By the 1950s, the state established “a vast surveillance network to monitor any expression of sentiments deemed anti-state or anti-revolutionary.”¹²⁹ This extensive surveillance network was in place to monitor the North Korean citizens, in the form of the “Inminban” institute and the North Korean “organizational life.”¹³⁰ North Korean citizens enjoyed very little freedom as the authorities began to monitor them, publically and privately.¹³¹

¹²³ Hazel Smith, *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 118.

¹²⁴ Young Park and Young Park, *Korea and the Imperialists: In Search of a National Identity* (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2009),263.

¹²⁵ *Ibid* 346

¹²⁶ Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, ed., *North Korea Handbook* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 93.

¹²⁷ Andrei Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),11.

¹²⁸ Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, *North Korea Handbook*, 379.

¹²⁹ Suzy Kim, *Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 242.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*

¹³¹ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 37.

The Inminban, or the people's group, is a neighborhood watch system.¹³² The Neighborhood watch encompasses 20-40 households with a leader appointed to oversee all the households. The leader is responsible for scrutinizing the intimate details of family life and to report to the police any behavior considered illegal or disloyal.¹³³ Neighbors spied on neighbors, creating an elaborate surveillance network in which citizens were always on guard and living in fear. "The population is encouraged to condemn any behavior that may pose a threat to the political system and its leadership, even a casual remarks shared in a small circle could end up being reported by informants, leading to serious consequences."¹³⁴ The duties of the leaders of the Inminban included monitoring strangers, maintaining the public's health, and protecting facilities and infrastructures.

The "organizational life" is consists of associations that the people are required to join and come under the supervision of the Workers' Party of Korea.¹³⁵ There are associations for every age, starting at the age of seven:¹³⁶

- Children's Union is for the 7 to 13 years-olds
- Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League is for the 14 to 30 years-olds
- After 30 years-old – it depended on their occupation and marital status.
 - General public
 - General Federation of Korean Trade Unions
 - Democratic Women's Union
 - Union of Agricultural Working People,
 - Privileged few
 - Worker's Party of Korea; these members would become officials of the mass associations.

It was required to be a member of one of the associations until death.¹³⁷ These associations served as a continued form of indoctrination in Kim philosophy. With the

¹³² Ibid 38

¹³³ Ibid 39

¹³⁴ Daniel Schwekendiek, *A Socioeconomic History of North Korea* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011), 74.

¹³⁵ Charles K. Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 106.

¹³⁶ Chae-jöng Sö, *Origins of North Korea's Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 106.I.

Songbun system, the Juch'e policies, and the support of the Worker's party of Korea, Kim Il-sung was able to reconfigure the political structure of North Korea and eradicate all forms of opposition to insure his role as Supreme Ruler over North Korea.

¹³⁷ Koh Jung-sik, *Is North Korea really changing?* (n.p.: Institute for Unification Education, Ministry of Unification (South Korea), 2014), 88.

Chapter Three
Systematic Problems

Kim Dynasty

Kim Il-sung came to power in 1946, with the support and loyalty of guerrilla fighters and the Soviet Union. During the early years of power, Kim Il-sung created a closely controlled society by establishing the citizen surveillance networks to insure that the people learned to abide by the newly initiated Juch'e doctrine. He served as Secretary General of the KWP and as President of North Korea. Kim Il-sung used a highly personalized approach to running the DPRK in which he was involved in decision-making and governing processes.¹³⁸ He used the Songban policy to conducted several purges between 1945 through 1960's, to rid himself of all political opposition. The first purge from 1945 to 1950 targeted anyone who benefited from or collaborated with the Japanese. The second purge occurred from 1957 to 1958 and targeted political opposition, while promoting those most loyal to his regime. The third purge happened in the 1960s, the targeted included anyone belonging to pro-Chinese, and pro-Soviet Union factions that threaten his regime and the policies he was promoting.¹³⁹ Kim's style of governing followed the "traditional isolationism system" that had been prominent in Korean history for hundreds of years prior to the Japanese invasion of 1876, and his incorporation of resisting outside influence came from his experiences during the Japanese colonization and the civil war.¹⁴⁰ Kim's regime also embodied "the Confucian tradition of absolute loyalty to an individual leader," to bolster his control of the country¹⁴¹ While North Korea accepted aid from the Soviet Union and

¹³⁸Ken E. Gause, "North Korean Leadership Dynamics and Decision-making under Kim Jong-un," CNA Analysis & Solutions, last modified March 2014, accessed November 22, 2015, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2014-U-006988-Final.pdf.

¹³⁹ Bruce E. Bechtol, *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 113.

¹⁴⁰Ibid

¹⁴¹Ibid

China for decades to come, these countries did not have any political influence over Kim's regime. During the 1960s, Kim Il-sung created a Monolithic Ideology System known as the Suryong System. He turned Juch'e into a religion, presenting himself as the Christ-like savior of North Korea further promoting his cult-like regime. The Suryong System extended his power beyond the WPK, the administration and the military.¹⁴² It allowed him to take complete control of state planning and the economy.¹⁴³ Kim Il-sung, and his descendents, are seen as bestowing benevolence on the people and in return, the people pledge their loyalty to the Kim regime.¹⁴⁴

Kim Jong-il emerged in the 1970s with his appointment as director of the propaganda bureau of the KWP.¹⁴⁵ This advancement solidified his claim as a possible heir to Kim Il-sung and brought about a struggle for succession between Kim Jong-il, and his uncle Kim Yong-ju. Kim Jong-il received the backing of "the first generation revolutionaries, while Kim Yong-ju had experience within the DPRK government."¹⁴⁶ With Kim Sung-ae out of contention the competition became about Kim Jong-il and Kim Yong-ju. To help solidify his surety as heir Kim Jong-il lead the Fifth Party Congress, in 1974, to proclaim that Juch'e was a monolithic ideology. He established the "Ten Principles" of this monolithic governing system to center on Kim Il-sung-ism limiting everyone else from the power circle."¹⁴⁷ Their competition helped to elevate Kim Il-sung's personality cult further and led to incorporating a new concept called "absolution

¹⁴² Hyöng-jung Pak, *Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2014), 24.

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Sö, *Origins of North Korea's*, 89.

¹⁴⁵ G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon, *The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 155

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ John Cha and Kwang-ju Son, *Exit Emperor Kim Jong-il: Notes from His Former Mentor* (Bloomington, IN: Abbott Press, 2012), 62.

of the Great Leader.”¹⁴⁸ Kim Il-sung officially designated his son as heir apparent in 1980, insuring Kim Jong-il’s succession.¹⁴⁹

His father groomed Kim Jong-il for at least a decade before coming to power. This lengthy grooming period gave Kim Jong-il time to remove many challengers prior to his takeover.¹⁵⁰ In 1994, when Kim Il-sung died, Kim Jong-il became Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and the Supreme Commander of the North Korean Army.¹⁵¹ In 1997, Kim Jong-il became the General Secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party.¹⁵² In 1998, the constitution was revised the position of President was abolished. Kim Il-sung was designated as the Eternal President and elevated Kim Jong-il as chairman of the National Defense Commission.¹⁵³ The NDC has authority over national, military, and economic affairs.¹⁵⁴ After a three-year mourning period the Supreme People’s Assembly formally elected Kim Jong-il as their leader.¹⁵⁵ Kim Jong-il maintained rigid control over the citizens and continued the policies that his father employed.¹⁵⁶ He blocked opposition, push the Juch’e ideology, maintained the elaborate spy network, and employed brute force.¹⁵⁷ “He used perks and rewards to

¹⁴⁸ Ibid

¹⁴⁹ Jungsup Kim, *International Politics and Security in Korea* (Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar, 2007), 36.

¹⁵⁰ Kim, *North Korean Foreign Policy*, 10.

¹⁵¹ Ibid 9.

¹⁵² Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 6.

¹⁵³ Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 7.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid 7

¹⁵⁵ *Business in Korea North for Everyone: Practical Information and Contacts for Success* (n.p.: Intl Business Pubns USA, 2012), 21.

¹⁵⁶ Leslie Alan Horvitz and Christopher Catherwood, *Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide* (New York: Facts on File, 2006), 267.

¹⁵⁷ Michael Breen, *Kim Jong-il: North Korea’s Dear Leader*, rev. and updated ed. (Singapore: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012), 96.

win over military and elite members."¹⁵⁸ In an effort to protect his leadership Kim Jong-il utilized three methods to try to prevent a coup:¹⁵⁹

- choosing military leaders based on their loyalty and not competence
- advancing relative to key positions
- creating multiple, competing and overlapping internal security agencies

This last measure worked to reduce the unity of security agencies, creating rivalries and mistrust within the organizations.

In 1990s, Kim Jong-il instituted the “Military First” policy as another method to ensure regime survival.¹⁶⁰ Kim Jong-Il inherited a country that was almost bankrupt, and was starting to suffer from the famine creating an environment of instability.¹⁶¹ It is unclear if Kim Jong-il voluntarily instituted the military first policies in response to the economic and food crisis, or if the Military forced Kim Jong-il to give them control or if it had been a combination of both circumstances.¹⁶² The formation of this policy was to safeguard North Korea’s style of socialism under any circumstances.¹⁶³ Kim Jong-Il ruling platform was “military first – workers second”¹⁶⁴ In North Korea the nuclear weapon is considered a result of military-first politics and preserves state sovereignty.

After his brain aneurysm,¹⁶⁵ Kim Jong-il began preparing for his successor and officially named Kim Jong-un in June 2009.¹⁶⁶ Kim Jong-un was the youngest of three

¹⁵⁸ Jennifer Lind, "Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power," ed. Daniel Byman, Belfer Center For Science and International Affairs, last modified July 2010, accessed November 5, 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20269/keeping_kim.html.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Smith, *North Korea: Markets and Military*, 235.

¹⁶¹ Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, *North Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Jong Il: New Perspectives* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 87.

¹⁶² Smith, *North Korea: Markets and Military*, 237.

¹⁶³ Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 63.

¹⁶⁴ Lim, *Leader Symbols and Personality*, 94.

¹⁶⁵ Jongwoo Han and T'ae-hŏn Chŏng, *Understanding North Korea: Indigenous Perspectives* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 39.

¹⁶⁶ Tom Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2015* (Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2015), 788.

sons and Kim Jong-il's favorite son. Kim Jong-nam, the oldest, fell out of favor when he was caught trying to enter Japan with a forged passport.¹⁶⁷ Kim Jong-il viewed Kim Jong-chol, the second son, as girlish and too weak to rule.¹⁶⁸ Kim Jong-il helped to ensure a smooth transition of power by making fundamental changes to who held power. He was able to orchestrated state policies to insure the National Defense Commission Chairman wield absolute power.¹⁶⁹ The transfer of power happened quickly and efficiently in an attempt to stabilize the monolithic regime.¹⁷⁰ Kim Jong-un was elected to chairman of the NDC in April 2012, during the next year Kim Jong-un transitions was marked by purges of potential a hostile officials and international provocations.¹⁷¹ Kim Jong-un has made it clear there will be no changes to the "Military First" policy and that all other policies enacted by his father and grandfather would continue.¹⁷²

Defense Strategies

After the Korean War ended, North Korea was busy with reconstruction. It was not until the sixties that North Korea started investing large amounts of its resources to build-up its military.¹⁷³ The focus on the military came from the internationally tensions heightened during the 1960s. It began with the "Park Chung Hee's Military Coup," in South Korea, when Japan-South Korea began holding security talks and the Cuban

¹⁶⁷ Naoko Aoki, "Korea's Third Kim: Will Anything Change?" *World Affairs*, last modified March/April 2012, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/korea%E2%80%99s-third-kim-will-anything-change>.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁹ Han and Chöng, *Understanding North Korea: Indigenous*, 39.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁷¹ Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World*, 788.

¹⁷² Aoki, "Korea's Third Kim: Will," *World Affairs*.

¹⁷³ Narushige Michishita, *North Korea's Military-diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008* (London: Routledge, 2009), 7.

missile crisis occurred, Kim Il-sung viewed these events as security threats.¹⁷⁴ In response, he instituted two extreme military policies in 1962: the “Four Military Lines” and the “Economy-Defense Parallel-Development Policy.”¹⁷⁵

The “Four Military Lines” was instrumental in instituting four policies: (1) to arm the entire population; (2) fortify the entire country; (3) train the entire army as a “cadre army,” a group of trained qualified personnel each capable of forming, training, or leading an expanded organization; (4) and modernize the military.¹⁷⁶ The “Economy-Defense Parallel-Development Policy” promoted military strength and efficiency to be equally as important as the economy and heavy industry.¹⁷⁷ When Kim Jong-il became leader, he made the military highest priority over economy and industry.¹⁷⁸ Military doctrine was refined further to incorporate the concepts of “combined operations” and “two-front war.”¹⁷⁹ Combined operations called for the integration of guerrilla warfare operations with conventional ground forces. The “two-front war” the first front traditionally was with South Korea along the DMZ, the second front the rear area of Korea or the rest of the world.¹⁸⁰ It is estimated that 40% of the population serve in some form of military capacity and are able to mobilize easily for war.¹⁸¹ These new military policies increased military expenses from 5.8% in 1964 to 31% in 1970.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁴ Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership*, 92.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

¹⁷⁶ French, *North Korea: The Paranoid*, 217.

¹⁷⁷ Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 121

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ Scobell and Sanford, *North Korea's Military Threat*, viii.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Ibid

¹⁸² "A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea," Ministry of Unification, 21.

North Korea argues that the economy can recover from collapse; however, the collapse of the military would crumble the entire country.¹⁸³ The following chart indicates how much North Korea allocated to defense spending from 1991 to 2005:¹⁸⁴

Table 7.1 North Korean GNP, government spending and military expenditure (unit: US\$100m., current)

	<i>GNP</i>	<i>Government spending</i>	<i>Estimated and (announced) defence spending</i>
1991	229	171.7	51.3 (20.8)
1992	211	184.5	55.4 (21.0)
1993	205	187.2	56.2 (21.5)
1994	212	191.9	57.6 (21.9)
1995	223	208.2	63.0
1996	214	n.a.	57.8
1997	177	91.0	47.8
1998	126	91.0	47.8 (13.3)
1999	158	92.3	47.8 (13.5)
2000	168	95.7	50.0 (13.7)
2001	157	98.1	50.0 (14.1)
2002	170	101.0	50.0 (14.9)
2003	184	149.0	50.0 (17.7)
2004	208	25.1	17.9 (3.9)
2005	242	29.0	22.0 (4.6)

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defence 2006; for GNP and government spending see Bank of Korea 2006; 'ROK Unification Education School', Understanding North Korea, 2008, www.uniedu.go.kr. Figures in parentheses represent military expenditure officially announced by North Korea. Estimated military expenditure for 2004 and 2005 is derived from IISS 2007. The figures since 2002 have changed due to North Korea's new economic plan

Since the mid-1960s North Korea has imposed a "statistical blackout" and has not officially released any data on their economy, military or weapons defenses, agriculturally or social.¹⁸⁵ Without enough data, it is hard to compare how much North Korea spent on agricultural needs during the same time impossible.¹⁸⁶

The military first policy allows the military to decide how to allocate scarce resources. It is unknown to the outside world when North Korea began its nuclear

¹⁸³ Kim, *North Korean Foreign Policy*, 11.

¹⁸⁴ Andrew T. H Tan, *The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 95.

¹⁸⁵ Nick Eberstadt, *The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 18.

¹⁸⁶ Soo-Bin Park, "The North Korean Economy: Current Issues and Prospects," Department of Economics, 2, accessed November 24, 2015, http://carleton.ca/economics/wp-content/uploads/cep04-05.pdf?origin=publication_detail.

program.¹⁸⁷ North Korea officially acknowledged the birth of the nuclear program began in 1952 with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Research Institute.¹⁸⁸ In 1959, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.¹⁸⁹ North Korea began to branch out in their nuclear capabilities and in the 1980s became capable in producing nuclear weapons.¹⁹⁰

North Korea's nuclear advancements have caused concern for international countries, and have become the focal point of international talks. In December 1985, North Korea accepted the opportunity to become a party to the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)."¹⁹¹ In December 1991, North and South Korea agreed to ban nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula.¹⁹² By 1992, there was growing evidence that North Korea was converting nuclear energy waste into weapons grade plutonium while negotiations were ongoing to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accords.¹⁹³ The IAEA confirmed, in 1993, that North Korea's reprocessing process was more advanced than North Korea acknowledged.¹⁹⁴ In June 1994, North Korea withdrew from the IAEA and threatened to turn its nuclear fuel into bombs.¹⁹⁵ President Carter, a trained naval nuclear engineer,¹⁹⁶ negotiated with Kim Il-

¹⁸⁷ Ashley J. Tellis et al., *Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), 165.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

¹⁸⁹ Worden, *North Korea: A Country*, 260.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid 261.

¹⁹¹ "Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Accession to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, last modified December 12, 1985, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/democraticpeoplesrepublicofkorea/acc/moscow>.

¹⁹² "North Korea Nuclear Chronology," NTI, last modified February 2011, accessed November 24, 2015, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/north_korea_nuclear.pdf?_=1316543714.

¹⁹³ Ibid

¹⁹⁴ Robert E. Williams and Paul R. Viotti, *Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 2012), 93

¹⁹⁵ "Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards," International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed November 24, 2015, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>.

sung striking a deal to avert confrontation.¹⁹⁷ Oct 1994, the United States and North Korea sign “Agreed Framework” pact, the United States agreed to supply North Korea with light-water reactors, which created small amounts of weapons-grade plutonium.¹⁹⁸ North Korea agreed to freeze and dismantle their nuclear processing plant and allow international experts to inspect their military sites. In 1998, the international community suspected North Korea of having an underground nuclear facility.¹⁹⁹ North Korea showed the world what its missile program was capable of when it launched a three-stage space launcher over Japan in 1998.²⁰⁰ According to North Korea, it released a satellite that orbited the Earth 100 times.²⁰¹

In 2002, North Korea admitted to violating its 1994 Agreement Framework Pact and declared the agreement nullified.²⁰² The Six-Party talks began in 2003 between North and South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the United States.²⁰³ Their aim was to end North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiations. After two sessions, North Korea agreed to end its nuclear weapons program in return for security, economic and energy benefits in 2005.²⁰⁴ North Korea admitted to conducting its first nuclear test in

¹⁹⁶ "Jimmy Carter's Naval Service," Jimmy Carter Presidential Library & Museum, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/jec/jcnavy.phtml>.

¹⁹⁷ J. Robert Moskin, *American Statecraft: The Story of the U.S. Foreign Service* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2013), 737.

¹⁹⁸ North Korea Nuclear Chronology," NTI.

¹⁹⁹ Kai He and Huiyun Feng, *Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 64.

²⁰⁰ "North Korea Missile Update - 1998," Wisconsin Project Nuclear Arms Control, last modified 1998, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/nkorea/bm98.html>.

²⁰¹ Ibid

²⁰² North Korea Nuclear Chronology," NTI.

²⁰³ Nicholas Eberstadt and Alex Coblin, "Dependencia, North Korea Style," The Asian Institute for Policy Studies, last modified November 6, 2014.

²⁰⁴ Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, last modified February 21, 2006, accessed November 24, 2015.

October 2006.²⁰⁵ Six nation talks resumed in 2006 coming to an agreement in 2007 that North Korea would disable its nuclear facilities and allow nuclear inspectors into the country, in exchanged for \$400 million in fuel oil and aid.²⁰⁶ By 2008 North Korea resumed plutonium reprocessing, after charging that the United States has not fulfilled its promise of removing North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism.²⁰⁷ In 2009, North Korea ended its participation after continued missile testing violated the agreement it made.²⁰⁸

Over the years, North Korea has employed a negotiating strategy with foreign countries that follow the pattern of “Demand, Offer, and Threat.”²⁰⁹ The DPRK has set by a core set of demands that have been prevalent since the first nuclear crisis in 1993, such as ending United States sanctions, normalizing relations, and building a strategic relationship, acquiring economic aid or compensation for concessions.²¹⁰ North Korea offers to stand down to alleviate the international community’s fears and while promising to take affirmative steps to “resolve all security concerns, by suspending, ending, or dismantling its nuclear and/or missile programs.”²¹¹ The threat consists of the punishments or the consequences for not meeting the conditions of their offer. Thus a clear pattern has emerged; the DPRK has conducted provocation maneuvers, from attacking South Korea vessels, shots fired in the DMZ, to escalating tensions by threatening nuclear war to begin negotiations, all in an effort to secure political and

²⁰⁵ North Korea Nuclear Chronology," NTI.

²⁰⁶ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 260.

²⁰⁷ Mark E. Manyin, "North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?," Federation of American Scientists, last modified June 29, 2010, accessed November 24, 2015, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30613.pdf>.

²⁰⁸ Eberstadt and Coblin, "Dependencia, North Korea Style," The Asian Institute for Policy Studies.

²⁰⁹ Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, *North Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Jong Il: New Perspectives* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 57.

²¹⁰ Ibid

²¹¹ Ibid 58

economical compensation.²¹² The DPRK's reliance on the threat controls international negotiations, leaving little room for discussion concerning human rights violations.²¹³

When Kim Jong-un became ruler, he continued these tactics of negotiation. On March 31, 2013, during the Central Committee assembly, Kim Jong-un said, "Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people's happy life."²¹⁴ During the same assembly, Kim Jong-un is supposed to have adopted the Pyongjin Line, a strategic course of building the economy and nuclear program simultaneously.²¹⁵ Currently there is not enough evidence to evaluate if this is rhetoric or if this is an enacted policy.

Economy

Initially after the World War II, Kim Il-sung did not have to make many economic changes. At the time of the division of Korea, the north controlled 76% of the peninsula's mining production, 92% of its electrical generating capability, and 80% of its heavy industrial facilities, leaving the South Korea with the majority of the rice production. Kim Il-sung's goal was to create a self-reliant national economy, believing it was a prerequisite for political independence. To achieve this Kim Il-sung devised a strategy to prioritize heavy industry similar in manner as Stalin had done in the Soviet Union.²¹⁶ He focused on light industry and agriculture to coincide with the heavy industrial development. "In 1946 North Korean authorities distributed 1 million hectares of farmland to landless peasants to increase agriculture and began the process of

²¹² Ibid

²¹³ Ibid 59

²¹⁴ "Kim Jong Un's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know," Nautilus Institute, accessed November 24, 2015, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/#_edn4.

²¹⁵ Ibid

²¹⁶ Willoughby, *North Korea*, 29.

nationalizing industry.”²¹⁷ North Korea established a stable economy before the Korean War. During the Korean War, the region suffered extensive structural damage, due to three years of aerial bombardments. According to damage assessments done by the United States Air Force, “eighteen of the twenty-two major cities in North Korea had been obliterated to half their size.”²¹⁸ In addition, the bombardments destroyed hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland, industrial and transportation infrastructures.²¹⁹

After the Korean War, North Korea rebuilt their country and economy relying heavily on the Soviet Union and China for economic and military support and substantial aid came in the form of labor, materials, reconstruction and building plants, and technology transfers.²²⁰ China provided thirty-four divisions of soldiers as free labor; each division held a minimum of ten thousand soldiers, these soldiers remained in North Korea until 1958.²²¹ Initially North Korea was able to revive their economy until the 1960s when its economy became stagnant. North Korea went through many construction and economic campaigns through 1954 to 1993, in conjunction with these campaigns, Kim Il-sung instituted mass mobilization movements. These movements consist of utilizing every potential laborer; women were assigned to light industry, soldiers were assigned to industrial or construction projects and prisoners performed

²¹⁷ Oh and Hassig, *North Korea through the Looking*, 48.

²¹⁸ Sahr Conway-Lanz, *Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity after World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 151.

²¹⁹ Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, "China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, last modified May 2012, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_Working_Paper_4_China_and_the_Postwar_Reconstruction_of_North_Korea.pdf.

²²⁰ Shen and Xia, "China and the Post-War," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 3.

²²¹ Ibid

industrial labor.²²² Workers were encouraged to compete in order to increase production. As the chart below shows mass mobilization and foreign aid helped North Korea's economy peaked during 1957 through 1961.

Economic plans	Official Results ²²³	
Post-War Construction Plan (1954-1956)	Gross industrial production of 1955:	56% higher than 1949
Five-Year Economic Plan (1957-1961)	Annual industrial growth rate: Industrial production of 1960:	46.3% 1957-1959 3.5 times larger than in 1956
First Seven-Year Economic Plan (1961-1967)	Extended to 1970; Annual industrial growth rate:	18% (original goal) 12.8% (official growth rate)
Six-Year Economic Plan (1971-1976)	Annual industrial growth rate:	14% official goal 16.3% official growth rate
Second Seven-Year Economic Plan (1978-1984)	Re-adjustment period (1985-1986) Annual industrial growth rate:	12.1% official goal 12.2% official growth rate
Third Seven-Year Economic Plan (1987-1993)	Re-adjustment period (1994-1996) Annual industrial growth rate:	10% official goal No official growth rate

Tensions were rising between the socialist countries in the 1960s, when tensions between China and the Soviet Union reached a climax and the smaller socialist countries had to choose sides.²²⁴ North Korea's tension with the Soviet Union happened when they sided with China, resulting in the Soviet Union withholding aid in the early 1960s.²²⁵ Relations between the two countries would recover to some extent

²²² Michael J. Seth, *A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 145.

²²³ Jae-Cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea. Routledge Contemporary Asia Series* (n.p.: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 91.

²²⁴ Ibid

²²⁵ Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership*, 92.

by 1965 aid from the Soviet Union resumed, between 1965 to 1968 Soviet aid expanded.²²⁶

In the late 1960s into the 1970s, several factors contributed to a further decline North Korea's decline in economic development:

- There was a shortfall of consumer goods.
- The use of massive amounts of resources on lavishly constructed gigantic monuments.
- Increased military defense spending.

North Korea was still upholding the heavy industry priority, failing to produce enough consumer goods. Massive amounts of resources were used to build the great statue of Kim Il-sung, the museum of Korean Revolution, and the Tower of Juch'e, in an effort to express loyalty to the Kim regime and its political ideals. In but when the economy declined, the worked stopped.²²⁷ The budget for military expenses increased significantly to support the 1960s from 5.8% in 1964, to 31% in 1970, in response to the new perceived international threat.²²⁸

Further economic strains came from the creation of the Suryong economic system, the appointment of Kim Jong-il as heir apparent and the campaign to diversify their trade routes by reaching out the Western countries.²²⁹ "The Suryong political system established an economy that consisted of two parts: the Party-economy and the Second economy. The Party economy revolved around the upper classes, and the regime. The Second economy acquired funds for North Korea's military and managed

²²⁶ Sergey S. Radchenko, "The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives," Wilson Center, accessed November 27, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf.

²²⁷ Andrei Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144.

²²⁸ "Arms Race and Persisting Tension," Ministry of Unification, 21, <https://books.google.com/books?id=w-yUB>

²²⁹ Hyöng-jung Pak and Choi Sahyun, *Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea*, comp. Korea Institute for National Unification (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2014), 12.

revenues earned via weapons exports.²³⁰ “The designation of Kim Jong-il as Kim Il-sung’s successor made it necessary to prepare political funds for the cause.”²³¹ Kim Jong-il began a glorification project of his father’s rule. In order to sway the military, the elite, and the political agencies, Kim Jon-il needed funding to provide luxury goods to reward loyalty.²³²

In an effort to revitalize the sluggish economy, in an effort to offset these new economic needs. North Korea set about trying to entice Western capital investments in the form of loans and technologies.²³³ This venture would yield nearly \$600 million dollars worth of loans and contracts between 1970 and 1975 with Japan and Western European Countries.²³⁴ These contracts were for the trade of resources, factories, and technologies to produce raw materials. By 1973, its trade with the European Economic Community exceeded its trade with other socialist countries.²³⁵ The DPRK planned to use the investments to restore the industries to production level, and use the revenues to pay off the reconstruction period debt. This was not to happen, their economy was not designed to receive foreign capital, and their industries had difficulties incorporating Western equipment.²³⁶ In 1973, the world experience and a global oil crisis caused by international oil prices rising. The DPRK diverted revenues earned from these contracts to pay for the higher cost, resulting in their inability to repay the international loans their secured. By 1974, the DPRK could no longer pay for Western resources or

²³⁰ Ibid

²³¹ Ibid

²³² Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol, and Robert M. Collins, *Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea's Illicit International Activities* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010).

²³³ Jinwung Kim, *A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), 505.

²³⁴ Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 174.

²³⁵ Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 177.

²³⁶ Bluth, *Crisis on the Korean*, 68.

technologies, and their foreign debt payments stopped in the 1980s. North Korea was the first communist country to default on its debts to the West.²³⁷ Their default resulted in an “imposed isolation by the international community” resulting in then the north’s economy slowing down and lagging behind South Korea’s economy.”²³⁸

During the 1980s, North Korea continued to experience economic problems. Both the Soviet Union and China moved to market economies,²³⁹ North Korea could no longer trade labor for energy and materials they were now required to pay for it.²⁴⁰ The DPRK could no longer pay to import the raw materials needed to carry out its agricultural plans.²⁴¹ It became apparent that there were limitations with North Korea’s closed economy.²⁴² North Korea’s pursuit of a self-reliant economy continued to hinder economic growth and technological progress. In 1984, the government attempted to fix the economy by increasing production of consumer goods.²⁴³ The state did not change its heavy industry priority policies, creating a lack of the materials needed to increase production of consumer goods, impeding the success of the campaign. In addition to the lack of materials, the international community expected North Korea to repay its debt by 1985, which had reached \$5.2 billion dollars.²⁴⁴

²³⁷ Charles K. Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, last modified April 2009.

²³⁸ "North Korea Overview," PBS Commanding Heights, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/kp/kp_overview.html.

²³⁹ Jialin Zhang, *China's Response to the Downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1994), 6.

²⁴⁰ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief*, 406.

²⁴¹ John McMillan and Barry Naughton, *Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 327.

²⁴² Charles Harvie, Hyön-hun Yi, and Junggun Oh, *The Korean Economy: Post-crisis Policies, Issues and Prospects* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004), 245.

²⁴³ Jae-Cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea. Routledge Contemporary Asia Series* (n.p.: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 94.

²⁴⁴ Bluth, *Crisis on the Korean*, 68.

In 1985, in an effort to generate international currency, they instituted a second economic campaign.²⁴⁵ The state instituted the “Joint Venture Law” in order to attract Western capital, technology, and expertise.²⁴⁶ This marked the first time North Korea had invited outside capital into the country.²⁴⁷ There were three groups of investment types:²⁴⁸

- Equity joint ventures – North Korea and Foreign Investors invest jointly, operate the business jointly, it is a limited liability corporations, and profits are distributed according to their investment shares.
- Contractual joint venture – North Korea and Foreign Investors invest jointly, only North Korea manages the operations, profits are distributed according to their investment shares, and when the contract term is over the company transfers to the host country.
- Foreign-owned venture – Foreign investor owns and exclusively operates the corporation, North Korean authorities heavily regulate these corporations, and they are only allowed to operate in the Free Economic Trade Zones.

This campaign plan failed as only 53 companies concluded investment contracts from 1985 to 1989.²⁴⁹ Most of these investors were former Koreans living in Japan or the United States. Commercial infrastructure was lacking and the foreign companies ran into problems due to DPRK political interference and lack of transparency from the government.²⁵⁰ Purchases within the zones were restricted to hard currency spenders, foreign diplomats and privileged North Koreans.²⁵¹ Between the limited buyers and the party’s interference with management and bureaucratic red tape, the companies were

²⁴⁵ Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership*, 94.

²⁴⁶ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 426.

²⁴⁷ Haeyoung Kim, "STIFLED GROWTH AND ADDED SUFFERING.," *Critical Asian Studies* 46, no. 1 (January 2014): 102, accessed September 1, 2015, EBSCOhost.

²⁴⁸ Young Back Choi, *Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration* (Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar, 2001), 111.

²⁴⁹ Jae-Cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea. Routledge Contemporary Asia Series* (n.p.: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 94.

²⁵⁰ Ralph C. Hassig and Kong Dan Oh, *The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 50.

²⁵¹ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 26.

not successful. In 1987, North Korea initiated yet another economic campaign. North Korea decided to hold the “13th World Festival of Youth and Students,” in 1989. This was in response to the Seoul Olympics in 1988. The money spent staging the festival dealt and already weak economy a serious blow.²⁵² In 1991 after the failure of the festival, influenced by China’s success with the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), The DPRK created their own SEZs in an effort to bring in international capital.²⁵³ These SEZs operated as a tourist area, an industrial complex, or a port open for use by China and the Soviet Union.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, their aid dropped significantly from \$2.56 billion in 1990 to \$1.4 million in 1994.²⁵⁴ The DPRK turned to China for additional assistance, but China did not give as much as North Korea received from the Soviet Union. Bilateral trade with China fell from \$900 million in 1993 to \$550 million in 1995, while food exports fell by half between 1993 and 1994.²⁵⁵ When Kim Jong-il took over as leader in 1994, the economy had weakened to the extent that the government could not provide for the basic needs to the people.²⁵⁶ In response, Kim Jong-il instituted the “Two Meal a Day” campaign. By the end of the 1990s, two meals a day had become an impossible dream for many North Koreans. It was during this time the North Korea turned to drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, and exporting weapons to the Middle East, in an effort to generate the money needed to

²⁵² Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership*, 94.

²⁵³ <http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Abrahamian-SEZs-14-1118-HQ-Print.pdf>

²⁵⁴ *Report of the detailed*, 39.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*

²⁵⁶ Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership*, 94.

continue to fund the government and the military.²⁵⁷ In the 2000s, the DPRK included counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals to its list of illegal activities.²⁵⁸

It is difficult to pin point how much revenue is generated by these illicit economic routes since by their very nature illegal activities are disguised. In 2008, the UN report stated it estimated the revenue from illegal activities has generated as much as \$500 million a year, a third of the DPRK's annual exports.²⁵⁹ These figures are hard to substantiate, as North Korea does not officially release economic data. These revenue channels received increased scrutiny from the international countries after the nuclear crisis of 2002. North Korea's alternative economic routes became targets for sanctions.²⁶⁰ In response to the nuclear crisis, international countries have instituted embargos and sanctions to curb trade with North Korea.²⁶¹ International countries imposed "sanctions on military and technological materials, luxury goods, as well as freezing North Korea's financial assets with the exception of funds necessary to meet basic needs."²⁶² The sanctions did not prevent North Korea from acquiring the items wanted.

Since Kim Jong-un's ascension to power there has been a lot of speculation about the changes he would make. After his ascension, there was a renewed focus on the economy and a push to once again draw foreign investments and trade to the country.²⁶³ It was rumored that agricultural reforms were being put into place, in an

²⁵⁷ Robert C. Kelly, Ph.D et al., "2015 North Korea Country Review," <http://www.countrywatch.com>.

²⁵⁸ Kim and Kang, *Engagement with North Korea*, 125.

²⁵⁹ *Report of the detailed*, 200.

²⁶⁰ Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang, *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 123.

²⁶¹ *Ibid* 126

²⁶² "Resolution 1718 (2006)," Global Policy Forum, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/1014reso1718.pdf>.

²⁶³ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 899.

effort to increase harvests and easing the suffering of the people.²⁶⁴ With limited information coming out of North Korea, these rumors are hard to confirm. North Korea remains very dependent on China for its economic stability, yet resents this dependency. The DPRK fears China could use this dependency to limit or control its nuclear program.²⁶⁵ Efforts are underway to diversify away from China as North Korea tries to rebuild relations with Russia. A possibility of renewed relations was prompted by Russia's agreement to write off almost \$10 billion dollars of North Korea's Soviet era debt in 2014, allowing the country to pay off the remaining \$1.09 billion over the next twenty years.²⁶⁶ It remains to be seen if this new relationship will amount to anything substantial that would allow North Korea to diminish their dependency on China.

Sanctions

North Korea's economic structure is widespread with faults and shortcomings. While the spending associated with Juch'e policy of military is certainly a big reason for the country's economic crisis, many believe the sanctions that North Korea has suffered since the Korean War have been counterproductive to economic reforms.²⁶⁷ On December 19, 1950 three days after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman invoked the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, prohibiting all trade with North Korea.²⁶⁸ The United States amended the Export Control Act of 1949, adding the

²⁶⁴ Ibid

²⁶⁵ Tan, *Security and Conflict in East*, 165.

²⁶⁶ Vladimir Soldatkin, "Russia writes off 90 percent of North Korea debt, eyes gas pipeline," *Reuters* (New York, NY), accessed April 19, 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/19/russia-northkorea-debt-idUKL6N0NB04L20140419>.

²⁶⁷ Kim, "STIFLED GROWTH AND ADDED," 108.

²⁶⁸ Kenneth Aaron Rodman, *Sanctions beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 28.

“Cannon Amendment.”²⁶⁹ The Cannon Amendment can only be applied when United States troops fight under the command of the United Nations. In this scenario, the United States used this new amendment to halt trade instituting a complete embargo on exports with North Korea.²⁷⁰ These initial sanctions against North Korea were not lifted until 2008 when President Bush determined that the sanctions put in place during the Korean War no longer serve our national interest.²⁷¹

Since the Korean War, sanctions against North Korea in an effort halt their Nuclear and missile programs. There are common misconceptions revolving around sanctions enacted against North Korea, the three statements are usually stated in news media:²⁷²

- a. North Korea is the most heavily sanctioned country in the world.
- b. Sanctions cannot affect an isolated country like North Korea.
- c. There is nothing left to sanction in North Korea.

The first misconception is easy to dispute; the United States, European Union, and The United Nations have all imposed more sanctions against Iran, than they have on North Korea. The United States has targeted Zimbabwe, Congo, and Burma for human rights violations, yet has taken no action against North Korea since the “United Nations Commission of Inquiry” came out in 2014, citing crimes against humanity.²⁷³ The

²⁶⁹ John M. Rothgeb, *U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing Economic Dreams and Political Realities* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001), 92.


²⁷⁰ Ibid

²⁷¹ Dianne E. Rennack, "North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions," Federation of American Scientists, 10, accessed November 27, 2015, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41438.pdf>.

²⁷² Bruce Klingner, "Debunking Six Myths About North Korean Sanctions," CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified December 22, 2014, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://csis.org/publication/six-myths-about-north-korean-sanctions>.

²⁷³ Ibid

following chart compares the number of sanctions enacted against North Korea versus Iran:²⁷⁴




The number of individuals and entities listed in North Korea's sanctions regimes

The second myth is harder to prove or disprove, it is well known that North Korea suffers from economic and agricultural problems, what is hard to prove is how the sanctions made these problems worse. The regime is able to acquire the money it needs to cover luxury items and sanctions have not stopped North Korea from continually fulfilling their Military First Policies and violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In regards to the third myth it is more about enforcing the current sanctions than imposing new sanctions. The Kim regime has used many ways to continue to develop weapons programs, obtain currency, and strengthen the elites' allegiance. Kim Jong-un, as his father before him, uses luxury goods to gain favor with the elite's loyalties. The luxury items are acquired through third party countries, as long as they have the

²⁷⁴ Myong-Hyun Go, "North Korea as Iran's Counterfactual: a Comparison of Iran and North Korea Sanctions," THE ASIAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, last modified November 30, 2013, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/north-korea-as-irans-counterfactual-a-comparison-of-iran-and-north-korea-sanctions/>.

money to purchase them. It has become apparent to the international community how dependent the Kim regime has become on these items to maintain stability and further is political objectives.²⁷⁵ “Based on statistics collected from Chinese customs data by South Korea’s intelligence services state that since Kim Jong-un’s succession, expenditures for luxury goods have increased from \$446 million in 2010 to \$644 million in 2012, an amount six times greater than what was spent on importing food for its hungry.”²⁷⁶



The sanctions that are currently in place are not enforced by many countries, it is easy to blame China, but they are not the only country ignoring sanctions against North Korea. Dozens of European based companies continue to sell items or invest in North Korean companies, as have Middle Eastern countries.²⁷⁷ The fact is North Korea owns a WMD program, and could respond violently to hard line sanctions, this prevents

²⁷⁵ "Luxury Goods in North Korea: Tangible and Symbolic Importance to the Kim Jong-un Regime," KEI Korea Economic Institute of America, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://keia.org/publication/luxury-goods-north-korea-tangible-and-symbolic-importance-kim-jong-un-regime>.

²⁷⁶ Joshua Stanton, "North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions," Fletcher Security Review, last modified January 21, 2015, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!stanton/c1vgi>.

²⁷⁷ Kim, "STIFLED GROWTH AND ADDED," 100.

the international community from initiating them. The other fact is China holds UN veto power, and would use it to prevent UN hard-line sanctions. North Korea is not going to back down on its nuclear programs as the program ensures its continued existence.²⁷⁸ It is believed that if China were to start enforcing the sanctions against North Korea, the country may be more willing to negotiate.²⁷⁹ “China is reluctant to be too harsh on North Korea for fear that the regime would collapse and destabilize the region.”²⁸⁰

“Since 2006, The United Nations has passed five sanction resolutions against North Korea (1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094). These resolutions prohibit North Korea from possessing and trafficking in WMD technology, from importing luxury goods, and from importing or exporting most weapons, along with related materiel or services.”²⁸¹ All of these sanctions were in response to North Korea’s weapons programs. None of the sanctions could be “directed toward humanitarian and diplomatic activities or developmental programs addressing the needs of the civilian population.”²⁸² The enforcement of sanctions depends of the agreement of the U.N. Security Council Members to interpret them and on the member states to enforce them.²⁸³

When North Korea creates, a nuclear crisis the international community responds with sanctions aiming to curb the nuclear threat or give in by supplying aid. North Korea has carved out a unique position in the international world, international countries fear

²⁷⁸ Jacques L. Fuqua, *Nuclear Endgame: The Need for Engagement with North Korea* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), 12.

²⁷⁹ Colum Lynch, "Is there anything left to sanction in North Korea?," *Foreign Policy*, last modified February 13, 2013, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/13/is-there-anything-left-to-sanction-in-north-korea/>.

²⁸⁰ Denise Youngblood Coleman, Ph.D, ed., *North Korea 2015 Country Review* (Houston, TX: Country Watch, 2015), 142, PDF.

²⁸¹ Stanton, "North Korea: The Myth," *Fletcher Security Review*.

²⁸² *Ibid*

²⁸³ Francesco Giumelli, "How EU sanctions work: a new narrative," The European Union Institute for Security Studies, last modified May 2013, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_129.pdf.

pushing North Korea too far as it may result in a war. This fear leaves the DPRK insulated from accountable for its actions. Between U.N. bureaucracy and poor enforcement by the member states, U.N. Sanctions have slowed North Korean WMD programs but not stopped them.²⁸⁴ Nor have these sanctions influenced the DPRK to turn its attention away from its military first policy to take care of its citizens. With all these sanctions in place, not one is used to protect the North Korean people from human rights abuses by the DPRK.

China

China plays a critical role in enabling the Kim regime and the DPRK to survive and facilitate the countries human rights abuses. China is one of the five founding members of the UN who hold veto power and they are North Korea's strongest ally within the UN. China has a rocky relationship with North Korea, on one hand, they have been North Korea's biggest ally, their biggest trading partner, biggest financial and resource supporter since the Korean War.²⁸⁵ North Korea imports from China are 85% and 75% of their exports go into China.²⁸⁶ Based on several treaties that China has with North Korea, they actively monitor the border and forcibly return captured North Korean escapees. The DPRK has never been as dependent on another country as it is currently on China, and is increasingly resentful of its dependency on China. The DPRK perceives that this dependency gives China an advantage over North Korea.

²⁸⁴ Stanton, "North Korea: The Myth," *Fletcher Security Review*.

²⁸⁵ Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified August 22, 2014, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>.

²⁸⁶ Eberstadt and Coblin, "Dependencia, North Korea Style," The Asian Institute for Policy Studies.

The belief is that North Korea would like to develop relationships with the other Six-Party members, to move away from its dependency on China.²⁸⁷

On the other hand, when North Korea performed its first nuclear weapons test in 2006 a strain of the relationship began to materialize.²⁸⁸ During the crisis China disagreed with the United States hard line policy towards North Korea, believing it would push them to accelerate the nuclear program instead of abandoning the program.²⁸⁹ China used its influence to persuade the United States and Japan to provide economic incentives in return for North Korea's concessions on its nuclear program.²⁹⁰ It is in China's best interest to preserve peace and stability in the peninsula. It balances the goal is to denuclearize North Korea and prevent a dangerous chain reaction in the region while continuing its specific relationship with North Korea.²⁹¹ North Korea's nuclear program is viewed as a liability to China's national interest as it fears North Korea's nuclear ambitions could incite an arms race in the region.²⁹² China's main priority is to maintain stability within North Korea; preferring status quo to the prospect of a collapse which would send refugees flooding over the Chinese- North Korean border.²⁹³ If North Korea provokes a war, China, the United States and South Korea be major players in the confrontation, a position the three countries do not want. China receives praise for signing the U.N. Resolution 1718, yet China would not agree to sign

²⁸⁷ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 98.

²⁸⁸ Xu and Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship," Council on Foreign Relations.

²⁸⁹ Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak, *North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007), 198.

²⁹⁰ Ibid 198

²⁹¹ Yufan Hao, C. X. George Wei, and Lowell Dittmer, *Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 9.

²⁹² Gregory J. Moore, *North Korean Nuclear Operationality: Regional Security and Nonproliferation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2013), 177.

²⁹³ Tan, *North Korea, International Law*, 81.

the resolution until the tough economic sanctions were removed leaving on only the luxury goods sanctions in place.²⁹⁴ If the concessions were not made, China would have used its veto power to scrap the entire bill. China has positioned itself into a peculiar place; it simultaneously asserts its relationship with North Korea while denying responsibility to influence its actions.²⁹⁵ China benefits by its offers to mediate to end North Korea confrontations in return for political concessions, but will not use its influence to deter North Korea from its nuclear program or discuss human rights abuses.²⁹⁶ This tactic can only last so long before the international community expects China to assert its influence over North Korea or step aside. China would prefer to see a unified Korea that practiced similar political ideals as China. In the case of a collapse, China has suggested that it would take control of Pyongyang and control the northern portion of the Korea Peninsula.²⁹⁷ It does not want the United States, via South Korea, to gain control of the entire peninsula.

The UN's report implicated China in facilitating North Korea's crimes against humanity.²⁹⁸ "China is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which gives the sovereign states the discretion in establishing processes for evaluation of refugee claims within their own legal systems."²⁹⁹ In spite of the agreement, China currently does not have a national refugee system to determine refugee status. China views

²⁹⁴ Xu and Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship," Council on Foreign Relations.

²⁹⁵ Tan, *North Korea, International Law*, 82.

²⁹⁶ Ibid

²⁹⁷ Ibid 83

²⁹⁸ Robert Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure," Brookings, last modified Summer 2014, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/opinions/2014/07/north-korea-human-rights-cohen/north-korea-un-cohen.pdf>.

²⁹⁹ Yuan Ji, "Crafting a Multilateral Solution for North Korean Refugee Settlement What American Policymakers Can Learn from the Indochinese Refugee Crisis," *Journal of International Law and International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2011): 66.

North Koreans who crossed the border as illegal immigrants.³⁰⁰ It is in this belief that China maintains its repatriation of North Korean escapees does not go against international law as the repatriation upholds its bilateral treaty obligations made with the DPRK.³⁰¹ China claims to have three treaties with North Korea: (1) Escaped Criminals Reciprocal Extradition Treaty, a secret agreement made in the early 1960's, stipulating that any North Koreans that illegally cross the North Korea-China border must be returned as criminals.³⁰² (2) 1964 Protocol between the PRC Ministry of Public Security and the DPRK Social Safety Ministry for Mutual Cooperation in Safeguarding National Security and Social Order in Boarder Areas, describes mutual obligations regarding border control and repatriation of criminals. Article 4 of the Protocol states that both sides will prevent illegal border crossings and that "Illegal border crossers will be returned to the other side."³⁰³ (3) "1986 Protocol called for further cooperation to prevent illegal border crossings as well as mutual extradition concerning defecting criminals."³⁰⁴

In 2000, it is estimated that 30,000 to 300,000 North Koreans escaped and crossed the border into China.³⁰⁵ Over the last two decades, China has forcibly returned tens of thousands of these escapees back to North Korean. On occasion, they have also arrested and imprisoned anyone helping or sheltering illegal immigrants, this

³⁰⁰ Kim, *Escaping North Korea: Defiance*, 76.

³⁰¹ Tan, *North Korea, International Law*, 155.

³⁰² Ibid

³⁰³ Hazel Smith, "Explaining North Korea Migration to China," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, last modified September 2012, accessed November 24, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_eDossier_11_Explaining_North_Korean_Migration_to_China.pdf.

³⁰⁴ Tan, *North Korea, International Law*, 155.

³⁰⁵ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 84.

includes NGO activists for attempting to help North Koreans to reach South Korea.³⁰⁶

China asserts that forced repatriation is essential to maintaining national security, social order, and border controls.³⁰⁷ Once returned the escapees are sent to the political prison camps where they are subjected to torture, rape, starvation, and possible execution.³⁰⁸

It is because of this forced repatriation that the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) has implicated China in North Korea's crimes against humanity. China claims that they are honoring the treaties in place and that the migrants they return to North Korea are not punished.³⁰⁹ During the COI's investigation, China denied the COI access to its border area to question the migrants to determine if they meet the criteria for protection under political refugee status.³¹⁰ When the COI findings were published, China stated that the charges were "divorced from reality" because the investigators had not visited the border area.³¹¹ The UN report does not specifically mention China in its allegations; it is referred to as the neighboring country. The UN treaty bodies have called on China directly to cease its practice of forcibly repatriating North Koreans, to no avail.³¹²

While China continues to criticize North Korea's nuclear program, it stands behind North Korea when it criticizes the UN report charging North Korea with human rights violation. The Chinese are not likely to change their policies concerning North

³⁰⁶ "China's Repatriation of North Korean Refugees," Amnesty International USA, last modified March 5, 2012, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/china-s-repatriation-of-north-korean-refugees>.

³⁰⁷ Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North," Brookings.

³⁰⁸ In-t'aek Hyön and Miranda A. Schreurs, *The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 180.

³⁰⁹ Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North," Brookings.

³¹⁰ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 84.

³¹¹ Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North," Brookings.

³¹² "China's Repatriation Of North Korean Refugees," U.S. Government Publishing Office, last modified March 5, 2012, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg74809/html/CHRG-112hhrg74809.htm>.

Korean escapees as officials view the North Korean refugees as economic illegal immigrants undermining Chinese border control, and should forcibly be repatriate back to North Korea.³¹³ China's foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei stated that:

“Human rights issues shall not be politicized or be used to pressurize other countries.” He added that China does not believe human rights issues should be discussed by the UN Security Council or taken up by the ICC. “The referral of human rights issues to the International Criminal Court is not conducive to their resolution,” Hong said. China's position on the UN Security Council will keep North Korea from ever facing prosecution from the ICC.”³¹⁴

This statement is an indication where China's political position on repatriation and other human rights abuses stands. China would likely veto any decision to refer North Korea to the ICC, to face judgment for their human rights violations.

³¹³ Report of the detailed, 130.

³¹⁴ Shannon Tiezzi, "China Responds to North Korea's Nuclear Threat," *The Diplomat*, November 21, 2014, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/china-responds-to-north-koreas-nuclear-threat/>.

Chapter Four

North Korea's Human Rights Abuses

UN Report Human rights abuses

“On November 18, 2014, The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly endorsed a recent U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COIs) report detailing crimes against humanity in North Korea and requested that the Security Council discuss the report and consider an International Criminal Court (ICC) referral.”³¹⁵ The “Report of The Detailed Findings of The Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea” listing the following violations committed by the DPRK:³¹⁶

- right to food, life
- crimes associated with prison camps
- Torture and inhuman treatment; Arbitrary arrest and detention, execution
- Discrimination,
- Violations of freedom of expression, freedom of individual movement, refugees and asylum seekers

The COI determined that the North Korean Government was responsible for committing systematic human rights abuses on a scale without parallel in the contemporary world.³¹⁷ The report was published after a yearlong inquiry that included testimonies from 240 North Korean exiles.³¹⁸ The exiled North Koreans testified confidentially, as they feared the DPRK would retaliate against their families still located in North Korea.³¹⁹ They believe the North Korea government continues to monitor their

³¹⁵ “Statement to the Security Council on the Situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, by Ivan Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, New York, 22 December 2014,” United Nations Human Rights, accessed November 8, 2015, [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15448&LangID=.](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15448&LangID=)

³¹⁶ Ibid 7.

³¹⁷ “World Report 2015: North Korea,” Human Rights Watch, accessed November 6, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/north-korea>.

³¹⁸ Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, report no. A/HRC/25/63, Twenty-fifth Session (n.p.: Human Rights Council, 2014), 5. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx>

³¹⁹ Daniel Schwekendiek, *A Socioeconomic History of North Korea* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011), 12

every move.³²⁰ In 2014, Yeonmi Park a defector from North Korea, living in Seoul, tells how the Seoul police informed her that the North Korean government was watching her and her mother, giving credibility to their fear.³²¹ The U.N. state members voted to discuss the report and to consider referring it to the ICC. To date the state members have not referred the report to the ICC.

After the report was filed with The United Nations, Ivan Simonovic the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, stated, "Rarely has such an extensive charge-sheet of international crimes been brought to this Council's attention."³²² He equated the human rights abuses of North Koreans, to the treatment the Korean people experienced during the Second World War at the hands of the Japanese. He proceeded to chastise the international community for focusing on military and nuclear priorities at the expense of economic and social rights as well as the lives and well-being of the North Korean people.³²³

In 1991, both North and South Korea became members of The United Nations.³²⁴ Since then the DPRK has ratified several international treaties it has violated daily. North Korea ratified "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1981."³²⁵ "The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

³²⁰ Report of the detailed, 14.

³²¹ Yeonmi Park, *In Order to Live* (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2015), 259

³²² "Statement to the Security," United Nations Human Rights.

³²³ Ibid

³²⁴ "UN Documents for DPRK (North Korea): General Assembly Documents," Security Council Report, accessed November 8, 2015, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22General%20Assembly%20Documents%22+AND+%22DPRK%20\(North%20Korea\)%22&ctype=DPRK%20\(North%20Korea\)&rtype=General%20Assembly%20Documents&cbtype=dprk-north-korea](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22General%20Assembly%20Documents%22+AND+%22DPRK%20(North%20Korea)%22&ctype=DPRK%20(North%20Korea)&rtype=General%20Assembly%20Documents&cbtype=dprk-north-korea).

³²⁵ "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," United Nations Human Rights, accessed November 8, 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>.

(ICESCR) was ratified in 1981.”³²⁶ “The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified in 1990.”³²⁷ “The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified in 2001.”³²⁸ Documentation of the listed abuses dates to as early as 1979, prior to membership of the United Nations and their treaty ratifications. From 2003 to 2011, the General Assembly made annual resolutions condemning the DPRK’s human rights record, with no further action taken, allowing the North Korean government to continue committing the violations.³²⁹

Food shortage

The DPRK had a policy to ensure food security through self-sufficiency, to ensure this they began expanding cropland, shifting traditional food crops such as potatoes, millet, and tubers to higher-yield grains namely rice, and corn.³³⁰ North Korea began the Public Distribution System (PDS) in 1950s, to distribute food to the Korean people.³³¹ The PDS collected the harvest from all the collective farms minus the portions the farmers needed for their own consumption.³³² Then the organization allocated the food to the provinces, each province was responsible for making sure the people in their area receive food.³³³ Those most loyal received more favorable rations than those viewed as hostile.³³⁴ The chart below shows how many grams were allotted

³²⁶ "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," United Nations Human Rights, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>.

³²⁷ "Convention on the Rights of the Child," United Nations Human Rights, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx>.

³²⁸ "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," United Nations Human Rights, accessed November 8, 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf>.

³²⁹ Ibid

³³⁰ Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*, 26.

³³¹ "A Matter of Survival The North Korean Government’s Control of Food and the Risk of Hunger," 8, last modified May 2006, PDF.

³³² Ibid

³³³ French, *North Korea: The Paranoid*, 143.

³³⁴ Ibid

per person per day, and that the PDS progressively failed to meet its ration targets even before the famine and organizations collapse in the 1990s.³³⁵

	Norm	Ration for Official Worker
1955	Basic Formula from 900 grams of daily rations for heavy industrial workers to 300 grams for children	700 grams per day 256 kg per year
1973	Deduction of four days rations from monthly rations for so-called "war-time grain reserves" (average 13% deduction)	608 grams per day 222 kg per year
1987	10% deduction for so-called "patriotic grain"	547 grams per day 200 kg per year
1992	10% deduction from adult rations	492 grams per day 179 kg per day

Throughout the 1980s, the government started focusing “on the use of chemical fertilizers in the agricultural process.”³³⁶ They also incorporated the use of “double cropping, and triple seedlings to give the perceived sense of improving the environment while also increasing agriculture development.”³³⁷ The DPRK adopted an industrial approach to agricultural production by integrating “mechanization, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation, and electrification.”³³⁸ Unfortunately, the agricultural conditions in the DPRK were not favorable for producing crops and it did not have the industrial components necessary for the type of agriculture it was trying to achieve.³³⁹

³³⁵ Suk Lee, "The DPRK Famine of 1994-2000: Existence and the impact," KINU, 7, accessed November 9, 2015, <http://www.kinu.or.kr/upload/neoboard/DATA05/05-06.pdf>.

³³⁶ Robert Winstanley-Chesters, *Environment, Politics, and Ideology in North Korea: Landscape as Political Project* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 31,

³³⁷ Ibid

³³⁸ Stephan Haggard, "Famine, Marketization, and Economic Reform in North Korea," American Economic Association, accessed November 18, 2015, https://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2006/0107_0800_1502.pdf.

³³⁹ Eun Kwan Choi, Yesook Merrill, and Ŭng-han Kim, *North Korea in the World Economy* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 209.

The DPRK relied on the socialist-style barter trade with the Soviet Union and China to acquire the raw materials needed to subsidize their agricultural productivity.³⁴⁰ “Socialist-style barter trade” is based on usage value. Goods and services are produced for their usefulness and not to generate profit.³⁴¹ North Korea provided laborers to the Soviet Union in exchange for aid and as a way to pay off debts.³⁴² Despite its claims to self-reliance, North Korea was very dependent on outside assistance for raw materials.³⁴³ This would become a problem in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union and China moved to a market economy. North Korea could not pay for the raw materials it needed to carry out its agricultural plans.³⁴⁴ Lack of resources hindered North Korea's ability to generate the materials needed to create its chemical fertilizer, leading to a decline in food production.³⁴⁵

The starvation period in North Korea began at the end of the 1980s, in the early 1990s the DPRK launched the “Let’s eat two meals a day” campaign as a way to ease in further ration cuts.³⁴⁶ The reports and the numbers counter the claims made by North Korea that the 1995 floods are the main cause of their food crisis. By 1996, wild food accounted for 30% of the populations’ diet,³⁴⁷ 1997 the PDS was only supplying rations

³⁴⁰ Ibid

³⁴¹ Seth Shobhit, "Socialist Economies: How China, Cuba And North Korea Work," Investopedia, <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/081514/socialist-economies-how-china-cuba-and-north-korea-work.asp>.

³⁴² USA Int’L Business Publications, *Russia Today. Atlas for Business and Political Decision Makers: Strategic Information and ... Developments* (Place of publication not identified: Intl Business Pubns Usa, 2015), 135.

³⁴³ Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*, 27.

³⁴⁴ "The Agricultural Situation of North Korea," Food & Fertilizer Technology Center, 8, accessed November 6, 2015, http://fftc.agnet.org/htmlarea_file/library/20110726131553/eb475.pdf.

³⁴⁵ Ibid

³⁴⁶ French, *North Korea: The Paranoid*, 100.

³⁴⁷ Amnesty International, "THE CRUMBLING STATE OF HEALTH CARE IN NORTH KOREA," 6, last modified 2010, <https://www.amnesty.de/files/asa240012010en.pdf>.

to 6% of the population.³⁴⁸ Violating the countries own constitution Article 25 (3) that declares, “The state provides all the working people with every condition for obtaining food, clothing, and housing.”³⁴⁹

The PDS shut down in 1998, and the government told the people that the families were required to obtain food themselves and could no longer rely on the government.³⁵⁰ People were abandoned to find their own coping mechanisms to avoid starvation. “Farmers markets” spontaneously appeared, collective farms began using their rice to purchase a variety of food from the famers markets. This was the first time the people actively went against the government, as owning a private business was a political crime.³⁵¹ As the food shortage persisted food markets became tolerated and then legal in 2002.³⁵² The South Korean Ministry of Unification estimates that ordinary citizens obtain 60% of their food from these informal markets.³⁵³ In 2005, the DPRK tried to revive the PDS while doing an about face on the informal markets and making them illegal again.³⁵⁴ The government made it clear they would now be handing out rations again, the planned a target ration of 573 grams per person per day (PPPD).³⁵⁵

³⁴⁸ Amnesty International, "Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,"8, last modified 2004, digital file.

³⁴⁹ "DPRK's Socialist Constitution," Korea np.com, accessed November 6, 2015, http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/061st_issue/98091708.htm.

³⁵⁰ Andrew Natsios, "The Politics of Russia in North Korea," *Special Report*, August 2, 1999, 5, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr990802.pdf>.

³⁵¹ Mahesh Nalla et al., *Crime and Punishment around the World*, ed. Graeme R. Newman, Janet P. Stamatel, and Hung-En Sung, vol. 1, *Crime and Punishment around the World* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 180.


³⁵² PUKCHANG and PYONGYANG, "Through a glass, darkly," *The Economist*, March 11, 2004, [Page #], <http://www.economist.com/node/2502961>.

³⁵³ Wonhyuk Lim, "North Korea's Economic Futures: Internal and External Dimensions," The Brookings Institution, last modified November 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/lim_20051102.pdf.

³⁵⁴ Andrei Lankov, "The North Korean Paradox and the Subversive Truth," American Enterprise Institute, last modified March 1, 2009, accessed November 28, 2015, <https://www.aei.org/publication/the-north-korean-paradox-and-the-subversive-truth/print/>.

³⁵⁵ Anna-Leena Rasanen and Siemon Hollema, comps., *Food and Nutrition Security In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (n.p.: World Food Programme, n.d.), 12, http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/DPRK_draft_FINAL%201%20October%202013.pdf.

The World Food Programme (WFP) allots half a kilogram or 500 grams of food per day per person.³⁵⁶ “Less than a quarter of PDS dependent households, which is about 65% to 70% of the Korean population, and two-thirds of farmers received their food rations from 2003 to 2007, and those who did rarely received their full entitlement.”³⁵⁷ In the last four years, as the chart below will show, the food ration has barely reached the 400-grams per day well below the government and WFP mark.³⁵⁸



As early as 1993, low ranking military personnel experienced food shortages.³⁵⁹ In 1996, the DPRK established the “militarization of agriculture” and sent military soldiers to work on the farms and to prevent food hoarding.³⁶⁰ Eventually the government sent the soldiers to seize the food for the troops.³⁶¹ Those soldiers stationed on a farm, were better off than urban soldiers were as farmers bribed soldiers

³⁵⁶ “FAQs,” World Food Programme, <http://www.wfp.org/faqs#faq14>.

³⁵⁷ *SPECIAL REPORT FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA* (n.p.: FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME Economic and Social Development Department, 2008), 22, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/ai475e/ai475e00.htm#r13>.

³⁵⁸ Rasanen and Hollema, *Food and Nutrition Security*, 12.

³⁵⁹ Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*, 110.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid* 110

³⁶¹ *Ibid*

with food.³⁶² As conditions deteriorated, many soldiers deserted in search of food, while others were sent back to their villages when the military did not have enough to feed them.³⁶³ As rations became tighter, corrupt high-ranking officials stole the food meant for the people and lower ranking soldiers to use for their own personal gain.³⁶⁴

The food shortages were having a profound impact on North Korean children. In 1998, 62% of North Korean children were stunted from malnutrition, the numbers varied from province to province. Those of the lowest Songbun classification living in the north had the worst numbers.³⁶⁵ The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), states that the health of children is usually a good indicator of the health of a community.³⁶⁶ World Health Organization (WHO) maintains, “Stunting is the result of inadequate nutrition and causes long-term negative effects on the child’s ability to grow and learn, and to develop into productive adults later in life.”³⁶⁷ Restricted development affects whole societies and nations; it can create a long-term health and humanitarian burden for the country.

It was not until 1995 that the DPRK appealed to the outside world for help with the famine, blaming natural disasters.³⁶⁸ The government concealed the true conditions of the famine from the outside world and from its own people, which led to deaths.

North Korea’s choice to withhold of necessary data made it difficult to provided targeted

³⁶² Ibid 111

³⁶³ Ibid

³⁶⁴ Hyung Gu Lynn, *Bipolar Orders: The Two Koreas since 1989* (Halifax: Fernwood Pub., 2007), 141.

³⁶⁵ Rasanen and Hollema, *Food and Nutrition Security*, 21.

³⁶⁶ *SPECIAL REPORT FAO/WFP CROP*, 27.

³⁶⁷ *WHA Global Nutrition Targets 2025: Stunting Policy Brief* (n.p.: WHO, 2014), 1], http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/globaltargets_stunting_policybrief.pdf.

³⁶⁸ Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, *Foreign Assistance to North Korea* (n.p.: Federation of American Scientists, 2014), 3, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf>.

humanitarian and development assistance in the country.³⁶⁹ The DPRK violated its citizen's right to information hindering their ability to develop coping skills to combat starvation early on, escapee's testified about people starving in their homes waiting for their food rations.³⁷⁰ They also tell how "the elderly went out into the fields to die so they did not burden their families and children were so weak they could not hold up their heads."³⁷¹ North Korea was aware of the food crisis well before the mass flooding and their eventual plea for assistance.

During the famine, the state continued to maintain laws and controls criminalizing efforts by the people to find alternatives to starving, such as moving to areas where food was a little more plentiful or bartering for food.³⁷² Military spending continued without reduction it was still top priority throughout the famine.³⁷³ The state used food as a tool of control over its population; it prioritized those it felt were more deserving and crucial to maintaining the regime over those it viewed as expendable.³⁷⁴ North Korea has received food aid from 1995 through 2015. After six years, donor fatigue was setting in, as awareness that the food deficit was only partly due to natural disasters.³⁷⁵ Food aid does not address the absence of structural changes and development plans, and as North Korea was not forth coming in possible reforms to elevate their food shortage donors were less incline to contribute. By 2015, there was a stream of contradictory

³⁶⁹ *Report of the detailed*, 175.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid*

³⁷¹ Michael Rubin, *Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes*, online-ausg. ed. (New York: Encounter Books, 2015), 109.

³⁷² *Ibid* 208

³⁷³ Hyung Gu Lynn, *Bipolar Orders: The Two Koreas since 1989* (Halifax: Fernwood Pub., 2007), 141.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid* 155

³⁷⁵ Eun Kwan Choi, Yesook Merrill, and Ŭng-han Kim, *North Korea in the World Economy* (London: Routledge, 2003), 211.

information on North Korea's economic problems and food shortages.³⁷⁶ First, there were reports of the worst drought since the 1995 appeal for help. Followed by declarations that the harvest was the best they had seen in decades thanks to the agricultural reforms Kim Jong-un put in place. By the fall, the picture was dire, the harvest was not going to be able to yield the amount of food necessary to feed the population, the WFP announced it extended its aid to North Korea over the next year.³⁷⁷ It remains to be seen if North Korea has in fact made agricultural reforms that will yield an adequate harvest next year.

Discrimination

When the Songbun class system was created, no one was excluded from the political process based on his or her Songbun status.³⁷⁸ The Korean War contributed significantly to the strong class distinction that is prevalent today. Those who "sacrificed for the fatherland, were given higher status over those who supported the South, United Nations, or chose not to join the military."³⁷⁹ The WPK defined those that did not sacrifice for the fatherland, returned prisoners of war and families of those that migrated south as hostile to the regime whether their opposition was real or perceived.³⁸⁰ The May 30th 1957 Resolution began the loyalty classifications for all citizens, the enactment of the Cabinet Decree No. 149 ordered the removal of the hostile class to the northern mountainous provinces, separating friend from foe from within the North Korea

³⁷⁶ Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, "North Korean food shortage news roundup: October and November (updated)," North Korean Economy Watch, last modified November 10, 2015, <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/countries/un/food-aid/>.

³⁷⁷ Ibid

³⁷⁸ Collins, "Marked For Life: SONGBUN," *THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA*, 12.

³⁷⁹ Worden, *Korea North: A Country*, 79.

³⁸⁰ Ibid

population.³⁸¹ The labels attached to citizens during this period have been passed down generation after generation.

The process of determining a person's status is not transparent, and North Korean citizens cannot challenge the results. At birth, a baby's Songbun classification system is assigned after an examination is conducted on their parent's status.³⁸² The consequences began early in school where grades were determined by Songbun and not performance.³⁸³ Songbun controls every aspect of their lives what jobs they can do after school to their ability to travel, how much food or health care they receive and even who they can marry.³⁸⁴ The commission found that the "Songbun system leads to structural discrimination whereby generations become locked into disadvantage and social mobility is not possible."³⁸⁵ Once assigned the baby's status it is theirs for life barring any acts of wrongdoing or in limited cases, they rise to a higher status. Losing status is much easier; all it takes is a political crime as determined by the state.³⁸⁶

Women's rights

Within the Songbun system, women have become one of the most vulnerable to discrimination with nowhere to turn for protection. At the time of Korea's division Kim Il-sung reportedly supported equal rights for the women who participated in the independence movement. He declared that they would be on equal footing with men and receive assignments suited to their abilities and aptitudes and he also introduced

³⁸¹ Gause, *Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment*, 105.

³⁸² Ibid

³⁸³ Schwekendiek, *A Socioeconomic History of North*, 39.

³⁸⁴ Ibid

³⁸⁵ *Report of the detailed*, 91.

³⁸⁶ "International Covenant on Civil," United Nations Human Rights.

the “Law of Sex Equality,” in 1946.³⁸⁷ The law emphasized free marriage and divorce, equal rights to inherit property, it prohibited the buying or selling of women, and prostitution. Women were promoted into the labor force where they received paid maternity leave, reduced work hours for mothers with young families and free nurseries, and kindergartens.³⁸⁸ The introduction of women into the work force served to breakdown the family as it took the economic power away from male head of the family as did the creation of institutionalization of childrearing. The institutionalization of childrearing consisted of state run nurseries and schools, set up to start Kim ideology indoctrination early.³⁸⁹ Kim Il-sung’s cult image portrayed him as the father of the people, the patriarch.³⁹⁰ The enactment of the Law of Sex Equality was not enough to change the Patriarchal mentality of the society to allow women to achieve gender equality.³⁹¹

In the 1990s as the economy deteriorated, so did the rights of the women.³⁹² Women were dismissed from the work force, labeling working for the state as “men’s work.”³⁹³ Since the men were still required to report to work and they were not being paid, the women had to assume the duties as the breadwinner.³⁹⁴ As the economy collapsed the women who did not work for the state, and did not have to report to work

³⁸⁷ OECD, *Atlas of Gender and Development: How Social Norms Affect Gender Equality in Non-OECD Countries* (Paris: OECD, Development Centre, 2010), 32

³⁸⁸ *Report of the detailed*, 85.

³⁸⁹ Connor, *The Koreas: A Global*, 204.

³⁹⁰ Lim, *Leader Symbols and Personality*, 84.

³⁹¹ Tétreault, *Women and Revolution in Africa*, 174.

³⁹² Keumsoon Lee, *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2008*(Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2008), 300,

http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp?page=1&num=26&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir=&bid=DATA04&ses=

³⁹³ Kyung-Ae Park, *New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 50.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid* 51

every day, began operating private markets.³⁹⁵ The state imposed restrictions on these markets and at times cracked down on them, yet the women continued the markets due to the need to feed their families. Women are still subservient to their husbands and with women bringing home the food and money, this has led to an increase in domestic violence, as the men are unable to cope with the changing gender roles.³⁹⁶ Women have begun to experience violence outside the home.

Sexual assaults became commonplace, escapees testified, “That soldiers demanded sex from women who were caught committing minor violations.”³⁹⁷ Article 280 of the North Korean penal code states it is a “crime to force sex on a woman in a subordinate relationship.”³⁹⁸ Even with this law in place, Officials do not fear punishment for their actions towards women.³⁹⁹ Women turned towards prostitution to procure food and money needed to provide for their families,⁴⁰⁰ If the women is caught they are punished while the men are released.⁴⁰¹ Women who cross over into China in the hope to acquire food often become victims of trafficking networks. If North Korean women are caught in China, they were forcibly sent back to North Korea where they are immediately sent to a prison camp.

Both North Korea and China have strict laws against trafficking and apply stiff penalties to include execution. Yet China’s refoulement practice and North Korea’s

³⁹⁵ Michael J. Seth, *A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 455, <https://books.google.com/books?>

³⁹⁶ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 483.

³⁹⁷ *Report of the detailed*, 91.

³⁹⁸ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 563

³⁹⁹ *Ibid* 200

⁴⁰⁰ Won-hong Kim, *Women of North Korea: A closer look at every life* (2014), 79.

⁴⁰¹ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 484.

punishment for repatriation render the victims helpless.⁴⁰² If the women are pregnant at the time of their capture, they are subjected to forced abortions in the camps or if they are too far along they are allowed to give birth and then the guards kill their babies “in an effort to adhere to the “pure Korean race.”⁴⁰³ North Korea’s discrimination against women places them in positions of vulnerability, which is made worse by their inability to protest or fight against these violations.⁴⁰⁴ The women’s organizations are not voluntary they serve only to promote party politics, that have no political influence or the ability to promote women’s rights.⁴⁰⁵

Freedom of Expression

The people’s lack of ability to politically influence or promote rights violates their right to freedom. North Korea has a “Freedom House Rating” of seven, the lowest rating available. North Korea’s media and education “concentrates on promoting Juch’e ideology and deification of the Kim Dynasty.”⁴⁰⁶ The North Korean people learn from a very early age not to question their Supreme Leaders.⁴⁰⁷ All North Koreans are required to know and be able to recite the Ten Principles by heart. The Ten Principles is used to suppress individualism; it promotes the one-ideology system calling for the unconditional obedience:⁴⁰⁸ With the implementation of the Ten Principles came the formation of the evaluation meetings in which citizens conducted self-criticism sessions,

⁴⁰² Euna Lee and Lisa Dickey, *The World Is Bigger Now: An American Journalist's Release from Captivity in North Korea-- a Remarkable Story of Faith, Family, and Forgiveness* (New York: Broadway Books, 2010), 21.

⁴⁰³ Ahlam Lee, *North Korean Defectors in a New and Competitive Society: Issues and Challenges in Resettlement, Adjustment, and the Learning Process* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 37.

⁴⁰⁴ *Report of the detailed*, 98.

⁴⁰⁵ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 465.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid* 350

⁴⁰⁷ Christoph Bluth, *Korea* (Oxford: Wiley, 2013), 178.

⁴⁰⁸ *Report of the detailed*, 35.

reference point 79

to insure they were living up to the Ten Principles.⁴⁰⁹ Those found violating the Ten Principles are “heavily penalized and sent to prison camps, as those violations are considered as ideologically impure.”⁴¹⁰ Kim Jong-un amended The Ten Principles in 2013 to include references to his father Kim Jong-il. After Kim Jong-un executed his uncle in 2013, he ordered the indoctrinations sessions to increase and expected the population to pledge their loyalty in writing. The execution created fear and bafflement leaving the population, and those in the upper core, to understand that there was no room for criticism of the process, through its lack of transparency, and the hasty and violent ending.⁴¹¹ These intense state indoctrination sessions take place in a country that does not tolerate facts or opinions critical to its official ideology. Any criticism, rejection, or idleness on these principles is a political crime.⁴¹²

The purpose of the system is to create loyal subjects committed to the Supreme Leader and to instill hostility towards Japan, the United States, and South Korea.⁴¹³ North Korea established an elaborate surveillance system, under the WPK to monitor for expressions of sentiments deemed anti-state or anti-revolutionary. This includes secret informers, and the neighborhood watch, which assigns a person who monitors their residents’ actions. Since the 1990s, citizens have been secretly exercising their right to knowledge by listening to South Korea radio, watching South Korean television

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid

⁴¹⁰ Jae-Cheon Lim, *Leader Symbols and Personality Cult in North Korea: The Leader State* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 25.

⁴¹¹ Daniel Schwegendiek, *A Socioeconomic History of North Korea* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011), 49.

⁴¹² Nalla et al., *Crime and Punishment around*, 180.

⁴¹³ *Report of the detailed*, 46.

From among the pictures taken in the DPRK by an Associated Press photographer, one of the pictures featured was described as “Kindergarten kids’ drawings that depict children killing United States soldiers hang on the wall at Kaeson Kindergarten in central Pyongyang on 9 March 2013. For North Koreans, the systematic indoctrination of anti-Americanism starts as early as kindergarten.”

or foreign DVDs, and using cell phones to acquire new information from outside of North Korea. If caught they can be charged with a political crime.⁴¹⁴

Travel

When it comes to travel, the DPRK does not only mistrust any foreigner entering the country, they also closely check and double check on North Koreans traveling abroad.⁴¹⁵ The North Korea authorities maintain their control over the people in order to prevent any social or ideological influences from entering their country.⁴¹⁶ North Koreans must have a travel certificate to move to a “location other than their registered area of residence,” within or outside North Korea.⁴¹⁷ Under international pressures, in 1998 the DPRK added article 75 to the constitution guaranteeing the right to freedom of residence and travel.⁴¹⁸ In reality, authorities continue to restrict movements. In the 2000s, the DPRK intensified inspections of travel certificates, if caught without one the citizen can receive harsh fines or worse sent to a prison camp.⁴¹⁹ Once approved to go travel abroad, if the traveler fails to return, their families are sent to the political labor camps.⁴²⁰ Restrictions seem to be more limiting for men than women are, as men are required to report to work and their absence is noticed sooner. The women are able to move around more freely, as they conduct their own businesses and markets to support

⁴¹⁴ Mahesh Nalla et al., *Crime and Punishment around the World*, ed. Graeme R. Newman (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 180.

⁴¹⁵ Schwekendiek, *A Socioeconomic History of North*, 55.

⁴¹⁶ Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, *North Korea Handbook*, 359.

⁴¹⁷ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 292.

⁴¹⁸ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 291.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid

⁴²⁰ Cath Senker, *North Korea and South Korea* (New York: Rosen Pub., 2013), 30.

the family.⁴²¹ The number of female refugees that have made it to South Korea has increased over the years as shown in the chart below.⁴²²

Year/ Classification	98	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	Total
Male	831	565	510	474	626	424	515	573	608	662	591	795	404	369	8,049
Female	116	478	632	811	1,272	960	1,513	1,981	2,195	2,252	1,811	1,911	1,098	1,145	18,668
Total	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402	2,706	1,502	1,514	26,717

When Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea stepped up their efforts to control defections. Kim Jong-un reinstated heavy penalties if citizens are caught crossing the border illegally they are sent to the political prison camps. During Kim Jong-il's reign, punishments had become lenient, if caught citizens faced a fined or a limited sentence in a labor training facilities as punishment.⁴²³ Persecutions of family members of those who had defected or have family members, whose whereabouts are unknown, have become worse.⁴²⁴ The families of escapees are ordered to register with the local People's Security Bureau for monitoring or are sent away to prison camps.⁴²⁵ The number of refugees shown in the chart does not give a factual account of the number of people who have tried to escape North Korea. Due to the closed off nature of North Korea and China's active repatriation of those caught, it is unlikely to know the true number of the North Koreans who have attempted to leave.

⁴²¹ Mike Kim, *Escaping North Korea: Defiance and Hope in the World's Most Repressive Country* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 2010), 36.

⁴²² "Overview," Ministry of Unification, <http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3026>. *North Korean Refugees in South Korea*

⁴²³ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 577.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid* 549

⁴²⁵ *Report of the detailed*, 112.

Prison camps

One of those viewed as expendable are the prisoner in the prison camps. North Korea persistently denies that it has prison camps, their very existence is a state secret, and they have been disguised as military or farming facilities.⁴²⁶ In 1979, the North Korean prison camps became known in international human rights circles, when Amnesty International campaigned for the release of Ali Lamada from Venezuela, a translator who worked in North Korea for the DPRK.⁴²⁷ Amnesty published his account of his time in prison; his story is remarkably similar to the testimonies from escaped North Koreans. The next account was from the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee and Human Rights Watch/Asia released a report in 1988, discussing the camps.⁴²⁸ The international community has known of the camps since 1979, yet they have not addressed the abuses during political negotiations.

During the Korean War, documents captured from North Korea showed that “The Process and Guidelines for Executing Forced Labor” announced the creation of labor camps in 1947 by the Soviet Unions.⁴²⁹ The prison labor camps were enlarged during the 1950s to accommodate the number of people sentenced during Kim Il-sung’s political purges.⁴³⁰ Initially Kim Il-sung purged Japanese collaborators in the 1940s then it became political opponents and rival socialist in the 1950s to 1960s. This turned into imprisoning anyone who displayed opposition to the Workers’ Party of Korea, the state policies and to the Kim Dynasty. Kim Il-sung instituted the “guilt by association” policy

⁴²⁶ *Report of the detailed*, 221.

⁴²⁷ Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 92.

⁴²⁸ David R. Hawk, *The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of "Those Who Are Sent to the Mountains"*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 42, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf.

⁴²⁹ Gause, *Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment*, 92.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid*

where whole families, including children or grandchildren, are imprisoned along with the offender.⁴³¹ “Under an edict from Kim Il-sung in 1972, up to three generations must be punished in order to wipe out the “seed” of class enemies.”⁴³² David Hawk, of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, “there are no trials for those in the political camps, but presumed deviants are suspected of wrongdoing, wrong thinking, wrong knowledge, wrong association or wrong background.”⁴³³ The commission received accounts of party officials and their families who did not receive a trial or court sentencing prior to being sent to the prison camps and were assigned to hard labor.⁴³⁴

It is estimated that 80,000 to 120,000 are imprisoned within four remaining prison camps, as of 2014.⁴³⁵ The North Korean government continually denies the use of torture and human rights violations. They declare the violations have disappeared due to law revisions and that law enforcement officials receive thorough training to prevent committing these violations.⁴³⁶ The lives in these prisons include daily abuses, and often deadly conditions; insufficient food leading to starvation, vitally no medical treatment, lack of proper housing or clothing, regular mistreatment, rape, torture and executions.⁴³⁷ The abuses begin immediately upon entering the camp; prisoners are subjected body cavity searches, performed in order to degrade the prisoners, not to obtain evidence. This is especially so with the female prisoners who usually undergo

⁴³¹ Ian Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments* (London: Routledge, 2012), 28

⁴³² “The gulag behind the goose-steps,” *The Economist*, April 21, 2012, [Page #], <http://www.economist.com/node/21553090>.

⁴³³ *Ibid*

⁴³⁴ *Report of the detailed*, 101.

⁴³⁵ “World Report 2015: North,” Human Rights Watch.

⁴³⁶ Morse Tan, *North Korea, International Law, and the Dual Crises: Narrative and Constructive Engagement* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 40.

⁴³⁷ World Report 2015: North,” Human Rights Watch.

these examinations in front of other prisoners and guards.⁴³⁸ Ordinary guards are performing the examinations and usually in unsanitary conditions.⁴³⁹ International criminal law considers any unjustified coercive invasion of the genital opening of the victim with a part of the perpetrator's body as rape."⁴⁴⁰

There are two types of prison camps within North Korea, the "Kwan-li-so" are political labor colonies and the "Kyo-hwa-so" are long-term prison labor facilities.⁴⁴¹ "The prisoners' day-to-day life consists of performing hard and at times dangerous labor."⁴⁴² Although North Korea used the Soviet Gulag as a template to establish Kwan-li-so prison camps based on the testimony of exiled North Koreans, many features of the DPRK camps are harsher than the Gulag camps.⁴⁴³

The Kyo-hwa-so which means, "a place to make a good person through re-education," are prisons for criminal offenses.⁴⁴⁴ They are labor training camps and the families of prisoners do not join them, but are aware of their location. As part of their reeducation process, after a long day of labor, the prisoners are required to memorize Kim Il-sung's speeches, the New Year's Day Joint Editorials, and take part in organized "self-criticism" sessions.⁴⁴⁵ Many of these prisoners have had some form of judicial process, and receive fixed term sentences.⁴⁴⁶ While the facility may physically resemble prisons in other countries, the offenses do not resemble crimes that would

⁴³⁸ Norma Kang Muico, "Forced Labour in North Korean Prison Camps," Antislavery, http://www.antislavery.org/includes/documents/cm_docs/2010/n/nk_2007.pdf.

⁴³⁹ *Report of the detailed*, 120.

⁴⁴⁰ Mark Ellis, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court Protects against Sexual Crimes," Center on Law and Globalization, https://clg.portalmx.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=204.

⁴⁴¹ David P. Forsythe, *Encyclopedia of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 337.

⁴⁴² *Report of the detailed*, 220.

⁴⁴³ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 28.

⁴⁴⁴ "North Korea: Harsher Policies against Border-Crossers," Human Rights Watch, 8, last modified March 2007, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/03/05/north-korea-harsher-policies-against-border-crossers>.

⁴⁴⁵ Hawk, *The Hidden Gulag: The Lives*, 83.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid* 84.

normally be punishable in other countries. Such as private economic transactions that are not done within an officially appointed workstation.⁴⁴⁷ A citizen crossing the Korean Chinese border in search of food during the famine is another example of such a crime.

Kwan-li-so is a “management place” in its literal translation or the common English translation “political prison camp.”⁴⁴⁸ Kwan-li-so are correctional labor camps, most of these victims are sentenced for life, inmates are denied contact with the outside world, and their families that did not join them are not informed if they are alive or dead, they just stop existing.⁴⁴⁹ There have been reports of releases which took place on the birthdays of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, released prisoners and guards are forbidden to talk about the camps with anyone outside the camps.⁴⁵⁰

Kwan-li-so prisoners are imprisoned for political reasons without the benefit of a trial or court sentencing.⁴⁵¹ Those sent to the Kwan-li-so prisons lose their rights as citizens; they fall under the rules or lack of rules of the guards. There have been a number of reports in which public executions are held and other reports of prisoners being taken away and never coming back widely believed to be executed in secret.⁴⁵² Usually the public executions were carried out on those who attempted to escape.⁴⁵³ Testimonies from former guards who have defected and from former prisoners all tell of witnessing many executions within the prisons. Mr. Hawk reports “Starvation food

⁴⁴⁷ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011), 88

⁴⁴⁸ Chong-ch'öl Pak and Chŏng-ho No, *Law and Policy on Korean Unification: Analysis and Implications* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2014), 226.

⁴⁴⁹ Hawk, *The Hidden Gulag: The Lives*, 9.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid 34

⁴⁵¹ Jeffries, *North Korea, 2009-2012: A Guide*, 95.

⁴⁵² Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 126.

⁴⁵³ Ibid

rations, forced labor, routine beatings, systematic torture, and abuse, along with executions put the North Korean camps in the ranks of history's worst prisons for political offenders" even comparing them to the Nazi concentration camps.⁴⁵⁴

North Korea's judiciary and prison system violates the ICCPR Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 which protect citizens from arbitrary arrest or detention, to a fair and public hearing, protection from torture and inhuman treatment.⁴⁵⁵ The commission found that the due process is absent throughout the justice system, oversight of the detention processes for crimes in the DPRK are controlled by the Office of the Prosecutor.⁴⁵⁶ Based on testimonies from escapees, the more political a case is the less likely the suspect will receive due process in a court. Those suspected of political crimes are held in detention centers for months, where they are degraded, intimidated, and tortured, until a confession is received." The State Security Department (SSD) makes the decisions on highly political cases outside the judiciary process, while reserving the judiciary process for political cases of medium security, and handing off the less serious crimes to the Ministry of People's Security (MPS).⁴⁵⁷ The MPS works in reverse, the serious crimes go through the judiciary process, and bypasses the courts for less serious crimes. These organizations are considered safeguards of the party, protecting people's lives from various criminal infringements.⁴⁵⁸ In North Korea, citizens of the

⁴⁵⁴ Hawk, *The Hidden Gulag: The Lives*, 4.

⁴⁵⁵ "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," United Nations Human Rights, accessed November 8, 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>.

⁴⁵⁶ Su-am Kim, *The North Korean Penal Code, Criminal Procedures, and Their Actual Applications* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006), 16, http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_02_01.jsp?page=1&num=12&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir=&bid=DATA05&ses=&category=2676.

⁴⁵⁷ Han et al., *White Paper on Human*, 137.

⁴⁵⁸ Collins, "Marked For Life: SONGBUN," *THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA.*, 46.

hostile class are considered enemies of the state, escapees have testified, “people of low Songbun who have committed a crime face harsher punishments.”

Chapter Five
Attempts at Solutions

Economic reforms

In an effort to ease the economy crisis during the 1990s, China inspired North Korea with the success of its Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The SEZs in North Korea would operate as a tourist area, an industrial complex, or a port open for use by China and the Soviet Union. In 1991, the DPRK created the Rason SEZ near the Chinese Russian border in an effort to try to bring in international capital in nine years it generated \$150 million.⁴⁵⁹ Rason lacked of transportation, energy, and communication infrastructures majorly impeding early visits by Chinese tourist.⁴⁶⁰ This earlier SEZs did not live up to expectations, but with the breakdown of the PDS during the famine, North Korea had a greater need for financial resources, they expanded their SEZs in the 2000s.⁴⁶¹ These new include the Kaesong-Industrial Complex (KIC) that was a joint venture with South Korea, Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone; by the mid 2000s both of these zones closed due to international tensions.⁴⁶² Since Kim Jong-un has become leader, there is a renewed interest in reopening the SEZs. North Korea has collaborated with China and Russia to improving the infrastructure of the Rason. In October 2013, The DPRK announced they will be building fourteen new SEZ within North Korea over the next few years. The DPRK reports that they have signed contracts with Singapore, Hong Kong, and China to start construction of these new sites.⁴⁶³

⁴⁵⁹ Andray Abrahamian, Geoffrey K. See, and Wang Xingyu, "THE ABCs OF NORTH KOREA'S SEZs," U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, last modified 2014, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Abrahamian-SEZs-14-1118-HQ-Print.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁰ "Special Economic Zones in the DPRK," The National Committee on North Korea, accessed November 22, 2015, <http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/special-economic-zones-in-the-dprk>.

⁴⁶¹ Abrahamian, See, and Xingyu, "THE ABCs OF NORTH," U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS.

⁴⁶² "Special Economic Zones in the DPRK," The National Committee on North Korea.

⁴⁶³ Ibid

Other types of economic reforms during the 1990s and 2000s included legalized markets, increased wages, devaluing the won, and authorized state enterprises to enter into market activities.⁴⁶⁴ The State Development Bank was formally opened in 2010, it was designed to bring in outside capital, and also functioned to finance economic recovery projects such as building the country's ailing infrastructure."⁴⁶⁵ North Korea hoped that these reforms provided incentives and would attract more foreign investments. Since Kim Jong-un's political appointment, there is a new interest in reform efforts. After Kim Jong-un became heir apparent, he began visiting the economic zones on 58 separate trips while only making 33 trips to visit military installations.⁴⁶⁶ The number of trips to the economic zones is viewed that he will be focusing on economic reforms as a way to secure his legitimacy.⁴⁶⁷

After his father's death, Kim Jong-un continued to associate himself with economic performance. Kim Jong-un has expressed his concern about North Korea's poor economy, and food deficiency. In a November 2011 statement, he refers to "food as more critical than bullets."⁴⁶⁸ A top Korean official, Yang Hyong-sop, stated that Kim Jong-un was pursuing a "knowledge-based" economic system and implementing additional economic reforms similar to those used by China.⁴⁶⁹ North Korea is sending people to China study its public companies and factories, while also meeting with Chinese commerce-related officials in hopes of learning how to implement similar

⁴⁶⁴ Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 124.

⁴⁶⁵ Kim, "STIFLED GROWTH AND ADDED," 104.

⁴⁶⁶ Abrahamian, See, and Xingyu, "THE ABCS OF NORTH," U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid

⁴⁶⁸ Backes and Kailitz, *Ideocracies in Comparison: Legitimation*, 219.

⁴⁶⁹ Kim, "STIFLED GROWTH AND ADDED," 105.

strategies at home.⁴⁷⁰ It remains to be seen if the economic reforms the DPRK instituted under Kim Jong-un, will alleviate the economic problems facing the country in the long term. "What should not be forgotten, however, is that the country is not poor ... the resources of the country are misspent, misallocated and misused on the elite and the 'military first' policy to the detriment of the populace."⁴⁷¹

NGOS

The Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), responded to North Korea's plea in 1995 for food aid, in an effort to prevent deaths from starvation.⁴⁷² Unlike other humanitarian emergencies, North Korea's government was still intact, creating a political environment that the foreign aid workers had to navigate. In time, they realized the food crisis they responded to did not originate with the floods as previously reported, although the flooding made a dire circumstance worse. The experiences in Africa and other parts of the world did not prepare the foreign aid workers for the obstacles they faced in North Korea. The NGOs policies in the past have insisted on transparency of the delivery process of the received aid.⁴⁷³ This would not be the case in North Korea.

The major obstacle faced by the foreign aid workers was the constraints put in place by the DPRK. North Korea rigidly controlled the process of aid distribution, the aid workers were limited to the amount of contact they had with the Korean people,

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid

⁴⁷¹ "North Korea hunger," Thomson Reuters Foundation.

⁴⁷² Doug Bandow, "No Foreign Aid for North Korea if Another Famine Strikes," Cato Institute, last modified August 12, 2015, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://www.cato.org/blog/no-foreign-aid-north-korea-another-famine-strikes>.

⁴⁷³ Gloria Agyemang, Dr. et al., *NGO accountability and aid delivery*, research report no. 110 (London, England: London: Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 2009), 7, accessed November 29, 2015, <http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/sustainability-reporting/rr-110-001.pdf>.

officials monitored them at all times. The aid workers could not move around as they wish, they were only allowed in specified counties to access the famine, they had to give a notice before visiting a specific area, when visiting the counties they were escorted by the DPRK officials and their contact with ordinary citizens was severely limited. DPRK officials prohibited foreign Korean language speakers to work in the country; they assigned the aid workers to work with the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) that oversaw all international aid relief efforts within the country.⁴⁷⁴ Aid workers were under specific rules about where and when they could monitor the distribution of the food received.

North Korea insisted that the aid received was to go through the PDS governmental distribution system, officials shielded foreign visitors from the worst of their people's suffering, while struggling to make sure that they were exposed to sufficient suffering to create sympathy and support for continued aid materials.⁴⁷⁵ By distributing the food through the DPRK's PDS system, aid workers could verify that the food arrived at the PDS but were unable to monitor if it went to the neediest of citizens.⁴⁷⁶ Initially the DPRK altered labels identifying food aid so the ordinary citizen did not know the food was coming from someone other than the government.⁴⁷⁷ Since all of the food was distributed through the government, "it became part of the system of oppression."⁴⁷⁸ This became a point of contention as the aid workers felt that many who

⁴⁷⁴ L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 6.

⁴⁷⁵ Mark E. Manyin and Mi Ae Taylor, "Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in North Korea," *Federation of American Scientists*, 6.

⁴⁷⁶ L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 87.

⁴⁷⁷ Kūktong Munje Yōn'guso, *East Asian Review* (n.p.: Institute for East Asian Studies, 2001), 13:28.

⁴⁷⁸ Sandra Fahy, *Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 196.

needed the food were not getting it, there were suspicions that North Korean officials diverted significant amounts of humanitarian aid to their military.⁴⁷⁹

Medical aid workers quickly realized that North Korean medical personnel were lacking in modern day skills. It became clear that there had been little or no interaction with the international community as their skills reflected the standard knowledge of the 1960s and 1970s.⁴⁸⁰ Medical aid began to be combined with training due to restrictive movements and the inability to reach those in need left the medical aid workers uncertain their programs were actually making a beneficial impact. This doubt is the reason the medical relief organizations left North Korea in 1998.⁴⁸¹ The difficulties the aid workers experience prompted many organizations to leave North Korea after a few years.

Humanitarian aid constituted a direct threat to Juch'e, threatening to undermine the central role of the state.⁴⁸² The notion of give and take in international diplomacy is a foreign concept to North Korea, "their rules are based on a zero-sum game in which only one side can win."⁴⁸³ North Korea officials did not want their country to be seen as impoverished or be treated like a "third world country," to save face, meant that much of the aid given to North Korea was offensive to the North Korean leadership, if not unacceptable at the time.⁴⁸⁴ Used items became a problem, even though in good

⁴⁷⁹ Mi Ae Taylor and Mark E. Manyin, "Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in North Korea," *Federation of American Scientists*, 1, last modified March 25, 2011, accessed November 28, 2015, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41749.pdf>.

⁴⁸⁰ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 55.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid* 56

⁴⁸² *Ibid* 3

⁴⁸³ Kihl and Kim, *North Korea: The Politics*, 21.

⁴⁸⁴ *SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: Hearings on 93-390 Before the INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH, SECOND (2004) (statement of NORTH KOREA: HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES, AND HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES)*. 38, Accessed November 28, 2015. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa93390.000/hfa93390_of.htm.

condition and better than the ordinary citizen owned or the medical community utilized. North Korea viewed aid contributions as gifts that were presented by a visiting delegations, much in the same manner that tribute was received in the Chinese Imperial court. The officials linked the quality and presentation with the amount of respect the visitor had for the court. By using this tactic, North Korea was able to portray itself as a Country receiving gifts from the outside world and not as a poor nation in need of handouts.⁴⁸⁵ North Korea became insulted at any slight suggesting they were needy or underdeveloped. The officials were focused on receiving materials needed and not interested in advice on how to improve their country. NGOs worked on the premise that “if you teach a man to fish, you feed him for a lifetime. North Koreans felt not only did they know how to fish, but that Kim Il-sung invented fishing.”⁴⁸⁶

North Korea decided on the number the number of aid workers allowed to enter the country, to the amount of money the foreign aid organization brought with it to the negotiating table. Delegations were expected to bring token donation to every meeting, this expectation was even higher for those who wanted to establish a presence within North Korea. Fact-finding mission were not allowed the organizations and aid workers had to rely on the word of North Korea officials.⁴⁸⁷ The aid workers timed their visits with the arrival of aid was scheduled to justify their visits.⁴⁸⁸ Foreign relief workers complained that at times the officials were so demanding that it felt like they were paying to bring aid into the country.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid

⁴⁸⁶ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 41.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid 37

⁴⁸⁸ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 37.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid

North Korea is entering its twentieth year of emergency humanitarian assistance. The WFP remains the largest food aid provider to North Korea. Over the years, competing demands from countries in need has resulted in “Donor Fatigue.”⁴⁹⁰ “Donor fatigue” was becoming apparent in 2003, as there have been no reforms to change agricultural and economic shortages within North Korea. The biggest problem comes from the figures that show North Korea has effectively used the inflow of aid to offset its own commercial food imports. The charts show that as aid was coming in, the amount of government money spent on food imports declined.⁴⁹¹




Figure 12. Volume of aid and imports on commercial terms⁹⁷¹

⁴⁹⁰ *Korea North Country Study Guide: Strategic Information and Developments*, 2015 ed. (Washington, DC: International Business Publications, USA, 2015), 230, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://Korea North Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments By IBP, Inc.>

⁴⁹¹ *Report of the detailed*, 199.




Figure 13. Democratic People's Republic of Korea: merchandise imports and food imports⁹⁷²

The WFP is having a difficult time raising donations needed to help the North Korean people. International community continues to watch as North Korea continues to take an aggressive stance and continually launch missiles and purchase high-end merchandise for the core class and promoting tourist areas for the rich all the while allowing its citizens to starve.

In 2010, WFP stated they had received one third of the required amount of food to address the needs of the North Korean people.⁴⁹² By 2014, the WFP was considering closing down their facility as they only raise a fraction of the aid they needed.⁴⁹³ In the spring of 2015, North Korea was stating they expected to have the worst drought in 100 years.⁴⁹⁴ In April, the United Nations called for \$111 million to fund crucial humanitarian needs this year in North Korea, which it said remains drastically

⁴⁹² Manyin and Nikitin, *Foreign Assistance to North*, 17.

⁴⁹³ "North Korea's donor fatigue," North Korean Economy Watch, accessed November 29, 2015, <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2014/09/25/north-koreas-donor-fatigue/>.

⁴⁹⁴ Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, "North Korea's donor fatigue," North Korean Economy Watch, accessed November 29, 2015, <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/statistics/agriculture-statistics/>.

under-funded.⁴⁹⁵ The UN's emergency response fund (CERF) was only able to allocated \$6.3 million to counter the impacts of the drought.⁴⁹⁶ By July 2015, the DPRK was stating that this year's harvest had actually increased despite adverse weather conditions, due to implemented agricultural reforms.⁴⁹⁷ The dilemma remains does the world continue to send aid to support those suffering the most and help prop up the regime or stop the aid and hope that the North Korean government increases funding to import food for the people?

⁴⁹⁵ James Pearson and Jack Kim, "North Korea says hit by worst drought in 100 years Read more at Reuters<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/17/us-northkorea-drought-idUSKBN0OW1E920150617#98KveZxvFXD8vvAo.99>," Reuters, last modified June 17, 2015, accessed November 29, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/17/us-northkorea-drought-idUSKBN0OW1E920150617#R8LygRHKIM5vhY7u.97>.

⁴⁹⁶ Silberstein, "North Korean food shortage," North Korean Economy Watch.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid

Conclusion

From the inception of the Songbun class division to the military first policy North Korea's political system produced a governmental facilitation arena for human rights abuses. Kim Il-sung took the Yangban class system from the Chosŏn Dynasty era and flipped it on its head to create the Songbun class system. Raising up the peasants and casting down the privileged to create a new order. Kim Il-sung and his guerrilla soldier followers made up the upper classes, and purged anyone who represented or promoted political ideal that was different from the world they wished to create. Class status became hereditary with little chance of changing the classification received at birth, cementing the upper class and their descendents firmly into positions of power and control over the country.

The Juch'e principles "Chaju" domestic and foreign independence policy, "Charip" economic independence policy and "Chawi" military independence policy grew out of the historical experiences of foreign dominance and would become an essential component of North Korea's political system. With Juch'e, Kim Il-sung set about creating a policy that in theoretically gives back some semblance of self to the country. For almost forty years, foreign governments controlled Korea, the desire for independence and self-governance was strong. To achieve this he believed the people needed unify to achieve an economically stable infrastructure and have military strength to achieve independence.

North Korea has never achieved economic independence, after the division they relied on the Soviet Union for aid and when its aid stopped North Korea turned to China. China has since provided substantial amounts of food, resources, and finances.

Nevertheless, even China's aid could not make up for the inadequate policies that would lead to North Korea's economic and food crisis. The DPRK asked the international community for agricultural food aid for the past twenty years. Yet they are still able to afford their luxury items and military expenses because of the weapons sales and illegal activities. Their need for military independence comes from their fear and weakness felt during the Korean War. Their obsessive need for military strength and independence, came from the sacrifice of their economic independence. The country chose to put all their resources into the military first policy, at the expense of their infrastructure, agriculture, and people.

The original policies have moved far beyond the ideals for which they were intended. Kim Il-sung as well as Kim Jong-Il have used these policies to create a state ruled by one party that is controlled by one person, who is in charge of a government that is not content on just ruling over a country of people. They have set up a political system that controls every aspect of its citizens' lives. Every violation listed by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry is possible because of those policies and laws that are in place. From birth to death, the system dictates the where, when and why of everyday life. If a citizen questions or criticizes the system, they have committed a political crime, which results in hard labor for life at a prison camp.

Another measure of control used by the government is food distribution system that made the citizens dependant on the government for their food. The food shortages are a direct result of implementing unsound agricultural techniques areas terrain resulting in poor crop yields. When combined with environmental disasters the DPRK could not provide the food needed to its entire population. During the famine women

found the level of violence directed at them increased, in an already extreme patriarchal society that did not enforce the laws currently in place to protect the women. The policies set forth by the Workers Party of Korea, obstruct the personal freedoms of the people. The state uses surveillance, fear, and punishment to prevent all forms of expression that may lead to rebellion. Those who receive permission to travel abroad are monitored to make sure they do not bring influences from foreign countries into North Korea that would threaten the security of the regime. If anyone is caught watching or listening to foreign media, they are punished by being sent to the prison camps. If a North Korean escapes and is caught in China they are repatriated back to North Korea and sent to the prison camps. All of these violations are actions that many people around the world take for granted.

The international governments have failed to restrain North Korea on many issues. North Korean escapees receive little humanitarian protection or support from the international community. China has not been held accountable for their role in committing human rights violations in regards to their repatriating North Korean escapees caught in China. Nor have many international countries honored the sanctions put in place by the United Nations, even if the sanctions enacted in response to North Korea's nuclear program. Currently North Korea's nuclear program overshadows human rights abuses during international negotiations. The six countries talks focus on preventing threats of war and not human rights abuses.

Since Kim Jong-un's succession, there were predictions that he would be the one to reform North Korea. To date there have not been any visible positive changes to North Korea's policies, yet there have been several international altercations since he

became the ruler of North Korea. Escapees have testified that Kim Jong-un has reinstated harsher measures toward political crimes. Information has been made available that states Kim Jong-un plans to focus on the economy in conjunction with military first policy. This is a tight rope for the regime to balance, they have to keep the military happy to prevent a coup, but it is apparent that the country needs to make changes to remain stable. Food aid was helping, but with donor fatigue causing the contributions to decrease every year, North Korea cannot count on the international community to continue to support their agricultural needs. Kim Jong-un would have to allocate resources to improve the croplands and be open to receiving agricultural and crop technology from other countries, instead of continually relying on disguised handouts. This may require the government to break from its closed society policy and allow the outside world to come in.

The international community's have a responsibility to end the human rights abuses in North Korea. There are several possible options available to deal with the human rights issues in North Korea. One is to have all the treaty nations come together to act in unison to implement the same sanctions on luxury goods, and adhering to those sanctions across the board, until human rights reforms are enacted and enforced. The international community should act together to put pressure on the Chinese Government to fulfill its obligations to protect the North Korean escapees by declaring them refugees and respect the right of North Koreans to seek and enjoy asylum. The international countries should also pressure China to use its influence to do more in persuading North Korea to turn some of its focus on reforming current policies that permit the human rights abuses. North Korea is not going to give up the biggest

bargaining chip they have any time soon. The nuclear program makes them feel safe but more importantly gives them a sense of power, especially negotiating power. The International community should not give up on trying to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear program, but pressuring them to end their human rights abuses should be on the agenda during negotiating talks.

The solution to North Korea's nuclear program and their human rights violations are not easy solutions. Rarely do the all the treaty nations agree to act in unison. China has veto power in the United Nations and is becoming an international powerful nation of its own right, so would not give in to pressure easily. The chance that North Korea would reform on its own is highly unlikely. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, the Kim dynasty is in its third generation of dynasty rule and the first generation to hold absolute power. Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have proven to be just as ruthless as the Kim Il-sung. The best case scenario would be if the North Korean government chose to make reforms to improve the lives of their citizens and become a functioning member of the international community. This is unlikely in the near future. The second best scenario would include the North Korean government to collapse and the international world, more pointedly South Korea, stepped in to govern. China is not likely to allow that to happen. That leaves war, which no one wants and North Korea is willing to exploit that fear. It will be interesting to see how the country survives the next few years.

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